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LECTURES 


SYSTEMATIC    THEOLOGY, 


EMBRACINO 


LECTURES  ON  MORAL  GOVERNMENT, 


TOGETHER  WITH 


ATONEMENT,  OTORAE  AND  PHYSICAE  DEPRAVITT, 

REGENERATION,  PHIEOSOPHICAE  THEORIES,  AND  EVI. 

DENCES  OF  REGENERATION. 


BY 


REV.  CHARLES  G.  FINNEY, 

a 
Professor  of  Theology  in  the  Oberlin  Collegiate  Institute. 


OBERLIN :  JAMES  M.  FITCH. 
BOSTON:    CROCKER    &    BREWSTER 
NEW  YORK :  SAXTON  &  MILES. 

1846. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1846, 

By  Charles  G.  Finney, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  for  the  District  of  Ohio. 


J^i*/^^ 


OBERLIN  PRESS : 

JAMES    U,     riTCH,     PKriTTKR. 


PREFACE 


1.  The  truths  of  the  blessed  gospel  have  been  hidden  un- 
der a  false  Philosophy.  Of  this  I  have  been  long  convinced. 
Nearly  all  the  practical  doctrines  of  Christianity  have  been 
embarrassed  and  perverted  by  assuming  as  true  the  dogma  of 
a  Necessitated  Will.)  This  has  been  a  leaven  of  error  that,  as 
we  shall  see,  has  "  leavened  nearly  the  whole  lump ''  of  gospel 
truth.  In  the  present  work  I  have  in  brief  attempted  to  prove, 
and  have  every  where  assumed  tho;^ freedom  of  the  Will.  } 

2.  My  principal  design  in  pubhshing  on  Systematic  The- 
ology at  the  present  time  is,  to  furnish  my  pupils  with  a  class 
or  text  book,  where  many  points  and  questions  are  discussed 
of  great  practical  importance,  but  which  have  not,  to  my 
knowledge,  been  discussed  in  any  system  of  theological  in- 
struction extant.  I  have  also  hoped  to  benefit  other  studious 
and  pious  minds. 

3.  I  have  written  for  those  who  are  wilUng  to  take  the  trouble 
of  thinking  and  of  forming  opinions  of  their  own  on  theologi- 
cal questions.  It  has  been  no  part  of  my  aim  to  spare  my 
pupils  or  any  one  else  the  trouble  of  intense  thought.  Had 
I  desired  to  do  so,  the  subjects  discussed  would  have  rendered 
such  an  attempt  abortive. 

4.  There  are  many  questions  of  great  practical  importance, 
and  questions  in  which  multitudes  are  taking  a  deep  interest 
at  present,  that  can  not  be  intelligently  settled  without  insti- 


IT  PREFACE. 

tuting  fundamental  inquiries  involving  the  discussion  of  those 
questions  that  lie  at  the  foundation  of  morality  and  religion. 

5.  I  am  too  well  acquainted  with  the  prejudices  of  the  great 
mass  of  professing  Christians,  and  with  their  unwillingness 
to  be  at  the  pains  of  studying  elementary  truths  and  of  judg- 
ing for  themselves,  to  expect  that  this  book  will  soon  find  fa- 
vor with  the  majority  of  them.  Still  I  am  aware  that  a  spirit 
of  inquiry  into  the  fundamental  and  elementary  truths  of  re- 
ligion and  of  all  science,  is  abroad,  and  is  waking  up  more 
and  more  in  the  Church.  There  is  a  deep  and  growing  de- 
mand for  explanation  in  regard  to  the  subjects  discussed  in 
this  work.  Especially  is  this  true  of  ministers  and  of  lead- 
ing laymen  and  women.  This  book  is  a  humble  attempt  to 
meet  this  demand.  My  object  has  been  to  simplify  and  ex- 
plain.    The  book  has  no  literary  merit  and  claims  none. 

6.  I  fear  that  the  book  will  not  be  understood  even  by  some 
who  are  willing  to  read  and  are  desirous  of  understanding  it. 
The  reasons  are, 

(1.)  The  book  is  Mghly  metaphysical.  This,  however,  is 
owing  to  the  nature  of  the  subject.  The  subject  is,  mind  in 
its  relations  to  moral  law.  Hence,  the  discussion,  to  be  any 
thing  to  the  purpose,  must  be  metaphysical.  To  avoid  meta- 
physics in  such  a  discussion  were  to  waive  my  subject^  and  to 

write  about  something  else. 
/J  . 

(2.)  There  is  a  good  deal  of  repetition  in  the  work.     This 

I  judged  to  be  indispensable  to  perspicuity.  Perhaps  the 
reader  will  not  agree  with  me  in  this,  and  may  think  he  should 
have  understood  me  just  as  well  if  I  had  repeated  less.  But 
my  experience  upon  this  subject  after  having  taught  these 
truths  for  years  has  ripened  the  conviction  that  there  is  no 
y  other  way  of  being  understood  upon  such  a  subject. 
/ — "^O  I  fear  that  with  all  my  painstaking  the  book  will  not  be 
understood  even  by  many  who  desire  to  understand  it,  on  ac- 
count of  my  inabiUty  to  simplify  and  explain  so  profound  a 
subject.  With  this  thought  I  have  been  much  oppressed. 
(4.)  Notwithstanding  the  repetition  alluded  to,  I  fear  it  is 


P  REF  ACE.  V 

condensed  too  much  to  be  understood  by  some.     The  book  to 
be  understood  must  be  studied  and  not  merely  read. 

7.  This  volume  is  much  more  difficult  to  understand  than 
any  of  the  remaining  volumes  will  be.  I  have  begun  with 
the  second  volume,  as  this  was  to  be  on  subjects  so  distinct 
from  what  will  appear  in  the  first  volume  that  this  volume 
might  as  well  appear  first,  and  because  it  seemed  especially 
called  for  just  now,  to  meet  a  demand  of  the  Church  and  of 
my  classes. 

8.  Most  of  the  subjects  of  dispute  among  Christians  at  the 
present  day  are  founded  in  misconceptions  upon  the  subjects 
discussed  in  this  volume.  If  I  have  succeeded  in  settling  the 
questions  which  I  have  discussed,  we  shall  see  that  in  future 
volumes  most  of  the  subjects  of  disagreement  among  Christ- 
ians at  the  present  day  can  be  satisfactorily  adjusted  with 
comparative  ease. 

9.  What  I  have  said  on  the  "  Foundation  of  Moral  Obli- 
gation" is  the  key  to  the  whole  subject.  Whoever  masters' 
and  understands  that  can  readily  understand  all  the  rest. 
But  he  who  will  not  possess  himself  of  my  meaning  upon 
this  subject  will  not,  can  not  understand  the  rest. 

10.  Let  no  one  despair  in  commencing  the  book,  nor  stumble 
at  the  definitions,  thinking  that  he  can  never  understand  so 
abstruse  a  subject.  Remember  that  what  follows  is  an  expan- 
sion and  an  explanation  by.  way  of  appHcation  of  what  you 
find  so  condensed  in  the  first  pages  of  the  book.  My  broth- 
er, sister,  friend — read,  study,  think,  and  read  again.  You 
were  made  to  think.'  It  will  do  you  good  to  think;  to  develop 
fovLT  powers'^  study.  God  designed  that  religion  should  ( 
require  thought,  intense  thought,  and  should  thoroughly  de- 
velop our  powers  of  thought.     The  Bible  itself  is  written  in 

a  style  so  condensed  as  to  require  much  intense  study.  Many 
know  nothing  of  the  Bible  or  of  reUgion  because  they  will 
not  think  and  study.  I  do  not  pretend  to  so  explain  theology- 
as  to  dispense  with  the  labor  of  thinking.  I  have  no  ability 
and  no  wish  to  do  so. 


VI  PREFACE. 

11.  I  suppose  that  faults  will  be  discovered  in  the  book  hy 
others  that  I  have  not  seen  myself.  If  so,  I  hope  to  be  able 
to  see  them  and  to  correct  them  before  I  die. 

12.  But  I  hope  if  any  of  my  brethren  think  to  convince 
me  of  error  that  they  will  first  understand  me,  and  show  that 
they  have  read  the  book  through^  and  that  they  understand  it,  and 
are  candidly  inquiring  after  truth  and  not  '^  striving  for  mas- 
teries." If  my  brother  is  inquiring  after  truth,  I  will,  by  the 
grace  of  God,  •'  hear  with  both  ears  and  then  judge."  But  I 
will  not  promise  to  attend  to  all  that  cavilers  may  say,  nor  to 
notice  what  those  impertinent  talkers  and  writers  may  say  or 
write  who  must  have  controversy.  But  to  all  honest  inquirers 
after  truth  I  would  say,  hail  my  brother!  Let  us  be  thorough. 
Truth  shall  do  us  good. 

13.  This  volume  is  designed  to  supercede  my  published 
Skeletons  upon  the  subject  of  Moral  Government.  There  has 
been  much  demand  for  an  amplification  of  this  subject.  I 
have  for  brevity's  sake,  in  some  few  instances,  quoted  from 
my  Skeletons,  but  in  general  I  have  written  altogether  with- 
out reference  to  that  work,  until  I  come  to  the  Atonement  and 
Human  Government.  I  should  have  expanded  these  subjects 
much  more  than  I  have,  had  there  been  room  in  this  volume 
for  such  an  amplification.  Upon  these  questions  I  have  trans- 
ferred most  of  what  was  written  in  my  Skeletons  to  the  pres- 
ent volume,  making  such  changes  in  the  arrangement  and 
discussion  as  I  supposed  would  render  so  brief  a  statement 
perspicuous. 

14.  I  perceive  that  the  Publisher  has  put  forth  a  prospectus 
of  this  work  in  which  he  has  spoken  of  it  in  terms,  I  fear, 
decidedly  too  high.  I  knew  nothing  of  this  until  some  time 
after  the  prospectus  was  out.  All  I  can  honestly  say  of  the 
work  is,  that  I  have  intended  to  do  good,  and  have  done  the 
best  that  I  could  under  the  circumstances.  I  submit  the  work 
to  the  prayerful  study  of  my  Christian  brethren,  and  if  it 
shall  meet  the  end  for  which  it  was  intended,  I  have  not 
labored  in  vain. 

C.  G.  FINNEY. 
Oberlin,  July  15,  18i6. 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE  I. 


Moral  Government.  Pack 

Definition  of  the  the  term  Law, 1 

Distinction  between  Physical  and  Moral  Law,  -     -     -    -  1 

The  essential  Attributes  of  Moral  Law, 2 

Liberty  as  opposed  to  Necessity,     ----^---2 

Adaptability,  or  Adaptation, 2 

Universality, 3 

Uniformity, 3 

Impartiality, 3 

Justice, 3 

Practicability, 4 

Independence,    -     -    --- 4 

Immutability, 5 

Unity, 12 

Equity, 12 

Expediency, 13 

Exclusiveness, 14 

Utility, -    -    -    -       15 

LECTURE  11. 

Moral  Government, — Continued. 

Definition  of  the  term  Government    -  ^     .    -     -     -  16 

Distinction  between  moral  and  physical  government,  16 

The  fundamental  reason  of  Moral  Government,    -     -  17 

Whose  right  it  is  to  govern,' 19 

What  is  implied  in  the  right  to  govern, 21 

Point  out  the  limits  of  this  right, 22 

What  is  implied  in  Moral  Government, 25 

Definition  of  Moral  Obligation, 25 

The  conditions  of  Moral  Obligation, 25 

Remarks,  -    -    - 27 


VUl  CONTENTS, 


LECTURE  III. 

Page 
Moral  government, — Continued. 

Man  a  subject  of  Moral  Obligation,     --.._-     29 

Extent  of  Moral  Obligation, 30 

Shown  by  an  appeal  to  reason,  or  to  natural  theology,  to 
what  acts  and  states  of  mind  moral  obligation  cannot 

directly  extend, 35 

Shown  to  what  acts  and  states  of  mind  Moral  Obliga- 
tion must  directly  extend,    36 

To  what  acts  and  mental  states  Moral  Obligation  indi- 
rectly extends, ,_,     .-38 

LECTURE  IV. 

'     Ij^NDATIONOF  MoRAL  OBLIGATION. 

/^Definition  of  Moral  Obligation  repeated,     -     -     -     -     40 

Attention  called  again  to  the  conditions  of  Moral  Obhga- 
tion, 40 

What  is  intended  by  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,   41 

The  extent  of  moral  obligation, 41 

Points  of  agreement  among  the  principal  parties  in  this 
discussion, 41 

Wherein  parties  differ, 42 

Shown  from  reason  and  revelation  what  must  be  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obUgation,    --- 43 

Shown  wherein  that  consists  which  constitutes  the  true 
foundation  of  moral  obligation;  in  other  words,  in 
what  the  highest  well-being  or  ultimate  good  of  senti- 
ent beings  consists, 44 

The  ultimate  and  absolute  good  must  belong  to  being,  or 
to  sentient   existences, 45 

With  moral  agents  at  least  the  ultimate  good  must  con- 
sist in  a  state  of  mind, 45 

The  ultimate  and  absolute  good  in  the  sense  of  the  in- 
trinsically valuable,  can  not  be  identical  with  Moral 
Law, 45 

Obedience,  or  the  course  of  acting  or  wilHng  required  by 
the  law,  cannot  be  the  ultimate  end  aimed  at  by  the 
law  or  the  lawgiver,     ---*--     ----4G 

The  absolute  and  ultimate  good  of  being  can  not  consist 
in  moral  worth  or  good  desert, 47 

Right  Character,  moral  woith,  good  desert,  meritorious- 


CONTENTS.  1* 

Page 
ness,  or  whatever  you  call  it,  can  not  be  or  consist  in  a 
state  of  mind, 49 

The  ultimate  or  absolute  good  can  not  consist  in  any 
thing  external  to  mind  itself, 49 

Objections  to  this  philosophy  considered,    -    -    -    -      58 

LECTURE   V. 

^Foundation  of  moral  obligation, — False  theories. 

That  the  sovereign  will  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  mor- 
al Obligation, 67 

The  theory  of  Paley, 70 

The  utilitarian  philosophy, 72 

LECTURE   VI. 

Foundation  of  moral  obligation, — False  theories. 
The  theory  that  regards  right  as  the  foundation  of  moral 
obligation, 76 

LECTURE   VII. 

Foundation  of  moral  obligation, — False  theories. 
The  theory  that  the  goodness  or  moral  excellence  of  God 
is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation, 90 

LECTURE  VIII. 

Foundation  of  moral  obligation, — False  theories. 

The  Philosophy  which  teaches  that  moral  order  is  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation, 110 

The  theory  that  maintains  that  the  nature  and  relations 
of  moral  beings  is  the  true  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation,     J- Ill 

The  theory  that  teaches  that  moral  obligation  is  found- 
ed in  the  idea  of  duty, Ill 

That  philosophy  which  teaches  the  complexity  of  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation, 115 

Another  form  of  the  theory  that  affirms  the  complexity 
of  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation;  complex,  how- 
ever, only  in  a  certain  sense, 118 


X  CONTENTS. 

LECTURE  IX. 

Page 
Foundation  of  moral  obligation. — Practical  bearings 
OF  the  different  theories. 
The  theory  that  regards   the  sovereign  will  of  God  as 

the  foundation  of  moral  obligation, 127 

The  theory  of  the  selfish  school, 132 

The  natural  and  necessary  results  of  utilitarianism,  -      135 

LECTURE  X. 

Foundation  of  moral  obligation. — Practical  bearings 

OF  THE  different  THEORIES, CONTINUED. 

Practical  bearings  and  tendency  of  Rightarianism,  -    -    139 

The  philosophy  which  teaches  that  the  divine  goodness 
or  moral  excellence  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation,      143 

The  theory  which  teaches  that  moral  order  is  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obligation, 144 

The  practical  bearings  of  the  theory  that  moral  obliga- 
tion is  founded  in  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral 
agents, 145 

The  theory  which  teaches  that  the  idea  of  duty  is  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation, 146 

The  complexity  of  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,   146 

The  practical  bearings  of  what  is  regarded  as  the  true 
theory  of  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  namely 
that  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
verse is  the  sole  foundation  of  moral  obligation,     -     148 

LECTURE  XI. 

Moral  government, — Continued. 

What  constitutes  obedience  to  moral  law,     -     -     -     150 
Obedience  cannot  be  partial  in  the  sense  that  the  sub- 
ject ever  does  or  can  partly  obey  and  partly  disobey 

at  the   same  time,    ---- 150 

Can  the  will  at  the  same  time  make  opposite  choices?    150 
The  choice  of  an  ultimate  end  is,  and  must  be,  the  su- 
preme  preference  of  the  mind,     --,---     151 
An  intelligent  choice  must  respect  ends  or  means,  -     -  151 
ffo  choice  whatever  can  be  made  inconsistent  with  the 


CONTENTS.  » 

Page 

present  choice  of  an  ultimate  end, 151 

Inquiry  respecting  the  strength  or  intensity  of  the 
choice, 152 

The  law  does  not  require  the  constant  and  most  intense 
action  of  the  will, 155 

An  intention  cannot  be  right  and  honest  in  kind  and 
deficient  in  the  degree  of  intensity, 155 

Examination  of  the  philosophy  of  the  question  whether 
sin  and  holiness  consist  in  supreme  ultimate  and  op- 
posite choices  or  intentions,    158 

Objections  to  the  foregoing  philosophy  considered,  -      167 

This  philosophy  examined  in  the  light  of  the  Scriptures,  171 

LECTURE  XII. 

Moral  Government — Continued. 

In  what  sense  we  have  seen  that  obedience  to  moral 

law  cannot  be  partial, 174 

In  what  sense  obedience  to  moral  law  can  be  partial,    175 
The  government  of  God  accepts  nothing  as  virtue  but 

obedience  to  the  law  of  God, 175 

There  can  be  no  rule  of  duty  but  moral  law,   -    -     -      176 
Nothing  can  be  virtue  or  true  religion  but  obedience  to 

the  moral  law, 177 

Nothing  can  be  virtue  that  is  not  just  what  the  moral  law 
demands.     That  is,  nothing  short  of  what  it  requires 

can  be  in  any  sense  virtue, 178 

Uses  of  the  term  Justification, 178 

Fundamentally  important  inquiries  respecting  this  sub- 
ject,     179 

Remarks, 187 

LECTURE   XIII. 

Moral  Government — Continued. 

What  constitutes  obedience  to  moral  law,    -    -    -    -    188 

Just  rules  of  legal  interpretation, 189 

That  actual  knowledge  is  indispensable. to  moral  obliga- 
tion shown  from  scripture, 191 

In  the  light  of  the  above  rules  inquire  what  is  not  implied 
in  entire  obedience  to  the  law  of  God, 192 


XU  CONTENTS 


LECTURE   XIV. 

Moral  Government — Continued.  Page 

Call  attention  to  certain  facts  in  mental  philosophy  as 

they  are  revealed  in  consciousness, 209 

Point  out  the  attributes  of  that  love  which  constitutes 

obedience  to  the  law  of  God, 213 

Voluntariness, 213 

Liberty, 214 

Intelligence, 214 

Virtuousness, 214 

Disinterestedness, 215 

Impartiality, 216 

UniversaHty, 218 

LECTURE    XV. 

Attributes  OF  Love. 

Efficiency, 220 

Penitence, 221 

Faith, 223 

Complacency, --.._.  224 

LECTURE    XVI. 

Attributes  of  Love — Continued. 

Opposition, - 229 

Compassion, 233 

LECTURE  XVII. 

Attributes  of  Love — Continued. 

Mercy, 237 

Justice, 239 

Truth  or  truthfulness, -     244 

LECTURE  XVIII. 

Attributes  of  Love — Continued. 

Patience, 248 

Meekness, 252 

Long-suffering, 253 

Humility, 254 


CONTENTS.  Xiii 

LECTURE  XIX. 

Page 
Attributes  of  liOVE — Continued. 

Self-denial, 256 

Condescension, 260 

Candor, 261 

Stability, 262 

Kindness, 263 

#    Severity, 265 

LECTURE  XX.      . 

Attributes  of  Love — Continued. 

Holiness,  or  Purity, 269 

Modesty, 271 

Sobriety,      -     -    - 272 

Sincerity, 273 

Zeal, 275 

Unity,  - 286 

Simplicity, -    -  277 

LECTURE  XXL 

Attributes  of  Love — Continued. 

Gratitude, -    278 

Wisdom, 279 

Economy, 281 

LECTURE  XXII. 

Moral  Government. 

Revert  to  some  points  that  have  been  settled,  -  -  -  284 
Show  what  disobedience  to  moral  law  can  not  consist  in,  285 
What  disobedience  to  moral  law  must  consist  in,    -    -  286 

LECTURE  XXIII. 

Moral  Government. 

What  constitutes  disobedience, -     292 

What  is  not  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  law  of  God,  292 


XIT  CONTENTS, 

LECTURE  XXIV. 

Attributes  of  Selfishness. 

What  constitutes  disobedience  to  moral  law,     -     -    -  298 

What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  moral  law,    -     -  298 

Attributes  of  selfishness.  Voluntariness, 300 

Liberty, 301 

Intelligence, 301 

Unreasonableness,     --- 301 

Interestedness, 302 

Partiahty, 303 

Impenitence, 306 

Unbelief, 306 

LECTURE  XXV. 

Attributes  of  Selfishness — Continued. 

Efficiency, 308 

Opposition  to  benevolence  or  to  virtue, 311 

Cruelty,    -    -     - 313 

Unreasonableness, 315 

Injustice, --    316 

LECTURE  XXVI. 

Attributes  of  Selfishness — Continued. 

Oppression, 319 

War,  - 321 

Unmercifulness, 324 

Falsehood  or  lying, 325 

Pride, 326 

LECTURE  XXVII. 

Attributes  of  Selfishness — Continued. 

Enmity,    ------ 329 

Madness, 330 

Impatience, 331 

Intemperance, -  333 

Recklessness, 336 

Unity, 337 


CONTENTS.  XV 

LECTURE  XXVIII. 

Page 
Attributes  of  Selfishness — Continued. 

Egotism, 340 

Simplicity, 342 

Total  Moral  Depravity  implied  in  sellishness  as  one   of 

its  attributes,  ----« 343 

The  scriptures  assume  and  affirm  it, 349 

Remarks, 357 

LECTURE  XXIX. 

Moral  Government. 

Obedience  to  Moral  Law  is  and  must  be,  under  every 
dispensation  of  the  Divine  Government  the  unaltera- 
ble condition  of  Salvation, 364 

Under  a  gracious  dispensation,  a  return  to  full  obedience 
to  Moral  Law  is  not  dispensed  with  as  a  condition  of 
salvation,  but  this  obedience  is  secured  by  the  indwell- 
ing spirit  of  Christ  received  by  faith  to  reign  in  the 
heart, 365 

LECTURE  XXX. 

Moral  Government. 

What  constitutes  the  sanctions  of  law, 371 

There  can  be  no  law  without  sanctions, 371 

In  what  light  sanctions  are  to  be  regarded,   -     -     -     -  372 
The  end  to  be  secured  by  law,  and  the  execution  of  pe- 
nal sanctions, 372 

By  what  rule  sanctions  ought  to  be  graduated,   -     -    -  373 

God's  law  has  sanctions, 373 

What  constitutes  the  remuneratory  sanctions  of  the  law 

of  God, 374 

The  perfection  and  duration  of  the  remuneratory  sanc- 
tions of  the  law  of  God, 374 

What  constitutes  the  vindicatory  sanctions  of  the  law 

of  God, 374 

Duration  of  the  penal  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God,     -  374 
Inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  term  Infinite,  -     -     -     375 
Infinites  may  differ  indefinitely  in  amount,     -     -     -     -  375 
I  must  remind  you  of  the  rule  by  which  degrees  of 
guilt  are  to  be  estimated, 376 


Ifl  CONTENTS. 

Page 

That  all  and  every  sin  must  from  its  verv  nature  involve 
infinite  guill  in  the  sense  of  deserving  endless  punish- 
ment,      376 

Notwithstanding  all  sin  deserves  endless  punishment, 
yet  the  guilt  of  different  persons  may  vary  indefinite- . 
ly,  and  punishment,  although  always  endless  in  dura- 
tion, may  and  ought  to  vary  in  degree  according  to  the 
guilt   of  each   individual, 377 

That  penal  inflictions  under  the  government  of  God  must 
be   endless, 377 

Examine  this  question  in  the  light  of  Revelation,     -     382 

LECTURE  XXXI. 

Atonement. 

I  will  call  attention  to  several  well  established  govern- 
mental principles, 384 

Define  the  term  Atonement,     --------     33g 

I  am  to  inquire  into  the  teachings  of  natural  theology,  or 
into   the  a  priori  affirmations  of  reason  upon   this 

subject, 388 

The  fact  of  Atonement, 393 

The  design  of  the  Atonement, 398 

Christ's  obedience  to  the  moral   law   as  a  covenant  of 

works,  did  not  constitute  the  Atonement,  -  -  -  398 
The  atonement  was  not  a  commercial  transaction,  -  398 
The  atonement  of  Christ  was  intended  as  a  satisfaction 

of  public  justice, 399 

His  taking  human  nature,  and  obeying  unto  death,  under 
such  circumstances,  constituted  a  good  reason  for  our 
being  treated  as  righteous, -    -    -  405 

LECTURE  XXXII. 

Extent  of  Atonement. 

For  whose  benefit  the  Atonement  was  intended,     -    411 

Objections  answered,    --. 416 

Remarks  on  the  Atonement, 420 

LECTURE  XXXIII. 
Human  Government. 

The  ultimate  end  of  God  in  creation, 424 

Providential  and  Moral  Governments  are  indispensa- 
ble means  of  securing  the  highest  good  of  the  uni- 


CONTENTS.  XYU 

Page 

verse, 424 

Civil  and  family  governments  are  indispensabe  to  the 
securing  of  this  end,  and  are  therefore  really  a  part 
of  the  Providential  and  moral  government  of  God,     425 

Human  Governments  are  a  necessity  of  human  nature,  425 

This  necessity  will  continue  as  long  as  human  beings 
exist  in  this  w^orld, 426 

Human  Governments  are  plainly  recognized  in  the  Bi- 
ble as  a  part  of  the  moral  government  of  God,     -     -  426 

It  is  the  duty  of  all  men  to  aid  in  the  establishment  and 
support  of  Human  Government, 427 

It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  human  governments  can  ever 
be  dispensed  with  in  the  present  world,     -    -    -    -428 

Objections  answered, 428 

Inquire  into  the  foundation  of  the  right  of  human  govern- 
ments,     434 

Point  out  the  limits  or  boundary  of  this  right,      -    434 

LECTURE  XXXIV. 

Human  Governments — Continued. 

The  reasons  why  God  has  made  no  form  of  Church  or 
Civil  Government  universally  obligatory,      -     -     -     436 

The  particular  forms  of  Church  and  State  Government, 
must  and  will  depend  upon  the  virtue  and  intelligence 
of  the  people, 437     j 

That  form  of  Government  is  obligatory,  that  is  best  suit-        ^^^1 
ed  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  people,-    -    -    -  438 

Revolutions  become  necessary  and  obligatory,  when  the         , 
virtue  and  inteUigence  or  the  vice  and  ignorance  of        /  ^ 
the  people  demand  them, 439 

In  what  cases  human  legislation  is  valid,  and  in  what 
cases  it  is  null  and  void,     - 440 

In  what  cases  we  are  bound  to  disobey  human  govern-        ^    ] 
ments, 440    J 

Apply  the  foregoing  principles  to  the  rights  and  duties 
of  governments  and  subjects  in  relation  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  necessary  penalties  of  law,     -     -    -     -    440 

LECTURE  XXXV. 

Moral  Depravity. 
Definition  of  the  terna  Depravity, 447 


XVlU  CONTENTS. 

Page 
Point  out  the  distinction  between  physical  and  moral  de- 
pravity,      -    -• 447 

Of  what  physical  depravity  can  be  predicated,    -     -      448 
Of  what  moral  depravity  can  be  predicated,     -     -     *   449 
Mankind  are  both  physically  and  morally  depraved,     450 
Subsequent  to  the  commencement  of  moral  agency  and 
previous  to  regeneration  the  moral  depravity  of  man- 
kind is  universal,     * 451 

The  morai  depravity  of  the  unregenerate  moral  agents 
of  our  race,  is  total,    --- 453 

LECTURE  XXXVI. 

Moral  Depravity — Continued. 

Proper  method  of  accounting  for  the  universal  and  total 
moral  depravity  of  the  unregenerate  moral  agents  of 
our  race,    ---- 456 

Moral  depravity  consists  in  selfishness,  or  in  the  choice 
of  self-interest,  self-gratification,  or  self-indulgence,  as 
an  end, -" 456 

Dr.  Wood's  view  of  Physical  and  Moral  Depravity  ex- 
amined,  45T 

Standards  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  examined,    -     -  461 

LECTURE  XXXVII. 

]\f ORAL  DEPRAVITY CONTINUED. 

Further  examination  of  the  arguments  adduced  in  sup- 
port of  the  position  that  human  nature  is  in  itself  sinful,  468 

LECTURE  XXXVIII. 

Moral  Depravity — Continued. 

The  proper  method  of  accounting  for  moral  depravity,  478 

Prest.  Edwards  views  examined, 482 

Summary  of  the  truth  on  this   subject, 484 

Remarks, 485 

LECTURE  XXXIX. 

Regeneration. 
The  common  distinction  between  Regeneration  and  Con- 
version,  --    490 

I  am  to  state  the  assigned  reasons  for  this  distinction,     491 


CONTENTS.  XIX 

Page 

I  am  to  state  the  objections  to  this  distinction,   -    -    -  491 

What  regeneration  is  not, 494 

What  regeneration   is, 494 

The  universal  necessity  of  regeneration,     -     -     -    -  496 

Agencies  employed  in  regeneration, 496 

Instrumentalities  employed  in  the  work,     -     -     -     -  498 

In  regeneration  the  subject  is  both  passive  and  active,  499 

What  is  implied  in  regeneration, 500 

LECTURE  XL. 

Regeneration — Continued. 

Philosophical  theories  of  regeneration, 502 

The  different  theories  of  Regeneration  examined,    -     502 
Objections  to  the  Taste  Scheme,     -     -     -     -     .     -     -   511 

The  Susceptibility  Scheme, 513 

Theory  of  a  Divine  Moral  Suasion, 518 

Objections  to  this  theory, 518 

Remarks, 519 

LEtTURE  XLI. 

Regeneration — Continued.  * 

Evidences  of  Regeneration, 521 

Introductory  Remarks, 521 

Wherein  the  experience  and  outward  life  of  saints  and 

sinners  may  agree, 522 

Remarks, 531 

LECTURE  XLIl. 

Regeneration — Continued. 

Wherein   Saints   and  Sinners  or  Deceived  Professors 
must  differ, 536 

LECTURE  XLIII. 

Regeneration — Continued. 

In  what  Saints  and  Sinners  differ, 551 

What  is  it  to  overcome  the  world? 555 

Who  are  those  that  overcome  the  world? 558 

Why  do  believers  overcome  the  world? 558 

LECTURE  XLIV. 

Regeneration — Continued. 

Wherein  Saints  and  Sinners  differ, 571 


FINNEY'S  LECTURES 


ON 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT, 


LECTURE  I. 

I.  Definition  of  Law. 

IL  Distinction  between  Physical  and  Moral  Law. 

IIL  Attributes  of  Moral  Law. 

L  In  discussing  the  subject,  I  must  begin  with  defining  the 
term  Law. 

Law,  in  a  sense  of  the  term  both  sufficiently  popular  and 
scientific  for  my  purpose,  is  A  Rule  of  Action.  In  its 
generic  signification,  it  is  applicable  to  every  kind  of  action, 
whether  of  matter  or  of  mind — whether  intelligent  or  unin- 
telligent— whether  free  or  necessary  action. 

II.  I  must  distinguish  between  Physical  and  Moral  Law* 
Physical  law  is  a  term  that  represents  the  order  of  sequence, 

in  all  the  changes  that  occur  under  the  law  of  necessity, 
whether  in  matter  or  mind.  I  mean  all  changes,  whether  of 
state  or  action,  that  do  not  consist  in  the  voluntary  states  or 
actions  of  free  will.  Physical  law  is  the  law  of  force,  or  ne- 
cessity, as  opposed  to  the  law  of  liberty.  Physical  law  is  the 
law  of  the  material  universe.  It  is  also  the  law  of  mind,  so 
far  as  its  states  and  changes  are  involuntary.  All  changes  of 
mental  state  or  action,  which  do  not  consist  in  free  and  sov- 
ereign changes  or  actions  of  will,  must  occur  under,  and  be 
subject  to  Physical  Law.  They  cannot  possibly  be  accounted 
1 


3  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

for,  except  as  they  are  ascribed  to  the  law  of  necessity  or  force. 
In  one  word,  then.  Physical  Law  is  the  law  of  necessity  or 
force,  and  controls  all  changes  and  actions,  whether  of  matter 
or  mind,  except  the  actions  of  free  will. 

^  Moral  Law  is  a  rule  of  moral  action  with  sanctions.     It  is 

that  rule  of  action  to  which  moral  beings  are  under  a  moral 
obligation  to  conform  all  their  voluntary  actions,  and  is  en- 
forced by  sanctions  equal  to  the  value  of  the  precept.  It  is 
the  rule  for  the  government  of  free  and  intelligent  action,  as 
opposed  to  necessary  and  unintelligent  action.  It  is  the  law 
of  liberty^  as  opposed  to  the  law  of  necessity — of  motive  and 
free  choice,  as  opposed  to  force  of  every  kind  that  renders 

^  action  necessary,  or  unavoidable.  Moral  Law  is  a  rule  for 
the  direction  of  the  action  of  free  will,  and  strictly  of  free 
7oill  only.  But  less  strictly,  it  is  the  rule  for  the  direction  of 
the  actions  of  free  will,  and  of  all  those  actions  and  states  of 
mind  and  body,  that  are  connected  with  the  free  actions  of 
will  by  a  Physical  Law,  or  by  a  law  of  necessity.  Thus, 
Moral  Law  controls  involuntary  mental  states  and  outward 
action,  only  by  securing  conformity  of  the  actions  of  free 
y    will  to  its  precept. 

^         III.  I  must  point  out  the  essential  attributes  of  Moral  Law, 

1.  Subjectively.  It  is,  and  must  be,  an  idea  of  the  Reason, 
developed  in  the  mind  of  the  subject.  It  is  an  idea,  or  con- 
ception of  that  state  of  will,  or  course  of  action  which  is  oblig- 
atory upon  a  moral  agent.  No  one  can  be  a  moral  agent,  or 
the  subject  of  Moral  Law,  unless  he  has  this  idea  developed; 
for  this  idea  is  identical  with  the  law.  It  is  the  law  devel- 
oped, or  revealed  within  himself;  and  thus  he  becomes  "  a 
law  to  himself,"  his  own  reason  affirming  his  obligation  to 
conform  to  this  idea,  or  law. 

2.  A  second  attribute  is  Liberty^  as  opposed  to  JVecessity,  Its 
precept  must  lie  developed  in  the  Reason,  as  a  rule  of  duty — a 
law  of  moral  obligation — a  rule  of  choice,  or  of  ultimate  inten- 
tion, declaring  that  which  a  moral  agent  ought  to  choose,  will, 
intend.  But  it  does  not,  must  not,  can  not  possess  the  attri- 
bute of  necessity  in  its  relations  to  the  actions  of  free  will. 
It  must  not,  cannot,  possess  an  element  or  attribute  of  force, 
in  any  such  sense  as  to  render  conformity  of  will  to  its  precept 
unavoidable  and  necessary.  This  would  confound  it  with 
Physical  Law, 

3.  A  third  attribute  of  Moral  Law,  is  adaptability^  or  adapta- 
tion. It  must  be  the  Law  of  jYa^wre,  that  is,  its  precept  must  pro- 
scribe and  require  just  that  state  of  the  will,  and  that  course  of 


C/ 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  5$ 

action  which  is  demanded  by  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  beings,  and  nothing  more  or  less. 

Moral  Law,  subjectively  considered,  is  simply  an  idea  of  that 
state  of  the  voluntary  power,  that  is  befitting  to  moral  agents 
upon  condition  of  their  nature  and  relations.  Their  nature 
and  relations  being  perceived,  the  reason  hereupon  neces- 
sarily affirms  that  they  ought  to  will,  intend,  the  highest 
good  of  being  for  its  own  intrinsic  value.  This  is  what  is 
meant  by  the  law  of  nature.  It  is  a  law,  or  rule,  neces- 
sarily imposed  upon  us  by  our  own  nature.  It  is  nothing 
more  or  less  than  that  which  reason  spontaneously  and  ne- 
cessarily aflirms  to  he  Jit,  proper^  right,  in  view  of  our  nature 
and  relations,  and  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  highest  well  being 
of  God  and  the  universe.  Those  being  given,  this  is  affirmed 
to  be  duty.  It  is  an  idea  of  that  state  of  the  heart,  and  that 
course  of  life,  that  from  their  nature  and  relations,  is  indis- 
pensable to  the  highest  good  of  all.  By  Moral  Law  being  the 
Law  of  J\ature,  is  intended,  that  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents  being  what  they  are,  a  certain  course  of  willing 
and  acting  is  indispensable  to,  and  will  result  in  their  highest 
well  being;  that  their  highest  well  being  is  valuable  in  it- 
gelf,  and  should  be  willed  for  that  reason. 

4.  A  fourth  Attribute  of  Moral  Law  is  Universality.  The 
conditions  being  the  same,  it  requires,  and  must  require,  of 
all  moral  agents,  the  same  things,  in  whatever  world  they 
may  be  found. 

5.  A  fifth  attribute  of  Moral  Law,  is  Uniformity,  All  the 
conditions  and  circumstances  being  the  same,  its  claims  are 
uniformly  the  same.  This  follows  from  the  very  nature 
of  Moral  Law.  / 

6.  A  sixth  attribute  of  Moral  Law  is,  and  must  be,  Impartial- 
ity, Moral  Law  is  no  respecter  of  persons — knows  no  privi- 
leged classes.  It  demands  one  thing  of  all,  without  regard 
to  any  thing,  except  the  fact  that  they  are  moral  agents.  By 
this  it  is  not  intended,  that  the  same  course  of  outward  con- 
duct is  required  of  all — but  the  same  state  of  heart  in  all — 
that  all  shall  have  one  ultimate  intention — that  all  shall  con- 
secrate themselves  to  one  end — that  all  shall  entirely  con- 
form in  heart  and  life  to  their  nature  and  relations. 

7.  A  seventh  attribute  of  Moral  La#  is,  and  must  be,  Jus- 
tice.    That  which  is  unjust  cannot  be  Law. 

Justice,  as  an  attribute  of  Moral  Law,  must  respect  both  the 
precept  and  the  sanction.  J^istice,  as  an  attribute  of  the  pre- 
cept, consists  in  the  requisition  of  just  that,  and  no  more,  which 


4  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

is  in  exact  accordance  with  the  nature  and  relations  of  the 
subject. 
A~  Justice,  as  an  attribute  of  the  sanction,  consists  in  the 
j  promise  of  just  such  rewards  and  punishments  as  are  equal  to 
I  the  guilt  of  disobedience,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  value 
Lof  obedience  on  the  other. 

Sanctions  belong  to  the  very  essence  and  nature  of  Moral 
Law.  A  law  without  sanctions  is  no  law^  it  is  only  counsel, 
or  advice.  Sanctions  are — in  a  certain  sense,  to  be  explained 
in  a  future  lecture — the  motives  which  the  Law  presents,  with 
design  to  secure  obedience  to  the  precept.  Consequently, 
they  should  always  be  graduated  by  the  importance  of  the 
precept;  and  that  is  not  properly  law  which  does  not  promise, 
expressly  or  impliedly,  a  reward  proportionate  to  the  value 
of  obedience,  and  threaten  punishment  equal  to  the  evil  or 
guilt  of  disobedience.  Law  cannot  be  unjust,  either  in  pre- 
cept or  sanction:  and  it  should  always  be  remembered,  that 
what  is  unjust,  is  not  law^  cannot  be  law.  It  is  contrary  to 
the  true  definition  of  law.  Moral  Lazu  is  a  rule  of  adi&n, 
founded  in,  and  suited  to,  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings, 
sustained  by  sanctions  equal  to  the  value  of  obedience,  and  the 
^     guilt  of  disobedience, 

8.  An  eighth  attribute  of  Moral  Law  is  Prac/ica627?7?/.    That 
f    which  the  precept  demands,  must  be  possible  to  the  subject. 

That  which  demands  a  natural  impossibility,  is  not,  and  can- 
not be  Moral  Law,  The  true  definition  of  law  excludes  the 
supposition  that  it  can,  under  any  circumstances,  demand  an 
absolute  impossibility.  Such  a  demand  could  not  be  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  agents,  and 
therefore  practicability  must  always  be  an  attribute  of  Moral 
Law.  To  talk  of  inability  to  obey  Moral  Law,  is  to  talk  sheer 
r'     rK)nsense. 

9.  A  ninth  attribute  of  Moral  Law  is  Independence,  It  is 
founded  in  the  self-existent  nature  of  God.  It  is  an  eternal  and 
necessary  idea  of  the  Divine  Reason.  It  is  the  unalterable  and 
eternal  self-existent  rule  of  the  Divine  conduct,  the  law  which 
the  intelligence  of  God  imposes  on  Himself.  He  is  a  law  to 
Himself,  Moral  Law,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter  more  fully,  does 
not,  and  cannot  originate  in  the  will  of  God.  It  originates, 
or  rather,  is  founded  <n  his  eternal,  immutable,  self-existent 
nature.  It  eternally  existed  in  the  Divine  Reason.  It  is  the 
idea  of  that  state  of  will  which  is  obligatory  upon  God  upon 
condition  of  his  natural  attributes,  or  in  other  words,  upon 

y  condition  of  his  nature.     As  a  law,  it  is  entirely  independent 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


of  his  will,  just  as  his  own  existence  is.  It  is  obligatory  also 
upon  every  moral  agent,  entirely  independent  of  the  will  of 
God.  Their  nature  and  relations  being  given,  and  their  in- 
teUigence  being  developed,  Moral  Law  must  be  obhgato- 
ry  upon  them,  and  it  lies  not  in  the  option  of  any  be- 
ing to  make  it  otherwise.  To  pursue  a  course  of  conduct 
suited  to  their  nature  and  relations,  is  necessarily  and  self- 
evidently  obligatory,  the  willing  or  nilling  of  any  being  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding. 

10.  A  tenth  attribute  of  moral  law  is  Immutability,    Mora! 
Law  can  never  change,  or  be  changed.  Moral  Law  always  re- 
quires of  every  moral  agent  a  state  of  heart  and  course  of  conduct 
precisely  suited  to  his  nature  and  relations.     Nothing  more 
nor  less.     Whatever  his  nature  is,  his  capacity  and  relations 
are,  entire  conformity  tojustthat  nature,  those  capacities  and 
relations,  is  required  at  every  moment,  and  nothing  more  or 
less.     If  capacity  is  enlarged,  the  subject  is  not  thereby  ren- 
dered capable  of  works   of  supererogation — of  doing  more 
than  the  Law  demands;  for  the  Law  still,  as  always,  requires 
the  full  consecration  of  his  whole  being  to  the  public  inter- 
ests.   If  by  any  means  whatever,  his  ability  is  abridged,  Moral 
Law,  always  and  necessarily  consistent  with  itself,  still  requires 
that  what  is  left — nothing  more  or  less-r— shall  be  consecrated 
to  the  same  end  as  before.     Whatever  demands  more  or  less 
tlian  entire.,  universal,  and  constant  conformity  of  heart  and  life, 
tolKe  nature,  capacity  and  relations  of  moral  agents,  be  they  zvhat 
they  may,  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  Moral  Law,     To  suppose  that  it 
could  be  otherwise,  would  be  to  contradict  the  true  definition  of 
Moral  Law.  If  therefore,  the  capacity  is  by  any  means  abridged, 
the  subject  does  not  thereby  become  incapable  of  rendering  full 
obedience;  for  the  Law  still  demands  and  urges,  that  the  heart 
and  life  shall  be  fully  conformed  to  the  present  existing  nsituTe, 
capacity,  and  relations.     Any  thing  that  requires  more  or  less 
than  this,  whatever  else  it  is,  is  not,  and  cannot  be  Moral  Law. 
To  affirm  that  it  can,  is  to  talk  nonsense.  Nay,  it  is  to  blaspheme 
against  the  immaculate  majesty  of  Moral  Law.     Moral  Law 
invariably  holds  one  language.     It  never  changes  the  spirit 
of  its  requirement.     "  Thou  shalt  /ore,"  or  he  perfectly  benevo- 
lent, is  its  uniform,  and  its  only  demand.     This  demand  it 
never  varies,  and  never  can  vary.     It  is  as  immutable  as  God 
is,  and  for  the  same  reason.     To  talk  of  letting  down,  or  al- 
tering Moral  Law,  is  to  talk  absurdly.     The  thing  is  naturally 
impossible.     No  being  has  the  right  or  the  power  to  do  so. 
^he  supposition  overlooks  the  very  nature  of  Moral  Law* 
1* 


6  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Should  the  natural  capability  of  the  mind,  by  any  means  what- 
ever, be  enlarged  or  abridged,  it  is  perfectly  absurd  and  a 
contradiction  of  the  nature  of  Moral  Law,  to  say,  that  the 
claims  of  the  law  are  either  elevated  or  lowered.  Moral  Law 
is  not  a  statute,  an  enactment,  that  has  its  origin  or  its  found- 
ation in  the  will  of  any  being.  It  is  the  Law  ofMture,  the  law 
which  the  nature  or  constitution  of  every  moral  agent  imposes 
on  himself.  It  is  the  unalterable  demand  of  the  Reason,  that 
the  whole  being,  whatever  there  is  of  it  at  any  time,  shall 
be  entirely  consecrated  to  the  highest  good  of  universal  being. 
In  other  words,  it  is  the  soul's  idea  or  conception  of  that  state 
of  heart  and  course  of  life,  which  is  exactly  suited  to  its  na- 
ture and  relations.  It  cannot  be  too  distinctly  understood,  that 
Moral  Law  is  nothing  more  or  less,  than  the  Law  of  Nature, 
that  is,  it  is  the  rule  imposed  on  us,  not  hy  the  arbitrary  will  of 
any  being,  but  by  our  own  intelligence.  It  is  an  idea  of  that 
which  is  fit,  suitable,  agreeable  to  our  nature  and  relations  for 
the  time  being,  that  which  it  is  reasonable  for  us  to  will  and 
do,  at  any  and  every  moment,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances 
of  our  present  existence, — just  what  the  Reason  affirms  to  be 
suited  to  our  nature  and  relations,  under  all  the  circumstances 
of  the  case. 

It  has  been  said,  that  if  we  dwarf,  or  abridge  our  powers, 
we  do  not  thereby  abridge  the  claims  of  God;  that  if  we 
render  it  impossible  to  perform  so  high  a  service  as  we  might 
have  done,  the  Lawgiver,  nevertheless,  requires  the  same  as 
before,  that  is,  that  under  such  circumstances  He  requires  of 
us  an  impossibility; — that  should  we  dwarf,  or  completely 
derange,  or  stultify  our  powers.  He  would  still  hold  us  under 
obligation  to  perform  all  that  we  might  have  performed,  had 
our  powers  remained  in  their  integrity.     To  this  I  reply, 

[That  this  affirmation  assumes,  that  Moral  Law  and  moral 
obligation,  are  founded  in  the  will  of  God; — that  His  mere 
will  makes  law.  This  is  a  fundamental  mistake.  God  cannot 
legislate  in  the  sense  of  making  Law.  He  declares  and  en- 
forces the  common  law  of  the  universe,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
Law  of  Nature.  This  law,  I  repeat  it,  is  nothing  else  than  that 
nile  of  conduct  which  is  in  accordance  with  the  nature  and 
relations  of  moral  beings.  The  totality  of  its  requisitions  are, 
both  in  its  letter  and  its  spirit,  "thou  shalt  love,  &c.,  with  all 
iky  heart,  thy  soul,  thy  might,  thy  strength,''^  That  is,  whatever 
there  is  of  us,  at  any  moment,  is  to  be  wholly  consecrated  to 
God,  and  the  good  of  being,  and  nothing  more  or  less.  If 
our  nature  or  relations  are   changed,  no   matter  by  what 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


means,  or  to  wh:il  extent,  provided  we  are  still  moral  agents, 
its  language  and  spirit  are  the  same  as  before, — "thou  shalt 
love  with  all  thy  strength^''  &c. 

1  will  here  quote  from  the  Oberlin  Evangelist,  an  extract 
of  a  letter  from  an  esteemed  brother,  embodying  the  sub- 
stance of  the  above  objection,  together  with  my  reply. 

*"  One  point  is  what  you  say  of  the  claims  of  the  law,  in  the 
Oberhn  EvangeHst,  Vol,  2,  p.  50: — •  The  question  is,  What 
does  the  law  of  God  require  of  Christians  of  the  present  gener- 
ation, in  all  respects  in  our  circumstances,  with  all  the  ignor- 
ance and  debility  of  body  and  mind  which  have  resulted  from 
the  intemperance  and  abuse  of  the  human  constitution  through 
so  many  generations?'  But  if  this  be  so,  then  the  more  ig- 
norant and  debilitated  a  person  is  in  body  and  mind,  in  con- 
sequence of  his  own  or  ancestors'  sins  and  follies,  the  less  tl>e 
law  would  require  of  him,  and  the  less  would  it  be  for  him  to 
become  perfectly  holy — and,  the  nearer  this  ignorance  and 
debility  came  to  being  perfect,  the  nearer  would  he  be  to 
being  perfectly  holy,  for  the  less  would  be  required  of  him  to  ~ 
make  him  so.  But  is  this  so?  Can  a  person  be  perfectly- 
sanctified  while  particularly  that  'ignorance  of  mind,'  which 
is  the  effect  of  the  intemperance  and  abuse  of  the  human  con- 
stitution, remains?  Yea,  can  he  be  sanctified  at  all,  only  as 
this  ignorance  is  removed  by  the  truth  and  Spirit  of  God  ;  it 
being  a  moral  and  not  a  physical  effect  of  sinning?  I  say  it 
kindly;  here  appears  to  me  at  least,  a  very  serious  entering 
wedge  of  error.  Were  the  effect  of  human  depravity  upon 
man  simply  to  disable  him,  like  taking  from  the  body  a  limb, 
or  destroying  in  part,  or  in  whole,  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  I 
would  not  object;  but  to  say,  this  effect  is  ignorance,  a  moral 
effect  wholly,  and  then  say,  having  this  ignorance,  the  Law 
levels  its  claims  according  to  it,  and  that  with  it,  a  man  can  bi^ 
entirely  sanctified,  looks  not  to  me  like  the  teachings  of  tlie 
Bible." 

(1.)  I  have  seen  the  passage  from  my  lecture  here  alluded  to, 
quoted  and  commented  upon,  in  different  periodicals,  and  uni- 
formly with  entire  disapprobation. 

(2.)  It  has  always  been  separated  entirely  from  the  exposi- 
tion which  I  have  given  of  the  Law  of  God  in  the  same  lec- 
tures; with  which  exposition,  no  one,  so  far  as  I  know,  has 
seen  fit  to  grapple. 

^.  (3.)  I  believe,  in  every  instance,  the  objections  that  have 
been  made  to  this  paragraph,  were  made  by  those  who  pro- 
fess to  believe  in  the  present  natural  ability' of  sinners  to  do 
all  their  duty. 


8  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(4.)  I  would  most  earnestly  and  respectfully  inquire,  what 
consistency  there  is,  in  denominating  this  paragraph  a  dan- 
gerous heresy,  and  still  maintaining  that  men  are  at  present 
naturally  able  to  do  all  that  God  requires  of  them? 

(5.)  I  put  the  inquiry  back  to  those  brethren, — by  what  au- 
thority do  you  affirm,  that  God  requires  any  more  of  any 
moral  agent  in  the  universe,  and  of  man  in  his  present  condi- 
tion, than  he  is  at  present  able  to  perform? 

(6.)  I  inquire,  does  not  the  very  language  of  the  law  of  God 
prove  to  a  demonstration,  that  God  requires  no  more  of  man 
than,  in  his  present  stale,  he  is  able  to  perform?  Let  us  hear 
its  language:  "Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy 
heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy  mind,  and  with 
all  thy  strength.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 
Now  here,  God  so  completely  levels  his  claims,  by  the  very 
wording  of  these  commandments,  to  the  present  capacity  of 
every  human  being,  however  young  or  old,  however  maimed, 
debilitated,  or  idiotic,  as,  to  use  the  language  or  sentiment 
of  Prof.  Hickok,  of  Auburn  Seminary,  uttered  in  my  hearing 
tliat,  "if  it  were  possible  to  conceive  of  a  moral  pigmy  ^  the  Law 
requires  of  him  nothing  more,  than  to  use  whatever  strength 
he  has,  in  the  service  and  for  the  glory  of  God." 

(7.)  I  most  respectfully  but  earnestly  inquire  of  my  breth- 
ren, if  they  believe  that  God  requires  as  much  of  men  as  of 
angels,  of  a  child  as  a  man,  of  a  half-idiot  as  of  a  Newton?  I 
mean  not  to  ask  whether  God  requires  an  equally  perfect 
consecration  of  all  the  powers  actually  possessed  by  each  of 
these  classes;  but  whether  in  degree.  He  really  requires  the 
same,  irrespective  of  their  present  natural  ability? 

(8.)  I  wish  to  inquire,  whether  my  brethren  do  not  admit 
that  the  brain  is  the  organ  of  the  mind,  and  that  every  abuse 
of  the  physical  system  has  abridged  the  capacity  of  the  mind, 
wiiile  it  remains  connected  with  this  tenement  of  clay?  And 
I  would  also  ask,  whether  my  brethren  mean  to  maintain,  at 
the  same  breath,  the  doctrine  of  present  natural  abiUty  to 
comply  with  all  the  requirements  of  God,  and  also  the  fact 
tliat  God  now  requires  of  man  just  the  same  degree  of  service 
that  he  might  have  rendered  if  he  had  never  sinned,  or  in  any 
way  violated  the  laws  of  his  being?  And  if  they  maintain 
these  two  positions  at  the  same  time,  I  farther  inquire,  whetlier 
tliey  believe  that  man  has  natural  ability  at  the  present  mo- 
ment to  bring  all  his  faculties  and  powers,  together  with  his 
knowledge,  on  to  as  high  ground  and  into  the  same  state  in 
which  they  might  have  been,  had  he  never  sinned?  My 
brethren,  is  there  not  some  inconsistency  here? 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  V 

(9.)  In  the  paragraph  from  the  letter  above  quoted,  the 
brother  admits,  that  if  a  man  by  his  own  act  had  deprived 
himself  of  any  of  his  corporeal  faculties,  he  would  not  thence- 
forth be  under  an  obhgation  to  use  those  faculties.  But  he 
tliinks  this  principle  does  not  hold  true,  in  respect  to  the  ig- 
norance of  man;  because  he  esteems  his  ignorance  a  moral, 
and  not  a  natural  defect.  Here  I  beg  leave  to  make  a  few 
inquiries: 

[1.]  Should  a  man  wickedly  deprivehimself  of  the  use  of  a 
hand,  would  not  this  act  be  a  moral  act?     No  doubt  it  would. 

[2.]  Suppose  a  man  by  his  own  act,  should  make  himself  an 
idiot,  would  not  this  act  be  a  moral  act? 

[3.]  Would  he  not  in  both  these  cases  render  himself  natur- 
ally unable,  in  the  one  case,  to  use  his  hand,  and  in  the  other, 
his  reason?  Undoubtedly  he  would.  But  how  can  it  be  af- 
firmed, with  any  show  of  reason,  that  in  the  one  case  his  na- 
tural inability  discharges  him  from  the  obligation  to  use  his 
hand,  and  that  in  the  other  case,  his  natural  ability  does  not 
affect  his  obligation — that  he  is  still  bound  to  use  his  reason, 
of  which  he  has  voluntarily  deprived  himself,  but  not  his  hand? 
Now  the  fact  is,  that  in  both  these  cases  the  inabiUty  is  a  n*^ 
tural  one. 

[4.]  I  ask,  if  a  man  has  willingly  remained  in  ignorance  of 
God, whether  his  ignorance  is  a  moral  or  natural  inability?  If 
it  is  a  moral  inability,  he  can  instantly  overcome  it,  by  the 
right  exercise  of  his  own  will.  And  nothing  can  be  a  moral 
inability  that  cannot  be  instantaneously  removed  by  our  own 
volition.  Do  my  brethren  believe,  that  the  present  ignorance 
of  mankind  can  be  instantaneously  removed,  and  their  know- 
ledge become  as  perfect  as  it  might  have  been  had  they  never 
sinned,  by  an  act  of  volition  on  the  part  of  men?  If  they  do 
not,  why  do  they  call  this  a  moral  inability,  or  ignorance  a 
moral  effect?  fihe  fact  is,  that  ignorance  is  often  the  natural 
effect  of  moral  delinquency.  Neglect  of  duty  occasions  ignor- 
ance; and  this  ignorance  constitutes  a  natural  inability  to  do 
that  of  which  a  man  is  utterly  ignorant — -just  as  the  loss  of  a 
hand,  in  the  case  supposed,  is  the  natural  effect  of  a  moral  act, 
but  in  itself  constitutes  a  natural  inability  to  perform  those  duties 
that  might  have  been  performed  but  for  the  loss  of  this  hand. 
The  truth  is,  that  this  ignorance  does  constitute,  while  it  re- 
mains, a  natural  inability  to  perform  those  duties  of  which  the 
mind  is  ignorant;  and  all  that  can  be  required  is,  that  from  the 
present  moment,  the  mind  should  be  diligently  and  perfectly 
engaged  in  acquiring  what  knowledge  it  can,  and  in  perfectly 


10  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

obeying,  as  fast  as  it  can  obtain  the  light.  If  this  is  not  true, 
it  is  utter  nonsense  to  talk  about  natural  ability  as  being  a  sine 
qua  non  of  moral  obligation.  And  I  would  kindly,  but  most 
earnestly  ask  my  brethren,  by  what  rule  of  consistency  they 
maintain,  at  the  same  breath,  the  doctrine  of  a  natural  ability 
to  do  whatever  God  requires,  and  also  insist  that  He  requires 
men  to  know  as  much,  and  in  all  respects  to  render  Him  the 
same  kind  and  degree  of  service  as  if  they  never  had  sinned,  or 
rendered  themselves  in  imj  respect  naturally  incapable  of 
doing  and  being,  at  the  present  moment,  all  that  they  might 
have  done  and  been,  had  they  never  in  any  instance  neglected 
their  duty? 

(10.)  The  brother,  in  the  above  paragraph,  seems  to  feel 
pressed  with  the  consideration,  that  if  it  be  true  that  a  man's 
ignorance  can  be  any  excuse  for  his  not  at  present  doing  what 
he  might  have  done  but  fortius  ignorance,  it  will  follow,  that 
the  less  he  knows  the  less  is  required  of  him,  and  should  he 
become  a  perfect  idiot,  he  would  be  entirely  discharged  from 
moral  obligation.  To  this  I  answer:  Yes,  or  the  doctrine  of 
natural  ability,  and  the  entire  Government  of  God,  are  a  mere 
farce.  If  a  man  should  annihilate  himself,  would  he  not 
thereby  set  aside  his  moral  obUgation  to  obey  God?  Yes, 
truly.  Should  he  make  himself  an  idiot,  has  he  not  thereby 
annihilated  his  moral  agency;  and  of  course  his  natural  ability 
to  obey  God?  And  will  my  New  School  brethren  adopt  the 
position  of  Dr.  Wilson  of  Cincinnati,  as  maintained  on  the 
trial  of  Dr.  Bcecher,  that  ^^moral  obligation  does  not  imply 
abihty  of  any  kind?"  The  truth  is,  that  for  the  time  being,  a 
man  may  destroy  his  moral  agency,  by  rendering  himself  a  lu- 
natic or  an  idiot;  and  while  this  lunacy  or  idiocy  continues, 
obedience  to  God  is  naturally  impossible,  and  therefore  not 
required. 

But  it  is  also  true,  that  no  human  being  and  no  moral  agent 
can  deprive  himself  of  reason  and  moral  agency,  but  for  a  lim- 
ited time.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe,  that  the  soul  can  be 
deranged  or  idiotic,  when  separated  from  the  body.  And 
therefore  moral  agency  will  in  all  cases  be  renewed  in  a 
future,  if  not  in  the  present  state  of  existence,  when  God  will 
hold  men  fully  responsible  for  having  deprived  themselves  of 
power  to  render  Him  all  that  service  which  they  might  other- 
wise have  rendered.  But  do  let  me  inquire  again,  can  my 
dear  brethren  maintain  that  an  idiot  or  lunatic  can  be  a 
moral  agent?  Can  they  maintain,  that  a  moral  being  is  the 
subject  of  moral  obligation  any  farther  than  he  is  in  a  state 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  II 

of  sanity?  Can  they  maintain,  that  an  infant  is  the  subject 
of  moral  obligation,  previous  to  all  knowledge?  And  can 
they  maintain,  that  moral  obligation  can,  in  any  case,  exceed 
knowledge?  If  they  can  and  do — then,  to  be  consistent,  they 
must  flatly  deny  that  natural  ability  is  a  sine  qua  non  of  moral 
obligation,  and  adopt  the  absurd  dogma  of  Dr.  Wilson,  that 
'  moral  obligation  does  not  imply  any  ability  whatever.'  When 
my  brethren  will  take  this  ground,  I  shall  then  understand 
and  know  where  to  meet  them.  But  I  beseech  you,  brethren, 
not  to  complain  of  inconsistency  in  me,  nor  accuse  me  of 
teaching  dangerous  heresy,  while  I  teach  nothing  more  than 
you  must  admit  to  be  true,  or  unequivocally  admit,  in  extenso^ 
the  very  dogma  of  Dr.  Wilson,  quoted  above. 

I  wish  to  be  distinctly  understood.  Xniaintain,  that  jpresent 
ignorance  is  present  natural  inability,  as  absolutely  as  the  pres- 
ent want  of  a  hand  is  present  natural  inability  to  use  it.  And 
I  also  maintain,  that  the  Law  of  God  requires  nothing  more  of 
any  human  being,  than  that  which  he  is  at  present  naturally 
able  to  perform,  under  the  present  circumstances  of  his  being. 
Do  my  brethren  deny  this?  If  they  do,  then  they  have  gone 
back  to  Dr.  Wilson's  ground.  If  they  do  not,  why  am  I  ac- 
counted a  heretic  by  them,  for  teaching  what  they  themselves 
maintain  ? 

(II.)  In  my  treatise  upon  the  subject  of  entire  sanctification, 
I  have  shown  from  thelBible,  that  actual  knowledge  is  indis- 
pensable to  moral  obligation,  and  that  the  legal  maxim,  "ig- 
norance of  the  law  excuses  no  one,"  is  not  good  in  morals. 

(12.)  Professor  Stuart,  in  a  recent  number  of  the  Biblical 
Repository,  takes  precisely  the  same  ground  that  I  have  taken, 
and  fully  maintains,  jJiat  siQ.is  the  voluntary  transgression  of  ^  a 
known  law.  And  he  further  abundantly  shows,  that  this  is  no 
new  of "Irett^rodox  opinion.  Now  Prof.  Stuart,  in  the  article 
jJluded  to,  takes  exactly  the  same  position  in  regard  to  what 
constitutes  sin  that  I  have  done  in  the  paragraph  upon  which 
so  much  has  been  said.  And  may  I  be  permitted  to  inquire, 
why  the  same  sentiment  is  orthodox  at  Andover,  and  sound 
theology  in  the  Biblical  Repository,  but  highly  heterodox  and 
dangerous  at  Oberlin? 

(13.)  Will  my  brethren  of  the  New  School,  to  avoid  the  con- 
clusiveness of  my  reasonings  in  respect  to  the  requirements  of 
the  Law  of  God,  go  back  to  Old  Schoolism,  physical  depravity, 
and  accountability  based  upon  natural  inability,  and  all  the 
host  of  absurdities  belonging  to  its  particular  views  of  or- 
thodoxy?   I  recollect  that  Dr.  Beecher  expressed  his  surprise 


12  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

at  the  position  taken  by  Dr.  Wilson,  to  which  I  have  alluded, 
and  said  he  did  not  beHeve  that  "many  men  could  be  found, 
who  could  march  up  without  winking  to  the  maintenance  of 
such  a  proposition  as  that."  But  to  be  consistent,  I  do  not 
see  but  that  my  brethren,  with  or  "  without  winking,"  are 
driven  to  the  necessity,  either  of  "  marching  up  "  to  maintain- 
ing the  same  proposition,  or  they  must  admit,  that  this  objec- 
tionable paragraph  in  my  lecture  is  the  truth  of  God. 

11.  An  eleventh  attribute  ofMoral  Law  is  C/m7?/.  MoralLaw 
proposes  but  one  ultimate  end  of  pursuit  to  God,  and  to  all 
moral  agents.  The  whole  of  its  requisitions  in  their  spirit  and 
last  analysis,  are  summed  up  and  expressed  in  one  word,  love  or 
benevolence.  This  I  only  announce  here.  It  will  more  fully 
appear  hereafter.  Law  is  a  pure  and  simple  idea  of  the.  rea- 
son. It  is  the  idea  of  perfect,  universal  and  constant  conse- 
cration of  the  whole  being,  to  the  highest  good  of  being.  Just 
this  is,  and  nothing  more  nor  less,  can  be  Moral  Law;  for 
just  this,  and  nothing  more  nor  less,  is  a  state  of  heart  and 
a  course  of  life  exactly  suited  to  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents,  which  is  the  only  true  definition  of  Moral  Law. 

To  suppose,  that  under  any  possible  or  conceivable  circum- 
stances, the  Moral  Law  should  require  any  thing  more  or  less, 
were  to  make  a  supposition  contrary  to  the  very  nature  of 
Moral  Law.  It  were  to  overlook  the  proper  definition  of  Moral 
Law,  as  has  been  said  before. 

12.  Equity  is  another  attribute  of  Moral  Law.  Equity  is 
equality.  That  only  is  equitable  which  is  equal.  The  inter- 
est and  well-being  of  every  sentient  existence  and  especially 
of  every  moral  agent,  is  of^ome  value  in  comparison  with  the 
interests  of  others  and  of  the  whole  universe  of  creatures. 
Moral  Law,  by  a  necessity  of  its  own  nature,  demands  that  the 
interest  and  well-being  of  every  member  of  the  universal  fam- 
ily shall  be  regarded  according  to  its  relative  or  comparative 
value,  and  that  in  no  case  shall  it  be  sacrificed  or  wholly  neg- 
lected without  his  forfeiture  to  whom  it  belongs.  The  distinc- 
tion allowed  by  human  tribunals  between  law  and  equity  does 
not  pertain  to  Moral  Law,  nor  does  or  can  it  strictly  pertain  to 
any  law.  For  it  is  impossible  that  that  should  be  law,  in  the  sense 
of  imposing  obligation  to  obey,  of  which  equity  is  not  an  attri- 
bute. An  inequitable  law  cannot  be.  The  requirements  of  law 
must  be  equal.  A  moral  agent  may,  by  transgression,  forfeit 
the  protection  of  law  and  may  come  into  such  governmental 
relations  by  trampling  on  the  Law,  that  Moral  Law  may  de- 
mand that  he  be  made  a  public  example — that  his  interest 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  13 

and  well-being  be  laid  upon  the  altar,  and  that  he  be  offered  a 
sacrifice  to  public  justice  as  a  preventive  of  crime  in  others. 
It  may  happen  also  that  sacrifices  may  be  demanded  by  Moral 
IjRW  of  innocent  beings  for  the  promotion  ofa  greater  amount 
of  good  than  that  sacrificed  by  the  innocent.  Sach  was  the 
case  with  the  atonement  of  Christ,  and  such  is  the  case  with 
the  missionary  and  with  all  who  are  called  by  the  Law  of 
Love  to  practice  self-denial  for  the  good  of  others.  But  let  it 
be  remembered  that  Moral  Law  never  requires  or  allows 
any  degree  of  self-denial  and  self-sacrifice  that  rehnquishes 
a  good  of  greater  value  than  that  gained  by  the  sacrifice.  Nor 
does  it  in  any  case  demand  or  permit  that  any  interest  not 
forfeited  by  its  possessor,  shall  be  reHnquished  or  finally  neglect- 
ed without  adequate  ultimate  compensation.  As  has  been  said, 
every  interest  is  of  some  comparative  value;  and  ought  to  be  es- 
teemed just  in  proportion  to  its  comparative  value.  Moral  Law 
demands  and  must  demand  that  it  shall  be  so  regarded  by  all  mo- 
ral agents  to  whom  it  is  known.  "Tiiou  shalt  love  thy  neigh- 
bor AS  thyself"  is  its  unalterable  language.  It  can  absolutely 
utter  no  other  language  than  this,  and  nothing  can  be  Moral  Law 
or  Law  in  any  sense  that  ought  to  be  obeyed,  or  that  can  inno- 
cently be  obeyed  which  holds  any  other  language.  Law  is  not 
and  cannot  be  an  arbitrary  enactment  of  any  being  or  number  of 
beings.  Unequal  Law  is  a  misnomer*  That  is,  that  which  is 
unequal  in  its  demands  is  not  and  cannot  be  Law,  Law  must 
respect  the  interests  and  the  rights  of  all  and  of  each  member 
of  the  universal  family.  It  is  impossible  that  it  should  be 
otherwise,  and  still  be  Law, 

13.  Expediency  is  another  attribute  of  Moral  Law, 
That  which  is  upon  whole  zoise,  is  expedient, — that  which 
is  upon  the  whole  expedient  is  demanded  by  Moral  Law.  True 
expediency  and  the  spirit  of  Moral  Law  are  always  identical. 
Expediency  may  be  inconsistent  with  the  letter,  but  never  with 
the  spirit  of  Moral  Law.  Law  in  the  form  of  commandment 
is  a  revelation  or  declaration  of  that  course  which  is  ex- 
pedient. It  is  expediency  revealed,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
commandments  of  the  decalogue,  and  the  same  is  true, 
of  every  precept  of  the  Bible,  it  reveals  to  us  what  is  expe- 
dient. A  revealed  law  or  commandment  is  never  to  be  set 
aside  by  any  considerations  of  expediency.  We  may  know 
with  certainty  that  what  is  required  is  eocpedient.  The  com- 
mand is  the  expressed  judgment  of  God  in  the  case  and  reveals 
with  unerring  certainty  the  true  path  of  expediency.  When 
Paul  says,  "  All  things  are  lawful  unto  me  but  all  things 
2 


14  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

are  not  expedient,"  we  must  not  understand  him  as  meaning 
that  all  things  in  the  absolute  sense  were  lawful  to  him,  or  that 
any  thing  was  in  this  sense  lawful  to  him  that  was  not  expedi- 
ent. But  he  doubtless  intended  that  many  things  were  ineoc- 
pedient  that  are  not  expressly  prohibited  by  the  letter  of  the 
Jaw, — that  the  spirit  of  the  law  prohibited  many  things  not 
expressly  forbidden  by  the  letter.  It  should  never  be  forgot- 
ten that  that  which  is  plainly  demanded  by  the  highest  good 
of  the  universe  is  Law,  It  is  expedient.  It  is  wise.  The 
true  spirit  of  the  Moral  Law  does  and  must  demand  it.  So,  on 
the  other  hand,  whatever  is  plainly  inconsistent  with  the  high- 
est good  of  the  universe  is  illegal,  unwise,  inexpedient,  and 
must  be  prohibited  by  the  spirit  of  Moral  Law.  But  let  the 
thought  be  repeated,  that  the  Bible  precepts  always  reveal 
that  which  is  truly  expedient,  and  in  no  case  are  we  at  liber- 
ty to  set  aside  the  spirit  of  any  commandment  upon  the  suppo- 
sition that  expediency  requires  it.  Some  have  denounced  the 
doctrine  of  expediency  altogether  as  at  all  times  inconsistent 
with  the  Law  of  Right,  These  philosophers  proceed  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  Law  of  Right  and  the  Law  of  Benevolence 
are  not  identical  but  inconsistent  with  each  other.  This  is  a 
common  but  fundamental  mistake,  which  leads  me  to  remark 
that, 

14.  Exclusivcness  is  another  attribute  of  Moral  Law.  That  is, 
Moral  Law  is  the  only  possible  rule  of  Moral  Obligation.  A  dis- 
tinction is  usually  made  between  Moral,  Ceremonial,  Civil, 
and  Positive  Laws.  This  distinction  is  in  some  respects  con- 
venient^ but  is  liable  to  mislead  and  to  create  an  impression 
that  a  law  can  be  obligatory,  or  in  other  words  that  that  can 
be  Law  that  has  not  the  attributes  of  Moral  Law,  Nothing 
can  be  Law  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  term  that  is  not  and 
would  not  be  universally  obligatory  upon  moral  agents  under 
the  same  circumstances.  It  is  Law  because  and  only  be- 
cause that  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  the  course 
prescribed  is^^,  proper^  suitable  to  their  natures,  relations  and 
circumstances.  There  can  be  no  Lazo  as  a  rule  of  action  for 
moral  agents  but  Moral  Law,  or  the  Law  of  Benevolence. 
Every  other  rule  is  absolutely  excluded  by  the  very  nature  of 
Moral  Law.  Surely  there  can  be  no  Law  that  is  or  can  be 
obligatory  upon  moral  agents  but  one  suited  to  and  founded  in 
their  nature,  relations  and  circumstances.  This  is  and  must 
be  the  Law  of  Love  or  Benevolence.  This  is  the  Law  of  Right 
and  nothing  else  is  or  can  be.  Every  thing  else  that  claims  to 
be  Law  and  to  impose  obHgation  upon  moral  agents,  from  what- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  15 

ever  source  it  emanates,  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  Law,  but 
must  be  an  imposition  and  "  a  thing  of  nought." 

15.  Utility  is  also  an  attribute  of  Moral  Law.  Law  propo- 
ses the  highest  good  of  universal  being  as  its  end  and  requires 
all  moral  agents  to  consecrate  themselves  to  the  promotion  of 
this  end.  Consequently  Utility  must  be  one  of  its  attributes. 
That  which  is  upon  the  whole  in  the  highest  degree  useful  to 
the  universe  must  be  demanded  by  Moral  Law.  Moral  Law 
must,  from  its  own  nature,  require  just  that  course  of  willing  and 
acting  that  is  upon  the  whole  in  the  highest  degree  promotive 
of  the  public  good, — in  other  words,  that  which  is  upon  the  whole 
in  the  highest  degree  useful.  It  has  been  strangely  and  ab- 
surdly maintained  that  right  would  be  obligatory  if  it  neces- 
sarily tended  to  and  resulted  in  universal  and  perfect  misery. 
Than  which  a  more  nonsensical  affirmation  was  never  made. 
The  affirmation  assumes  that  the  Law  of  Right  and  of  Good- 
will are  not  only  distinct,  but  may  be  antagonistic.  It  also 
assumes  that  that  can  be  Law  that  is  not  suited  to  the  nature 
and  relations  of  moral  agents.  Certainly  it  will  not  be  pre- 
tended that  that  course  of  willing  and  acting  that  necessarily 
tends  to  and  results  in  universal  misery  can  be  consistent  with 
the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  agents.  Nothing  is  or  can 
be  suited  to  their  nature  and  relations  that  is  not  upon  the 
whole  promotive  of  their  highest  well-being.  Utility  and 
Right  are  always  and  necessarily  at  one.  They  can  never 
be  inconsistent.  That  which  is  upon  the  whole  most  useful 
is  right,  and  that  which  is  right  is  upon  the  whole  useful. 


LECTURE  II. 

I.  Term  Governaient  defined. 

II.  Distinction  between  Moral  and  Physical  Govern- 
ment. 

III.  Fundamental  Reason  of  Moral  Government. 

IV.  Whose  right  it  is  to  govern. 

V.  What  is  implied  in  the  right  to  govern. 

VI.  Limits  of  the  right  to  govern. 

VII.  What  is  implied  in  Moral  Government. 

VIII.  Moral  obligation  defined. 

IX.  Conditions  of  moral  obligation. 
/.  Define  the  term  government. 

The  primary  idea  of  government,  is  that  of  direction,  guid- 
ance, control,  bj,  or  in  accordance  with  rule,  or  law.  This 
seems  to  be  the  generic  signification  of  the  term  government; 
but  it  appears  not  to  be  sufficiently  broad  in  its  meaning,  to 
express  all  that  properly  belongs  to  moral  government,  as  we 
shall  see.     This  leads  me, 

//.   To  distinguish  between  moral  and  physical  government. 

All  government,  as  we  shall  see,  is,  and  must  be  either  moral 
or  physical;  that  is,  all  guidance  and  control  must  be  exercised 
in  accordance  with  either  moral  or  physical  Law;  for  there 
can  be  no  Laws  that  are  not  either  moral  or  physical.  Physi- 
cal government,  is  control,  exercised  by  a  law  of  necessity  or 
force,  as  distinguished  from  the  law  of  free  will,  or  liberty.  It 
is  the  control  of  substance,  as  opposed  to  Free  Will.  The  only 
government  of  which  substance,  as  distinguished  from  free 
will,  is  capable, is  and  must  be  physical.  This  is  true,  whether 
the  substance  be  material  or  immaterial,  whether  matter  or 
mind.  States  and  changes,  whether  of  matter  or  mind,  that 
do  not  consist  in  the  actions  of  free  will,  must  be  subject  to 
the  law  of  necessity.  In  no  other  way  can  they  be  ac- 
counted for.  They  must  therefore  belong  to  the  department 
of  physical  government.  Physical  government,  then,  is  the 
administration  of  physical  law,  or  the  law  of  force. 

Thus,  the  states  and  changes  of  our  Intellect  and  Sensibility, 
come  under  the  department  of  physical  government.  These 
states  and  changes  are  effected  by  a  law  of  necessity,  as  op- 
posed to  the  law  of  liberty,  or  free  will.  The  Intellect  and 
Sensibility,  as  we  shall  abundantly  see  hereafter,  are  so  cor- 
related to  the  will,  that  its  free  actions  produce  certain 
changes  in  them,  by  a  law  of  force,  or  necessity.  Thoughts 
and  feelings  are  not,  strictly  moral  actions,  for  the  reason  that 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  17 

they  are  not  voluntary,  and  must  therefore  belong  to  the  de- 
partment of  physical,  as  opposed  to  moral  government.  There 
is  a  secondary  sense  in  which  thoughts  and  feelings,  as  also 
outward  actions,  may  be  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  depart- 
ment of  moral  government,  and  consequently,  as  possessing 
moral  character.  As  thoughts,  feelings  and  outward  actions, 
are  connected  with,  and  result  from  free  actions  of  the  will 
hj  a  law  of  necessity,  a  moral  agent  must  be  responsible  for 
them  in  a  certain  sense.  But  in  such  cases,  the  character  of 
the  agent  belongs  strictly  to  the  intention  that  caused  them, 
and  not  to  those  involuntary  and  necessary  states  and  actions 
themselves.  They  cannot  strictly  come  under  the  category 
of  moral  actions,  as  we  shall  more  fully  see  hereafter,  for  the 
reason,  that  being  the  result  of  a  law  of  necessity,  they  do 
not,  cannot,  with  strict  propriety,  be  said  to  belong  to  the  de- 
partment of  moral  government. 

Moral  Government  consists  in  the  declaration  and  adminis- 
tration of  Moral  Law.  It  is  the  government  of  free  will  as  dis- 
tinguished from  substance.  Physical  government  presides 
over  and  controls  physical  states  and  changes  of  substance 
or  constitution,  and  all  involuntary  states  and  changes.  -Moral 
Government  presides  ov^r  and  controls,  or  seeks  to  control  the 
actions  of  Free  Will:  it  presides  over  intelligent  and  voluntary 
states  and  changes  of  mind.  It  is  a  government  of  motive, 
as  opposed  to  a  government  of  force — control  exercised,  or 
sought  to  be  exercised,  in  accordance  with  the  Law  of  Liberty, 
as  opposed  to  the  Law  of  Necessity.  It  is  the  administration 
of  moral  as  opposed  to  Physical  Law. 

Moral  Government  includes  the  dispensation  of  rewards  and 
punishments. 

Moral  Government  is  administered  by  means  as  complicated 
and  vast,  as  the  whole  of  the  works,  and  providence,  and 
ways,  and  grace  of  God. 

///.  /  am  to  inquire  into  the  fundamental  reason  of  Moral 
Government, 

Government  must  be  founded  in  a  good  and  sufficient 
reason,  or  it  is  not  right.  No  one  has  a  right  to  prescribe 
rules  for,  and  control  the  conduct  of  another,  unless  there 
is  some  good  reason  for  his  doing  so.  There  must  be  a 
necessity  for  moral  government,  or  the  administration  of  it  is 
tyranny.  Is  there  any  necessity  for  moral  government?  And 
if  so,  wherein  ?  I  answer,  that  from  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  beings,  virtue,  or  holiness,  is  indispensable  to  happiness. 
But  holiness  cannot  exist  without  Moral  Law,  and  Moral  Gov- 
2*    "^  -*- 


18  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ernment;  for  holiness  is  nothing  else  than  conformity  to  Moral 
law  and  Moral  Government.  Moral  Government  then,  is  in- 
dispensable to  the  highest  well  being  of  the  universe  of  Moral 
agents,  and  therefore  ought  to,  and  must  exist.  The  universe 
is  dependent  upon  this  as  a  means  of  securing  the  highest 
good.  This  dependence  is  a  good  and  sufficient  reason  for 
the  existence  of  Moral  Government.  Let  it  be  understood, 
then,  that  Moral  Government  is  a  necessity  of  moral  beings, 
and  therefore  right. — When  it  is  said,  that  the  right  to  govern 
is  founded  in  the  relation  of  dependence,  it  is  not,  or  ought  not 
to  be  intended,  that  this  relation  itself  confers  the  right  to 
govern,  irrespective  of  the  necessity  of  Government.  The 
mere  fact,  that  one  being  is  dependent  on  another,  does  not 
confer  on  one  the  right  to  govern,  and  impose  upon  the  other 
obligation  to  obey,  unless  the  dependent  one  needs  to  be  gov- 
erned, and  consequently,  that  the  one  upon  whom  the  other  is 
dependent,  cannot  fulfil  to  him  the  duties  of  benevolence, 
without  governing  or  controlling  him.  The  right  to  govern, 
implies  the  duty  to  govern.  Obligation,  and  consequently, 
the  right  to  govern,  implies,  that  government  is  a  condition 
of  fulfilling  to  the  dependent  party  the  duties  of  benevolence. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  right  to  govern,  {^founded  in  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  interests  to  be  secured  by  government;  and 
the  right  is  conditionated  upon  the  necessity  of  Government 
as  a  means  to  secure  those  interests.  I  will  briefly  sum  up  the 
argument  under  this  head,  as  follows: 

1.  It  is  impossible  that  government  should  not  exist. 

2.  Every  thing  must  be  governed  by  Laws  suited  to  its  nature. 

3.  Matter  must  be  governed  by  Physical  Laws. 

4.  The  free  actions  of  Will  must  be  governed  by  motives, 
and  moral  agents  must  be  governed  by  moral  considerations. 

5.  We  are  conscious  of  moral  agency,  and  can  be  governed 
only  by  a  Moral  Government. 

6.  Our  nature  and  circumstances  demand  that  we  should 
/be  undef  a  Moral  Government;  because — 

i     (1.)  Moral  happiness  depends  upon  moral  order. 
\    (2.)  Moral  order  depends  upon  the  harmonious  action  of  all 
our  powers,  as  individuals  and  members  of  society. 

^(3.)  No  community  can  perfectly  harmonize  in  all  their 
views  and  feeUngs,  without  perfect  knowledge,  or,  to  say  the 
/least,  the  same  degree  of  knowledge  on  all  subjects  on  which 
!  they  are  called  to  act. 

(4.)  But  no  community  ever  existed,  or  will  exist,  in  which 
every  individual  possesses  exactly  the  same  amount  of  know- 


MORAL  GOVERNMilNT.  S§ 

ledge,  and  where  the  members  are,  therefore,  entirely  agreed 
in  all  their  thoughts,  views  and  opinions. 

(5.)  But  if  they  are  not  agreed  in  opinion,  or  have  not  ex- 
actly the  same  amount  of  knowledge,  they  will  not  in  every 
thing  harmonize,  as  it  respects  their  courses  of  conduct. 

(6.)  There  must  therefore  be  in  every  community  some 
standard  or  rule  of  duty,  to  which  all  the  subjects  of  the  com- 
munity are  to  conform  themselves. 

(7.)  There  must  be  some  head  or  controHing  mind,  whose 
will  shall  be  law,  and  whose  decisions  shall  be  regarded  as  in- 
falhble  by  all  the  subjects  of  the  government. 

(8.)  However  diverse  their  intellectual  attainments  are,  in 
this  they  must  all  agree,  that  the  will  of  the  lawgiver  is  right, 
and  universally  the  rule  of  duty. 

(9.)  This  will  must  be  authoritative  and  not  merely  ad- 
visory. 

(10.)  There  must  of  necessity  be  a  penalty  attached  to,  and 
incurred  by  every  act  of  disobedience  to  this  will. 

(11.)  If  disobedience  be  persisted  in,  exclusion  from  the 
privileges  of  the  government  is  the  lowest  penalty  that  can 
consistently  be  inflicted. 

(12.)  The  good  then,  of  the  universe  imperiously  requires, 
that  there  should  be  a  Moral  Governor. 

IV*   Whose  right  it  is  to  govern. 

We  have  just  seen,  that  necessity  is  a  condition  of  the  right 
and  duty  to  govern — that  the  highest  well  bejng  of  the 
universe  demands,  and  is  the  end  of  Moral  Government.  It 
must  therefore,  be  his  right  and  duty  to  govern,  whose  attri- 
butes, physical  and  moral,  best  qualify  him  to  secure  the  end 
of  government.  To  him  all  eyes  and  hearts  should  be  di- 
rected, to  fill  this  station,  to  exercise  this  control,  to  administer 
all  just  and  necessary  rewards  and  punishments.  It  is  both 
bis  right  and  duty  to  govern.  I  will  here  introduce  from  my 
Skeletons,  a  brief  argument,  to  show  that  God  has  a  right,  and 
that  therefore  it  is  his  duty,  to  govern,  and  that  he  is  a  Moral 
Goverqor. 

That  God  is  a  Moral  Governor,  we  infer — 

1.  From  our  own  consciousness.  From  the  very  laws  of  our 
being  we  naturally  aflirm  our  responsibility  to  him  for  our  con- 
duct. As  God  is  our  Creator,  we  are  naturally  responsible  to 
Him  for  the  right  ex'ercise  of  our  powers.  And  as  our 
good  and  his  glory  depend  upon  our  conformity  to  the  same 
rule,  to  which  He  conforms  his  whole  being,  he  is  under  a 
moral  obligation  to  require  us  to  be  holy  as  he  is  holy. 


20  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

2.  His  natural  attributes  qualify  Him  to  sustain  the  relation 
of  a  Moral  Governor  to  the  universe. 

3.  His  moral  character,  also,  qualifies  him  to  sustain  this  re- 
lation. 

4.  His  relation  to  the  universe  as  Creator  and  Preserver, 
when  considered  in  connection  with  his  nature  and  attributes, 
confers  on  Him  the  right  of  universal  government. 

5.  His  relation  to  the  universe,  and  our  relations  to  Him  and 
to  each  other,  render  it  obligatory  upon  him  to  establish  and 
administer  a  Moral  Government  over  the  universe. 

6.  The  honor  of  God  demands  that  he  should  administer 
such  a  government. 

7.  His  conscience  must  demand  it.  He  must  know  that  it 
would  be  wrong  for  Him  to  create  a  universe  of  moral  beings, 
and  then  refuse  or  neglect  to  administer  over  them  a  Moral 
Government. 

8.  His  happiness  must  demand  it,  as  he  could  not  be  happy 
unless  he  acted  in  accordance  with  his  conscience. 

9.  If  God  is  not  a  Moral  Governor  he  is  not  wise.  Wisdom 
consists  in  the  choice  of  the  best  ends,  and  in  the  use  of  the 
most  appropriate  means  to  accomplish  those  ends.  If  God 
is  not  a  Moral  Governor,  it  is  inconceivable  that  He  should 
have  had  any  important  end  in  view  in  the  creation  of  moral 
beings,  or  that  he  should  have  chosen  the  best  or  any  suitable 
means  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  most  desirable  end. 

10.  The  conduct  or  providence  of  God  plainly  indicates  a 
design  to  exert  a  moral  influence  over  moral  agents. 

11.  His  providence  plainly  indicates  that  the  universe  of 
mind  is  governed  by  Moral  Laws,  or  by  laws  suited  to  the  na- 
ture of  moral  agents. 

12.  Consciousness  recognizes  the  existence  of  an  inward 
law,  or  knowledge  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions. 

13.  This  inward  moral  consciousness  or  conscience  implies 
the  existence  of  a  rule  of  duty  which  is  obligatory  upon  us. 
This  rule  implies  a  ruler,  and  this  ruler  must  be  God. 

14.  If  God  is  not  a  Moral  Governor,  our  very  nature  de- 
ceives us. 

15.  If  God  is  not  a  Moral  Governor,  the  whole  universe,  so 
far  as  we  have  the  means  of  knowing  it,  is  calculated  to  mis- 
lead mankind  in  respect  to  this  fundamental  truth. 

16.  If  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Moral  Government,  there  is, 
in  reality,  no  such  thing  as  moral  character. 

17.  All  nations  have  believed  that  God  is  a  Moral  Gov- 
ernor. 


MORAL  GOVERNMEirr.  !£l 

18.  Our  nature  is  such,  that  we  must  believe  it.  The  con- 
viction of  our  moral  accountability  to  God,  is  in  such  a  sense 
the  dictate  of  our  moral  nature,  that  we  cannot  escape  from  it. 

19.  We  must  abhor  God,  if  we  ever  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  fact  that  he  created  moral  agents,  and  then  exercised 
over  them  no  Moral  Government. 

20.  The  connection  between  moral  delinquency  and  suffer- 
ing is  such  as  to  render  it  certain  that  Moral  Government  does, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  exist. 

21.  The  Bible,  which  has  been  proved  to  be  a  revelation 
from  God,  contains  a  most  simple  and  yet  comprehensive  sys- 
tem of  Moral  Government. 

22.  If  we  are  decived  in  respect  to  our  being  subjects  of 
Moral  Government,  we  are  sure  of  nothing. 

V,   What  is  implied  in  the  right  to  govern. 

1.  From  what  has  just  been  said,  it  must  be  evident,  that 
the  right  to  govern,  implies  the  7iecessity  of  government  as  a 
means  of  securing  an  intrinsically  valuable  end. 

2.  Also  that  the  right  to  govern,  implies  the  duty^  or  obliga- 
tion to  govern.  There  can  be  no  right  in  this  case,  without 
corresponding  obligation;  for  the  right  to  govern  is  founded  in 
the  obligation  to  govern. 

3.  The  right  to  govern  implies  obligation  on  the  part  of  the 
subject  to  obey.  It  cannot  be  the  right  or  duty  of  the  gov- 
ernor to  govern,  unless  it  is  the  duty  of  the  subject  to  obey. 
The  governor  and  subject  are  alike  dependent  upon  govern- 
ment, as  the  indispensable  means  of  promoting  the  highest 
good.  The  governor  and  the  subject  must,  therefore,  be 
under  reciprocal  obligation,  the  one  to  govern,  and  the  other 
to  be  governed,  or  to  obey.  The  one  must  seek  to  govern, 
the  other  must  seek  to  be  governed. 

4.  The  right  to  govern  implies  the  right  and  duty  to  dispense 
just  and  necessary  rewards  and  punishments — to  distribute, 
rewards  proportioned  to  merit,  and  penalties  proportioned  to 
demerit,  whenever  the  public  interests  demand  their  execu- 
tion. 

5.  It  implies  the  right  and  duty  to  use  all  necessary  means 
to  secure  the  end  of  government  as  far  as  possible. 

6.  It  implies  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  subject  cheerfully 
to  acquiesce  in  any  measure  that  may  be  necessary  to  secure 
the  end  of  government — in  case  of  disobedience,  to  submit  to 
merited  punishment,  and  if  necessary,  to  aid  in  the  infliction 
of  the  penalty  of  Law. 

7.  It  implies  the  right  and  obligation  of  both  ruler  and  ruled, 


22  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

to  consecrate  themselves  to  the  promotion  of  the  great  end  of 
government,  with  a  single  and  steady  aim. 

8.  It  implies  obligation,  both  on  the  part  of  the  ruler  and 
ruled,  to  be  always  ready,  and  when  occasion  offers,  actually  to 
make  any  personal  and  private  sacrifice  demanded  by  the 
higher  public  good — to  cheerfully  meet  any  emergency,  and 
exercise  any  degree  of  self-denial  that  can  and  will  result  in  a 
good  of  greater  value  to  the  public,  than  that  sacrificed  by  the 
individual,  or  by  any  number  of  individuals,  it  always  being 
understood,  that  present  voluntary  sacrifices  shall  have  an  ul- 
timate reward. 

9.  It  implies  the  right  and  duty  to  employ  any  degree  of 
force  which  is  indispensable  to  the  maintenance  of  order,  the 
execution  of  wholesome  laws,  the  suppression  of  insurrections, 
the  punishment  of  rebels  and  disorganizers,  and  sustaining  the 
supremacy  of  Moral  Law.  It  is  impossible  that  the  right  to 
govern  should  not  imply  this ;  and  to  deny  this  right  is  to  deny 
the  right  to  govern.  Should  an  emergency  occur,  in  which  a 
ruler  had  no  right  to  use  the  indispensable  means  of  securing 
order,  and  the  supremacy  of  Law,  the  moment  this  emergency 
occurred,  his  right  to  govern  would,  and  must  cease:  for  it  is 
impossible  that  it  should  be  his  right  to  govern,  unless  it  be  at 
the  same  time,  and  for  the  same  reason,  his  duty  to  govern: 
but  it  is  absurd  to  say,  that  it  is  his  right  and  duty  to  govern, 
and  yet  at  the  s^me  time,  that  he  has  not  a  right  to  use  the  indis- 
pensable means  of  government.  It  is  the  same  absurdity,  as 
to  say,  that  he  has,  and  has  not  the  right  to  govern  at  the  same 
time.  If  it  be  asked,  whether  an  emergency  like  the  one 
under  consideration  is  possible,  and  if  so,  what  might  justly  be 
regarded  as  such  an  emergency,  I  answer,  that  should  cir- 
cumstances occur  under  which  the  sacrifice  necessary  to  sus- 
tain, would  overbalance  the  good  to  be  derived  from  the  prev- 
alence of  government,  this  would  create  the  emergency  under 
consideration,  in  which  the  right  to  govern  would  cease. 

VI.  Point  out  the  limits  of  this  right. 

The  right  to  govern  is,  and  must  be,  just  co-extensive  with  the 
necessity  of  government.  We  have  seen-,  that  the  right  to 
govern  is  founded  in  the  necessities  of  moral  beings.  In  other 
words,  the  right  to  govern,  is  founded  upon  the  fact,  that  the 
highest  good  of  moral  agents  cannot  be  secured,  but  by  mean« 
of  government. 

It  is  a  first  truth  of  Reason,  that  what  is  good  or  valuable  in 
itself,  should  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake,  and  that  it  must  there- 
fore be  the  duty  of  moral  agents  to  aim  at  securing,  and  so  far 


MORAL  QOVERNMEirr.  23 

as  in  them  lies,  to  use  the  means  of  securing  the  highest  good 
of  the  universe  for  its  own  sake,  or  on  account  of  its  intrinsic 
value.  If  moral  government  is  the  only  means  bj  which  this 
end  can  be  secured,  then  government  is  a  necessity  of  the 
universe,  thence  a  duty.  But  under  this  head,  to  avoid  mis- 
take, and  to  correct  erroneous  impressions  which  are  some- 
times entertained,  I  must  show  what  is  not  the  foundation  of 
the  right  to  govern.  The  boundary  of  the  right  must,  as  will 
be  seen,  depend  upon  the  foundation  of  the  right.  The  right 
must  be  as  broad  as  the  reason  for  it.  If  the  reason  of  the  right 
be  mistaken,  then  the  limits  of  the  right  cannot  be  ascertained, 
and  must  necessarily  be  mistaken  also. 

1.  Hence  the  right  to  govern  the  universe,  for  instance, 
cannot  be  found  in  the  fact,  that  God  sustains  to  it  the  relation 
of  Creator.  This  is  by  itself  no  reason  why  He  should  govern 
it,  unless  it  needs  to  be  governed — unless  some  good  will  result 
from  government.  Unless  there  is  some  necessity  for  govern- 
ment, the  fact  that  God  created  the  universe,  can  give  Him  no 
right  to  govern  it. 

2.  The  fact  that  God  is  the  Owner  and  Sole  Proprietor  of 
the  universe,  is  no  reason  why  he  should  govern  it.  Unless 
either  his  own  good,  or  the  good  of  the  universe,  or  of  both  to- 
gether, demands  government,  the  relation  of  Owner  cannot 
confer  the  right  to  govern.  Neither  God,  nor  any  other  being, 
can  own  moral  beings,  in  such  a  sense  as  to  have  a  right  to- 
govern  them,  when  government  is  wholly  unnecessary,  and 
can  result  in  no  good  whatever  to  God,  or  to  his  creatures. 
Government,  in  such  a  case,  would  be  perfectly  arbitrary 
and  unreasonable,  and  consequently  an  unjust,  tyrannical  and 
wicked  act.  God  has  no  such  right.  No  such  right  can,  by 
possibility  in  any  case  exist. 

3.  The  right  to  govern  cannot  be  founded  in  the  fact,  that 
God  possesses  all  the  attributes,  natural  and  moral,  that  are 
requisite  to  the  administration  of  JNIoral  Government.  This 
fact  is  no  doubt  a  condition  of  the  right;  for  without  these 
qualifications  He  could  have  no  right,  however  necessary  gov- 
ernment might  be.  But  the  possession  of  these  attributes  can- 
not confer  the  right  independently  of  the  necessity  of  govern- 
ment: for  however  well  qualified  He  may  be  to  govern,  still, 
unless  government  is  necessary  to  securing  his  own  glory  and 
the  highest  well-being  of  the  universe,  he  has  no  right  to  gov- 
ern it.  Possessing  the  requisite  qualifications  is  the  condition, 
and  the  necessity  of  government  is  the  foundation  of  the  right 
to  govern.     More  strictly,  the  right  is  founded  in  the  intrinsic 


i4  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

value  of  the  interests  to  be  secured  by  government,  and  con- 
ditionated  upon  the  fact,  that  government  is  the  necessary 
means  or  condition  of  securing  the  end. 

4.  Nor  is  the  right  to  govern  conferred  by  the  value  of  the 
interests  to  be  secured,  nor  by  the  circumstance  of  the  neces- 
sity of  government  merely,  without  respect  to  the  condition 
just  above  mentioned.  Did  not  God's  natural  and  moral  at- 
tributes qualify  Him  to  sustain  that  relation  better  than  any 
one  else,  the  right  could  not  be  conferred  on  Him  by  any  other 
fact  or  relation. 

5.  The  right  to  govern  is  not,  and  cannot  be  an  abstract 
right  based  on  no  reason  whatever.  The  idea  of  this  right 
is  not  an  ultimate  idea  in  such  a  sense,  that  our  intelligence 
affirms  the  right  without  assigning  any  reason  on  which  it  is 
founded.  The  human  intelligence  cannot  say  that  God  has  a 
right  to  govern,  because  he  has  such  aright;  and  that  this  is  rea- 
son enough,  and  all  the  reason  that  can  be  given.  Our  Reason 
does  not  affirm  that  government  is  right,  because  it  is  right,  and 
that  this  is  a  first  truth,  and  an  ultimate  idea.  If  this  were  so, 
then  God's  arbitrary  will  would  be  law,  and  no  bounds  possi- 
bly could  be  assigned  to  the  right  to  govern.  If  God's  right 
to  govern  be  a  first  truth,  an  ultimate  truth,  fact  and  idea, 
founded  in  no  assignable  reason,  then  He  has  the  right  to 
legislate  as  little,  and  as  much,  and  as  arbitrarily,  as  unneces- 
sarily, as  absurdly,  and  injuriously  as  possible;  and  no  injus- 
tice is,  or  can  be  done;  for  he  has,  by  the  supposition,  aright 
to  govern,  founded  in  no  reason,  and  of  course  without  any 
end.  Assign  any  other  reason  as  the  foundation  of  the  right 
to  govern  than  the  value  of  the  interests  to  be  secured  and 
conditionated  upon  the  necessity  of  government,  and  you  may 
search  in  vain  for  any  limit  to  the  right.  But  the  moment 
the  foundation  and  the  condition  of  the  right  are  discovered, 
we  see  instantly,  that  the  right  must  be  co-extensive  with  the 
reason  upon  which  it  is  founded,  or  in  other  words,  must  be 
limited  by,  and  only  by  the  fact,  that  thus  far,  and  no  farther, 
government  is  necessary  to  the  highest  good  of  the  universe. 
No  legislation  can  be  valid  in  heaven  or  earth — no  enact- 
ments can  impose  obhgation,  except  upon  the  condition,  that 
such  legislation  is  demanded  by  the  highest  good  of  the  Gov- 
ernor and  the  Governed.  Unnecessary  legislation  is  invalid 
legislation.  Unnecessary  government  is  tyranny.  It  can  in 
no  case  be  founded  in  right.  It  should,  however,  be  observed, 
that  it  is  often,  and  in  the  government  of  God,  universally  true, 
that  the  Sovereign,  and  not  the  subject,  is  to  be  the  Judge 


HORAL  GOVERNMENT.  .^^ 

of  what  is  necessary  legislation  and  government.  Under  no 
government,  therefore,  are  laws  to  be  despised  or  rejected  be- 
cause we  are  unable  to  see  at  once  their  necessity,  and  hence 
their  wisdom.  Unless  they  are  palpably  unnecessary,  and 
therefore  unwise  and  unjust,  they  are  to  be  respected  and 
obeyed  as  a  less  evil  than  contempt  and  disobedience,  though 
at  present  we  are  unable  to  see  their  wisdom.  Under  the 
government  of  God  there  can  never  be  any  doubt,  and  of 
course  any  ground  for  distrust  and  hesitancy,  as  it  respects 
the  duty  of  obedience. 

VII.   What  is  implied  in  Moral  Government, 

1.  Moral  Government  implies  a  Moral  Governor. 

2.  It  implies  the  existence  of  Moral  Law. 

3.  It  impUes  the  existence  of  Moral  Agents  as  the  subjects 
of  Moral  Government. 

4.  It  implies  the  existence  of  Moral  Obligation  to  obey 
Moral  Law.  , 

5.  It  implies  the  fact  of  Moral  Character,  that  is,  of  praise 
or  blame-worthiness  in  the  subjects  of  Moral  Government.  A 
Moral  Agent  must  be  under  Moral  Obligation,  and  one  who 
is  under  Moral  Obligation,  must  have  Moral  Character.     If 

he  complies  with  obhgation,  he  must  be  holy  and  praise- wor-    ^ 
thy;  if  he  refuse  to  comply  with  Moral  Obligation,  he  must  V 
be  sinful  and  blame-worthy. 

VIIL  Definition  of  Moral  Obligation, 

Obhgation  is  a  bond,  or  that  which  binds.  Moral  Obli- 
gation is  the  bond,  ligament,  or  tie  that  binds  amoral  agent  to 
Moral  Law.  Moral  Obligation  is  oughtness.  It  is  a  responsi- 
bility imposed  on  the  moral  agent  by  his  own  reason.  It  is  a 
first  truth  of  Reason  that  he  ought  to  will  the  valuable  for  its 
own  sake. 

Moral  Law  is  the  rule  in  conformity  with  which  he  ought 
to  act,  or  more  strictly,  to  will. 

Obligation  we  express  by  the  term  ought^  and  say  that  a 
moral  agent  ought  to  obey  Moral  Law,  or  that  he  ought  to 
choose  that  which  Moral  Law  requires  him  to  will. 

IX,  The  conditions  of  Moral  Obligation, 

1.  Moral  Agency,  The  conditions  of  Moral  Agency  are 
the  attributes  of  Intelligence^  Sensibility^  and  Free  Will;  or 
in  other  words  power  or  capacity  to  know,  to  feel,  and  to 
will  in  conformity  or  disconformity  with  knowledge  or  with 
moral  obligation.  There  must  be  Intelhgence  or  the  fac- 
ulty of  knowing  the  valuable  or  the  good,  and  that  the  valua- 
ble or  the  good  exists  or  is  possible,  that  something  exists  or 


26  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

may  exist  which  is  a  good  in  itself,  or  valuable  on  its  own  ac- 
count. There  must  be  reason  to  affirm  Moral  Obligation,  to 
will  the  valuable  because  it  is  valuable.  Moral  Obhgation 
cannot  exist  where  there  is  no  knowledge  of  moral  relations, 
of  the  valuable,  the  good,  where  there  is  no  Intellect  to  affirm 
Oughtness  or  Moral  Obligation — to  affirm  the  Tightness  of  wil- 
ling good  or  the  valuable,  and  the  wrongness  of  willing  evil  or 
of  selfish  wilHng. 

It  is  generally  agreed  that  Moral  Obligation  respects  strict- 
ly only  the  ultimate  intention  or  choice  of  an  end  for  its  own 
sake.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  idea  of  this  end  must  be  de- 
veloped as  a  condition  of  Moral  Obligation.  The  end  must  be 
first  known  or  perceived.  This  perception  must  develop  the 
idea  or  affirmation  of  obligation  to  choose  or  will  it.  The  de- 
velopment of  the  idea  of  obligation  necessitates  the  develop- 
ment of  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  as  its  correlatives.  The 
development  of  these  last  must  necessitate  the  affirmation  of 
praise  and  blame-worthiness  as  their  correlatives. 

The  conditions  of  moral  obligation,  strictly  speaking,  are 
tne  powers  of  moral  agency  with  the  development  of  the 
ideas  of  the  intrinsically  valuable,  of  moral  obligation  and 
of  right  and  wrong.  It  implies  the  development  also  of  the 
ideas  of  praise  and  blame-worthiness. 

3.  Sensibility,  or  the  power  or  susceptibility  of  feeling. 
Without  this  faculty  the  knowledge  of  the  good  or  the  valua- 
ble would  not  be  possible.  This  faculty  supplies  the  chrono- 
logical condition  of  the  idea  of  the  good  or  valuable.  Feeling 
pleasure  or  pain  in  the  sensibiUty  suggests  and  develops 
the  idea  of  the  good  or  the  valuable  in  the  intelligence,  just 
as  the  perception  of  body  suggests  and  develops  the  idea  of 
space,  or  just  as  beholding  succession  suggests  and  develops  the 
idea  of  time.  Perceiving  body  or  succession,  is  the  chronolog- 
ical condition  of  the  idea  of  space  or  time.  So  the  feehng 
of  pleasure  in  like  manner  suggests  or  develops  the  idea  of 
the  valuable.  The  existence  then  of  the  SensibiUty  or  of  a 
susceptibility  to  pleasure  or  pain  must  be  a  condition  of  Moral 
Agency  and  hence  of  Moral  Obligation. 

3.  Moral  Agency  implies  the  possession  of  Free  Will.  By 
Free  Will  is  intended  the  power  of  choosing  or  refusing  to 
choose  in  compliance  with  moral  obligation  in  every  instance. 
Free  Will  implies  the  power  of  originating  and  deciding  our 
own  choices  and  of  exercising  our  own  sovereignty  in  every 
instance  of  choice  upon  moral  questions — of  deciding  or  choos- 
ing in  conformity  with  dutv  or  nthprwise  in  all  cases  of  moral 


MORAL  GOVERiNMENT.  27 

obligation.  That  man  can  not  be  under  a  moral  obligation 
to  perform  an  absolute  impossibility  is  a  first  truth  of  reason. 
But  man's  causality,  his  whole  power  of  causality  to  perform  or 
do  any  thing,  lies  in  his  Will.  If  he  cannot  will,  he  can  do 
nothing.  His  whole  liberty  or  freedom  must  consist  in  his 
power  to  will.  His  outward  actions  and  his  menial  states  are 
connected  with  the  actions  of  his  Will  by  a  law  of  necessity. 
If  I  will  to  move  my  muscles,  they  must  move  unless  there  be 
a  paralysis  of  the  nerves  of  voluntary  motion,  or  unless  some 
resistance  be  opposed  that  overcomes  the  power  of  my  voli- 
tions. The  sequences  of  choice  or  volition  are  always  under 
the  law  of  necessity,  and  unless  the  Will  is  free  man  has  no 
freedom.  And  if  he  has  no  freedom  he  is  not  amoral  agent, 
that  is,  he  is  incapable  of  moral  action  and  also  of  moral  char- 
acter. Free  Will  then  in  the  above  defined  sense  must  be  a 
condition  of  moral  agency  and  of  course  of  moral  obligation. 
4.  Moral  Agency  implies  as  has  been  said  the  actual  devel- 
opment of  the  idea  of  good,  or  the  valuable,  of  obligation  and  of 
oughtness  or  duty.  The  mind  must  know  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  the  good  or  valuable  as  a  condition  of  the  obligation 
to  will  it.  Mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  cannot  but  aflSrm  ob- 
ligation to  will  the  good  or  the  valuable  as  soon  as  the  idea 
of  the  good  or  valuable  is  developed;  but  the  development  of 
this  idea  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  moral  obligation. 
When  the  faculties  of  a  moral  being  are  possessed,  with  suflS- 
cient  light  on  moral  subjects  to  develop  the  idea  of  the  good 
or  the  valuable  together  with  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong, 
the  mind  instantly  afiirms  and  must  aflSrm  moral  obligation  or 
oughtness.  Moral  Agency  commences  at  the  instant  of  the 
development  of  those  ideas,  and  with  them  also  commences 
moral  obHgation  and  of  course  moral  character. 

REMARKS. 

1.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  sin 
came  to  exist;  that  a  want  of  experience  in  the  universe, 
in  regard  to  the  nature  and  natural  tendencies  and  results  of 
sin,  prevented  the  due  influence  of  sanctions. 

2.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  see  that  all  the  devel- 
opments of  sin  are  enlarging  the  experience  of  the  universe  in 
regard  to  its  nature  and  tendencies,  and  thus  confirming  the 
influence  of  moral  government  over  virtuous  minds. 

3.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  can  understand  the 
design  and  tendency  of  the  Atonement;  that  it  is  designed, 
and  that  it  tends  to  reconcile  the  exercise  of  mercy,  with  a  due 
administration  of  law. 


38  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

4.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  can  understand  the 
philosophy  of  the  Spirit's  influences  in  convicting  and  sanctify- 
ing the  soul;  that  this  influence  is  moral,  persuasive,  and  not 
physical, 

5.  If  the  government  of  God  is  moral,  we  can  understand 
tlie  influence  and  necessity  of  faith.  Confidence  is  indispen- 
sable to  heart  obedience  in  any  government.  This  is  emphati- 
cally true  under  the  Divine  Government. 

6.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  can  see  the  necessity 
and  power  of  Christian  example.  Example  is  the  highest 
moral  influence. 

7.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  his  natural  or  physical 
omnipotence  is  no  proof  that  all  men  will  be  saved ;  for  sal- 
vation is  not  effected  by  physical  power. 

8.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  see  the  importance  of 
watchfulness,  and  girding  up  the  loins  of  our  minds. 

9.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  see  the  necessity  of  a 
well  instructed  ministry,  able  to  wield  the  motives  necessary 
to  sway  mind. 

12.  If  God's  government  is  moral,  we  see  the  philosophical 
bearings,  tendencies,  and  power  of  the  Providence,  Law,  and 
Gospel  of  God,  in  the  great  work  of  man's  salvation. 


LECTURE  III. 

I.  Man  a  Subject  of  Moral  Obligation. 

II.  Extent  op  Moral  Obligation. 

/.  Man  is  a  Subject  of  Moral  Obligation, 

This  IS  a  first  truth  of  reason*  A  first  truth  has  this  invaria- 
ble characteristic,  namely,  all  moral  agents  know  it  bj  a  ne- 
cessity of  nature  and  assume  its  truth  in  all  their  practical 
judgments,  whatever  their  philosophical  theories  may  be.  « 

Now  who  does  not  know  that  men  possess  the  attributes  of  ^ 
moral  agents:  to  wit,  Intellect,  (including  reason,  conscience, 
and  consciousness,)  Sensibility,  and  Free  Will,  Every  mor- 
al agent  does  know  and  cannot  but  know  this.  That  man 
has  Intellect  and  SensibiUty,  or  the  powers  of  knowing  and 
feeling,  has  not  to  my  knowledge  been  doubted.  In  theory,  the 
freedom  of  the  will  in  man  has  been  denied.  Yet  the  very  de- 
niers  have,  in  their  practical  judgments,  assumed  the  freedom  of 
the  human  will  as  well  and  as  fully  as  the  most  staunch  defen- 
ders of  human  liberty  of  will.  Indeed  no  body  ever  did  or 
can  in  practice  call  in  question  the  freedom  of  the  human 
will  without  justly  incurring  the  charge  of  insanity.  By  a 
necessity  of  his  nature  every  moral  agent  knows  himself  to  be 
free.  He  can  no  more  hide  this  fact  from  himself,  or  reason 
himself  out  of  the  conviction  of  its  truth,  than  he  can  speculate 
himself  into  a  disbelief  of  his  own  existence.  He  may  in  spec- 
ulation deny  either,  but  in  fact  he  knozvs  both.  That  he  is, 
that  he  is  free,  that  he  is  a  subject  of  moral  obligation  are  truths 
equally  well  known,  and  known  precisely  in  the  same  way, 
namely,  he  intuits  them — sees  them  in  their  own  light  by 
virtue  of  the  constitution  of  his  being.  I  have  said  that  man  is 
conscious  of  possessing  the  powers  of  a  moral  agent.  He  has 
also  the  idea  of  the  valuable,  of  right  and  of  wrong:  of  this  he 
is  conscious.  But  nothing  else  is  necessary  to  constitute  man 
or  any  other  being  a  subject  of  moral  obligation  than  the  pos- 
session of  these  powers  together  with  sufficient  light  on  moral 
subjects  to  develop  the  ideas  just  mentioned.  / 

Again.  Man,  by  a  law  of  necessity,  affirms  himself  to  be 
under  moral  obligation.  He  cannot  doubt  it.  He  affirms  ab- 
solutely and  necessarily  that  he  is  praise  or  blame-worthy  as 
he  is  benevolent  or  selfish.  Every  man  assumes  this  of  him- 
self and  of  all  other  men  of  sound  mind.  This  assumption  is 
irresistible  as  well  as  universal. 

The  truth  assumed  then  is  a  first  truth  and  not  to  be  called 
in  question.     But  if  it  be  called  in  question  in  theory,  it  still 
3* 


30  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOaY. 

remains  and  must  remain,  while  reason  remains,  a  truth  of 
certain  knowledge  from  the  presence  of  which  there  is  and  can 
be  no  escape.  The  spontaneous,  universal,  and  irresistible 
affirmation  that  men  of  sound  mind  are  praise  or  blame-worth  j 
as  they  are  selfish  or  benevolent,  shows  beyond  contradiction 
that  all  men  regard  themselves  and  others  as  the  subjects  of 
moral  obligation. 

//.  Extent  of  Moral  Obligation, 

By  this  is  intended,  to  what  acts  and  states  of  mind  does 
moral  obligation  extend?  This  certainly  is  a  solemn  and  a 
fundamentally  important  question. 

In  the  examination  of  this  question  I  shall, 

1.  State  again  the  conditions  of  moral  obligation. 

2.  Show  by  an  appeal  to  reason  or  to  natural  theology,  to 
what  acts  and  states  of  mind  moral  obligation  cannot  directly 
extend. 

3.  To  what  acts  or  states  of  mind  moral  obligation  must 
directly  extend. 

4.  To  what  acts  and  mental  states  moral  obligation  must 
indirectly  extend. 

5.  Examine  the  question  in  the  light  of  the  oracles  of  God. 
1.  State  again  the  conditions  of  moral  obHgation.     These 

must  of  necessity  be  introduced  here  if  we  would  understand 
this  subject,  although  they  have  been  examined  in  a  former 
Lecture  at  considerable  length.     These  conditions  are, 

(1.)  The  powers  and  susceptibilities  of  moral  agency.  Irir 
tellect^  including  Reason^  Conscience^  and  Self-consciousness. 
Reason  is  the  intuitive  faculty  or  function  of  the  intel- 
lect. It  gives  by  direct  intuition  the  following  among  oth- 
er truths:  the  absolute — for  example,  right  and  wrong;  the 
necessary — space  exists;  the  infinite — space  is  infinite;  the 
perfect — God  is  perfect — God's  law  is  perfect,  &c.  In 
short  it  is  the  faculty  that  intuits  moral  relations  and  af- 
firms moral  obligation  to  act  in  conformity  with  perceived 
moral  relations.  It  is  that  faculty  that  postulates  all  the 
a  priori  truths  of  science  whether  mathematical,  philosoph- 
ical, theological,  or  logical, 

Consaerice  is  the  faculty  or  function  of  the  Intelligence  that 
recognizes  the  conformity  or  disconformity  of  the  heart  and  life 
to  the  Moral  Law  as  it  lies  revealed  in  the  reason,  and  also 
awards  praise  to  conformity  and  blame  to  disconformity  to  that 
law.  It  also  affirms  that  conformity  to  the  moral  law  deserves  re- 
ward and  that  disconformity  deserves  punishment.  It  also 
possesses  a  propelling  or  impulsive  power  by  which  it  urges 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  31 

the  conformity  of  Will  to  Moral  Law.    It  does,  in  a  certain 
sense,  seem  to  possess  the  power  of  retrihution.  / 

Consciousness  is  the  faculty  or  function  of  self-knowledge. 
It  is  the  faculty  that  recognizes  our  own  existence,  mental  ac- 
tions, and  states,  together  with  the  attributes  of  liberty  or 
necessity,  belonging  to  those  actions  or  states. 

"  Consciousness  is  the  mind  in  the  act  of  knowing  it- 
self." By  consciousness  I  know  that  I  am — that  I  affirm 
that  space  is» — that  I  also  affirm  that  the  whole  is  equal  to  all 
its  parts — that  every  event  must  have  a  cause,  and  many  such 
like  truths.  I  am  conscious  not  only  of  these  affirmations,  but 
also  that  necessity  is  the  law  of  these  affirmations,  that  I  can- 
not affirm  otherwise  than  I  do  in  respect  to  this  class  of  truths. 
I  am  also  conscious  of  choosing  to  sit  at  my  desk  and  write, 
and  I  am  just  as  conscious  that  liberty  is  the  law  of  this  choice. 
That  is,  I  am  conscious  of  necessarily  regarding  myself  as  en- 
tirely ^ree  in  this  choice,  and  of  affirming  my  own  ability  to 
have  chosen  not  to  sit  at  my  desk  and  of  being  now  able 
to  choose  not  to  sit  and  write.  I  am  just  as  conscious  of  affir- 
ming the  liberty  or  necessity  of  my  mental  states  as  I  am  of 
the  states  themselves.  Consciousness  gives  us  our  existence 
and  attributes,  our  mental  acts  and  states,  and  all  the  attri- 
butes and  phenomena  of  our  being  of  which  we  have  any 
knowledge.  In  short  all  our  knowledge  is  given  to  us  by 
consciousness.  The  Intellect  is  a  receptivity  as  distinguished 
from  a  voluntary  power.  All  the  acts  and  states  of  the  intelli- 
gence are  under  the  law  of  necessity  or  physical  law.  The  will 
can  command  the  attention  of  the  intellect.  Its  thoughts,  per- 
ceptions, affirmations,  and  all  its  phenomena  are  involuntary 
2tnd  under  a  law  of  necessity.  Of  this  we  are  conscious.  An- 
other faculty  indispensable  to  moral  agency  is, 

(2.)  Sensibility.  This  is  the  faculty  or  susceptibility  of  feel- 
ing. All  sensation,  desire,  emotion,  passion,  pain,  pleasure, 
and  in  short  every  kind  and  degree  of  feeling  as  the  term  feel- 
ing is  commonly  used,  is  a  phenomenon  of  this  faculty.  This 
faculty  supplies  the  chronological  condition  of  the  idea  of  the 
valuable,  and  hence  of  right  and  wrong  and  of  moral  obliga- 
tion. The  experience  of  pleasure  or  happiness  develops  the 
idea  of  the  valuable  just  as  the  perception  of  body  develops 
the  idea  of  space.  But  for  this  faculty  the  mind  could  have 
no  idea  of  the  valuable  and  hence  of  moral  obligation  to  will 
the  valuable,  nor  of  right  and  wrong,  nor  of  praise  and 
blame-worthiness. 

This  faculty  like  the  intellect  is  a  receptivity  or    purely  a 


32  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

passive  as  distinguished  from  a  voluntary  faculty.  All  its  phe- 
nomena are  under  the  law  of  necessity.  I  am  conscious  that 
I  cannot,  by  any  direct  effort,  feel  when  and  as  I  will.  This 
faculty  is  so  correlated  to  the  intelligence  that  when  the  intel- 
lect is  intensely  occupied  with  certain  considerations,  the  Sensi- 
bility is  affected  in  a  certain  manner,  and  certain  feelings  exist  in 
the  Sensibility  by  a  law  of  necessity.  I  am  conscious  that  when 
certain  conditions  are  fulfilled,  I  can  not  but  have  certain  feel- 
ings, and  that  when  these  conditions  are  not  fulfilled,  I  can  not 
have  those  feelings.  I  know  by  consciousness  that  my  feel- 
ings and  all  the  states  and  phenomena  of  the  Sensibility  are 
only  indirectly  under  the  control  of  my  Will.  By  wilHng  I 
can  direct  my  Intelligence  to  the  consideration  of  certain  sub- 
jects, and  in  this  way  alone  affect  my  Sensibility,  and  produce 
a  given  state  of  feeling.  So  on  the  other  hand  if  certain  feel- 
ings exist  in  the  Sensibility  which  I  wish  to  suppress,  I  know 
that  I  can  not  annihilate  them  by  directly  willing  them  out  of 
existence,  but  by  diverting  my  attention  from  the  cause  of 
them,  they  cease  to  exist  of  course  and  of  necessity.  Thus 
feeling  is  only  indirectly  under  the  control  of  the  Will. 
Another  faculty  indispensable  to  moral  agency  is, 
(3.)  Free  Will.  By  Free  Will  is  intended  the  power  to 
choose,  in  every  instance,  in  accordance  with  moral  obliga- 
tion, or  to  refuse  so  to  choose.  This  much  must  be  implied  in 
Fr^e  Will,  and  I  am  not  concerned  to  affirm  any  thing  more. 
The  Will  is  the  voluntary  power.  In  it  resides  the  power  of 
causality.  As  consciousness  gives  the  affirmation  that  neces- 
sity is  an  attribute  of  the  phenomena  of  the  Intellect  and  of 
the  SensibiHty,  so  it  just  as  unequivocally  gives  the  affirma- 
tion that  Liberty  is  an  attribute  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
Will.  I  am  as  conscious  of  affirming  that  I  could  will  differ- 
ently from  what  I  do  in  every  instance  of  moral  obHgation,  as 
I  am  of  the  affirmation  that  I  can  not  affirm^  in  regard  to  truths 
of  intuition,  otherwise  than  I  do.  I  am  as  conscious  of  being 
free  in  willing  as  I  am  of  not  being  free  or  voluntary  in  my 
feelings  and  intuitions. 

Consciousness  of  affirming  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  that 
is,  of  power  to  will  in  accordance  with  moral  obligation,  or 
to  refuse  thus  to  will,  is  a  necessary  condition  of  the  affirma- 
tion of  moral  obligation.  For  example:  No  man  affirms,  or 
can  affirm,  his  moral  obligation  to  undo  all  the  acts  of  his  past 
life,  and  to  live  his  life  over  again.  He  can  not  affirm  himself 
to  be  under  this  obligation,  simply  because  he  cannot  but 
affirm  the  impossibihty  of  it.     He  can  affirm,  and  indeed  can 


MORA.L  GOVERNMENT.  33? 

not  but  affirm  his  obligation  to  repent  and  obey  God  in  fu*- 
ture,  because  he  is  conscious  of  affirming  his  ability  to  do  this^ 
Consciousness  of  the  affirmation  of  ability  to  comply  with  any 
requisition,  is  a  necessary  condition  of  the  affirmation  of  obli- 
gation to  comply  with  that  requisition.  Then  no  moral  agent 
can  affirm  himself  to  be  under  moral  obligation  to  perform 
an  impossibility. 

(4.)  A  fourth  condition  of  moral  obligation  is  Light,  or  so» 
much  knowledge  of  our  moral  relations  as  to  develop  the- 
idea  of  oughtness.     This  implies, 

[1.]  The  perception  or  idea  of  the  intrinsically  valuable. 

[2.]  The  affirmation  of  obUgation  to  will  the  valuable  for  its- 
own  sake. 

[3.]  The  development  of  the  idea  that  it  is  right  to  will  the 
good  or  the  valuable  and  wrong  not  to  will  it  for  its  own  sake 
or  disinterestedly. 

Before  I  can  affirm  my  obligation  to  will,  I  must  perceive 
something  in  that  which  I  am  required  to  will  as  an  ultimate 
end,  that  renders  it  worthy  of  being  chosen.  I  must  have  an 
object  of  choice.  That  object  must  possess  in  itself  that 
which  commends  itself  to  my  Intelligence  as  worthy  of  being 
chosen. 

All  choice  must  respect  means  or  ends.  That  is,  every 
thing  must  be  willed  either  as  an  end  or  a  means.  I  can  not 
be  under  obligation  to  will  the  means  until  I  know  the  end. 
I  can  not  know  an  end,  or  that  which  can  possibly  be  chosen 
as  an  ultimate  end,  until  I  know  that  something  is  intrinsically 
valuable.  I  can  not  know  that  it  is  right  or  wrong  to  choose 
or  refuse  a  certain  end,  until  I  know  whether  the  proposed  ob- 
ject of  choice  is  intrinsically  valuable  or  not.  It  is  impossi- 
ble for  me  to  choose  it  as  an  ultimate  end,  unless  I  perceive 
it  to  be  intrinsically  valuable.  This  is  self-evident;  for  choos- 
ing it  as  an  end  is  nothing  else  than  choosing  it  for  its  intrin- 
sic value.  Moral  obligation,  therefore,  always  and  necessa- 
rily implies  the  knowledge  that  the  well  being  of  God  and  of 
the  Universe  is  valuable  in  itself,  and  the  affirmation  that 
it  ought  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake,  that  is,  impartially 
and  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  value.  It  is  impossible  that 
the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  should  be  developed  untiL  the 
idea  of  the  valuable  is  developed.  Right  and  wrong  respect 
intentions,  and  strictly  nothing  else,  as  we  shall  see.  In- 
tention implies  an  end  intended.  Now  that  which  is-  cho- 
sen as  an  ultimate  end,  is  and  must  be  chosen  for  rts^  own 
sake  or  for  its  intrinsic  value.     Until  the  end  is  apprehendedi 


34  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

no  idea  or  affirmation  of  obligation  can  exist  respecting 
it.  Consequently  no  idea  of  right  or  wrong  in  respect  to 
that  end  can  exist.  The  end  must  first  be  perceived.  The 
idea  of  the  intrinsically  valuable  must  be  developed.  Simul- 
taneously with  the  development  of  the  idea  of  the  valuable 
the  Intelligence  affirms,  and  must  affirm  obligation  to  will  it, 
or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  that  it  is  right  to  will  it,  and 
wrong  not  to  will  it. 

It  is  impossible  that  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  and  of 
right  and  wrong  should  be  developed  upon  any  other  con- 
ditions than  those  just  specified.  To  affirm  the  contrary 
were  absurd.  Suppose,  for  instance,  it  should  be  said  that 
the  idea  of  the  intrinsically  valuable  is  not  necessary  to  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  moral  obligation,  and  of  right 
and  wrong.  Let  us  look  at  it.  It  is  agreed  that  moral 
obligation,  and  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  respect,  di- 
rectly, intentions  only.  It  is  also  admitted  that  all  inten- 
tions must  respect  either  means  or  ends.  It  is  also  admitted 
that  obligation  to  will  means,  can  not  exist  until  the  end  is 
known.  It  is  also  admitted  that  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end 
implies  the  choice  of  a  thing  for  its  own  sake,  or  because  it  is 
intrinsically  valuable.  Now,  from  these  admissions,  it  follows 
that  the  idea  of  the  intrinsically  valuable  is  the  condition  of 
moral  obligation,  and  also  of  the  idea  of  moral  obligation. 
It  must  follow  also  that  the  idea  of  the  valuable  must  be  the 
condition  of  the  idea  that  it  would  be  right  to  choose  or  wrong  not 
to  choose  the  valuable.  When  I  come  to  the  discussion  of 
the  subject  of  moral  depravity,  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  that 
the  idea  of  the  valuable  is  very  early  developed,  and  is  among 
the  earliest,  if  not  the  very  first,  of  human  intellections.  I 
have  here  only  to  insist  that  the  development  of  this  idea  is 
a  sine  qua  non  of  moral  obligation.  It  is,  then,  nonsense  to 
affirm  that  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  are  developed  antece- 
dently to  the  idea  of  the  valuable.  It  is  the  same  as  to  say 
that  I  affirm  it  to  be  right  to  will  an  end,  before  I  have  the 
idea  of  an  end,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  of  the  intrinsically 
valuable,  or  wrong  not  to  will  an  end  when  as  yet  I  have  no 
idea  or  knowledge  of  any  reason  why  it  should  be  willed, 
or  in  other  words,  while  I  have  no  idea  of  an  ultimate  end. 
This  is  absurd. 

Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  then,  that  the  conditions  of 
moral  obligation  are, 

I.  The  possesssion  of  the  powers,  or  faculties,  and  suscep- 
.Abilities  of  a  moral  agent. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  33 

2.  Lights  or  the  development  of  the  ideas  of  the  valua- 
ble, of  moral  obligation,  of  right  and  wrong. 

It  has  been  absurdly  contended  that  Sensibility  is  not  ne- 
cessary to  moral  agency.  This  assertion  overlooks  the  fact 
that  Moral  Law  is  the  Law  of  Nature;  that,  therefore,  were 
the  powers  and  susceptibilities  radically  different  from  what 
they  are,  or  were  the  correlation  of  these  powers  radically 
otherwise  than  it  is  they  could  not  still  be  moral  agents  in  the 
sense  of  being  under  the  same  law  that  moral  agents  now  are. 
Possessing  a  different  nature,  they  must  of  necessity  be  sub- 
ject to  a  different  law.  The  law  of  their  nature  must  be  their 
law^  and  no  other  could  by  any  possibility  be  obligatory  upon 
them. 

//.  /  am  to  show  hy  an  appeal  to  reason^  or  to  natural  theology^ 
to  what  acts  and  states  of  mind  moral  obligation  cannot  directly 
extend. 

L  Not  to  external  or  muscular  action.  These  actions  are 
connected  with  the  actions  of  the  Will  by  a  law  of  necessity* 
If  I  will  to  move  my  muscles  they  must  move,  unless  the 
nerves  of  voluntary  motion  are  paralyzed,  or  some  resistance 
is  offered  to  muscular  motion  that  overpowers  the  strength  of 
my  Will,  or,  if  you  please,  of  my  muscles.  It  is  generally 
understood  and  agreed  that  moral  obligation  does  not  directly 
extend  to  bodily  or  outward  action. 

2.  Not  to  the  states  of  the  Sensibility.  I  have  already 
remarked  that  we  are  conscious  that  our  feelings  are  not  vol- 
untary but  involuntary  states  of  mind.  Moral  obligation  can 
not,  therefore,  directly  extend  to  them. 

3.  Not  to  states  of  the  Intelligence.  The  phenomena  of 
this  faculty  we  also  know  by  consciousness  to  be  under  the 
law  of  necessity.  It  is  impossible  that  moral  obligation  should 
extend  directly  to  any  involuntary  act  or  state  of  mind. 

4.  Not  to  unintelUgent  acts  of  Will.  There  are  many  un- 
intelligent volitions  or  acts  of  Will,  to  which  moral  obligation 
can  not  extend,  for  example,  the  volitions  of  maniacs,  or  of 
infants,  before  the  reason  is  at  all  developed.  They  must  at 
birth  be  the  subjects  of  volition,  as  they  have  motion  or  mus- 
cular action.  The  voHtions  of  somnambulists  are  also  of  this 
character.  Purely  instinctive  voHtions  must  also  come  under 
the  category  of  unintelligent  actions  of  Will.  For  example: 
A  bee  lights  on  my  hand,  I  instantly  and  instinctively  shake 
him  off.  I  tread  on  a  hot  iron,  and  instinctively  move  my 
foot.  Indeed  there  are  many  actions  of  will  which  are  put 
forth  under  the  influence  of  pure  instinct,  and  before  the 


I 


36  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Intelligence  can  affirm  obligation  to  will  or  not  to  will.  These 
surely  can  not  have  moral  character,  and  of  course  moral 
obligation  cannot  extend  to  them. 

///.  To  what  acts  and  states  of  mind  Moral  Obligation  must 
directly  extend. 

1.  To  all  intelligent  acts  of  will.  These  are  and  must 
be  free. 

2.  All  intelligent  acts  of  will  must  consist,  either  in  the 
choice  of  ends  or  means.  The  mind  does  not  act  intelligent- 
ly, except  as  it  acts  in  reference  to  some  end  or  object  of  choice. 

3.  The  choice  of  an  ultimate  end  is  an  ultimate  intention. 

4.  The  choice  of  the  means  to  secure  an  ultimate  end,  is 
but  an  endeavor  of  the  will  to  secure  it,  and  is  therefore,  but 
an  exertion  of  the  ultimate  intention.  It  is  choosing  this  as  a 
means  to  that^  that  is,  it  is  the  choice  of  the  end  and  of  the 
means  for  its  sake.  Choosing  the  means  is  sometimes,  though 
I  think  improperly,  denominated  subordinate  choice,  or  the 
choice  of  subordinate  ends. 

5.  All  intelligent  wilHng,  choosing,  intending,  must  consist, 
either  in  the  choice  of  an  end,  or  in  volitions  or  efforts  to  se- 
cure an  end.  In  other  words,  all  choosing  must  consist  in 
choosing  an  end,  or  something  for  its  own  sake,  or  in  choosing 
means  to  compass  the  end.  This  must  be,  or  there  is  really 
no  object  of  choice. 

6.  I  have  said,  that  Moral  Obligation  respects  the  ultimate 
intention  only.  I  am  now  prepared  to  say  still  further,  that 
this  is  a  first  truth  of  Reason.  It  is  a  truth  universally  and 
necessarily  assumed  by  all  Moral  Agents,  their  speculations 
to  the  contrary  in  any  wise  notwithstanding.  This  is  evident 
from  the  following  considerations. 

(1.)  Very  young  children  know  and  assume  this  truth  uni- 
versally. They  always  deem  it  a  sufficient  vindication  of 
themselves,  when  accused  of  any  delinquency,  to  say,  "I  did 
not  mean  to,"  or  if  accused  of  short  coming,  to  say,  "  I  meant 
or  intended  to  have  done  it — I  designed  it."  This,  if  true, 
they  assume  as  an  all-sufficient  vindication  of  themselves. 
They  know  that  this,  if  believed,  must  he  regarded  as  a  suffi- 
cient excuse  to  justify  them  in  every  case. 

(2.)  Every  Moral  Agent  necessarily  regit rds  such  an  excuse 
as  a  perfect  justification,  in  case  it  be  sincerely  and  truly 
made. 

(3.)  It  is  a  saying  as  common  as  men  are,  and  as  true  as  com- 
mon, that  men  are  to  be  judged  by  their  motives,  that  is,  by 
their  designs,  intentions.     It  is  impossible  for  us  not  to  assent 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  87 

to  this  truth.  If  a  man  intend  evil,  though  perchance  he 
may  do  us  good,  we  do  not  excuse  him,  but  hold  him  guilty  of 
the  crime  which  he  intended.  So  if  he  intend  to  do  us 
good,  and  perchance  do  us  evil,  we  do  not,  and  cannot 
condemn  him.  For  this  intention  and  endeavor  to  do  us  good, 
we  cannot  blame  him,  although  it  has  resulted  in  evil  to  us. 
He  may  be  to  blame  for  other  things  connected  with  the  af- 
fair. He  may  have  come  to  our  help  too  late,  and  may  have 
been  to  blame  for  not  coming  when  a  different  result  would 
have  followed;  or  he  may  have  been  blamable  for  not  being 
better  qualified  for  doing  us  good.  He  may  have  been  to 
blame  for  many  things  connected  with  the  transaction,  but  for 
a  sincere,  and  of  course  hearty  endeavor  to  do  us  good,  he  is 
not  culpable,  nor  can  he  be,  however  it  may  result.  If  he 
honestly  intended  to  do  us  good,  it  is  impossible  that  he  should 
not  have  used  the  best  means  in  his  power  at  the  time:  this 
is  implied  in  honesty  of  intention.  And  if  he  did  this,  rea- 
son cannot  pronounce  him  guilty,  for  it  must  judge  him  by 
his  intentions. 

(4.)  Courts  of  Criminal  Law  have  always  in  every  enlight- 
ened country  assumed  this  as  a  first  truth.  They  always  in- 
quire into  the  quo  animo,  that  is,  the  intention,  and  judge  ac- 
cordingly. 

(5.)  The  universally  acknowledged  truth  that  lunatics  are  not 
moral  agents  and  responsible  for  their  conduct,  is  but  an  illus- 
tration of  the  fact  that  the  truth  we  are  considering  is  regard- 
ed and  assumed  as  a  first  truth  of  Reason, 

7.  Again  if  it  be  true,  which  certainly  it  must  be,  that  all 
choices  respect  ends  or  means,  and  that  the  choice  of  means 
to  effect  an  end  is  only  an  endeavor  to  secure  the  intended 
end,  it  must  also  be  true  that  Moral  Obligation  extends  di- 
rectly only  to  ultimate  intention. 

8.  But  the  Bible  every  where,  either  expressly  or  impliedly 
recognizes  this  truth.  "  If  there  be  a  willing  mind,  that  is, 
a  right  willing  or  intention^  it  is  accepted,"  &c. 

9.  Again.  All  the  Law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word,  love.  Now  this 
can  not  be  true  if  the  spirit  of  the  whole  Law  does  not  di- 
rectly respect  intentions  only.  If  it  extends  directly  to 
thoughts,  emotions,  and  outward  actions,  it  can  not  be  truly 
said  that  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  Law.  This  love  must  be 
good  will,  for  how  could  involuntary  love  be  obligatory? 

10.  Again.  The  spirit  of  the  Bible  every  where  respects  the 
intention.  If  the  intention  is  right,  or  if  there  be  a  willing 
mind  it  is  accepted  as  obedience.    But  if  there  be  not  a  will- 

4 


38  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ing  mind,  that  is,  right  intention,  no  outward  act  is  regarded 
as  obedience.  The  willing  is  always  regarded  by  the  Scrip- 
tures as  the  doing.  If  a  man  look  on  a  woman  to  lust  after  her, 
that  is,  with  licentious  intention  or  willing,  he  hath  committed 
adultery  wuth  her  already,  &c.  So  on  the  other  hand,  if  one 
intends  to  perform  a  service  for  God  which  after  all  he  is  una- 
ble to  perform,  he  is  regarded  as  having  virtually  done  it,  and 
is  rewarded  accordingly. 

This  is  too  obviously  the  doctrine  of  the  Bible  to  need  fur- 
ther elucidation. 

IV,  To  what  Acts  and  Mental  States  Moral  Obligation  indi- 
rectly extends. 

Under  this  head  I  remark, 

That  it  has  been  already  said  that  outward  action  to- 
gether with  the  states  of  the  Intelligence  and  Sensibility  are 
connected  with  the  actions  of  the  Will  by  a  Law  of  Neces- 
sity. 

(1.)  The  muscles  of  the  body  are  directly  under  the  control  of 
the  Will.  I  will  to  move,  and  my  muscles  must  move,  unless 
there  be  a  paralysis  of  the  nerves  of  voluntary  motion,  or  un- 
less some  opposing  power  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  overconie 
the  strength  of  my  Will  be  interposed. 

(*2.)  The  Intellect  is  also  directly  under  the  control  of  the 
Will.  I  am  conscious  that  I  can  control  and  direct  my  atten- 
tion as  I  please,  and  think  upon  one  subject  or  another. 

(3.)  The  Sensibility,  I  am  conscious,  is  only  indirectly  con- 
trolled by  the  Will.  Feeling  can  be  produced  only  by  direct- 
ing the  attention  and  thoughts  to  those  subjects  that  excite 
Feeling  by  a  Law  of  Necessity. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  to  say, 

1.  That  Moral  Obligation  extends  indirectly  to  outward  or 
bodily  actions.  These  are  often  required  in  the  Word  of  God. 
The  reason  is  that  being  connected  with  the  actions  of  the 
Will  by  a  Law  of  Necessity,  if  the  Will  is  right  the  outward 
action  must  follow,  except  upon  the  contingencies  just  named, 
and  therefore  such  actions  may  reasonably  be  required.  But 
if  the  contingencies  just  named  intervene  so  that  outward  ac- 
tion does  not  follow  the  choice  or  intention,  the  Bible  accepts 
the  Will  for  the  deed  invariably.  "If  there  be  a  wilUng 
mind  it  is  accepted  according"  &c. 

2.  Moral  Obligation  extends  indirectly  to  the  states  of  the 
Sensibility,  so  that  certain  emotions  or  feelings  are  required  as 
outward  actions  are,  and  for  the  same  reason,  namely,  the 
states  of  the  Sensibility  are  connected  with  the  actions  of  the 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  39 

Will  by  a  Law  of  Necessity.  But  when  the  Sensibility  is 
exhausted,  or  when  for  any  reason  the  right  action  of  the 
Will  does  not  produce  the  required  feelings,  it  is  accepted 
upon  the  principle  just  named. 

3.  Moral  Obligation  indirectly  extends  also  to  the  states  of 
the  Intellect;  consequently  the  Bible,  to  a  certain  extent, 
and  in  a  certain  sense,  holds  men  responsible  for  their  Thoughts 
and  Opinions.  It  every  where  assumes  that  if  the  heart  be 
constantly  right  the  Thoughts  and  Opinions  will  correspond 
with  the  state  of  the  Heart  or  Will;  '^If  any  man  will  do 
his  will  he  shall  know  the  doctrine  whether  it  be  of  God."  It 
is,  however,  manifest  that  the  Word  of  God  every  where  as- 
sumes that,  strictly  speaking,  all  virtue  and  vice  belong  to  the 
heart  or  intention.  Where  this  is  right,  all  is  regarded  as 
right;  and  where  this  is  wrong,  all  is  regarded  as  wrong.  It  is 
upon  this  assumption  that  the  doctrine  of  total  depravity  rests. 
It  is  undeniable  that  the  veriest  sinners  do  many  things  out- 
wardly which  the  Law  of  God  requires.  Now  unless  the  in- 
tention decides  the  character  of  these  acts,  they  must  be  re- 
garded as  really  virtuous.  But  when  the  intention  is  found  to 
be  selfish,  then  it  is  ascertained  that  they  are  sinful  notwith- 
standing their  literal  conformity  tothe  Law  of  God. 

The  fact  is  that  Moral  Agents  are  so  constituted  that  it  is 
impossible  for  them  not  to  judge  themselves  and  others  by 
their  motives  and  intentions.  They  cannot  but  assume  it  as  a 
first  truth  that  a  man's  character  is  as  his  intention  is,  and 
consequently  that  Moral  Obligation  respects  directly  only 
intention . 

4.  Moral  Obligation  then  indirectly  extends  to  every  thing 
about  us,  over  which  the  Will  has  direct  or  indirect  control. 
The  Moral  Law,  while,  strictly,  it  legislates  over  intention 
only,  yet  in  fact  legislates  over  the  whole  being,  inasmuch  as 
all  our  powers  are  directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  inten- 
tion by  a  Law  of  Necessity.  Strictly  speaking,  however, 
Moral  Character  belongs  alone  to  the  intention.  In  strict 
propriety  of  speech,  it  can  not  be  said  that  either  outward  ac- 
tion or  any  state  of  the  Intellect  or  the  Sensibihty  has  a  moral 
element  or  quality  belonging  to  it.  Yet  in  common  language, 
which  is  sufficiently  accurate  for  most  practical  purposes,  we 
speak  of  thought,  feeling,  and  outward  action  as  holy  or  un- 
holy. 


LECTURE  IV. 
FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

In  discussing  this  subject  I  will, 

I.  Repeat  the  Definition  of  Moral  Obligation. 

II.  Remind  you  of  the  Conditions  of  Moral  Obligation?, 

III.  Show  what  is  intended  by  the  Foundation  of  Mor- 
al Obligation. 

IV.  Point  out  again  the  Extent  of  Moral  Obligation. 

V.  Notice  the  Points  of  Agreement  between  the 
principal  parties  in  this  discussion. 

VI.  Show  wherein  they  disagree. 

VII.  Show  from  Reason  and  Revelation  what  must  be 
the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

VIII.  Show  wherein  that  consists  which  constitutes 
the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

IX.  Examine   the  claims  of  the  Principal  Theories 

THAT  HAVE  BEEN  ADVOCATED  ON  THIS  SUBJECT. 

Before  I  enter  directly  upon  the  discussion  I  would  ob- 
serve that  this  question,  like  most  Theological  questions,  is  both 
Psychological  and  Theological.  It  is  common,  and  as  absurd 
and  vain  as  it  is  common,  to  object  to  Metaphysical  discus- 
sions in  the  examination  of  Theological  questions.  The  fact 
is  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  holding  Theological  opinions 
without  assuming  the  truth  of  some  system  of  Mental  Philoso- 
phy. Metaphysical  Theology  is  only  Bible  Theology  ex- 
plained; and  to  object  to  Metaphysics  in  Theology  is  only  to 
object  to  the  application  of  Reason  in  the  explanation  of  the 
facts  of  Revealed  Theology.  It  has,  however,  been  too  com- 
mon to  discuss  this  question  without  suitable  reference  to  the 
Bible,  that  is,  it  has  been  common  to  treat  it  as  a  purely  Psy- 
chological Question.  But  this  mode  of  procedure  can  never 
be  satisfactory  to  a  Christian  Mind.  I  shall  therefore  discuss 
it  both  as  a  Biblical  and  as  a  Psychological  Question. 

/.  /  am  to  repeat  the  Definition  of  Moral  Obligation, 

Obligation  is  that  which  binds.  Moral  Obligation  is  the 
bond  or  ligament  that  binds  a  Moral  Agent  to  Moral  Law. 
The  idea,  however,  is  too  plain  to  be  defined  by  the  use  of 
other  language.  It  is  a  pure  idea  of  the  Reason,  and  better 
understood  than  explained  by  any  term  except  that  of  Mor- 
al Obligation  itself. 

//.  /  am  to  call  attention  again  to  the  Conditions  of  Moral 
Obligation, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  41 

These  have  been  so  fully  discussed  in  a  preceding  lecture 
that  it  is  only  necessary  to  observe  that  these  conditions  are 
the  powers  of  moral  agency,  together  with  so  much  light  on 
moral  relations  as  to  develop  the  idea  of  Oughtness  or  Moral 
Obhgation. 

///.  /  am  to  show  what  is  intended  hy  the  Foundation  of  Mor- 
al  Obligation, 

The  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation  is  the  Reason  or  Con- 
sideration that  imposes  obligation  on  a  moral  agent  to  obey 
moral  law.  Should  the  question  be  asked,  why  does  the  mor- 
al law  require  what  it  does?  the  true  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion would  also  answer  the  question,  what  is  the  Founda- 
tion of  Moral  Obligation?  There  must  be  some  good  and 
sufficient  reason  for  the  law  requiring  what  it  does,  or  it 
cannot  be  Moral  Law  or  impose  Moral  Obligation.  The 
question  then  is,  why  does  the  Moral  Law  require  what  it 
does?  The  reason  that  justifies  and  demands  the  requisition 
must  be  the  reason  why  it  ought  to  be  obeyed.  The  reason 
for  the  command  must  be  identical  with  the  reason  for  obedi- 
ence— the  reason  why  the  law  should  require  what  it  does, 
is  the  reason  why  we  should  do  what  it  requires.  This  rea- 
son, whatever  it  is,  is  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation, 
that  is,  of  the  obligation  to  obey  Moral  Law.  To  ascertain 
what  this  reason  is,  is  the  object  of  the  discussion  upon  which 
we  have  entered. 

IV,  I  am  to  remind  you  of  the  Extent  of  Moral  Obligation. 

In  a  former  Lecture,  it  has  been  shown  that  moral  obliga- 
tion extends,  strictly  speaking,  to  the  ultimate  intention  only, 
that  the  Law  of  God  requires  only  entire  consecration  to  the 
right  end. 

V.  I  am  to  notice  the  points  of  Agreement  among  the  prin- 
cipal parties  in  this  discussion, 

1.  They  agree  in  their  definition  of  Moral  Obligation. 

2.  They  also  agree  in  respect  to  the  conditions  of  moral 
obligation — that  they  are,  as  has  just  been  stated,  the  powers 
of  moral  agency  with  so  much  light  respecting  moral  rela- 
tions as  to  develop  the  idea  of  oughtness  or  obligation. 

3.  They  agree  also  in  respect  to  what  is  intended  by  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation — namely,  that  the  founda- 
tion of  moral  obligation  is  the  fundamental  reason  or  con- 
sideration on  which  the  obligation  rests  or  is  founded. 

4.  They  agree  also  in  respect  to  the  extent  of  moral  obli- 
gation, that  strictly  speaking,  it  extends  only  to  the  ultimate 
action  or  choice  of  the  Will ;  or  in  other  words,  that  it  ex- 

4* 


42  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

tends  to  the  ultimate  intention  only,  or  to  the  choice  of  an  ul- 
timate end,  or  of  something  for  its  own  sake. 

5.  They  agree  in  holding  that  an  ultimate  end  is  one  cho- 
sen for  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself,  or  for  its  own  intrinsic  val- 
ue, and  not  as  a  condition  or  means  of  securing  any  other  end. 

6.  They  hold  in  common  that  the  moral  law  as  revealed  in 
the  Bible  covers  the  whole  ground  of  moral  obhgation — that 
is,  that  the  Law  of  God  as  revealed  in  the  Bible  requires  all 
that  is  obligatory  on  moral  agents. 

7.  They  agree  also  that  the  sum  of  the  requirements  of 
the  Moral  Law  is  expressed  in  one  word,  Love;  that  the  term 
love  is  comprehensive  of  all  that  the  true  spirit  of  the  Moral 
Law  requires. 

8.  They  agree  also  that  this  love  is  not  an  emotion  or  mere 
involuntary  feeling  of  any  kind,  but  that  it  consists  in  ultimate 
choice,  preference,  intention,  or  in  the  choice  of  an  ultimate 
end,  that  is,  of  something  for  its  own  sake,  or  for  what  it  is  in 
and  of  itself. 

9.  They  agree  that  the  fundamental  reason  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  choose  an  ultimate  end  must  be  found  in  the  end  itself^ 
and  that  this  reason,  or  that  in  the  end  which  imposes  obliga- 
tion to  choose  it  as  an  end,  must  be  identical  with  the  end  it- 
self. The  fundamental  reason  for  choosing  a  thing,  is  that 
in  the  thing  which  renders  it  obligatory  to  choose  it.  This 
reason  is  the  end  on  which  the  choice  ought  to  and  must  ter- 
minate, or  the  true  end  is  not  chosen.     This  brings  me, 

VL   To  show  wherein  they  differ. 

From  the  foregoing  it  must  be  plain  that  they  must  differ 
only  in  respect  to  the  end  on  which  choice,  preference,  inten- 
tion, ought  to  terminate;  that  is,  they  differ  in  respect  to  that 
which  moral  agents  ought  to  choose  as  an  ultimate  end.  This 
is  the  true  point  of  difference.  The  question  on  w^hich  they 
differ  is  this:  What  is  the  ultimate  end  to  which  movi\\  agents 
are  under  obhgation  to  consecrate  their  whole  being? 

VIL  I  am  to  shozo  from  Reason  and  Revelation  what  must  be 
the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

This  inquiry,  as  will  be  seen,  resolves  itself  into  an  inquiry 
concerning  the  true  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  Law  of  God. 
What  does  the  Moral  Law  mean?  What  does  it  require? 
What  is  the  end  which  it  commands  moral  agents  to  choose, 
will,  intend,  for  its  own  sake?  Let  it  be  remembered  that  it 
is  agreed  that  moral  obligation  cannot  exist  in  respect  to  the 
choice  of  an  ultimate  end,  unless  there  be  something  in  the 
e^d  itself  that  renders  it  worthy  or  deserving  of  being  chosen 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  4J^' 

for  its  own  sake.  It  is  plainly  impossible  to  choose  any  thing 
as  an  ultimate  end  or  for  its  own  sake,  except  as  it  is  chosen  for 
what  it  is  in  and  of  itself.  And  it  is  just  as  plain  that  there 
can  be  no  obligation  to  choose  it  for  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself 
except  there  be  in  it  that  which  renders  it  worthy  of  choice. 
This  brings  me  to  lay  down  the  following  proposition: 

The  highest  Well  Being  of  God  and  of  the  Universe  of  se-n^ 
tient  existences  is  the  end  on  which  ultimate  preference^  choice^  in- 
tention^ ought  to  terminate.  In  other  words,  the  Well  Being 
of  God  and  of  the  Universe  is  the  absolute  a7id  ultimate  good^  and 
therefore   it  should  he    chosen   by  every   moral    agent,  ./ 

It  is  certain  that  the  highest  well  being  of  God  and  of  the  Uni- 
verse of  sentient  existences  must  be  intrinsically  and  infinitely 
valuable  in  itself.  It  is  a  first  truth  of  reason  that  whatever  '^^ 
is  intrinsically  valuable  should  be  chosen  for  that  reason,  or  as 
an  end.  It  is  and  must  be  a  first  truth  of  reason,  that  what- 
ever is  intrinsically  and  infinitely  valuable  ought  to  be  chosen 
as  the  uUimate  end  of  existence  by  every  moral  agent.  To 
say  that  a  thing  is  intrinsically  and  infinitely  valuable,  is  the 
same  as  to  say  that  it  is  intrinsically  and  infinitely  worthy  or 
deserving  of  being  chosen  for  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself. 
Therefore  to  admit  or  afiirm  that  a  thing  is  intrinsically  and 
infinitely  valuable,  is  the  same  as  to  afiirm  that  every  moral 
agent  who  has  the  knowledge  of  this  intrinsically  and  infinitely 
valuable  thing,  is  under  an  obhgation  of  infinite  weight  to 
choose  it  for  the  reason  that  it  is  intrinsically  and  infinitely 
valuable,  or,  in  other  words  to  choose  it  as  an  ultimate  end. 
It  is  then  the  intrinsic  and  infinite  value  of  the  highest  good 
or  well  being  of  God  and  of  the  Universe  that  constitutes 
the  true  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation.  The  Moral  Law 
then  must  require  moral  agents  to  will  good  or  {hat  which  is 
intrinsically  valuable  to  God  and  the  Universe  of  sentient  ex- 
istences for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  ultimate  end.'  Be  it  remem- 
bered that  Moral  Obhgation  respects,  strictly  speaking,  the 
ultimate  intention  only.  It  must  follow  that  the  highest  well 
being  of  God  and  of  the  Universe,  is  the  intrinsically  valua- 
ble end  on  which  ultimate  choice  ought  to  terminate. 

And  here  let  it  be  observed  that  good  may  be  willed  for  its 
own  sake;  that  is,  because  it  is  good  or  valuable  on  condition 
that  it  belongs  to  or  can  be  enjoyed  by  self.  This  may  be  the 
condition  on  which  a  moral  agent  chooses  its  existence.  He 
may  refuse  to  choose  it  because  it  is  valuable,  except  on  the  con- 
dition that  it  belongs  to  self.  Its  relation  to  self  may  with 
him  be  the  condition  on  which  he  will  choose  it.  To  choose 
thus  is  Selfishness, 


44  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

^     Good  may  be  chosen  disinterestedly^  that  is,  for  its  own  in- 
J^trinsic  value  to  being  in  general^  that  is,  the  highest  well  be- 
/  ing  of  being  in  general  may  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake  or  on 
(  account  of  its  intrinsic  value.     This  is  what  is  called  disinter' 
\ested  benevolence, 
^^       It  should  be  observed  that  all  the  actions  of  the  Will  con- 
sist in  choices  or  willings.  These  actions  are  generally  regard- 
ed as  consisting  in  Choice  and  Volition,     By  choice  is  intend- 
ed the  selection  or  choice  of  an  end.  By  volition  is  intended 
the  executive  efforts  of  the  Will  to  secure  the  end  intended. 

The  Killing  or  refusing  of  the  will  is  only  choice  in  an  op- 
posite direction.  In  Nilling,  the  will  as  really  chooses  as  in 
any  other  acts  of  will.  If  it  refuses  one  end,  it  in  the  very 
act  chooses  another.  If  it  refuses  one  means,  it  is  only  because 
it  seeks  another. 

It  should  further  be  observed  in  this  place  that  all  intelli- 
gent choices  or  actions  of  the  Will,  must  consist  either  in  the 
choice  of  an  end  or  of  means  to  secure  an  end.  To  deny  this 
is  the  same  as  to  deny  that  there  is  any  object  of  choice. 
If  the  Will  acts  at  all,  it  wills,  chooses.  If  it  chooses,  it  choos- 
es something — there  is  some  object  of  choice.  In  other  words, 
it  chooses  something  for  some  reason,  and  that  reason  is  truly 
the  object  of  the  choice.  Or  at  least,  ^e  fundamental  reason 
for  choosing  a  thing  is  the  object  chosen.  Now  whenever  the 
Will  chooses,  it  chooses  something  for  its  own  sake  or  for  what 
it  is  in  and  of  itself,  or  as  a  means  or  condition  of  securing 
that  which  is  chosen  for  its  own  sake.  To  say  that  there  can 
be  an  intelligent  action  of  the  Will  that  does  not  consist  ei- 
ther in  the  choice  of  an  end  or  of  means  to  secure  an  end,  is 
the  same  thing  as  to  say  that  there  is  an  action  of  the  Will, 
when  nothing  whatever  is  willed,  or  chosen;  which  is  absurd. 

It  should  further  be  observed  that  the  choice  of  an  end  im- 
plies the  choice  of  all  the  known,  necessary  conditions  and 
means  of  securing  that  end;  that  the  choice  of  an  end,  se- 
cures and  even  necessitates^  while  the  choice  of  the  end  con- 
tinues, the  choice  of  the  known  necessary  conditions  and 
means. 

VIIL  I  am  to  show  wherein  that  consists  which  constitutes  the 
true  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation ;  in  other  words^  in  what 
the  highest  Well-Being  or  Ultimoie  Good  of  sentient  beings  con- 
sists ? 

In  discussing  this  question  I  will  endeavor  to  show, 

1.  Wherein  it  can  not  consist. 

%  Show  wherein  it  must  consist. 


MORAL  GfOVERNMENT,  4$ 

But  first  I  must  define  the  different  sense  of  the  term  good. 
Good  may  be  natural  or  moral.  Natural  good  is  synonymous 
with  valuable.  Moral  good  is  synonymous  yfiihvirtue.  Mor- 
al good  may  be  a  natural  good  in  the  sense  that  it  may  be  a 
means  or  condition  of  natural  good.  Good  may  be  Absolute 
and  Relative,  Absolute  good  is  that  which  is  valuable  in  itself 
or  intrinsically  valuable.  Relative  good  is  that  which  is  valu- 
able as  a  means.  Absolute  good  may  also  be  a  relative  good, 
that  is,  it  may  be  a  means  of  perpetuating  and  augmenting  it- 
self. Good  may  also  be  Ultimate.  Ultimate  good  is  that  ab- 
solute good  in  which  all  relative  good  terminates  or  results. 
It  is  that  absolute  good  to  which  all  relative  good  sustains  the 
relation  of  conditions  or  means. 

I  would  here  remark  also  that  there  is  a  broad  distinction 
between  the  conditions  and  means  of  the  highest  good  of  being 
and  that  which  constitutes  the  absolute  and  ultimate  good  of  be- 
ing, 

1.  Wherein  the  ultimate  and  absolute  good  can  not  consist. 

By  an  ultimate  good  is  intended  that  which  is  intrinsically 
valuable.  Relative  good  is  that  which  is  valuable  as  a  means 
of  ultimate  good.     I  here  remark, 

(1.)  That  the  ultimate  and  absolute  good  must  belong  to  being 
or  to  sentient  existences.  It  must  be  inseparable  from  beings 
that  have  a  conscious  existence.  It  is  nonsense  to  speak  of 
an  insentient  or  unconscious  existence  as  being  capable  of  or 
as  being  a  subject  of  the  absolute  and  ultimate  good.  Noth- 
ing can  be  a  good  or  intrinsically  valuable  to  such  a  being. 
A  block  of  marble  can  not  be  the  subject  of  good.  To  it  noth- 
ing is  good  or  evil.  Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  that  none 
but  a  sentient  being  can  know  or  possibly  be  a  subject  of 
good  in  the  sense  of  the  valuable.     I  remark, 

(2.)  That  with  moral  agents  at  least  the  ultimate  good  must 
consist  in  a  state  of  mind.  It  must  consist  in  something  that 
must  be  sought  and  found,  if  found  at  all,  within  the  field  of 
consciousness.  v^ 

[1.]  The  ultimate  and  absolute  good  in  the  sense  of  the  in* 
trinsically  valuable^  can  not  be  identical  with  Moral  Law,  Mor- 
<d  Law  as  we  have  seen,  is  an  Idea  of  the  Reason,  Moral  Law 
and  Moral  Government  must  propose  some  end  to  be  secured 
by  means  of  law.  Law  can  not  be  its  own  end.  It  can 
not  require  the  subject  to  seek  itself  as  an  ultimate  end.  This 
were  absurd.  The  Moral  Law  is  nothing  else  than  the  Reason's 
Idea,  or  Conception  of  that  course  of  willing  and  acting  that 
is  fit,  proper,  suitable  to,  and  demanded  by  the  nature,  rela-    ./ 


46  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

tions,  necessities,  and  circumstances  of  moral  agents.  Their 
nature,  relations,  circumstances  and  wants  being  perceived, 
the  Reason  necessarily  affirms  that  they  ought  to  propose  to 
themselves  a  certain  end,  and  to  consecrate  themselves  to  the 
promotion  of  this  end  for  its  own  sake,  or  for  its  own  intrinsic 
value.  This  end  can  not  be  law  itself.  The  law  is  a  simple 
and  pure  idea  of  the  Reason  and  can  never  be  in  itself  the  su- 
preme, intrinsic,  absolute  and  ultimate  good. 
w  [2.]  Nor  can  obedience,  or  the  course  of  acting  or  willing 

required  by  the  law,  be  the  ultimate  end  aimed  at  by  the  law 
€«"  the  lawgiver.  The  law  requires  action  in  reference  to  an 
end^  or  that  an  end  should  be  willed ;  but  the  willing  and  the 
end  to  be  willed  can  not  be  identical.  The  action  required 
and  the  end  to  which  it  is  to  be  directed  can  not  be  the  same* 
To  affirm  that  it  can,  is  absurd.  It  is  to  affirm  thkt  obe- 
dience to  law  is  the  ultimate  end  proposed  by  Law  or 
Government.  The  obedience  is  one  thing,  the  end  to  be 
secured  by  obedience  is  and  must  be  another.  Obedience 
must  be  a  means  or  condition^  and  that  which  law  and  obedi- 
ence are  intended  to  secure,  is  and  must  be  the  ultimate  end  of 
^  obedience.  The  law  or  the  lawgiver  aims  to  promote  the  high- 
est good  or  blessedness  of  the  universe.  This  must  be  the 
etid  of  IMoral  Law  and  Moral  Government.  Law  and  obedi- 
ence must  be  the  means  or  conditions  of  this  end.  It  is  ab- 
.  surd  to  deny  this.  To  deny  this  is  to  deny  the  very  nature  of 
Moral  Law  and  to  lose  sight  of  the  true  and  only  end  of  Mor- 
al Government.  Nothing  can  be  Moral  Law  and  nothing  can 
be  Moral  Government  that  does  not  propose  the  highest  good 
of  moVal  beings  as  its  ultimate  end.  But  if  this  is  the  end  of 
law  and  the  end  of  government  it  must  be  the  end  to  be  aimr 
cd  at  or  intended  by  the  ruler  and  the  subject.  And  this  end 
must  be  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  The  end  propos- 
ed to  be  secured  must  be  intrinsically  valuable  or  that  would 
not  be  Moral  Law  that  proposed  to  secure  it.  The  end  must 
be  good  or  valuable^  per  se,  or  there  can  be  no  Moral  Law  re- 
quiring it  to  be  sought  or  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end,  nor  any 
obligation  to  choose  it  as  an  ultimate  end. 

It  must  be  true,  then,  that  the  end  proposed  by  Moral  Law 
can  neither  be  the  law  itself  nor  obedience  to  law.  Obedience 
consists  in  the  choice  of  an  end.  It  is  impossible  that  choice 
should  be  an  ultimate  end.  To  make  choice  an  ultimate  end 
were  to  choose  choice,  and  to  intend  intention  as  an  ultimate 
end — this  is  plainly  impossible. 

[3.]  The  absolute  and  ultimate  good  of  being  can  not  con- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  ^ 

sist  in  moral  worth  or  good  desert.  Moral  worth  or  good  de- 
sert is  a  result  of  obedience  to  law.  It  is  not  a  state  of  mind 
— it  is  merit.  It  is  a  quality  or  attribute  of  character.  As  it 
is  not  a  state  of  mind,  it  can  not  be  the  ultimate  and  absolute 
good  of  being.  It  is  good  desert^  and  is  not  identical  with  the 
good  deserved.  It  is  a  good  and  an  indispensable  condition  ot 
of  the  ultimate  and  absolute  good,  but  can  not  be  identical 
with  it.  As  it  does  not  consist  in  a  state  of  mind,  it  is  im- 
possible that  it  should  be  the  ultimate  good.  It  is  intrinsical- 
ly meritorious  or  deserving  of  good,  but  not  identical  with  the 
ultimate  good.  It  is  that  to  which  the  law  and  the  lawgiver 
promise  the  ultimate  good,  but  it  is  not  the  good  promised. 

Moral  worth,  merit,  and  good  desert,  can  never  have  been 
the  end  proposed  by  the  lawgiver.  The  law  proposes  to  se- 
cure moral  worth,  not  as  an  ultimate  end^  not  as  the  ultimate 
and  absolute  good  of  the  subject,  but  as  a  condition  of  his  be- 
ing rewarded  with  absolute  good.  The  Lawgiver  and  the  law 
propose  ultimate  and  perfect  satisfaction  and  blessedness  as  a 
result  of  virtue  and  of  moral  worth.  This  result  must  be 
the  ultimate  and  absolute  good. 

The  reason  why  virtue  and  moral  excellence  or  worth 
have  been  supposed  to  be  a  good  in  themselves,  and  in- 
trinsically  and  absolutely  valuable,  is,  that  the  mind  ne- 
cessarily regards  them  with  satisfaction.  They  meet  a  de- 
mand of  the  Reason  and  Conscience;  they  are  the  arch- 
etypes of  the  Ideas  of  the  Reason  and  are  therefore  nat- 
urally and  necessarily  regarded  with  satisfaction, just  as  when 
we  behold  natural  beauty,  we  necessarily  enjoy  it.  We  nat- 
urally experience  a  mental  satisfaction  in  the  contemplation 
of  beauty,  and  this  is  true  whether  the  beauty  be  physical  or 
moral.  Both  meet  a  demand  of  our  nature,  and  therefore  we 
experience  satisfaction  in  their  contemplation.  Now  it  has 
been  said  that  this  satisfaction,  is  itselfproof  thatwe  pronounc- 
ed the  beauty  a  good  in  itself.  But  ultimate  good  must,  as 
we  have  said,  consist  in  a  state  of  mind.  But  neither  physi- 
cal nor  moral  beauty  is  a  state  of  mind.  Aside  from  the  sat- 
isfaction produced  l3y  their  contemplation,  to  whom  or  to  what 
can  they  be  a  good?  Take  physical  beauty  for  example,  aside 
from  every  beholder,  to  whom  or  to  what  is  it  a  good?  Is  it  a 
good  to  itself?  But  it  can  not  be  a  subject  of  good.  It  must 
be  a  good  only  as  and  because  it  meets  a  demand  of  our 
being  and  produces  satisfaction  in  its  contemplation.  It  is  a 
relative  good.  The  satisfaction  experienced  by  contemplat- 
ing it,  is  an  ultimate  good.    It  is  only  a  condition  of  ultimate 


48  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

good.  So  virtue  or  holiness  is  morally  beautiful.  Moral 
worth  or  excellence  is  morally  beautiful.  Beauty  is  an  attri- 
bute or  element  of  holiness,  virtue,  and  of  moral  worth, 
or  right  character.  But  the  beauty  is  not  identical  with  holi- 
ness nor  moral  worth  any  more  than  the  beauty  of  a  rose  and 
the  rose  are  identical.  The  rose  is  beautifuL  Beauty  is  one 
of  its  attributes.  So  virtue  is  morally  beautifuL  Beauty  is 
one  of  its  attributes.  But  the  beauty  in  neither  case  is  a  state 
of  mind,  and  can  not  be  an  ultimate  good.  The  contempla- 
tion of  either  and  of  both  naturally  begets  mental  satisfaction 
because  of  the  relation  of  the  archetype  to  the  idea  of  our 
Reason.  We  are  so  constituted  that  beholding  the  arche- 
types of  certain  ideas  of  our  Reason  produces  mental  satisfac- 
tion. Not  because  we  affirm  the  archetypes  to  be  good  in 
themselves ;  for  often,  to  say  the  least,  as  for  instance  in  the 
case  of  physical  beauty,  this  cannot  be,  but  because  these  arch- 
etypes meet  a  demand  of  our  nature.  They  meet  this  demand, 
and  thus  produce  satisfaction.  This  satisfaction  is  an  ulti- 
mate good,  but  that  which  produces  it,  is  only  a  relative  good. 
Apart  from  the  satisfaction  produced  by  the  contemplation  of 
moral  worth,  of  what  value  can  it  be?  Can  the  worthiness  of 
good,  or  the  moral  beauty  be  the  end  proposed  by  the  lawgiver? 
Or  must  we  seek  to  secure  moral  worth  in  moral  agents  for  the 
sake  of  the  good  in  which  it  results?  If  neither  the  subject  of  mor- 
al excellence  or  worth  nor  any  one  else  experienced  the  least  satis- 
faction in  contemplating  it — if  it  did  not  so  meet  a  demand  of 
mir  being  or  of  any  being  as  to  afford  the  least  satisfaction  to 
any  sentient  existence,  to  whom  or  to  what  would  it  be  a  good? 
If  it  meets  a  demand  of  the  nature  of  a  moral  agent,  it  must 
produce  satisfaction.  It  does  meet  a  demand  of  our  being, 
and  therefore  produces  satisfaction  to  the  Intelligence,  the 
Conscience,  the  SensibiUty.  It  is  therefore  necessarily 
pronounced  by  us  to  be  a  good.  We  are  apt  to  say  it  is  an 
ultimate  good ;  but  it  is  only  a  relative  good.  It  meets  a  de- 
mand of  our  being  and  thus  produces  satisfaction.  This  sat- 
isfaction is  the  ultimate  good  of  being.  At  the  very  moment 
we  pronounce  it  a  good  in  itself,  it  is  only  because  we  experi- 
ence such  a  satisfaction  in  contemplating  it.  At  the  very 
time  we  say  that  we  consider  it  a  good  in  itself  wholly  indo 
pendent  of  its  results.,  we  only  say  so  the  more  positively 
because  we  are  so  gratified  at  the  time  by  thinking  of  it.  It 
is  its  experienced  results  that  is  the  ground  of  the  affirma- 
tion. 

[4.]  It  cannot  be  too  distitictly  understood  that  Right  Char* 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  49 

acter^  Moral  Worth,  Good  Desert,  Meritoriousness,  or  whatever 
you  call  it,  can  not  be  Or  consist  in  a  state  of  Mind,  and 
therefore  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be  an  ultimate  good 
or  intrinsically  valuable.  By  Right  Character,  Moral  Worth, 
Good  Desert,  Meritor iousness,  &c.,  as  distinguished  from  vir- 
tue, we  can  mean  nothing  more  than  that  it  is  fit  and  prop- 
er and  suitable  to  the  nature  and  relation  of  things,  that  a 
virtuous  person  should  be  blessed."  The  Intelhgence  is  grat- 
ified when  this  character  is  perceived  to  exist.  This  per- 
ception produces  intellectual  satisfaction.  This  satisfaction 
is  a  good  in  itself  But  that  which  produces  this  satisfaction, 
is  in  no  proper  sense  a  good  in  itself.  Were  it  not  for  the 
fact  that  it  meets  a  demand  of  the  Intelligence  and  thus  pro- 
duces satisfaction,  it  could  not  so  much  as  be  thought  of  as  a 
good  in  itself  any  more  than  any  thing  else  thatis  a  pure  concep- 
tion of  the  Reason,  such,  for  instance,  as  a  mathematical  line. 

It  is  impossible  that  the  Lawgiver  or  the  Law  should 
make  obedience  or  the  worthiness  resulting  from  obedience, 
an  ultimate  end,  God  requires  the  highest  good  of  the 
universe  to  be  willed  as  an  ultimate  end.  Now  he  requires 
the  willing  for  the  sake  of  the  good  willed.  He  aims  and 
must  aim  at  securing  the  good  and  not  merely  the  willing* 
He  must  aim  at  securing  the  good^  and  not  merely  securing 
the  wilHng  or  the  worthiness  resulting  from  willing.  It  is 
the  end  He  aims  at.  The  willing  and  the  worthiness  of  wil- 
ling are  valuable  only  as  the  end  willed  is  valuable.  Were 
it  not  that  the  end  is  intrinsically  valuable,  the  willing  would 
not  be  so  much  as  relatively  valuable.  It  would  have  no  val- 
ue whatever.  And  but  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end 
willed,  Good  Desert  would  not  result  from  willing  it.  Both 
the  virtuousness  and  the  meritoriousness  of  willing  the  end 
depends  altogether  upon  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.  But 
for  this,  I  say  again,  neither  Virtue  nor  Merit  could  exist. 
Now  it  is  absurd  to  make  that  an  ultimate  good  and  to  affirm 
that  to  be  intrinsically  and  ultimately  valuable,  whose  whole 
value  consists  in  its  relations  to  an  ultimate  good. 

[5.]  The  ultimate  or  absolute  good  can  not  cojisist  in  any 
thing  external  to  Mind  itself  Moral  Agents  are  so  con- 
stituted as  to  sustain  certain  correlations  to  things  external 
to  themselves,  many  of  which  things  are  necessary  means 
and  conditions  of  their  well  being.  But  none  of  these  can 
be  good  or  valuable  in  themselves.  That  is,  nothing  without 
the  consciousness  of  being  can  be  a  good  per  se. 

The  Constitution  of  Moral  Agents  has  three  primary  De- 
5 


w 


50  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

partments  or  Faculties  as  we  have  formerly  seen,  namely, 
the  Intellect^  the  Sensibility^  and  the  Will.  All  the  demands 
of  our  being  may  be  and  must  be  made  by  one  of  these 
Faculties.  The  Intellect  has  its  demands  or  wants.  The 
Sensibility  has  its  objects  of  desire,  or  its  demands  and 
wants.  Our  whole  being  is  comprised  in  these  three  de- 
partments, and  they  sustain  such  correlations  to  each  other 
and  to  the  universe  that  the  objects  demanded  by  these 
powers  or  susceptibilities  are  indispensable  conditions  of 
our  well-being  or  being  satisfied.  For  instance,  the  Intellect  de- 
mands knowledge  of  Truth;  the  Conscience  demands  obedi- 
ence to  Moral  Law ;  the  Sensibihty  demands  those  objects  that 
excite  its  desires.  These  are^only  specimens  of  the  de- 
mands or  wants  of  our  being.^v  Our  well-being  or  our  high- 
est good  is,  from  the  constitution  of  our  Nature,  condition- 
ated  upon  the  demands  of  our  Nature  being  met  and  our 
wants  supplied.  These  wants  are  numerous.  Now  the  ob- 
jects that  are  so  correlated  tons  as  to  be  the  conditions  of  our 
blessedness,  are  not  the  ultimate  and  absolute  goo(J;^  Truth, 
for  example,  is  a  condition  or  means  of  our  ultimate  good, 
but  it  is  not  itself  an  ultimate  good.  To  whom  or  what  would 
it  be  a  good  were  there  no  Intelligence  to  apprehend  it?  It 
meets  a  demand  of  the  IntelHgence,  and  is  therefore  a  rela- 
tive good.  The  same  is  and  must  be  true  of  every  thing  that 
is  so  correlated  to  us  as  to  meet  a  demand  of  our  Constitution. 
The  meeting  of  these  demands,  the  supply  of  these  wants 
produces  mental  satisfaction.  This  satisfaction  is  an  ultimate 
good.     But  the  things  that  produce  it  are  only  relative  good. 

It  is  possible  that  an  ultimate  good  may  be  also  a  relative 
good.  Thus  the  satisfaction  or  blessedness  that  constitutes 
the  ultimate  good  may  and  does  tend  to  perpetuate  and  in- 
crease itself  The  contemplation  by  us  of  the  joy  of  others 
may  be,  and  often  is,  a  means  of  increasing  our  own.  In  this 
case  the  ultimate  good  is  both  an  ultimate  and  a  relative  good; 
that  is,   it  is  both  an  ultimate  end  and  a  means. 

It  is  true  also  that  a  thing  may  meet  a  demand  of  our  being  and 
be  at  the  same  time  a  means  and  an  ultimate  end.  Our  Nature 
demands  Satisfaction.,  Blessedness.,  Enjoyment.  This  is  an  ul- 
timate demand.  That  which  supplies  or  meets  this  demand 
is  an  ultimate  good.  The  universal  satisfaction  of  all  the  pow- 
ers and  susceptibilities  of  our  Nature  is  the  ultimate  good  of 
our  being.  This  demand  is  only  met  by  the  ultimate  and  ab- 
solute good.  All  other  demands  are  met  by  their  appropri- 
ate objects,  not  one  of  which  is  an  ultimate  or  absolute  good, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  51 

but  only  a  relative  good.  As  these  objects  meet  the  demands 
of  our  Constitution  they  produce  satisfaction;  this  satisfaction 
is  an  ultimate  good.  Did  they  not  produce  satisfaction  they 
would  not  be  a  good  in  any  sense.  The  Intelligence  is  met 
and  the  Reason  is  satisfied,  that  is,  the  things  which  it  de- 
manded, it  has  obtained,  or  they  are  accomplished. 

Virtue,  then,  or  obedience  to  Moral  Law  is  in  some  sense  a  good 
to  a  Moral  Agent,  that  is,  it  meets  a  demand  of  his  Reason 
or  Conscience.  Moral  Worth,  also,  or  Right  Character,  is 
demanded  by  the  IntelHgence  of  every  Moral  Agent,  and 
where  Moral  Worth  is  seen  to  exist,  this  demand  of  the  In- 
telHgence is  met.  So  far  that  exists  which  it  demanded  ; 
so  that  in  this  sense  Moral  Worth  is  valuable  to  a  Moral 
Agent  inasmuch  as  it  meets  a  demand  of  his  being.  So  all 
the  objects  of  desire  are  valuable  in  the  sense  that  they  meet 
a  demand  of  the  Constitution. 

But  here  an  inquiry  arises.  Are  these  the  ultimate  good?  I 
answer  no,  for  this  reason,  that  they  are  not,  and  cannot  be  re- 
garded by  the  mind  as  ultimate.  The  universal  intelligence  de- 
mands Virtue  or  obedience  to  moral  law,  and  when  this  is  seen 
to  exist  the  Intelligence  is  satisfied.  For  example;  when  the 
mind  perceives  any  thing  to  which  it  sustains  such  a  correla- 
tion that  the  thing  is  demanded  by  the  mind,  in  other  words, 
that  it  is  a  necessity  of  nature,  the  possession  of  the  object  sat- 
isfies the  demand.  When  the  IntelHgence  acquires  the 
knowledge  that  it  demands,  it  is  satisfied.  When  the 
Conscience  has  that  which  it  demands,  or  when  that  exists 
which  the  conscience  demands,  the  conscience  is  satisfied. 
When  the  SensibiHty  possesses  those  objects  of  desire  which 
it  craved,  the  SensibiHty  is  satisfied.  Whenever  the  Intelli- 
gence perceives  the  concrete  realization  of  those  ideas  of  the 
Reason  whose  realization  was  demanded  by  the  Intelligence, 
the  Intelligence  is  satisfied.  The  mind  continues  to  struggle 
after  all  the  objects  that  are  so  correlated  to  it  as  to  be  de- 
manded by  any  power  of  the  mind,  and  it  does  not  rest  until 
that  demand  is  met.  As  soon  as  the  demand  is  met  the 
mind  rests  and  is  satisfied.  Now  observe,  those  things  after 
which  the  mind  is  struggling  to  meet  its  demands,  are  not 
the  ultimate  good  of  the  mind  that  is  thus  struggHng.  When 
the  mind  has  obtained  the  objects  after  which  it  struggles, 
and  which  it  demands,  it  then  rests — it  is  satisfied.  And  it 
matters  not  which  of  the  powers  of  the  mind  makes  the  de- 
mand, the  power  is  not  satisfied  until  the  end  is  gained.  And 
when  the  end  is  gained,  thus  far  the  mind  is  satisfied.    A 


52  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

benevolent  mind  is  not  seeking  merely  self-satisfaction^  for 
this  is  not  what  Reason  demands.  But  it  seeks  the  satisfac- 
tion of  being  in  general,  including  its  own,  and  in  willing  the 
general  good  is  sure  to  secure  its  own. 

This  brings  me  to  remark  again,  that  those  objects  external  to 
the  mind  itself  after  which  the  mind  struggles  and  which,  when 
obtained,  meet  the  demands  of  the  constitution  and  satisfy  the 
mind  are  not  the  ultimate  good  of  the  mind,  but  the  satisfaction  re- 
sulting from  the  possession  of  those  objects  is  the  ultimate  good. 

It  appears  to  me  that  this  must  be  self-evident.  If  the 
mind  i?>  perfectly  satisfied^  \hG.  satisfaction  itself  is  to  the  mind 
a  perfect^  an  ultimate^  and  an  absolute  good.  For  example, 
God  possesses  a  self  existent  and  infinite  nature.  Certain 
things  were  demanded  by  the  constitution  and  laws  of  his 
own  being;  such  as  that  his  will  should  be  conformed  to 
the  Law  of  his  Intelligence,  or  in  other  words  that  he  should 
be  virtuous.  Now  when  this  demand  was  met*  and  the  heart 
o:r  Will  was  conformed  to  the  law  of  tlie  Intelligence,  which 
was  from  eternity  with  him,  this  demand  of  his  Being  was 
met — his  Conscience,  and  his  Intelligence  were  satisfied. 
They  are  so.  His  Intelligence  is  in  a  state  of  infinite  and 
eternal  satisfaction,  or  in  other  words,  he  possesses  necessa- 
rily what  we  call  an  intellectual  pleasure  or  delight  or  satis- 
faction in  the  state  of  his  Will,  or  in  other  words,  in  the 
Will's  conformity  to  the  law  of  his  Intelhgence.  Now  mark :  the 
\irtue  that  meets  this  demand  is  to  Him  a  goody  because  it 
meets  a  demand  of  his  Being.  But  it  is  not  the  ultimate 
goody  but  the  satisfaction  which  he  has  in  that  state  of  his 
Will  is  the  ultimate  good.  So  there  were  many  other  ideas  of  the 
Divine  Reason,  such  as  the  idea  of  the  Just,  of  the  Right,  the 
Beautiful,  the  Useful,  the  Merciful,  and  such  hke.  Now  the 
Intelligence  demanded  that  these  ideas  should  be  realized, 
and  the  Sensibility  also  desires  the  realization  of  these  ideas. 
In  other  words  still,  the  reahzation  of  these  ideas  was  not 
only  demanded  by  the  Intelhgence,  but  their  realization  was 
an  object  of  rational  desire. 

When  creative '|)Ower  went  forth  for  the  realization  of  these 
ideas,  when  the  universe  sprang  into  existence  as  the  arche- 
type or  living  expression  and  exemplification  of  these  ideas, 
the  Divine  Mind  was  satisfied.  He  is  represented  as  having 
looked  upon  all  that  He  had  made,  and  pronounced  it  '''•  very 

Sod,''"'     That  is.  He  was  satisfied  with  the  work  of  his  hands, 
e  beheld  the  reahzation  of  the  ideas  of  his  own  Reason, 
and  saw  that  these  demands  of  his  being  were  met.    Now 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  53 

observe  :  from  eternity  these  things  were  present  to  God  in 
such  a  sense  that  He  was  from  eternity  satisfied  with  or  en- 
joyed the  realization  of  all  these  ideas.  In  other  words,  ev- 
ery demand  of  his  Being  was  from  eternity  met — since  from 
eternity  all  things  that  are  or  will  be  have  been  present  to 
the  Divine  Omniscience. 

Now  I  inquire  what  must  be  the  ultimate  good  of  God? 
Certainly  not  these  created  things',  not  any  thing  created  or 
uncreated  that  is  so  correlated  to  Him  as  to  meet  a  demand 
of  his  Being  with  the  exception  of  this  one  thing — the  in- 
Jjiiite  satisfaction  of  the  Divine  Mind.  God  can  say,  I  have 
no  want.  All  the  demands  of  his  infinite  mind  are  fully  met. 
The  ideas  of  his  Reason  are  reahzed.  His  desires  are,  upon 
the  whole,  fulfilled,  and  every  power  and  susceptibility  is  full. 
His  satisfaction  is  perfect  and  infinite.  When  I  say  all  the 
demands  of  his  nature  are  met,  I  mean  that  his  Omniscience 
embraces  all  events,  and  to  Him  all  things  that  tvill  6e,  arc  al- 
ready to  Him  in  such  a  sense  as  to  satisfy  the  Divine  Mind. 
He  pronounces  it  dXi.  very  good ^  in  the  sense  that,  upon  the 
whole,  he  is  satisfied. 

That  state  of  mind,  the  Satisfaction.,  the  perfect  and  infinite 
Rest  of  the  Drvine  Mind,  in  having  every  demand  of  His  being 
met,  is  His  ultimate  good.  / 

Now,  it  is  self-evident,  that  this  must  also  be  the  ultimate 
good  of  every  being  in  existence.  That  which  meets  the  de- 
mands of  His  being  is  not  its  ultimate  good.,  with  the  single 
exception  of  the  satisfaction  that  results  from  having  all  the 
other  demands  of  every  department  of  the  being  fully  met  and 
satisfied.  This  satisfaction  is  the  ultimate  demand  of  our 
being.  That  is,  it  is  that  which  is  ultimately  demanded,  and 
for  the  sake  of  which  all  the  other  things  are  demanded. 
This  is  an  ultimate  good.  But  that  which  meets  no  other 
demand  of  our  being,  can  be  the  ultimate  good ;  for  all  these 
things,  whatever  they  are,  onjy  result  in  satisfaction.,  but  do 
not  constitute  it.  Satisfaction  is,  and  jnust  be,  the  ultimate 
g(K)d :  and  whatever  produces  this  result  must  be  only  a  relative  >/ 
good.  The  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  then, 
or  the  highest  good  of  universal  being  must  consist  in  a  state 
of  entire  satisfactioii.  Whenever  a  mind  is  in  a  state  in  which 
it  can  affirm,  I  have  no  wants  that  are  unsupplied,  my  whole 
being  is  satisfied — that  state  of  satisfaction  that  results  from 
the  meeting  of  all  the  demands  of  the  constitution,  is,  and  it 
seems  to  me  must  be,  the  ultimate  good  of  the  being. 

Here  let  it  be  observed,  that  Satisfaction  of  mind,  in  the 
5* 


a 


54  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sense  in  which  I  have  explained  it,  is  the  ultimate  good  of 
being,  whether  any  one  possesses  it  or  not.  The  Reason  af- 
firms, that  it  is  an  ultimate  and  an  absolute  good^  for  any  mind 
to  be  perfectly  and  universally  satisfied.  This  is  the  thing 
which  ought  to  be  willed  for  its  own  sake,  whether  any  one 
ever  possesses  it  or  not.  Every  Moral  Agent  ought  to  will 
the  perfect  satisfaction  of  God  and  of  all  beings,  for  the  sake 
of  the  intrinsic  value  of  that  state  of  mind. 

They  only,  of  Moral  Agents,  will  possess  this  ultimate 
Good,  whose  heart  and  life  are  conformed  to  the  dictates  of 
their  Intelligence,  and  every  want  or  demand  of  whose  being 
is  met  and  fully  satisfied. 

Just  so  far  as  any  mind  is  entirely  satisfied,  just  so  far  it 
possesses  that  which  belongs  to  or  constitutes  the  ultimate 
good.  Suppose  my  heart  to  be  entirely  conformed  to  the 
Law  of  my  Intelligence — thus  far  my  Conscience,  my  Intelli- 
gence and  my  Sensibility  are  satisfied.  My  Sensibility  is 
satisfied  thus  far,  for  the  conformity  of  my  Will  to  the  Law  of 
my  Intelligence  is  not  only  a  demand  of  my  Intelligence,  but 
of  my  Sensibility.  So  that  if  I  am  virtuous,  thus  far  I  am  sat- 
isfied whether  any  body  else  is  virtuous  or  not.  Thus  far  I 
possess  that  satisfaction  which  constitutes  the  ultimate  good. 
But  as  yet,  I  may  not  possess  this  in  perfection.  All  the  de- 
mands of  my  being,  in  respect  to  myself  and  others,  may  not 
be  met,  and  consequently  my  satisfaction  may  not  be  perfect 
and  universal.  But  so  far  as  I  have  it,  it  is  in  kind  of  the 
ultimate  good.  I  shall  never  possess  it  in  a  perfect  degree, 
until  every  demand  of  my  constitution  is  met — until  I  can  say, 
I  have  no  want  that  is  not  supplied. 

By  the  term  satisfaction,  I  mean  more  than  is  generally 
understood  by  the  term  happiness.  This  term  is  generally 
used  to  express  merely  the  satisfaction  of  the  Sensibility. 
There  is,  however,  such  a  thing  as  intellectual  satisfaction^ 
the  satisfaction  of  Conscience.  In  other  words,  there  is  a 
natural,  and  if  I  may  so  speak,  a  moral  satisfaction.  The 
demands  of  the  Intelligence  and  of  the  Heart  and  of  the 
Sensibihty,  are  all  fully  met.  This  results  in  a  state  of  uni- 
versal and  entire  mental  satisfaction.  It  is  a  state  perhaps 
well  and  fully  expressed  by  the  term  blessedness.  Every 
power  and  susceptibility  is  full,  is  satisfied.  The  mind 
can  say,  it  is  enough, — I  have  no  want.  This  state  must 
be  the  ultimate  and  the  absolute  good.  Whatever  con- 
duces to  this  state,  whatever  meets  any  demand  of  any 
power  or  susceptibility,  is  a  means,  or  condition  of  this 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  '  55 

state,  and  is  in  this  sense  a  good.  It  is  not  an  absolute, 
but  a  relative  good.  This  appears  to  be  self-evident.  When  I 
can  say  that  every  demand  of  my  being  is  met,  then  I  possess 
the  ultimate  good  in  a  degree  that  is  unmixed  with  any  alloy. 
If  the  demands  of  my  Intelligence,  or  of  any  power  of  my 
being  are  enlarged,  if  I  come  into  relations  where  my  constitu- 
tion demands  more,  when  these  demands  are  all  met,  my 
satisfaction  will  increase.  But  so  long  as  my  satisfaction  is 
universal  and  complete,  my  blessedness  is  perfect  in  the  sense 
that  I  have  no  want  that  is  not  fully  met.  This  satisfaction, 
let  it  be  repeated,  is,  and  must  be  the  ultimate  good  of  being. 

The  Intelhgence  of  a  Moral  Agent  demands  moral  order. 
But  Moral  Order  itself  is  not  the  ultimate  good.  But  the  sat- 
isfaction which  the  mind  has  in  contemplating  a  state  of  Mor- 
al Order  is  an  ultimate  good. 

Here  again  let  me  observe  that  it  .has  been  insisted  that 
those  things  demanded  by  the  Intelligence  must  be  affirmed  to 
be  a  good  in  themselves,  or  we  should  not  have  pleasure  in 
them,  or  in  other  words,  we  should  not  be  satisfied  with  them. 
I  perceive  beauty.  Now  it  is  said  that  unless  I  affirm  that 
beauty  is  a  good  in  itself  it  would  affi)rd  me  no  satisfaction 
to  behold  it.  But  this  is  certainly  a  mistake.  As  I  have  ob- 
served hGioYGA\^e  ultimate  good  belongs  to  sentient  beings  and 
must  certainly  be  inseparable  from  them;  that  is,  none  but 
a  sentient  being  can  be  the  subject  of  ultimate  good.  The 
ultimate  good  of  all  beings  must  of  necessity  be  subjective; 
that  is,  it  must  belong  to  themselves.  As  moral  agents  the 
ultimate  good  must  consist  in  a  state  of  mind.  This  should 
always  be  borne  in  mind.  Now  if  it  be  objected  that  when 
we  behold  beauty  for  example^  the  Intelhgence  must  pro- 
nounce it  to  be  a  good  in  itself  as  a  condition  of  its  produ- 
cing satisfaction  in  us,  I  answer:  To  whom  or  what  is  beauty, 
as  separate  from  sentient  existences  a  good?  I  behold  this 
archetype  of  my  idea  of  beauty.  Now  in  what  sense  can  it 
be  a  good  in  itself?  Can  it  be  a  good  to  itself?  If  not  in 
what  sense  can  it  be  a  good  in  itself?  Good  as  I  have  said, 
belongs  to  sentient  beings.  But  in  the  case  supposed,  this 
beauty  does  not  belong  to  any  sentient  existence.  It  is  an 
object  of  contemplation  distinct  from  all  being.  It  is  not  a 
state  of  mind.  To  whom  or  to  what  then  is  it  a  good  in  itself? 
It  is  and  must  be  a  relative  good  to  every  beholder  that  has 
the  idea  of  beauty.  But  it  can  by  no  means  be  a  good  in 
itself.  The  same  is  and  must  be  true  of  all  those  arche- 
types of  the  Reason  that  do  not  consist  in  a  state  of  mind. 


56  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

They  belong  to  no  being.  They  can  be  in  no  sense  a  good 
in  themselves^  unless  they  are  a  good  to  themselves^  which  is  ab- 
surd. They  are  good  only  relatively  to  those  who  have  the 
idea  whose  archetype  they  are.  This  class  of  beings  are 
satisfied  or  gratified  with  beholding  them,  not  because  they  are 
good  in  themselves,  but  because  being  archetypes  of  the  ideas 
of  their  own  Reason,  they  necessarily  take  pleasure  in  them. 
Now  it  is  not  the  archetype  itself  which  I  affirm  to  be  an  ul- 
timate good,  but  I  am  so  constituted  that  beholding  the  ar- 
chetype of  my  idea  affords  me  satisfaction^  and  this  satisfac- 
tion is  an  ultimate  good.     It  is  a  state  of  blessedness. 

That  which  remains  at  present,  is  to  examine  this  Philoso- 
phy in  the  light  of  Revelation ;  to  see  whether  it  recognizes 
tlie  highest  well  being,  blessedness,  or  satisfaction  of  God 
and  of  the  Universe  as  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obhgation. 
And  here  I  observe  that  it  is  agreed  that  the  Law  of  God 
demands  that  that  should  be  chosen  which  ought  to  be  chosen ; 
that  the  identical  end  which  Moral  Agents  are  required  to 
choose  is  proposed  as  the  ultimate  end  on  which  choice  ought 
to  terminate,  by  the  Law  of  God.     We  will  inquire  then, 

What  is  the  true  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  Moral  Law  as 
revealed  in  the  Bible?  Its  two  great  precepts  are,  ^'Thou 
shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  Heart,  with  all  thy 
Soul,  with  all  thy  Mind,  and  with  all  thy  strength;  and  thy 
neighbor  as  thyself."  Now  it  is  agreed  that  this  love  is  not  a 
mere  emotion  or  feehng,  but  that  it  consists  in  willing,  choos- 
ing, intending  an  end.  I  observe  again  that  it  requires  that 
something  should  be  willed  to  God  and  our  neighbor,  or  which 
is  the  same,  to  God  and  the  universe  of  creatures*  But  what 
is  this  something  that  is  to  be  willed  to  them?  What  is  this 
love  but  good  will,  willing  the  good  of  God  and  of  the  Uni- 
verse? What  is  of  equal  value  to  this?  Nay  what  is  of  any 
intrinsic  value  but  this?  The  highest  well  being  of  God  and 
of  the  Universe  must  be  that  which  we  ought  to  will. 
And  this  must  be  the  love  which  we  are  commanded  to  exer- 
cise. This  imphcs  the  wilHng  of  the  universal  satisfac- 
tion of  the  Divine  Mind  with  all  the  necessary  means 
and  conditions  of  this  result;  this  satisfaction  being  the  ulti- 
mate end  both  in  respect  to  God  and  our  neighbor,  and  the 
conditions  and  means  as  relatively  valuable. 

And  here  let  me  remark  that  it  is  very  plain  that  the  Law 
recognizes  but  one  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

*•  The  whole  law''''  it  is  said  "  is  fulfilled  in  one  word — Love." 
*^  Therefore  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  Law^     And  this  love 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  57 

must  be  the  love  of  God  and  our  neighbor^  and  not  of  other 
things.  The  law  does  not  say,  Thou  shalt  love  right — truth 
— beauty  or  any  thing  else,  with  all  thy  heart  and  with  all  thy 
soul,  but  God  and  thy  neighbor.  This  then  is  the  End.  Truth, 
beauty,  virtue,  and  a  multitude  of  things  are  relative  goods  and 
conditions  of  the  ultimate  good  or  of  the  universal  satisfaction 
that  results  from  all  the  demands  of  the  being  of  God  and  of 
our  neighbor  being  fully  satisfied. 

Whoever  contends  that  there  is  more  than  one  foundation 
of  Moral  Obligation  should  bereminded  that  one  z^orof  express- 
es all  that  is  required  by  the  Moral  Law.  That  word  is 
LOVE,  and  this  love  respects  God  and  our  neighbor  only.  In 
other  words  whoever  loves  God  with  all  his  heart  and  soul,  and 
mind,  and  strength,  and  his  neighbor  as  himself,  fulfils  the  whole 
law.  This  is  the  Ultimate  End — the  good  of  God  and  our  7ieighr 
bor.  That  this  love,  if  it  consists  in  willing  any  thing  to  God 
and  our  nei'g'A^or,  must  consist  in  willing  their  highest  well-being 
with  all  the  necessary  conditions  and  means  thereof  must  be 
self-evident;  for  as  I  have  said,  these  are  the  only  things  that 
are  valuable  to  God  or  our  neighbor,  and  to  be  under  obligation 
to  will  any  thing  else  than  these  to  God  and  to  our  neighbor 
were  absurd.  When  we  have  willed  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  our  neighbor  as  an  ultimate  end,  we  have  willed  to 
them  every  good  of  which  they  are  capable ;  and  what  more 
can  we  will  to  them?  and  if  we  refuse  to  will  this,  of  what  use 
is  it  to  will  any  thing  else? 

Let  this  theory  again  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  some  of  the 
precepts  of  the  gospel. — ^'Whether  therefore  ye  eat  or  drink 
or  whatsoever  ye  do,  do  all  to  the  glory  of  God."  By  this  lan- 
guage, as  it  is  used  in  the  Scriptures,  we  are  to  understand 
that  God  requires  of  us  to  aim  at  pleasing  Him  in  all  that  we 
do.  That  is,  we  are  to  aim  at  satisfying  God  and  meeting  the 
demands  of  His  Conscience,  His  Intelligence,  His  Sensibility 
and  in  short,  so  to  demean  ourselves  as  that  He  shall  be  per- 
fectly satisfied  with  us.  This  satisfaction  is  His  ultimate  good. 
At  this  we  should  aim — at  pleasing  God.,  at  satisfying  God^  so 
that  He  shall  say,  all  that  1  want  in  respect  to  you.,  I  have. 
This  is  what  God  requires  us  to  will.  He  requires  that  we 
should  live  to  please  or  gratify  Him  for  the  sake  of  the  intrinsic 
value  of  his  well-being  or  of  His  satisfaction.  To  love  God — to 
consecrate  ourselves  to  God — to  do  all  to  the  glory  of  God,  is 
to  choose  or  intend  in  all  our  ways  to  please  God;  that  is, 
to  choose  the  pleasure,  the  gratification  or  satisfaction  or 
well-being  of  God  as  the  ultimate  end  to  which  we  consecrate 
ourselves. 


58  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Let  this  question  again  be  brought  into  the  light  of  the  ex- 
ample of  God  and  of  Christ.  God  no  doubt  has  the  same  end 
in  view  which  He  requires  us  to  have.  Christ  has  also  the 
same  end  in  view  that  his  Father  has  and  that  He  requires  us 
to  have.  But  what  end  have  they  in  view?  God  says,  "I 
have  created  all  things  for  myself"  That  is,  He  has  exerted 
his  almighty  power  in  the  creation  of  objects  to  reahze  the 
ideas  of  his  own  Reason  for  the  sake  of  the  satisfaction  which 
necessarily  results  to  Himself  and  to  the  universe  from  their  realizO' 
Hon.  He  pronounces  the  works  of  his  hands  "very  good^''^  that 
is,  they  are  satisfactory  to  Him,  they  are  good  in  such  a 
sense  that  He  is  satisfied  with  them  as  the  archetypes  of  his 
own  ideas.  In  the  contemplation  of  these  archetypes  He  is 
satisfied.  This  satisfaction  must  be  to  Him  an  infinite  good. 
Christ  must  have  the  same  end  in  view. 

The  whole  Moral  Government  of  God  as  well  as  his  prov- 
idential government — in  short,  all  creation,  and  providence, 
and  government,  physical  and  moral,  show  that  God  and 
Christ  are  endeavoring  to  realize  the  ideas  of  the  good,  the 
just,  the  merciful,  the  beautiful,  the  useful,  the  right,  the  per- 
fect, and  all  those  ideas  in  the  reahzation  of  which  they  have 
so  much  satisfaction. 

The  good  of  creatures  must  enter  into  the  end  at  which  they  aim. 
This  is  manifest  from  creation,  and  providence,  and  the  Bible. 
To  meet  the  demands  of  the  nature  and  constitution  of  every 
being,  is  manifestly  the  tendency  of  things  so  far  as  we  can 
understand  them.  These  things  are  means  of  producing  sat- 
isfaction in  the  minds  of  Moral  Agents,  and  in  '•'•  satisfying 
the  wants  of  every  hving  thing."  Thus  it  is  said,  ''  Thou 
openest  thy  hand  and  satisfyest  the  wants  of  every  living 
tiling."  This  satisfaction  of  creatures  is  an  ultimate  good. 
Their  virtue  and  every  thing  else  but  this  satisfaction  itself,  is 
a  condition  and  means  of  promoting  it.  The  highest  good 
then  of  the  universe  must  be  that  at  which  God  and  all  holy 
beings  ought  to  aim  and  really  do  aim.  Unless  they  aim  at 
this,  their  aim  can  never  meet  the  demands  of  the  Intelli- 
gence of  Moral  Agents.  If  they  do  aim  at  this,  the  Intelli- 
gence cannot  but  be  satisfied. 

But  to  this  philosophy  it  is  objected, 

1.  That  if  the  highest  good  or  well-being  of  God  and  of 
the  Universe  be  the  sole  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  it 
follows  that  we  are  not  under  obligation  to  will  any  thing  ex- 
cept this  end  with  the  necessary  conditions  and  means  there- 
of.    That  every  thing  but  this  end^  which  we  are  bound  to  will 


MORAL  GOVERNMEJTT,  SS^ 

must  be  willed  as  a  means  to  this  end  or  because  of  its  ten- 
dency to  promote  this  end.  And  this  it  is  said  is  the  doctrine 
of  Utility. 

To  this  I  answer;  The  doctrine  of  Utility  is,  that  the  found- 
ation of  the  obligation  to  will  both  the  end  and  the  means 
is  the  tendency  of  the  willing  to  promote  the  end.  But 
this  is  absurd.  The  doctrine  of  this  discourse  is  not, 
as  UtiHtarians  say,  that  the  foundation  of  the  obHgation 
to  will  the  End  or  the  Means  is  the  tendency  of  the  willing 
to  promote  that  end,  but  that  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to 
will  both  the  end  and  the  means,  is  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
end.  And  the  condition  of  the  obligation  to  will  the  means  is 
the  perceived  tendency  of  the  means  to  promote  the  end. 

The  end  is  to  be  willed  for  its  own  sake.  The  conditions 
and  means  of  this  end  are  to  be  willed  for  the  sake  of 
the  end ;  that  is,  it  is  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.,  that 
is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will  the  conditions 
and  means.  The  tendency  of  the  means  to  promote  the  end  is 
not,  as  Utilitarians  say,  the  Foundation  of  the  Obligation  to 
will  the  means,  but  both  the  end  and  the  means  are  to  be 
willed  for  the  same  reason,  to  wit,  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
end.  The  obligation  to  will  the  mcanshem^  only  conditionor 
ted  upon,  but  not  found  in  their  tendency  to  promote  the  end. 
This  then  is  not  the  doctrine  of  Utility. 

2.  It  is  objected  that  if  the  good  of  being  be  the  only 
Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  we  should  be  indifferent  in 
respect  to  the  means,  if  the  end  could  be  obtained.  But  this, 
it  is  said,  contradicts  human  consciousness.  To  this  I  answer, 
the  end  to  be  obtained  is  the  satisfaction  of  universal  mincl^ 
that  results  from  having  every  demand  of  the  being  fully  met. 
Now  it  is  impossible  that  this  satisfaction  should  exist  unless 
these  demands  are  met.  To  suppose  then  that  the  end  can 
be  obtained  without  these  demands  being  met,  is  the  same  as 
to  suppose  that  the  end  can  be  obtained  without  the  natural 
and  necessary  conditions  and  means.  This  supposition  is  there- 
fore an  impossible  supposition,  and  consequently  inadmissi- 
ble. 

Again ;  if  universal  mind  were  perfectly  satisfied  so  that  there 
were  no  demand  or  want  of  any  being  that  was  not  fully 
met,  we  should  of  course  be  satisfied^  and  well  satisfied.,  andper- 
fectly  satisfied.,  on  this  supposition. 

The  philosohpy  to  which  this  objection  is  opposed  teach- 
es that  the  highest  well  being  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
verse is  the  ultimate,  the  absolute  good  of  moral  agents  and 


60  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

therefore  that  it  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation.  It 
further  teaches  that  the  absolute  and  ultimate  good  of  moral 
agents  in  its  last  analysis  consists  in  mental  satisfaction^  enjoys 
ment^  blessedness,  happiness,  and  that  this  state  of  mind  is 
conditionated  upon  the  fact  that  every  demand  of  every  power 
of  onr  being  is  fully  met  and  satisfied.  The  objection  is  this, 
that  if  mental  satisfaction,  enjoyment,  blessedness  or  happi- 
ness were  but  complete  and  universal,  we  should  be  indiifer- 
ent,  that  is,  that  we  should  be  satisfied  as  it  respects  the  means 
and  conditions  of  this  satisfaction.  That  if  the  universal 
mind  were  satisfied  it  would  be  satisfied  by  whatever  means. 
This  is,  to  be  sure,  a  truism.  Or  the  objection  amounts  to 
this.  If  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe 
of  moral  agents  be  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  it  fol- 
lows that  if  this  end  is  obtained  and  the  highest  well-being 
of  God  and  of  the  universe  be  secured,  we  should  be  indif 
ferent  as  it.  respects  the  conditions  and  means.  In  other 
words  we  should  be  indifferent  whether  it  was  accomplished 
by  possible  or  impossible  means.  If  the  mental  satisfaction 
do  but  universally  exist  it  matters  not  whether  the  Intelli- 
gence, the  Conscience  or  the  Sensibility  be  satisfied.  If  that 
state  of  mind  which  can  alone  result  from  the  fact  that  every 
demand  of  every  power  and  susceptibility  of  our  nature  be 
fully  met  and  satisfied,  do  but  exist,  it  matters  not  whether 
any  demand  of  our  being  is  met,  whether  we  are  at  all  sat- 
isfied. Or  again:  If  our  nature  is  such  that  it  can  not  be 
satisfied  unless  virtue  be  connected  with  happiness^  and  sin  with 
misery,  that  is,  unless  misery  exist  in  connection  with  sin, 
and  happiness  in  connection  with  holiness,  did  happiness  but 
exist  it  would  be  indifferent  to  us  and  we  should  be  just  as 
well  satisfied  did  happiness  exist  in  connection  with  sin  and 
misery  in  connection  with  holiness  as  we  now  are.  The 
objection  is  an  absurdity  and  a  contradiction.  It  overlooks  that 
which  is  impUed  in  the  well  being  of  God  and  of  the  universe. 

3.  "It  is  said  that  if  the  sole  Foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion be  the  highest  good  of  Universal  Being,  all  obKgation 
pertaining  to  God  would  respect  his  susceptibilities  and  the 
means  necessary  to  this  result.  When  we  have  willed  God's 
highest  well-being  with  the  means  necessary  to  that  result 
we  have  fulfilled  all  our  duty  to  Ilim." 

To  this  I  reply;  certainly,  when  we  have  willed  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  with  the  necessary  con- 
ditions and  means  thereof,  we  have  done  our  whole  duty  to 
bim:  for  this  is  loving  Him  with  all  our  heart  and  our  neighbor 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  61 

ns  ourselves.  The  necessary  conditions  of  the  highest  well-be- 
ing of  the  universe,  are  that  every  moral  being  shouldbe 
perfectly  virtuous  and  that  every  demand  of  the  IntelHgence 
and  of  the  whole  being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  of  crea- 
tures be  perfectly  met,  so  that  universal  mind  shall  be  in  a 
state  of  perfect  and  universal  satisfaction.  To  will  this  is  all 
that  the  Law  of  God  does  or  can  require. 

4.  It  is  said  that  '■'•  If  the  highest  good  of  being  be  the 
Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  it  would  follow  that  if  God's 
character  were  the  opposite  of  what  it  is,  we  should  be  un- 
der the  same  obligation  to  Him  that  we  are  now."  To  this 
I  answer: — 

(1.)  It  is   not   true.     We  are   to   will   the  highest  well- 
being   of  God.     This   results   from  the   meeting   of  every 
demand   of  his  being.     We   are  to    will  his  perfect   satis- 
faction as  a  good  in   itself.     But  it  is  impossible   that   we 
should  will  that  He  should  be  actually  and  perfectly  satisfied 
except  on  the  condition  that  He  obeys  the  laws  of  his  bc" 
ing.     If  He  should  not  fulfill  the  laws  of  his  being — ^if,  for 
example.  He  should  not  conform  his  Will  to  the  law  of  his 
Intelligence  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  will  or  be  under 
an  obligation  to  will   that   He  should  be  actually   and  per- 
fectly satisfied  with   Himself    ^e   can   not,  therefore,   be 
under   an  obligation   to   will   the  perfect   and  universal  sat- 
isfaction or   blessedness   of  God,  except  on  condition  that  He 
is  perfectly/  virtuous.  ^We   should  not  be  under  an  obliga- 
tion  to   will   his   actual   well  being   and  satisfaction  were  his 
character  otherwise  than  what  it  is.     But   the  demands  of 
his  being  being  met.  He  being  perfectly  virtuous  and  meeting 
every  demand  of  his  Intelligence,  we  are  under  an  obhgation, 
in  view  of  this  consideration,  to  will  his  actual.^ perfect^  univer- 
sal^ eternal^  infinite  blessedness  or  satisfaction.     It  is  not  true, 
then,  as  the  objection  affirms,  that  our  obligation  would  be 
the  same  to  God  that  it  now  is,  whether  his  character  were 
what  it  now  is  or  not. 

(2.)  As  a  possible  good  we  should  be  under  obhgation  to 
will  his  highest  well  being  with  all  the  conditions  and  means 
thereof  But  we  should  not  be  under  obligation  to  will  his 
highest  well  being  as  an  actual  good  without  the  necessary 
conditions  and  means  thereof;  and  therefore  if  He  refused  to 
fulfill  the  necessary  conditions  we  should  not  be  under  obli- 
gation to  will  his  actual  satisfaction  or  blessedness.  In  one 
sense  we  should  be  under  obligation  to  love  God  let  his  char- 
acter be  what  it  might,  just  as  we  are  under  obhgation  to  love 
%    6 


62  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY.  , 

wicked  men.  We  should  be  under  obligation  to  regard  and 
will  his  and  their  highest  well  being  as  sl  possible  good  of  in- 
finite value  in  itself.  But  as  an  actually  existing  good.,  we 
should  not  be  under  anobhgation  to  will  it,  but  upon  the  condi- 
tion that  they  deserve  it,  by  fulfilUng  on  their  part  the  indis- 
pensable conditions. 

5.  It  is  objected,  "  That  if  the  good  of  being  be  the  sole 
Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  right  and  wrong  would  be 
contingent  and  not  fixed,  that  is,  the  same  intention  or  choice 
would  possess  a  character  according  as  it  is  contemplated  rel- 
atively to  the  good  of  Being." 

To  this  I  reply, — That  right  and  wrong  are  not  contingent  but 
fixed.  To  will  the  highest  good  of  being  is  right  in  itself,  and  no- 
thing else  is  in  itself  right.  To  will  any  thing  else  than  this  as  an 
ultimate  end  is  wrong  in  itself,  and  therefore  unalterably  and 
invariably  wrong.  An  intention  is  right  or  wrong  as  it  ter- 
minates on  the  good  of  being  or  on  some  thing  else  as  an  ul- 
timate end.  This  must  be,  and  every  thing  else  in  the  only 
sense  in  which  it  has  moral  character  at  all,  is  right  or 
wrong  as  it  proceeds  from  the  choice  of  the  highest  well-be- 
ing of  God  and  the  Universe  as  an  ultimate  end  or  from  some 
other  choice. 

6.  It  is  objected,  '-^  That  if  this  be  the  sole  Foundation  of 
Moral  Obligation,  it  follows  that  if  all  the  good  now  in  exist- 
ence were  connected  with  sin  and  all  the  misery  connected 
with  holiness,  we  should  be  just  as  well  satisfied  as  we  now 
are." 

To  this  I  answer.  We  are  satisfied,  only  when  the  demands  of 
our  being  are  met.  One  demand  of  our  being  is,  that  all  moral 
agents  should  be  holy,  and  that  they  should  be  actually  and  per- 
fectly happy  only  on  the  condition  that  they  are  holy.  Now  if 
our  constitution  only  demanded  their  happiness  irrespective  of 
their  hoUness,  then  were  they  perfectly  happy  we  should  be 
satisfied  whether  they  were  holy  or  not.  But  our  constitu- 
tion being  what  it  is,  we  should  not  be  and  can  not  be  satisfied 
with  their  happiness  unless  they  are  holy:  for  their  hoHness, 
as  a  condition  of  their  actual  blessedness,  is  an  unalterable  de- 
mand of  our  IntelHgence.  Now,  therefore,  although  we  are  to 
regard  their  universal  satisfaction  as  the  ultimate  good,  yet 
we  also  know,  and  can  not  but  aftirm  that  their  universal 
satisfaction  or  blessedness  is  naturally  impossible,  and  that  it 
ought  to  be,  except  on  condition  of  their  perfect  holiness.  There- 
fore the  supposition  is  impossible  and  inadmissible. 

Let  it  be  understood  that  the  highest  well  being  of  God 


.lORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


63 


and  of  the  Universe  of  Moral  Agents  is  conditionated  on  the 
fact  that  every  demand  of  every  power  of  their  being  is  sat- 
isfied. Therefore  as  the  IntelUgence  and  Conscience  of  eve- 
ry Moral  Agent  demands  that  actual  happiness  should  be 
connected  with  holiness  and  actual  misery  should  be  connec- 
ted with  sin,  we  should  not  be  satisfied  with  happiness  in  Mor- 
al Agents  unless  it  were  connected  with  holiness,  nor  with 
misery  unless  it  were  connected  with  sin — such  bdng  the 
laws  of  our  being  that  nothing  else  than  this  can  meet  the 
demands  of  our  being  in  respect  to  Moral  Agents. 

7.  It  is  said,  '-^  If  any  moral  act  can  be  conceived  of,  which 
has  not  the  element  of  willing  the  highest  good  of  being  in 
it,  -  this  theory  is  false !"  To  this  I  reply.  That  strict- 
ly speaking  it  is  agreed  on  all  hands  by  the  parties  in 
this  discussion,  that  no  act  is  a  moral  act,  but  an  ul- 
timate act,  choice,  or  intention  of  the  Will.  Now  if  any 
ultimate  choice  can  be  conceived  of  that  does  not  terminate 
on  the  good  of  universal  being  which  after  all  is  morally  right 
or  virtuous,  then  this  theory  is  false.  But  no  such  moral  act 
or  ultimate  choice  can  be  found.  But  an  example  is  brought 
forward  of  moral  obligation  to  do  that  which  does  not  im- 
ply the  choice  of  the  highest  good  of  being.  It  is  said  we  are  un- 
der obligation  to  esteem  and  treat  as  worthy  of  confidence  those 
whose  known  veracity  entitles  them  to  our  confidence.  This, 
let  it  be  observed,  is  an  example  or  an  instance  in  which  it  is 
said  that  we  are  under  obligation  where  no  reference  is  had 
to  the  good  of  being.  Now,  let  it  be  remembered,  that  the 
theory  to  overthrow  which  this  example  is  brought  forward  is 
that  the  satisfaction  of  the  mind  arising  from  the  fact  that 
exery  demand  of  his  hdng  is  met,  is  that  in  which  the  ultimate 
good  of  being  consists.  Now  it  is  a  demand  of  the  Intelli- 
gence of  every  moral  being  that  we  should  esteem  and  treat 
as  worthy  of  confidence  those  whose  character  entitles  them 
to  this  confidence.  Thus,  then,  to  esteem  and  treat  all  that 
are  truthful,  is  one  of  the  demands  of  the  universal  Intelli- 
gence of  Moral  Agents.  Unless  this  demand  be  met  by  a 
being  he  cannot  be  satisfied  with  himself.  His  Intelligence 
and  Conscience  are  not  satisfied. 

We  are  under  obligation,  therefore,  to  treat  every  indi- 
vidual of  known  veracity  as  worthy  of  confidence;  for  this  is  an 
unalterable  condition  of  our  being  satisfied,  or  of  the  demands  of 
our  nature  being  met.  We  are  under  obligation  also  to  will 
that  every  Moral  Agent  in  the  Universe  should  meet  this  de- 
mand of  his  being  as  an  unalterable  condition  of  his  highest  well- 


64  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

being.  So  we  see  that  this  example  is  not  one  in  which  no 
reference  is  had  to  the  highest  good  of  being.  For  in  this 
very  example  the  highest  good  of  being  is  the  ultimate 
end,  and  treating  the  individual  according  to  his  nature,  rela- 
tions, and  character  for  veracity,  is  one  of  the  indispensable 
conditions  and  means  of  reahzing  this  end.  It  is  not  only 
a  demand  of  my  being  that  I  should  treat  one  who  is  wor* 
thy  of  confidence  as  worthy,  but  it  also  is  a  demand  of  his  being 
and  Intelligence  that  /  should  thus  treat  him.  If  I  would  aim, 
therefore,  at  his  highest  good,  or  at  meeting  the  demands  of 
his  being  for  the  sake  of  promoting  his  entire  and  perfect  sat- 
isfaction, I  must  treat  him  as  worthy  of  confidence.  So  that 
his  highest  good  and  my  highest  good  and  the  highest  good  of 
all  beings  demand  that  I  should  thus  treat  him.  For  the  In- 
teUigence  of  God  and  of  every  intelHgent  being  in  the  uni- 
verse demands  that  I  should  treat  a  being  with  confidence  who 
is  worthy  of  confidence.  So  that  I  do  not  really  meet  the  de- 
mands of  my  own  being,  nor  of  the  Intelligence  of  any  being 
unless  I  do  thus  treat  him.  Therefore,  thus  esteeming  and  treat- 
ing him  is  indispensable  to  the  highest  good  of  being.  And 
if  I  am  under  an  obhgation  to  choose  the  highest  satisfaction 
or  good  of  Universal  Being  as  an  end,  I  must  be  under  an 
obhgation  to  treat  every  being  so  as  to  meet  the  demands  of 
my  own  Intelligence  and  the  InteUigence  of  the  Universe. 
This  I  cannot  do  without  esteeming  the  holy  as  holy,  the  truth- 
ful as  truthful,  &:c. 

8.  It  is  objected  again  that  we  are  all  conscious  of  often 
affirming  ourselves  to  be  under  moral  obligation  when  no  re- 
ference is  had  by  us  to  the  good  of  being  as  an  end.  Exam- 
ple— To  love  God  because  he  is  good.  This  affirmation,  it  is 
said,  has  no  reference  to  the  good  of  God.     To  this  I  answer, 

Such  an  affirmation,  if  it  be  made,  is  most  nonsensical. 
What  is  it  to  love  God  ?  Why,  as  is  agreed,  it  is  not  to  ex- 
ercise a  mere  emotion  of  complacency  in  Him.  It  is  to  will 
something  to  Him.  But  what  ought  I  to  will  to  Him  in  view 
of  his  goodness  ?  Why  surely  I  ought  to  will  good  to  Him. 
But  why  ought  I  to  will  good  rather  than  evil  to  God?  Sure- 
ly, first  and  fundamentally,  because  good  is  good  or  valuable 
to  Him,  and  secondarily,  because  and  upon  condition  that 
He  is  holy  or  good.  The  fact  is,  there  is  in  all  such  cases 
a  mistake  in  supposing  that  we  affirm  moral  obhgation  when 
no  reference  is  had  to  the  good  of  being  as  an  ultimate  end. 
It  is  ^.  first  truth  of  reason  that  the  good  of  being  is  valuable 
in  itself,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  63 

This  truth  is  every  where  and  at  ail  times  and  by  all  moral 
agents  assumed  and  known.     While  this  is  a  first  truth  that 
tjie  good  of  being  is  valuable  and  ought  to  be  willed  as  a  pos- 
sible good  for  its  own  sake  entirely  irrespective  of  moral 
character,  yet  it  is  also  a  first  truth  of  reason  that  the  high- 
est good  or  the  actual  blessedness  of  moral  agents  is  neces- 
sarily conditionated  upon  their  holiness,  and  that  this  ought  to 
be  so.     Therefore,  every  moral  agent  while  he  assumes  his  ob- 
ligation to  will  the  well  being  of  all  moral  agents  as  a  possi- 
ble good  whether  they  are  holy  or  unholy,  at  the  same  time 
affirms,  and  assumes,  his  obHgation  to  will  the  actual  blessed- 
ness of  God  and  of  every  moral  agent  only  upon  the  condi- 
tion that  He  is  holy.     Thus  necessarily  stand  the  assump- 
tions of  every  mind.     Now  when  we  perceive  that  a  being 
is  holy,  we  thereupon  affirm  our  obligation  to  will  his  actual 
blessedness.     And  being  assured  that  God  is  holy  we  irre- 
sistibly affirm  that  we  are  under  infinite  obligation  to  love 
Him.     And  being  consciously  affected  at  the  time  by  a  con- 
sideration of  his  goodness,  and  overlooking  the  assumption 
at   the  bottom   of  our  minds,  that  his  good  is  of  infinite 
value,  we  loosely  suppose  ourselves  to  have  no  reference  to 
his  good  or  to  the  intrinsic  value  of  his  good.     Now  in  ev- 
ery case  of  this  kind  we  do  and  must  have  respect  to  his 
good,  or  we  really  make  no  intelligent  affirmation  at  all  in 
respect  to  moral  obligation.     If  I  do  not  affirm  myself  under 
obUgation  to  will  good  to  God,  I  in  fact  make  no  intelligent 
and  just  affirmation  about  it.     This  in  fact  is  and  must  be  my 
duty;  and  nothing  else,  more  or  less,  is.     My  whole  duty  to 
God  and  my  neighbor  is   to  love  the  one  with  all  my  heart, 
and  the  other  as  myself     This   God  himself  has  expressly 
asserted,  and  whoever  makes  the  assertion  that  He  requires 
more  of  me  than  this,  let  him  look  to  it.     There  is  not,  there 
can  not  be  moral  obligation  when  no  reference  is  had  to  the 
good  of  God  and  of  being,  for  to  love  God  and  our  neighbor 
is  not  and  can  not  be  any  thing  else  than  to  will  their  highest 
good.     The  fact  is  that  those  who  make  such  objections  as 
this  to  the  philosophy  and  theology  of  this  lecture,  either  do 
not  mean  what  they  say,  or  they  must  assume  the  existence  of 
some  other  law  and  of  some  other  rule  of  duty  than  the  law 
of  love  revealed  in  the  Bible.     What !  can  it  be  possible  that 
they  have  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  whole  law  is  fulfiled  in 
one  word  love  or  good  will  to  God  and  our  neighbor,  when 
they  make  such  assertions  ?     This  law  allows  of  no  obliga- 
tion but  to  love  God  and  our  neighbor,  that  is  to  will  their 


66  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

good,  for  surely  this  love  can  be  nothing  else.  But  here  comes 
an  objector  and  says  that  we  often  affirm  moral  obligation 
when  no  reference  is  had  to  the  good  of  God  and  our  neigh- 
bor. To  such  an  one  I  only  reply,  if  this  affirmation  of  ob- 
ligation is  ever  really  made  by  any  one,  *•*•  he  knows  not  what 
he  says  nor  whereof  he  affirms." 

9.  But  it  is  said  that  a  moral  agent  may  sometimes  be  un- 
der obUgation  to  will  evil  instead  of  good  to  others.  I  an- 
swer:— 

It  can  never  be  the  duty  of  a  moral  agent  to  will  evil 
to  any  being  for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  ultimate  end.  The  char- 
acter and  governmental  relations  of  a  being  may  be  such  that  it 
may  be  duty  to  will  the  execution  of  law  upon  him  to  meet  a  de- 
mand of  the  public  conscience  and  intelligence  and  thus  pro- 
mote the  public  good.  But  in  this  case  good  is  the  end  willed 
and  misery  only  a  means.  So  it  may  be  the  duty  of  a  moral 
agent  to  will  the  temporary  misery  of  even  a  holy  being  to 
promote  the  public  interests.  Such  was  the  case  with  the 
sufferings  of  Christ.  The  Father  willed  his  temporary  mis- 
ery to  promote  the  public  good.  But  in  all  cases  when  it  is 
duty  to  will  misery,  it  is  only  as  a  means  or  condition  of 
good  to  the  pubhc  or  to  the  individual  and  not  as  an  ultimate 
end. 

There  are  several  other  objections  to  this  theory.  But  as 
each  of  the  other  theories  stand  opposed  to  this  and  are  of 
course  so  many  objections  to  it,  I  will  consider  them  in  their 
proper  place,  and  proceed  to  remove  objections  to  the  truth 
jis  I  go  forward. 


^t 


m 

LECTURE  V. 

FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

FALSE  THEORIES. 

L  The  Will  of  God. 

II.  Self  Interest. 

III.  Utilitarianism. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  the  examination  of  various  other 
Theories  of  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  they  all  involve  the  most  palpable  con- 
tradiction of  their  own  admitted  principles,  of  the  plainest 
intuitions  of  Reason,  and  of  Divine  Revelation.  I  will  com- 
mence with  the  Theory, 

I.  That  the  Sovereign  Will  of  God  is  the  Foundation  of 
Moral  Obligation. 

By  the  Will  of  God  I  suppose  is  intended  his  willing 
that  we  should  will,  choose,  intend  some  end.  For  Moral 
Obligation,  let  it  be  remembered,  respects  the  choice  of  an 
end,  or  the  ultimate  intention.  This  theory,  then,  makes 
God's  willing,  commanding,  the  foundation  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  choose  or  intend  an  ultimate  end.  If  this  is  so, 
then  the  willing  of  God  is  the  end  to  be  intended.  For  the 
end  to  be  intended  and  the  reason  of  the  obligation  to  intend 
it,  are  identical.  But  it  is  impossible  to  will  or  choose  the 
Divine  willing  or  requirement  as  an  ultimate  end.  God's 
willing  reveals  a  Law,  a  rule  of  choice,  or  of  intention.  It 
requires  something  to  be  intended  as  an  ultimate  end  for  its 
own  intrinsic  value.  This  end  can  not  be  the  willing,  com- 
mandment, law  itself.  This  is  absurd  and  impossible.  Does 
God  will  that  I  should  choose  his  willing  as  an  ultimate  end? 
This  is  ridiculously  absurd.  It  is  a  plain  contradiction  to 
say  that  Moral  Obligation  respects  directly  ultimate  intention 
only,  or  the  choice  of  an  end  for  its  own  intrinsic  value,  and 
yet  that  the  Will  of  God  is  the  foundation  or  reason  of  the  ob-  < 
Kgation.  This  is  affirming  at  the  same  breath  that  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  end  which  God  requires  me  to  choose,  is  the 
reason  or  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  choose  it,  and  yet 
that  this  is  not  the  reason,  but  that  the  Will  of  God  is  the 
reason. 

Willing  can  never  be  an  end.  God  can  not  will  our  wil- 
ling as  an  end.  Nor  can  he  will  his  willing  as  an  end.  Wil- 
ling, choosing,  always  and  necessarily  implies  an  end  willed 


68  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

entirely  distinct  from  the  willing  or  choice  itself.  Willing 
can  not  be  regarded  or  willed  as  an  ultimate  end  for  two 
reasons: 

(1.)  Because  that  on  which  choice  or  willing  terminates,  and 
not  the  choice  itself,  must  be  regarded  as  the  end. 

(2.)  Because  choice  or  wilHng  is  of  no  intrinsic  value  and 
of  no  relative  value  aside  from  the  end  willed  or  chosen. 

2.  The  will  of  God  can  not  be  the  foundation  of  Moral 
Obligation  in  created  moral  agents.  It  is  admitted  that  God 
is  himself  the  subject  of  Moral  Obligation.  If  so,  there  is 
some  reason,  independent  of  his  own  will,  why  he  wills  as 
he  does,  some  reason  that  imposes  obligation  upon  him  to 
will  as  he  does  will.  His  will,  then,  respecting  the  conduct 
of  moral  agents,  is  not  the  fundamental  reason  of  their  obliga- 
tion; but  the  foundation  of  their  obligation  nust  be  the  rea- 
son which  induces  God  or  makes  it  obligatory  on  him  to  will 
in  respect  to  the  conduct  of  moral  agents,  just  what  he  does. 

3.  If  the  will  of  God  were  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obli- 
gation, he  could,  by  willing  it,  change  the  nature  of  virtue  and 
vice. 

4.  If  the  will  of  God  were  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obli- 
gation, he  not  only  can  change  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice, 
but  has  a  right  to  do  so ;  for  if  there  is  nothing  back  of  his 
will  that  is  as  binding  upon  him  as  upon  his  creatures,  he 
could  at  any  time,  by  willing  it,  make  malevolence  a  virtue, 
and  benevolence  a  vice. 

5.  If  the  will  of  God  be  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion, we  have  no  standard  by  which  to  judge  of  the  moral 
character  of  His  actions,  and  cannot  know  whether  he  is 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame. 

6.  If  the  will  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion, he  has  no  standard  by  which  to  judge  of  his  own  char- 
acter, as  he  has  no  rule  with  which  to  compare  his  own  ac- 
tions. 

7.  If  the  will  of  God  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion, he  is  not  himself  a  subject  of  Moral  obligation.     But, 

8.  If  God  is  not  a  subject  of  Moral  Obligation,  he  has  no 
moral  character;  for  virtue  and  vice  are  nothing  else  but  con- 
formity or  non-conformity  to  Moral  Obligation.  The  will  of 
God,  as  expressed  in  his  law,  is  the  rule  of  duty  to  moral 
agents.  It  defines  and  marks  out  the  path  of  duty,  but  the 
fundamental  reason  why  moral  agents  ought  to  act  in  confor- 
mity to  the  will  of  God,  is  plainly  not  the  will  of  God  itself. 

9.  The  Will  of  no  being  can  be  law.     Moral  Law  is  an 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


69 


idea  of  the  Reason  and  not  the  willing  of  any  being.  If  the 
Will  of  any  being  were  law,  that  being  could  not  by  natural 
possibility  will  wrong,  for  whatever  he  willed  would  be  right, 
simply  and  only  because  he  willed  it.     This  is  absurd. 

10.  But  let  us  bring  this  Philosophy  into  the  hght  of  Divine 
Revelation.  '""To  the  Law  and  to  the  Testimony:  if  it  agree 
not  therewith,  it  is  because  it  hath  no  light  in  it." 

The  Law  of  God,  or  the  Moral  Law,  requires  that  God 
shall  be  loved  with  all  the  heart  and  our  neighbor  as  our- 
selves. Now  it  is  agreed  by  the  parties  in  this  discussion^ 
that  the  love  required  is  not  mere  emotion,  but  that  it  consists 
in  choice,  wilhng,  intention — i.  e.,  in  the  choice  of  something 
on  account  of  its  own  intrinsic  value,  or  in  the  choice  of  an 
ultimate  end.  Now  what  is  this  end?  What  is  that  which 
we  are  to  choose  for  its  own  intrinsic  value?  Is  it  the  will  or 
command  of  God?  Are  we  to  will  as  an  ultimate  end,  that 
God  should  will  that  we  should  thus  will?  What  can  be 
more  absurd,  self-contradictory,  and  ridiculous  than  this  ?  But 
again:  what  is  this  love,  willing,  choosing,  intending,  required 
by  the  Law?  We  are  commanded  to  love  God  and  our  neigh- 
bor. What  is  this — what  can  it  be,  but  to  will  the  highest 
good  or  well-being  of  God  and  our  neighbor?  This  is  intrinsi- 
cally and  infinitely  valuable.  This  must  be  the  end  required, 
and  nothing  can  possibly  be  Law  that  requires  the  choice  of 
any  other  ultimate  end.  Nor  can  that  by  any  possibility  be 
true  Philosophy  that  makes  any  thing  else  the  Reason  or 
Foundation  of  Moral  Obhgation. 

But  it  is  said  that  we  are  conscious  of  affirming  our  obli- 
gation to  obey  the  will  of  God  without  reference  to  any  oth- 
er reason  than  his  will;  and  this,  it  is  said,  proves  that  His 
will  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Obligation. 

To  this  I  reply,  the  Reason  does  indeed  affirm  that  we 
ought  to  will  that  which  God  commands,  but  it  does  not  and 
can  not  assign  His  will  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to 
will  it.  His  whole  will  respecting  our  duty  is  summed  up  in 
the  two  precepts  of  the  Law.  These  as  we  have  seen,  require 
universal  good  will  to  being,  or  the  Supreme  Love  of  God 
and  the  Equal  Love  of  our  neighbor — that  we  should  will  the 
highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  Universe  for  its  own  sake, 
or  for  its  own  intrinsic  value.  Reason  affirms  that  we  ought 
thus  to  will.  And  can  it  be  so  self-contradictory  as  to  affirm 
that  we  ought  to  will  the  good  of  God  and  of  the  Universe 
for  its  own  intrinsic  value;  yet  not  for  this  reason,  but  because 
God  wills  that  we  should  will  it?    Impossible  !     But  in  this  ob- 


(y 


70  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

jection  or  assertion,  the  objector  has  reference  to  some  out- 
ward act,  some  condition  or  means  of  the  end  to  be  chosen, 
and  not  to  the  end  itself.  But  even  in  respect  to  any  act 
whatever,  his  objection  does  not  hold  good.  For  example, 
God  requires  me  to  labor  and  pray  for  the  salvation  of  souls, 
or  to  do  any  thing  else.  Now  his  command  is  necessarily  re- 
garded by  me  as  obligatory,  not  as  an  arbitrary  requirement, 
but  as  revealing  infallibly  the  true  means  or  conditions  of 
securing  the  great  and  ultimate  end  which  I  am  to  will  for 
its  intrinsic  value.  I  necessarily  regard  his  commandment 
as  wise  and  benevolent,  and  it  is  only  because  I  so  regard  it 
that  I  affirm  or  can  affirm  my  obligation  to  obey  Him.  Should 
He  command  me  to  choose  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for  its 
own  intrinsic  value,  that  which  my  Reason  affirmed  to  be  of 
no  intrinsic  value,  I  could  not  possibly  affirm  my  obligation 
to  obey  Him.  Should  He  command  me  to  do  that  which  my 
Reason  affirmed  to  be  unwise  and  malevolent,  it  were  im- 
possible for  me  to  affirm  my  obligation  to  obey  Him.  This 
proves  beyond  controversy  that  Reason  does  not  regard  His 
command  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  obey,  but 
only  as  infallible  proof  that  that  which  He  commands  is  wise  and 
benevolent  in  itself,  and  commanded  by  Him  for  that  reason. 

If  the  will  of  God  were  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion, He  might  command  me  to  violate  and  trample  down  all 
the  laws  of  my  being,  and  to  be  the  enemy  of  all  good,  and 
I  should  not  only  be  under  obligation,  but  affirm  my  obliga- 
tion to  obey  him.  But  this  is  absurd.  This  brings  us  to  the 
conclusion  that  he  who  asserts  that  Moral  Obligation  respects 
the  choice  of  an  end  for  its  intrinsic  value,  and  still  affirms 
the  will  of  God  to  be  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation, 
contradicts  his  own  admissions,  the  plainest  intuitions  of 
Reason,  and  Divine  Revelation.  His  theory  is  grossly  inconsist- 
ent and  nonsensical.  It  overlooks  the  very  nature  of  Moral 
Law  as  an  idea  of  Reason,  and  makes  it  to  consist  in  arbitra- 
ry willing.     This  is  nonsense. 

//.  /  now  proceed  to  slate  and  examine  a  second  Theory. 

For  convenience  sake  1  shall  call  it  the  theory  of  Paley. 
His  theory,  as  every  reader  of  Paley  knows,  makes  self-inter- 
est the  Ground  of  Moral  Obligation.  Upon  this  theory  I  re- 
mark, 

1.  That  if  self-interest  be  the  ground  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion, then  self-interest  is  the  end  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake. 
To  be  virtuous  I  must  in  every  instance  intend  my  own  inter- 
est as  the  supreme  good. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  71 


^ 


2.  Upon  this  hypothesis,  I  am  to  treat  my  own  interest  as 
supremely  valuable,  when  it  is  infinitely  less  valuable  than 
the  interests  of  God.  Thus  I  am  under  a  moral  obligation  to 
prefer  an  infinitely  less  good,  because  it  is  my  own,  to  one  of 
infinitely  greater  value  that  belongs  to  another.  This  is  pre-  a/' 
cisely  what  every  sinner  in  earth  and  hell  dues. 

3.  But  this  theory  would  impose  on  me  a  moral  obligation 
to  choose  contrary  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  things,  and, 
therefore,  contrary  to  Moral  Law.     But  this  is  absurd. 

4.  But  let  us  examine  this  theory  in  the  light  of  the  re- 
vealed law.  If  this  Philosophy  be  correct,  the  Law  should 
read,  '^  Thou  shalt  love  thyself  supremely,  and  God  and  thy 
neighbor  not  at  all."  For  Dr.  Paley  holds  the  only  reason  of 
the  obligation  to  be  self-interest.  If  this  is  so,  then  I  am  un- 
der an  obligation  to  love  myself  alone,  and  never  do  my  du- 
ty when  I  at  all  love  God  or  my  neighbor.  He  says  it  is  the 
utility  of  any  rule  alone  which  constitutes  the  obligation  of 
it.  [Paley'' s  Moral  Philo,^  Book  2,  chap.  6.)  Again  he  says, 
'•''And  let  it  be  asked  why  I  am  obliged,  (obligated)  to  keep 
my  word?  and  the  answer  will  be:  Because  I  am  urged  to  do 
so  by  a  violent  motive,  namely,  the  expectation  of  being  af- 
ter this  life  rewarded  if  I  do  so,  or  punished  if  I  do  not." — 
{Paley'' s  Moral  Philo,  Book  2,  chap  3.)  Thus  it  would  seem  that 
it  is  the  utility  of  a  rule  to  myself  only  that  constitutes  the 
ground  of  obligation  to  obey  it. 

But  should  this  be  denied,  still  it  can  not  be  denied  that 
Dr.  Paley  maintains  that  self-interest  is  the  ground  of  Moral 
Obligation.  If  this  is  so,  i.  e.,  if  this  be  the  foundation  of 
Moral  Obligation,  whether  Paley  or  any  one  else  holds  it  to 
be  true,  then,  undeniably,  the  Moral  Law  should  read,  "  thou 
shalt  love  thyself  supremely,  and  God  and  thy  neighbor 
subordinately;"  or,  more  strictly,  Thou  shalt  love  thyself  as 
an  end,  and  God  and  your  neighbor  only  as  a  means  of  pro- 
moting your  own  interest. 

5.  If  this  theory  be  true,  all  the  precepts  in  the  Bible  need 
to  be  altered.  Instead  of  the  injunction,  "  Whatever  you  doy 
do  it  heartily  unto  the  Lore?,"  it  should  read:  Whatever  you 
do,  do  it  heartily  unto  yourself.  Instead  of  the  injunction, 
"Whether,  therefore,  ye  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  ye  do,  do- 
all  to  the  glory  of  God,"  it  should  read:  Do  all  to  secure 
your  own  interest.  Should  it  be  said  that  this  school  would 
gay  that  the  meaning  of  these  precepts  is,  do  all  to  the  glory 
of  God  to  secure  your  own  interest  thereby,  I  answer:  This- 
is  a  contradiction.     To  do  it  to  or  for  the  glory  of  God  is  one 


72  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

thing,  to  do  it  to  secure  my  own  interest  is  an  entirely  differ^ 
ent  and  opposite  thing.  To  do  it  for  the  glory  of  God,  is  to 
make  his  glory  my  end.  But  to  do  it  to  secure  my  own  inter- 
est, is  to  make  my  own  interest  the  end. 

6.  But  let  us  look  at  this  theory  in  the  light  of  the  revealed 
conditions  of  salvation.  ^'Except  a  man  forsake  all  that  he  hath 
he  can  not  he  my  discipte^  If  the  theory  under  consideration  be 
true,  it  should  read:  Except  a  man  make  his  own  interest  the 
supreme  end  of  pursuit,  he  can  not  be  my  disciple.  Again; 
"  If  any  man  will  come  after  me,  let  him  deny  himself  and 
take  up  his  cross,"  &c.  This,  in  conformity  with  the  theory 
in  question,  should  read:  '^If  any  man  will  come  after  me  let 
him  not  deny  himself,  but  cherish  and  supremely  seek  his  own 
interest.  A  multitude  of  such  passages  might  be  quoted,  as 
every  reader  of  the  Bible  knows. 

7.  But  let  us  examine  this  theory  in  the  hght  of  Scripture 
declarations.  "  It  is  more  blessed  to  give  than  to  receive." 
This,  according  to  the  theory  we  are  opposing,  should  read: 
It  is  more  blessed  to  receive  than  to  give.  ^'•Charity,  (love) 
seeketh  not  her  own,'''*  This  should  read :  Charity  seeketh  her 
own.  '-'-  No  man  (that  is  no  righteous  man.)  liveth  to  himself" 
This  should  read:  Every  (righteous  man)  liveth  to  himself. 

8.  Let  this  theory  be  examined  in  the  hght  of  the  spirit  and 
example  of  Christ.  ""Even  Christ  pleased  not  himself." 
This  should  read,  if  Christ  was  holy  and  did  his  duty:  Even 
Christ  pleased  himself,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  sought  his 
own  interest. 

^'•1  seek  not  mine  own  glory  but  the  glory  of  Him  who  sent 
me."  This  should  read:  I  seek  not  the  glory  of  Him  who 
sent  me,  but  mine  own  glory. 

But  enough;  you  can  not  fail  to  see  that  this  is  a  selfish 
Philosophy,  and  the  exact  opposite  of  the  truth  of  God. 

But  let  us  examine  this  Philosophy  in  the  light  of  the  ad- 
mission that  Moral  Obligation  respects  ultimate  intention  only. 
I  ought  to  choose  the  good  of  God  and  my  neighbor  for  its 
own  intrinsic  value ;  That  is,  as  an  ultimate  end,  and  yet  not 
as  an  ultimate  end  for  its  intrinsic  value,  but  only  as  a  means 
of  promoting  my  own  interest!  This  is  a  plain  contradiction. 
What!  I  am  to  love,  that  is,  will  good  to  God  and  my  neigh- 
bor as  an  ultimate  end  or  for  its  own  sake^  merely  to  promote 
my  own  happiness! 

///.  I  will  in  the  next  place  consider  the  Utilitarian  Philosophy* 

This  maintains  that  the  utility  of  an  act  or  choice  renders 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  73 

it  ohligatory.  That  is,  Utility  is  the  Foundation  of  Mor- 
al Obligation — that  the  tendency  of  an  act,  choice,  or  inten- 
tion, to  secure  a  good  or  valuable  end  is  the  foundation  of 
the  obligation  to  put  forth  that  choice  or  intention.  Upon 
this  theory  I  remark,  ' 

1.  That  it  is  absurd  to  say  the  foundation  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  choose  a  certain  end  is  to  be  found  not  in  the  value  of 
the  end  itself  but  in  the  tendency  of  the  intention  to  secure  the 
end.  The  tendency  is  valuable  or  otherwise,  as  the  end  is 
valuable  or  otherwise.  It  is  and  must  be  the  xalue  of  the 
end  and  not  the  tendency  of  an  intention  to  secure  the  end,  that  ^ 
constitutes  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  intend. 

2.  We  have  seen  that  the  foundation  of  obligation  to  w^ill 
or  choose  any  end  as  such,  that  is,  on  its  own  account,  must 
consist  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  and  that  nothing  else 
whatever  can  impose  obligation  to  choose  any  thing  as  an 
ultimate  end,  but  its  intrinsic  value.  To  affirm  the  contrary  is  to 
affirm  a  contradiction.  It  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  I  ought  to 
choose  a  thing  as  an  end.,  and  yet  not  as  an  end.,  that  is,  ybr  its  Q 
own  sake.,  hut  for  some  other  reason,  to  wit,  the  tendency  of 
my  choice  to  secure  that  end.  Here  I  affirm  at  the  same 
breath  that  the  thing  intended  is  to  be  a?i  end^  that  is,  chosen 
for  its  own  intrinsic  value.,  and  yet  not  as  an  end  or  for  its  in- 
trinsic value,  but  for  entirely  a  different  reason,  to  wit,  the 
tendency  of  the  choice  to  secure  it.  \. 

3.  But  we  have  also  seen  that  the  end  chosen  and  the  rea- 
son for  the  choice  are  identical.     If  Utility  be  the  foundation 
of  Moral  ObHgation,  then  Utihty  is  the  end  to  be  chosen. 
That  is,  the  tendency  of  the  choice  to  secure  its  end  is  the  end     . 
to  he  chosen.     This  is  absurd. 

4.  But  the  very  announcement  of  this  theory  implies  its 
absurdity.  A  choice  is  obligatory  because  it  tends  to  secure 
good.  But  w^hy  secure  good  rather  than  evil  ?  The  answer 
is  because  good  is  valuable.  Ah  1  here  then  we  have  an- 
other reason,  and  one  which  must  be  the  true  reason,  to  wit, 
the  value  of  the  good  which  the  choice  tends  to  secure.  Ob- 
ligation to  use  means  to  do  good  may  and  must  be  conditiona- 
ted  upon  the  tendency  of  those  means  to  secure  the  end,  but 
the  obHgation  to  use  them  is  founded  solely  in  the  value  of  '^ 
the  end. 

But  let  us  examine  this  philosophy  in  the  light  of  the  ora- 
cles of  God.     What  say  the  Scriptures? 

I.  The  Law.  Does  this  require  us  to  love  God  and  our 
neighbor  because  loving  God  and  our  neighbor  tends  to  the 
7 


74  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

well-being  either  of  God,  our  neighbor,  or  ourselves  ?  Is  it 
the  tendency  orutiUty  of  love  that  makes  it  obligatory  upon  us 
to  exercise  it?  What!  will  good,  not  from  regard  to  its 
value,  but  because  wilUng  good  will  do  good  !  But  why  do 
good  ?  What  is  this  love  ?  Here  let  it  be  distinctly  remem- 
bered that  the  love  required  by  the  law  of  God  is  not  a 
mere  emotion  or  feeling,  but  willing,  choosing,  intending, 
in  a  word,  that  this  love  is  nothing  else  than  ultimate  inten-* 
tion.  What,  then,  is  to  be  intended  as  an  end  or  for  its  own 
sake  ?  Is  it  the  tendency  of  love  or  the  utility  of  ultimate 
intention  that  is  the  end  to  be  intended?  It  must  be  the  lat- 
ter if  Utilitarianism  is  true. 

According  to  this  theory,  when  the  law  requires  supreme 
love  to  God,  and  equal  love  to  our  neighbor,  the  meaning 
is,  not  that  we  are  to  will,  choose,  intend  the  well-being  of 
God  and  our  neighbor  for  its  own  sake  or  because  of  its  ititriri' 
sic  value^  but  because  of  the  tendency  of  the  intention  to  pro- 
mote the  good  of  God,  our  neighbor  and  ourselves.  But 
suppose  the  tendency  of  love  or  intention  to  be  what  it  may, 
the  utility  of  it  depends  upon  the  intrinsic  value  of  that  which 
it  tends  to  promote.  Suppose  love  or  intention  tends  to  pro- 
mote its  end^  this  is  a  useful  tendency  only  because  the 
end  is  valuable  in  itself.  It  is  nonsense  then  to  say  that 
love  to  God  and  man,  or  an  intention  to  promote  their  good 
is  required,  not  because  of  the  value  of  their  well-being,  but 
because  love  tends  to  promote  their  well-being. 
•  But  the  supposition  that  the  Law  of  God  requires  love  to 
God  and  man  or  the  choice  of  their  good  on  account  of  the 
tendency  of  love  to  promote  their  well-being,  is  absurd.  It 
is  to  represent  the  law  as  requiring  love,  not  to  God  and  our 
neighbor  as  an  end,  but  to  tendency  as  an  end.  The  law  in 
this  case  should  read  thus  :  Thou  shalt  love  the  utility  or  ten- 
dency of  Love  with  all  thy  heart,  &:c. 

If  the  theory  under  consideration  is  true,  this  is  the  spirit 
and  meaning  of  the  Law  :  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  and  thy 
neighbor,  that  is,  thou  shall  choose  their  good,not  for  its  own  sake 
or  as  an  end,  but  because  choosing  it  tends  to  promote  it. 
This  is  absurd  ;  for  I  ask  again,  why  promote  it  but  for  its 
own  value  ? 

Again  this  theory  is  absurd,,  because  if  the  Law  of  God 
requires  ultimate  intention,  it  is  a  contradiction  to  affirm  that 
the  intention  ought  to  terminate  on  its  own  tendency  as  an  end. 

2.  Again,  let  us  examine  this  theory  in  the  Hght  of  the  pre- 
cepts of  the  gospel.     '•''  Do  all  to  the  glory  of  God."     The 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  75 

spirit  of  this  requirement,  as  is  admitted,  is,  intend,  choose 
the  glory  of  God.  But  why  choose  the  glory  of  God  ?  Why, 
if  UtiUtarianism  be  true,  not  because  of  the  value  of  God's 
glory,  but  because  choosing  it  tends  to  promote  it.  But 
again,  I  ask  why  promote  it  if  it  be  not  valuable  ?  And  if  it 
be  valuable,  why  not  will  it  for  that  reason  ? 

3.  But  it  is  said  that  we  are  conscious  of  affirming  obligation 
to  do  many  things  on  the  ground  that  those  things  are  useful 
or  tend  to  promote  good. 

I  answer  that  we  are  conscious  of  affirming  obligation  to 
do  many  things  upon  condition  of  their  tendency  to  promote 
good,  but  that  we  never  affirm  obligation  to  be  founded  on 
this  tendency.  Such  an  affirmation  would  be  a  down-right 
absurdity.  I  am  under  an  obligation  to  use  the  means  to 
promote  good,  not  for  the  sake  of  its  intrinsic  value^  but  for 
the  sake  of  the  tendency  of  the  means  to  promote  it !  This 
is  absurd. 

I  say  again,  the  obligation  to  outward  action  or  to  use 
means  may  and  must  be  conditionated  upon  perceived  tendency, 
but  TiGweY  founded  in  this  tendency.  Ultimate  intention  has 
no  such  condition.  The  perceived  intrinsic  value  imposes  ob- 
ligation without  any  reference  to  the  tendency  of  the  inten- 
tion. 

4.  But  suppose  any  utiUtarian  should  deny  that  moral  obli- 
gation respects  ultimate  intention  only,  and  maintain  that  it 
also  respects  those  volitions  and  actions  that  sustain  to  the 
ultimate  end  the  relation  of  means,  and  therefore  assert  that 
the  foundation  of  moral  obligation  in  respect  to  all  those  vo- 
litions and  actions,  is  their  tendency  to  secure  a  valuable  end. 
This  would  not  at  all  relieve  the  difficulty  of  Utilitarianism, 
for  in  this  case  tendency  could  only  be  a  condition  of  the  ob- 
ligation, while  the  fundamental  reason  of  the  obligation  would 
and  must  be  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  which  these  may  have 
a  tendency  to  promote.  Tendency  to  promote  an  end  can 
impose  no  obligation.  The  end  must  be  intrinsically  valua- 
ble and  this  alone  imposes  obligation  to  choose  the  end,  and 
to  use  the  means  to  promote  it.  Upon  condition  that  any 
thing  is  perceived  to  sustain  to  this  end  the  relation  of  a  ne- 
cessary means,  we  are  for  the  sake  of  the  end  alone  under  ob- 
ligation to  use  the  means. 


LECTURE   VI. 
FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

IV.  Right ARiANisM. 

IF.  I  now  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  theory  that  regards 
RIGHT  as  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

In  the  examincttion  of  this  Philosophy  I  must  begin  by  de- 
fining terms.  What  is  Right?  The  primary  signification  of 
the  term  is  straight.  When  used  in  a  moral  sense  it  means 
ft.,  suitable.,  agreeable  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral 
agents.  Right  is  objective  and  subjective.  Objective  right  is 
an  idea  of  the  fit,  the  suitable,  the  agreeable  to  the  nature  and 
relations  of  moral  beings.  It  is  an  idea  of  that  choice  or  ul- 
timate intention,  and  of  the  consequent  course  of  life  which 
is  befitting  to  or  obhgatory  upon  moral  agents.  Objective  right 
is  moral  law.  It  is  the  rule  of  moral  action  as  it  lies  re- 
vealed in  the  ideas  of  the  reason  of  every  moral  agent. 
Thus,  strictly  speaking,  objective  right  is  subjective  law.  This 
idea  or  law  of  reason  is  subjective  as  it  lies  in  the  mind  of  the 
subject  of  it.  But  as  a  rule  of  action  or  rather  of  ultimate 
intention,  in  other  words,  regarded  as  a  rule  or  law  of  right.^ 
it  is  objective  right  and  subjective  law. 

Subjective  right  is  synonymous  with  righteousness,  upright- 
ness, virtue.  It  consists  in  or  is  an  attribute  of  that  state  of 
the  will  which  is  conformed  to  objective  right,  or  to  moral  law. 
It  is  a  term  that  expresses  the  moral  quality.,  element.,  or  attri- 
biite  of  that  ultimate  intention  which  the  law  of  God  requires. 
In  other  words  still,  it  is  conformity  of  heart  to  the  law  of  ob- 
jective right,  or,  as  I  just  said,  it  is  more  strictly  the  term 
that  designates  the  moral  character  of  that  state  of  heart. 
Some  choose  to  regard  subjective  right  as  consisting  in  this 
state  of  heart.,  and  others  insist  that  it  is  only  an  element.,  attri- 
bute., or  quality  of  this  state  of  heart,  or  of  this  ultimate  in- 
tention. I  shall  not  contend  about  words,  but  shall  show 
that  it  matters  not,  so  far  as  the  question  we  are  about  to  ex- 
amine is  concerned,  in  which  of  these  lights  subjective  right 
is  regarded,  whether  as  consisting  in  ultimate  intention  con- 
formed to  law,  or,  as  an  attribute,  element,  or  quality  of  this 
intention. 

I  would  here  repeat  a  remark  made  on  a  former  occa- 
sion, that  since  moral  obHgation  respects  the  ultimate  in- 
tention, that  is,  the  choice  of  an  end  for  its  intrinsic  val- 
ue, moral  obligation  must  imply  the  perception  or  idea 
of  the  valuable.  Until  the  mind  perceives  or  has  the 
idea  of  the  valuable  developed,  it  cannot  have  the  idea  of 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  77 

moral  obligation  and  consequently  of  right  and  wrong  devel- 
oped. If  moral  obligation  respects  the  choice  of  an  end,  the 
obligation  cannot  exist  until  the  end  is  apprehended.  When 
the  end  is  apprehended  the  affirmation  of  moral  obligation  to 
choose  it,  and  of  the  rightness  of  compliance,  and  the  wrong- 
ness  of  noncompliance  with  the  obligation,  is  made  by  a  law 
of  necessity.  The  mind  is  so  constituted  that  when  the  idea 
of  the  intrinsically  valuable  is  developed,  the  correlated  ideas 
of  moral  obligation,  of  right  and  wrong,  of  praise  and  blame- 
worthiness, of  justice  and  injustice,  &c.,  are  developed  by  a 
law  of  necessity. 

The  theory  under  consideration  was  held  by  the  ancient 
Greek  and  Roman  Philosophers.  It  was  the  theory  of  Kant, 
and  is  now  the  theory  of  the  transcendental  school  in  Europe 
and  America.  Cousin,  in  manifest  accordance  with  the  views  of 
Kant,  states  the  theory  in  these  words ;  "Do  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  right,  or  rather,  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right. 
Morality  has  to  do  with  the  intentions." — {Enunciation  of  mo- 
ral law — Elements  of  Psychology  p.  162.)  Those  who  follow 
Kant,  Cousin  and  Coleridge  state  the  theory  either  in  the 
same  words,  or  in  words  that  amount  to  the  same  thing. 
They  regard  right  as  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  '■Will 
the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right."  This,  if  it  has  any  mean- 
ing, means,  Will  the  right  as  an  ultimate  end,  that  is,  for 
its  own  sake.  Let  us  examine  this  very  popular  philosophy, 
first,  in  the  light  of  its  own  principles,  and  secondly  in  the  , 
light  of  Revelation. 

I.  In  the  light  of  its  own  principles.  And, 
(1.)  This  philosophy  strenuously  maintains  that  Moral  Ob- 
ligation respects  the  ultimate  intention  only,  that  is,  that  it 
respects  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end.  It  also  maintains 
that  to  choose  an  ultimate  end  is  to  choose  something  for  its 
own  intrinsic  value,  either  to  self  or  being  in  general,  and  not 
as  a  means  or  condition  of  any  other  end.  This,  it  will  be 
seen,  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end 
is  the  choice  of  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being,  that  is, 
to  self  or  to  the  universe.  This,  again,  it  will  be  seen,  is 
the  same  as  to  say  that  ultimate  intention  is  and  must  be  sy- 
nonymous either  with  good  will  to  being  in  general  or  identi- 
cal with  disinterested  benevolence,  or  with  willing  good  to 
self  in  particular.  But  how  does  this  teaching  consist  with 
choosing  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right?  Are  the  good 
of  being,  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being,  and  the  right  the  <) 
same  thing?  Are  the  right  and  the  intrinsically  valuable  the 
7* 


78  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

same  thing?  Are  the  right,  and  the  highest  well  being  of  God 
and  of  the  universe  identical?  To  choose,  will,  intend  the 
highest  good  of  God  and  the  universe,  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for 
its  own  value,  is  right.  For  this  is  choosing  the  proper,  fit, 
suitable,  right  end.  But  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right  is  to  will  another  end,  and  this  is  not  right.  To  will  the 
good  for  the  sake  of  the  good,  that  is,  to  will  it  disinterested- 
ly, is  right.  But  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  is 
not  right. 

But  does  this  philosophy  mean  that  right  is  the  supreme 
and  ultimate  good  upon  which  intention  ought  to  terminate? 
If  so,  in  what  sense  of  the  term  right  does  this  theory  re- 
gard it  as  the  intrinsically  and  supremely  valuable?  Is  it  in 
the  sense  of  Objective  Right?  But  Objective  Right  is  a  mere 
abstract  idea  or  laru.  It  is  impossible  that  this  should  possess 
any  intrinsic  value.  It  may  be  and  is  a  condition  or  means 
of  virtue,  and  hence  of  ultimate  satisfaction  or  good,  and 
therefore  may  be  relatively/  valuable.  But  to  make  a  mere 
idea  of  the  reason,  an  abstract  idea  or  law  the  intrinsical- 
ly valuable  thing  which  all  moral  agents  are  bound  to  choose 
as  the  supreme  good,  and  to  which  they  are  bound  to  conse- 
crate themselves  for  its  own  sake,  is  absurd.  To  prefer  this 
to  the  highest  well  being  of  God  and  the  universe  is  not  right. 
It  can  not  be  right. 

(2.)  It  is  absurd  to  talk  of  making  objective  right  an  ultimate 
end.  Make  /aw  an  ultimate  end!  Law  is  a  rule  of  choice  or 
willing,  as  this  philosophy  maintains.  But  what  does  law  re- 
quire a  moral  agent  to  will,  choose,  intend?  Why,  according 
to  this  philosophy,  it  requires  him  to  will,  choose,  intend  no 
end  whatever  bat  itself.  A  very  important  law  surely  that 
requires  its  subject  to  will  only  its  own  existence  and  nothing 
else!  And  what  is  its  own  existence  or  self  that  it  should 
make  itself  the  supreme  good?  Why,  forsooth,  it  is  a  mere 
abstract  idea.  But  it  is  impossible  for  the  mind  to  choose 
this  as  the  supreme  good,  or  as  an  ultimate  end,  for  the  plain 
reason  that  it  can  not  be  regarded  as  intrinsically  valuable. 

(3.)  It  is  absurd  to  represent  the  moral  law  as  requiring 
its  subjects  to  make  itself  the  end  to  which  they  ought  to  con- 
secrate themselves.  The  law  must  require  the  choice  of  some 
intrinsically  and  supremely  valuable  end.  This  must  be  the 
highest  good  or  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  and  can 
not  be  a  mere  abstract  law  or  idea.  What,  a  mere  idea  of 
greater  intrinsic  value  than  the  infinite  and  eternal  happiness 
or  well  being  of  God  and  of  the  universe !    Impossible. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  79 

But  does  this  philosophy  teach  thut  subjective  right  is  the  founda- 
tion of  moral  obligation?  Subjective  right  is  a  compliance  with 
moral  obligation,  and  can  n.ot  therefore  be  the  foundation  of 
the  obligation.  Subjective  right,  is  virtue,  righteousness.  It 
must,  as  has  been  said,  consist  either  in  ultimate  intention^  or  it 
must  be  a  quahty  or  attribute  of  that  intention.  If  it  be  re- 
garded as  identical  with  that  ultimate  choice  or  intention 
which  the  moral  law  requires,  then,  according  to  this  philoso- 
phy, moral  agents  are  bound  to  choose  their  own  choice  or  to 
intend  their  own  intention  as  an  ultimate  end,  that  is,  to  in- 
tend their  own  intention  for  its  own  intrinsic  value.  This  is 
absurd  and   nonsensical. 

If  subjective  right  is  to  be  regarded,  not  as  identical  with 
ultimate  choice  or  intention,  but  as  a  quality,  element,  or 
attribute  of  the  choice  or  intention,  then  moral  agents,  if 
this  philosophy  be  true,  are  under  a  moral  obligation  to 
choose,  will,  intend  nothing  out  of  their  choice  or  intention, 
but  to  choose  or  intend  an  element,  attribute  or  quality  of 
their  intention  as  an  ultimate  end.  Upon  one  supposition 
ultimate  intention  must  terminate  upon  itself  as  an  end; 
upon  the  other  it  must  terminate  upon  a  quality  or  attribute  of 
itself.  Either  supposition  is  a  gross  absurdity  and  an  im- 
possibility. What!  choose  my  own  choice  as  an  end!  This 
is  a  natural  impossibility.  Choose  an  attribute  of  my  own 
choice  as  an  end  or  object  of  the  very  choice  of  which  it  is 
an  attribute!  This  is  equally  a  natural  impossibility.  Choice 
must  of  necessity  terminate  on  some  object  out  of  itself,  else 
there  is  no  object  of  choice.  Thus  we  see  that  subjective 
right  cannot  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end,  because  it  is  not 
an  ultimate.  In  what  possible  or  conceivable  sense,  then, 
can  right  be  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation?  I  answer 
in  no  possible  or  conceivable  sense.  It  is  grossly  inconsistent 
and  self  contradictory  for  this  philosophy  to  maintain  at  the 
same  breath,  that  moral  obligation  respects  the  choice  of  an 
ultimate  end,  and  that  right  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obliga- 
tion. Why,  right,  as  we  have  just  seen,  consists  either  in  the 
law  or  idea  of  obligation,  or  in  obedience  to  this  law  or  obli- 
gation. It  is  therefore  stark  nonsense  to  affirm  that  right  is 
the  foundation  of  the  obligation.  Obedience  to  law  can  not  be 
identical  with  the  reason  for  this  obedience.  Compliance  with  an 
obligation^  can  not  be  identical  with  the  reason  or  foundation  of 
the  obligation.  In  other  words,  intending  in  accordance  with  ob- 
ligation, can  not  be  identical  with  the  thing  or  end  intended. 
If  objective  right  be  the  end  to  be  intended,  then  obedience  to 


80  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  law  is  identical  with  choosing  the  law  as  an  ultimate  end. 
Choosing  the  law  as  an  ultimate  end  is  obedience  to  the   law ! 

(4.)  But  here  it  is  objected  that  we  really  affirm  our  obliga- 
tion to  love  God  because  of  his  moral  excellence.  To  this  I  re- 
ply— That  this  objection  in  the  mouth  of  a  Rightarian  must 
mean  that  it  is  right  to  love  God  for  or  because  of  his  moral 
excellence  and  that  we  are,  bound  to  love  Him  because  it  is 
right  ?  But  to  love  Him  because  it  is  right.,  and  to  love  Him  for 
his  moral  excellence  are  not  identical.  The  objection  in- 
volves a  contradiction.  This  love,  let  it  be  remembered,^is 
willing,  intending  an  end.  But  what  am  I  bound  to  will  or 
intend  to  God  in  view  of  his  moral  excellence.  Am  I  bound 
to  will  his  goodness  as  an  end?  This  must  be,  if  his  good- 
ness is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation,  for  as  we  have  repeat- 
edly seen  the  reason  for  choosing  any  thing  as  an  ultimate  end 
and  the  end  chosen  are  identical.  But  to  will  the  divine  good- 
ness, which  consists  in  benevolence,  as  an  ultimate  end  is  ab- 
surd. But  am  I  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right? 
Is  this  loving  God  or  willing  any  thing  to  Him?  Or  am  I 
to  will  good  to  God  because  it  is  right  to  will  good  to  Him  ?  This 
is  absurd  and  a  contradiction.  To  will  good  to  God  as  an 
ultimate  end,  is  to  will  it  for  its  own  sake  or  because  of  its 
own  intrinsic  value.  It  is  impossible  to  will  good  to  God  for 
its  own  sake,  because  it  is  right.  It  is  the  same  as  to  will  good 
to  God  for  its  intrinsic  value,  yet  not  for  its  intrinsic  value, 
but  because  it  is  right.  This  is  willing  the  right  and  not  the 
good  as  an  end.  The  assumption,  that  we  affirm  our  obligation 
to  love  God  to  be  founded  in  his  moral  excellence,  will  be  ful- 
ly considered  in  its  proper  place,  I  would  only  here  remark 
that  it  is  not  very  consistent  in  a  rightarian  to  urge  this  objec- 
tion. 

(5.)  But  right  here  it  will  be  well  to  inquire  into  the  ground 
of  the  mistake  of  rightarians.  Kant,  and  if  consistent,  all 
rightarians,  consider  the  law  itself  as  imposing  obhgation, 
and  therefore  of  course  as  being  the  foundation  of  obligation. 
Hence  Kant  affirms  that  ethics  or  morahty  or  virtue  does 
not  imply  any  religion,  but  only  the  adoption  into  the  will 
of  a  maxim,  "  at  all  times  fit  for  law  universal."  He  holds 
that  the  mind  needs  no  end  upon  which  to  fix,  nothing  at 
which  to  aim  beside  or  out  of  the  law  itself ;  nothing  to  in- 
tend, no  motive  out  of  the  precept  or  maxim  itself,  but  simply 
the  adoption  of  the  maxim  just  named,  and  which  Cousin  ex- 
presses thus,  ^^Do  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,"  or  ^' Will 
the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right."    Now  it  is  a  fundamen- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  81 

tal  mistake  to  represent  the  law  itself,  as  imposing  obli- 
gation, and  therefore  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation. 
Law  is  a  rule  according  to  which  moral  agents  are  bound  to 
will.  God  and  reason  afhrm  their  obligation  to  will  in  ac- 
cordance with  law,  or  in  other  words,  to  will  that  which  the 
law  requires.  But  the  law  requires  that  something  shall  be 
willed  for  its  own  sake,  and  this  is  the  same  as  to  say  that 
tiie  end  to  be  willed  deserves  to  be  willed  on  its  own  account, 
which  again,  is  the  same  as  to  affirm  that  the  obHgation  is 
founded,  not  in  the  law,  but  in  the  end  which  the  law  requires 
us  to  seek.  The  law  requires  us  to  seek  the  end  simply  and 
only  because  of  its  intrinsic  value,  and  not  because  the  law 
can  of  itself  impose  obligation.  Now  the  idea  that  right  or 
law  can  impose  obligation  is  founded  in  a  radical  misappre- 
hension of  the  nature  of  law.  It  is  a  rule  of  willing  or  a 
rule  that  declares  how  moral  agents  ought  to  will  or  what 
they  ought  to  choose.  But  it  is  not  the  foundation  of  the 
obligation  to  choose  that  which  the  law  requires  to  be  cho- 
sen as  an  end.  For  the  reason  for  choosing  this  is  and  must 
be  its  intrinsic  value,  and  were  it  not  intrinsically  valuable, 
the  law  could  not  require  it  to  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end. 
But  for  its  intrinsic  value,  a  requirement  to  choose  it  as  an 
ultimate  end  could  not  be  law.  Objective  right  and  law,  as 
we  have  before  seen,  are  identical.  If  right  is  the  foundar 
tion  of  obligation,  then  law  is  the  foundation  of  obligation. 
This  is  and  must  be  Rightarianism.  (But  it  is  a  gross  absurdi- 
ty and  a  contradiction  to  make  the  law  requiring  the  choice 
of  an  ultimate  end  or  of  something  for  its  own  intrinsic  val- 
ue, the  reason,  or  foundation  of  the  obligation  instead  of  tlie 
intrinsic  value  of  that  which  is  to  be  chosen  for  its  value. 
Nothing  can  by  any  possibility  impose  obligation  to  choose 
an  ultimate  end  but  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.  Neither 
law  nor  any  lawgiver  in  earth  or  heaven  can  impose  such 
an  obligation.  This  philosophy  represents  the  moral  law  as 
requiring  its  subjects  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right  or  to  will  the  right  as  an  ultimate  end.  Of  course  it 
must  represent  subjective  right  or  virtue  as  consisting  in 
willing  objective  right  or  as  an  ultimate  end.  This  we  have 
seen  is  absurd. 

2.  But  let  us  examine  this  philosophy  in  the  light  of  the 
oracles  of  God. 

(1.)  In  the^ghtof  the  Moral  Law.  The  whole  Law  is  ex- 
pressed by  tire  Great  Teacher  thus:  '''Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul,  with 


/ 


82  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

all  thy  might,  and  with  all  thy  strength;  and  thy  neighbor  as 
thyself."  Paul  says  "All  the  Law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word — 
love:"  "  therefore  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law."  Now  it  is 
admitted  by  this  philosophy,  that  the  love  required  by  the  Law 
is  not  a  mere  emotion,  but  that  it  consists  in  willing,  choice, 
intention;  that  it  consists  in  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end,  or 
in  the  choice  of  some  thing  for  its  own  sake,  or  which  is  the 
same  thing,  for  its  intrinsic  value.  What  is  this  which  the 
Law  requires  us  to  will  to  God  and  our  iieighhor?  Is  it  to  will 
the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right  ?  But  what  has  this  to  do  with 
loving  God  and  our  neighbor?  To  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  rights  is  not  the  same  as  to  love  God  and  our  neighbor,  as 
it  is  not  willing  any  thing  to  them.  Suppose  it  be  said,  that 
the  Law  requires  us  to  will  the  good,  or  highest  blessedness  of 
God  and  our  neighbor,  because  it  is  right.  This,  as  has  been 
shown,  is  a  contradiction  and  an  impossibility.  To  will  the 
blessedness  of  God  and  our  neighbor  in  any  proper  sense,  is  to 
will  it  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  an  ultimate  end.  But  this  is  not 
to  will  it  because  it  is  right.  To  will  the  good  of  God  and  our 
neighbor  for  its  own  sake,  or  for  its  intrinsic  value,  is  right. 
But  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  is  not  right.  To 
will  the  good  because  it  is  good,  or  the  valuable  because  it  is 
valuable,  is  right,  because  it  is  willing  it  for  the  right  reason. 
But  to  will  the  right  because  it  is  right,  is  not  right,  because  it 
is  not  willing  the  right  end.  To  will  the  good  because  it  is 
right.,  is  not  to  will  the  good  as  an  end,  but  the  right  as  an  end, 
which  is  not  right.  The  Law  of  God  does  not,  can  not  require 
us  to  love  right  more  than  God  and  our  neighbor.  What ! 
right  of  greater  value  than  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and 
of  the  universe?  Impossible.  It  is  impossible  that  the  Moral 
Law  should  require  any  thing  else  than  to  will  the  highest 
good  of  universal  being  as  an  ultimate  end.  It  is  a  first  truth 
of  Reason,  that  this  is  the  most  valuable  thing  possible  or  con- 
ceivable; and  that  could  by  no  possibility  be  law,  that  should 
require  any  thing  else  to  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end.  Ac- 
cording to  this  philosophy,  the  revealed  law  should  read: 
"  Thou  shalt  love  the  right  for  its  own  sake,  with  all  thy  heart 
and  with  all  thy  soul."  The  fact  is,  the  Law  requires  the  su- 
preme love  of  God,  and  the  equal  love  of  our  neighbor.  It 
says  nothing,  and  implies  nothing  about  doing  right  for  the 
sake  of  the  right.  Rightarianism  is  a  rejection  of  the  Divine 
Revealed  Law,  and  a  substituting  in  its  stead  an  entirely  differ- 
ent rule  of  Moral  Obligation,  a  rule  that  deifies  right,  that 
rejects  the  claims  of  God,  and  exalts  right  to  the  throne. 


/ 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  83 

(2.)  "Whether  therefore,  ye  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  ye 
do,  do  all  to  the  glory  of  God."  Does  this  precept  require  ua 
to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  rights  or  is  it  in  spirit  the 
same  as  the  Law?     The  same  as  the  Law,  heyond  a  doubt. 

(3.)  '•''  Do  good  unto  all  men,  as  ye  have  opportunity."  Here 
again,  are  we  required  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
rights  or  to  will  the  good  of  our  neighbor  because  of  its  own  in- 
trinsic value?     The  latter,  most  certainly. 

(4.)  Take  the  commands  to  pray  and  labor  for  the  salvation 
of  souls.  Do  such  commandments  require  us  to  go  forth  to 
will  or  do  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  rights  or  to  will  the  sal- 
vation of  souls  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  salvation  ?  When 
we  pray  and  preach  and  converse,  must  we  aim  at  rights  must 
the  love  of  rights  and  not  the  love  of  God  and  of  souls  influence 
us?  When  I  am  engaged  in  prayer,  and  travail  day  and  night 
for  souls,  and  have  an  eye  so  single  to  the  good  of  souls  and  to 
the  glory  of  God,  and  am  so  swallowed  up  with  my  subject  as 
not  so  much  as  to  think  of  the  righf^  am  I  all  wrong?  Must  I 
pray  because  it  is  rights  and  do  all  I  do  and  suffer  all  I  suffer, 
not  from  good  will  to  God  and  man,  but  because  it  is  right? 
Who  does  not  know,  that  to  intend  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right  in  all  these  things  instead  of  having  an  eye  single  to  the 
good  of  being,  would  and  must  be  any  thing  rather  than  true 
r/Ugion? 

,  (5.)  Examine  this  philosophy  in  the  light  of  Scripture  de- 
clarations. "  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only 
begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  beheveth  in  Him,  might  not 
perish,  J^ut  have  everlasting  life."  Now,  are  we  to  under- 
stand that  God  gave  his  Son,  not  from  any  regard  to  the  good 
of  souls  for  its  own  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  right  1  Did  He 
will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right?  Did  He  give  His  Son 
to  die  for  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  or  to  die  to  render 
the  salvation  of  souls  possible,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  souls  ? 

(6.)  Did  Christ  give  Himself  to  die  and  labor  for  the  right 
for  the  sake  of  the  right,  or  for  souls  from  love  to  souls?  Did 
prophets,  and  apostles,  and  martyrs,  and  have  the  saints  in  all 
ages,  willed  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  or  have  they 
labored  and  suffered  and  died  for  God  and  souls  from  love  to 
them? 

(7.)  How  infinitely  strange  would  the  Bible  read,  if  it  adopted 
this  philosophy.  The  Law,  cis  has  been  said,  would  read  thus: 
"Thou  shalt  love  the  right  with  all  thy  heart;"  "Whatsoever 
ye  do,  do  all  for  the  sake  of  the  right -^"^  "Do  the  right  unto 
all  men  for  the  sake  of  the  right;"  "God  so  loved  the  right 


\ 


84  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

for  the  sake  of  the  right  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son, 
to  do  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  rights  Should  we  interro- 
gate the  holy  men  of  all  ages,  and  ask  why  they  do  and  suffer 

85  they  do,  with  this  philosophy,  they  must  answer.  We  are 
willing  and  doing  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right.  We  have 
no  ultimate  regard  to  God  or  to  the  good  of  any  being,  but  only 
to  the  right. 

(8.)  But  take  another  passage  which  is  quoted  in  support  of 
this  philosophy:  "  Children  obey  your  parents  in  the  Lord,  for 
this  is  right."  Now  what  is  the  spirit  of  this  requirement? 
What  is  it  to  obey  parents?  Why,  if,  as  this  philosophy  holds, 
it  must  resolve  itself  into  Ultimate  Intention,  what  must  the 
child  intend  for  its  own  sake?  Must  he  will  good  to  God  and 
his  parents,  and  obey  his  parents  as  a  means  of  securing  the 
liighest  good,  or  must  he  will  the  right  as  an  end  for  the  sake 
of  the  right,  regardless  of  the  good  of  God  or  of  the  universe? 
Would  it  be  right  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right, 
rather  than  to  will  the  good  of  the  universe  for  the  sake  of  the 
good,  and  obey  his  parents  as  a  means  of  securing  the  highest 
good? 

It  is  right  to  will  the  highest  good  of  God  and  of  the  universe, 
and  to  use  all  the  necessary  means,  and  fulfill  all  the  necessary 
conditions  of  this  highest  well-being.  For  children  to  obey 
their  parents  is  one  of  the  means,  and  for  this  reason  it  is  right, 
and  upon  no  other  condition  can  it  be  required.  But  it  is  said 
that  children  affirm  their  obligation  to  obey  their  parents 
entirely  irrespective  of  the  obedience  having  any  reference 
to  or  sustaining  any  relation  to  the  good  of  being.  This  is  a 
mistake.  The  child,  if  he  is  a  Moral  Agent,  and  does  really 
affirm  Moral  Obhgation,  not  only  does,  but  must  perceive  the 
end  upon  which  his  choice  or  intention  ought  to  terminate. 
If  he  really  makes  an  intelHgent  affirmation,  it  is  and  must 
be,  that  he  ought  to  will  an  end,  that  this  end  is  not,  and 
can  not  be  the  rights  as  has  been  shown.  He  knows  that  he 
ought  to  will  his  parents'  happiness,  and  his  own  happiness, 
and  the  happiness  of  the  world,  and  of  God;  and  he  knows 
that  obedience  to  his  parents  sustains  the  relation  of  a 
means  to  this  end.  The  fact  is,  it  is  a  first  truth  of  Reason, 
that  he  ought  to  will  the  good  of  his  parents  and  the  good  of 
every  body.  He  also  knows  that  obedience  to  his  parents  is 
a  necessary  means  to  this  end.  If  he  does  not  know  these 
things,  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  be  a  Moral  Agent,  or  to 
make  any  intelfigent  affirmation  at  all;  and  if  he  has  any 
idea  of  obedience,  it  is,  and  must  be  only  such  as  animals 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  8S 

have  who  are  actuated  wholly  hj  hope,  fear  and  instinct. 
As  well  might  we  say,  that  an  ox  or  a  dog,  who  gives 
indication  of  knowing  in  some  sense,  that  he  ought  to  obey 
us,  affirms  Moral  Obligation  of  himself,  as  to  say  this  of  a 
child  in  whose  mind  the  idea  of  the  good,  or  valuable  to 
being  is  not  developed.  What!  does  Moral  Obligation 
respect  ultimate  intention  only;  and  does  ultimate  intention 
consist  in  the  choice  of  something  for  its  own  intrinsic  value, 
and  yet  is  it  true  that  children  affirm  Moral  Obligation  before 
the  idea  of  the  intrinsically  valuable,  is  at  all  developed?  Im- 
possible! But  this  objection  assumes  that  children  have  the 
idea  of  right  developed  before  the  idea  of  the  valuable.  This 
can  not  be.  The  end  to  be  chosen,  must  be  apprehended  by 
the  mind  before  the  mind  can  have  the  idea  of  Moral  Ohliga- 
tion  to  choose  an  end,  or  of  the  right  or  wrong  of  choosing  or 
not  choosing  it.  The  development  of  the  idea  of  the  good  or 
valuable,  must  precede  the  development  of  the  ideas  of  ri?ht 
and  of  Moral  Obligation. 

But  here  again,  I  must  bring  into  view  the  fundamental 
error  of  this  philosophy,  to  wit,  that  right  is  the  end  to  be 
willed.  Right,  as  we  have  seen,  is  objective  or  subjective. 
Objective  right  is  an  idea,  a  law.  Subjective  right  is  virtue. 
But  virtue,  as  it  consists  in  love,  or  wilHng,  can  not  be  an  end. 
Objective  right,  or  law,  can  not  be  an  end.  To  will  objective 
right  as  an  end,  would  be  to  will  the  idea,  or  law,  as  an  end. 
This  is  absurd,  as  w6  have  seen.  What  sort  of  a  law  would 
that  be  that  required  that  nothing  should  be  willed  as  an  end 
but  itself?  This  could,  by  no  possibility,  be  Law,  Law  is 
that  which  declares  what  ought  to  be  willed  as  an  end,  or  for 
its  own  intrinsic  value;  and  what  law  would  that  be,  which 
instead  of  requiring  the  highest  good  of  God  and  the  uni- 
verse to  be  chosen  as  an  end,  should  require  the  rule,  law  or 
idea  itself  to  be  willed  as  the  ultimate  and  supreme  good? 
Surely  this  would  not,  could  not  be  law.  The  law  of  God, 
then,  is  not,  and  can  not  be  developed  in  the  mind  of  a  child 
who  has  no  knowledge  or  idea  of  the  valuable,  and  who  has 
and  can  have  no  reference  to  the  good  of  any  being,  in  obe- 
dience to  his  parents. 

It  is  one  thing  to  intend  that  which  is  rights  and  quite  an- 
other to  intend  the  right  as  an  end.  For  example,  to  choose 
my  own  gratification  as  an  end,  is  wrong.  But  this  is  not 
choosing  the  wrong  as  an  end.  A  drunkard  chooses  to  gratify 
bis  appetite  for  strong  drink  as  an  end,  that  is,  for  its  own 
sake.  This  is  wrong.  But  the  choice  does  not  terminate  on 
8 


86  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  Tvrong,  but,  on  the  gratification.  The  thing  intended  is 
not  the  wrong.  The  Hquor  is  not  chosen,  the  gratification 
is  not  intended,  because  it  is  wrongs  but  notwithstanding 
it  is  wrong.  To  love  God  is  right^  but  to  suppose  that  God  is 
loved  because  it  is  right^  is  absurd.  It  is  to  suppose  that  God 
is  loved,  not  from  any  regard  to  God,  but  from  a  regard  to 
right.  This  is  an  absurdity  and  a  contradiction.  To  love 
or  will  the  good  of  my  neighbor,  is  right.  But  to  will  the 
right,  instead  of  the  good  of  my  neighbor,  is  not  right.  It 
is  loving  right  instead  of  my  neighbor;  but  this  is  not  right, 

(9.)  But  it  is  said  that  I  am  conscious  of  affirming  to  myself 
that  I  ought  to  will  the  right.  This  a  mistake.  I  am  con- 
scious of  affirming  to  myself,  that  I  ought  to  will  that  the  wil- 
ling of  ichich  is  rights  to  wit,  to  will  the  good  of  God  and  of 
being.  This  is  right.  But  this  is  not  choosing  the  right  as  an 
end. 

(10.)  But  it  is  said  again,  '•'  I  am  conscious  of  affirming  to 
myself^  that  I  ought  to  will  the  good  of  being,  because  it  is 
right.'^^  That  is,  to  will  the  good  of  being,  as  a  means,  and  the 
right  as  an  end!  which  is  making  right  the  supreme  good  and 
the  good  of  being  a  means  to  that  end.  This  is  absurd.  But 
to  say,  that  I  am  conscious  of  affirming  to  myself  my  obliga- 
tion to  love  or  will  the  good  of  God  and  my  neighbor,  because 
it  is  right,  is  a  contradiction.  It  is  the  same  as  to  say,  I  ought 
to  love,  or  intend  the  good  of  God  and  my  neighbor,  as  an  ul- 
timate end,  and  yet,  not  to  intend  the  good  of  God  and  my 
neighbor,  but  intend  the  right. 

(11.)  Bdft  it  is  said,  that  "I  ought  to  love  God  in  compliance 
with,  and  out  of  respect  to  my  obligation;  that  I  ought  to  will 
it,  because  and  for  the  reason  that  I  am  botmd  to  will  it."  That 
is,  that  in  loving  God  and  my  neighbor,  I  must  intend  to  dis- 
charge or  comply  with  my  obligation;  and  this,  it  is  said,  is 
identical  with  intending  the  right.  But  ought  my  supreme 
object  to  be  to  discharge  my  duty — to  meet  obligation  instead 
of  willing  the  well-being  of  God  and  my  neighbor  for  its  own 
sake?  If  my  end  is  to  do  my  duty,  I  do  not  do  it.  For  what 
is  my  obligation?  Why,  to  love,  or  will  the  good  of  God  and 
my  neighbor,  that  is,  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  value.  To  dis- 
charge my  obligation,  then,  I  must  intend  the  good  of  God 
and  my  neighbor,  as  an  end.  That  is,  I  must  intend  that 
which  I  am  under  an  obhgation  to  intend.  But  I  am  not 
under  an  obligation  to  intend  the  rights  because  it  is  rights  nor 
to  do  my  duty  because  it  is  duty,  but  to  intend  the  good  of 
God  and  of  my  neighbor,  because  it  is  good.     Therefore,  to 


y^ 


aiORAL  GOVERNMEXT.  $? 

discharge  my  obligation,  I  must  intend  the  good,  and  not  the 
right — the  good  of  God  and  my  neighbor,  and  not  to  do  my 
duty.  I  say  again,  to  intend  the  good,  or  valuable,  is  right\ 
but  to  intend  the  right  is  not  right. 

(12.)  But  it  is  said,  that  in  very  many  instances,  at  least,  I 
am  conscious  of  affirming  my  Moral  Obligation  to  do  the  rights 
without  any  reference  to  the  good  of  being,   when  I  can  as- 
sign no  other  reason  for  the  affirmation  of  obligation,  than  the 
right.     For  example,  I  behold  virtue,  I  affirm  spontaneously 
and  necessarily,  that  I  ought  to  love  that  virtue.     And  this,  it 
is  said,  has  no  reference  to  the  good  of  being.     Are  wilhng 
the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right  and  loving  virtue,  the  same 
thing?    But  what  is  it  to  love  virtue?     Not  a  mere  feeling 
of  delight  or  complacency  in  it?     But  it  is  agreed,  that  Moral 
Obligation  respects  the  ultimate  intention  only.     What,  then, 
do  I  mean  by  the  affirmation,  that  I  ought  to  love  virtue? 
What  is  virtue?     It  is  ultimate  intention,  or  an  attribute  of  y 
ultimate  intention.     But  what  is  loving  virtue?     It  consists  in 
wilhng  its  existence.     But  it  is  said,  that  I  affirm  my  obhga- 
tion  to  love  virtue  as  an  end,,  or  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  from 
any  regard  to  the  good  of  being.     This  is  absurd,  and  a  con-  v 
tradiction.     To  love  virtue,  it  is  said,  is  to  will  its  existence  as 
an  end.     But  virtue  consists  in  intending  an  end.    Now,  to  -> 
love  virtue,  it  is  said,  is  to  will,  intend  its  existence  as  an  end,, 
for  its  own  sake.     Then,  according  to  this  theory,  I  affirm  my 
obligation  to  intend  the  intention  of  a  virtuous  being  as  an 
end,  instead  of  intending  the  same  end  that  he  does.     This  is  '^ 
absurd.     His  intention  is  of  no  value,  is  neither  naturally  good 
nor  morally  good,  irrespective  of  the  end  intended.     It  is  nei- 
ther right  nor  wrong,  irrespective  of  the  end  chosen.     It  is 
therefore,  impossible  to  will,  choose,  intend  the  intention  as  an 
end,  without  reference  to  the  end  intended.     To  love  virtue, 
then,  is  to  love  or  will  the  end  upon  which  virtuous  intention 
terminates,  namely,  the  good  of  being,  or,  in  other  words,  to 
love  virtue,  is  to  will  its  existence, /or  the  sake  of  the  end  it  has 
in  view,,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  to  will  the  same  end.     Vir- 
tue is  intending,  choosing  an  end.    Loving  virtue  is  willing  that 
the  virtuous  intention  should  exist  for  the  sake  of  its  end.     Take 
away  the  end,  and  who  would  or  could  will  the  intention? 
Without  the  end,,  the  virtue,  or  intention,  would  not,  and  could 
not  exist.     It  is  not  true,  therefore,  that  in  the  case  supposed, 
I  affirm  my  obligation  to  will,  or  intend,  without  any  reference 
to  the  good  of  being. 

(13.)  But  again,  it  is  said,  that  when  I  contemplate  the  ■■$ 


0 


88  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Moral  Excellence  of  God,  I  affirm  my  obligation  to  love  him 
solely  for  his  goodness^  without  any  reference  to  the  good  of 
being,  and  for  no  other  reason  than  because  it  is  right.  But  to 
love  God  because  of  his  moral  excellence^  and  because  it  is  rights 
are  not  the  same  thing.  It  is  a  gross  contradiction,  to  talk  of 
loving  God  for  his  Moral  Excellence,  because  it  is  right.  It  is 
the  same  as  to  say,  I  love  God  for  the  reason  that  he  is  morally 
excellent,  or  worthy,  yet  not  at  all  for  this  reason,  but  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  right.  To  love  God  for  his  Moral  Worth,  is 
to  will  good  to  him  for  its  own  sake,  upon  condition  that  he 
deserves  it.  But  to  will  his  Moral  Worth  because  it  is  right, 
is  to  will  the  right  as  an  ultimate  end,  to  have  supreme  regard 
to  right,  instead  of  the  Moral  Worth,  or  the  well-being  of  God. 

But  it  may  reasonably  be  asked,  why  should  Rightarians 
bring  forward  these  objections?  They  all  assume  that  Moral 
Obhgation  may  respect  something  else  than  ultimate  intention. 
Why,  I  repeat  it,  should  Rightarians  affirm  that  the  Moral  Ex- 
cellence of  God,  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  since 
they  hold  that  right  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obhgation? 
Why  should  the  advocates  of  the  theory,  that  the  Moral  Ex- 
cellence of  God  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  affirm 
that  right  is  the  foundation,  or  that  we  are  bound  to  love  God 
for  his  Moral  Excellence,  because  this  is  right  ?  These  are  gross 
contradictions.  There  is  no  end  to  the  absurdities  in  which 
error  involves  its  advocates,  and  it  is  singular  to  see  the  advo- 
cates of  the  different  theories,  each  in  his  turn,  abandon  his 
own,  and  affirm  some  other,  as  an  objection  to  the  true  theory. 
It  has  also  been,  and  still  is  common  for  writers  to  confound 
different  theories  with  each  other,  and  to  affirm,  in  the  compass 
of  a  few  pages,  several  different  theories.  At  least  this  has 
been  done  in  some  instances. 

Consistent  Rightarianism  is  a  Godless,  Christless,  loveless 
philosophy.  This  Kant  saw,  and  acknowledged.  He  calls  it 
pure  legality^  that  is,  he  understands  the  law  as  imposing 
obligation  by  virtue  of  its  own  nature,  instead  of  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  end,  which  the  law  requires  Moral  Agents  to 
choose.  He  loses  sight  oftheend,  and  does  not  recognize 
any  end  whatever.  He  makes  a  broad  distinction  between 
morality  and  religion.  Morality  consists,  according  to  him 
in  the  adoption  of  the  maxim,  ^'  Do  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  right,"  or  "Act  at  all  times  upon  a  maxim  fit  for  law  uni- 
versal." The  adoption  of  this  maxim  is  morality.  But  now, 
having  adopted  this  maxim,  the  mind  goes  abroad  to  carry  its 
maxim  into  practice.     It  finds  God  and  being  to  exist,  and  sees 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  89 

it  to  be  right  to  intend  their  good.  This  intending  the  good  is 
religion,  according  to  him.  Thus,  he  says,  ethics  lead  to,  or 
result  in  religion.  (See  Kant  on  Rehgion.)  But  who  does 
not  feel  prompted  to  inquire,  whether,  when  we  apprehend 
God  and  being,  we  are  to  will  their  well-being  as  an  end,  or  for 
its  own  sake,  or  because  it  is  right?  If  for  its  own  sake,  where 
then  is  the  maxim,  "Will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right?" 
for  if  we  are  to  will  the  good,  not  as  an  ultimate  end  but  for 
the  sake  of  the  right,  then  right  is  the  end  that  is  preferred  to 
the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe.  It  is  im- 
possible that  this  should  be  religion.  Indeed  Kant  himself 
admits  that  this  is  not  religion. 

But  enough  of  this  cold  and  loveless  philosophy.  As  it  ex- 
alts right  above  all  that  is  called  God  and  subverts  all  the 
teachings  of  the  Bible,  it  can  not  be  a  light  thing  to  be  deluded 
by  it.  But  it  is  remarkable  and  interesting  to  see  Christian 
Rightarians,  without  being  sensible  of  their  inconsistency,  so 
often  confound  this  philosophy  with  that  which  teaches  that 
good  will  to  being  constitutes  virtue.  Numerous  examples  of 
it  occur  every  where  in  their  writings,  which  demonstrate  that 
Rightarianism  is  with  them  only  a  theory  that  "  plays  round 
the  head  but  comes  not  near  the  heart." 


8* 


LECTURE  VII. 
FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

DIVINE  MORAL  EXCELLENCE  THEORY. 

V.  I  NOW  ENTER  UPON  THE  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  ThEORY, 
THAT  THE  GoODNESS,  OR  MoRAL    EXCELLENCE  OF  GoD  IS    THE 

Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 
To  this  philosophy  I  reply, 

1.  That  its  absurdity  may  be  shown  in  several  ways. 

(I.)  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  Moral  Obligation  respects 
the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end. 

(2.)  That  the  reason  of  the  obligation,  or  that  which  im- 
poses obligation,  is  identical  with  the  end  on  which  the  in- 
tention ought  to  terminate.  If,  therefore,  the  goodness  of 
God  be  the  reason,  or  foundation  of  Moral  ObHgation,  then 
the  goodness  of  God  is  the  ultimate  end  to  be  intended.  But 
as  this  goodness  consists  in  love,  or  benevolence,  it  is  impos- 
sible that  it  should  be  regarded  or  chosen,  as  an  ultimate  end; 
and  to  choose  it  were  to  choose  the  Divine  choice,  to  intend 
the  Divine  intention  as  an  ultimate  end,  instead  of  choosing 
what  God  chooses,  and  intending  what  he  intends. 

Or  if  the  goodness  or  moral  excellence  of  God  is  to  be  re- 
garded, not  as  identical  with,  but  as  an  attribute  or  moral 
quality  of  benevolence,  then,  upon  the  theory  under  consider- 
ation, a  moral  agent  ought  to  choose  a  quality  or  attribute  of 
the  Divine  choice  or  intention  as  an  ultimate  end,  instead  of 
the  end  upon  which  the  Divine  intention  terminates.  This 
is  absurd. 

2.  It  is  impossible  that  virtue  should  be  the  foundation  of 
Moral  Obligation.  Virtue  consists 'in  a  compliance  with 
Moral  Obligation.  But  obhgation  must  exist  before  it  can  be 
complied  with.  Now,  upon  this  theory,  obligation  can  not 
exist  until  virtue  exists  as  its  foundation.  Then  this  theory 
amounts  to  this:  Virtue  is  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obliga- 
tion ;  therefore  Virtue  must  exist  before  Moral  Obligation  can 
exist.  But  as  Virtue  consists  in  a  conformity  to  Moral  Obli- 
gation, Moral  Obligation  must  exist  before  Virtue  can  exist. 
Therefore  neither  Moral  Obligation  nor  Virtue,  can  ever,  by 
any  possibihty,  exist.  God's  Virtue  must  have  existed  prior  to 
his  obligation,  as  its  foundation.  But  as  Virtue  consists  in 
compliance  with  Moral  Obligation,  and  as  obligation  could 
not  exist  until  Virtue  existed   as  its  foundation;    in  other 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  &1 

words,  as  obligation  could  not  exist  without  the  previous  ex- 
istence of  Virtue,  as  its  foundation,  and  as  Virtue  could  not 
exist  without  the  previous  existence  of  obligation,  it  follows, 
that  neither  God,  nor  any  other  being,  could  ever  be  virtuous 
for  the  reason  that  he  could  never  be  the  subject  of  Moral 
Obligation.  Should  it  be  said,  that  God's  holiness  is  the 
foundation  of  our  obligation  to  love  Him,  I  ask  in  what  sense 
it  can  be  so?  What  is  the  nature  or  form  of  that  love,  which 
his  Virtue  lays  us  under  an  obligation  to  exercise?  It  can  not 
be  a  mere  emotion  of  complacency,  for  emotions  being  involun- 
tary states  of  mind  and  mere  phenomena  of  the  Sensibility,  are 
without  the  pale  of  legislation  and  morality.  Is  this  love  re- 
solvable into  benevolence,  or  good  will?  But  why  will  good 
to  God  rather  than  evil?  Why,  surely,  because  good  is  valuable 
in  itself.  But  if  it  is  valuable  in  itself,  this  must  be  the  fun- 
damental reason  for  willing  it  as  a  possible  good;  and  his 
Virtue  must  be  only  a  secondary  reason  or  condition  of  the 
obligation,  to  will  his  actual  blessedness.  But  again,  the 
foundation  of  Moral  Obligation  must  be  the  same  in  all 
worlds,  and  with  all  Moral  Agents,  for  the  simple  reason, 
that  Moral  Law  is  one  and  identical  in  all  worlds.  If  God's 
Virtue  is  not  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obhgation  in  Him, 
which  it  can  not  be,  it  can  not  be  the  foundation  of  obli- 
gation in  us,  as  Moral  Law  must  require  Him  to  choose  the 
same  end  that  it  requires  us  to  choose*  His  Virtue  must  be 
a  secondary  reason  of  his  obligation  to  will  his  own  actual 
blessedness,  and  the  condition  of  our  obligation  to  will  his 
actual  and  highest  blessedness,  but  can  not  be  the  funda- 
mental reason,  that  always  being  the  intrinsic  value  of  his 
well-being. 

But  for  the  sake  of  a  somewhat  systematic  examination  of 
this  subject,  I  will, 

1.  Show  what  Virtue,  or  Moral  Excellence  is, 

2.  That  it  can  not  be  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

3.  Show  what  Moral  Worth  or  Good  Desert  is. 

4.  That  it  can  not  be  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

5.  Show  what  relation  Virtue,  Merit,  and  Moral  Worth  sus- 
tain to  Moral  Obhgation. 

6.  Answer  objections. 

1,  Show  what  Virtue,  or  Moral  Excellence  is. 

Virtue,  or  Moral  Excellence,  consists  in  conformity  of  will 
to  Moral  Law.  It  must  either  be  identical  with  love  or  good 
will,  or  it  must  be  the  moral  attribute  or  element  of  good  will 
or  benevolence. 

2.  It  can  not  be  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 


92  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

It  is  agreed,  that  the  Moral  Law  requires  love;  and  that 
this  term  expresses  all  that  it  requires.  It  is  also  agreed, 
that  this  love  is  good  will,  or  that  it  resolves  itself  into  choice, 
or  ultimate  intention.  It  mus't,  then,  consist  in  the  choice  of 
an  ultimate  end.  But  since  Virtue  either  consists  in  choice, 
or  is  an  attribute  of  choice,  or  benevolence,  it  is  impossible  to 
will  it  as  an  ultimate  end.  For  this  would  involve  the  absurdity 
of  choosing  choice,  or  intending  intention,  as  an  end,  instead 
of  choosing  that  as  an  end  upon  which  virtuous  choice  termi- 
nates. Or  if  Virtue  be  regarded  as  the  Moral  Attribute  of 
love  or  benevolence,  to  make  it  an  ultimate  end,  would  be  to 
make  an  attribute  of  choice  an  ultimate  end,  instead  of  that  on 
which  choice  terminates,  or  ought  to  terminate.  This  is 
absurd. 

3.  Show  what  Moral  Worth,  or  Good  Desert  is. 

Moral  Worth,  or  Good  Desert  is  not  identical  with  Virtue, 
or  obedience  to  Moral  Law,  but  is  an  attribute  of  character, 
resulting  from  obedience.  Virtue,  or  Holiness,  is  a  state  of 
mind.  It  is  an  active  and  benevolent  state  of  the  Will.  Moral 
Worth  is  not  a  state  of  mind,  but  is  the  result  of  a  state  of 
mind.  We  say  that  a  man's  obedience  to  Moral  Law,  is  val- 
uable in  such  a  sense  that  a  holy  being  is  worthy,  or  deserving 
of  good,  because  of  his  Virtue,  or  Holiness.  But  this  Worthi- 
ness, this  Good  Desert,  is  not  a  state  of  mind,  but,  as  I  said,  it  is 
a  result  of  benevolence.  It  is  an  attribute  or  quality  of  cha- 
racter, and  not  a  state  of  mind. 

4.  Moral  Worth,  or  Good  Desert,  can  not  be  the  Founda- 
tion of  Moral  Obligation. 

(1.)  It  is  admitted,  that  good,  or  the  intrinsically  valuable  to 
being,  must  be  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation.  The 
law  of  God  requires  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end.  This  end 
must  be  intrinsically  valuable,  for  it  is  its  intrinsic  value  that  im- 
poses obHgation  to  will  it.  Nothing,  then,  can  be  the  Found- 
ation of  Moral  Obligation  but  that  which  is  a  good,  or  intrin- 
sically valuable  in  itself. 

We  have  seen  in  a  former  Lecture,  and  here  repeat,  that 
ultimate  good,  or  the  intrinsically  valuable,  must  belong  to, 
and  be  inseparable  from  sentient  existences.  A  block  of 
marble  can  not  enjoy,  or  be  the  subject  of  good.  It  has  also 
been  said,  that  that  which  is  intrinsically  good  to  Moral  Agents, 
must  consist  in  a  state  of  mind.  It  must  be  something  that 
is  found  within  the  field  of  consciousness.  Nothing  can  be  to 
them  an  intrinsic  good,  but  that  of  which  they  can  be  con- 
scious.    By  this,  it  is  not  intended,  that  every  thing  of  which 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  93 

they  are  conscious,  is  to  them  an  ultimate  good,  or  a  good  in 
any  sense;  hut  it  is  intended,  that  that  can  not  be  to  them  an 
ultimate,  or  intrinsic  good,  of  which  they  are  not  conscious. 
Ultimate  good  must  consist  in  a  conscious  state  of  mind. 
Whatever  conduces  to  the  state  of  mind  that  is  necessarily 
regarded  by  us  as  intrinsically  good  or  valuable,  is  to  us  a 
relative  good;  but  the  state  of  mind  alone,  is  the  ultimate 
good.  From  this  it  is  plain,  that  Moral  Worth,  or  Good  De- 
sert, can  not  be  the  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  because 
it  is  not  a  state  of  mind,  and  can  not  be  an  ultimate  good. 
The  consciousnesss  of  Good  Desert,  that  is,  the  consciousness 
of  affirming  of  ourselves  Good  Desert,  is  an  ultimate  good. 
Or,  more  strictly,  the  satisfaction  which  the  mind  experiences, 
upon  occasion  of  affirming  its  Good  Desert,  is  an  ultimate 
good.  But  neither  the  conscious  affirmation  of  Good  Desert, 
nor  the  satisfaction  occasioned  by  the  affirmation,  is  identical 
with  Moral  Worth  or  Good  Desert.  Merit,  Moral  Worth, 
Good  Desert,  is  the  condition,  or  occasion  of  the  affirmation, 
and  of  the  resulting  conscious  satisfaction,  and  is  therefore  a 
good,  but  it  is  not,  and  can  not  be  an  ultimate,  or  in- 
trinsic good.  It  is  valuable,  but  not  intrinsically  valuable. 
Were  it  not  that  Moral  Beings  are  so  constituted,  that  it  meets 
a  demand  of  the  Intelligence,  and  therefore  produces  satisfac- 
tion in  its  contemplation,  it  would  not  be,  and  could  not  rea- 
sonably be  regarded  as  a  good  in  any  sense.  But  since  it 
meets  a  demand  of  the  IntelHgence,  it  is  a  relative  good,  and 
results  in  ultimate  good. 

5.  Show  what  relation  Moral  Excellence,  Worth,  Merit, 
Desert,  sustain  to  Moral  Obligation. 

(1.)  We  have  seen,  that  neither  of  them  can  be  the  founda- 
tion of  Moral  Obligation ;  that  neither  of  them  has  in  it  the 
element  of  the  intrinsic,  or  ultimate  good,  or  valuable;  and 
that  therefore  a  Moral  Agent  can  never  be  under  obligation 
to  will  or  choose  them  as  an  ultimate  end. 

(2.)  Worth,  Merit,  Good  Desert,  can  not  be  a  distinct 
ground,  or  foundation  of  Moral  Obligation,  in  such  a  sense  as 
to  impose  obHgation,  irrespective  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  good. 
All  obHgation  must  respect,  strictly,  the  choice  of  an  end, 
with  the  necessary  conditions  and  means.  The  intrinsic  value 
of  the  end  is  the  foundation  of  the  obHgation  to  choose  both  it 
and  the  necessary  conditions  and  means  of  securing  it.  But 
for  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  there  could  be  no  obligation 
to  will  the  conditions  and  means.  Whenever  a  thing  is  seen 
to  be  a  necessary  condition  or  means  of  securing  an  intrinsi- 


&4  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

cally  valuable  end,  this  perceived  relation  is  the  condition  of 
our  obligation  to  will  it.  The  obligation  is,  and  must  be 
founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  and  conditionated 
upon  the  perceived  relation  of  the  object  to  the  end.  The 
Intelligence  of  every  Moral  Agent,  from  its  nature  and  law3 
affirms,  that  the  ultimate  good  and  blessedness  of  Moral  Beings 
is,  and  ought  to  be  conditionated  upon  their  Holiness  and 
Good  Desert.  This  being  a  demand  of  Reason,  Reason  can 
never  affirm  Moral  Obligation  to  will  the  actual  blessedness 
of  Moral  Agents,  but  upon  condition  of  their  Virtue,  and  con- 
sequent Good  Desert,  or  Merit.  The  Intelligence  affirms, 
that  it  is  fit,  suitable,  proper,  that  Virtue,  Good  Desert,  Merit, 
HoKness,  should  be  rewarded  with  Blessedness.  Blessedness 
is  a  good  in  itself,  and  ought  to  be  willed  for  that  reason,  and 
Moral  Agents  are  under  obligation  to  will  that  all  beings 
capable  of  good  may  be  worthy  to  enjoy,  and  may  therefore 
actually  enjoy  blessedness.  But  they  are  not  under  obligation 
to  will  that  every  Moral  Being  should  actually  enjoy  bles- 
sedness, but  upon  condition  of  Holiness  and  Good  Desert. 
The  relation  that  Holiness,  Merit,  Good  Desert,  (fee.  sustain  to 
Moral  Obhgation,  is  this:  they  supply  the  condition  of  the 
obHgation  to  will  the  actual  blessedness  of  the  being  or  beings 
who  are  holy.  The  obligation  must  be  founded  in  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  good  we  are  to  will  to  them.  For  it  is  absurd 
to  say,  that  we  are,  or  can  be  under  obligation  to  will  good 
to  them,  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  an  ultimate  end,  and  yet  that 
the  obligation  should  not  be  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of 
the  good.  Were  it  not  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  good, 
we  should  no  sooner  affirm  obligation  to  will  good  to  them 
than  evil.  The  good,  or  blessedness  is  the  thing,  or  end  we 
are  under  obligation  to  will.  But  obligation  to  will  an  ulti- 
mate end  can  not  possibly  be  founded  in  any  thing  else  than 
the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.  Suppose  it  should  be  said,  that 
in  the  case  of  Merit,  or  Good  Desert,  the  obligation  is  found- 
ed in  Merit,  and  only  conditionated  on  the  intrinsic  value  of 
the  good  I  am  to  will.  This  would  be  to  make  desert  the 
end  willed,  and  good  only  the  condition,  or  means.  This  were 
absurd. 

(3.)  But  again:  to  make  Merit  the  ground  of  the  obligation, 
and  the  good  willed  only  a  condition,  amounts  to  this:  I  per- 
ceive Merit,  whereupon  I  affirm  my  obligation  to  will  what? 
Not  good  to  him  because  of  its  value  to  him,  nor  from  any  dis- 
position to  see  him  enjoy  blessedness  for  its  own  sake,  but  be- 
cause of  his  Merit.    But  what  does  he  merit?    Why,  good, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  95 

or  blessedness.  It  is  good,  or  blessedness,  that  I  am  to  will  to 
him,  and  this  is  the  end  I  am  bound  to  will,  that  is,  I  am  to 
will  his  good,  or  blessedness,  for  its  own  intrinsic  value.  The 
obligation,  then,  must  be  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
end,  that  is,  his  well-being,  or  blessedness,  and  only  condition- 
ated  upon  Merit. 

6.  I  am  to  answer  objections. 

(1.)  It  is  objected  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  and  in  support 
of  the  theory  we  are  examining,  that  the  Bible  represents  the 
goodness  of  God  as  a  reason  for  loving  him,  or  as  a  foundation 
of  the  obligation  to  love  him. 
To  this  I  answer, 

[1.]  The  Bible  may  assign,  and  does  assign  the  goodness  of 
God  as  a  reason  for  loving  him,  but  it  does  not  follow,  that  it 
affirms,  or  assumes,  that  this  reason  is  the  foundation,  or  a 
foundation  of  the  obligation.  The  inquiry  is,  in  what  sense 
does  the  Bible  assign  the  goodness  of  God  as  a  reason  for  lov- 
ing him?  Is  it  that  the  goodness  of  God  is  the  foundation  of 
the  obligation,  or  only  a  condition  of  the  obhgation  to  will  his 
actual  blessedness?  Is  His  goodness  a  distinct  ground  of  obli- 
gation to  love  him?  But  what  is  this  love  that  His  goodness 
lays  us  under  an  obligation  to  exercise  to  him?  It  is  agreed, 
that  it  can  not  be  an  emotion,  that  it  must  consist  in  willing 
something  to  Him.  It  is  said  by  some,  that  the  obligation  is  to 
treat  Him  as  worthy.  But  I  ask,  worthy  of  what?  Is  He 
worthy  of  any  thing?  If  so,  what  is  it?  For  this  is  the  thing 
that  I  ought  to  will  to  Him.  Why,  worthy  of  blessing,  and 
honor,  and  praise  and  obedience.  But  these  must  all  be  em- 
braced in  the  single  word,  love  ?  The  Law  has  forever  decided 
the  point,  that  our  whole  duty  to  God  is  expressed  by  this  one 
term.  It  has  been  common  to  make  assertions  upon  the  sub- 
ject, that  involve  a  contradiction  of  the  Bible.  The  Law  of 
God,  as  revealed  in  the  two  precepts,  "Thou  shalt  love  the 
Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thy- 
self," covers  the  whole  ground  of  Moral  Obligation.  It  is 
expressly  and  repeatedly  taught  in  the  Bible,  that  love  to  God 
and  our  neighbor,  is  the  fulfilhng  of  the  law.  It  is,  and  must 
be  admitted,  that  this  love  consists  in  willing  something 
to  God  and  our  neighbor.  What,  then,  is  to  be  willed  to 
them?  The  command  is.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as 
thyself.  This  says  nothing  about  the  character  of  my  neigh- 
bor. It  is  the  value  of  His  interests,  of  his  well-being, 
that  the  Law  requires  me  to  regard.  It  does  not  require  me 
to  love  my  righteous  neighbor  merely,  nor  to  love  my  righteous 


96  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

neighbor  better  than  I  do  my  wicked  neighbor.     It  is  my 
neighbor  that  I  am  to  love.     That  is,  I  am  to  will  his  well- 
being,  or  his  good,  with  the  conditions  and  means  thereof,  ac- 
cording to  its  value.     If  the  Law  contemplated  the  Virtue  of 
any  being  as  a  distinct  ground  of  obligation,  it  could  not  read 
as  it  does.     It  must,  in  that  case,  have  read  as  follows:  If 
thou  art  righteous,  and  thy  neighbor  is  as  righteous  as  thou 
art,  thou  shalt  love  him  as  thyself.     But  if  he  is  righteous, 
and  thou  art  not,  thou  shalt  love  him,  and  not  thyself.     If 
thou  art  righteous,  and  he  is  not,  thou  shalt  love  thyself,  and 
not  thy  neighbor.     How  far  would  this  be  from  the  gloss  of 
the  Jewish  Rabbles  so  fully  rebuked  by  Christ,  namely,  "-'Ye 
have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time,  thou 
shalt  love  thy  neighbor,  and  hate  thine  enemy.     But  I  say 
unto  you,  love  your  enemies;  bless  them  that  curse  you;  do 
good  to  them  that  hate  you;  and  pray  for  them  that  despite- 
fully  use  and  persecute  you.     For  if  ye  love  them  that  love 
you,  what  thank  have  ye?     Do  not  even  the  publicans  the 
same?"     The  fact  is,  the  Law  knows  but  one  ground  of  Moral 
Obhgation.     It  requires  us  to  love  God  and  our  neighbor. 
This   love    is  good   will.      What  else    ought   we,  or    can 
we  possibly  will  to  God  and  our  neighbor,  but  their  highest 
good,  or  well-being,  with  all  the  conditions  and  means  thereof. 
This  is  all  that  can  be  of  any  value  to  them,  and  all  that  we 
can,  or  ought  to  will  to  them  under  any  circumstances  what- 
ever.    When  we  have  willed  this  to  them,  we  have  done  our 
whole  duty  to  them.      '^  Love  is  the  fulfilHng  of  the  law." 
We  owe  them  nothing  more,  absolutely.     They  can  have  no- 
thing more.     But  this  the  Law  requires  us  to  will  to  God  and 
our  neighbor,  on  account  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  good, 
whatever  their  character  may  be,  that  is,  this  is  to  be  willed 
to  God  and  our  neighbor,  as  a  possible  good,  whether  they 
are   holy  or  unholy,    simply  because  of  its  intrinsic  value. 
But  while  the  law  requires  that  this  should  be  willed  to 
all,  as  a  possible  and  intrinsic  good,  irrespective  of  character; 
it  cannot,  and  does  not  require  us  to  will  that  God,  or  any 
Moral  Agent,  shall  be  actually  blessed,  but  upon  condition 
that  he  be  holy.     Our  obligation  to  the  unholy,  is  to  will  that 
they  might  be  holy,  and  perfectly  blessed.     Our  obligation 
to  the  holy  is  to  will  that  they  be  perfectly  blessed.     The  Bible 
represents  love  to  enemies  as  one  of  the  highest  forms  of 
Virtue:  ''God  commcndeth  his  love  toward  us,  in  that  while 
we  were  yet  sinners,  Christ  died  for  us."    But  if  love  to  ene- 
mies be  a  high  and  a  valuable  form  of  Virtue,  it  must  be  only 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  97 

^because  the  true  spirit  of  the  Law  requires  the  same  love  to 
them  as  to  others,  and  because  of  the  strong  inducements 
not  to  love  them.     Who  does  not  regard  the  Virtue  of  the 
atonement  as  being  as  great  as  if  it  had  been  made  for  the 
friends,  instead  of  the  enemies  of  God?     And  suppose  God 
were    supremely  selfish  and  unreasonably  our  enemy,  who 
would  not  regard  good  will  exercised  toward  him  as  being  as 
praiseworthy  as  it  now  is.     Now,  if  he  were  unjustly  our  ene- 
my, would  not  a  hearty  good  will  to  him  in  such  a  case  be  a  strik- 
ing and  valuable  instance  of  virtue  ?  In  such  a  case  we  could  not, 
might  notwill  his  actual  blessedness,  but  we  might,  and  should 
be  under  infinite  obHgationto  will  that  he  might  become  holy, 
and  thereupon  be  perfectly  blessed.  We  should  be  under  obliga- 
tion to  will  his  good  in  such  a  sense,  that  should  he  become  holy, 
we  should  will  his  actual  blessedness,  without  any  change  in  our 
ultimate  choice  or  intention,  and  without  any  change  in  us  that 
would  imply  an  increase  of  virtue.    So  of  our  neighbor:  we  are 
bound  to  will  his  good,  even  if  he  is  wicked,  in  such  a  sense  as 
to  need  no  new  intention  or  ultimate  choice,  to  will  his  actual 
blessedness,  should  he  become  holy.     We  may  be  as  holy  in 
loving  a  sinner,  and  in  seeking  his  salvation  while  he  is  a  sin- 
ner, as  in  willing  his  good  after  he  is  converted  and  becomes 
a  saint.     God  was  as  virtuous  in  loving  the  world  and   seek- 
ing to  save  it  while  in  sin,  as  he  is  in  loving  those  in  it  who 
are  holy.     The.  iact  is,  if  we  are  truly  benevolent,  and  will 
tlifijiighest  well-being  of  all,  with  the  conditions  and  means 
of  their  bTes~sedness,  it  follows,  of  course,  and  of  necessity, 
that  when  one  becomes  holy,  we  shall  love  him  with  the 
love    of  complacency;    that  we    shall,   of  course,    will  his 
actual  blessedness,  seeing  that  he  has  fulfilled  the  neces- 
sary conditions,  and  rendered  himself  worthy  of  blessedness. 
It  impUes   no  increase  of  Virtue  in   God  when   a   sinner 
repents,  to  exercise  complacency  toward  him.    Complacency, 
as  a  state  of  Will  or  heart,  is  only  benevolence  modified 
by  the    consideration  or  relation  of  right  character  in  llie 
object  of  it.     God,  prophets,  apostles,  martyrs  and  saints, 
in  all  ages,  are  as  virtuous  in  their  self-denying  and  un- 
tiring labors  to  save  the  wicked,  as  they  are  in  their  com- 
placent love  to  the  saints.     This  is  the  universal  doctrine 
of  the  Bible.     It  is  in  exact  accordance  with  the  spirit  and 
letter  of  the  law.     '•'  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself:" 
that  is,  whatever  his  character  may  be.     This  is  the  doctrine 
of  reason,  and  accords  with  the  convictions  of  all  men.     But 
if  this  is  so,  it  follows  that  Virtue  is  not  a  distinct  ground  of 
9 


98  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Moral  Obligation,  but  only  modifies  obligation  in  this  sense — 
we  are  under  obligation  to  will  the  actual  blessedness  of  a 
moral  being,  upon  condition  of  his  holiness.  We  ought  to 
will  his  good  or  blessedness  for  its  own  value,  whatever  his 
character  may  be;  but  we  ought  to  will  it  as  a  fact  and  reality, 
only  upon  condition  of  his  holiness.  Its  intrinsic  value  is  the 
foundation  of  the  obligation,  and  his  holiness  the  condition 
of  the  obHgation  to  will  his  actual  enjoyment  of  perfect  bles- 
sedness. When,  therefore,  the  Bible  calls  on  us  to  love  God 
for  his  goodness,  it  does  not  and  can  not  mean  to  assign  the 
fundamental  reason,  or  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will  his 
good;  for  it  were  absurd  to  suppose,  that  his  good  is  to  be 
willed,  not  for  its  intrinsic  value,  but  because  he  is  good. 
Were  it  not  for  its  intrinsic  value,  we  should  as  soon  affirm  our 
obligation  to  will  evil  as  good  to  him.  The  Bible  assumes 
the  first  truths  of  Reason.  It  is  a  first  truth  of  Reason,  that 
God's  well-being  is  of  infinite  value,  and  ought  to  be  willed  as  a 
possible  good  whatever  his  character  may  be;  and  that  it  ought 
to  be  willed  as  an  actual  reality  upon  condition  of  His  holi- 
ness. Now  the  Bible  does  just  as  in  this  case  might  be  ex- 
pected. It  informs  us  of  his  actual  and  infinite  hoHness, 
and  calls  on  us  to  love  Him  or  to  will  His  good  for  that  rea- 
son. But  this  is  not  asserting  nor  implying  that  His  holi- 
ness is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will  His  good  in 
any  such  sense  as  that  we  should  not  be  under  obligation  to 
will  it  with  all  our  heart  and  soul  and  mind  and  strength  as 
a  possible  good  whether  He  were  holy  or  not.  It  is  plain  that 
the  law  contemplates  only  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  to 
be  willed.  It  would  require  us  to  will  the  well-being  of  God 
with  all  our  heart,  &c.,  or  as  the  supreme  good,  whatever  His 
character  might  be.  Were  not  this  so,  it  could  not  be  Moral 
Law.  His  interest  would  be  the  supreme  and  the  infinite 
good  in  the  sense  of  the  intrinsically  and  infinitely  valuable, 
and  we  should,  for  that  reason,  be  under  infinite  obligation 
to  will  that  it  might  be,  whether  He  were  holy  or  sinful,  and 
upon  condition  of  His  holiness,  to  will  the  actual  existence 
of  his  perfect  and  infinite  blessedness.  Upon  our  coming  to 
the  knowledge  of  his  holiness,  the  obligation  is  instantly  im- 
posed, not  merely  to  will  his  highest  well-being  as  a  possi- 
ble, but  as  an  actually  existing  good. 

[2.]  Again.  It  is  impossible  that  goodness^  virtue.,  good  desert.^ 
merits  should  be  a  distinct  ground  or  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation in  such  a  sense  as  to  impose  or  properly  to  increase 
obligation.     It  has  been  shown  that  neither  of  these  can  be 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


99 


an  ultimate  good  and  impose  obligation  to  choose  it  as  an  ul- 
timate end  or  for  its  intrinsic  value. 

[3.]  Again.  If  they  impose  obligation,  it  must  be  an  obligation 
to  will  something  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  something  for  its  own 
sake.  But  nothing  can  do  that  ^t  the  very  thing  that  is  the 
ultimate  good  or  the  intrinsically  valuable.  To  choose  a 
thing  for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  ultimate  end,  is  to  choose  it 
for  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself,  and  not  for  any  other  reason. 
Now  if  goodness  or  merit  can  impose  moral  obhgation  to 
will,  it  must "  be  an  obligation  to  will  itself  as  an  ulti- 
mate end.  It  must  be  because  they  are  ultimate  and  intrin- 
sic good.  But  this  we  have  seen  can  not  be;  therefore  these 
things  can  not  be  a  distinct  ground  or  foundation  of  moral 
obligation. 

But  again,  the  law  does  not  make  virtue,  good  desert, 
or  merit,  the  ground  of  obligation,  and  require  us  to  love 
them  and  to  will  them  as  an  ultimate  end;  but  to  love, God 
and  our  neighbor  as  an  ultimate  good.  It  does,  no  doubt, 
require  us  to  will  God's  goodness,  good  desert,  worthiness, 
merit,  as  a  condition  and  means  of  his  highest  well-being, 
but  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  it  requires  us  to  will  either  of 
these  things  as  an  ultimate  end  instead  of  his  perfect  bles- 
sedness, to  which  these  sustain  only  the  relation  of  a  condi- 
tion. Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  that  nothing  can  im- 
pose moral  obligation  but  that  which  is  an  ultimate  and  an 
intrinsic  good,  for  if  it  impose  obligation  it  must  be  an  obli- 
gation to  choose  itself  for  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself  All  ob- 
ligation must  respect  the  choice  either  of  an  end  or  of  means. 
Obligation  to  choose  means  is  founded  in  the  value  of  the 
end.  Whatever  then  imposes  obhgation  must  bean  ultimate 
end.  It  must  possess  that  in  and  of  itself  that  is  worthy  or 
deserving  of  choice  as  an  intrinsic  and  ultimate  good.  This 
we  have  seen,  virtue,  merit,  &c.,  can  not  be,  therefore  they 
can  not  be  a  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  But  it  is  said 
they  can  increase  obligation  to  love  God  and  holy  beings. 
But  we  are  under  infinite  obhgation  to  love  God  and  to  will 
his  good  with  all  our  power,  because  of  the  intrinsic  value  of 
His  well-being,  whether  He  is  holy  or  sinful.  Upon  condition 
that  He  is  holy,  we  are  under  obligation  to  will  His  actual 
blessedness,  but  certainly  we  are  under  obligation  to  will  it 
with  no  more  than  all  our  heart  and  soul  and  mind  and 
strength.  But  this  we  are  required  to  do  because  of  the  in- 
trinsic value  of  His  blessedness,  whatever  his  character  might 
be.     The  fact  is,  we  can  do  no  more,  and  can  be  under  obli- 


rlOO  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

-gation  to  do  no  more,  than  to  will  His  good  with  all  our  pow- 
er, and  this  we  are  bound  to  do  for  its  own  sake;  and  no 
more  than  this  can  we  be  under  obligation  to  do  for  any  rea- 
son whatever.  Our  obUgation  is  to  will  His  good  with  all 
our  strength  by  virtue  of  itf  infinite  value,  and  it  can  not  be 
increased  by  any  other  consideration  than  our  increased  knowl- 
edge of  its  value,  which  increases  our  ability. 

[4]  Again.  I  am  bound  to  love  my  neighbor  asmy  self  what- 
ever his  character  may  be.  If  he  is  holy  I  am  under  obliga- 
tion to  love  him  no  more.  This  settles  the  question  that  his 
hohness  does  not,  can  not  increase  my  obligation.  The  fact 
is  that  merit,  good  desert,  &c.,  only  modify  obligation  in 
this  respect;  they  are  the  condition  of  the  obligation  to  will 
the  actual  blessedness  of  the  holy  being,  but  they  never  are 
or  can  be  a  distinct  ground  of  obligation.  The  intrinsic 
value  of  the  well-being  of  God  and  of  moral  agents,  of  itself 
imposes  obligation  to  will  their  highest  possible  well-being 
with  all  the  conditions  and  means  thereof  This  is  all  that 
they  can  possibly  have,  and  this  is  all  that  I  can  will  to  them. 
Nothing  remains,  or  can  remain,  but  for  them  to  fulfil  the 
condition  by  being  actually  holy,  and  I  am  under  obligation 
to  will  their  actual  and  highest  well-being  for  its  own  intrin- 
sic value  to  them,  or  as  an  ultimate  end.  This  is  all  that  I 
can  will,  and  this  is  all  that  they  can  have.  This  is  all  that  I 
can  be  under  obligation  to  will  to  them.  This  obligation 
must,  as  I  have  said,  be  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  their 
well-being,  and  conditionated,  so  far  as  their  actual  blessed- 
ness is  concerned,  upon  their  holiness.  This  conducts  us  to 
a  position  from  which  we  can  see  how  to  answer  the  follow- 
ing objections. 

(2.)  It  is  said  that  moral  excellence  can  and  does  of  itself 
impose  moral  obligation;  for  example,  that  a  character  for 
veracity  imposes  obhgation  to  treat  a  truthful  person  as 
worthy  of  credit. 

Answer:  What  is  the  obligation  in  this  case?  It  must 
resolve  itself  into  an  obhgation  to  will  something  to  him. 
But  what  am  I  bound  to  will  to  him?  What  else  than  that 
he  should  be  actually  blessed?  That  since  in  him  the  condi- 
tions are  fulfilled  he  should  actually  enjoy  the  highest  bles- 
sedness? I  am  to  will  his  highest  blessedness  as  a  possible 
good  for  its  own  sake  irrespective  of  his  character,  and  upon 
condition  that  he  be  holy,  I  am  to  will  his  actual  enjoyment 
of  all  possible  good.  This  is  and  must  be  my  whole  obhga- 
tion to  him.     This  implies  obligation  to  believe  him  and  out- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


101 


wardly  to  treat  him  as  worthy  of  confidence,  as  thus  treating 
him  is  a  condition  and  means  of  his  actual  enjoyment  of  all 
possible  good.  The  whole  obligation,  however,  resolves  itself 
into  an  obligation  to  will  his  actual  and  highest  well-being. 

(3.)  It  is  said  that  favors  received  impose  obligation  to  exer- 
cise gratitude;  that  the  relation  of  benefactor  itself  imposes 
obligation  to  treat  the  benefactor  according  to  this  relation. 

Answer:  I  suppose  this  objection  contemplates  this  rela- 
tion as  a  virtuous  relation,  that  is,  that  the  benefactor  is  truly 
virtuous  and  not  selfish  in  his  benefaction.  If  not,  then  the 
relation  can  not  at  all  modify  obligation. 

If  the  benefactor  has  in  the  benefactiorl  obeyed  the  law  of 
love,  if  he  has  done  his  duty  in  sustaining  this  relation,  I  am 
under  obligation  to  exercise  gratitude  toward  him.  But  what 
is  gratitude?  It  is  not  a  mere  emotion  or  feeling,  for  this  is  a 
phenomenon  of  the  sensibiHty  and,  strictly  speaking,  without 
the  pale  both  of  legislation  and  morality.  Gratitude  when 
spoken  of  as  a  virtue  and  as  that  of  which  moral  obligation 
can  be  affirmed,  must  be  an  act  of  will.  An  obligation  to 
gratitude  must  be  an  obligation  to  will  something  to  the  bene- 
factor. But  what  am  I  under  obligation  to  will  to  a  benefac- 
tor but  his  actual  highest  well-being?  If  it  be  God,  I  am  un- 
der obUgation  to  will  his  actual  and  infinite  blessedness  with 
all  my  heart  and  with  all  my  soul.  If  it  be  my  neighbor,  I  am 
bound  to  love  him  as  myself,  that  is,  to  will  his  actual  well- 
being  as  I  do  my  own.  What  else  can  either  God  or  man 
possess  or  enjoy,  and  what  else  can  I  be  under  obligation  to 
will  to  them?  I  answer,  nothing  else.  To  the  law  and  to  the 
testimony;  if  any  philosophy  agree  not  herewith,  it  is  because 
there  is  no  light  in  it.  The  virtuous  relation  of  benefactor 
modifies  obligation  just  as  any  other  and  every  other  form  of 
virtue  does,  and  in  no  other  way.  Whenever  we  perceive 
virtue  in  any  being,  this  supplies  the  condition  upon  which  we 
are  bound  to  will  his  actual  highest  well-being.  He  has  done 
his  duty.  He  has  compUed  with  obligation  in  the  relation  he 
sustains.  He  is  truthful,  upright,  benevolent,  just,  merciful, 
no  matter  what  the  particular  form  may  be  in  which  the  indi- 
vidual presents  to  me  the  evidence  of  his  holy  character.  It  is 
all  precisely  the  same  so  far  as  my  obligation  extends.  I  am, 
independently  of  my  knowledge  of  his  character,  under  obli- 
gation to  will  his  highest  well-being  for  its  own  sake.  That 
is,  to  will  that  he  may  fulfil  all  the  conditions,  and  thereupon, 
enjoy  perfect  blessedness.  But  I  am  not  under  obligation  to 
will  his  actual  blessedness  until  I  have  evidence  of  his  virtue. 
9* 


102  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

This  evidence,  however  I  obtain  it,  by  whatever  manifesta- 
tions of  virtue  in  him  or  by  whatever  means,  supplies  the 
condition  upon  which  I  am  under  obhgation  to  will  his  actual 
and  highest  well-being.  This  is  my  whole  obligation.  It  is 
all  he  can  have,  and  all  I  can  will  to  him.  All  objections  of 
this  kind,  and  indeed  all  possible  objections  to  the  true  theory 
and  in  support  of  the  one  I  am  examining,  are  founded  in  an 
erroneous  view  of  the  subject  of  moral  obligation.  Or 
in  a  false  and  anti-scriptural  philosophy  that  contradicts 
the  law  of  God,  and  sets  up  another  rule  of  moral  obligation. 
(4.)  But  it  is  said  that  in  all  instances  in  which  we  affirm 
Moral  Obligation,  we  necessarily  affirm  the  moral  excellence 
or  goodness  of  God  to  be  the  foundation  or  reason  of  the  ob- 
ligation. 

Answer  :  This  is  so  great  a  mistake,  that  in  no  instance 
whatever  do  we  or  can  we  affirm  the  moral  excellence  of 
God  to  be  the  foundation  of  obhgation,  unless  we  do  and 
can  affirm  the  most  palpable  contradiction.     Let  it  be  re- 
membered    1.  That  moral  obligation   respects  ultimate  in- 
tention only.     2.    That  ultimate  intention  is  the  choice  of 
an  end  for  its  intrinsic  value.     3.  That  the  ground  or  rea- 
son of  our  obhgation   to  intend  an  end  is  the  intrinsic  value 
of  the  end,  and  is  really  identical  with  the  end  to  be  chosen. 
4.  That  moral  excellence    either  consists  in  ultimate  inten- 
tion or  in  an  attribute  of  this  intention,   and  therefore  can 
not  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end.     5.  That  moral  obliga- 
tion always  resolves  itself  into  an  obligation  to  will  the  high- 
est well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  for  its  own  intrinsic 
value.     6.  Now,   can   Reason  be  so  utterly  unreasonable  as 
to  affirm  all  these,  and  also  that  the  ground  or  reason  of  the 
obhgation  to  will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  uni- 
verse for  its  own  intrinsic  value,  is  not  its  intrinsic  value,  but 
is  the  Divine  Moral  Excellence  ? 

(5.)  But  it  is  also  insisted  that  when  men  attempt  to  assign 
a  reason  why  they  are  under  moral  obligation  of  any  kind, 
as  of  love  to  God,  they  all  agree  in  this,  in  assigning  the 
Divine  Moral  Excellence  as  the  reason  of  that  obligation.  I 
answer: — 

[1.]  There  is  and  can  be  but  one  kind  of  moral  obligation. 

[2.]  It  is  not  true  that  all  men  agree  in  assigning  the  moral 

excellence  of  God  as  the  foundation  or  fundamental  reason 

of  the  obhgation,  to  love  Him  or  to  will  his  good  for  its  own 

sake.     I  certainly  am  an  exception  to  this  rule. 

[3.]  If  any  body  assigns  this  as  the  reason  of  the  obhga- 
tion, he  assigns  a  false  reason,  as  has  just  been  shown. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  103 

[4.]  No  man  who  knew  what  he  said  ever  assigned  the 
goodness  of  God  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will 
his  good  as  an  ultimate  end,  for  this  is  as  we  have  often  seen 
a  gross  contradiction  and  an  impossibility. 

[5.]  The  only  reason  why  any  man  supposes  himself  to  as- 
sign the  goodness  of  God  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation 
to  will  good  to  Him  is  that  he  loosely  confounds  the  conditions 
of  the  obhgation  to  will  his  actual  blessedness  with  the 
foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will  it  for  its  own  sake,  or  as 
a  possible  good.  Were  it  not  for  the  known  intrinsic  value 
of  God's  highest  well-being,  we  should  as  soon  affirm  our  ob- 
ligation to  will  evil  as  good  to  Him,  as  has  been  said. 

[6.]  Again  :  If  the  Divine  moral  Excellence  were  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation,  if  God  were  not  holy  and 
good,  moral  obligation  could  not  exist  in  any  case. 

[7.]  God's  moral  obligation  can  not  be  founded  in  his  own 
moral  excellence,  for  his  moral  excellence  consists  in  his  con- 
formity to  moral  obligation,  and  the  fact  implies  the  existence 
of  moral  obligation,  prior,  in  the  order  of  nature,  to  his  moral 
excellence,  as  was  said  before. 

[8.]  The  fact  is,  the  intrinsic  and  infinite  value  of  the  well- 
being  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  is  a  first  truth  of  reason 
and  always  and  necessarily  taken  along  with  us  at  all  times* 
That  moral  excellence  or  good  desert  is  a  naturally  necessary 
condition  of  their  highest  well-being  is  also  a  first  truth  al- 
ways and  necessarily  taken  along  with  us  whether  we  are 
conscious  of  it  or  not.  The  natural  impossibility  of  willing 
the  actual  existence  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and 
the  universe  of  moral  agents  but  upon  condition  of  their 
worthiness,  is  a  self-evident  truth.  So  that  no  man  can  affirm 
his  obhgation  to  will  the  actual  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  of  moral  agents  but  upon  condition  of  their  moral  excel- 
lence any  more  than  he  can  affirm  his  obligation  to  will  their 
eternal  well-being  but  upon  condition  of  their  existence. 

That  every  moral  agent  ought  to  will  the  highest  well-being 
of  God  and  of  all  the  universe  for  its  own  sake  as  a  possible 
good  whatever  their  characters  may  be,  is  also  a  first  truth 
of  reason.  Reason  assigns  and  can  assign  no  other  reason 
for  willing  their  good  as  an  ultimate  end  than  its  intrinsic 
value;  and  to  assign  any  other  reason  as  imposing  obligation 
to  will  it  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake  were  absurd  and  self- 
contradictory.  Obligation  to  will  it  as  an  end  and  for  its  own 
sake,  implies  the  obligation  to  will  its  actual  existence  in  all 
cases  and  to  all  persons  when  the  indispensable  conditions  are 


104  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

fulfilled.  These  conditions  are  seen  to  be  fulfilled  in  God,  and 
therefore  upon  this  condition  reason  affirms  obligation  to  will 
His  actual  and  highest  blessedness  for  its  own  sake,  the  in- 
trinsic value  being  the  fundamental  reason  of  the  obligation 
to  will  it  as  an  end,  and  the  Divine  Goodness  the  condition  of 
the  obhgation  to  will  the  actual  existence  of  His  highest 
blessedness.  Suppose  that  I  existed  and  had  the  idea  of 
blessedness  and  its  intrinsic  value  duly  developed,  together 
with  an  idea  of  all  the  necessary  conditions  of  it  ;  but  that 
I  did  not  know  that  any  other  being  than  myself  existed  and 
yet  I  knew  their  existence  and  blessedness  possible.  In  this 
case  I  should  be  under  obligation  to  will  or  wish  that  beings 
might  exist  and  be  blessed.  Now  suppose  that  I  compHed 
with  this  obhgation,  my  virtue  is  just  as  real  and  as  great  as 
if  I  knew  their  existence  and  willed  their  actual  blessedness, 
provided  my  idea  of  its  intrinsic  value  were  as  clear  and  just 
as  if  I  knew  their  existence.  And  now  suppose  I  came  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  actual  existence  and  holiness  of  all  ho- 
ly beings,  I  should  make  no  new  ultimate  choice  in  willing 
their  actual  blessedness.  This  I  should  do  of  course,  and 
remainingbenevolent,  of  necessity;  and  if  this  knowledge  did 
not  give  me  a  higher  idea  of  the  value  of  that  which  I  before 
willed  for  its  own  sake,  the  willing  of  the  real  existence  of 
their  blessedness  would  not  make  me  a  whit  more  virtuous 
than  when  I  willed  it  as  a  possible  good  without  knowing 
that  the  conditions  of  its  actual  existence  would  ever,  in 
any  case  be  fulfilled. 

The  Bible  reads  just  as  it  might  be  expected  to  read  and 
just  as  we  should  speak  in  common  life.  It  hein^  a  Jirst  truth  of 
reason  that  the  well-being  of  God  is  of  infinite  value  and  there- 
fore ought  to  be  willed  for  its  own  sake — it  also  being  a  first 
truth  that  virtue  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  fulfilling 
the  demands  of  his  own  reason  and  conscience,  and  of  course 
of  his  actual  blessedness^  and  of  course  also  a  condition  of  the 
obligation  to  will  it,  we  might  expect  the  bible  to  exhort  and 
require  us  to  love  God  or  will  His  actual  blessedness  and 
mention  His  virtue  as  the  reason  or  fulfilled  condition  of  the 
obHgation,  rather  than  the  intrinsic  value  of  his  blessedness 
as  the  foundation  of  the  obhgation.  The  foundation  of  the 
obligation  being  a  first  truth  of  reason  needs  not  to  be  a  mat- 
ter of  revelation.  Nor  need  the  fact  that  virtue  is  the  condi- 
tion of  His  blessedness,  nor  the  fact  that  we  are  under  no 
obligation  to  will  His  actual  blessedness  but  upon  condition  of 
His  holiness.     But  that  in  him  this  condition  is  fulfilled  needs 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  105 

to  be  revealed,  and  therefore  the  bible  announces  it  as  a  rea- 
son or  condition  of  the  obligation  to  love  Him,  that  is,  to  will 
His  actual  blessedness. 

(6.)  Again:  it  is  asserted  that  when  men  would  awaken  a 
sense  of  moral  obligation  they  universally  contemplate  the 
moral  excellence  of  God  as  constituting  the  reason  of  their 
obligation,  and  if  this  contemplation  does  not  awaken  their 
sense  of  obligation  nothing  else  can  or  will.     I  answer, 

The  only  possible  reason  why  men  ever  do  or  can  take  this 
course,  is  that  they  loosely  consider  religion  to  consist  in /ee/- 
ings  of  complacency  in  God  and  are  endeavoring  to  awaken 
these  complacent  emotions.  If  they  conceive  of  religion 
as  consisting  in  these  emotions,  they  will  of  course  conceive 
themselves  to  be  under  obligation  to  exercise  them,  and  to  be 
sure  they  take  the  only  possible  course  to  awaken  both  these 
and  a  sense  of  obligation  to  exercise  them.  But  they  are 
mistaken  both  in  regard  to  their  obligation  and  the  nature  of 
religion.  Did  they  conceive  of  religion  as  consisting  in  good 
will,  or  in  willing  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the 
universe  for  its  own  sake,  would  they,  could  they  resort  to 
the  process  in  question,  that  is,  the  contemplation  of  the 
Divine  moral  excellence,  as  the  only  reason  for  willing  good 
to  him  instead  of  considering  the  infinite  value  of  those  in- 
terests to  the  reaUzation  of  which  they  ought  to  consecrate 
themselves? 

If  men  often  do  resort  to  the  process  in  question,  it  is  be- 
cause they  love  to  feel  and  have  a  self-righteous  satisfaction 
in  feelings  of  complacency  in  God,  and  take  more  pains  to 
awaken  these  feelings  than  to  quicken  and  enlarge  their  be- 
nevolence. A  purely  selfish  being  may  be  greatly  affected  by 
the  great  goodness  and  kindness  of  God  to  him.  I  know  a 
man  who  is  a  very  niggard  so  far  as  all  benevolent  giving  and 
doing  for  God  and  the  world  are  concerned,  who,  I  fear,  re- 
sorts to  the  very  process  in  question,  and  is  often  much  affected 
with  the  goodness  of  God.  He  can  bluster  and  denounce 
all  who  do  not  feel  as  he  does.  But  ask  him  for  a  dollar  to 
forward  any  benevolent  enterprize  and  he  will  evade  your 
request,  and  ask  you  how  you  feel,  whether  you  are  engaged 
in  religion,  &c. 

(7.)  It  has  been  asserted  that^nothing  can  add  to  the  sense 
of  obligation  thus  excited. 

To  this  I  answer  that  if  the  obligation  be  regarded  as  an 
obligation  to  feel  emotions  of  complacency  in  God,  this  is 
true.     But  if  the  obhgation  be  contemplated  as  it  really  is, 


106  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

an  obligation  to  will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  for  its 
own  sake,  the  assertion  is  not  true,  but  on  the  contrary  affirms 
an  absurdity.  I  am  under  obHgation  to  will  the  highest  well- 
being  of  God  and  of  the  Universe  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for 
its  own  intrinsic  value.  Now  according  to  this  philosophy, 
in  order  to  get  the  highest  view  of  this  obligation,  I  must 
contemplate  not  the  intrinsic  value  of  those  infinite  interests 
that  I  ought  to  will,  but  the  goodness  of  God.  This  is  ab- 
surd. The  fact  is,  I  must  prize  the  value  of  the  interests  to 
be  willed  and  the  goodness  of  God  as  a  reason  for  willing 
actual  blessedness  to  Him  in  particular. 

But  it  may  well  be  asked,  why  does  the  bible  and  why  do 
we  so  often  present  the  character  of  God  and  of  Christ  as 
a  means  of  awakening  a  sense  of  moral  obligation  and  of 
inducing  virtue?     Answer, 

It  is  to  lead  men  to  contemplate  the  infinite  value  of  those 
interests  which  we  ought  to  will.  Presenting  the  example 
of  God  and  of  Christ,  is  the  highest  moral  means  that  can  be 
used.  That  God's  example  and  man's  example  is  the  most 
impressive  and  efficient  way  in  which  he  can  declare  his  views 
and  hold  forth  to  public  gaze  the  infinite  value  of  those  inte- 
rests upon  which  all  hearts  ought  to  be  set.  For  example, 
nothing  can  set  the  infinite  value  of  the  soul  in  a  stronger  light 
than  the  example  of  God  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost 
has  done. 

Nothing  can  beget  a  higher  sense  of  obligation  to  will  the 
glory  of  the  Father  and  the  salvation  of  souls,  than  the  exam- 
ple of  Christ.  His  example  is  his  loudest  preaching,  his 
clearest  most  impressive  exhibition,  not  merely  of  his  own 
goodness,  but  of  the  intrinsic  and  infinite  value  of  the  inte- 
rest he  sought  and  which  we  ought  to  seek.  It  is  the  love, 
the  care,  the  self-denial,  and  the  example  of  God  in  his  effi^rts 
to  secure  the  great  ends  of  benevolence  that  hold  those  inte- 
rests forth  in  the  strongest  light,  and  thus  beget  a  sense  of 
obHgation  to  seek  the  same  end.  But  let  it  be  observed,  it  is 
not  a  contemplation  of  the  goodness  of  God  that  awakens  this 
sense  of  obligation,  but  the  contemplation  of  the  value  of 
those  interests  which  he  seeks,  in  the  light  of  His  painstaking 
and  example;  this  quickens  and  gives  efficiency  to  the  sense 
of  obHgation  to  will  what  He  wills.  Suppose,  for  example, 
that  I  manifest  the  greatest  concern  and  zeal  for  the  salva- 
tion of  souls,  it  would  not  be  the  contemplation  of  my  good- 
ness that  would  quicken  in  a  by-stander  a  sense  of  obliga- 
tion to  save  souls,  but  my  zeal,  and  life,  and  spirit,  would  have 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  107 

the  strongest  tendency  to  arouse  in  him  a  sense  of  the  infinite 
and  intrinsic  value  of  the  soul,  and  thus  quicken  a  sense  of 
obligation.  Should  I  behold  multitudes  rushing  to  extinguish 
a  flaming  house,  it  would  not  be  a  contemplation  of  their 
goodness,  but  the  contemplation  of  the  interests  at  stake  to 
the  consideration  of  which  their  zeal  would  lead  me  that 
would  quicken  a  sense  of  obligation  in  me  to  hasten  to  lend 
my  aid. 

(8.)  Again:  it  is  asserted  that  moral  action  is  impracticable 
upon  any  other  principle. 

[1.]  What  does  this  mean?  Does  it  mean  that  there  can 
be  no  obligation  unless  the  goodness  of  God  be  regarded 
as  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation?  If  so,  the  mistake 
is  radical, 

[2.]  Or  does  it  mean  that  action  can  have  no  moral  char- 
acter whatever,  unless  it  be  put  forth  in  view  of  the  fact 
or  upon  the  assumption  that  the  goodness  of  God  is  the  foun- 
datian  of  moral  obligation?  If  this  be  the  meaning,  the  mis- 
take is  no  less  radical. 

Thus  we  see  that  it  is  grossly  absurd  and  self-contradictory 
for  any  one  to  maintain  that  moral  obligation  respects  the 
ultimate  intention  or  choice  of  an  end  for  its  own  intrinsic 
value,  and  at  the  same  time  assert  that  the  Divine  moral  ex- 
cellence is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  The  fact  is, 
it  never  is,  and  never  can  be  the  foundation  of  moral  obliga- 
tion. Our  whole  duty  resolves  itself  into  an  obligation  to 
will  the  highest  good  or  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
verse as  an  ultimate  end.  Faith,  gratitude,  and  every  phase 
of  virtue  resolves  itself  into  this  love  or  good  will,  and  the 
foundation  of  the  obligation  to  will  this  end  for  its  own  sake, 
can  by  no  possibilitybe  any  other  than  its  own  intrinsic  value. 
To  affirm  that  it  can  is  a  most  palpable  contradiction.  The 
moral  law  proposes  an  end  to  be  sought,  aimed  at,  chosen, 
intended.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  Divine  Being  as  well  as  of 
every  other  moral  agent,  to  consecrate  himself  to  the  promo- 
tion of  the  most  valuable  end.  This  end  can  not  be  his 
own  virtue.  His  virtue  consists  in  choosing  the  end  demand- 
ed by  the  law  of  his  own  reason.  This  end  can  not  be  iden- 
tical with  the  choice  itself;  for  this  would  be  only  to  choose 
his  own  choice  as  an  ultimate  end.  But  again  it  is  impossi- 
ble that  God  should  require  moral  agents  to  make  His  own 
virtue  an  ultimate  end. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  law  requires  us  to  will  God's  good, 
blessedness,  &c.,  because  or  for  the  reason  that  He  is  virtu* 


108  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ous,  I  ask  what  can  be  intended  by  this  assertion?  Is  it  in- 
tended that  we  are  bound  to  will  His  good  not  because  it  is 
valuable  to  Him,  but  because  He  is  good?  But  why,  I  ask 
again,  should  we  will  good  rather  than  evil  to  Him?  The 
only  answer  must  be  because  good  is  good  or  valuable.  If 
the  good  is  to  be  willed  because  it  is  valuable,  this  must  be 
the  fundamental  reason  or  foundation  of  the  obligation  to 
will  it;  and  His  goodness  is  and  can  be  only  a  secondary 
reason  or  condition  of  the  obligation  to  will  good  to  Him  in 
particular,  or  to  will  His  actual  blessedness.  My  intelli- 
gence demands,  and  the  intelligence  of  every  moral  being  de- 
mands that  holiness  should  be  the  unalterable  condition  of 
the  blessedness  of  God  and  of  every  moral  agent.  This 
God's  intelligence  must  demand.  Now  his  complying  with 
this  condition  is  a  changeless  condition  of  the  obligation  of 
a  moral  agent  to  will  His  actual  blessedness.  Whatever  His 
character  might  be,  we  are  under  obligations  to  will  His  bles- 
sedness with  the  conditions  and  means  thereof,  on  account  of 
its  own  intrinsic  value.  But  not  until  we  are  informed  that 
he  has  met  this  demand  of  reason  and  conscience  and  per- 
formed this  condition  and  thus  rendered  himself  worthy  of 
blessedness,  are  we  under  obligation  to  will  it  as  a  reality 
and  fact. 

Revelation  is  concerned  to  make  known  the  fact  that  He 
is  holy  and  of  course  calls  on  us  in  view  of  His  holiness  to 
love  and  worship  Him.  But  in  doing  this,  it  does  not,  can 
not  mean  that  His  holiness  is  the  foundation  of  the  obliga- 
tion to  will  His  good  as  an  ultimate  end. 

The  moral  excellence  of  God,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  can 
modify  moral  obhgation  only  as  follows.  Every  moral  agent 
is  under  obligation  of  infinite  weight  to  will  the  highest  well- 
being  of  God  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for  its  own  sake,  as  a 
possible  good,  whether  God  be  holy  or  sinful.  But  since 
the  intelHgence  affirms  that  blessedness  ought  to  be  condi- 
tionated  upon  holiness,  no  moral  agent  is  under  obligation 
to  exercise  the  love  of  complacency  in  God,  that  is,  to  will 
His  actual  blessedness  but  upon  condition  of  his  holiness. 
Now  seeing  that  He  is  holy,  moral  agents  are  under  obliga- 
tion to  will  His  actual,  and  perfect,  and  infinite  and  eternal 
blessedness.  Or  in  other  words,  they  are  under  infinite  obli- 
gation to  exercise  that  modification  of  benevolence  toward 
Him  which  is  properly  termed  complacency. 

Our  obligation  when  viewed  apart  from  His  character  is  to 
will  or  wish  that  God  might  fulfil  all  the  conditions  of  perfect 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  109 

blessedness  and  upon  that  condition  that  He  might  actually 
enjoy  perfect  and  infinite  satisfaction.  But  seeing  that  He 
meets  the  demands  of  His  own  intelligence  and  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  universe,  and  that  he  voluntarily  fulfils  all  the 
necessary  conditions  of  his  highest  well-being,  our  obligation 
is  to  will  his  actual  and  most  perfect  and  eternal  blessedness. 

But  here  it  is  said,  as  was  noticed  in  a  former  lecture,  that 
we  often  and  indeed  generally  affirm  our  obligation  to  love 
God  in  view  of  His  moral  excellence,  without  any  reference 
to  the  good  or  well-being  of  God  as  an  end;  that  His  good- 
ness is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation,  and  that  in  affirming 
this  we  have  no  respect  to  the  value  of  his  blessedness, 
and  that  indeed  His  well-being  or  blessedness  is  not  so 
much  as  thought  of,  but  only  His  holiness  or  goodness  is 
the  object  of  thought  and  attention.  To  this  I  answer:  If 
we  really  affirm  obligation  to  love  God,  we  must  affirm  either 
that  we  ought  to  feel  complacency  in  Him,  or  that  we  ought 
to  will  something  to  Him.  It  is  admitted  that  the  obligation 
is  to  will  something  to  Him.  But  if  God  is  good,  holy,  what 
ought  we  to  will  to  Him?  Why  certainly  something  which 
is  valuable  to  Him  and  that  which  is  most  valuable  to  Him. 
What  should  this  be  but  his  actual,  perfect,  infinite,  eternal 
blessedness?  It  is  certainly  nonsense  to  say  that  a  moral 
agent  affirms  himself  to  be  under  obligation  to  love  God 
without  any  reference  to  his  well-being.  It  is  true  that  moral 
agents  may  be  consciously  and  deeply  affected  with  the  con- 
sideration of  the  goodness  of  God  when  they  affirm  their  obli- 
gation to  love  him.  But  in  this  affirmation  they  do  and  must 
assume  the  intrinsic  value  of  his  blessedness  as  the  foundation 
of  the  obligation,  or  they  make  no  intelligent  affirmation 
whatever.  They  really  do  affirm  and  must  affirm  that  they 
ought  to  will  good  to  God,  assuming  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
good  to  Him,  or  they  would  just  as  soon  affirm  obligation  to 
will  evil  as  good  to  Him. 


10 


LECTURE  VIII. 
FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION- 
FALSE  THEORIES. 

VI.  Theory  of  Moral  Order. 

VII.  Theory  of  Nature  and  Relations. 

VIII.  Theory  that  the  Idea  of  Duty  is  the  foundation 
op  moral  obligation. 

IX.  Complex  theory. 

VI,  I  come  now  to  consider  the  philosophy  which  teaches  thai 
Moral  Order  is  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

But  what  is  moral  order?  The  advocates  of  this  theory 
define  it  to  be  identical  with  the  fit,  proper,  suitable.  It  is, 
then,  according  to  them,  synonymous  with  the  right.  Moral 
order  must  be  in  their  view  either  identical  with  law  or  with 
virtue.  It  must  be  either  an  idea  of  the  fit,  the  right,  the  prop- 
er the  suitable,  which  is  the  same  as  objective  right;  or  it  must 
consist  in  conformity  of  the  will  to  this  idea  or  law,  which  is 
virtue.  It  has  been  repeatedly  shown  that  right,  whether  ob- 
jective or  subjective  can  not  by  any  possibility  be  the  end  at 
which  a  moral  agent  ought  to  aim  and  to  which  he  ought  to 
consecrate  himself.  If  moral  order  be  not  synonymous  with 
right  in  one  of  these  senses,  I  do  not  know  what  it  is;  and  all 
that  I  can  say  is,  that  if  it  be  not  identical  with  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  it  cannot  be  the  end 
at  which  moral  agents  ought  to  aim,  and  can  not  be  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obligation.  But  if  by  moral  order,  as  the  phrase- 
ology of  some  would  seem  to  indicate,  be  meant  that  state  of 
the  universe  in  which  all  law  is  universally  obeyed  and  as  a 
consequence  of  universal  well-being,  this  theory  is  only  an- 
other name  for  the  true  one.  It  is  the  same  as  willing  the 
highest  well-being  of  the  universe  with  the  conditions  and 
means  thereof 

Or  if  it  be  meant,  as  other  phraseology  would  seem  to  indi- 
cate, that  moral  order  is  a  state  of  things  in  which  either  all 
law  is  obeyed,  or  the  disobedient  are  punished  for  the  sake 
of  promoting  the  public  good; — if  this  be  what  is  meant  by 
moral  order — it  is  only  another  name  for  the  true  theory. 
Willing  moral  order  is  only  willing  the  highest  good  of  the 
universe  for  its  own  sake  with  the  condition,  and  means  there- 
of 

But  if  by  moral  order  be  meant  the  fit,  suitable,  in  the  sense 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  Ill 

of  law  physical  or  moral,  it  is  absurd  to  represent  moral  or- 
der as  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 

VII.  I  will  next  consider  the  Theory  that  maintains  that  the 
JVature  and  Relations  of  Moral  Beings  is  the  true  Foundation  of 
Moral  Obligation. 

1.  The  advocates  of  this  theory  confound  the  conditions  of 
moral  obhgation  with  the  foundation  of  obUgation.  The  na- 
ture and  relations  of  moral  agents  to  each  other  and  to  the  uni- 
verse is  the  condition  of  their  obligation  to  will  the  good  of 
being,  but  not  the  foundation  of  the  obligation.  What!  the 
nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings  the  foundation  of  their 
obligation  to  choose  an  ultimate  end.  Then  this  end  must  be 
their  nature  and  relations.  This  is  absurd.  Their  nature 
and  relations,  being  what  they  are,  their  highest  well-being  is 
known  to  them  to  be  of  infinite  and  intrinsic  value.  But  it  is 
and  must  be  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  and  not  their  na- 
ture and  relations  that  imposes  obligation  to  will  the  highest 
good  of  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  end. 

Writers  upon  this  subject  are  often  falling  into  the  mistake 
of  confounding  the  conditions  of  moral  obhgation  with  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation.  Moral  agency  is  a  condition, 
but  not  the  foundation  of  the  obligation.  Light,  or  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being,  is  a  condition,  but 
not  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  The  intrinsically  val- 
uable is  the  foundation  of  the  obligation,  and  light  or  the 
perception  of  the  intrinsically  valuable,  is  only  a  condition  of 
the  obhgation.  So  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings 
is  a  condition  of  their  obligation  to  will  each  other's  good, 
and  so  is  light  or  a  knowledge  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  their 
blessedness,  but  the  intrinsic  value  is  alone  the  foundation  of 
the  obligation.  It  is,  therefore,  a  great  mistake  to  affirm  "that 
the  known  nature  and  relations  of  moral  agents  is  the  true 
foundation  of  moral  obligation." 

VIIL  The  next  theory  that  demands  attention  is  that  which  teach' 
es  that  Moral  Obligation  is  founded  in  the  Idea  of  Duty, 

According  to  this  philosophy  the  end  at  which  a  moral 
agent  ought  to  aim,  is  duty.  He  must  in  all  things  '-^  aim  at 
doing  his  duty."  Or,  in  other  words,  he  must  always  have 
respect  to  his  obligation,  and  aim  at  discharging  it. 

It  is  plain  that  this  theory,  is  only  another  form  of  stating 
the  rightarian  theory.  By  aiming,  intending  to  do  duty,  we 
must  understand  the  advocates  of  this  theory  to  mean  the 
adoption  of  a  resolution  or  maxim,  by  which  to  regulate  their 
lives — the  formation  of  a  resolve  to  obey  God — to  serve  God 


112  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

— to  do  at  all  times  what  appears  to  be  right — to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  conscience — to  obey  the  law — to  discharge  obliga- 
tion, &c.  I  have  expressed  the  thing  intended  in  all  these 
ways  because  it  is  common  to  hear  this  theory  expressed  in 
all  these  terms  and  in  others  like  them.  Especially  in  giv- 
ing instruction  to  inquiring  sinners,  nothing  is  more  common 
than  for  those  who  profess  to  be  spiritual  guides  to  assume 
the  truth  of  this  philosophy,  and  give  instructions  according- 
ly. These  philosophers  or  theologians  will  say  to  sinners, 
Make  up  your  mind  to  serve  the  Lord;  resolve  to  do  your 
whole  duty  and  to  do  it  at  all  times;  resolve  to  obey  God  in 
all  things — to  keep  all  his  commandments;  resolve  to  deny 
yourselves — to  forsake  all  sin — to  love  the  Lord  with  all  your 
heart  and  your  neighbor  as  yourself.  They  often  represent 
regeneration  as  consisting  in  this  resolution  or  purpose. 

Such-like  phraseology,  which  is  very  common  and  almo&t 
universal  among  rightarian  philosophers,  demonstrates  that 
they  regard  virtue  or  obedience  to  God  as  consisting  in  the 
adoption  of  a  maxim  of  life.  With  them,  duty  is  the  great 
idea  to  be  realized.  All  these  modes  of  expression  mean  the 
same  thing,  and  amount  to  just  Kant's  morality,  which  he  ad- 
mits does  not  necessarily  imply  religion,  namely,  ^'  Act  upon 
a  maxim  at  all  times  fit  for  law  universal,"  and  to  Cousin's, 
which  is  the  same  thing,  namely,  '•'•  Will  the  right  for  the  sake 
of  the  right"  Now,  I  can  not  but  regard  this  philosophy  on 
the  one  hand,  and  utilitarianism  on  the  other,  as  equally 
wide  from  the  truth,  and  as  lying  at  the  foundation  of  much 
of  the  spurious  religion  with  which  the  church  and  the 
world  are  cursed.  Utilitarianism  begets  one  type  of  selfish- 
ness, which  it  calls  religion,  and  this  philosophy  begets  anoth- 
er, in  some  respects  more  specious,  but  not  a  whit  the  less 
selfish,  God-dishonoring  and  soul-destroying.  The  nearest 
that  this  philosophy  can  be  said  to  approach  either  to  true 
morality  or  religion,  is,  that  if  the  one  who  forms  the  resolu- 
tion understoodhimself  he  would  resolve  to  become  truly  moral 
instead  of  really  becoming  so.  But  this  is  in  fact  an  absurdi- 
ty and  an  impossibiUty,  and  the  resolution-maker  does  not  un- 
derstand what  he  is  about  when  he  supposes  himself  to  be 
forming  or  cherishing  a  resolution  to  do  his  duty.  Observe: 
he  intends  to  do  his  duty.  But  to  do  his  duty  is  to  form  and 
cherish  an  ultimate  intention.  To  intend  to  do  his  duty  is 
merely  to  intend  to  intend.  But  this  is  not  doing  his  duty,  as 
will  be  shown.  He  intends  to  serve  God,  but  this  is  not  serv- 
ing God  as  will  also  be  shown.     Whatever  he  intends,  he  i^ 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  113 

neither  truly  moral  nor  religious,  until  he  really  intends  the 
same  end  that  God  does;  and  this  is  not  to  do  his  duty,  nor  to 
do  right,  nor  to  comply  with  obligation,  nor  to  keep  a  con- 
science void  of  offence,  nor  to  deny  himself,  nor  any  such-like 
things.  God  aims  at  and  intends  the  highest  well-being  of 
Himself  and  the  Universe  as  an  ultimate  end,  and  this  is  doing 
his  duty.  It  is  not  resolving  or  intending  to  do  his  duty,  but 
is  doing  it.  It  is  not  resolving  to  do  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right,  but  it  is  doing  right.  It  is  not  resolving  to  serve  him- 
self and  the  universe  but  is  actually  rendering  that  service. 
It  is  not  resolving  to  obey  the  moral  law,  but  is  actually  obey- 
ing it.  It  is  not  resolving  to  love  but  actually  loving  his  neigh- 
bor as  himself.  It  is  not,  in  other  words,  resolving  to  be  be- 
nevolent but  is  being  so.  It  is  not  resolving  to  deny  self,  but 
is  actually  denying  self. 

A  man  may  resolve  to  serve  God  without  any  just  idea  of 
what  it  is  to  serve  Him.     If  he  had  the  idea  of  what  the  law  of 
God  requires  him  to  choose  clearly   before  his  mind — if  he 
perceived  that  to  serve  God  was  nothing  less  than  to  conse- 
crate himself  to  the  same  end  to  which  God  consecrates  him- 
self, to  love  God  with  all  his  heart  and  his  neighbor  as  him- 
self, that  is,  to  will  or  choose  the  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  of  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  end — to  devote  all  his  be- 
ing, substance,  time  and  influence  to  this  end; — I  say,  if  this 
idea  were  clearly  before  his  mind,  he  would  not  talk  of  resolv- 
ing to  consecrate  himself  to  God — resolving  to   do  his  duty, 
to  do  right — to  serve  God — to  keep  a  conscience  void  of  offence, 
and  such-like  things.     He  would  see  that  such   resolutions 
were  totally  absurd  and  a  mere  evasion  of  the  claims  of  God. 
It  has  been  repeatedly  shown  that  all  virtue  resolves  itself  in- 
to the  intending  of  an  ultimate  end  or  of  the  highest  well-be- 
ing of  God  and  the  universe.     This  is  true  morality  and  noth- 
ing else  is.     This  is  identical  with  that  love  to  God  and  man 
which  the  law  of  God  requires.     This  then,  is  duty.     This  is 
serving  God.     This  is  keeping  a  conscience  void  of  offence. 
This  is  right  and  nothing  else  is.     But  to  intend  or  resolve  to  do 
this  is  only  to  intend  to  intend  instead  of  at  once  intending  what 
God  requires.     It  is  resolving  to  love  God  and  his  neighbor  in- 
stead of  really  loving  him;  choosing   to  choose  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  instead  of  really  choos- 
ing it.     Now  this  is  totally  absurd,  and  when  examined  to  the 
bottom  will  be  seen  to  be  nothing  else  than  a  most  perverse 
postponement  of  duty  and  a  most  God-provoking  evasion  of 
his  claims.     To  intend  to  do  duty  is   gross  nonsense.     To  do 
10* 


114  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

duty  is  to  love  God  with  all  the  heart  and  our  neighbor  as  oar- 
selves,  that  is,  to  choose,  will,  intend  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  our  neighbor  for  its  own  sake.  To  intend  to  do  du- 
ty, to  aim  at  doing  duty,  at  doing  right,  at  discharging  obhga- 
tion,  &c.  is  to  intend  to  intend,  to  choose  to  choose,  and  such- 
like nonsense.  Moral  obligation  respects  the  ultimate  inten- 
tion. It  requires  that  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being  shall 
be  willed  for  its  own  sake.  To  comply  with  moral  obligation 
is  not  to  intend  or  aim  at  this  compliance  as  an  end,  but  to 
will,  choose,  intend  that  which  moral  law  or  moral  obligation 
requires  me  to  intend,  namely,  the  highest  good  of  being.  To 
intend  obedience  to  law  is  not  obedience  to  law,  for  the  reason 
that  obedience  is  not  that  which  the  law  requires  me  to  intend. 
To  aim  at  discharging  obHgation  is  not  discharging  it,  just  for 
the  reason  that  I  am  under  no  obligation  to  intend  this  as  an 
end.  Nay,  it  is  totally  absurd  and  nonsensical  to  talk  of  resolv- 
ing, aiming,  intending  to  do  duty — to  serve  the  Lord,  &c.  &c. 
All  such  resolutions  imply  an  entire  overlooking  of  that  in 
which  true  reUgion  consists.  Such  resolutions  and  intentions 
from  their  very  nature  must  respect  outward  actions  in  which 
is  no  moral  character,  and  not  the  ultimate  intention,  in  which 
all  virtue  and  vice  consist.  A  man  may  resolve  or  intend  to 
do  this  or  that.  But  to  intend  to  intend  an  ultimate  end,  or  to 
choose  it  for  its  intrinsic  value  instead  of  willing  and  at  once 
intending  or  choosing  that  end,  is  grossly  absurd,  self  contra- 
dictory, and  naturally  impossible.  Therefore  this  philosophy 
does  not  give  a  true  definition  and  account  of  virtue.  It  is 
self  evident  that  it  does  not  conceive  rightly  of  it.  Audit  can 
not  be  that  those  who  give  such  instructions  or  those  who 
receive  and  comply  with  them  have  the  true  idea  of  reli- 
gion in  their  minds.  Such  teaching  is  radically  false  and 
such  a  philosophy  leads  only  to  bewilder,  and  dazzles  to  blind. 
It  is  one  thing  for  a  man  who  actually  loves  God  with  all  his 
heart  and  his  neighbor  as  himself  to  resolve  to  regulate  all 
his  outward  life  by  the  law  of  God,  and  a  totally  different  thing 
to  intend  to  love  God  or  to  intend  his  highest  glory  aild  well- 
being.  Resolutions  may  respect  outward  action,  but  it  is  to- 
tally absurd  to  intend  or  resolve  to  form  an  ultimate  intention. 
But  be  it  remembered  that  morality  and  religion  do  not  belong 
to  outward  action,  but  to  ultimate  intentions.  It  is  amazing 
and  afflicting  to  witness  the  alarming  extent  to  which  a  spu- 
rious philosophy  has  corrupted  and  is  corrupting  the  church 
of  God.  Kant  and  Cousin  and  Coleridge  have  adopted  a 
phraseology  and  manifestly  have  conceived  in  idea  a  philoso- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  115 

phy  subversive  of  all  true  love  to  God  and  man,  and  teach  a 
religion  of  maxims  and  resolutions  instead  of  a  religion  of  Love. 
It  is  a  philosophy,  as  we  shall  see  in  a  future  Lecture,  which 
teaches  that  the  moral  law  or  law  of  right,  is  entirely  distinct 
from  and  may  be  opposite  to  the  law  of  benevolence  or  love. 
The  fact  is,  this  philosophy  conceives  of  duty  and  right  as 
belonging  to  mere  outward  action.  This  must  be,  for  it  can 
not  be  crazy  enough  to  talk  of  resolving  or  intending  to  form 
an  ultimate  intention.  Let  but  the  truth  of  this  philosophy 
be  assumed  in  giving  instructions  to  the  anxious  sinner,  and  it 
will  immediately  dry  off  his  tears  and  in  all  probability  lead 
him  to  settle  down  in  a  rehgion  of  resolutions  instead  of  a  re- 
ligon  of  love.  Indeed  this  philosophy  will  immediately  dry 
off,  (if  I  may  be  allowed  the  expression)  the  most  genuine  and 
powerful  revival  of  religion,  and  run  it  down  into  a  mere  re- 
vival of  a  heartless,  Christless,  loveless  philosophy.  It  is  much 
easier  to  persuade  anxious  sinners  to  resolve  to  do  their  duty, 
to  resolve  to  love  God,  than  it  is  to  persuade  them  really  to  do 
their  duty,  and  really  to  love  God  with  all  their  heart  and  with 
all  their  soul  and  their  neighbor  as  themselves. 

IX,  We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  that  philosophy  which 
teaches  the  Complexity  of  the  Foundation  of  Moral  Obligation. 

This  theory  maintains  that  there  are  several  distinct  grounds 
of  moral  obhgation;  that  the  highest  good  of  being  is  only 
one  of  the  grounds  of  moral  obligation,  while  right,  moral 
order,  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  agents,  merit  and  de- 
merit, truth,  duty,  and  many  such  like  things,  are  distinct 
grounds  of  moral  obligation ;  that  these  are  not  merely  condi- 
tions of  moral  obligation,  but  that  each  one  of  them  can  by 
itself  impose  moral  obligation.  The  advocates  of  this  theory, 
perceiving  its  inconsistency  with  the  doctrine  that  moral  ob- 
ligation respects  the  ultimate  choice  or  intention  only,  seem 
disposed  to  relinquish  the  position  that  obligation  respects 
strictly  only  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end,  and  to  maintain 
that  moral  obligation  respects  the  ultimate  action  of  the  will. 
By  ultimate  action  of  the  will  they  mean,  if  I  understand 
them,  the  will's  treatment  of  every  thing  according  to  its  in- 
trinsic nature  and  character;  that  is,  treating  every  thing  or 
taking  that  attitude  in  respect  to  every  thing  known  to  the 
mind  that  is  exactly  suited  to  what  it  is  in  and  of  itself.  For 
example,  right  ought  to  be  regarded  and  treated  by  the  will 
as  right,  because  it  is  right.  Truth  ought  to  be  regarded  and 
treated  as  truth  for  its  own  sake,  virtue  as  virtue,  merit  as 
merit,  demerit  as  demerit,  the  useful  as  useful,  the  beautiful 


116  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

as  beautiful,  the  good  or  valuable  as  valuable,  each  forits  own 
sake ;  that  in  each  case  the  action  of  the  will  is  ultimate  in  the 
sense  that  its  action  terminates  on  these  objects  as  ultimates; 
in  other  words,  that  all  those  actions  of  the  will  are  ultimates 
that  treat  things  according  to  their  nature  and  character,  or 
ac  cording  to  what  they  are  in  and  of  themselves.  Now  in 
respect  to  this  theory  I  would  enquire: 

1.  What  is  intended  by  the  will's  treating  a  thing  or  taking 
that  attitude  in  respect  to  it  that  is  suited  to  its  nature  and 
character?     Are  there  any  other  actions  of  will  than  choices 
and  intentions  ?     Choice,  preference,  intention,  volition — are 
not  all  the  actions  of  the  will  comprehended  in  these  ?     Choice, 
preference,   intention — are    not  these  identical?     Do  not  all 
the  actions  of  the  will  consist  either  in  the  choice  of  an  end 
or  in   the  choice  of  means  to   secure  an  end?     If  there  are 
any    other   actions  than  these,  are  they  intelligent  actions? 
If  so,  what  are  those  actions  of  will  that  consist  neither  in 
the  choice  of  an  end,  nor  in  volitions  or  efforts  to  secure  an 
end?     Can   there  be  intelligent  acts  of  will  that  neither  re- 
spect ends  nor  means?     Can  there  be  moral  acts  of  will  when 
there  is  no  choice  or  intention?     If  there  is  choice  or  inten- 
tion, must  not  these  respect  an  end  or  means?     What  then 
can  be  meant  by  ultimate  action  of  will  as  distinguished  from 
ultimate   choice  or  intention?     Can  there  be  choice  without 
there  is  an  object  of  choice?     If  there  is  an  object  of  choice, 
must  not  this  object  be  chosen  either  as  an  end  or  as  a  means? 
If  as  an   ultimate  end,  how  does  this  differ  from  ultimate  in- 
tention?    If  as  a  means,  how  can  this  be  regarded  as  an  ulti- 
mate action  of  the  will?     What  can  be  intended  by  actions  of 
will  that  are  not  acts  of  choice  nor  of  volition?     I  can  con- 
ceive  of  no  other.     But  if  all  acts  of  will  must  of  necessity 
consist  in  willing  or  nilling,  that  is  in  choosing  or  refusing, 
which  is  the  same  as  willing  one  way  or  another  in  respect 
to  all  objects  of  choice  apprehended  by  the  mind,  how  can 
there  be  any  intelligent  act  of  the  will  that  does  not  consist 
in  or  that  may  not  and  must  not  in  its  last  analysis  be  resolu- 
ble into,  and  be  properly  considered  as  the  choice  of  an  end 
or  of  means  to  secure  an  end?     Can  moral  law  require  any 
other  action  of  will  than  choice  and  volition?     What  other 
actions  of  will  are  possible  to  us?     Whatever  moral  law  does 
require,  it  must   and  can  only  require  choices  and  volitions. 
It  can  only  require  us  to  choose  ends  or  means.     It  can  not 
require  us  to  choose  as  an  ultimate  end  any  thing  that  is  not 
intrinsically  worthy  of  choice — nor  as  a  means  any  thing  that 
does  not  sustain  that  relation. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  117 

2.  Secondly,  let  us  examine  this  theory  in  the  light  of  the 
revealed  law  of  God.  The  whole  law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word, 
Love. 

Now  we  have  seen  that  the  will  of  God  can  not  be  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obligation.  Moral  obligation  must  be  founded 
in  the  nature  of  that  which  moral  law  requires.  Unless  there 
be  something  in  the  nature  of  that  which  moral  law  requires  us 
to  will  that  renders  it  worthy  or  deserving  of  choice,  we  can 
be  under  no  obligation  to  will  or  choose  it.  It  is  admitted 
that  the  love  required  by  the  law  of  God  mus1*consist  in  an 
act  of  the  will  and  not  in  mere  emotions.  Now,  does  this 
love,  willing,  choice,  embrace  several  distinct  ultimates  ?  If  so, 
how  can  they  all  be  expressed  in  one  word  love?  Observe, 
the  law  requires  only  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor  as  an  ul- 
timate. This  love  or  willing  must  respect  and  terminate  on 
God  and  our  neighbor.  The  law  says  nothing  about  willing  right 
for  the  sake  of  the  right,  or  truth  for  the  sake  of  the  truth, 
or  beauty  for  the  sake  of  beauty,  or  virtue  for  the  sake  of  virtue, 
or  moral  order  for  its  own  sake,  or  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents  for  their  own  sake;  nor  is,  nor  can  any  such 
thing  be  implied  in  the  command  to  love  God  and  our  neigh- 
bor. All  these  and  innumerable  other  things  are  and  may 
be  conditions  and  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  our  neighbor.  As  such,  the  law  may,  and  doubtless  does, 
in  requiring  us  to  will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  our 
neighbor  as  an  ultimate  end,  require  us  to  will  all  Sese  as  the 
necessary  conditions  and  means.  The  end  which  the  revealed 
law  requires  us  to  will  is  undeniabl}'  simple  as  opposed  to  com- 
plex. It  requires  only  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor.  One  word 
expresses  the  whole  of  moral  obligation.  Now  certainly  this 
word  can  not  have  a  complex  signification  in  such  a  sense  as  to 
include  several  distinct  and  ultimate  objects  of  love,  or  of 
choice.  This  love  is  to  terminate  on  God  and  our  neighbor, 
and  not  on  abstractions,  nor  on  inanimate  and  insentient  exist- 
ences. I  protest  against  any  philosophy  that  contradicts  the 
revealed  law  of  God,  and  that  teaches  that  any  thing  else 
than  God  and  our  neighbor,  is  to  be  loved  for  its  own  sake, 
or  that  any  thing  else  is  to  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end  than 
the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  our  neighbor.  In  oth- 
er words,  I  object  utterly  to  any  philosophy  that  makes  any 
thing  obligatory  upon  a  moral  agent  that  is  not  expressed  or 
impUed  in  perfect  good  will  to  God  and  to  the  universe  of  sen- 
tient existences.  ''To  the  word  and  to  the  testimony;  if" 
any  philosophy  '-'  agree  not  therewith,  it  is  because  there  is  no 


118  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

light  in  it."  The  revealed  law  of  God  knows  but  one  ground 
or  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  It  requires  but  one  thing, 
and  that  is  just  that  attitude  of  the  will  toward  God  and  our 
neighbor  that  accords  with  the  intrinsic  value  of  their 
highest  well-being;  that  God's  moral  worth  shall  be  willed  as 
of  infinite  value  as  a  condition  of  his  own  well-being,  and  that 
his  actual  and  perfect  blessedness  shall  be  willed  for  its  own 
sake,  and  because  or  upon  condition  that  he  is  worthy;  that 
our  neighbor's  moral  worth  shall  be  willed  as  an  indispensable 
condition  of  fiis  blessedness,  and  that  if  our  neighbor  is  wor- 
thy of  happiness,  his  actual  and  highest  happiness  shall  be 
willed.  The  fact  is  that  all  ultimate  acts  of  will  must  consist 
in  ultimate  choices  and  intentions,  and  the  revealed  law  re- 
quires that  our  ultimate  choice,  intention,  should  terminate  on 
the  good  of  God  and  our  neighbor,  thus  making  the  founda- 
tion of  moral  obligation  simple,  moral  action  simple,  and  all 
true  morahty  to  be  summed  up  in  one  word,  Love.  It  is  im- 
possible with  our  eye  upon  the  revealed  law  to  make  more 
than  one  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  and  it  is  utterly  inad- 
missible to  subvert  this  foundation  by  any  philosophisings 
whatever.  This  law  knows  but  one  end  which  moral  agents 
are  under  obligation  to  seek  and  sets  at  nought  all  so-called 
ultimate  actions  of  will  that  do  not  terminate  on  the  good  of 
God  and  our  neighbor.  The  ultimate  choice  with  the  choice 
of  all  the  conditions  and  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  the  universe,  is  all  that  the  revealed  law  recognizes  as 
coming  within  the  pale  of  its  legislation.  It  requires  nothing 
more  and  nothing  less. 

But  there  is  another  form  of  the  complex  theory  of  moral 
obligation  that  I  must  notice  before  I  dismiss  this  subject. 
In  the  examination  of  it  I  shall  be  obliged  to  repeat  some 
things  which  have  been  in  substance  said  before.  Indeed 
there  has  been  so  much  confusion  upon  the  subject  of  the  na- 
ture of  virtue  or  of  the  foundation  of  moral  obhgation  as  to 
render  it  indispensable  in  the  examination  of  the  various  false 
theories  and  in  removing  objections  to  the  true  one,  to  fre- 
quently repeat  the  same  thought  in  different  connections. 
This  I  have  found  to  be  unavoidable  if  I  would  render  the  sub- 
ject at  all  intelligible  to  the  common  reader. 

I  pass  now  to  the  consideration  of  another  form  of  the  the- 
ory  that  affirms  the  complexity  of  the  foundation  of  Moral  Ob- 
ligation; complex^  however^  only  in  a  certain  sense. 

This  philosophy  admits  and  maintains  ihdii  the  good^  that  is, 
the  valuable  to  being,  is  the  only  ground  of  moral  obligation, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  119 

and  that  in  every  possible  case  the  valuable  to  being,  or  the 
good,  must  be  intended  as  an  end  as  a  condition  of  the  inten- 
tion being  virtuous.  In  this  respect  it  maintains  that  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation  is  simple,  a  unit.  But  it  also 
maintains  that  there  are  several  ultimate  goods  or  several  ulti- 
mates  or  things  which  are  intrinsically  good  or  valuable  in 
themselves,  and  are  therefore  to  be  chosen  for  their  own  sake 
or  as  an  ultimate  end ;  that  to  choose  either  of  these  as  an 
ultimate  end  or  for  its  own  sake  is  virtue. 

It  admits  that  happiness  or  blessedness  is  a  good,  and 
should  be  willed  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  an  ultimate  end,  but 
it  maintains  that  virtue  is  an  ultimate  good;  that  right  is  an 
ultimate  good;  that  the  just  and  the  true  are  ultimate  goods; 
in  short  that  the  realization  of  the  ideas  of  the  reason,  or  the 
carrying  out  into  concrete  existence  any  idea  of  the  rea- 
son is  an  ultimate  good.  For  instance:  there  were  in  the 
Divine  mind  from  eternity,  certain  ideas  of  the  good  or 
valuable;  the  right,  the  just,  the  beautiful,  the  true,  the  use- 
ful, the  holy.  The  realization  of  these  ideas  of  the  Divine 
reason,  according  to  this  theory,  was  the  end  which  God 
aimed  at  or  intended  in  creation;  He  aimed  at  their  realization 
as  ultimates  or  for  its  own  sake,  and  regarded  the  concrete 
realization  of  every  one  of  these  ideas  as  a  separate  and  ul- 
timate good;  and  so  certain  as  God  is  virtuous,  so  certain  it 
is,  says  this  theory,  that  an  intention  to  realize  these  ideas 
for  their  own  sake,  or  for  the  sake  of  the  reahzation  is  vir- 
tue. Therefore  the  intention  on  our  part  to  realize  these 
ideas  for  the  sake  of  the  reahzation  is  virtue.  Then  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation  is  complex  in  the  sense  that  to 
will  either  the  good  or  valuable,  the  right,  the  true,  the  just, 
the  virtuous,  the  beautiful,  the  useful,  &c.,  for  its  own  sake, 
eras  an  ultimate  end,  is  virtue;  that  there  is  more  than  one 
virtuous  ultimate  choice  or  intention.  Thus  any  one  of  seve- 
ral distinct  things  may  be  intended  as  an  ultimate  end  with 
equal  propriety  and  with  equal  virtuousness.  The  soul  may 
at  one  moment  be  wholly  consecrated  to  one  end,  that  is,  to 
one  ultimate  good,  and  sometimes  to  another,  that  is,  some- 
times it  may  will  one  good  and  sometimes  another  good  as 
an  ultimate  end  and  still  be  equally  virtuous. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  subject  I  will, 

1.  State  again  the  exact  question  to  he  discussed. 

2.  Define  again  the  different  senses  of  the  term  good. 

3.  Shoio  in  what  sense  of  the  term  good  it  can  be  an  ultimate, 

4.  That  satisfaction  or  enjoyment  is  the  only  ultimate  good. 


120  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

1.  The  exact  question.  It  is  this:  In  what  does  the  supreme 
and  ultimate  good  consist? 

2.  The  different  senses  of  the  term  good. 

(1.)  Good  may  be  natural  or  moral.  Natural  good  is  sy- 
nonymous with  valuable.  Moral  good  is  synonymous  with 
virtue.  Moral  good  is  in  a  certain  sense  a  natural  good,  that 
is,  it  is  valuable  as  a  means  of  natural  good;  and  the  advo- 
cates of  this  theory  affirm  that  moral  good  is  valuable  in 
itself. 

(2.)  Good,  as  has  formerly  been  said,  may  be  absolute  and 
relative.  Absolute  good  is  that  which  is  intrinsically  valua- 
ble. Relative  good  is  that  which  is  valuable  as  a  means. 
It  is  not  valuable  in  itself,  but  valuable  because  it  sustains 
to  absolute  good  the  relation  of  a  means  to  an  end.  Abso- 
lute good  may  also  be  a  relative  good,  that  is,  it  may  tend 
to  perpetuate  and  augment  itself. 

Good  may  also  be  ultimate. 

Ultimate  good  is  that  intrinsically  valuable  or  absolute  good 
in  which  all  relative  good,  whether  natural  or  moral,  termi- 
nates. It  is  that  absolute  good  to*which  all  relative  good  sus- 
tains the  relation  of  a  means  or  condition. 

3.  In  what  sense  of  the  term  good^  it  can  be  an  ultimate. 

(1.)  Not  in  the  sense  of  moral  good  or  virtue.  This  has 
been  so  often  shown  that  it  needs  not  be  repeated  here.  I 
will  only  say  that  virtue  belongs  to  intention.  It  is  impossible 
that  intention  should  be  an  ultimate.  The  thing  intended 
must  be  the  ultimate  of  the  intention.  We  have  seen  that 
to  make  virtue  an  ultimate,  the  intention  must  terminate  on 
itself,  or  on  a  quality  of  itself,  which  is  absurd.  Good  can 
not  be  an  ultimate  in  the  sense  of  relative  good.  To  suppose 
that  it  could,  were  to  suppose  a  contradiction;  for  relative 
good  is  not  intrinsically  valuable,  but  only  valuable  on  account 
of  its  relations. 

(2.)  Good  can  be  an  ultimate  only  in  the  sense  of  the  natu- 
ral and  absolute,  that  is,  that  only  can  be  an  ultimate  good, 
which  is  naturally  and  intrinsically  valuable  to  being.  This 
only  can  be  an  end  or  an  ultimate  good,  namely,  that  which 
sustains  such  a  relation  to  sentient  existences  as  to  be  by 
reason  of  their  own  natures  intrinsically  valuable  to  them. 
And  we  shall  soon  inquire  whether  any  thing  can  be  intrin- 
sically vuluable  to  them  but  enjoyment,  mental  satisfaction, 
or  blessedness. 

I  come  now  to  state  the  point  upon  which  issue  is  taken, 
to  wit:  That  enjoyment,  blessedness,  or  mental  satisfaction 
is  the  only  ultimate  good. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  121 

(1.)  It  has  been  before  remarked  and  should  be  repeated 
here  that  the  intrinsically  valuable  must  not  only  belong  to 
and  be  inseparable  from  sentient  beings,  but  that  the  ultimate 
or  intrinsic  absolute  good  of  moral  agents  must  consist  in  a 
state  of  mind.  It  must  be  something  to  be  found  in  the  field 
of  consciousness.  Nothing  can  be  affirmed  by  a  moral  agent 
to  be  an  intrinsic,  absolute,  ultimate  good,  but  a  state  of  mind. 
Take  away  mind,  and  what  can  be  a  good  per  se;  or,  what 
can  be  a  good  in  any  sense? 

(2.)  Again,  it  should  be  said  that  the  ultimate  and  absolute 
good  cannot  consist  in  a  choice  or  in  a  voluntary  state  of 
mind.  The  thing  chosen  is  and  must  be  the  ultimate  of  the 
choice.  Choice  can  never  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end.  Be- 
nevolence then,  or  the  love  required  by  the  law  can  never  be 
the  ultimate  and  absolute  good.  It  is  admitted  that  blessed- 
ness, enjoyment,  mental  satisfaction,  is  a  good,  an  absolute 
and  ultimate  good.  This  is  a  first  truth  of  reason.  All  men 
assume  it.  All  men  seek  enjoyment  either  selfishly  or  disin- 
terestedly, that  is,  they  seek  their  own  good  supremely,  or  the 
general  good  of  being.  That  it  is  the  only  absolute  and  ulti- 
mate good  is  also  a  first  truth.  But  for  this  there  could  be 
no  activity — no  motive  to  action — no  object  of  choice.  En- 
joyment is  in  fact  the  ultimate  good.  It  is  in  fact  the  result 
of  existence  and  of  action.  It  results  to  God  from  his  exist- 
ence, his  attributes,  his  activity,  and  his  virtue,  by  a  law  of 
necessity.  His  powers  are  so  correlated  that  blessedness 
can  not  but  be  the  state  of  his  mind,  as  resulting  from  the 
exercise  of  his  attributes  and  the  activity  of  his  will.  Hap- 
piness or  enjoyment  results  both  naturally  and  governmental- 
ly  from  obedience  to  law  both  physical  and  moral.  This 
shows  that  government  is  not  an  end,  but  a  means.  It  also 
shows  that  the  end  is  blessedness  and  the  means  obedience 
to  law.  Obedience  to  law  can  not  be  the  ultimate  end  of 
government,  for, 

[1.]  Obedience  to  moral  law  consists  in  the  love  of  God 
and  our  neighbor,  that  is,  in  willing  good  to  God  and  our 
neighbor.  The  good  and  not  the  wilUng  must  be  the  end  of 
government. 

[2.]  The  sanctions  of  government  or  of  law  in  the  widest 
sense  of  the  term,  must  be  the  ultimate  of  obedience  and  the 
end  of  government.  The  sanctions  of  moral  government 
must  be  the  ultimate  good  and  evil.  That  is,  they  must 
promise  and  threaten  that  which  is  in  its  own  nature  an  ulti- 
mate good  or  evil.     Virtue  must  consist  in  the  impartial 


122  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

choice  of  that  as  an  end  which  is  proffered  as  the  reward  of 
virtue.  This  is  and  must  be  the  ultimate  good.  Sin  consists 
in  choosing  that  which  defeats  or  sets  aside  this  end,  or  in 
selfishness. 

But  what  is  intended  by  the  rights  the  just^  the  true^  &c. 
being  ultimate  goods  and  ends  to  be  chosen  for  their  own 
sake?  The^Qm^yhQohjective  OT  subjective.  Objective  right, 
truth,  justice,  iSz^c.  are  mere  ideas  and  can  not  be  good  or 
valuable  in  themselves.  Subjective  right,  truth,  justice,  &c., 
are  synonymous  with  righteousness,  truthfulness,  and  just- 
ness. These  are  virtue.  They  consist  in  an  active  state  of 
the  will  and  resolve  themselves  into  choice,  intention.  But 
we  have  repeatedly  seen  that  intention  can  neither  be  an  end 
nor  a  good  in  itself,  in  the  sense  of  intrinsically  valuable. 

Again:  Constituted  as  moral  agents  are,  it  is  a  matter  of 
consciousness  that  the  concrete  realization  of  the  ideas  of 
right,  and  truth,  and  justice,  of  beauty,  of  fitness,  of  moral 
order,  and  in  short,  of  all  that  class  of  ideas,  is  indispensa- 
ble as  the  condition  and  means  oftheir  highest  well-being,  and 
that  enjoyment  or  mental  satisfaction  is  the  result  of  reali- 
zing in  the  concrete  those  ideas.  This  enjoyment  or  satis- 
faction then  is  and  must  be  the  end  or  ultimate  upon  which 
the  intention  of  God  must  have  terminated,  and  upon  which 
ours  must  terminate  as  an  end  or  ultimate. 

Again:  The  enjoyment  resulting  to  God  from  the  concrete 
Realization  of  his  own  ideas  must  be  infinite.  He  must  there- 
fore have  intended  it  as  the  supreme  good.  It  is  in  fact  the 
ultimate  good.     It  is  in  fact  the  supremely  valuable. 

Again :  If  there  is  more  than  one  ultimate  good,  the  mind 
must  regard  them  all  as  one,  or  sometimes  be  consecrated  to 
one  and  sometimes  to  another — sometimes  wholly  consecra- 
ted to  the  beautiful,  sometimes  to  the  just,  and  then  again 
to  the  right,  then  to  the  useful,  to  the  true  &c.  But  it  may 
be  asked  of  what  value  is  the  beautiful  aside  from  the  enjoy- 
ment it  affords  to  sentient  existences.  It  meets  a  demand  of 
our  being,  and  hence  affords  satisfaction.  But  for  this  in 
what  sense  could  it  be  regarded  as  good?  The  idea  of  the 
useful,  again,  can  not  be  an  idea  of  an  ultimate  end,  for  utiHty 
implies  that  something  is  valuable  in  itself  to  which  the  use- 
ful sustains  the  relation  of  a  means  and  is  useful  only  for  that 
reason. 

Of  what  value  is  the  true,  the  right,  the  just,  &c.,  aside 
from  the  pleasure  or  mental  satisfaction  resulting  from  them 
to  sentient  existences?    Of  what  value  were  all  tlie  rest  of 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


123 


the  universe,  were  there  no   sentient  existences  to   enjoy 
it. 

Suppose,  again,  that  every  thing  else  in  the  universe  ex- 
isted just  as  it  does,  except  mental  satisfaction  or  enjoyment, 
and  that  there  were  absolutely  no  enjoyment  of  any  kind  in 
any  thing  any  more  than  there  is  in  a  block  of  granite,  of 
what  value  would  it  all  be;  and  to  what  or  to  whom  would  it 
be  valuable?  Mind  without  susceptibility  of  enjoyment  could 
neither  know  nor  be  the  subject  of  good  nor  evil,  any  more 
tlian  a  slab  of  marble.  Truth  in  that  case  could  no  more  be 
a  good  to  mind  than  mind  could  be  a  good  to  truth;  the  eye 
would  be  the  good  of  light  as  much  as  Hght  would  be  the  good 
of  the  eye.  Nothing  in  the  universe  could  give  or  receive 
tlie  least  satisfaction  or  dissatisfaction.  Neither  natural  or 
moral  fitness  or  unfitness  could  excite  the  least  emotion  or 
mental  satisfaction.  A  block  of  marble  might  just  as  well 
be  the  subject  of  good  as  any  thing  else  upon  such  a  suppo- 
sition. 

Again:  It  is  obvious  that  all  creation,  where  law  is  obeyed, 
tends  to  one  end,  and  that  end  is  happiness  or  enjoyment. 
This  demonstrates  that  enjoyment  was  the  end  at  which  God 
aimed  in  creation. 

Again :  It  is  evident  that  God  is  endeavoring  to  realize  all 
the  other  ideas  of  his  reason  for  the  sake  of,  and  as  a  means 
of  realizing  that  of  the  valuable  to  being.  This  as  a  matter 
offact  is  the  result  of  realizing  in  the  concrete  all  those  ideas. 
This  must  then  have  been   the  end  intended. 

But  again:  The  bible  knows  of  but  one  ultimate  good. 
This,  as  has  been  said,  the  moral  law  has  forever  settled. 
JIhfi  highest  welHjeing  of^od  and  the  universe  is  the  only 
end  required  by  the  law.  Creation  proposes  but  one  end. 
Physical  and  moral  government  propose  but  one  end.  The 
bible  knows  but  one  end,  as  we  have  just  seen.  The  law  and 
the_gos£el  propose  the  good  of  being  only  as  the  end  of  vir- 
tuous intention.  '^  Thou  sHaltlove  the  Lord  thy  God,  and  thy 
neighbor  as  thyself."  Here  is  the  whole  duty  of  man.  But 
here  is  nothing  of  choosing,  willing,  loving,  truth,  justice, 
right,  utility,  or  beauty,  as  an  ultimate  end  for  their  own 
sakes.  The  fact  is,  there  are  innumerable  relative  goods,  or 
conditions,  or  means  of  enjoyment,  but  only  one  ultimate 
good.  DisH^fcerested  ~bette¥©l€nca  to  God  and  man  is  the 
whole  of  virtue,  and  every  modification  of  love  resolves  itself  in 
iHe  lasta-nalysis  into  this.  If  this  is  so,  well-being  in  the  sense 
orehjoyment  must  be  the  only  ultimate  or  good.     But  well 


124  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

being,  in  the  complex  sense  of  the  term^  is  made  up  of  en- 
joyment and  the  means  and  sources  or  conditions  of  enjoy- 
ment. Conformity  to  law  universal^  must  be  the  condition 
and  enjoyment;  the  uUimate  end,  strictly  and  properly  speak- 

It  is  nonsense  to  object  that  if  enjoyment  or  mental  satis- 
faction be  the  only  ground  of  moral  obligation,  we  should  be 
indifferent  as  to  the  means.  This  objection  assumes  that  in 
seeking  an  end  for  its  intrinsic  value,  we  must  be  indifferent 
as  to  the  way  in  which  we  obtain  that  end,  that  is,  whether  it 
be  obtained  in  a  manner  possible  or  impossible,  right  or  wrong. 
It  overlooks  the  fact  that  from  the  laws  of  our  own  being  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  will  the  end  without  willing  also  the 
indispensable  and  therefore  the  appropriate  means;  and  also 
that  we  can  not  possibly  regard  any  other  conditions  or  means 
of  the  happiness  of  moral  agents  as  possible,  and  therefore  as 
appropriate  or  right,  but  holiness  and  universal  conformity  to 
the  law  of  our  being.  As  we  said  in  a  former  lecture,  enjoy- 
ment or  mental  satisfaction  results  from  having  the  different 
demands  of  our  being  met.  One  demand  of  the  reason  and 
conscience  of  a  moral  agent  is  that  happiness  should  be  con- 
ditionated  upon  holiness.  It  is  therefore  naturally  impossible 
for  a  moral  agent  to  be  satisfied  with  the  happiness  or  enjoy- 
ment of  moral  agents  except  upon  the  condition  of  their  ho- 
liness. 

But  this  class  of  philosophers  insist  that  all  the  archetypes 
of  the  ideas  of  the  reason  are  necessarily  regarded  by  us  as 
good  in  themselves.  For  example:  I  have  the  idea  of  beau- 
ty. I  behold  a  rose.  The  perception  of  this  archetype  of 
the  idea  of  beauty  gives  me  instantaneous  pleasure.  Now 
it  is  said,  that  this  archetype  is  necessarily  regarded  by  me 
as  a  good.  I  have  pleasure  in  the  presence  and  percep- 
tion of  it,  and  as  often  as  I  call  it  to  remembrance.  This 
pleasure,  it  is  said,  demonstrates  that  it  is  a  good  to  me ;  and 
this  good  is  in  the  very  nature  of  the  object,  and  must  be 
regarded  as  a  good  in  itself.  To  this  I  answer,  that  the  pres^ 
ence  of  the  rose  is  a  good  to  me,  but  not  an  ultimate  good. 
It  is  only  a  means  or  source  of  pleasure  or  happiness  to  me. 
The  rose  is  not  a  good  in  itself  If  there  were  no  eyes  to  see 
it  and  no  olfactories  to  smell  it,  to  whom  could  it  be  a  good? 
But  in  what  sense  can  it  be  a  good  except  in  the  sense  that  it 
gives  satisfaction  to  the  beholder?  The  satisfaction  and  not 
the  rose,  is  and  must  be  the  ultimate  good.  But  it  is  inquired, 
do  not  I  desire  the  rose  for  its  own  sake?    I  answer,  yes;  you 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT*  125 

desire  It  for  its  owyi  sake^  but  you  do  not,  can  not  choose  it  for 
its  own  sake^  but,  to  gratify  the  desire.  The  desires  all  termi- 
nate on  their  respective  objects.  The  desire  for  food  termi- 
nates on  food ;  thirst  terminates  on  drink,  &c.  These  things 
are  so  correlated  to  these  appetites  that  they  are  desired  for 
their  own  sakes.  But  they  are  not  and  can  not  be  chosen  for 
their  own  sakes  or  as  an  ultimate  end.  They  are  and  must 
be  regarded  and  chosen  as  the  means  of  gratifying  their  re- 
spective desires.  To  choose  them  simply  in  obedience  to  the 
desire  were  selfishness.  But  the  gratification  is  a  g:ood  and  a 
part  of  universal  good.  The  reason,  therefore,  urges  and 
demands  that  they  should  be  chosen  as  a  means  of  good  to 
myself.  When  thus  chosen  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  the 
intelligence,  and  no  more  stress  is  laid  upon  the  gratification 
than  in  proportion  to  its  relative  value,  and  when  no  stress 
is  laid  upon  it  simply  because  it  is  my  own  gratification,  the 
choice  is  holy.  The  perception  of  the  archetypes  of  the  va- 
rious ideas  of  the  reason  will,  in  most  instances,  produce  en- 
joyment. These  archetypes,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  the 
concrete  realization  of  these  ideas,  is  regarded  by  the  mind  as 
a  good,  but  not  as  an  ultimate  good.  The  ultimate  good  is 
the  satisfaction  derived  from  the  perception  of  them. 

The  perception  of  moral  or  physical  beauty  gives  me  satis- 
faction. Now  moral  and  physical  beauty  are  regarded  by  me 
as  good,  but  not  as  ultimate  good.  They  are  relative  good 
only.  Were  it  not  for  the  pleasure  they  give  me,  I  could  not 
in  any  way  connect  with  them  the  idea  of  good.  Suppose  no 
such  thing  as  mental  satisfaction  existed,that  neither  the  percep- 
tion of  virtue  nor  of  natural  beauty,  nor  of  any  thing  else,  could 
produce  the  least  emotion  or  feeling  or  satisfaction  of  any- 
kind.  There  would  be  the  idea  and  its  archetype  both  in  ex- 
istence and  exactly  answering  to  each  other.  But  what  then? 
The  archetype  would  no  more  be  the  good  of,  or  valuable  to 
the  idea,  than  the  idea  would  be  the  good  of  or  valuable  to  the 
archetype.  The  mental  eye  might  perceive  order,  beauty, 
physical  and  moral,  or  any  thing  else;  but  these  things  would 
no  more  be  a  good  to  the  eye  or  intellect  that  perceived  them 
than  the  eye  would  be  a  good  to  them.  The  fact  is,  the  idea 
of  good  or  of  the  valuable  could  not  in  such  a  case  exist,  con-  , 
sequently  virtue  or  moral  beauty  could  not  exist.  The  idea 
of  good,  or  of  the  valuable,  must  exist  before  virtue  can  exist. 
It  is  and  must  be  the  development  of  the  idea  of  the  valuable, 
that  develops  the  idea  of  moral  obligation,  of  right  and  wrong, 
and  consequently,  that  makes  virtue  possible.  The  mind 
11* 


126  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

must  perceive  an  object  of  choice  that  is  regarded  as  intrin- 
sically valuable  before  it  can  have  the  idea  of  moral  obligation 
to  choose  it  as  an  end.  This  object  of  choice  can  not  be  vir- 
tue or  moral  beauty,  for  this  would  be  to  have  the  idea  of  vir- 
tue or  of  moral  beauty  before  the  idea  of  moral  obligation,  or 
of  right  and  wrong.  This  were  a  contradiction.  The  mind 
must  have  the  idea  of  some  ultimate  good  the  choice  of 
which  would  be  virtue  or  concerning  which  the  reason  affirms 
moral  obligation,  before  the  ideaofvirtueorofrightor  wrong 
can  exist.  The  development  of  the  idea  of  the  valuable  or 
of  an  ultimate  good  must  precede  the  possibility  of  virtue  or 
of  the  idea  of  virtue,  of  moral  obligation,  or  of  right  and 
wrong.  It  is  absurd  to  say  that  virtue  is  regarded  as  an  ulti- 
mate good,  when  in  fact  the  very  idea  of  virtue  does  not  and 
can  not  exist  until  a  good  is  presented  in  view  of  which  the 
mind  affirms  moral  obligation  to  will  it  for  its  own  sake,  and 
also  affirms  that  the  choice  of  it  for  that  reason  would  be  vir- 
tue. 


LECTURE   IX. 

FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION. 

PRACTICAL  BEARINGS  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  THEORIES. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  this  is  a  highly  practical 
question,  and  one  of  surpassing  interest  and  importance,  and 
I  have  gone  through  the  discussion  and  examination  of  the 
several  principal  theories  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  the 
way  to  expose  the  practical  results  of  those  various  theories, 
and  show  that  they  legitimately  result  in  some  of  the  most 
soul-destroying  errors  that  cripple  the  church  and  curse  the 
world.  I  have  slightly  touched  already  upon  this  subject,  but 
so  slightly,  however,  as  to  forbid  its  being  left  until  we  have 
looked  more  steadfastly,  and  thoroughly  into  it. 

/.  /  will  begin  with  the  theory  that  regards  the  sovereign  will 
of  God  as  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 

One  legitimate  and  necessary  result  of  this  theory,  is  a  to- 
tally erroneous  conception  both  of  the  character  of  God  and 
of  the  nature  and  design  of  His  government.  If  God'g(  will 
is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  it  follows  that  He  is  an 
arbitrary  sovereign.  He  is  not  under  law  himself,  and  He 
has  no  rule  by  which  to  regulate  His  conduct,  nor  by  which 
either  himself  or  any  other  being  can  judge  of  his  m.oral 
character.  Indeed  unless  He  is  under  law,  or  is  a  subject  of 
moral  obligation,  he  has  and  can  have  no  moral  character; 
for  moral  character  always  and  necessarily  implies  moral  law 
and  moral  obligation.  If  God's  will  is  not  itself  under  the 
law  of  His  infinite  reason,  or  in  other  words,  if  it  is  not  con- 
formed to  the  law  imposed  upon  it  by  His  intelligence,  then 
His  will  is  and  must  be  arbitrary  in  the  worst  sense,  that  is, 
in  the  sense  of  having  no  regard  to  reason,  or  to  the  nature 
and  relations  of  moral  agents.  But  if  His  will  is  under  the 
law  of  His  reason,  if  he  acts  from  principle,  or  has  good  and 
benevolent  reasons  for  his  conduct,  then  His  will  is  not  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation,  but  those  reasons  that  lie  re- 
vealed in  the  Divine  intelligence,  in  view  of  which  it  affirms 
moral  obhgation,  or  that  He  ought  to  will  in  conformity  with 
those  reasons.  In  other  words,  if  the  intrinsic  value  of  His 
own  well-being  and  that  of  the  universe  be  the  foundation 
of  moral  obligation;  if  His  reason  affirms  his  obligation  to' 
choose  this  as  an  ultimate  end,  and  to  consecrate  His  infinite 


128  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

energies  to  the  realization  of  it;  and  if  His  will  is  conformed 
to  this  law,  it  follows, 

(1.)  That  His  will  is  not  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 

(2.)  That  He  has  infinitely  good  and  wise  reasons  for  what 
He  wills,  says,  and  does. 

(3.)  That  He  is  not  arbitrary,  but  always  acts  in  conformity 
with  principles  and  for  reasons  that  will,  when  universally 
known,  compel  the  respect  and  even  admiration  of  every  in- 
telligent being  in  the  universe. 

(4.)  That  He  has  a  moral  character,  and  is  infinitely  virtuous. 

(5.)  That  he  must  respect  himself. 

(6.)  That  he  must  possess  a  happiness  intelligent  in  kind, 
and  infinite  in  degree. 

(7.)  That  creation,  providential,  and  moral  government,  are 
the  necessary  means  of  an  infinitely  wise  and  good  end,  and 
that  the  evils  that  exist  are  only  unavoidably  incidental  to  this 
infinitely  wise  and  benevolent  arrangement,  and  although 
great,  are  indefinitely  the  less  of  two  evils.  That  is,  they  are 
an  evil  indefinitely  less  than  no  creation  and  no  government 
would  have  been,  or  than  a  different  arrangement  and  govern- 
ment would  have  been.  It  is  conceivable  that  a  plan  of  ad- 
ministration might  have  been  adopted  that  would  have  pre- 
vented the  present  evils,  but  if  we  admit  that  God  has  been 
governed  by  reason  in  the  selection  of  the  end  he  has  in  view, 
and  in  the  use  of  means  to  accomplish  it,  it  will  follow  that  the 
evils  are  less  than  would  have  existed  under  any  other  plan  of 
administration,  or  at  least,  that  the  present  system,  with  all 
its  evils,  is  the  best  that  infinite  wisdom  and  love  could  adopt. 

(8.)  These  incidental  evils,  therefore,  do  not  at  all  detract 
from  the  evidence  of  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God,  for  in 
all  these  things  He  is  not  acting  from  caprice,  or  mahce,  or 
an  arbitrary  sovereignty,  but  is  acting  in  conformity  with  the 
law  of  his  infinite  intelligence,  and  of  course  has  infinitely 
good  and  weighty  reasons  for  what  He  does  and  suffers  to  be 
(jone — so  good  and  so  weighty  reasons  that  he  could  not  do 
otherwise  without  violating  the  law  of  his  own  intelligence  and 
therefore  committing  infinite  sin. 

(9.)  It  follows  also  that  there  is  ground  for  perfect  confi- 
dence, love,  and  submission  to  His  Divine  will  in  all  things. 
That  is :  If  His  will  is  not  arbitrary,  but  conformed  to  the 
law  of  His  infinite  intelHgence,  then  it  is  obligatory  as  our 
rule  of  action,  because  it  reveals  infallibly  what  is  in  ac- 
cordance with  infinite  intelHgence.  We  may  be  entirely 
safe  always  in  obeying  all  the  Divine  requirements,  and  in 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  129 

submitting  to  all  his  dispensations,  however  mysterious, 
being  assured  that  they  are  perfectly  wise  and  good.  Not 
only  are  we  safe  in  doing  so,  but  we  are  under  infinite  obliga- 
tion to  do  so,  not  because  His  arbitrary  will  imposes  obliga- 
tion, but  because  it  reveals  to  us  infallibly  the  end  we  ought 
to  choose  and  the  indispensable  means  of  securing  it.  His 
will  is  law,  not  in  the  sense  of  its  originating  and  imposing 
obligation  of  its  own  arbitrary  sovereignty,  but  in  the  sense 
of  its  being  a  revelation  of  both  the  end  we  ought  to  seek 
and  the  means  by  which  the  end  can  be  secured.  Indeed 
this  is  the  only  proper  idea  of  law.  It  does  not  in  any 
case  of  itself  impose  obligation,  but  is  only  a  revelation  of 
obligation.  Law  is  a  condition,  but  not  the  foundation  of 
obligation.  The  will  of  God  is  a  condition  of  obligation 
only  so  far  forth  as  it  is  indispensable  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
end  we  ought  to  seek,  and  the  means  by  which  this  end  is 
to  be  secured.  Where  these  are  known,  there  is  obligation 
whether  God  has  revealed  his  will  or  not. 

The  foregoing  and  many  other  important  truths,  little 
less  important  than  those  already  mentioned,  and  too  nume- 
rous to  be  now  distinctly  noticed,  follow  from  the  fact  that  the 
good  of  being  and  not  the  arbitrary  will  of  God,  is  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obhgation.  But  no  one  of  them  is  or  can  be 
true  if  His  will  is  the  foundation  of  obligation.  Nor  can  any 
one  who  consistently  holds  or  believes  that  His  will  is  the 
foundation  of  obhgation,  hold  or  beheve  any  of  the  foregoing 
truths,  nor  indeed  hold  and  beUeve  any  truth  of  the  law  or 
gospel.  Nay,  he  cannot,  if  he  be  at  all  consistent,  have 
even  a  correct  conception  of  one  truth  of  God's  moral  govern- 
ment.    Now  let  us  see  if  he  can. 

(1.)  Can  he  believe  that  God's  will  is  wise  and  good  un- 
less he  admits  and  believes  that  it  is  subject  to  the  law  of  His 
intelligence.  Certainly  he  can  not,  and  to  affirm  that  he  can 
is  a  palpable  contradiction.  But  if  he  admits  that  the  Di- 
vine will  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the  Divine  intelligence 
this  is  denying  that  His  will  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation. If  he  consistently  holds  that  the  Divine  will  is  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation,  he  must  either  deny  that  His 
will  is  any  evidence  of  what  is  wise  and  good,  or  maintain 
the  absurdity  that  whatever  God  wills  is  wise  and  good,  sim- 
ply for  the  reason  that  God  wills  it,  that  if  he  willed  the  di- 
rectly opposite  of  what  he  does,  it  would  be  equally  wise  and 
good.  But  this  is  an  absurdity  the  swallowing  of  which 
would  choke  a  moral  agent  to  death. 


130  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(2.)  If  he  consistently  holds  and  believes  that  God's  sove- 
reign will  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obhgation,  he  can  not 
regard  Him  as  having  any  moral  character,  for  the  reason 
that  there  is  no  standard  by  which  to  judge  of  His  willing 
and  acting;  for,  by  the  supposition,  he  has  no  intelligent  rule 
of  action,  and  therefore  can  have  no  moral  character  as  he  is 
not  a  moral  agent,  and  can  himself  have  no  idea  of  the  moral 
character  of  his  own  actions,  for  in  fact,  upon  the  supposition 
in  question,  they  have  none.  Any  one,  therefore,  who  holds 
that  God  is  not  a  subject  of  moral  law,  imposed  on  Him  by 
His  own  reason,  but  on  the  contrary  that  His  sovereign  will 
is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  must,  if  consistent,  deny 
that  He  has  moral  character;  and  he  must  deny  that  God 
is  an  intelligent  being,  or  admit  that  He  is  infinitely  wicked 
for  not  conforming  His  will  to  the  law  of  His  intelligence, 
and  for  not  being  guided  by  his  infinite  reason  instead  of  set- 
ting up  an  arbitrary  sovereignty  of  will. 

(3.)  He  who  holds  that  God's  sovereign  will  is  the  founda- 
tion of  moral  obligation  instead  of  a  revelation  of  obligation, 
if  he  be  at  all  consistent,  can  neither  assign  nor  have  any 
good  reason  either  for  confidence  in  Him  or  submission  to 
Him.  If  He  has  no  good  and  wise  reasons  for  what  He  com- 
mands, why  should  we  obey  Him?  If  He  has  no  good  and 
wise  reasons  for  what  he  does,  why  should  we  submit  to  Him? 

Will  it  be  answered  that  if  we  refuse,  we  do  it  at  our  peril, 
and  therefore  it  is  wise  to  do  so  even  if  He  have  no  good  rea- 
sons for  what  he  does  and  requires?  To  this  I  answer  that 
it  is  impossible  upon  the  supposition  in  question  either  to 
obey  or  submit  to  God  with  the  heart.  If  we  can  see  no 
good  reasons,  but  on  the  other  hand,  are  assured  there  are  no 
good  and  wise  reasons  for  the  Divine  commands  and  conduct, 
it  is  forever  naturally  impossible  from  th^.  laws  of  our  nature 
to  render  any  thing  more  than  feigned  obedience  and  sub- 
mission. Whenever  we  do  not  understand  the  reason  for  a 
Divine  requirement,  or  of  a  dispensation  of  Divine  provi- 
dence, the  condition  of  heart  obedience  to  the  one  and  sub- 
mission to  the  other,  is  the  assumption  that  He  has  good  and 
wise  reasons  for  both.  But  assume  the  contrary,  to  wit,  that 
He  has  no  good  and  wise  reasons  for  either,  and  you  render 
heart  obedience,  confidence,  and  submission  impossible.  It 
is  perfectly  plain,  therefore,  that  he  who  consistently  holds 
the  theory  in  question,  can  neither  conceive  rightly  of  God 
nor  of  any  thing  respecting  His  law,  gospel,  or  government, 
moral  or  providential.     It  is  impossible  for  Him  to  have  an 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  131 

intelligent  pietj.  His  religion,  if  he  have  any,  must  be  sheer 
superstition,  in  as  much  as  he  neither  knows  the  true  God, 
nor  the  true  reason  why  he  should  love  Him,  believe,  obey,  or 
submit  to  Him.  In  short,  he  neither  knows,  nor,  if  consistent, 
can  know  any  thing  of  the  nature  of  true  religion,  and  has 
not  so  much  as  a  right  conception  of  what  constitutes  virtue. 

But  do  not  understand  me  as  affirming  that  none  who  pro- 
fess to  hold  the  theory  in  question  have  any  true  knowledge 
of  God  or  any  true  religion.  No,  they  are  happily  so  purely 
theorists  on  this  subject,  and  so  happily  inconsistent  with 
themselves,  as  to  have,  after  all,  a  practical  judgment  in  fa- 
vor of  the  truth.  They  do  not  see  the  logical  consequences 
of  their  theory  and  of  course  do  not  embrace  them,  and  this 
happy  inconsistency  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  their  sal- 
vation. There  is  no  end  to  the  absurdities  to  which  this  the- 
ory legitimately  conducts  us,  as  might  be  abundantly  shown. 
But  enough  has  been  said,  I  trust,  to  put  you  on  your  guard 
that  you  do  not  entertain  fundamentally  false  notions  of  God. 
and  of  his  government,  and  consequently  of  what  constitutes 
true  love,  faith,  obedience,  and   submission    to  Him. 

(4.)  Another  pernicious  consequence  of  this  theory  is,  that 
those  who  hold  it  will  of  course  give  false  directions  to  inqui- 
ring sinners.  Indeed,  if  ministers,  the  whole  strain  of  their 
instructions  must  be  false.  They  must,  if  consistent,  not  only 
represent  God  to  their  hearers  as  an  absolute  and  arbitrary 
sovereign,  but  they  must  represent  religion  as  consisting  in 
submission  to  this  arbitrary  sovereignty.  If  sinners  inquire 
what  they  must  do  to  be  saved,  they  must  answer  in  substance 
that  they  must  cast  themselves  on  the  sovereignty  of  a  God 
whose  law  is  solely  an  expression  of  his  arbitrary  will,  and 
whose  every  requirement  and  purpose  is  founded  in  his  arbi- 
trary sovereignty.  This  is  the  God  whom  they  must  love, 
in  whom  they  must  believe,  and  whom  they  must  serve  with  a 
willing  mind.  How  infinitely  different  such  instructions  are 
from  those  that  would  be  given  by  one  who  knew  the  truth. 
Such  an  one  would  represent  God  to  an  inquirer  as  infinitely 
reasonable  in  all  his  requirements,  in  all  his  ways.  He  would 
represent  the  sovereignty  of  God  as  consisting,  not  in  arbi- 
trary will,  but  in  benevolence  or  love  directed  by  infinite 
knowledge  in  the  promotion  of  the  highest  good  of  being. 
He  w^ould  represent  his  law,  not  as  the  expression  of  his  arbi- 
trary will,  but  as  having  its  foundation  in  the  self-existent 
nature  of  God  and  in  the  nature  of  moral  agents,  as  being 
the  very  rule  which  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  and  rela- 


I 


132  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGV. 

tions  of  moral  agents;  that  its  requisitions  are  not  arbitra- 
ry, but  that  the  very  thing  and  only  that  is  required  which 
is  in  the  nature  of  things  indispensable  to  the  highest  well- 
being  of  moral  agents;  that  God's  will  does  not  originate 
obligation  by  any  arbitrary  fiat,  but  on  the  contrary  that  he 
requires  what  he  does  because  it  is  obligatory  in  the  nature 
of  things;  that  his  requirement  does  not  create  right,  but  that 
he  requires  only  that  which  is  naturally  and  of  necessity 
right.  These  and  many  such  like  things  would  irresistibly 
commend  the  character  of  God  to  the  human  intelligence  as 
a  being  worthy  to  be  trusted,  and  as  one  to  whom  submission 
is  infinitely  safe  and  reasonable. 

But  let  the  advocates  of  the  theory  under  consideration 
but  consistently  press  this  theory  upon  the  human  intelligence, 
and  the  more  they  do  so  the  less  reason  can  it  perceive  either 
for  submitting  to,  or  for  trusting  in  God.  The  fact  is,  the 
idea  of  arbitrary  sovereignty  is  shocking  and  revolting  not 
only  to  the  human  heart,  whether  unregenerate  or  regene- 
rate, but  also  to  the  human  intelHgence.  Religion,  based 
upon  such  a  view  of  God's  character  and  government,  must 
be  sheer  superstition  or  gross  fanaticism. 

//.  /  will  next  glance  at  the  legitimate  results  of  the  theory  of 
the  Selfish  School, 

This  theory,  as  you  recollect,  teaches  that  our  own  interest 
is  the  foundation  of  moral  obhgation.  In  conversing  with  a 
distinguished  defender  of  this  philosophy,  I  requested  the 
theorist  to  define  moral  obligation,  and  this  was  the  definition 
given,  to  wit:  "  It  is  the  obligation  of  a  moral  agent  to  seek 
his  own  happiness."  Upon  the  practical  tendency  of  this 
theory  I  remark, 

I.  It  tends  directly  and  inevitably  to  the  confirmation  and 
despotism  of  sin  in  the  soul.  All  sin,  as  we  shall  abundantly 
see,  resolves  itself  into  a  spirit  of  self-seeking,  or  into  a 
disposition  to  seek  good  to  self,  and  upon  condition  of  its 
relations  to  self,  and  not  impartially  or  disinterestedly.  This 
philosophy  represents  this  spirit  of  self-seeking  as  virtue,  and  on- 
ly requires  that  in  our  efforts  to  secure  our  own  happiness  we 
should  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  others  in  also  seeking 
theirs.  But  here  it  may  be  asked,  when  these  philosophers 
insist  that  virtue  consists  in  willing  our  own  happiness,  and 
that  in  seeking  it  we  are  bound  to  have  respect  to  the  right 
and  happiness  of  others,  do  they  mean  that  we  are  to  have  a 
positive  or  merely  a  negative  regard  to  the  rights  and  hap- 
piness of  others?    If  they  mean  that  we  are  to  have  a  posi- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  133 

tive  regard  to  others'  rights  and  happiness,  what  is  that  but 
giving  up  their  theory  and  holding  the  true  one,  to  wit,  that 
the  happiness  of  each  one  shall  be  esteemed  according  to  its 
intrinsic  value,  for  its  own  sake?  That  is,  that  we  should  be 
disinterestedly  benevolent?  But  if  they  mean  that  we  are  to 
regard  our  neighbor's  happiness  negatively,  that  is,  merely 
in  such  a  sense  as  not  to  hinder  it,  what  is  this  but  the  most 
absurd  thing  conceivable?  What!  I  need  not  care  positive- 
ly for  my  neighbor  s  happiness,  I  need  not  will  it  as  a  good  in 
itself,  and  for  its  own  value,  and  yet  I  must  take  care  not  to 
hinder  it.  But  why?  Why,  because  it  is  intrinsically  as  val- 
uable as  my  own.  Now  if  this  is  assigning  any  good  reason 
why  I  ought  not  to  hinder  it,  it  isjust  because  it  is  assigning  a 
good  reason  why  I  ought  positively  and  disinterestedly  to  will 
it;  which  is  the  true  theory.  But  if  this  is  not  a  sufficient 
reason  to  impose  obhgation,  positively  and  disinterestedly  to 
will  it,  it  can  never  impose  obligation  to  avoid  hindering  it, 
and  I  may  pursue  my  own  happiness  in  my  own  way  without 
regard  to  that  of  any  other. 

'2,  If  this  theory  be  true,  sinful  and  holy  beings  are  pre- 
cisely ahke,  so  far  as  ultimate  intention  is  concerned,  in  which 
we  have  seen  all  moral  character  consists.  They  have  pre- 
cisely the  same  end  in  view,  and  the  difference  lies  only  in  the 
means  they  make  use  of  to  promote  their  own  happiness. 
That  sinners  are  seeking  their  own  happiness,  is  a  truth  of 
universal  consciousness.  If  moral  agents  are  under  obliga- 
tion to  seek  their  own^happiness  as  the  supreme  end  of  life,  it 
follows  that  holy  beings  do  so.  So  that  holy  and  sinful  beings 
are  precisely  alike  so  far  as  the  end  for  which  they  live  is 
concerned,  the  onl_^  difference  being,  as  has  been  observed, 
in  the  different  means  they  make  use  of  to  promote  this  end. 
But  observe,  no  reason  can  be  assigned,  in  accordance  with 
this  philosophy,  why  they  use  different  means  only  that  they 
differ  in  judgment  in  respect  to  them,  for  let  it  be  remembered 
that  this  philosophy  denies  that  we  are  bound  to  have  ti  posi- 
tive and  disinterested  regard  to  our  neighbor's  interest,  and 
of  course  no  benevolent  considerations  prevent  the  holy  from 
using  the  same  means  as  do  the  wicked.  Where,  therefore, 
is  the  difference  in  their  character,  although  they  do  use  this 
diversity  of  means?  I  say  again,  there  is  none.  If  this  differ- 
ence be  not  to  be  ascribed  to  disinterested  benevolence  in 
one  and  to  selfishness  in  the  other,  there  really  is  and  can  be 
no  difference  in  character  between  them^  According  to  this 
theory  nothing  is  right  or  wrong  in  itself  but  the  intention  to 
1.2 


134  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

promote  my  own  happiness,  and  any  thing  is  right  or  wrong 
as  it  is  intended  to  promote  this  result  or  otherwise.  For  let  it  be 
borne  in  mind  that  if  moral  obligation  respects  strictly  the  ulti- 
mate intention  only,  it  follows  that  ultimate  intention  alone  is 
right  or  wrong  in  itself,  and  all  other  things  are  right  or  wrong  as 
they  proceed  from  a  right  or  wrong  ultimate  intention.  This 
must  be  true.  Also,  if  my  own  happiness  be  the  foundation 
of  my  moral  obHgation,  it  follows  that  this  is  the  ultimate  end 
at  which  I  ought  to  aim,  and  that  nothing  is  right  or  wrong 
in  itself,  in  me,  but  this  intention  or  its  opposite,  and  further- 
more that  every  thing  else  must  be  right  or  wrong  in  me  as  it 
proceeds  from  this  or  from  an  opposite  intention.  I  may  do, 
and  upon  the  supposition  of  the  truth  of  this  theory,  I  am 
bound  to  do  whatever  will,  in  my  estimation,  promote  my  own 
happiness,  and  that,  not  because  of  its  intrinsic  value  as  a 
part  of  universal  good,  but  because  it  is  my  own.  To  seek 
it  as  a  part  of  universal  happiness,  and  not  because  it  is  my 
own,  would  be  to  act  on  the  true  theory,  or  the  theory  of  dis- 
interested benevolence;  which  this  theory  denies. 

3.  Upon  this  theory  I  am  not  to  love  God  supremely,  and 
my  neighbor  as  myself.  If  I  love  God  and  my  neighbor,  it 
is  to  be  only  as  a  means  of  promoting  my  own  happiness, 
which  is  not  loving  Him  but  loving  myself  supremely. 

4.  This  theory  teaches  radical  error  in  respect  both  to  the 
character  and  government  of  God;  and  the  consistent  de- 
fender of  it  can  not  but  hold  fundamentally  false  views  in  re- 
spect to  what  constitutes  hohness  or  virtue  either  in  God  or 
man.  They  do  not  and  can  not  know  the  difference  between 
virtue  and  vice.  In  short,  it  is  impossible  that  all  their  views 
of  reHgion  should  not  be  radically  false  and  absurd. 

5.  The  teachers  of  this  theory  must  fatally  mislead  all 
who  consistently  follow  out  their  instructions.  In  preaching 
they  must,  if  consistent,  appeal  wholly  to  hope  and  fear,  in- 
stead of  addressing  the  heart  through  the  intelligence.  All 
their  instructions  must  tend  to  confirm  selfishness.  All  the 
motives  they  present,  if  consistent,  tend  only  to  stir  up  a  zeal 
within  them  to  secure  their  own  happiness.  If  they  pray,  it 
will  only  be  to  implore  the  help  of  God  to  accomplish  their 
selfish  ends. 

Indeed  it  is  impossible  that  this  theory  should  not  blind  its 
advocates  to  the  fundamental  truths  of  morality  and  religion, 
and  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  one  could  more  efficiently 
serve  the  devil  than  by  the  inculcation  of  such  a  philosophy 
as  this. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  135 

///.  Let  us  in  the  next  place  look  into  the  natural^  and  if  its 
advocates  are  consistent^  necessary  results  of  Utilitarianism. 

This  theory,  you  know,  teaches  that  the  utihty  of  an  action 
or  of  a  choice,  renders  it  obligatory.  That  is,  I  am  bound  to 
■will  good,  not  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good;  but  because 
wilhng  good  tends  to  produce  good — to  choose  an  end,  not 
because  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  but  because  the  will- 
ing of  it  tends  to  secure  it.  The  absurdity  of  this  theory  has 
been  sufficiently  exposed.  It  only  remains  to  notice  its  legit- 
imate practical  results. 

1.  It  naturally,  and,  I  may  say,  necessarily  diverts  the  at- 
tention from  that  in  which  all  morality  consists,  namely  the 
ultimate  intention.  Indeed  it  seems  that  the  abettors  of  this 
scheme  must  have  in  mind  only  outward  action,  or  at  most  ex- 
ecutive volitions,  when  they  assert  that  the  tendency  of  an 
action,  is  the  reason  of  the  obligation  to  put  it  forth.  It 
seems  impossible  that  they  should  assert  that  the  reason  for 
choosing  an  ultimate  end  should  or  could  be  the  tendency  of 
choice  to  secure  it.  This  is  so  palpable  a  contradiction  that 
it  is  difficult  to  beheve  that  they  have  ultimate  intention  in 
mind  when  they  make  the  assertion.  An  ultimate  end  is  ever 
chosen  for  its  intrinsic  value,  and  not  because  choice  tends  to 
secure  it.  How,  then,  is  it  possible  for  them  to  hold  that  the 
tendency  of  choice  to  secure  an  ultimate  end  is  the  reason  of 
an  obligation  to  make  that  choice?  But  if  they  have  not 
their  eye  upon  ultimate  intention  when  they  speak  of  moral 
obligation,  they  are  discoursing  of  that  which  is  strictly  with- 
out the  pale  of  morality.  I  said  in  a  former  lecture,  that  the 
obligation  to  put  forth  volitions  or  outward  actions  to  secure  an 
ultimate  end  must  be  conditionated  upon  the  perceived  tenden- 
cy of  such  volitions  and  actions  to  secure  that  end,  but  while 
this  tendency  is  the  condition  of  the  obhgation  to  executive 
volition,  or  outward  action,  the  obligation  is  founded  in  the 
intrinsic  value  of  the  end  to  secure  which  such  volitions  tend. 
So  that  utilitarianism  gives  a  radically  false  account  of  the 
reason  of  moral  obligation.  A  consistent  ultilitarian  therefore 
can  not  conceive  rightly  of  the  nature  of  morality  or  virtue. 
He  can  not  consistently  hold  that  virtue  consists  in  willing  the 
highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  as  an  ultimate 
end  or  for  its  own  sake,  but  must,  on  the  contrary,  confine 
his  ideas  of  moral  obligation  to  volitions  and  outward  actions 
in  which  there  is  strictly  no  morality,  and  withal  assign  an  en- 
tirely false  reason  for  these,  to  wit  their  tendency  to  secure 
an  end  rather  than  the  value  of  the  end  which  they  tend  to 
secure. 


136  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

This  is  the  proper  place  to  speak  of  the  doctrine  of  expe- 
diency, a  doctrine  strenuously  maintained  by  utilitarians 
and  as  strenuously  opposed  by  rightarians.  It  is  this,  that 
whatever  is  expedient  is  right  for  that  reason,  that  is,  that  the 
expediency  of  an  action  or  measure  is  the  foundation  of  the 
obligation  to  put  forth  that  action  or  adopt  that  measure.  It 
is  easy  to  see  that  this  is  just  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
ntiHty  of  an  action  or  measure  is  the  reason  of  the  obligation 
to  put  forth  that  action  or  adopt  that  measure.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  utility,  tendency,  expediency,  is  only  a  condition 
of  the  obligation  ( in  the  sense  in  which  obligation  can  be 
affirmed  of  any  thing  but  ultimate  intention,)  to  put  forth  out- 
ward action  or  executive  volition,  never  the  foundation  of  the 
obligation,  that  always  being  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end 
to  which  the  voHtion,  action  or  measure  sustains  the  relation 
of  a  means.  I  do  not  wonder  'that  rightarians  object  to  this, 
although  I  do  wonder  at  the  reason  which,  if  consistent,  they 
must  assign  for  this  obligation,  to  wit,  that  any  action  or  voli- 
tion, (ultimate  intention  excepted,)  can  be  right  or  wrong  in  it- 
self irrespective  of  its  expediency  or  utility.  This  is  absurd 
enough  and  flatly  contradicts  the  doctrine  of  rightarians  then> 
selves,  that  moral  obligation  strictly  belongs  only  to  ultimate 
intention.  If  moral  obligation  belongs  only  to  ultimate  inten- 
tion, then  nothing  but  ultimate  intention  can  be  right  or  wrong 
in  itself.  And  every  thing  else,  that  is,  all  executive  volitions 
and  outward  actions  must  be  right  or  wrong,  (in  the  only 
sense  in  which  moral  character  can  be  predicated  of  them,)  as 
they  proceed  from  a  right  or  wrong  ultimate  intention.  This 
is  the  only  form  in  which  rightarians  can  consistently  admit 
the  doctrine  of  expediency,  that  is,  that  it  relates  exclusively 
to  executive  volitions  and  outward  actions.  And  this  they 
can  admit  only  upon  the  assumption  that  executive  volitions 
and  outward  actions  have  strictly  no  moral  character  in  then>- 
selves  but  are  right  or  wrong  only  as  and  because  they  pro- 
ceed necessarily  from  a  right  or  wrong  ultimate  intention.  AH 
schools  that  hold  this  doctrine,  to  wit,  that  moral  obligation 
respects  the  ultimate  intention  only,  must  if  consistent,  deny- 
that  any  tiling  can  be  either  right  or  wrong  per  se  but  ultimate 
intention.  Farther  they  must  maintain  that  utility,  expedi- 
ency, or  tendency  to  promote  the  ultimate  end  upon  which  ul- 
timate intention  terminates,  is  always  a  condition  of  the  obli- 
gation to  put  forth  those  volitions  and  actions  that  sustain 
to  this  end  the  relation  of  a  means.  And  still  further, 
they  must  maintain   that  the  obligation  to  use  those  means 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  137 

must  be  founded  in  the  value  of  the  end  and  not  in  the  ten- 
dency of  the  means  to  secure  it,  for  unless  the  end  be  intrin- 
sically valuable,  the  tendency  of  means  to  secure  it  can  impose 
no  obligation  to  use  them.  Tendency,  utility,  expediency, 
then,  I  say  again,  is  only  the  condition  of  the  obligation  to  use 
any  given  means  but  never  the  foundation  of  obligation.  An 
action  or  executive  volition  is  not  obligatory,  as  utilitarians 
say,  because  and  for  the  reason  that  it  is  useful  or  expedient, 
but  merely  upon  condition  that  it  is  so.  The  obligation  in  re- 
spect to  outward  action  is  always  founded  in  the  value  of  the 
end  to  which  this  action  sustains  the  relation  of  a  means, 
and  the  obligation  is  conditionated  upon  the  perceived  ten- 
dency of  the  means  to  secure  that  end.  Expediency  can  nev- 
er have  respect  to  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end,  or  to  that  in 
which  moral  character  consists,  to  wit,  ultimate  intention. 
The  end  is  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake.  Ultimate  intention 
is  right  or  wrong  in  itself,  and  no  questions  of  utility,  expedi- 
ency or  tendency  have  any  thing  to  do  with  the  obligation  to 
put  forth  ultimate  intention,  there  being  only  one  reason  for 
this,  namely,  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  to  be  intended.  It 
is  true  then  that  whatever  is  expedient  is  right,  not  for  that 
reason,  but  only  upon  that  condition.  The  inquiry  then,  Is  it 
expedient?  in  respect  to  outward  action,  is  always  proper; 
for  upon  this  condition  does  obligation  to  outward  action  turn. 
But  in  respect  to  ultimate  intention  or  the  choice  of  an  ultimate 
end,  an  inquiry  into  the  expediency  of  this  choice  or  intention 
is  never  proper,  the  obligation  being  founded  alone  upon  the 
perceived  and  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  and  the  obligation 
being  without  any  condition  whatever,  except  the  possession 
of  the  powers  of  moral  agency,  with  the  perception  of  the 
end  upon  which  intention  ought  to  terminate,  namely,  the 
good  of  universal  being.  But  the  mistake  of  the  utiUtarian 
is  fundamental,  Xh^iX  expediency  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation, for  in  fact  it  cannot  be  so  in  any  case  whatever.  I 
have  said,  and  here  repeat,  that  all  schools  that  hold  that 
moral  obligation  respects  ultimate  intention  only,  must,  it 
consistent,  maintain  that  perceived  utility,  expediency  &c., 
is  a  condition  of  obUgation  to  put  forth  any  outward  action, 
or  which  is  the  same  thing,  to  use  any  means  to  secure  the 
end  of  benevolence.  Therefore,  in  practice  or  in  daily  life 
the  true  doctrine  of  expediency  must  of  necessity  have  a 
place.  The  railers  against  expediency,  therefore,  know  not 
what  they  say  nor  whereof  they  affirm.  It  is,  however,  im- 
possible to  practice  upon  the  utilitarian  philosophy.     This 


138  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

teaches  that  the  tendency  of  an  action  to  secure  good 
instead  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good  is  the  founda- 
tion of  the  obUgation  to  put  forth  that  action.  But  this  is 
too  absurd  for  practice.  For  unless  the  intrinsic  value  of  the 
end  be  assumed  as  the  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  choose 
it,  it  is  impossible  to  affirm  obligation  to  put  forth  an  action 
to  secure  that  end.  The  folly  and  the  danger  of  utilitarian- 
ism is,  that  it  overlooks  the  true  foundation  of  moral  obUga- 
tion, and  consequently  the  true  nature  of  virtue  or  holiness. 
A  consistent  utilitarian  can  not  conceive  rightly  of  either. 

The  teachings  of  a  consistent  utihtarian  must  of  necessity 
abound  with  pernicious  error.  Instead  of  representing  vir- 
tue as  consisting  in  disinterested  benevolence  or  in  the  con- 
secration of  the  soul  to  the  highest  good  of  being  in  general 
for  its  own  sake,  it  must  represent  it  as  consisting  wholly  in 
using  means  to  promote  good.  That  is,  as  consisting  wholly 
in  e^^ecutive  vohtions  and  outward  actions,  which,  strictly 
speaking,  have  no  moral  character  in  them.  Thus  consistent 
utilitarianism  inculcates  fundamentally  false  ideas  of  the  na- 
ture of  virtue.  Of  course  it  must  teach  equally  erroneous 
ideas  respecting  the  character  of  God — the  spirit  and  mean- 
ing of  His  law — the  nature  of  repentance — of  sin — of  re- 
generation— and  in  short  of  every  practical  doctrine  of  the 
Bible. 


LECTURE   X. 

FOUNDATION  OF  MORAL  OBLIGATION- 
PRACTICAL  BEARINGS  OF  DIFFERENT  THEORIES. 

IV.  Practical  bearings  and  tendency  of  Rightarianism. 

It  will  b  e  recollected  that  this  philosophy  teaches  that  right 
is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  With  its  advocates, 
virtue  consists  in  willing  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right, 
instead  of  willing  the  good  for  the  sake  of  the  good.  The 
right  is  the  ultimate  end  to  be  aimed  at  in  all  things  instead 
of  the  highest  good  of  being.  From  such  a  theory  the  follow- 
ing consequences  must  flow.  I  speak  only  of  consistent  Right- 
arianism. 

L  If  this  theory  is  true,  there  is  a  law  of  right  entirely  dis- 
tinct from  the  law  of  love  or  benevolence.  The  advocates  of 
this  theory  often,  perhaps  unwittingly,  assume  the  existence 
cf  such  a  law.  They  speak  of  multitudes  of  things  as  being 
right  or  wrong  in  themselves,  entirely  independent  of  the  law 
of  benevolence.  Nay,  they  go  so  far  as  to  affirm  that  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  virtue  might  necessarily  tend  to  and  result  in 
universal  misery,  and  that  in  such  a  case,  we  should  be  under 
obligation  to  do  right,  or  will  right,  or  intend  right  although 
universal  misery  should  be  the  necessary  result.  This  as- 
sumes and  affirms  that  right  has  no  necessary  relation  to  will- 
ing the  highest  good  of  being  for  its  own  sake,  or,  what  is  the 
same  thing,  that  the  law  of  right  is  not  only  distinct  from  the 
law  of  benevolence,  but  may  be  directly  opposed  to  it;  that  a 
moral  agent  may  be  under  obligation  to  will  as  an  ultimate 
end  that  which  he  knows  will  and  must  by  a  law  of  necessity 
promote  and  secure  universal  misery.  Rightarians  sternly 
maintain  that  right  would  be  right,  and  that  virtue  would  be 
virtue  although  this  result  were  a  necessary  consequence. 
What  is  this  but  maintaining  that  moral  law  may  require 
moral  agents  to  set  their  hearts  upon  and  consecrate  themselves 
to  that  which  is  necessarily  subversive  of  the  well-being  of  the 
entire  universe?  And  what  is  this  but  assuming  that  that 
may  be  moral  law  that  requires  a  course  of  willing  and  act- 
ing entirely  inconsistent  with  the  nature  and  relations  of  mor- 
al agents?  Thus  virtue  and  benevolence,  not  only  may  be 
different  things  but  opposite  things,  in  case  virtue  or  right 
and  not  benevolence  is   obligatory.     This  is   not  onl^  ab- 


140  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

surd,  but  it  is  the  grossest  nonsense;  and  a  more  capital  er- 
ror in  morals  or  philosophy  can  hardly  be  conceived. 

Nothing  is  or  can  be  right  but  benevolence.  Nothing  is  or 
can  be  moral  law  but  that  which  requires  that  course  of  wil- 
ling and  acting  that  tends  to  secure  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  the  universe.  Nay,  nothing  can  be  moral  law  but 
that  which  requires  that  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of 
the  universe  should  be  chosen  as  an  ultimate  end.  Rightari- 
anism  overlooks  and  misrepresents  the  very  nature  of  moral 
law.  Do  but  contemplate  the  grossness  of  that  absurdity  that 
maintains  that  that  can  be  moral  law  that  requires  a  course  of 
willing  that  necessarily  results  in  universal  and  perfect  mise- 
ry; that  that  may  be  right,  and  virtue,  and  obligatory  that 
thus  necesarily  results  in  universal  misery.  What  then, it 
may  be  asked,  has  moral  law  to  do  with  the  nature  and  rela- 
tions of  moral  agents,  except  to  mock,  insult,  and  trample  them 
under  foot?  Moral  law  is  and  must  be  the  law  of  nature,  that 
is,  suited  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  agents.  But 
can  that  law  be  suited  to  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral 
agents  that  requires  a  course  of  action  necessarily  resulting  in 
universal  misery?  The  fact  is  that  rightarianism  not  only 
overlooks,  but  flatly  contradicts  the  very  nature  of  moral  law 
and  sets  up  a  law  of  right  that  is  the  direct  opposite  of  the 
law  of  natare. 

2.  This  philosophy  tends  naturally  to  fanaticism.  Con- 
ceiving as  it  does  of  right  as  distinct  from  and  often  opposed 
to  benevolence,  it  scoffs  or  rails  at  the  idea  of  inquiring 
what  the  highest  good  evidently  demands.  It  insists  that  such 
and  such  things  are  right  or  wrong  in  themselves  entirely  ir- 
respective of  what  the  highest  good  demands.  ^''Justitia  Jlat, 
mat  coelum^''^  is  its  motto — Do  right,  if  it  ruins  the  universe; 
thus  assuming  that  that  can  be  right  which  shall  ruin  God 
and  the  universe.  Having  thus  in  mind  a  law  of  right  distinct 
from  and  perhaps  opposed  to  benevolence  what  frightful  con- 
duct may  not  this  philosophy  lead  to?  This  is  indeed  the 
law  of  fanaticism.  The  tendency  of  this  philosophy  is  illus- 
trated in  the  spirit  of  many  reformers,  who  are  bitterly  con- 
tending for  the  right. 

3.  This  philosophy  teaches  a  false  morality  and  a  false  re- 
ligion. It  exalts  right  above  God  and  represents  virtue  as 
consisting  in  the  love  of  right  instead  of  the  love  of  God.  It 
exhorts  men  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right  instead 
of  the  good  of  being  for  the  sake  of  the  good  or  for  the  sake 
of  being.    It  teaches  us  to  inquire,  How  shall  I  do  right?  in- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  141 

stead  of,  How  shall  I  do  good?  What  is  right?  instead  of, 
What  will  most  promote  the  good  of  the  universe?  Now  that 
which  is  most  promotive  of  the  highest  good  of  being  is  right. 
To  intend  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe 
is  right.  To  use  the  necessary  means  to  promote  this  end  is 
right;  and  whatever  in  the  use  of  means  or  in  outward  action  is 
right  is  so  for  this  reason,  namely,  it  is  designed,  not  that  it 
tends  to  promote,  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the 
universe.  To  ascertain,  then,  what  is  right,  we  must  inquira, 
not  into  a  mere  abstraction,but  what  is  intended.  Or  if  we  would 
know  what  is  duty  or  what  would  be  right  in  us,  we  must  un- 
derstand that  to  intend  the  highest  well-being  of  the  universe 
as  an  end  is  right  and  duty;  and  that  in  practice  every  thing 
is  duty  or  right  that  is  intended  to  secure  this.  Thus  and  thus 
only  can  we  ascertain  what  is  right  in  intention,  and  what  is 
right  in  the  outward  life.  But  rightarianism  points  out  an 
opposite  course.  It  says:  Will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the 
right,  that  is,  as  an  end;  and  in  respect  to  means.  Inquire  not 
what  is  manifestly  for  the  highest  good  of  being,  for  this  you 
have  nothing  to  do  with;  your  business  is  to  will  the  right  for 
the  sake  of  the  right.  If  you  inquire  how  you  are  to  know 
what  is  right,  it  does  not  direct  you  to  the  law  of  benevolence 
as  the  only  standard,  but  it  directs  you  to  an  abstract  idea  of 
right  as  an  ultimate  rule,  having  no  regard  to  the  law  of  be- 
nevolence or  love.  It  tells  you  that  right  is  right  because  it 
is  right,  and  not  that  right  is  conformity  to  the  law  of  benevo- 
lence, and  right  for  this  reason.  The  truth  is  that  subjective 
right,  or  right  in  practice,  is  only  a  quality  of  disinterested 
benevolence.  But  the  philosophy  in  question  denies  this  and 
holds  that  so  far  from  being  a  quality  of  benevolence,  it  must 
consist  in  wiUing  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right.  Now 
certainly  such  teaching  is  radically  false  and  subversive  of  all 
sound  morality  and  true  religion. 

4.  As  we  have  formerly  seen,  this  philosophy  does  not  rep- 
resent virtue  as  consisting  in  the  love  of  God,  or  of  Christ,  or 
our  neighbor.  Consistency  must  require  the  abettors  of  this 
scheme  to  give  fundamentally  false  instructions  to  inquiring 
sinners.  Instead  of  representing  God  and  all  holy  beings  as 
devoted  to  the  public  good,  and  instead  of  exhorting  sinners 
to  love  God  and  their  neighbor,  this  philosophy  must  represent 
God  and  holy  beings  as  consecrated  to  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  right,  and  must  exhort  sinners  who  ask  what  they  shall  do 
to  be  saved,  to  will  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  to  love 
the  right,  to  deify  right  and  fall  down  and  worship  it.     Who 


I 


//' 


142  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

does  not  know  that  there  is  much  of  this  morality  and  religion  in 
the  world  and  in  the  church?  Infidels  are  great  sticklers  for 
this  religion, and  often  exhibit  as  much  of  it  as  do  some  righta- 
rian  professors  of  rehgion.  The  fact  is,  it  is  a  severe,  stern, 
loveless,  Godless,  Christless  philosophy,  and  nothing  but  hap- 
py inconsistency  prevents  its  advocates  from  uniformly  so 
manifesting  it  to  the  world.  I  have  already  in  a  former  lec- 
ture shown  that  this  theory  is  identical  with  that  which 
represents  the  idea  of  duty  as  the  foundation  of  moral  obli- 
gation and  that  it  gives  the  same  instructions  to  inquiring 
sinners.  It  exhorts  them  to  resolve  to  do  duty,  to  resolve  to 
serve  the  Lord,  to  make  up  their  minds  at  all  times  to  do  right, 
to  resolve  to  give  their  hearts  to  God,  to  resolve  to  conform 
in  all  things  to  right,  &c.  The  absurdity  and  danger  of  such 
instructions  were  sufficiently  exposed  in  the  lecture  referred 
to.  The  law  of  right  when  conceived  of  as  distinct  from  the 
law  of  benevolence,  is  a  perfecj;  strait-jacket,  an  iron  collar,  a 
snare  of  death. 

This  philosophy  represents  all  war^  all  slavery^  and  many 
things  as  wrong  per  se,  without  insisting  upon  such  a  defini- 
tion of  those  things  as  necessarily  implies  selfishness.  Any 
thing  whatever  is  wrong  in  itself  that  includes  and  implies 
selfishness,  and  nothing  else  is  or  can  be.  All  war  waged  for 
selfish  purposes  is  wrong  per  se.  But  war  waged  for  benevo- 
lent purposes,  or  war  required  by  the  law  of  benevolence,  is 
neither  wrong  in  itself,  nor  wrong  in  any  proper  sense.  All 
holding  men  in  bondage  for  selfish  motives  is  wrong  in  itself, 
but  holding  men  in  bondage  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  be- 
nevolence is  not  wrong  but  right.  And  so  it  is  with  every 
thing  else.  Therefore  where  it  is  insisted  that  all  war  and 
all  slavery  or  any  thing  else  is  wrong  in  itself,  such  a  defini- 
tion of  things  must  be  insisted  on  as  necessarily  implies  self- 
ishness. But  consistent  rightarianism  will  insist  that  all  war, 
all  slavery,  and  all  of  many  other  things,  is  wrong  in  itself 
without  regard  to  its  being  a  violation  of  the  law  of  benevo- 
lence. This  is  consistent  with  this  philosophy,  but  it  is  most 
false  and  absurd  in  fact.  Indeed  any  philosophy  that  assumes 
the  existence  of  a  law  of  right  distinct  from  and,  may  be,  op- 
posed to  the  law  of  benevolence,  must  teach  many  doctrines 
at  war  with  both  reason  and  revelation.  It  sets  men  in  chase 
of  a  philosophical  abstraction  as  the  supreme  end  of  life,  in- 
stead of  the. concrete  reality  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  the  universe.  It  preys  upon  his  soul  and  turns  into  solid 
iron  all  the  tender  sensibilities  of  his  being.  Do  but  contemplate 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  143 

a  human  being  supremely  devoted  to  an  abstraction  as  the  end 
of  life.  He  wills  the  right  for  the  sake  of  the  right.  For  this 
he  lives  and  moves  and  has  his  being.  What  sort  of  religion 
is  this  ?  God  forbid  that  I  should  be  understood  as  holding  or 
insinuating  that  professed  rightarians  universally  or  even  gene- 
rally consistently  carry  their  theory  to  its  legitimate  bounda- 
ry, and  that  they  manifest  the  spirit  that  it  naturally  begets. 
No.  I  am  most  happy  in  acknowledging  that  with  many,  and 
perhaps  with  most  of  them,  it  is  so  purely  a  theory  that  they 
are  not  greatly  influenced  by  it  in  practice.  Many  of  them  I 
regard  as  among  the  excellent  of  the  earth,  and  I  am  hap- 
py to  count  them  among  my  dearest  and  most  valued  friends. 
But  I  speak  of  the  philosophy  with  its  natural  results  when 
embraced,  not  merely  as  a  theory,  but  when  adopted  by  the 
heart  as  the  rule  of  life.  It  is  only  in  such  cases  that  its  natu- 
ral and  legitimate  fruits  appear.  Only  let  it  be  borne  in 
mind  that  right  is  conformity  to  moral  law,  that  moral  law  is 
the  law  of  nature,  or  the  law  founded  in  the  nature  and  rela- 
tions of  moral  agents,  the  law  that  requires  just  that  course 
of  willing  and  action  that  tends  naturally  to  secure  the  high- 
est well-being  of  all  moral  agents,  that  requires  this  course  of 
willing  and  acting  for  the  sake  of  the  end  in  which  it  naturally 
and  governmentally  results — and  requires  that  this  end  shall 
be  aimed  at  or  intended  by  all  moral  agents  as  the  supreme 
good  and  the  only  ultimate  end  of  life.  I  say,  only  let  these 
truths  be  borne  in  mind  and  you  will  never  talk  of  a  right  or 
a  virtue,  or  a  law,  obedience  to  which  necessarily  results  in 
universal  misery;  nor  will  you  conceive  that  such  a  thing  is 
possible. 

V.  The  philosophy  that  comes  next  under  review  is  that  which 
teaches  that  the  Divine  Goodness  or  Moral  Excellence  is  the  foun- 
dation of  moral  obligation. 

The  practical  tendency  of  this  philosophy  is  to  inculcate 
and  develope  a  false  idea  of  what  constitutes  virtue.  It  inevi- 
tably leads  its  advocates  to  regard  religion  as  consisting  in  a 
mere  feeling  of  complacency  in  God.  It  overlooks,  and,  if 
consistent,  must  overlook  the  fact  that  all  true  morality  and 
religion  consists  in  benevolence  or  in  willing  the  highest  well- 
being  of  God  and  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  end.  It  must 
represent  true  religion  either  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensi- 
bility, or  as  consisting  in  willing  the  goodness  or  benevolence 
of  God  as  an  end;  either  of  which  is  radical  error.  This 
scheme  does  not  and  can  not  rightly  represent  either  the  char- 
acter of  God  or  the  nature  and  spirit  of  his  law  and  govern- 


144  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ment.  It,  in  teaching,  presents  the  benevolence  of  God,  not 
as  an  inducement  to  benevolence  in  us,  that  is,  not  as  a  means 
of  leading  us  to  consider  and  adopt  the  same  end  of  life  to 
which  God  is  consecrated,  but  as  being  the  end  to  which  we 
are  to  consecrate  ourselves.  It  holds  forth  the  goodness  of 
God,  not  for  the  sake  of  setting  the  great  end  he  has  in  view 
strongly  before  us,  and  inducing  us  to  become  like  him  in  con- 
secrating ourselves  to  the  same  end,  to  wit,  the  highest  good 
of  being,  but  it  absurdly  insists  that  His  goodness  is  the  foun- 
dation of  our  obHgation,  which  is  the  same  thing  as  to  insist 
that  we  are  to  make  His  goodness  the  ultimate  end  of  life, 
instead  of  that  end  at  which  God  aims,  and  aiming  at  which 
constitutes  His  virtue.  Instead  of  representing  the  benevo- 
lence of  God  as  clearly  revealing  our  obligation  to  be  benevo- 
lent, it  represents  the  benevolence  as  being  the  foundation  of 
obligation.  Obhgation  to  what?  Not  to  will  good,  certainly; 
for  it  is  a  gross  contradiction  as  we  have  repeatedly  seen,  to 
say  that  I  am  under  obHgation  to  will  good  to  God  as  an  ulti- 
mate end  or  for  its  own  sake,  yet  not  for  this  reason,  but  be- 
cause God  is  good.  This  philosophy,  if  consistent,  must  pre- 
sent the  goodness  of  God  as  a  means  of  awakening  emotions 
of  complacency  in  God,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  making  us 
benevolent,  for  it  does  not  regard  religion  as  consisting  in  be- 
nevolence, but  in  a  love  to  God  for  His  goodness,  which  can 
be  nothing  else  than  a  feeling  of  complacency.  But  this  is 
radical  error.  The  practical  bearings  of  this  theory  are  well 
illustrated  in  the  arguments  used  to  support  it,  as  stated  and 
refuted  when  examining  its  claims  in  a  former  lecture.  The 
fact  is,  it  misrepresents  the  character,  law,  and  government  of 
God,  and  of  necessity,  the  nature  of  true  religion.  It  harps 
perpetually  on  the  goodness  of  God  as  the  sole  reason  for 
loving  Him,  which  demonstrates  that  benevolence  does  not, 
and  consistently  can  not  enter  into  its  idea  of  virtue  or  true 
religion. 

There  is,  no  doubt,  a  vast  amount  of  spurious  selfish  reli- 
gion in  the  world  growing  out  of  this  philosophy.  Many  lov« 
God  because  they  regard  him  as  loving  them,  as  being  their 
benefactor  and  particular  friend.  They  are  grateful  for  fa- 
vors bestowed  on  self.  But  they  forget  the  philosophy  and 
theology  of  Christ  who  said:  "-If  ye  love  them  that  love  you 
what  thank  have  ye?  Do  not  even  sinners  love  those  that 
love  them  ?"  They  seem  to  have  no  idea  of  a  religion  of  dis- 
interested benevolence. 

VI,  The  next  theory  to  he  noticed  is  that  which  teaches  that 
MorcU  Order  is  the  foundatiori  of  moral  obligation^ 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  145 

The  practical  objection  to  this  theory  is.  that  it  presents  a 
totally  wrong  end  as  the  great  object  of  life.  According  to 
the  teachings  of  this  school,  moral  order  is  that  intrinsically- 
valuable  end  at  which  all  moral  agents  ought  to  aim,  and  to 
which  they  are  bound  to  consecrate  themselves.  If  by  moral 
order  the  highest  good  of  being  is  intended,  this  philosophy 
is  only  another  name  for  the  true  one.  But  if,  as  I  suppose  is 
the  fact,  by  moral  order  no  such  thing  as  the  highest  good  of 
God  and  the  universe  is  intended,  then  the  theory  is  false  and 
can  not  teach  other  than  pernicious  error.  It  must  misrep- 
resent God,  His  law  and  government,  and  of  course  must  hold 
radically  false  views  in  respect  to  the  nature  of  holiness  and 
sin.  It  holds  up  an  abstraction  as  the  end  of  life,  and  exalts 
moral  order  above  all  that  is  called  God,  It  teaches  that 
men  ought  to  love  moral  order  with  all  the  heart,  and  with  all 
the  soul.  But  the  theory  is  sheer  nonsense  as  was  shown  in 
its  place.  Its  practical  bearing  is  only  to  bewilder  and  con- 
fuse the  mind. 

Again:  The  theory  must  overlook  or  deny  the  fact  that 
moral  obligation  respects  the  ultimate  intention;  for  it  seems 
impossible  that  any  one  possessing  reason  can  suppose  that 
moral  order  can  be  the  end  to  which  moral  beings  ought  to 
consecrate  themselves.  The  absurdity  of  the  theory  itself 
was  sufficiently  exposed  in  a  former  lecture.  Its  practical 
bearings  and  tendency  are  only  to  beget  confusion  in  all  our 
ideas  of  moral  law  and  moral  government. 

VII.  We  next  come  to  the  practical  bearings  of  the  theory  that 
moral  obligation  is  founded  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents* 

The  first  objection  to  this  theory  is  that  it  confounds  the 
conditions  with  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation.  The  na- 
ture and  relations  of  moral  beings  are  certainly  conditions  of 
their  obligation  to  will  each  other's  good.  But  it  is  absolutely 
childish  to  affirm  that  the  obligation  to  will  each  other^s  good 
is  not  founded  in  the  value  of  good  but  in  their  nature  and  re- 
lations. But  for  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  good  their  na- 
ture and  relations  would  be  no  reason  at  all  why  they  should 
will  good  rather  than  evil  to  each  other.  To  represent  the  na- 
ture and  relations  of  moral  agents  as  the  foundation  of  moral 
obligation  is  to  mystify  and  misrepresent  the  whole  subject  of 
moral  law,  moral  government,  moral  obligation,  the  nature  of 
sin  and  holiness,  and  beget  confusion  in  all  our  thoughts  on 
moral  subjects.  What  but  grossest  error  can  find  a  lodgment 
in  that  mind  that  consistently  regards  the  nature  and  relations 
13 


146  '  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  moral  beings  as  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation?  If 
this  be  the  true  theory,  then  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents  is  the  ultimate  end  to  which  moral  agents  are 
bound  to  consecrate  themselves.  Their  nature  and  relations 
is  the  intrinsically  valuable  end  vrhich  we  are  bound  to  choose 
for  its  own  sake.  This  is  absurd.  But  if  this  philosophy 
misrepresents  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  it  can  con- 
sistently teach  absolutely  nothing  but  error  on  the  whole 
subject  of  morals  and  religion.  If  it  mistakes  the  end  to 
be  intended  by  moral  agents,  it  errs  on  the  fundamental 
fact  of  all  morals  and  religion.  As  all  true  morality  and 
true  religion  consists  exclusively  in  willing  the  right  end, 
if  this  end  be  mistaken,  the  error  is  fatal.  It  is,  then,  no 
light  thing  to  hold  that  moral  obligation  is  founded  in  the 
nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings.  Such  statements  are 
a  great  deal  worse  than  nonsense — they  are  radical  error  on 
the  most  important  subject  in  the  world.  What  consisten- 
cy can  there  be  in  the  views  of  one  who  consistently  holds 
this  theory?  What  ideas  must  he  have  of  moral  law  and 
of  every  thing  else  connected  with  practical  theology?  In- 
stead of  willing  the  highest  good  of  God  and  of  being  he 
must  hold  himself  under  obligation  to  will  the  nature  and  re- 
lations of  moral  beings  as  an  ultimate  end. 

VllL  The  next  theory  in  order  is  that  which  teaches  that  the 
idea  of  duty  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation*  But  as  I 
sufficiently  exposed  the  tendency  and  practical  bearings  of 
this  theory  in  a  former  lecture,  I  will  not  repeat  here,  but  pass 
to  the  consideration  of  another  theory. 

IX,   The  complexity  of  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 
In  respect  to  the  practical  bearings  of  this  theory,  I  re- 
mark, 

1.  The  reason  that  induces  choice  is  the  real  object  chosen. 
If,  for  example,  the  value  of  an  object  induce  the  choice  of 
that  object,  the  valuable  is  the  real  object  chosen.  If  the 
rightness  of  a  choice  of  an  object  induce  choice,  then  the 
right  is  the  real  object  chosen.  If  the  virtuousness  of  an 
object  induce  choice,  then  virtue  is  the  real  object  chosen. 

2.  Whatever  really  influences  the  mind  in  choosing  must 
be  an  object  chosen.  Thus  if  the  mind  have  various  reasons 
for  a  choice,  it  will  choose  various  ends  or  objects. 

3.  If  the  foundation  of  moral  obUgation  be  not  a  unit, 
moral  action  or  intention  can  not  be  simple.  If  any  thing 
else  than  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being  is  or  can  be  the 
foundation  of  moral  obligation,  then  this  thing,  whatever  it  is, 


HORAL  GOVERNMENT.  147 

is  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake.     If  right,  justice,  truth,  vir- 
tue, or  any  thing  else  is  to  be  chosen  as  an  end,  then  just  so 
much  regard  must  be  had  to  them  as  their  nature  and  impor- 
tance demand.     If  the  good  or  valuable  to  being  be  an  ulti- 
mate good,   and  truth  and  justice  and  virtue  are  also  to  be 
chosen,  each  for  its  own  sake,  here  we  meet  with  this  diffi- 
culty, namely,  that  the  good  or  valuable  is  one  end  to  be  cho- 
sen, and  right  another,  and  virtue  another,  and  truth  another, 
and  justice  another,  and  the  beautiful  another,   and  so  on. 
Now,  who  does  not  see  that  if  this  be  so,  moral  obligation 
can  not  be  a  unit  nor  can  moral  action  be  simple?     If  there  be 
more  considerations  than  one  that  ought  to  have  influence  in 
deciding  choice,  the  choice  is  not  right,  or  at  least  wholly  right 
unless  each  consideration  that  ought  to  have  weight,  really  has 
the  influence  due  to  it  in  deciding  choice.     If  each  considera- 
tion has  not  its  due  regard,  the  choice  certainly  is  not  what  it 
ought  to  be.     In  other  words,  all  the  things  that  ought  to  be 
chosen  are  not  chosen.     Indeed,  it  is  self-evident,  if  there  is 
complexity  in  the  ultimate  end  to  be  chosen,  there  must  be 
the  same  complexity  in  the  choice,  or  the  choice  is  not  what 
it  ought  to  be;  and  if  several  considerations  ought  to  influ- 
ence ultimate  choice,  then  there  are  so  many  distinct  ultimate 
ends.     If  this  is  so,  then  each  of  them  must  have  its  due  re- 
gard in  every  case  of  virtuous  intention.     But  who  then  could 
ever  tell  whether  he  allowed  to  each  exactly  the  relative  in- 
fluence it  ought  to  have?     This  would  confound  and  stultify 
the  whole  subject  of  moral  obligation.     This  theory  virtual- 
ly and  flatly  contradicts  the  law  of  God  and  the  repeated  de- 
claration that  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor  is  the  whole  of 
virtue.     What,  does  God  say  that  all  the  law  is  fulfilled  in 
one  word.  Love,  that  is,  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor;  and 
shall  a  christian  philosopher  overlook  this,  and  insist  that  we 
ought  to  love  not  only  God  and  our  neighbor,  but  to  will  the 
right,  and  the  true,  and  the  just,  and  the  beautiful,  and  mul- 
titudes of  such  Hke  things  for  their  own  sake?     The  law  of 
God  makes  and  knows  only  one  ultimate  end,  and  shall  this  • 
philosophy  be  allowed  to  confuse  us  by  teaching  that  there  are 
many  ultimate  ends,  that  we  ought  to  will  each  for  its  own 
sake?      Nay   verily.     But   if  by   this   theory   it   is   intend- 
ed that  right,  and  justice,  and  truth,  and  the  beautiful,  &c., 
are  to  be  chosen  only  for  their  intrinsic  or  relative  value  to 
being,  then  the  valuable  alone  is  the  foundation  of  moral 
obligation.     This  is   simple  and  intelligible.     But  if  these 
are  to  be  chosen  each  for  its  own  sake,  then  there  are  so 


148  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

many  different  ends  to  be  chosen.  If  it  be  their  intrinsic  value 
that  is  to  be  chosen,  then  there  is  really  but  one  object  of  ul- 
timate choice,  and  that  is  the  intrinsically  valuable  to  being, 
and  it  is  this  upon  which  the  choice  terminates  in  whatsoever 
this  quality  may  be  found,  whether  in  right,  virtue^  justice^  truths 
&c.  But  if  on  the  other  hand  it  is  not  the  valuable  to  being 
found  in  these  things  which  is  the  reason  for  choosing  them,  but 
each  of  these  things  is  to  be  chosen  on  its  own  account  for 
a  reason  distinct  from  its  intrinsic  value  to  being,  then  there 
are,  as  has  been  said,  distinct  objects  of  choice  or  distinct 
ultimate  ends,  which  must  involve  the  whole  subject  of  moral 
law,  moral  obhgation,  moral  action,  and  moral  character  in 
vast  confusion.  I  might  here  insist  upon  the  intrinsic  absurdi- 
ty of  regarding  right,  justice,  virtue,  the  beautiful,  &c.  as 
ultimate  goods,  instead  of  mental  satis  faction  or  enjoyment. 
But  I  waive  this  point  at  present,  and  observe  that  either 
this  theory  resolves  itself  into  the  true  one,  namely,  that 
the  valuable  to  being,  in  whatsoever  that  value  be  found, 
is  the  sole  foundation  of  moral  obligation,  or  it  is  pernicious 
error.  If  it  be  not  the  true  theory,  it  does  not  and  can  not 
teach  ought  but  error  upon  the  subject  of  moral  law,  moral 
obligation,  and  of  course  of  morals  and  religion.  It  is  either, 
then,  confusion  and  nonsense,  or  it  resolves  itself  into  the 
true  theory,  just  stated. 

X.  Lastly,  I  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  practical  bearings 
of  what  I  regard  as  the  true  theory  of  the  foundation  of  moral 
obligation,  namely  that  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of 
the  Universe  is  the  sole  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 

Upon  this  philosophy  I  remark, 

I.  That  if  this  be  true  the  whole  subject  of  moral  obliga- 
tion is  perfectly  simple  and  intelligible;  so  plain  indeed  that 
"•  the  wayfaring  man  though  a  fool  caji  not  err  therein." 

(1.)  Upon  this  theory  moral  obhgation  respects  the  choice 
of  an  ultimate  end. 

(2.)  This  end  is  a  unit. 

(3.)  It  is  necessarily  known  to  every  moral  agent. 

(4.)  The  choice  of  this  end  is  the  whole  of  virtue. 

(5.)  It  is  impossible  to  sin  while  this  end  is  intended  with 
all  the  heart  and  with  all  the  soul. 

(6.)  Upon  this  theory  every  moral  agent  knows  in  every 
possible  instance  what  is  right,  and  can  never  mistake  his  real 
duty. 

(7.)  This  ultimate  intention  is  right  and  nothing  else  is 
right,  more  or  less. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


149 


(8.)  Right  and  wrong  respect  ultimate  intention  only  and 
are  always  the  same.  Right  can  be  predicated  only  of  good 
will,  and  wrong  only  of  selfishness.  These  are  fixed  and 
permanent.  If  a  moral  agent  can  know  what  end  he  aims  at 
or  fives  for,  he  can  know  and  can  not  but  know  at  all  times 
whether  he  is  right  or  wrong.  All  that  upon  this  theory  a 
moral  agent  needs  to  be  certain  of  is,  whether  he  lives  for  the 
right  end,  and  this,  if  at  all  honest  or  if  dishonest,  he  really 
can  not  but  know.  If  he  would  ask  what  is  right  or  what  is 
duty  at  any  time,  he  need  not  wait  for  a  reply.  It  is  right  for 
him  to  intend  the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end.  If  he 
honestly  does  this,  he  can  not,  doing  this,  mistake  his  duty, 
for  in  doing  this  he  really  performs  tlie  whole  of  duty.  With 
this  honest  intention  it  is  impossible  that  he  should  not  use 
the  means  to  promote  this  end  according  to  the  best  light  he 
has;  and  this  is  right.  A  single  eye  to  the  highest  good  of 
God  and  the  universe  is  the  whole  of  morality,  strictly  con- 
sidered, and  upon  this  theory  moral  law,  moral  government, 
moral  obhgation,  virtue,  vice,  and  the  whole  subject  of  morals 
and  religion  are  the  perfection  of  simplicity.  If  this  theory 
be  true,  no  honest  mind  ever  mistook  the  path  of  duty.  To 
intend  the  highest  good  of  being  is  right  and  is  duty.  No 
mind  is  honest  that  is  not  steadily  pursuing  this  end.  But  in 
the  nonest  pursuit  of  this  end  there  can  be  no  sin,  no  mis- 
taking the  path  of  duty.  That  is  and  must  be  the  path  of 
duty  that  really  appears  to  a  benevolent  mind  to  be  so.  That 
is,  it  must  be  his  duty  to  act  in  conformity  with  bis  honest 
convictions.  This  is  duty,  this  is  right.  So,  upon  this  theo- 
ry, no  one  who  is  truly  honest  in  pursuing  the  highest  good  of 
being  ever  did  or  can  mistake  his  duty  in  any  such  sense  as 
to  commit  sin.  I  have  spoken  with  great  plainness,  and  per- 
haps with  some  severity,  of  the  several  systems  of  error,  as 
I  cannot  but  regard  them,  upon  the  most  fundamental  and  im- 
portant of  subjects;  not  certainly  from  any  want  of  love  to 
those  who  hold  them,  but  from  a  concern  long  cherished  and 
growing  upon  me  for  the  honor  of  truth  and  for  the  good  of 
being.  Should  any  of  you  ever  take  the  trouble  to  look  into 
this  subject,  length  and  breadth,  and  read  the  various  sys- 
tems, and  take  the  trouble  to  trace  out  their  practical  results, 
as  actually  developed  in  the  opinions  and  practices  of  men, 
you  certainly  would  not  be  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  theo- 
logical and  philosophical  fogs  that  so  bewilder  the  world. 
How  can  it  be  otherwise  with  such  coafusion  of  opinion  upon 
the  fundamental  question  of  morals  and  religion? 
13* 


LECTURE    XI. 

MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

1.  In  what  sense  Obedience  to  Moral  Law  cannot  be 

PARTIAL. 

In  discussing  this  question  I  must, 

1.  Show  what  constitutes  obedience  to  moral  law. 

2.  That  obedience  cannot  be  partial  in  the  sense  that 
the  subject  ever  does  or  can  partly  obey  and  partly  disobey 
at  the  same  time. 

/.   What  constitutes  obedience  <^c. 

We  have  seen  in  former  lectures  that  disinterested  be- 
nevolence is  all  that  the  spirit  of  moral  law  requires,  that  is, 
that  the  love  which  it  requires  to  God  and  our  neighbor  is 
good  willing,  willing  the  highest  good  or  well-being  of  God 
and  of  being  in  general,  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake;  that 
this  willing  is  a  consecration  of  all  the  powers,  so  far  as  they 
2tre  under  the  control  of  the  will,  to  this  end.  Entire  conse- 
cration to  this  end  must  of  course  constitute  obedience  to  the 
moral  law.  The  next  question  is:  Can  consecration  to  this 
end  be  real  and  yet  partial  in  the  sense  of  not  being  entire 
for  the  time  being?  This  conducts  us  to  the  second  proposi- 
tion, namely; 

//.  That  obedience  can  not  be  partial  in  the  sense  that  the  sub- 
ject ever  does  or  can  partly  obey  and  partly  disobey  at  the  same 
time. 

That  is,  consecration,  to  be  real,  must  be,  for  the  time  be- 
ing, entire  and  universal.  It  will  be  seen  that  this  discussion 
respects  the  simplicity  of  moral  action,  that  is,  whether  the 
choices  of  the  will  that  have  any  degree  of  conformity  to 
moral  law  are  always  and  necessarily  wholly  conformed  or 
wholly  disco nformed  to  it.  There  are  two  distinct  branches 
to  this  inquiry. 

1.  The  one  is,  can  the  will  at  the  same  time  make  opposite 
choices?  Can  it  choose  the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  ulti- 
mate end,  and  at  the  same  time  choose  any  other  ultimate  end 
or  make  any  choices  whatever  inconsistent  with  this  ultimate 
choice? 

2.  The  second  branch  of  this  inquiry  respects  the  strength 
or  intensity  of  the  choice.  Suppose  but  one  ultimate  choice 
can  exist  at  the  same  time,  may  not  that  choice  be  less  effi- 
cient and  intense  than  it  ought  to  be? 

Let  us  take  up  these  two  inquiries  in  their  order. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  151 

1.  Can  the  will  at  the  same  time  choose  opposite  and  con- 
flicting ultimate  ends?  While  one  ultimate  end  is  chosen 
can  the  will  choose  any  thing  inconsistent  with  this  end?  In 
reply  to  the  first  branch  of  this  inquiry  I  observe, 

(1.)  Th^t  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end  is,  and  must  be^  the 
supreme  preference  of  the  mind.  Sin  is  the  supreme  prefer- 
ence^ _self-^ratification.  Holiness  is  the  supreme  preference 
of  the  good  of  being.  Can  then  two  supreme  preferences  coex- 
ist in  the  same  mind?  It  is  plainly  impossible  to  make  oppo- 
isite  choices  at  the  same  time.  That  is,  to  choose  opposite 
and  conflicting  ultimate  ends.  ' 

(2.)  All  inteUigent  choice,  as  has  been  formerly  shown, 
must  respect  ends  or  means.  Choice  is  synonymous  with  in- 
tention. If  there  is  a  choice  or  intention,  of  necessity  som^ 
thing  must  be  chosen  or  intended.  This  something  must  be 
chosen  for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  end,  or  for  the  sake  of  some- 
tliing  else  to  which  it  sustains  the  relation  of  a  means.  To 
deny  this  were  to  deny  that  the  choice  is  intelligent.  But  we 
are  speaking  of  no  other  than  inteUigent  choice,  or  the  choice 
of  a  moral  agent. 

(3.)  This  conducts  us  to  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  no 
choice  whatever  can  be  made  inconsistent  with  the  present 
choice  of  an  ultimate  end.  The  mind  can  not  choose  one  ul- 
timate end,  and  choose  at  the  same  time  another  ultimate 
end.  But  if  this  can  not  be,  it  is  plain  that  it  can  not  choose 
one  ultimate  end,  and  at  the  same  time,  while  in  the  exercise 
of  that  choice,  choose  the  means  to  secure  some  other  ulti- 
mate end,  which  other  end  is  not  chosen.  But  if  all  choice 
must  necessarily  respect  ends  or  means,  and  if  the  mind  can 
choose  but  one  ultimate  end  at  a  time,  it  follows  that,  while  in 
the  exercise  of  one  choice,  or  while  in  the  choice  of  one  ulti- 
mate end,  the  mind  can  not  choose,  for  the  time  being,  any 
thing  inconsistent  with  that  choice.  The  mind,  in  the  choice 
of  an  ultimate  end,  is  shut  up  to  the  necessity  of  willing  the 
means  to  acccomplish  that  end;  and  before  it  can  possibly 
will  means  to  secure  any  other  ultimate  end,  it  must  change 
its  choice  of  an  end.  If,  for  example,  the  soul  choose  the 
highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  as  an  ultimate 
end,  it  can  not  while  it  continues  to  choose  that  end,  use  or 
choose  the  means  to  eflect  any  other  end.  It  can  not  while 
this  choice  continues,  choose  self  gratification  or  any  thing 
else  as  an  ultimate  end,  nor  can  it  put  forth  any  volition  what- 
ever known  to  be  inconsistent  with  this  end.  Nay,  it  can 
put  forth  no  intelligent  volition  whatever  that  is  not  designed 


152  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

to  secure  this  end.  The  only  possible  choice  inconsistent 
with  this  end  is  the  choice  of  another  ultimate  end.  When 
this  is  done,  other  means  can  be  used  or  chosen  and  not  be- 
fore. This,  then,  is  plain,  to  wit,  that  obedience  to  moral  law 
can  not  be  partial,  in  the  sense  either  that  the  mind  can  choose 
two  opposite  ultimate  ends  at  the  same  time,  or  that  it  can 
choose  one  ultimate  end  and  at  the  same  time  use  or  choose 
means  to  secure  any  other  ultimate  end.  It  ''can  not  serve 
God  and  mammon."  It  can  not  will  the  good  of  being  as  an 
ultimate  end,  and  at  the  same  time  will  self-gratification  as  an 
ultimate  end.  In  other  words,  it  can  not  be  selfish  and  be- 
nevolent at  the  same  time.  It  can  not  choose  as  an  ulti- 
mate end  the  highest  good  of  being,  and  at  the  same  time 
choose  to  gratify  self  as  an  ultimate  end.  Until  self-grati- 
fication is  chosen  as  an  end,  the  mind  can  not  will  the  means 
of  self-gratification.  This  disposes  of  the  first  branch  of  the 
inquiry. 

2.  The  second  branch  of  the  inquiry  respects  the  strength 
or  intensity  of  the  choice. 

May  not  the  choice  of  an  end  be  real  and  yet  have  less 
than  the  required  strength  or  intensity?  The  inquiry  resolves 
itself  into  this:  Can  the  mind  honestly  intend  or  choose  an 
ultimate  end  and  yet  not  choose  it  with  all  the  strength  or  in- 
tensity which  is  required  or  with  which  it  ought  to  choose  it? 
Now  what  degree  of  strength  is  demanded?  By  what  crite- 
rion is  this  question  to  be  settled?  It  can  not  be  that  the  de- 
gree of  intensity  required  is  equal  to  the  real  value  of  the 
end  chosen,  for  this  is  infinite.  The  value  of  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  is  infinite.  But  a  finite 
being  can  not  be  under  obHgation  to  exert  infinite  strength. 
The  law  requires  him  only  to  exert  his  own  strength.  But 
does  or  may  he  not  choose  the  right  end  but  with  less 
than  all  his  strength?  Alibis  strength  lies  in  his  will;  the 
question,  therefore,  is,  may  he  not  will  it  honestly  and  yet  at 
the  same  time  withhold  a  part  of  the  strength  of  his  will?  No 
one  can  presume  that  the  choice  can  be  acceptable  unless  it 
be  honest.  Can  it  be  honest  and  yet  less  intense  and  ener- 
getic than  it  ought  to  be? 

We  have  seen  in  a  former  lecture  that  the  perception  of  an 
end  is  a  condition  of  moral  obligation  to  choose  that  end.  I 
now  remark  that  as  light  in  respect  to  the  end  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  obligation,  so  the  degree  of  obligation  cannot  ex- 
ceed the  degree  of  light.  That  is,  the  mind  must  apprehend 
the  valuable  as  a  condition  of  the  obligation  to  will  it.     The 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  153 

degree  of  the  obligation  must  be  just  equal  to  the  mind's 
honest  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  end.  The  degree  of  the 
obligation  must  vary  as  the  light  varies.  This  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  Bible  and  of  reason.  Jf  this  is  so,  it  follows  that  the 
mind  is  honest  when  and  only  when  it  devotes  its  strength  to 
the  end  in  view  with  an  intensity  just  proportioned  to  its  pres- 
ent Hght  or  estimate  of  the  value  of  that  end. 

We  have  seen  that  the  mind  can  not  will  any  thing  incon- 
sistent with  a  present  ultimate  choice.  If,  therefore,  the  end 
is  not  chosen  with  an  energy  and  intensity  equal  to  the  pres- 
ent Hght,  it  can  not  be  because  a  part  of  the  strength  is  em- 
ployed in  some  other  choice.  If  all  the  strength  is  not  given 
to  this  object,  it  must  be  because  some  part  of  it  is  voluntarily 
withholden.  That  is,  I  choose  the  end,  but  not  with  all  my 
strength,  or  I  choose  the  end,  but  choose  not  to  choose  it  with 
all  my  strength.  Is  this  an  honest  choice,  provided  the  end 
appears  to  me  to  be  worthy  of  all  my  strength?  Certainly  it 
is  not  honest. 

But  again:  It  is  absurd  to  affirm  that  I  choose  an  ultimate 
end  and  yet  do  not  consecrate  to  it  all  my  strength.  The 
choice  of  any  ultimate  end  impUes  that  that  is  the  thing  and 
the  only  thing  for  w^hich  we  live  and  act;  that  we  aim  at 
and  live  for  nothing  else  for  the  time  being.  Now  what  is  in- 
tended by  the  assertion  that  I  may  honestly  choose  an  ultimate 
end  and  yet  with  less  strength  or  intensity  than  I  ought.  Is 
it  intended  that  I  can  honestly  choose  an  ultimate  end,  and 
yet  not  at  every  moment  keep  my  will  upon  the  strain,  and 
will  at  every  moment  with  the  utmost  possible  intensity?  If 
this  be  the  meaning,  I  grant  that  this  may  be  so.  But  I  at 
the  same  time  contend  that  the  law  of  God  does  not  require 
that  the  will  or  any  other  faculty  should  be  at  every  moment 
upon  the  strain  and  the  whole  strength  exerted  at  every  mo- 
ment. If  it  does,  it  is  manifest  that  even  Christ  did  not  obey 
it.  I  insist  that  the  moral  law  requires  nothing  more  than 
honesty  of  intention,  and  assumes  that  honesty  of  intention 
will  and  must  secure  just  that  degree  of  intensity  which  from 
time  to  time  the  mind  in  its  best  judgment  sees  to  be  demand- 
ed. The  Bible  every  where  assumes  that  sincerity  or  honesty 
of  intention  is  moral  perfection ;  that  it  is  obedience  to  the 
law.  The  terms  sincerity  and  perfection  in  scripture  lan- 
guage are  synonymous.  Uprightness,  sincerity,  holiness, 
honesty,  perfection,  are  words  of  the  same  meaning  in  bible 
language. 

Again :  It  seems  to  be  intuitively  certain  that  if  the  mind 


154  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

W 

chooses  its  ultimate  end,  it  must  in  the  very  act  of  choice 
consecrate  all  its  time,  and  strength,  and  being  to  that  end, 
and  at  every  moment  while  the  choice  remains,  choose  and 
act  with  an  intensity  in  precise  conformity  with  its  ability  and 
the  best  light  it  has.  The  intensity  of  the  choice  and  the 
strenuousness  of  its  efforts  to  secure  the  end  chosen  must,  if 
the  intention  be  sincere,  correspond  with  the  view  which  the 
soul  has  of  the  importance  of  the  end  chosen.  It  does  not 
seem  possible  that  the  choice  or  intention  should  be  real  and 
honest  unless  this  is  so.  To  will  at  every  moment  with  the  ut- 
most strength  and  intensity  is  not  only  impossible,  but,  were 
it  possible,  to  do  so  could  not  be  in  accordance  with  the  soul's 
convictions  of  duty.  The  irresistible  judgment  of  the  mind 
is,  that  the  intensity  of  its  action  should  not  exceed  the  bound 
of  endurance.  That  the  energies  of  both  soul  and  body  should 
be  so  husbanded  as  to  be  able  to  accomplish  the  most  good 
upon  the  whole  and  not  in  a  given  moment. 
^  But  to  return  to  the  question.     Does  the  law  of  God  re- 

quire simply  uprightness  of  intention,  or  does  it  require  not 
only  uprightness  but  also  a  certain  degree  of  intensity  in  the 
intention?  Is  it  satisfied  with  simple  sincerity  or  uprightness 
of  intention,  or  does  it  require  that  the  highest  possible  in- 
tensity of  choice  shall  exist  at  every  moment?  When  it  re- 
quires that  we  love  God  with  all  the  heart,  with  all  the  soul, 
wdth  all  the  mind,  and  with  all  the  strength,  does  it  mean  that 
all  our  heart,  soul,  mind  and  strength  shall  be  consecrated  to 
this  end,  and  be  used  up  from  moment  to  moment  and  from 
hour  to  hour  according  to  the  best  judgment  which  the  mind 
can  form  of  the  necessity  and  expediency  of  strenuousness  of 
effort,  or  does  it  mean  that  all  the  faculties  of  soul  and  body 
shall  be  at  every  moment  on  the  strain  to  the  uttermost?  Does 
it  mean  that  the  whole  being  is  to  be  consecrated  to  and  used 
up  for  God  with  the  best  economy  of  which  the  soul  is  capa- 
ble; or  does  it  require  that  the  whole  being  be  not  only  con- 
secrated to  God,  but  be  used  up  without  any  regard  to 
economy,  and  without  the  soul's  exercising  any  judgment  or 
discretion  in  the  case?  In  other  words,  is  the  law  of  God  the 
law  of  reason,  or  of  folly?  Is  it  intelhgible  or  just  in  its  de- 
mands; orisit  perfectly  unintelligible  and  unjust?  Is  it  a  law 
suited  to  the  nature,  relations,  and  circumstances  of  moral 
agents;  or  has  it  no  regard  to  them?  If  it  has  no  regard  to 
either,  is  it,  can  it  be  moral  law  and  impose  moral  obliga- 
tion? It  seems  to  me  that  the  law  of  God  requires  that  all 
our  power,  and  strength,  and  being  be  honestly  and  continu- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  155 

ally  consecrated  to  God  and  held  not  in  a  state  of  the  utmost 
tension,  but  that  the  strength  shall  be  expended  and  employed 
in  exact  accordance  with  the  mind's  honest  judgment  of  what 
is  at  every  moment  the  best  economy  for  God.  If  this  be  not 
the  meaning  and  the  spirit  of  the  law,  it  can  not  he  law^  for  it 
could  be  neither  intelligible  nor  just.  Nothing  else  can  be 
a  law  of  nature.  What!  Does,  or  can  the  command,  thou 
shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  with  all  thy 
soul,  with  all  thy  might,  and  with  all  thy  strength,  require  that 
every  particle  of  my  strength  and  every  faculty  of  my  being 
shall  be  in  a  state  of  the  utmost  possible  tension?  How  long 
could  my  strength  hold  out  or  my  being  last  under  such  a 
pressure  as  this?  What  reason,  or  justice,  or  utility,  or  equi- 
ty could  there  be  in  such  a  commandment  as  this?  Were  this 
suited  to  my  nature  and  relations?  That  the  law  does  not  re- 
quire the  constant  and  most  intense  action  of  the  will,  I  argue 
for  the  following  reasons: 

(1.)  No  creature  in  heaven  or  earth  could  possibly  know 
whether  he  ever  for  a  single  moment  obeyed  it.  How  could 
he  know  that  no  more  tension  could  possibly  be  endured? 

(2.)  Such  a  requirement  would  be  unreasonable  inasmuch 
as  such  a  state  of  mind  would  be  unendurable. 

(3.)  Such  a  state  of  constant  tension  and  strain  of  the  facul- 
ties could  be  of  no  possible  use. 

(4.)  It  would  be  uneconomical.  More  good  could  be  effec- 
ted by  a  husbanding  of  the  strength. 

(5.)  Christ  certainly  obeyed  the  moral  law  and  nothing  is 
more  evident  than  that  his  faculties  were  not  always  on  the 
strain. 

(6.)  Every  one  knows  that  the  intensity  of  the  will's  action 
depends  and  must  depend  upon  the  clearness  with  which  the 
value  of  the  object  chosen  is  perceived.  It  is  perfectly  absurd 
to  suppose  that  the  will  should  or  possibly  can  act  at  all  times 
with  the  same  degree  of  intensity.  As  the  mind's  apprehen- 
sions of  truth  vary,  the  intensity  of  the  will's  action  must 
vary,  or  it  does  not  act  rationally,  and  consequently  not 
virtuously.  The  intensity  of  the  actions  of  the  will,  ought  to 
vary  as  light  varies,  and  if  it  does  not,  the  mind  is  not  honest. 
If  honest,  it  must  vary  as  light  and  ability  vary. 

That  an  intention  can  not  be  right  and  honest  in  kind  and 
deficient  in  the  degree  of  intensity,  I  argue. 

1.  From  the  fact  that  it  is  absurd  to  talk  of  an  intention 
right  in  kind  while  it  is  deficient  in  intensity.  What  does 
rightness  in  kind  mean  ?    Does  it  mean  simply  that  the  inten- 


156  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

tion  terminates  on  the  proper  object?  But  is  this  the  light 
kind  of  an  intention  when  only  the  proper  object  is  chosen, 
while  there  is  a  voluntary  withholding  of  the  required  energy 
of  choice?  Is  this,  can  this  be  an  honest  intention?  If  so 
what  is  meant  by  an  honest  intention?  Is  it  honest,  can  it 
be  honest  voluntarily  to  withhold  from  God  and  the  universe 
what  we  perceive  to  be  their  due?  and  what  we  are  conscious 
that  we  might  render?  It  is  a  contradiction  lo  call  this  hon- 
est. In  what  sense  then  may,  or  can  an  intention  be  accep- 
table in  kind,  while  deficient  in  degree?  Certainly  in  no 
sense  unless  known  and  voluntary  dishonesty  can  be  accepta- 
ble. But  let  me  ask  again  what  is  intended  by  an  intention 
being  deficient  in  degree  of  intensity  ?  If  this  deficiency  be  a 
sinful  deficiency,  it  must  be  a  known  deficiency.  That  is,  the 
subject  of  it  must  know  at  the  time  that  his  intention 
is  in  point  of  intensity  less  than  it  ought  to  be,  or  that 
he  wills  with  less  energy  than  he  ought;  or,  in  other  words, 
that  the  energy  of  the  choice  does  not  equal  or  is  not  agree- 
able to  his  own  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  end  chosen. 
But  this  implies  an  absurdity.  Suppose  I  choose  an  end,  that 
is,  I  choose  a  thing  solely  on  account  of  its  own  intrinsic 
value.  It  is  for  its  value  that  I  choose  it.  I  choose  it  for  iti 
value,  but  not  according  to  its  value.  My  perception  of  its 
value  led  me  to  choose  it  for  that  reason;  and  yet,  while  I 
choose  it  for  that  reason,  I  voluntarily  withhold  that  degree  of  in- 
tensity which  I  know  is  demanded  by  my  own  estimate  of  the  val- 
ue of  the  thing  which  I  choose !  This  is  a  manifest  absurdity  and 
contradiction.  If  I  choose  a  thing  for  its  value,  this  implies  that 
I  choose  it  according  to  my  estimate  of  its  value.  Happiness 
for  example  is  a  good  in  itself.  Now  suppose  I  will  its  exis- 
tence impartially,  that  is,  solely  on  account  ofits  intrinsic  value. 
Now,  does  not  this  imply  that  every  degree  of  happiness  must 
be  willed  according  to  its  real  or  relative  value?  Can  I  will 
it  impartially,  for  its  own  sake,  for  and  only  for  its  intrinsic 
value,  and  yet  not  prefer  a  greater  to  a  less  amount  of  happi- 
ness? This  is  impossible.  Willing  it  on  account  of  its  in- 
trinsic value  implies  willing  it  according  to  my  estimate  ofits 
intrinsic  value.  So,  it  must  be  that  an  intention  cannot  be 
sincere,  honest,  and  acceptable  in  kind  while  it  is  sinfully  de- 
ficient in  degree.  I  will  introduce  here  with  some  alteration 
and  addition  what  I  have  elsewhere  stated  upon  this  subject. 
I  quote  from  my  letter  in  the  Oberlin  Evangelist  upon  the  fol- 
lowing proposition: — 

Moral  Character  is  always  wholly  right  or  wholly  wrongs  and 
neoer  partly  right  and  partly  wrong  at  the  same  time. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  157 

^'•I  must  again  remind  you  of  that  in  which  moral  charac- 
ter consists,  and  occupy  a  few  moments  in  stating  what  I  have 
already  said,  that  moral  character  belongs  solely  to  the  ulti- 
mate intention  of  the  mind,  or  to  choice,  as  distinguished  from 
volition.  The  law  of  God  requires  supreme  disinterested  be- 
nevolence, and  all  holiness,  in  the  last  analysis,  resolves  itself 
into  some  modification  of  supreme  disinterested  benevolence, 
or  good- willing.  Benevolence,  or  good- willing,  is  synonymous 
with  good-intending,  or  intending  good.  Now  the  true  spirit 
of  the  requirement  of  the  moral  law  is  this — that  every  moral 
bemg^shall  choose  every  interest  according  to  its  value  as 
perceived  by  the  mind.  This  is  holiness.  It  is  exercising  su- 
preme love  or  good  will  to  God,  and  equal  love  or  good  will 
to  our  neighbor. 

TiiisJs-^-rAoice  or  intention,  as  distinguished  from  a  ro/i- 
tion..    It  is  also  an  ultimate  intention,  as  distinguished  from  a 

Choice  is  the  selection  of  an  ultimate  end.  Volition  is 
produced  by  choice,  and  is  the  effort  of  the  will  to  accomplish 
the  end  chosen.  An  ultimate  intention,  or  choice,  is  that 
which  is  intended  or  chosen  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  an  ultimate 
end,  and  not  something  chosen  or  intended  as  a  means  to  ac- 
compHsh  some  other  and  higher  end.  A  proximate  end  is  that 
which  is  chosen  or  intended,  not  as  an  ultimate  end,  but  as  a 
means  to  an  ultimate  end.  If  I  choose  an  end,  I,  of  course, 
put  forth  those  volitions  which  are  requisite  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  that  end.  Holiness,  or  virtue,  consists  in  the  su- 
preme ultimate  intention,  choice,or  willing  of  the  highest  well- 
being  of  God  and  the  highest  j^ood  of  his  kingdom.  Noth- 
ing else  than  this  is  virtue  or  holiness. 

As  holiness  consists  in  ultimate  intention,  so  does  sin.  And 
as  holiness  consists  in  choosing  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  the  good  of  the  universe,  for  its  own  sake,  or  as  the 
supreme  ultimate  end  of  pursuit;  so  sin  consists  in  willing, 
with  a  supreme  choice  or  intention,  self-gratification  and  self- 
interest.  Preferring  a  less  to  a  greater  good  because  it  is  our 
own  is  selfishness.  All  selfishness  consists  in  a  supreme  ulti- 
mate intention.  By  an  ultimate  intention,  as  I  have  said,  is 
intended  that  which  is  chosen  for  its  own  sake  as  an  end, 
and  not  as  a  means  to  some  other  end.  Whenever  a  moral 
being  prefers  or  chooses  his  own  gratification,  or  his  own  in- 
terest, in  preference  to  a  higher  good,  because  it  is  his  own, 
he  chooses  it  as  an  end,  for  its  own  sake,  and  as  an  ultimate 
end;  not  designing  it  as  a  means  of  promoting  any  other  and 
14 


'/ 


IBS  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

higher  end,  nor  because  it  is  a  part  of  universal  good.  Eve- 
ry sin,  then,  consists  in  an  act  of  will.  It  consists  in  prefer- 
ring self-gratification,  or  self-interest,  to  the  authority  of  God, 
the  glory  of  God,  and  the  good  of  the  universe.  It  is,  there- 
fore, and  must  be,  a  supreme  ultimate  choice,  or  intention. 

Sin  and  holiness,  then,  both  consist  in  supreme,  ultimate, 
and  opposite  choices,  or  intentions,  and  can  not,  by  any  pos- 
sibility, co-exist. 

But  for  the  sake  of  entering  more  at  large  into  the  discus- 
sion of  this  question,  I  will — 
1.  Examine  a  little  in  detail  the  philosophy  of  the  question,  and, 

2.  Bring  the  philosophy  into  the  light  of  the  Bible. 

And  in  discussing  the  philosophy  of  the  question,  I  would 
observe  that  five  suppositions  may  be  made,  and  so  far  as  I 
can  see,  only  five,  in  respect  to  this  subject. 

1.  It  may  be  supposed,  that  selfishness  and  benevolence 
can  co-exist  in  the  same  mind. 

3.  It  may  be  supposed,  that  the  same  act  or  choice  may 
have  a  complex  character,  on  account  of  complexity  in  the 
motives  which  induce  it. 

3.  It  may  be  supposed,  that  an  act  or  choice  may  be  right, 
or  holy  in  kind,  but  deficient  in  intensity  or  degree.     Or, 

4.  That  the  will,  or  heart,  may  be  right,  while  the  affec- 
tions, or  emotions,  are  wrong.     Or, 

.5.  That  there  may  be  a  ruling,  latent,  actually  existing,  ho- 
ly preference,  or  intention,  co-existing  with  opposing  voHtions. 

Now  unless  one  of  these  suppositions  is  true,  it  must  follow 
that  moral  character  is  either  wholly  right  or  wholly  wrong, 
and  never  partly  right  and  partly  wrong  at  the  same  time. 

And  now  to  the  examination. 

1.  It  may  be  supposed,  that  selfishness  and  benevolence 
can  co-exist  in  the  same  mind. 

It  has  been  shown  that  selfishness  and  benevolence  are 
supreme,  ultimate,  and  opposite  choices,  or  intentions.  They 
can  not,  therefore,  by  any  possibihty,  co-exist  in  the  same 
mind. 

3.  The  next  supposition  is,  that  the  same  act  or  choice 
may  have  a  complex  character,  on  account  of  complexity  in 
the  motives.     On  this  let  me  say: 

(1.)  Motives  are  objective  or  subjective.  An  objective 
motive  is  that  thing  external  to  the  mind  that  induces  choice 
or  intention.     Subjective  motive  is  the  intention  itself. 

(2.)  Character,  therefore,  does  not  belong  to  the  objective 
motive,  or  to  that  thing  which  the  mind  chooses;  but  moral 


[ 


MORAL  GO^^RNMENT.  159 

charactefis  confined  to  the  subjective  motive,  which  is  synony- 
mous with  choice  or  intention.  Thus  we  say  a  man  is  to  be 
judged  by  his  motives,  meaning  that  his  character  is  as  his 
intention  is.  Multitudes  of  objective  motives  or  considera- 
tions, may  have  concurred  directly  or  indirectly  in  their  influ- 
ence, to  induce  choice  or  intention;  but  the  intention  or  sub- 
jective motive  is  always  necessarily  simple  and  indivisible.  In 
other  words,  moral  character  consists  in  the  choice  of  an  ulti- 
mate end,  and  this  end  is  to  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake,  else  it 
it  not  an  ultimate  end.  If  the  end  chosen  be  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  the  good  of  the  universe — if  it  be  the 
willing  or  intending  to  promote  and  treat  every  interest  in  the 
universe  according  to  its  perceived  relative  value,  it  is  a  right, 
a  holy  motive,  or  intention.  If  it  be  any  thing  else,  it  is  sinful. 
Now  whatever  complexity  there  may  have  been  in  the  consid- 
erations that  led  the  way  to  this  choice  or  intention,  it  is  self- 
evident  that  the  intention  must  be  one,  simple,  and  indivisible. 
(3.)  Whatever  complexity  there  might  have  been  in  those 
considerations  that  prepared  the  way  to  the  settling  down  up- 
on this  intention,  the  mind  in  a  virtuous  choice  has  and  can 
have  but  one  reason  for  its  choice,  and  that  is  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  thing  chosen.  The  highest  well-being  of  God, 
the  good  of  the  universe,  and  every  good  according  to  its  per- 
ceived relative  value,  must  be  chosen  for  one,  and  only  one 
reason,  and  that  is  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good  which  is 
chosen  for  its  own  sake.  If  chosen  for  any  other  reason  the 
choice  is  not  virtuous.  It  is  absurd  to  say,  that  a  thing  is 
good  and  valuable  in  itself,  but  may  be  chosen,  not  for  that 
but  for  some  other  reason — that  God's  highest  well-being  and 
the  happiness  of  the  universe,  are  an  infinite  good  in  them- 
selves, but  are  not  to  be  chosen  for  that  reason,  and  on  their 
own  account,  but  for  some  other  reason.  Holiness,  then, 
must  always  consist  in  singleness  of  eye  or  intention.  It 
must  consist  in  the  supreme  disinterested  choice,  willing,  or 
intending  the  good  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  for  its  own 
sake.  In  this  intention  there  can  not  be  any  complexi- 
ty. If  there  were,  it  would  not  be  holy,  but  sinful.  It  is, 
therefore,  stark  nonsense  to  say,  that  one  and  the  same  choice 
may  have  a  complex  character,  on  account  of  complexity  of 
motive.  For  that  motive  in  which  moral  character  consists, 
is  the  supreme  ultimate  intention,  or  choice.  This  choice,  or 
intention  must  consist  in  the  choice  of  a  thing  as  an  end  and 
for  its  own  sake.  The  supposition,  then,  that  the  same  choice 
or  intention  may  have  a  complex  character,  on  account  of 
complexity  in  the  motives,  is  wholly  inadmissible. 


160  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

If  it  be  still  urged,  that  the  intention  or  subjective  motive 
may  be  complex — that  several  things  may  be  included  in  the 
intention  and  aimed  at  by  the  mind — and  that  it  may,  there- 
fore, be  partly  holy  and  partly  sinful — I  reply; 

(4.)  If  by  this  it  be  meant  that  several  things  may  be  aimed 
at  or  intended  by  the  mind  at  the  same  time,  I  inquire  what 
things?  It  is  true  that  the  supreme,  disinterested  choice  of 
the  highest  good  of  being,  may  include  the  intention  to  use 
all  the  necessary  means.  It  may  also  include  the  intention  to 
promote  every  interest  in  the  universe,  according  to  its  per- 
ceived relative  value.  These  are  all  properly  included  in  one 
intention;  but  this  impHes  no  such  complexity  in  the  subject- 
ive motive  as  to  include  both  sin  and  holiness. 

(5.)  If  by  complexity  of  intention  is  meant  that  it  may  be 
partly  disinterestedly  benevolent,  and  partly  selfish,  which  it 
must  be  to  be  partly  holy  and  partly  sinful,  I  reply,  that  this 
supposition  is  absurd.  It  has  been  shown  that  selfishness  and 
benevolence  consist  in  supreme,  ultimate,  and  opposite  choices 
or  intentions.  To  suppose,  then,  that  an  intention  can  be 
both  holy  and  sinful,  is  to  suppose  that  it  may  include  two  su- 
preme opposite  and  ultimate  choices  or  intentions  at  the  same 
time;  in  other  words,  that  I  may  supremely  and  disinterest- 
edly intend  to  regard  and  promote  every  interest  in  the  uni- 
verse according  to  its  perceived  relative  value,  for  its  own 
sake;  and  at  the  same  time,  may  supremely  regard  my  own 
self-interest  and  self-gratification,  and  in  some  things  supreme- 
ly intend  to  promote  my  selfish  interests,  in  opposition  to  the 
interests  of  the  universe  and  the  commands  of  God.  But  this 
is  naturally  impossible.  An  ultimate  intention,  then,  may  be 
complex  in  the  sense,  that  it  may  include  the  design  to  pro- 
mote every  perceived  interest,  according  to  its  relative  value; 
but  it  can  not,  by  any  possibility,  be  complex  in  the  sense  that 
it  includes  selfishness  and  benevolence,  or  holiness  and  sin. 

3.  The  third  supposition  is,  that  holiness  may  be  right,  or 
pure  in  kind,  but  deficient  in  degree.     On  this,  I  remark: 

(I.)  We  have  seen  that  moral  character  consists  in  the  ul- 
timate intention. 

(2.)  The  supposition,  therefore,  must  be,  that  the  intention 
may  be  right,  or  pure  in  kind,  but  deficient  in  the  degree  of 
its  strength. 

(3.)  Our  intention  is  to  be  tried  by  the  law  of  God,  both  in 
respect  to  its  kind  and  degree. 

(4.)  The  law  of  God  requires  us  to  will,  or  intend  the  pro- 
motion of  every  interest  in  the  universe  according  to  its  per- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


161 


ceived relative  value,  for  its  own  sake;  in  other  words,  that 
all  our  powers  shall  be  supremely  and  disinterestedly  devoted 
to  the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  the  universe. 

(5.)  This  cannot  mean  that  any  faculty  shall  at  every  mo- 
ment be  kept  upon  the  strain,  or  in  a  state  of  utmost  tension, 
for  this  would  be  inconsistent  with  natural  ability.  It  would 
be  to  require  a  natural  impossibility,  and  therefore  be  unjust. 

(6.)  It  cannot  mean  that  at  all  times,  and  on  all  subjects, 
the  same  degree  of  exertion  shall  be  made;  for  the  best  pos- 
sible discharge  of  duty  does  not  always  require  the  same  de- 
gree or  intensity  of  mental  or  corporeal  exertion. 

(7.)  The  law  can  not,  justly  or  possibly,  require  more,  than 
that  the  whole  being  shall  be  consecrated  to  God — that  we 
shall  fully  and  honestly  will  or  intend  the  promotion  of  every 
interest  according  to  its  perceived  relative  value,  and  accord- 
ing to  the  extent  of  our  ability. 

(8.)  Now  the  strength  or  intensity  of  the  intention  must, 
and  ought,  of  necessity,  to  depend  upon  the  degree  of  our 
knowledge  or  light  in  regard  to  any  object  of  choice.  If  our 
obligation  is  not  to  be  graduated  by  the  light  we  possess, 
then  it  would  follow  that  we  may  be  under  obligation  to  ex- 
ceed our  natural  abiUty,  which  can  not  be. 

(9.)  The  importance  which  we  attach  to  objects  of  choice, 
and  consequently  the  degree  of  ardor  or  intenseness  of  the 
intention,  must  depend  upon  the  clearness  or  obscurity  of  our 
views  of  the  real  or  relative  value  of  the  objects  of  choice. 

(10.)  Our  obligation  can  not  be  measured  by  the  views 
which  God  has  of  the  importance  of  those  objects  of  choice. 
It  is  a  well  settled  and  generally  admitted  truth,  that  increased 
light  increases  responsibiUty  or  moral  obligation.  No  crea- 
ture is  bound  to  will  any  thing  with  the  intenseness  or  degree 
of  strength  with  which  God  wills  it,  for  the  plain  reason, 
that  no  creature  sees  its  importance  or  real  value,  as  He  does. 
If  our  obligation  were  to  be  graduated  by  God's  knowledge 
of  the  real  value  of  objects,  we  could  never  obey  the  moral 
law  either  in  this  world  or  the  world  to  come,  nor  could  any 
being  but  God  ever,  by  any  possibihty,  meet  its  demands. 

(ll.)  Nor  can  our  obligation  be  measured  by  the  views  or 
knowledge  which  angels  may  have  of  the  intrinsic  or  relative 
value  of  the  glory  of  God,  the  worth  of  souls,  and  the  good 
of  the  universe. 

(12.)  Nor  can  the  obligation  of  a  heathen  be  measured  by 
the  knowledge  and  light  of  a  Christian. 

(13.)  Nor  the  obUgation  of  a  child,  by  the  knowledge  of  a  man. 
14* 


162  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(14.)  The  fact  is,  that  the  obligation  of  every  moral  being 
must  be  graduated  by  his  own  knowledge. 

(15.)  If,  therefore,  his  intention  be  equal  in  its  intensity  to 
his  views  or  knowledge  of  the  real  or  relative  value  of  differ- 
ent objects,  it  is  right.  It  is  up  to  the  full  measure  of  his  ob- 
ligation ;  and  if  his  own  honest  judgment  is  not  to  be  made 
the  measure  of  his  obligation,  then  his  obligation  can  exceed 
what  he  is  able  to  know;  which  contradicts  the  true  nature  of 
moral  law,  and  is,  therefore,  false. 

(16.)  If  conscious  honesty  of  intention,  both  as  it  respects 
the  kind  and  degree  of  intention,  according  to  the  degree  of 
light  possessed,  be  not  entire  obedience  to  moral  law,  then 
there  is  no  being  in  heaven  or  earth,  who  can  know  himself 
to  be  entirely  obedient;  for  all  that  any  being  can  possibly 
know  upon  this  subject  is,  that  he  honestly  wills  or  intends  in 
accordance  with  the  dictates  of  his  reason,  or  the  judgment 
which  he  has  of  the  real  or  relative  value  of  the  object  cho- 
sen. 

(17.)  If  something  more  than  this  can  be  required,  then  a 
law  can  be  binding  farther  than  it  is  prescribed,  or  so  pub- 
lished that  it  may  be  known,  which  is  contradictory  to  natu- 
ral justice,  and  absurd. 

(18.)  No  moral  being  can  possibly  blame  or  charge  himself 
with  any  default,  when  he  is  conscious  of  honestly  intending, 
willing,  or  choosing,  and  acting,  according  to  the  best  light  he 
has;  for  in  this  case  he  obeys  the  law  as  he  understands  it,  and 
of  course  can  not  conceive  himself  to  be  condemned  by  the 
law, 

(19.)  Good- willing,  or  intending  is,  in  respect  to  God,  to  be 
at  all  times  supreme,  and  in  respect  to  other  beings,  it  is  to  be 
in  proportion  to  the  relative  value  of  their  happiness  as  per- 
ceived by  the  mind.  This  is  always  to  be  the  intention.  The 
volitions,  or  efforts  of  the  will  to  promote  these  objects,  may 
and  ought  to  vary  indefinitely  in  their  intensity,  in  proportion 
to  the  particular  duty  to  which,  for  the  time  being,  we  are 
called. 

(20.)  But  farther,  we  have  seen  that  virtue  consists  in  wil- 
ling every  good  according  to  its  perceived  relative  value,  and 
that  nothing  short  of  this  is  virtue.  But  this  is  perfect  virtue 
for  the  time  being.  In  other  words,  virtue  and  moral  perfec- 
tion, in  respect  to  a  given  act,  or  state  of  the  will,  are  synony- 
mous terms.  Virtue  is  holiness.  Holiness  is  upright- 
ness. Uprightness  is  that  which  is  just  what,  under  the 
circumstances,  it  should  be;  and  nothing  else  is  virtue,  holi- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  163 

ness,  or  uprightness.  Virtue,  holiness,  uprightness,  moral 
perfection — when  we  apply  these  terms  to  any  given  state  of 
the  will — are  synonymous.  To  talk,  therefore,  of  a  virtue, 
holiness,  uprightness,  justice — right  in  kind,  but  deficient  in 
degree — ^is  to  talk  sheer  nonsense.  It  is  the  same  absurdity  as 
to  talk  of  sinful  holiness,  an  unjust  justice,  di  wrong  rightness, 
an  impure  purity,  an  imperfect  perfection,  a  disobedient  obedi- 
ence. 

(21.)  The  fact  is,  virtue,  holiness,  uprightness,  &c.,  signify 
a  definite  thing,  and  never  any  thing  else  than  conformity  to 
the  law  of  God.  That  which  is  not  entirely  conformed  to 
the  law  of  God  is  not  holiness.  This  must  be  true  in  philoso- 
phy, and  the  Bible  affirms  the  same  thing.  "•  Whosoever  shall 
keep  the  whole  law^  and  yet  offend  in  one  pointy  he  is  guilty  of 
alW  The  spirit  of  this  text  as  clearly  and  as  fully  assumes 
and  affirms  the  doctrine  under  consideration  as  if  it  had  been 
uttered  with  that  design  alone. 

(22.)  God  has  no  right  to  call  that  holy  which  is  defective 
in  degree. 

(23.)  Unless  every  perceived  interest  is,  for  the  time  being, 
willed  or  intended  according  to  its  relative  value,  there  is  no 
virtue.     Where  this  intention««xists,  there  can  be  no  sin. 

4.  The  next  supposition  is,  that  the  will,  or  heart,  may  be 
right,  while  the  affections  or  emotions  are  wrong.  Upon  this 
I  remark: 

(1.)  That  this  supposition  overlooks  that  in  which  moral 
character  consists.  It  has  been  shown  that  moral  character 
consists  in  the  supreme  ultimate  intention  of  the  mind,  and 
that  this  supreme,  disinterested  benevolence,  good-wilhng,  or 
intention,  is  the  whole  of  virtue.  Now  this  intention  begets 
volitions.  It  directs  the  attention  of  the  mind,  and,  there- 
fore, produces  thoughts,  emotions,  or  affections.  It  also, 
through  volition,  begets  bodily  action.  But  moral  character 
does  not  lie  in  outward  actions,  the  movements  of  the  arm,  nor 
in  the  volition  that  moves  the  muscles;  for  that  volition  ter- 
minated upon  the  action  itself.  I  will  to  move  my  arm,  and 
my  arm  must  move  by  a  law  of  necessity.  Moral  character 
belongs  solely  to  the  intention,  that  produced  the  volition,  that 
moved  the  muscles,  to  the  performance  of  the  outward  act 
So  intention  produces  the  volition  that  directs  the  attention 
of  the  mind  to  a  given  object.  Attention,  by  a  natural  ne- 
cessity, produces  thought,  affection,  or  emotion.  Now  thought 
affection,  or  emotion,  are  all  connected  with  volition,  hy  a 
natural  necessity;  that  is — if  the  attention  is  directed  to  an 


164  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

object,  corresponding  thoughts  and  emotions  must  exist  of 
course.  Moral  character  no  more  lies  in  emotion,  than  in 
outward  action.  It  does  not  lie  in  thought,  or  attention.  It_ 
does  not  lie  in  the  specific  volition  that  directed  the  attention; 
but  in  that  intention,  or  design  of  the  mind,  that  produced  the 
volition,  which  directed  the  attention,  which,  again,  produced 
the  thought,  which,  again,  produced  the  emotion.  Now  the 
supposition,  that  the  intention  may  be  right,  while  the  emo- 
tions or  feehngs  of  the  mind  may  be  wrong,  is  the  same  as  to 
say,  that  outward  action  may  be  wrong,  while  the  intention  is 
right.  The  fact  is,  that  moral  character  is  and  must  be  as  the 
intention  is.  If  any  feeling  or  outward  action  is  inconsistent 
with  the  existing  ultimate  intention,  it  must  be  so  in  spite  of 
the  agent.  But  if  any  outward  action  or  state  of  feeling  ex- 
ists, in  opposition  to  the  intention  or  choice  of  the  mind,  it 
cannot,  by  any  possibility,  have  moral  character.  Whatever 
is  beyond  the  control  of  a  moral  agent,  he  can  not  be  respon- 
sible for.  Whatever  he  can  not  control  by  intention  he  can 
not  control  at  all.  Every  thing,  for  which  he  can  possibly  be 
responsible,  resolves  itself  into  his  intention.  His  whole  char- 
acter, therefore,  is  and  must  be  as  his  intention  is.  If,  there- 
fore, temptations,  from  whatever  quarter  they  may  come, 
produce  emotions  within  him  inconsistent  with  his  intention, 
and  which  he  can  not  control,  he  cannot  be  responsible  for 
them. 

{2,y  As  a  matter  of  fact,  although  emotions,  contrary  to 
Ms  intentions,  may,  by  circumstances  beyond  his  control,  be 
brought  to  exist  in  his  mind;  yet,  by  wilHng  to  divert  the  at- 
tention of  the  mind  from  the  objects  that  produce  them,  they 
can  ordinarily  be  banished  from  the  mind.  If  this  is  done  as 
soon  as  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  can  be,  there  is  no  sin. 
If  it  is  not  done  as  soon  as  in  the  nature  of  the  case  it  can  be, 
then  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  the  intention  is  not  what  it 
ought  to  be.  The  intention  is  to  devote  the  whole  being  to 
the  service  of  God  and  the  good  of  the  universe,  and  of 
course  to  avoid  every  thought,  affection,  and  emotion,  incon- 
sistent with  this.  While  this  intention  exists,  it  is  certain  that 
if  any  object  be  thrust  upon  the  attention  which  excites  thoughts 
and  emotions  inconsistent  with  our  supreme  ultimate  inten- 
tion, the  attention  of  the  mind  will  be  instantly  diverted  from 
those  objects,  and  the  hated  emotion  hushed,  if  this  is  possi- 
ble. For,  while  the  intention  exists,  corresponding  volitions 
must  exist.  There  cannot,  therefore,  be  a. j:ight  state-of  heart 
or  intention,  while  the  emotions  or  aflfections  of  the  mind  are 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  165 

sinful.^  For  emotions  are  in  themselves  in  no  case  sinful,  and 
wnen  they  exist  against  the  will,  through  the  force  of  tempta- 
tion, the  soul  is  not  responsible  for  their  existence.  And,  as 
I  said,  the  supposition  overlooks  that  in  which  moral  character 
consists,  and  makes  it  to  consist  in  that  over  which  the  law 
does  not  properly  legislate;  for  love,  or  benevolence  is  the 
fulfilling  of  the  law. 

But  here  it  may  be  said,  that  the  law  not  only  requires  be- 
nevolence, or  good-wilHng,  but  requires  a  certain  kind  of 
emotions,  just  as  it  requires  the  performance  of  certain  out- 
ward actions,  and  that  therefore  there  may  be  a  right  inten- 
tion where  there  is  a  deficiency,  either  in  kind  or  degree,  of 
right  emotions.     To  this  I  answer: 

Outward  actions  are  required  of  men,  only  because  they 
are  connected  with  intention,  by  a  natural  necessity.  And 
no  outward  action  is  ever  required  of  us,  unless  it  can  be  pro- 
duced by  intending  and  aiming  to  do  it.  If  the  effect  does 
not  follow  our  honest  endeavors,  because  of  any  antagonist 
influence,  opposed  to  our  exertions,  which  we  can  not  over- 
come, \EfLliaye  by  our  intention  complied  with  the  spirit  of 
the  law,  andire  not  to  blame  that  the  outward  effect  does  not 
take  place.  Just  so  with  emotions.  All  we  have  power  to 
fo  do,  is,  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  mind  to  those  objects 
calculated  to  secure  a  given  state  of  emotion.  If,  from  any 
exhaustion  of  the  sensibility,  or  for  any  other  cause  beyond 
our  control,  the  emotions  do  not  arise  which  the  consideration 
of  that  subject  is  calculated  to  produce,  we  are  no  more  re- 
sponsible for.  the  absence  or  weakness  of  the  emotion,  than 
we  should  be  for  the  want  or  weakness  of  motion  in  our  mus- 
cles, when  we  willed  to  move  them,  in  consequence  of  exhaus- 
tion or  any  other  preventing  cause,  over  which  we  had  no 
control.  The  fact  is,  we  can  not  be  blame  worthy  for  not 
feeling  or  doing  that  which  we  can  not  do  or  feel  by  intending 
it.  If  the  intention  then  is  what  it  ought  to  be  for  the  time 
being,  nothing  can  be  morally  wrong. 

5.  The  last  supposition  is,  that  a  latent  preference,  or  right 
intention,  may  co-exist  with  opposing  or  sinful  volitions. 
Upon  this  I  remark: 

That  I  have  formerly  supposed  that  this  could  be  true,  but 
am  now  convinced  that  it  can  not  be  true ;  for  the  following 
reasons: 

(I.)  Observe,  the  supposition  is,  that  the  intention  or  ru- 
ling preference  may  be  right — may  really  exist  as  an  active 
and  virtuous  state  of  mind,  while,  at  the  same  time,  volition 
may  exist  inconsistent  with  it. 


166  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(2.)  Now  what  is  a  right  intention?  I  answer:  Nothing 
short  of  this — wilUng,  choosing,  or  intending  the  highest  good 
of  God  and  of  the  universe,  and  to  promote  this  at  every  mo- 
ment, to  the  extent  of  our  abiHty.  In  other  words — right  in- 
tention is  supreme,  disinterested  benevolence.  Now  what  are 
the  elements  which  enter  into  this  right  intention? 

a.  The  choice  or  wilUng  of  every  interest  according  to  its 
perceived  intrinsic  value. 

b.  To  devote  our  entire  being,  now  and  for  ever,  to  this  end. 
This  is  right  intention.  Now  the  question  is,  can  this  inten- 
tion co-exist  with  a  volition  inconsistent  with  it?  Volition  im- 
plies the  choice  of  something,  for  some  reason.  If  it  be  the 
choice  of  whatever  can  promote  this  supremely  benevolent 
end,  and  for  that  reason,  the  volition  is  consistent  with  the  in- 
tention; but  if  it  be  the  choice  of  something  perceived  to  be 
inconsistent  with  this  end,  and  for  a  selfish  reason,  then  the 
volition  is  inconsistent  with  the  supposed  intention.  But  the 
question  is,  do  the  volition  and  intention  co-exist?  According 
to  the  supposition,  the  will  chooses,  or  wills  something,  for  a 
selfish  reason,  or  something  perceived  to  be  inconsistent  with 
supreme,  disinterested  benevolence.  Now  it  is  plainly  impos- 
sible, that  this  choice  can  take  place  while  the  opposite  inten- 
tion exists.  For  this  selfish  volition  is,  according  to  the  sup- 
position, sinful  or  selfish;  that  is — something  is  chosen  for  its 
own  sake,  which  is  inconsistent  with  disinterested  benevolence. 
But  here  the  intention  is  ultimate.  It  terminates  upon  the  ob- 
ject chosen  for  its  own  sake.  To  suppose,  then,  that  benevo- 
lence still  remains  in  exercise,  and  that  a  volition  co-exists 
with  it  that  is  sinful,  involves  the  absurdity  of  supposing,  that 
selfishness  and  benevolence  can  co-exist  in  the  same  mind,  or 
that  the  will  can  choose,  or  will,  with  a  supreme  preference 
or  choice,  two  opposites,  at  the  same  time.  This  is  plainly 
impossible.  Suppose  I  intend  to  go  to  the  city  of  New  York 
as  soon  as  I  possibly  can.  Now  if,  on  my  way,  I  will  to  loiter 
unecessarily  a  moment,  I  necessarily  relinquish  one  indispen- 
sable element  of  my  intention.  In  wiUing  to  loiter,  or  turn 
aside  to  some  other  object  for  a  day,  or  an  hour,  I  must,  of 
necessity,  relinquish  the  intention  of  going  as  soon  as  I  possi- 
bly can.  I  may  not  design  to  finally  relinquish  my  journey, 
but  I  must  of  necessity  relinquish  the  intention  of  going  as 
soon  as  I  can.  Now  virtue  consists  in  intending  to  do  all  the 
good  I  possibly  can,  or  in  willing  the  glory  of  God  and  the 
good  of  the  universe,  and  intending  to  promote  them  to  the 
extent  of  my  ability.     Nothing  short  of  this  is  virtue.     Now 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  167 

if  at  any  time,  I  will  something  perceived  to  be  inconsisent 
with  this  intention,  I  must,  for  the  time  being,  relinquish  the 
intention,  as  it  must  indispensably  exist  in  my  mind  in  order 
to  be  virtue.  I  may  not  come  to  the  resolution,  that  I  will 
never  serve  God  any  more,  but  I  must  of  necessity  relinquish, 
for  the  time  bein^,  the  intention  of  doing  my  utmost  to  glorify 
God,  if  at  any  time  I  put  forth  a  selfish  volition.  For  a  selfish 
volition  implies  a  selfish  intention.  I  can  not  put  forth  a  voli- 
tion intended  to  secure  an  end  until  I  have  chosen  the  end. 
Therefore,  a  holy  intention  can  not  co-exist  with  a  selfish 
volition.  > 

It  must  be,  therefore,  that  in  every  sinful  choice,  the  will 
of  a  holy  being  must  necessarily  drop  the  exercise  of  supreme, 
benevolent  intention,  and  pass  mto  an  opposite  state  of  choice; 
that  is — the  agent  must  cease,  for  the  time  being,  to  exercise 
benevolence,  and  make  a  selfish  choice.  For  be  it  understood 
that  voHtion  is  the  choice  of  a  means  to  an  end;  and  of  course  y 
a  selfish  volition  implies  a  selfish  choice  of  an  end. 

Having  briefly  examined  the  several  suppositions  that  can 
be  made  in  regard  to  the  mixed  character  of  actions,  I  will 
now  answer  a  few  objections;  after  which,  I  will  bring  this 
philosophy  as  briefly  as  possible,  into  the  light  of  the  Bible. 

Objection.  Does  a  Christian  cease  to  be  a  Christian,  when- 
ever he  commits  a  sin?     I  answer: 

1.  Whenever  he  sins,  he  must,  for  the  time  being,  cease  to 
be  holy.     This  is  self-evident. 

2.  whenever  he  sins,  he  must  be  condemned.  He  must  in- 
cur the  penalty  of  the  law  of  God.  If  he  does  not,  it  must 
be  because  the  law  of  God  is  abrogated.  But  if  the  law  of 
God  be  abrogated,  he  has  no  rule  of  duty;  consequently,  can 
neither  be  holy  nor  sinful.  If  it  be  said  that  the  precept  is 
still  binding  upon  him,  but  that  with  respect  to  the  Christian 
the  penalty  is  forever  set  aside,  or  abrogated,  I  reply — that  to 
abrogate  the  penalty  is  to  repeal  the  precept;  for  a  precept 
without  penalty  is  no  law.  It  is  only  counsel  or  advice.  The 
Christian,  therefore,  is  justified  no  farther  than  he  obeys,  and 
must  be  condemned  when  he  disobeys,  or  Antinomianism  ^ 
is  true. 

/3.  When  the  Christian  sins,  he  must  repent,  and  'do  his 
Jrst  works,'  or  he  will  perish. 

4.  Until  he  repents  he  cannot  be  forgiven.  In  these  re- 
spects, then,  the  sinning  Christian  and  the  unconverted  sin- 
ner are  upon  precisely  the  same  ground. 

5.  In  two  important  respects  the  sinning  Christian  differs 
widely  from  the  unconverted  sinner; 


168  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(1.)  In  his  relations  to  God.  A  Christian  is  a  child  of  God. 
A  sinning  Christian  is  a  disobedient  child  of  God.  An  uncon- 
verted sinner  is  a  child  of  the  devil.  A  Christian  sustains  a 
covenant  relation  to  God,  such  a  covenant  relation  as  to  se- 
cure to  him  that  discipline  which  tends  to  reclaim  and  bring 
him 'back,  if  he  wanders  away  from  God.  ^'If  his  children 
forsake  my  law,  and  walk  not  in  my  judgments;  if  they 
break  my  statutes,  and  keep  not  my  commandments;  then  will 
I  visit  their  transgression  with  the  rod,  and  their  iniquity  with 
stripes.  Nevertheless  my  loving-kindness  will  I  not  utterly 
take  from  him,  nor  suffer  my  faithfulness  to  fail.  My  cove- 
nant will  I  not  break,  nor  alter  the  thing  that  is  gone  out  of 
my  lips."  Ps..  89:  30—34. 

(2.)  The  sinning  Christian  differs  from  the  unconverted  man, 
in  the  state  of  his  sensibility.  In  whatever  way  it  takes  place, 
every  Christian  knows  that  the  state  of  his  sensibility  in  re- 
spect to  the  things  of  God,  has  undergone  a  great  change. 
Now  it  is  true,  that  moral  character  does  not  lie  in  the  sensi- 
bility, nor  in  the  will's  obeying  the  sensibility.  Nevertheless 
our  consciousness  teaches  us,  that  our  feelings  have  great 
power  in  promoting  wrong  choice  on  the  one  hand  and  in  remo- 
ving obstacles  to  right  choice  on  the  other.  In  every  Chris- 
tian's mind  there  is,  therefore,  a  foundation  laid  for  appeals  to 
the  sensibilities  of  the  soul,  that  gives  truth  a  decided  advan- 
tage over  the  will.  And  multitudes  of  things  in  the  experi- 
ence of  every  Christian,  give  truth  a  more  decided  advantage 
over  his  will  through  the  intelligence  than  is  the  case  with  un- 
converted sinners. 

Ohj.  Can  a  man  be  born  again,  and  then  be  unborn?  I 
answer: 

/     1.  If  there  were  any  thing  impossible  in  this,  then  perse- 

I  verance  would  be  no  virtue. 

I  2.  None  will  maintain,  that  there  is  any  thing  naturally  m 
impossible  in  this,  except  it  be  those  who  hold  to  physical  re-  9 
generation.  M 

3.  If  regeneration  consist  in  a  change  in  the  ruling  prefer- 
ence of  the  mind  or  in  the  ultimate  intention,  as  we  shall  see 
it  does,  it  is  plain,  that  an  individual  can  be  born  again  and 

1    afterwards  cease  to  be  virtuous. 

\       4.  That  a  Christian  is  able  to  apostatize^  is  evident,  from  the 

I  many  warnings  addressed  to  Christians  in  the  Bible. 

I       .5.  A  Christian  may  certainly  fall  into  sin  and  unbelief^  and 

1  afterwards  be  renewed,  both  to  repentance  and  faith. 

\      Ohj*  Can  there  be  no  such  thing  as  weak  faith,  weak  love, 
»and  weak  repentance?    I  answer; 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  169 

1.  If  you  mean  comparatively  weak,  I  say,  yes.  But  if 
you  mean  weak,  in  such  a  sense  as  to  be  sinful,  I  say,  no. 
Faith,  Repentance,  Love,  and  every  Christian  grace,  properly 
so  called,  does  and  must  consist  in  an  act  of  will,  and  resolve 
itself  into  some  modification  of  supreme,  disinterested  benev- 
olence. I  shall,  in  a  future  lecture,  have  occasion  to  show  the 
philosophical  nature  of  faith.  Let  it  suffice  here  to  say, 
that  faith  necessarily  depends  upon  the  clearness  or  obscurity 
of  the  intellectual  apprehensions  of  truth.  Faith,  to  be  real 
or  virtuous,  must  embrace  whatever  of  truth  is  apprehended 
by  the  inteUigence  for  the  time  being. 

2.  Various  causes  may  operate  to  divert  the  intelligence 
from  the  objects  of  faith,  or  to  caus^  the  mind  to  perceive  but 
few  of  them,  and  those  in  comparative  obscurity. 

3.  Faith  may  be  weak,  and  will  certainly  and  necessarily  be 
weak  in  such  cases,  in  proportion  to  the  obscurity  of  the  views. 
And  jet^  if  the  will  or  heart  confides  so  far  as  it  apprehends 
the  truth,  which  it  must  do  to  be  virtuous  at  all,  faith  cannot 
be  weak  in  such  a  sense  as  to  be  sinful;  for  if  a  man  confides 
so  far  as  he  apprehends  or  perceives  the  truth,  so  far  as  faith 
is  concerned  he  is  doing  his  w  hole  duty. 

4.  Faith  may  be  weak  in  the  sense,  that  it  often  intermits 
and  gives  place  to  unbelief.  Faith  is  confidence,  and  unbe- 
lief is  the  withholding  of  confidence.  It  is  the  rejection  of 
truth  perceived.  Faith  is  the  reception  of  truth  perceived. 
Faith  and  unbelief,  then,  are  opposite  states  of  choice,  and 
can  by  no  possibility  co-exist. 

5.  Faith  may  be  weak,  in  respect  to  its  objects.  The  disci- 
ples of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  knew  so  little  of  Him,  were  so 
filled  with  ignorance  and  the  prejudices  of  education,  as  to 
have  very  weak  faith  in  respect  to  the  Messiahship,  power, 
and  divinity  of  their  Master.  He  speaks  of  them  as  having 
but  little  confidence,  and  yet  it  does  not  appear  that  they  did 
not  implicitly  trust  Him,  so  far  as  they  understood  Him.  And 
although,  through  ignorance,  their  faith  was  weak,  yet  there 
is  no  evidence,  that  when  they  had  any  faith  at  all  they  did 
not  confide  in  whatever  of  truth  they  apprehended. 

Obj.  But  did  not  the  disciples  pray,  "  Increase  our  faith  ?" 
I  answer. 

Yes.  And  by  this  they  must  have  intended  to  pray  for 
instruction;  for  what  else  could  they  mean?  Unless  a  man 
means  this,  when  he  prays  for  faith,  he  does  not  know  what  he 
prays  for.  Christ  produces  faith  by  enlightening  the  mind. 
When  we  pray  for  faith  we  pray  for  light.  And  faith,  to  be 
15 


170  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

real  faith  at  all,  must  be  equal  to  the  light  we  have.  If  appre- 
hended truth  he  not  implicitly  received  and  confided  in,  there 
is  no  faith ;  but  unbelief.  If  it  be,  faith  is  what  it  ought 
to  be,  wholly  unmixed  with  sin. 

Ohj.  But  did  not  one  say  to  our  Lord,  "Lord,  I  believe, 
help  thou  my  unbelief,"  thus  implying,  that  he  was  in  the  ex- 
ercise both  of  faith  and  unbelief  at  the  same  time?  I  an- 
swer, yes,  but, 

1.  This  was  not  inspiration. 

2.  It  is  not  certain,  that  he  had  any  faith  at  all. 

3.  If  he  had  and  prayed  understandingly,  he  meant  nothing 
more  than  to  ask  for  an  increase  of  faith,  or  for  such  a  degree 
of  light  as  to  remove  his  doubts  in  respect  to  the  divine  power 
of  Christ. 

Ohj.  Again  it  is  objected  that  this  philosophy  contradicts 
Christian  experience.     To  this  I  reply, 

1.  That  it  is  absurd  to  appeal  from  reason  and  the  Bible  to 
empirical  consciousness^  which  must  be  the  appeal  in  this  case. 
Reason  and  the  Bible  plainly  attest  the  truth  of  the  theory 
here  advocated.  What  experience  is  then  to  be  appealed  to 
to  set  their  testimony  aside  ?  Why,  christian  experience,  it  is 
replied.  But  what  is  christian  experience?  How  shall  we 
learn  what  it  is?  Why  surely  by  appealing  to  reason  and 
the  Bible.  But  these  declare  that  if  a  man  offend  in  one  point, 
he  does  and  must  for  the  time  being  violate  the  spirit  of  the 
whole  law.  Nothing  is  or  can  be  more  express  than  is  the 
testimony  of  both  reason  and  revelation  upon  this  subject. 
Here,  then,  we  have  the  unequivocal  decision  of  the  only 
court  of  competent  jurisdiction  in  the  case,  and  shall  we  be- 
fool ourselves  by  appealing  from  this  tribunal  to  the  court  of 
empirical  consciousness  ?  Of  what  does  that  take  cognizance? 
Why,  of  what  actually  passes  in  the  mind,  that  is,  of  its  men- 
tal states.  These  we  are  conscious  of  as  facts.  But  we  call 
these  states  christian  experience.  How  do  we  ascertain  that 
they  are  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  gospel  of  God? 
Why  only  by  an  appeal  to  reason  and  the  Bible.  Here,  then, 
we  are  driven  back  to  the  court  from  which  we  had  before  ap- 
pealed, whose  judgment  is  always  the  same. 

Obj,  But  it  is  said  this  theory  seems  to  be  true  in  philosophy, 
that  is,  the  intelligence  seems  to  affirm  it,  but  it  is  not  true 
in  fact 

Answer,  If  the  intelligence  affirms  it,  it  must  be  true  or 
reason  deceives  us.  But  if  the  intelligence  deceives  in  this, 
it  may  also  in  other  things.     If  it  fails  us  here,  it  fails  us  on 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  171 

the  most  important  of  all  questions.  If  reason  gives  false  tes- 
timony, we  can  never  know  truth  from  error  upon  any  moral 
subject.  We  certainly  can  never  know  what  religion  is  oris 
not,  if  the  testimony  of  reason  can  be  set  aside.  If  the  in- 
telligence can  not  be  safely  appealed  to,  how  are  we  to  know 
what  the  bible  means?  for  it  is  the  only  faculty  by  which  we 
get  at  the  truth  of  the  oracles  of  God? 

These  are  the  principal  objections  to  the  philosophical  view 
I  have  taken  of  the  simplicity  of  moral  action,  that  occur  to 
my  mind.  I  will  now  briefly  advert  to  the  consistency  of  this 
philosophy  with  the  scriptures. 

1.  The  Bible  every  where  seems  to  assume,  the  simplicity 
of  moral  action.  Christ  expressly  informed  his  disciples,  that 
they  could  not  serve  God  and  Mammon.  Now  by  this  He  did 
not  mean,  that  a  man  could  not  serve  God  at  one  time  and 
Mammon  at  another;  but  that  he  could  not  serve  both  at  the 
same  time.  The  philosophy  that  makes  it  possible  for  per- 
sons to  be  partly  holy  and  partly  sinful  at  the  same  time,  does 
make  it  possible  to  serve  God  and  Mammon  at  the  same  time, 
and  thus  flatly  contradicts  the  assertion  of  our  Savior. 

3.  James  has  expressly  settled  this  philosophy,  by  saying, 
that,  ^^  Whosoever  shall  keep  the  whole  law^,  and  yet  oflfend 
in  one  point,  he  is  guilty  of  all."  Here  he  must  mean  to  as- 
sert that  one  sin  involves  a  breach  of  the  whole  spirit  of  the 
law,  and  is  therefore  inconsistent  with  any  degree  of  holiness 
existing  with  it.  Also,  "-^  Doth  a  fountain  send  forth  at  the 
same  place  sweet  water  and  bitter  ?  Can  the  fig-tree,  my  breth- 
ren, bear  olive-berries?  either  a  vine,  figs ?  so  can  no  foun- 
tain both  yield  salt  water  and  fresh."  James  3:  II,  12. 
In  ths  passage  he  clearly  aflirms  the  simplicity  of  moral  ac- 
tion; for  by  nhe  same  place'  he  evidently  means,  the  same  time, 
and  what  he  says  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  a  man  can  not  be 
holy  and  sinful  at  the  same  time. 

3.  Christ  has  expressly  taught,  that  nothing  is  regeneration, 
or  virtue,  but  entire  obedience,  or  the  renunciation  of  all 
selfishness.  *•'  Except  a  man  forsake  all  that  he  hath,  he  can 
not  be  my  disciple." 

4.  The  manner  in  which  the  precepts  and  threatenings  of 
the  Bible  are  usually  given,  show  that  nothing  is  regarded  as 
obedience,  or  virtue,  but  doing  exactly  that  which  God 
commands. 

5.  The  common  philosophy,  that  maintains  the  co-existence 
o  f  both  sin  and  holiness  rn  the  mind  at  the  same  time,  is  vir- 
tually Antinomianism.     It  is  a  rejection  of  the  law  of  God  as 


172  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  standard  of  duty.  It  maintains,  that  something  is  holiness 
which  is  less  than  supreme  disinterested  benevolence,  or  the  de- 
votion for  the  time  of  the  whole  being  to  God.  Now  any 
philosophy  that  makes  regeneration,  or  holiness,  consist  in 
any  thing  less  than  just  that  measure  of  obedience  which  the 
law  of  God  requires,  is  Antinomianism.  It  is  a  letting  down, 
a  rejection  of  the  law  of  God. 

6.  The  very  idea  of  sin  and  holiness  co-existing  in  the 
same  mind,  is  an  absurd  philosophy,  contrary  to  scripture  and 
common  sense.  It  is  an  overlooking  of  that  in  which  holiness 
consists.  Holiness  is  obedience  to  the  law  of  God,  and  noth- 
ing else  is.  By  obedience,  I  mean  entire  obedience,  or  just 
that  which  the  law  requires.  Any  thing  else  than  that  which 
the  law  requires  is  not  obedience  and  is  not  holiness.  To 
maintain  that  it  is,  is  to  abrogate  the  law. 

I  might  go  to  great  lengths  in  the  examination  of  scripture 
testimony,  but  it  cannot  be  necessary,  or  in  these  lectures 
expedient.  I  must  close  this  lecture,  with  a  few  inferences 
and  remarks. 

1.  It  has  been  supposed  by  some,  that  the  simplicity  of 
moral  action,  has  been  resorted  to  as  a  theory  by  the  advocates 
of  entire  sanctification  in  this  life,  as  the  only  consistent 
method  of  carrying  out  their  principle.     To  this  1  reply: 

(1.)  That  this  theory  is  held  in  common,  both  by  those  who 
hold  and  those  who  deny  the  doctrine  of  entire  sanctification 
in  this  life. 

(2.)  The  truth  of  the  doctrine  of  entire  sanctification  does  not 
depend  at  all  upon  this  philosophical  theory  for  its  support; 
but  may  be  established  by  Bible  testimony,  whatever  the  phil- 
osophy of  hohness  may  be. 

2.  Growth  in  grace  consists  in  two  things: 

(I.)  In  the  stability  or  permanency  of  holy,  ultimate  in- 
tention. 

(i2.)  In  intensity  or  strength.  As  knowledge  increases, 
Christians  will  naturally  grow  in  grace,  in  both  these  re- 
spects. 

3.  The  theory  of  the  mixed  character  of  moral  actions,  is 
an  eminently  dangerous  theory,  as  it  leads  its  advocates  to 
suppose  that  in  their  acts  of  rebellion  there  is  something 
holy,  or  more  strictly,  that  there  is  some  holiness  in  them  while 
they  are  in  the  known  commission  of  sin. 

It  is  dangerous,  because  it  leads  its  advocates  to  place  the 
standard  of  conversion,  or  regeneration,  exceedingly  low;  to 
make  regeneration,  repentance,  true  love  to  God,  faith,  &c.. 


KORAL  GOVERNMENT.  173 

consistent  with  the  known  or  conscious  comnnission  of  present 
sin.  This  must  be  a  highly  dangerous  philosophy.  The  fact 
is,  that  regeneration,  or  holiness,  under  any  form,  is  quite 
another  thing  than  it  is  supposed  to  be  by  those  who  main- 
tain the  philosophy  of  the  mixed  character  of  moral  ac- 
tion. 

4.  There  can  scarcely  be  a  more  dangerous  error  than  that 
while  we  are  conscious  of  present  sin  we  are  or  can  be  in  a 
state  acceptable  to  God. 

5.  The  false  philosophy  of  many  leads  them  to  adopt  a 
phraseology  inconsistent  with  truth,  and  to  speak  as  if  they 
were  guilty  of  present  sin  when  in  fact  they  are  not,  but  are 
in  a  state  of  acceptance  with  God. 

6.  It  is  erroneous  to  say  that  Christians  sin  in  their  most 
holy  exercises,  and  it  is  as  injurious  and  dangerous  as  it  is 
false.  The  fact  is  holiness  is  holiness,  and  it  is  really  non- 
sense to  speak  of  a  holiness  that  consists  with  sin. 

7.  The  tendency  of  this  philosophy  is  to  quiet  in  their  de- 
lusions those  whose  consciences  assure  them  of  present  sin, 
as  if  this  could  be  true  and  they  in  a  state  of  acceptance  with 
God  notwithstanding. 


15* 


LECTURE   XII. 
MORAL  GOVERNMENT- 

I.  In  wha-t  sense  obedience  to  Moral  Law  can  be  par- 
tial. 

II.  The  Government  of  God  accepts  nothing  as  virtue. 

BUT  obedience  TO  MoRAL  LaW. 

/.  In  what  sense  obedience  to  Moral  Law  can  he  partial. 
In  discussing  this  subject  I  must, 

1.  Remind  you  of  the  sense  in  which  it  has  been  shown  that^ 
obedience  can  not  be  partial^  and, 

2.  Show  the  sense  in  which  it  can  be  partial. 

1.  In  what  sense  we  have  seen  that  obedience  to  moral  law 
can  not  be  partial. 

(1.)  Not  in  the  sense  that  a  moral  agent  can  at  the  same 
time  be  selfish  and  benevolent.  That  is,  a  moral  agent 
can  not  choose  as  an  ultimate  end  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  of  the  Universe,  and,  at  the  same  time,  choose  an 
opposite  end,  namely,  his  own  gratification.  In  other  words 
he  can  not  love  God  supremely  and  his  neighbor  as  him- 
self, and  at  the  same  time  love  himself  supremely,  and 
prefer  his  own  gratification  to  the  good  of  God  and  his  neigh- 
bor.    These  two  things,  we  have  seen,  can  not  be. 

(2.)  We  have  seen  that  a  moral  agent  can  not  honestly 
choose  the  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  as  an  ultimate 
end,  that  is,  for  and  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  value,  and  yet 
withhold  the  degree  of  intensity  of  choice  which  he  sees  the 
value  of  the  end  demands,  and  he  is  able  to  render.  In  other 
words,  he  can  not  be  honest  in  knowingly  and  intentionally 
withholding  from  God  and  man  their  dues.  That  is,  he  can 
not  be  honestly  dishonest. 

(3.)  We  have  seen  that  honesty  of  intention  implies  the 
esteeming  and  treating  of  every  being  and  thing  known  to 
the  mind  according  to  its  nature  and  relations,  and  every  inte- 
rest according  to  its  estimated  relative  importance  and  our 
ability  to  promote  it. 

(4.)  We  have  seen  that  neither  of  the  following  supposi- 
tions can  be  true. 

It  can  not  be  true, 

[1.]  That  an  act  or  choice  may  have  a  complex  character 
on  account  of  complexity  in  the  motives  that  induce  it* 

It  can  not  he  true, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  175 

[2.]  That  the  will  or  heart  may  be  right  while  the  emotions 
and  aifections  are  wrong  in  the  sense  of  sinful. 

It  can  not  be  true, 

[3.]  That  a  ruUng,  latent,  but  actually  existing  holy  prefer- 
ence or  intention,  may  co-exist  with  opposing  volitions. 

These  things,  we  have  seen,  can  not  be,  and  therefore  that 
the  following  is  true,  to  wit,  that  obedience  to  moral  law  can 
not  be  partial  in  the  sense  that  a  moral  agent  can  partly  obey 
and  partly  disobey  at  the  same  time;  that  he  can  not  be  both 
holy  and  unholy  in  the  same  act;  that  he  can  not  at  the  same 
time  serve  both  God  and  mammon.  This  certainly  is  the  doc- 
trine both  of  natural  and  revealed  theology.  This  summing 
up  of  what  was  taught  in  the  last  lecture  conducts  us  to  the 
discussion  of  the  second  inquiry,  namely : 

/.  In  what  sense  obedience  to  moral  law  can  be  partial. 

And  here  I  would  observe  that  the  only  sense  in  which 
obedience  to  moral  law  can  be  partial  is,  that  obedience  may 
be  intermittent.  That  is,  the  subject  may  sometimes  obey 
and  at  other  times  disobey.  He  may  at  one  time  be  selfish 
or  will  his  own  gratification  because  it  is  his  own,  and  with- 
out regard  to  the  well-being  of  God  and  his  neighbor,  and  at 
another  time  will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  Uni- 
verse as  an  end  and  his  own  good  only  in  proportion  to  its 
relative  value.  These  are  opposite  choices  or  ultimate  inten- 
tions. The  one  is  holy;  the  other  is  sinful.  One  is  obedi- 
ence and  entire  obedience,  to  the  law  of  God;  the  other  is  diso- 
bedience and  entire  disobedience  to  that  law.  These  for 
ought  we  can  see  may  succeed  each  other  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  times,  but  co-exist  they  plainly  can  not. 

//.  The  Government  of  God  accepts  nothing  as  virtue  but  obe- 
dience to  the  law  of  God. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  why  state  this  proposition?  Was 
this  truth  ever  called  in  question  1  If  such  questions  be  asked, 
I  must  answer  that  the  truth  of  this  proposition,  (though  ap- 
parently so  self-evident  that  the  suggestion  that  it  is,  or 
can  be  called  in  question,  may  reasonably  excite  astonish- 
ment,) is  generally  denied.  Indeed,  probably  nine-tenths  of 
the  nominal  church  deny  it.  They  tenaciously  hold  sentiments 
that  are  entirely  contrary  to  it,  and  amount  to  a  direct  denial 
of  it.  They  maintain  that  there  is  much  true  virtue  in  the 
world,  and  yet  that  there  is  no  one  who  ever  for  a  moment 
obeys  the  law  of  God;  that  all  christians  are  virtuous,  and 
that  they  are  truly  religious,  and  yet  not  one  on  earth  obeys 
the  moral  law  of  God;  in  short  that  God  accepts  as  virtue   ^ 


176  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

that  which  in  everj  instance  comes  short  of  ohedience  to  his 
law.  And  yet  it  is  generally  asserted  in  their  articles  of  faith 
that  obedience  to  moral  law  is  the  only  proper  evidence  of  a 
change  of  heart.  With  this  sentiment  in  their  creed,  they 
will  brand  as  a  heretic  or  as  a  hypocrite  any  one  who  profes- 
ses to  obey  the  law,  and  maintain  that  men  may  be  and  are 
pious,  and  eminently  so,  who  do  not  obey  the  law  of  God. 
This  sentiment,  which  every  one  knows  to  be  generally  held 
by  those  who  are  styled  orthodox  Christians,  must  assume 
that  there  is  some  rule  of  right  or  of  duty  beside  the  moral 
law,  or  that  virtue  or  true  religion  does  not  imply  obedience 
to  any  law.     In  this  discussion  I  shall, 

1.  Attempt  to  show  that  there  can  be  no  rule  of  right  or  duty 
hut  the  moral  law^  and, 

2.  That  nothing  can  be  virtue  or  true  religion  but  obedience  to 
this  law, 

3.  That  the  Government  of  God  acknowledges  nothing  else  as 
virtue  or  true  religion. 

1.     There  can  be  no  rule  of  duty  but  the  moral  law. 

Upon  this  proposition  I  remark, 

(1.)  That  the  moral  law,  as  we  have  seen,  is  nothing  else 
than  the  law  of  nature,  or  that  rule  of  action  which  is  found- 
ed, not  in  the  will  of  God,  but  in  the  nature  and  relations  of 
moral  agents.  It  prescribes  the  course  of  action  which  is 
agreeable  or  suitable  to  our  nature  and  relations.  It  is  unal- 
terably right  to  act  in  conformity  with  our  nature  and  rela- 
tions. To  deny  this  is  palpably  absurd  and  contradictory. 
But  if  this  is  right  nothing  else  can  be  right.  If  this  course 
is  obligatory  upon  us  by  virtue  of  our  nature  and  relations, 
no  other  course  can  possibly  be  obligatory  upon  us.  To  act 
in  conformity  with  our  nature  and  relations,  must  be  right  and 
nothing  more  or  less  can  be  right.  If  these  are  not  truths 
of  intuition,  then  there  are  no  such  truths. 

(2.)  God  has  never  proclaimed  any  other  rule  of  duty,  and 
should  He  do  it,  it  could  not  be  obligatory.  The  moral  law 
did  not  originate  in  His  arbitrary  will.  He  did  not  create  it, 
nor  can  He  alter  it,  or  introduce  any  other  rule  of  right  among 
moral  agents.  Can  God  make  any  thing  else  right  than  to 
love  him  with  all  the  heart  and  our  neighbor  as  ourselves? 
Surely  not.  Some  have  strangely  dreamed  that  the  law  of] 
faith  has  superseded  the  moral  law.  But  we  shall  see  that 
moral  law  is  not  made  void  but  is  estabHshed  by  the  law  of; 
faith.  True  faith,  from  its  very  nature,  always  implies  love 
or  obedience  to  the  moral  law,  and  love  or  obedience  to  the 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  177 

moral  law  always  implies  faith.  As  has  been  said  on  a  former 
occasion,  no  being  can  create  law.  Nothing  is  or  can  be 
obligatory  on  a  moral  agent  but  the  course  of  conduct  suited 
to  his  nature  and  relations.  No  being  can  set  aside  the  obli- 
gation to  do  this.  Nor  can  any  being  render  any  thing  more 
than  this  obhgatory.  Indeed  there  can  not  possibly  be  any 
other  rule  of  duty  than  the  moral  law.  There  can  be  no  oth- 
er standard  with  which  to  compare  our  actions,  and  in  the 
light  of  which  to  decide  their  moral  character.  This  brings 
us  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  proposition,  namely: 

//.  That  nothing  can  he  virtue  or  true  religion  but  obedience  to 
the  moral  law, 

^y  this  two  things  are  intended: 

(1.)  That  every  modification  of  true  virtue  is  only  obedi- 
ence to  moral  law. 

(2.)  That  nothing  can  be  virtue  but  just  that  which  the 
moral  law  requires. 

That  every  modification  of  true  virtue  is  only  obedience  to 
moral  law  will  appear  if  we  consider, 

[1.]  That  virtue  is  identical  with  true  religion. 

[2.]  That  true  rehgion  can  not  properly  consist  in  any  thing 
else  than  the  love  to  God  and  man  enjoined  by  the  moral  law. 

[3.]  That  the  bible  expressly  recognizes  love  as  the  fulfill- 
ing of  the  law,  and  as  expressly  denies  that  any  thing  else  is 
acceptable  to  God. 

-'Therefore  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law."  "  Though  I 
speak  with  the  tongues  of  men  and  of  angels,  and  have  not 
charity,  (love.)  I  am  become  as  sounding  brass  or  a  tinkling 
cymbal.  And  though  I  have  the  gift  of  prophecy,  and  under- 
stand all  mysteries  and  all  knowledge;  and  thcfugh  I  have  all 
faith  so  that  I  could  remove  mountains  and  have  not  charity  I 
am  nothing.  And  though  I  bestow  all  my  goods  to  feed  the 
poor,  and  though  I  give  my  body  to  be  burned  and  have  not 
charity,  (love)  it  profiteth  me  nothing." 

Love  is  repeatedly  recognized  in  the  bible,  not  only  as  con- 
stituting true  religion,  but  as  being  the  whole  of  religion. 
Every  form  of  true  religion  is  only  a  form  of  love  or  benevo- 
lence. Repentance  consists  in  the  turning  of  the  soul  from  a 
state  of  selfishness  to  benevolence,  from  disobedience  to  God's 
law,  to  obedience  to  it.  Faith  is  the  receiving  of,  or  confiding 
in,  embracing,  loving,  truth  and  the  God  of  truth.  It  is  only 
a  modification  of  love  to  God  and  Christ.  Every  christian 
grace  or  virtue,  as  we  shall  more  fully  see  when  we  come  to 
consider  them  in  deteiil,  is  only  a  modification  of  love.     God 


1?8  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

is  love.  Every  modification  of  virtue  and  holiness  in  God  is 
only  love  or  the  state  of  mind  which  the  moral  law  requires 
alike  of  him  and  of  us.  Benevolence  is  the  whole  of  virtue 
in  God  and  in  all  holy  beings.  Justice,  truthfulness,  and  every 
moral  attribute,  is  only  benevolence  viewed  in  particular  rela- 
tions. 

JVothing  can  be  virtue  that  is  not  just  what  the  moral  law 
demands.  That  w,  nothing  short  of  what  it  requires  can  be  in 
any  sense  virtue. 

The  common  idea  seems  to  be  that  a  kind  of  obedience  is 
rendered  to  God  by  Christians  which  is  true  religion,  and 
which  on  Christ's  account  is  accepted  of  God,  which  after  all 
comes  indefinitely  short  of  full  or  entire  obedience  at  any 
moment;  that  the  Gospel  has  somehow  brought  men,  that  is, 
Christians,  into  suchrelations  that  God  really  accepts  of  them 
an  imperfect  obedience,  something  far  below  what  His  law 
requires;  that  Christians  are  accepted  and  justified  while  they 
render  at  best  but  a  partial  obedience,  and  while  they  sin 
more  or  less  at  every  moment.  Now  this  appears  to  me  to  be 
as  radical  an  error  as  can  well  be  taught.  This  question 
naturally  branches  out  into  two  distinct  inquiries: 

(1.)  Is  it  possible  for  a  moral  agent  partly  to  obey  and  part- 
ly to  disobey  the  moral  law  at  the  same  time  ? 

(2.)  Can  God  in  any  sense  justify  one  who  does  not  yield  a 
present  and  full  obedience  to  the  moral  law? 

The  first  of  these  questions  has  been  fully  discussed  under 
another  head.  We  think  it  has  been  shown  that  obedience 
to  the  moral  law  can  not  be  partial  in  the  sense  that  the  sub- 
ject can  partly  obey  and  partly  disobey  at  the  same  time. 

We  will  now  attend  to  the  second  question,  namely:  Can 
God,  in  any  sense  justify  one  who  does  not  yield  a  present 
and  full  obedience  to  the  moral  law?  Or,  in  other  words,  can 
he  accept  any  thing  as  virtue  or  obedience  which  is  not  for  the 
time  being  full  obedience,  or  all  that  the  law  requires? 

The  term  justification  is  used  in  two  senses. 

[1.]  In  the  sense  of  pronouncing  the  subject  blameless. 

[2.]  In  the  sense  of  pardon  and  acceptance. 

It  is  in  this  last  sense  that  the  advocates  of  this  theory 
hold  that  Christians  are  justified,  that  is,  that  they  are  pardoned 
and  accepted  and  treated  as  just,  though  at  every  moment 
sinning  by  coming  short  of  rendering  that  obedience  which 
the  moral  law  demands.  They  do  not  pretend  that  they  are 
justified  at  any  moment  by  the  law,  for  that  at  every  moment 
condemns  them  for  present  sin,  but  that  they  are  justified  by 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  179 

grace,  not  in  the  sense  that  they  are  made  really  and  person- 
ally righteous  by  grace,  but  that  grace  pardons  and  accepts, 
and  in  this  sense  justifies  them  when  they  are  in  the  present 
commission  of  an  indefinite  amount  of  sin ;  that  grace  accounts 
them  righteous  while  in  fact  they  are  continually  sinning; 
that  they  are  fully  pardoned  and  acquitted  while  at  the  same 
moment  committing  sin.  While  voluntarily  withholding  full 
obedience,  their  partial  obedience  is  accepted,  and  the  sin  of 
withholding  full  obedience  is  forgiven.  God  accepts  what 
the  sinner  has  a  mind  to  give,  and  forgives  what  he  voluntari- 
ly withholds.  This  is  no  caricature.  It  is,  if  I  understand 
them,  precisely  what  many  hold.  In  considering  this  subject, 
I  wish  to  propose  for  discussion  the  following  inquiries  as  of 
fundamental  importance. 

1.  If  a  present  partial  obedience  can  be  accepted,  how 
great  apart  may  be  withholden  and  we  be  accepted? 

2.  If  we  are  forgiven  while  voluntarily^  withholding  a  part 
of  that  which  would  constitute  full  obedience,  are  we  not  for- 
given sin  of  which  we  do  not  repent,  and  forgiven  while  in  the 
act  of  committing  the  sin  for  which  we  are  forgiven? 

3.  What  good  can  result  to  the  sinner,  to  God,  or  to  the 
universe  from  forgiving  impenitence,  or  sin  which  is  per- 
sisted in? 

4.  Has  God  a  right  to  pardon  present,  and  of  course  unre- 
pented  sin? 

5.  Have  we  a  right  to  ask  him  to  forgive  present  unrepent- 
edsin? 

6.  Must  not  confession  of  present  and  of  course  unrepent- 
ed  sin  be  base  hypocrisy? 

7.  Does  the  bible  recognize  the  pardon  of  present  and  un- 
repented  sin? 

8.  Does  the  bible  recognize  any  justification  in  sin? 

9.  Can  there  be  such  a  thing  as  partial  repentance  of  sin? 
That  is,  does  not  repentance  imply  present  full  obedience  to 
the  law  of  God? 

10.  Must  not  that  be  a  gross  error  that  represents  God  as 
pardoning  and  justifying  a  sinner  in  the  present  voluntary 
commission  of  sin? 

11.  Can  there  be  any  other  than  a  voluntary  sin? 
1*2.  Must  not  present  sin  beunrepented  sin? 

We  will  now  attend  to  these  questions  in  their  order. 

1.  How  much  sin  may  we  commit,  or  how  much  may  we  at 
every  moment  come  short  of  full  obedience  to  the  Jaw  of 
God,  and  yet  be  accepted  and  justified? 


180  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

This  must  be  an  enquiry  of  infinite  importance.  If  we 
may  willfully  withhold  a  part  of  our  hearts  from  God  and  yet 
be  accepted,  how  great  a  part  may  we  withhold?  If  we  may 
love  God  with  less  than  all  our  hearts  and  our  neighbor  less 
than  ourselves  and  be  accepted,  how  much  less  than  supreme 
love  to  God  and  equal  love  to  our  neighbor  will  be  ac- 
cepted? 

Shall  we  be  told  that  the  least  degree  of  true  love  to  God 
and  our  neighbor  will  be  accepted?  But  what  is  true  love  to 
God  and  our  neighbor?  This  is  the  point  of  inquiry.  Is 
that  true  love  which  is  not  what  is  required?  If  the  least 
degree  of  love  to  God  will  be  accepted,  then  we  may  love 
ourselves  more  than  we  love  God  and  yet  be  accepted.  We 
maj'  love  God  a  little,  and  ourselves  much,  and  still  be  in  a 
state  of  acceptance  with  God.  We  may  love  God  a  little 
and  our  neighbor  a  little  and  ourselves  more  than  we  love 
God  and  all  our  neighbors,  and  yet  be  in  a  justified  state.  Or 
shall  we  be  told  that  God  must  be  loved  supremely?  But 
what  is  intended  by  this?  Is  supreme  love  a  loving  with  all 
the  heart?  But  this  is  full  and  not  partial  obedience;  but  the 
latter  is  the  thing  about  which  we  are  inquiring.  Or  is  su- 
preme love,  not  love  with  all  the  heart,  but  simply  a  higher 
degree  of  love  than  we  exercise  toward  any  other  being? 
But  how  much  greater  must  it  be  ?  Barely  a  little  ?  How  are 
we  to  measure  it?  In  what  scale  are  we  to  weigh,  or  by  what 
standard  are  we  to  measure  our  love  so  as  to  know  whether 
we  love  God  a  little  more  than  any  other  being?  But  how 
much  are  we  to  love  our  neighbor  in  order  to  our  being  accep- 
ted? If  we  may  love  him  a  little  less  than  ourselves,  how 
much  less  and  still  be  justified  ?  These  are  certainly  questions 
of  vital  importance.  But  such  questions  look  like  trifling. 
But  why  should  they  ?  If  the  theory  I  am  examining  be  true, 
these  questions  must  not  only  be  asked,  but  they  must  admit 
of  a  satisfactory  answer.  The  advocates  of  the  theory  in 
question  are  bound  to  answer  them.  And  if  they  can  not,  it 
is  only  because  their  theory  is  false.  Is  it  possible  that  their 
theory  should  be  true  and  yet  no  one  be  able  to  answer  such 
vital  questions  as  these  just  proposed?  If  a  partial  obedience 
-can  be  accepted,  it  is  a  momentous  question  how  partial  orj 
how  complete  must  that  obedience  be?  I  say  again,  that  this 
is  a  question  of  agonizing  interest.  God  forbid  that  w< 
should  be  left  in  the  dark  here.  But  let  us  look  at  the  secon( 
question. 

2.    If  we  are  forgiven   while  voluntarily  withholding 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  181 

part  of  that  which  would  constitute  full  obedience,  are  we  not 
forgiven  sin  of  which  we  do  not  repent,  and  forgiven  while 
in  the  act  of  committing  the  sin  for  which  we  are  forgiven? 

The  theory  in  question  is  that  Christians  never  at  any  time 
in  this  world  yield  a  full  obedience  to  the  Divine  law;  that 
they  always  withhold  a  part  of  their  hearts  from  the  Lord, 
and  yet  while  in  the  very  act  of  committing  this  abominable 
sin  of  voluntarily  defrauding  God  and  their  neighbor,  God 
accepts  their  persons  and  their  services,  fully  forgives  and 
justifies  them.  What  is  this  but  pardoning  present  and  per- 
tinacious rebellion!  Receiving  to  favor  a  God-defrauding 
wretch!  Forgiving  a  sin  unrepented  of  and  detestably  per- 
severed in?  Yes  this  must  be,  if  it  be  true  that  Christians  are 
justified  without  present  full  obedience.  That  surely  must  be 
a  doctrine  of  devils  that  represents  God  as  receiving  to  favor 
a  rebel  who  has  at  least  one  hand  filled  with  weapons  against 
his  throne. 

3.  But  what  good  can  result  to  God  or  the  sinner  or  to  the 
universe  by  thus  pardoning  and  justifying  an  unsanctified 
soul?  Can  God  be  honored  by  such  a  proceeding?  Will 
the  holy  universe  the  more  respect  fear  and  honor  God  for 
such  a  proceeding?  Does  it,  can  it  commend  itself  to  the  in- 
telHgence  of  the  universe? 

Will  pardon  and  justification  save  the  sinner,  while  yet  he 
continues  to  withhold  a  part,  at  least,  of  his  heart  from  God  ? 
While  he  still  cleaves  to  a  part  of  his  sins  ?  Can  heaven  be  ed- 
ified or  hell  confounded,  and  its  cavils  silenced  by  such  a  meth- 
od of  justification? 

4.  But  again:  Has  God  a  right  to  pardon  unrepented  sin? 
Some  may  feel  shocked  at  the  question,  and  may  insist  that 

this  is  a  question  which  we  have  no  right  to  agitate.  But  let 
me  inquire:  Has  God  a  right  to  act  arbitrarily?  Is  there  not 
some  course  of  conduct  which  is  suitable  in  him  ?  Has  he  not  giv- 
en us  intelligence  on  purpose  that  we  may  be  able  to  see  and 
judge  of  the  propriety  of  his  public  acts?  Does  He  not  in- 
vite and  require  scrutiny?  Why  has  He  required  an  atone- 
ment for  sin,  and  why  has  He  required  repentance  at  all? 
Who  does  not  know  that  no  executive  magistrate  has  a  right 
to  pardon  unrepented  sin?  The  lowest  terms  upon  which 
any  ruler  can  exercise  mercy,  are  repentance,  or  which  is  the 
same  thing,  a  return  to  obedience.  Who  ever  heard  in  any 
government  of  a  rebel's  being  pardoned  while  he  only  renoun- 
ced a  part  of  his  rebellion?  To  pardon  him  while  any  part  of 
his  rebellion  is  persevered  in,  were  to  sanction  by  a  public  act 
16 


182  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

that  which  is  lacking  in  his  repentance.     It  were  to  pronounce 
a  public  justification  of  his  refusal  to  render  full  obedience. 

5.  But  have  we  a  right  to  ask  forgiveness  while  we  perse- 
vere in  the  sin  of  withholding  a  part  of  our  heart  from  Him? 

God  has  no  right  to  forgive,  and  we  have  no  right  to  desire 
him  to  forgive  us  while  we  keep  back  any  part  of  the  price. 
While  we  persist  in  defrauding  God  and  our  neighbor,  we  can 
not  profess  penitence  and  ask  forgiveness  without  gross  hy- 
pocrisy. And  shall  God  forgive  us  while  we  can  not  without 
hypocrisy  even  profess  repentance?  To  ask  for  pardon  while 
we  do  not  repent  and  cease  from  sin,  is  a  gross  insult  to  God. 

6.  But  does  the  bible  recognize  the  pardon  of  present  un- 
repented  sin? 

Let  the  passage  be  found,  if  it  can  be,  where  sin  is  repre- 
sented as  pardoned  or  pardonable  unless  repented  of  and  fully 
forsaken.  No  such  passage  can  be  found.  The  opposite  of 
this  always  stands  revealed  expressly  or  impliedly  on  every 
page  of  Divine  Inspiration. 

7.  Does  the  bible  any  where  recognize  a  justification  in  sin  ? 

Where  is  such  a  passage  to  be  found?  Does  not  the  law  con- 
demn sin,  every  degree  of  it?  Does  it  not  unalterably  con- 
demn the  sinner  in  whose  heart  the  vile  abomination  is  found? 
If  a  soul  can  sin,  and  yet  not  be  condemned,  then  it  must  be 
because  the  law  is  abrogated,  for  surely  if  the  law  still  remains 
in  force,  it  must  condemn  all  sin.  James  most  unequivocally 
teaches  this:  '^  If  any  man  keep  the  whole  law,  and  yet 
offend  in  one  point,  he  is  guilty  of  all."  What  is  this  but  as- 
serting that  if  there  could  be  a  partial  obedience,  it  would  be 
unavailing,  since  the  law  would  condemn  for  any  degree  of 
sin;  that  partial  obedience,  did  it  exist,  would  not  be  re- 
garded as  acceptable  obedience  at  all?  The  doctrine  that  a 
partial  obedience  (in  the  sense- that  the  law  is  not  at  any  time 
fully  obeyed,)  is  accepted  of  God,  is  sheer  Antinomianism. — 
What!  a  sinner  justified  while  indulging  in  rebellion  against 
Godl 

But  it  has  been  generally  held  in  the  church  that  a  sinner 
must  intend  fully  to  obey  the  law  as  a  condition  of  justifica- 
tion; that  in  his  purpose,  intention,  he  must  forsake  all  sin;  that 
nothing  short  of  perfection  of  aim  or  intention  can  be  accept- 
ed of  God.  Now,  what  is  intended  by  this  language?  We 
have  seen  in  former  lectures  that  moral  character  belongs 
properly  only  to  the  intention.  If,  then,  perfection  of  inten- 
tion be  an  indispensable  condition  of  justification,  what  is  this 
but  an  admission  after  all  that  full  present  obedience  is  a  con- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  183 

ditioii  of  justification?  But  this  is  what  we  hold  and  they  de- 
ny. What  then  can  they  mean?  It  is  of  importance  to  as- 
certain what  is  intended  by  the  assertion  repeated  by  them 
thousands  of  times  that  a  sinner  can  not  be  justified  but  upon 
condition  that  he  fully  purposes  and  intends  to  abandon  all 
sin  and  to  live  without  sin;  unless  he  seriously  intends  to  ren- 
der full  obedience  to  all  the  commands  of  God.  Intends  to 
obey  the  law!  What  constitutes  obedience  to  the  law?  Why, 
love,  good  willing,  good  intending.  Intending  to  obey  the 
law  is  intending  to  intend,  willing  to  will,  choosing  to  choose! 
This  is  absurd. 

What  then  is  the  state  of  mind  which  is  and  must  be  the 
condition  of  justification?  Not  merely  an  intention  to  obey, 
for  this  is  only  an  intending  to  intend,  but  intending  what  the 
law  requires  to  be  intended,  to  wit,  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  of  the  universe.  Fully  intending  this,  and  not  fully 
intending  to  intend  this,  is  the  condition  of  justification.  But 
fully  intending  this,  is  full  present  obedience  to  the  law. 

But  again:  It  is  absurd  to  say  that  a  man  can  intend  fully 
to  obey  the  law  unless  he  actually  fully  intends  what  the  law 
requires  him  to  intend.  The  law  requires  him  fully  to  intend 
the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe.  And  un- 
less he  intends  this,  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  he  can  intend  full 
obedience  to  the  law;  that  he  intends  to  live  without  sin. — 
Why,  the  supposition  is  that  he  is  now  sinning,  that  is,  (for  no- 
thing else  is  sin)  voluntarily  withholding  from  God  and  man 
their  due.  He  chooses,wills  and  intends  this,  and  yet  the  sup- 
position is,  that  at  the  same  time  he  chooses,  wills,  intends 
fully  to  obey  the  law.  What  is  this  but  the  ridiculous  asser- 
tion that  he  at  the  same  time  intends  full  obedience  to  the  law 
and  intends  not  fully  to  obey,  but  only  to  obey  in  part,  volun- 
tarily withholding  from  God  and  man  their  dues. 

But  again  to  the  question,  can  man  be  justified  while  sin  re- 
mains in  him?  Surely  he  can  not  either  upon  legal  or  gospel 
principles,  unless  the  law  be  repealed.  That  he  can  not  be 
justified  by  the  law  while  there  is  a  particle  of  sin  in  him,  is 
too  plain  to  need  proof.  But  can  he  be  pardoned  and  accept- 
ed, and  then  justified  in  the  gospel  sense,  while  sin,  any  de- 
gree of  sin,  remains  in  him?  Certainly  not.  For  the  law,  un- 
less it  be  repealed  and  antinomianism  be  true,  continues  to 
condemn  him  while  there  is  any  degree  of  sin  in  him.  It  is  a 
contradiction  to  say  that  he  can  be  pardoned  and  at  the  same 
time  condemned.  But  if  he  is  all  the  time  coming  short  of  full 
obedience,  there  never  is  a  moment  in  which  the  law  is  not 


184  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

uttering  its  curses  against  him.  '•^Cursed  is  every  one  that 
continueth  not  in  all  things  that  are  written  in  the  book  of  the 
law,  to  do  them."  The  fact  is,  there  never  has  been,  and 
there  never  can  be  any  such  thing  as  sin  without  condemna- 
tion. '''Beloved,  if  our  own  heart  condemn  us,  God  is  greater 
than  our  heart,"  that  is,  he  much  more  condemns  us.  '^But  if 
our  heart  condemn  us  not,  then  have  we  confidence  towards 
God."  God  can  not  repeal  the  law.  It  is  not  founded  in  his 
arbitrary  will.  It  is  as  unalterable  and  unrepealable  as  his 
own  nature.  God  can  never  repeal  nor  alter  it.  He  can,  for 
Christ's  sake,  dispense  with  the  execution  of  the  penalty  when 
the  subject  has  returned  to  full  present  obedience  to  the  pre- 
cept, but  in  no  other  case,  and  upon  no  other  possible  condi- 
tions. To  affirm  that  he  can,  is  to  affirm  that  God  can  alter 
the  immutable  and  eternal  principles  of  moral  law  and  moral 
government. 

8.  The  next  inquiry  is,  can  there  be  such  a  thing  as  a  par- 
tial repentance  of  sin?  That  is,  does  not  true  repentance 
imply  a  return  to  present  full  obedience  to  the  law  of  God? 

In  consideriiig  this  question,  I  will  state  briefly, 

(1.)  What  repentance  is  not. 

(2.)  What  it  is. 

(3.)  What  is  not  implied  in  it. 

(4.)  What  is. 

I  shall  in  this  place  only  state  these  points  briefly,  leaving 
their  full  consideration  to  their  appropriate  place  in  this  course 
of  instruction. 

(1.)  What  repentance  is  not. 

[1.]  It  is  not  a  phenomenon  of  the  intelKgence.  It  does  not 
consist  in  conviction  of  sin,  nor  in  any  intellectual  views  of  sin 
whatever. 

[2.]  It  is  not  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibihty.  It  does  not 
consist  in  a  feeling  of  regret,  or  remorse,  or  of  sorrow  of  any 
kind  or  degree.     It  is  not  a  feeling  of  any  kind. 

(2.)  What  it  is. 

The  primary  signification  of  the  word  rendered  repentance 
is,  to  think  again,  but  more  particularly,  to  change  the  mind 
in  conformity  with  a  second  thought,  or  in  accordance  with  a 
more  rational  and  intelligent  view  of  the  subject.  To  repent 
is  to  change  the  choice,  purpose,  intention.  It  is  to  choose  a 
new  end,  to  begin  a  new  fife,  to  turn  from  self-seeking  to  seek- 
ing the  highest  good  of  being,  to  turn  from  selfishness  to  disin- 
terested benevolence,  from  a  state  of  disobedience  to  a  state 
of  obedience. 

(3.)  What  is  not  implied  in  it. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  185 

[1.]  It  does  not  imply  the  remembrance  of  all  past  sin. — 
This  would  be  implied  if  repentance  consisted,  as  some  seem 
to  suppose,  in  sorrowing  over  every  particular  sin.  But  as 
repentance  consists  in  returning  or  turning  to  God,  from  the 
spirit  of  self-seeking  and  self-pleasing  to  the  spirit  of  seeking 
the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe,  no  such 
thing  as  the  remembrance  of  all  past  sin  is  implied  in  it. 

[2.]  It  does  not  imply  a  continual  sorrowing  for  past  sin; 
for  past  sin  is  not,  can  not  be,  ought  not  to  be  the  subject  of 
continual  thought. 

(4.)  What  is  implied  in  it. 

[L]  An  understanding  of  the  nature  of  sin,  that  it  consists 
in  the  spirit  of  self-seeking,  or  in  selfishness.  This  is  impUed, 
as  a  condition  upon  which  repentance  can  be  exercised. 

[2.]  A  turning  from  this  state  to  a  state  of  consecration  to 
God  and  the  good  of  the  universe. 

[3.]  Sorrow  for  past  sin  when  it  is  remembered.  This  and 
the  following  particulars  are  implied  in  repentance  as  neces- 
sarily following  from  it. 

[4.]  Universal,  outward  reformation. 

[5.]  Hatred  of  sin. 

[6.]  Self-loathing  on  account  of  sin. 

Certainly  if  repentance  means  and  implies  any  thing,  it  does 
imply  a  thorough  reformation  of  heart  and  life.  A  reforma- 
tion of  heart  consists  in  turning  from  selfishness  to  benevo- 
lence. We  have  seen  in  a  former  lecture  that  selfishness  and 
benevolence  can  not  co-exist  in  the  same  mind.  They  are 
the  supreme  choice  of  opposite  ends.  These  ends  can  not 
both  be  chosen  at  the  same  time.  To  talk  of  partial  repent- 
ance as  a  possible  thing  is  to  talk  nonsense.  It  is  to  overlook 
the  very  nature  of  repentance.  What!  a  man  both  turn  away 
from  and  hold  on  to  sin  at  the  same  time?  Serve  God  and 
Mammon  at  one  and  the  same  time!  It  is  impossible.  This 
impossibility  is  affirmed  both  by  reason  and  by  Christ. 

9.  The  ninth  inquiry  is :  Must  not  that  be  a  gross  error 
that  represents  God  as  pardoning  and  justifying  a  sinner  in  the 
present  willful  commission  of  sin?    I  answer,  yes, 

(1.)  Because  it  is  antinomianism,  than  which  there  is  scarce- 
ly any  form  of  error  more  God-dishonoring. 

(2.)  Because  it  represents  God  as  doing  what  He  has  no 
right  to  do,  and  therefore,  as  doing  what  He  can  not  do  without 
sinning  himself 

(3.)  Because  it  represents  Christ  as  the  minister  of  sin, 
16* 


186  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and  as  justifying  his  people  in  their  sins,  instead  of  saving 
them  from  their  sins. 

(4.)  Because  it  represents  God  as  making  void  instead  of 
establishing  the  law  through  faith. 

(5.)  Because  it  is  a  prolific  source  of  delusion,  leading  mul- 
titudes to  think  themselves  justified  while  living  in  known  sin. 
But  perhaps  it  will  be  objected  that  the  sin  of  those  who  render 
but  a  partial  obedience,  and  whom  God  pardons  and  accepts, 
is  not  a  voluntary  sin.     This  leads  to  the  tenth  inquiry: 
10.  Can  there  be  any  other  than  a  voluntary  sin? 
What  is  sin?     Sin  is  a  transgression  of  the  law.     The  law 
requires  benevolence,  good  willing.     Sin  is  not  a  mere  nega- 
tion or  a  not  willing,  but  consists  in  wiUing  self-gratification. 
It  is  a  willing  contrary  to  the  commandment  of  God.     Sin  as 
well  as  holiness  consists  in  choosing,  wilhng,  intending.     Sin 
must  be  voluntary.     That  is,  it  must  be  intelHgent  and  volun- 
tary.    It  consists  in  willing,  and  it  is  nonsense  to  deny  that 
sin  is  voluntary.     The  fact  is  there  is  either  no  sin  or  there 
is  voluntary  sin.     Benevolence  is  wilhng  the  good  of  being 
in  general  as  an  end,  and  of  course  impUes  the  rejection  of 
self-gratification  as  an  end.     So  sin  is  the  choice  of  self-grati- 
fication as  an  end,  and  necessarily  implies  the  rejection  of  the 
good  of  being  in  general  as  an  end.     Sin  and  hohness  natu- 
rally and  necessarily  exclude  each  other.     They  are  eternal 
opposites  and  antagonists.     Neither  can  consist  with  the  pres- 
ence of  the  other  in  the  heart.     They  consist  in   the  active 
state  of  the  will,  and  there  can  be  no  sin  or  holiness  that  does 
not  consist  in  choice. 

12.  Must  not  present  sin  be  unrepented  sin? 
Yes,  it  is  impossible  for  one  to  repent  of  present  sin.  To  affirm 
that  present  sin  is  repented  of  is  to  affirm  a  contradiction.  It 
is  overlooking  both  the  nature  of  sin  and  the  nature  of  re- 
pentance. Sin  is  selfish  willing;  repentance  is  turning  from 
selfish  to  benevolent  wilhng.  These  two  states  of  will,  as  has 
just  been  said,  cannot  possibly  co-exist.  Whoever,  then,  is 
at  present  falling  short  of  full  obedience  to  the  law  of  God,  is 
voluntarily  sinning  against  God  and  is  impenitent.  It  is  non- 
sense to  say  that  he  is  partly  penitent  and  partly  impenitent; 
that  he  is  penitent  so  far  as  he  obeys,  and  impenitent  so  far 
as  he  disobeys.  This  realjy  seems  to  be  the  loose  idea  of 
many,  that  a  man  can  be  partly  penitent  and  partly  impeni- 
tent at  the  same  time.  This  idea  doubtless  is  founded  on 
the  mistake  that  repentance  consists  in  sorrow  for  sin,  or  is 
a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility.    But  we  have  seen  that  re- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  187 

pentance  consists  in  a  change  of  ultimate  intention,  a  change 
in  the  choice  of  an  end,  a  turning  from  selfishness  to  supreme 
disinterested  benevolence.  It  is,  therefore,  plainly  impossi- 
ble for  one  to  be  partly  penitent  and  partly  impenitent  at  the 
same  time,  inasmuch  as  penitence  and  impenitence  consist 
in  supreme  opposite  choices. 

So  then  it  is  plain  that  nothing  is  accepted  as  virtue  under 
the  government  of  God  but  present  full  obedience  to  his  law. 

REMARKS. 

1.  If  what  has  been  said  is  true,  we  see  that  the  church  has  fall- 
en into  a  great  and  ruinous  mistake  in  supposing  that  a  state 
ofsinlessness  is  a  very  rare,  if  not  an  impossible  attainment  in 
this  Hfe.  If  the  doctrine  of  this  lecture  be  true,  it  follows  that 
the  very  beginning  of  true  religion  in  the  soul,  implies  the  re- 
nunciation of  all  sin.  Sin  ceases  where  holiness  begins. — 
Now,  how  great  and  ruinous  must  that  error  be  that  teaches 
us  to  hope  for  heaven  while  living  in  conscious  sin;  to  look 
upon  a  sinless  state  as  not  to  be  expected  in  this  world;  that 
it  is  a  dangerous  error  to  expect  to  stop  sinning  even  for  an 
hour  or  a  moment  in  this  world;  and  yet  to  hope  for  heaven! 
And  how  infinitely  unreasonable  must  that  state  of  mind  be  that 
can  brand  as  heretics  those  who  teach  that  God  justifies  no 
one  but  upon  condition  of  present  sinlessness! 

2.  How  great  and  ruinous  the  error  that  justification  is 
conditionated  upon  a  faith  that  does  not  purify  the  heart  of 
the  believer;  that  one  may  be  in  a  state  of  justification  who 
lives  in  the  constant  commission  of  more  or  less  sin.  This  er- 
ror has  slain  more  souls,  I  fear,  than  all  the  universalism  that 
ever  cursed  the  world. 

3.  We  see  that  if  a  righteous  man  forsake  his  righteousness 
and  die  in  his  sin,  he  must  sink  to  hell. 

4.  We  see  that  whenever  a  christian  sins  he  comes  under 
condemnation,  and  must  repent  and  do  his  first  works,  or  be 
lost. 


■ 


/ 


LECTURE   XIII. 

MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

What  is  not  implied  in  obedience  to  Moral  Law. 

/.  /  will  state  briefly  what  constitutes  obedience. 

II.   What  is  not  implied  in  it. 

I.  What  constitutes  obedience  to  moral  law. 

1.  We  have  seen  that  all  that  the  law  requires  is  summa- 
rily expressed  in  the  single  word  love;  that  this  word  is  sy- 
nonymous with  benevolence;  that  benevolence  consists  in  the 
choice  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe 
as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake;  that  this  choice  is  an  ultimate 
intention.  In  short  we  have  seen  that  good  will  to  being  in 
general  is  obedience  to  the  moral  law.  Now  the  question  be- 
fore us  is,  what  is  not  implied  in  this  good  will  or  in  this  be- 
nevolent ultimate  intention  ?  I  will  here  introduce,  with  some 
alteration,  what  I  have  formerly  said  upon  this  subject. 

As  the  law  of  God,  as  revealed  in  the  Bible,  is  the  stand- 
ard and  the  only  standard  by  which  the  question  in  regard  to 
what  is  not,  and  what  is  implied  in  entire  sanctification  is  to 
be  decided,  it  is  of  fundamental  importance  that  we  under- 
stand what  is  and  what  is  not  implied  in  entire  obedience  to 
this  law.     It  must  be  apparent  to  all  that  this  inquiry  is  of 
prime  importance.     And  to  settle  this  question  is  one  of  the 
main  things  to  be  attended  to  in  this  discussion.     The  doc- 
trine of  the  entire  satisfaction  of  believers  in  this  life  can 
never  be  satisfactorily  settled  until  it  is  understood.     And  it 
can  not  be  understood  until  it  is  known  what  is  and  what  is 
not  implied  in  it.     Our  judgment  of  our  own  state  or  of  the 
state   of  others,  can  never  be  relied  upon  till  these  inqui- 
ries are  settled.     Nothing  is  more  clear  than  that  in  the  pres- 
ent vague  unsettled  views  of  the  Church  upon  this  question, 
no  individual  could  set  up  a  claim  of  having  attained  this  state 
without  being  a  stumbling  block  to  the  church.     Christ  was 
perfect,  and  yet  so  erroneous  were  the  notions  of  the  Jews 
in  regard  to  what  constituted  perfection  that  they  thought 
him  possessed  with  a  devil  instead  of  being  holy  as  he  claimed 
to  be.     It  certainly  is  impossible  that  a  person  should  profess 
to  render  entire  obedience  to  the  moral  law  without  being  a 
stumbling  block  to  himself  and  to  others  unless  he  and  they 
clearly  understand  what  is  not  and  what  is  implied  in  it.     I 
will  state  then  what  is  not  implied  in  entire  obedience  to  the 
moral  law  as  I  understand  it.    The  law  as  epitomized  by 


MORAL  go\t:rnment.  189 

Christ,  "Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart, 
and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy  mind,  and  with  all  thy 
strength,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,"  I  understand  to  lay 
down  the  whole  duty  of  man  to  God  and  to  his  fellow  crea- 
tures. Now  the  questions  are  what  is  not,  and  what  is  im- 
plied in  perfect  obedience  to  this  law?  Vague  notions  in  re- 
gard to  the  proper  answer  to  be  given  to  these  questions 
seem  to  me  to  have  been  the  origin  of  much  error.  To  set- 
tle these  questions  it  is  indispensable  that  we  have  distinctly 
before  our  minds  just  rules  of  legal  interpretation.  I  will 
therefore  lay  down  some  first  principles  in  regard  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  law,  in  the  light  of  which,  I  think  we  may 
safely  proceed  to  settle  these  questions.  ^ 

Rule  1.  Whatever  is  inconsistent  with  natural  justice  is 
not  and  can  not  be  moral  law. 

2.  Whatever  is  inconsistent  with  the  nature  and  relations 
of  moral  beings,  is  contrary  to  natural  justice  and  therefore 
can  not  be  moral  law. 

3.  That  which  requires  more  than  man  has  natural  ability 
to  perform,  is  inconsistent  with  his  nature  and  relations  and 
therefore  is  inconsistent  with  natural  justice,  and  of  course  „ 
is  not  moral  law. 

4.  Moral  law  then  must  always  be  so  understood  and  inter- 
preted as  to  consist  with  the  nature  of  the  subjects,  and  their 
relations  to  each  other  and  to  the  lawgiver.     Any  interpreta-        ^ 
tion  that  makes  the  law  to   require  more  than  is  consistent 
with  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings,  is  the  same  as 

to  declare  that  it  is  not  law.     No  authority  in  heaven  or  on 
earth  can  make  that  law,  or  obligatory  upon    moral  agents,    ^ 
which  is  inconsistent  with  their  nature  and  relations. 

5.  Moral  law  must  always  be  so  interpreted  as  to  cover  the 
whole  ground  of  natural  right  or  justice.  It  must  be  so  un- 
derstood and  explained  as  to  require  all  that  is  right  in  itself, 
and  therefore  immutably  and  unalterably  right. 

6.  Moral  law  must  be  so  interpreted  as  not  to  require  any 
thing  more  than  is  consistent  with  natural  justice  or  with  the 
nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings.  i^ 

7.  Moral  law  is  never  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  imply  the  ( 
possession  of  any  attributes  or  strength  and  a  perfection  of  at- 
tributes which  the  subject  does  not  possess.  Take  for  illus- 
tration the  second  commandment,  ""^Thou  shalt  love  thy  9 
neighbor  as  thyself."  Now  the  simple  meaning  of  this  com- 
mandment seems  to  be  that  we  are  to  regard  and  treat  every 
person  and  interest  according  to  its  relative  value.     Wc  are 


y 


190  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

not  to  understand  this  commandment  as  expressly  or  implied- 
ly requiring  us  to  know  in  all  cases  the  exact  relative  value 
of  every  person  and  thing  in  the  universe;  for  this  would  im- 
ply the  possession  of  the  attribute  of  omniscience  by  us.  No 
mind  short  of  an  omniscient  one  can  have  this  knowledge. 
The  commandment  then  must  be  so  understood  as  only  to  re- 
quire us  to  judge  with  candor  of  the  relative  value  of  differ- 
ent interests,  and  to  treat  them  according  to  their  value,  and 
our  ability  to  promote  them,  so  far  as  we  understand  it.  I 
repeat  the  rule  therefore;  Moral  law  is  never  to  be  so  in- 
terpreted as  to  imply  the  possession  of  any  attribute  or  a 
strength  and  perfection  of  attributes  which  the  subject  does 
not  possess. 

8.  Moral  law  is  never  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  require  that 
which  is  naturally  impossible  in  our  circumstances.  Exam- 
ple: The  first  commandment,  ^'  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy 
God  with  all  thy  heart,"  &:c.,  is  not  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to 
require  us  to  make  God  the  constant  and  sole  object  of  our 
attention,  thought,  and  affection,  for  this  would  not  only  be 
plainly  impossible  in  our  circumstances,  but  manifestly  contra- 
ry to  our  duty. 

9.  Moral  law  is  never  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  make  one 
requirement  inconsistent  with  another.  Example:  If  the  first 
commandment  be  s(5  interpreted  as  to  require  us  to  make  God 
the  only  object  of  thought,  affection,  and  attention,  then  we 
cannot  obey  the  second  commandment  which  requires  us  to 
love  our  neighbor.  And  if  the  first  commandment  is  to  be 
so  understood  that  every  faculty  and  power  is  to  be  directed 
solely  and  exclusively  to  the  contemplation  and  love  of  God, 
then  love  to  all  other  beings  is  prohibited,  and  the  second  con>- 
mandment  is  set  aside.  I  repeat  the  rule  therefore :  com- 
mandments are  not  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  conflict  with 
each  other. 

10.  A  law  requiring  perpetual  benevolence  must  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  consist  with  and  require  all  the  appropriate  and 
essential  modifications  of  this  principle  under  every  circum- 
stance; such  as  justice,  mercy,  anger  at  sin  and  sinners,  and 
a  special  and  complacent  regard  to  those  who  are  virtuous. 

11.  Moral  law  must  be  so  interpreted  as  that  its  claims 
shall  always  be  restricted  to  the  voluntary  powers  in  such  a 
sense  that  the  right  action  of  the  will  shall  be  regarded  as 
fulfilling  the  spirit  of  the  law,  whether  the  desired  outward 
action  or  inward  emotion  follow  or  not.  If  there  be  a  willing 
mind,  that  is,  if  the  will  or  heart  is  right,  it  is  and  must  iu 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  191 

justice  be  accepted  as  obedience  to  the  spirit  of  moral  law. 
For  whatever  does  not  follow  the  action  of  the  will,  by  a  law 
of  necessity,  is  naturally  impossible  to  us  and  therefore  not 
obligatory.  To  attempt  to  legislate  directly  over  the  invol- 
untary powers  would  be  inconsistent  with  natural  justice. 
You  may  as  well  attempt  to  legislate  over  the  beating  of  the 
heart,  as  directly  over  any  involuntary  mental  actions. 

12.  In  morals,  actual  knowledge  is  indispensable  to  moral 
obHgation.  The  maxim,  ''- ignorantia  legis  non  exciisaf^  (ig- 
norance of  the  law  excuses  no  one) — applies  in  morals  to  but  a 
very  limited  extent.  That  actual  knowledge  is  indispensa- 
ble to  moral  obligation,  will  appear, 

(1.)  From  the  following  Scriptures: 

James  4:  17:  "  Therefore  to  him  that  knoweth  to  do  good, 
and  doeth  it  not,  to  him  it  is  sin."  Luke  12:  47,  48:  •'  And 
that  servant,  which  knew  his  Lord's  will,  and  prepared  not 
himself,  neither  did  according  to  his  will,  shall  be  beaten  with 
many  stripes.  But  he  that  knew  not,  and  did  commit  things 
worthy  of  stripes,  shall  be  beaten  with  few  stripes.  For  unto 
whomsoever  much  is  given,  of  him  shall  be  much  required, 
and  to  whom  men  have  committed  much,  of  him  they  will 
ask  the  more."  John  9:11:  ^^  Jesus  said  unto  them,  If  ye 
were  bhnd  ye  should  have  no  sin:  but  now  ye  say.  We  see; 
therefore  your  sin  remaineth."  In  the  first  and  second  chap- 
ters of  Romans,  the  Apostle  reasons  at  large  on  this  subject. 
He  convicts  the  heathen  of  sin,  upon  the  ground  that  they 
violate  their  own  consciences,  and  do  not  live  according  to  the 
light  they  have. 

(2.)  The  principle  is  every  where  recognized  in  the  Bible, 
that  an  increase  of  knowledge  increases  obligation.  This 
impliedly,  but  plainly  recognizes  the  principle  that  knowl- 
edge is  indispensable  to,  and  commensurate  with  obligation. 
In  sins  of  ignorance,  the  sin  lies  in  the  state  of  heart  that  ne- 
glects or  refuses  to  be  informed,  but  not  in  the  neglect  of  what 
is  unknown.  A  man  may  be  guilty  of  present  or  past  ne- 
glect to  ascertain  the  truth.  Here  his  ignorance  is  sin,  or 
rather  the  state  of  heart  that  induces  ignorance  is  sin.  The 
heathen  are  culpable  for  not  living  up  to  the  light  of  nature; 
but  are  under  no  obligation  to  embrace  Christianity  until  they 
have  the  opportunity  to  do  so. 

13.  Moral  law  is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  be  consistent 
with  physical  law.  In  other  words  the  application  of  moral 
law  to  human  beings,  must  recognize  man  as  he  is,  as  both  a 
corporeal  and  intellectual  being;  and  must  never  be  so  inter- 


192  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

preted  as  that  obedience  to  it  would  violate  the  laws  of  the 
physical  constitution,  and  prove  the  destruction  of  the  body. 

14.  Moral  law  is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  recognize  all 
the  attributes  and  circumstances  of  both  body  and  soul.  In 
the  application  of  the  law  of  God  to  human  beings,  we  are  to 
regard  their  powers  and  attributes  as  they  really  are,  and  not 
as  they  are  not. 
'^  15.  Moral  law  is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  restrict  its  obli- 

gation to  the  actions,  and  not  to  extend  them  to  the  nature  or 
constitution  of  moral  beings.  Law  must  not  be  understood  as 
extending  its  legislation  to  the  nature,  or  requiring  a  man  to 
*'^ ,  possess  certain  attributes,  but  as  prescribing  a  rule  of  action. 
It  is  not  the  existence  or  possession  of  certain  attributes 
which  the  law  requires,  or  that  these  attributes  should  be  in  a 
certain  state  of  perfection;  but  the  right  use  of  all  these  at- 
tributes as  they  are,  is  what  the  law  is  to  be  interpreted  as 
requiring. 

16.  It  should  be  always  understood  that  the  obedience  of 
the  heart  to  any  law,  implies,  and  includes  general  faith,  or 
confidence  in  the  lawgiver.  But  no  law  should  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  require  faith  in  what  the  intellect  does  not  per- 
ceive. A  man  may  be  under  obligation  to  perceive  what  he 
does  not;  that  is,  it  may  be  his  duty  to  inquire  after  and  as- 
certain the  truth.  But  obligation  to  believe  with  the  heart, 
does  not  attach  until  the  intellect  obtains  perception  of  the 
things  to  be  believed. 

Now,  in  the  light  of  these  rules  let  us  proceed  to  inquire: 

//.   What  is  not  implied  in  entire  obedience  to  the  law  of  God* 

1.  Entire  obedience  does  not  imply  any  change  in  the  sub- 
stance of  the  soul  or  body,  for  this  the  law  does  not  require, 
and  it  would  not  be  obligatory  if  it  did,  because  the  require- 
ment would  be  inconsistent  with  natural  justice  and  therefore 
not  law.  Entire  obedience  is  the  entire  consecration  of  the 
powers,  as  they  are,  to  God.  It  does  not  imply  any  change  in 
them,  but  simply  the  right  use  of  them. 

2.  It  does  not  imply  the  annihilation  of  any  constitutional 
traits  of  character,  such  as  constitutional  ardor  or  impetuosi- 
ty. There  is  nothing  certainly,  in  the  law  of  God  that  re- 
quires such  constitutional  traits  to  be  annihilated,  but  simply 
that  they  should  be  rightly  directed  in  their  exercise. 

3.  It  does  not  imply  the  annihilation  of  any  of  the  consti- 
tutional appetites,  or  susceptibiUties.  It  seems  to  be  suppo- 
sed by  some,  that  the  constitutional  appetites  and  susceptibili- 
ties, are  in  themselves  sinful,  and  that  a  state  of  entire  con- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  193 

formity  to  the  law  of  God  implies  their  entire  annihilation. 
And  I  have  often  been  astonished  at  the  fact  that  those  who 
array  themselves  against  the  doctrine  of  entire  conformity  t(^ 
the  law  of  God  in  this  life,  assume  the  sinfulness  of  the  con- 
stitution of  man.  And  I  have  been  not  a  little  surprised  to 
find  that  some  persons  who  I  had  supposed  were  far  enough 
from  embracing  the  doctrine  of  physical  moral  depravity, 
were,  after  all,  resorting  to  this  assumption  to  set  aside  the 
doctrine  of  entire  sanctification  in  this  life.  But  let  us  ap- 
peal to  the  law.  Doss  the  law  any  where,  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly, condemn  the  constitution  of  man,  or  require  the  an- 
nihilation of  anything  that  is  properly  a  part  of  the  constitu- 
tion itself?  Does  it  require  the  annihilation  of  the  appetite 
for  food,  or  is  it  satisfied  merely  with  regulating  its  indul- 
gence? In  short,  does  the  law  of  God  any  where  require  any 
thing  more  than  the  consecration  of  all  the  powers,  appetites, 
and  susceptibilities  of  body  and  mind  to  the  service  of 
God? 

Entire  obedience  does  not  imply  the  annihilation  of  natu- 
ral affection,  or  natural  resentment.     By  natural  affection  I 
mean  that  certain  persons  may  be  naturally  pleasing   to  us. 
Christ  appears  to  have  had  a  natural  affection  for  John.     By 
natural  resentment  I  mean,  that,  from  the  laws  of  our  being, 
we  must  resent  or  feel  opposed  to  injustice  or  ill-treatment. 
Not  that  a  disposition  to  retaliate  or  revenge  ourselves  is  con- 
sistent with  the  law  of  God.     But  perfect  obedience  to  the 
law  of  God  does  not  imply  that  we  should  have  no  sense  of 
injury  and  injustice,  when  we  are  abused.     God  has  this,  and 
ought  to  have  it,  and  so  has   every  moral  being.     To    love 
your  neighbor  as  yourself  does  not  imply,  that  if  he  injure 
you,  you  feel  no  sense  of  the  injury  or  injustice,  but  that  you 
love  him  and  would  do  him  good,  notwithstanding  'his  injuri- 
ous treatment. 

5.  It  does  not  imply  any  unhealthy  degree  of  excitement 
of  the  mind.  Rule  13  lays  down  the  principle  that  moral  law 
is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  to  be  consistent  with  physical  law. 
God's  laws  certainly  do  not  clash  with  each  other.  And  the 
moral  law  can  not  require  such  a  state  of  constant  mental 
excitement  as  will  destroy  the  physical  constitution.  It  can 
not  require  any  more  mental  excitement  than  is  consistent 
with  all  the  laws,  attributes,  and  circumstances  of  both  soul 
and  body,  as  stated  in  rule  14. 

6.  It  does  not  imply  that  any  organ  or  faculty  is  to  be  at 
all  times  exerted  to  the  full  measure  of  its  capacity.     This 

17 


194  '  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

would  soon  exhaust  and  destroy  any  and  every  organ  of  the 
body.  Whatever  may  be  true  of  the  mind  when  separated 
from  the  body,  it  is,  certain,  while  it  acts  through  a  material 
organ,  that  a  constant  state  of  excitement  is  impossible.  When 
the  mind  is  strongly  excited,  there  is  of  necessity  a  great  de- 
termination of  blood  to  the  brain.  A  high  degree  of  excite- 
ment cannot  long  continue,  certainly,  without  producing  inflam- 
mation of  the  brain,  and  consequent  insanity.  And  the  law 
of  God  does  not  require  any  degree  of  emotion  or  mental  ex- 
citement, that  is  inconsistent  with  life  and  health.  Our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ  does  not  appear  to  have  been  in  a  state  of  con- 
tinual mental  excitement.  When  he  and  his  disciples  had 
been  in  a  great  excitement  for  a  time,  they  would  turn  aside, 
*^  and  rest  a  while." 

Who  that  has  ever  philosophized  on  this  subject,  does  not 
know  that  the  high  degree  of  excitement  which  is  sometimes 
witnessed  in  revivals  of  religion,  must  necessarily  be  short, 
or  that  the  people  must  become  deranged?  It  seems  some- 
times to  be  indispensable  that  a  high  degree  of  excitement 
should  prevail  for  a  time  to  arrest  public  and  individual  atten- 
tion, and  draw  off  people  from  other  pursuits,  to  attend  to 
the  concerns  of  their  souls.  But  if  any  suppose  that  this  high 
degree  of  excitement  is  either  necessary  or  desirable,  or  pos- 
sible to  be  long  continued,  they  have  not  well  considered  the 
matter.  And  here  is  one  grand  mistake  of  the  Church.  They 
have  supposed  that  the  revival  consists  mostly  in  this  state  of 
excited  emotion,  rather  than  in  conformity  of  the  human  will 
to  the  law  of  God.  Hence,  when  the  reasons  for  much  ex- 
citement have  ceased,  and  the  pubUc  mind  begins  to  grow 
more  calm,  they  begin  immediately  to  say,  that  the  revival  is 
on  the  decline;  when,  in  fact,  with  much  less  excited  emotion, 
there  may  be  vastly  more  real  rehgion  in  the  community. 

Excitement  is  often  important  and  indispensable,  but  the 
vigorous  actings  of  the  will  are  infinitely  more  important. 
And  this  state  of  mind  may  exist  in  the  absence  of  highly  ex- 
cited emotions. 

7.  Nor  does  it  imply  that  the  same  degree  of  emotion,  vo- 
lition, or  intellectual  effort,  is  at  all  times  required.  All  voli- 
tions do  not  need  the  same  strength.  They  cannot  have 
equal  strength,  because  they  are  not  produced  by  equally  in- 
fluential reasons.  Should  a  man  put  forth  as  strong  a  volition 
to  pick  up  an  apple,  as  to  extinguish  the  flames  of  a  burning 
house?  Should  a  mother  watching  over  her  sleeping  nurs- 
ling, when  all  is  quiet  and  secure,  put  forth  as  powerful  voli- 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  195 

tions,  as  might  be  required  to  snatch  it  from  the  devouring 
flames?  Now,  suppose  that  she  were  equally  devoted  to  God, 
in  watching  her  sleeping  babe,  and  in  rescuing  it  from  the 
jaws  of  death.  Her  holiness  would  not  consist  in  the  fact 
that  she  exercised  equally  strong  vohtions,  in  both  cases;  but 
that  in  both  cases  the  volition  was  equal  to  the  accompUsh- 
ment  of  the  thing  required  to  be  done.  So  that  persons  may- 
be entirely  holy,  and  yet  continually  varying  in  the  strength 
of  their  affections,  emotions,  or  volitions,  according  to  their 
circumstances,  the  state  of  their  physical  system,  and  the 
business  in  which  they  are  engaged. 

All  the  powers  of  body  and  mind  are  to  be  held  at  the  ser- 
vice and  disposal  of  God.  Just  so  much  of  physical,  intellec- 
tual, and  moral  energy  are  to  be  expended  in  the  performance 
of  duty,  as  the  nature  and  the  circumstances  of  the  case  re- 
quire. And  nothing  is  farther  from  the  truth,  than  that  the 
law  of  God  requires  a  constant,  intense  state  of  emotion  and 
mental  action  on  any  and  every  subject  alike. 

8.  Entire  obedience  does  not  imply  that  God  is  to  be  at  all 
times  the  direct  object  of  attention  and  affection.  This  is  not 
only  impossible  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  but  would  render 
it  impossible  for  us  to  think  of  or  love  our  neighbor  as  our- 
selves:  Rule  9. 

The  law  of  God  requires  the  supreme  love  of  the  heart. 
By  this  is  meant  that  the  mind's  supreme  preference  should 
be  of  God — that  God  should  be  the  great  object  of  its  su- 
preme regard.  But  this  state  of  mind  is  perfectly  consistent 
with  our  engaging  in  any  of  the  necessary  business  of  life — 
giving  to  that  business  that  attention  and  exercising  about 
it  all  those  affections  and  emotions  which  its  nature  and  im- 
portance demand. 

If  a  man  love  God  supremely,  and  engage  in  any  business 
for  the  promotion  of  his  glory,  if  his  eye  be  single,  his  affec- 
tions and  conduct,  so  far  as  they  have  any  moral  character, 
are  entirely  holy  when  necessarily  engaged  in  the  right 
transaction  of  his  business,  although  for  the  time  being  neither 
his  thoughts  nor  affections  are  upon  God. 

Just  as  a  man  who  is  supremely  devoted  to  his  family  may 
be  acting  consistently  with  his  supreme  affection,  and  render- 
ing them  the  most  important  and  perfect  service,  while  he 
does  not  think  of  them  at  all.  As  I  have  endeavored  to  show 
in  my  lecture  on  the  text,  '•'  Make  to  yourself  a  new  heart,  and 
a  new  spirit,"  the  moral  heart  is  the  mind's  supreme  prefer- 
ence.    As  I  there  stated,  the  natural  or  fleshy  heart,  propels 


196  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  blood  through  all  the  physical  system.  Now  there  is  a 
striking  analogy  between  this  and  the  moral  heart.  And  the 
analogy  consists  in  this,  that  as  the  natural  heart,  by  its  pul- 
sations, diffuses  life  through  the  physical  system,  so  the  moral 
heart,  or  the  supreme  governing  preference,  or  ultimate  in- 
tention of  the  mind,  is  that  which  gives  life  and  character  to 
man's  moral  actions.  Example,  suppose  that  I  am  engaged 
in  teaching  Mathematics;  in  this,  my  ultimate  intention  is  to 
glorify  God,  in  this  particular  calling.  Now,  in  demonstra- 
ting some  of  its  intricate  propositions,  I  am  obliged,  for  hours 
together,  to  give  the  entire  attention  of  my  mind  to  that  ob- 
ject. Now,  while  my  mind  is  thus  intensely  employed  in  one 
particular  business,  it  is  impossible  that  I  should  have  any 
thoughts  directly  about  God,  or  should  exercise  any  direct  af- 
fections, or  emotions,  or  volitions,  towards  him.  Yet  if,  in  this 
particular  calling,  all  selfishness  is  excluded,  and  my  supreme 
design  is  to  glorify  God,  my  mind  is  in  a  state  of  entire  obe- 
dience, even  though,  for  the  time  being,  I  do  not  think  of  God. 

It  should  be  understood  that  while  the  supreme  preference 
or  intention  of  the  mind  has  such  efficiency,  as  to  exclude  all 
selfishness,  and  to  call  forth  just  that  strength  of  volition, 
thought,  affection,  and  emotion,  that  is  requisite  to  the  right 
discharge  of  any  duty,  to  which  the  mind  may  be  called,  the 
heart  is  in  a  right  state.  And  this  must  always  be  the  case 
while  the  intention  is  really  honest,  as  was  shown  on  a  form- 
er occasion.  By  a  suitable  degree  of  thought,  and  feeling  as  to 
the  right  discharge  of  duty,  I  mean  just  that  intensity  of 
thought,  and  energy  of  action,  that  the  nature  and  importance 
of  the  particular  duty  to  which,  for  the  time  being,  1  am 
called,  demand,  in  my  honest  estimation. 

In  this  statement,  I  take  it  for  granted,  that  the  brain,  to- 
gether with  all  the  circumstances  of  the  constitution  are  such 
that  tlie  requisite  amount  of  thought,  feeling,  &c.,  are  possi- 
ble. If  the  physical  constitution  be  in  such  a  state  of  ex- 
haustion as  to  be  unable  to  put  forth  that  amount  of  exertion 
which  the  nature  of  the  case  might  otherwise  demand,  even 
in  this  case,  the  languid  efforts,  though  far  below  the  impor- 
tance of  the  subject,  would  be  all  that  the  law  of  God  re- 
quires. Whoever,  therefore,  supposes  that  a  state  of  entire 
obedience  implies  a  state  of  entire  abstraction  of  mind  from 
every  thing  but  God,  labors  under  a  grievous  mistake.  Such 
a  state  of  mind  is  as  inconsistent  with  duty,  as  it  is  impossi- 
ble, while  we  are  in  the  flesh. 

The  fact  is  that  the  language  and  spirit  of  the  law  have 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  197 

been  and  generally  are  grossly  misunderstood,  and  interpre- 
ted to  mean  what  they  never  did,  or  can  mean  consistently 
with  natural  justice.  Many  a  mind  has  been  thrown  open 
to  the  assaults  of  satan,  and  kept  in  a  state  of  continual  bond- 
age and  condemnation,  because  God  was  not,  at  all  times, 
the  direct  object  of  thought,  affection,  and  emotion;  and  be- 
cause the  mind  was  not  kept  in  a  state  of  perfect  tension,  and 
excited  to  the  utmost  at  every  moment. 

9.  Nor  does  it  imply  a  state  of  continual  calmness  of  mind. 
Christ  was  not  in  a  state  of  continual  calmness.  The  deep 
peace  of  his  mind  was  never  broken  up,  but  the  surface  or 
emotions  of  his  mind  were  often  in  a  state  of  great  excite- 
ment, and  at  other  times  in  a  state  of  great  calmness.  And 
here  let  me  refer  to  Christ  as  we  have  his  history  in  the  Bible 
in  illustration  of  the  positions  I  have  already  taken.  Exam- 
ple: Christ  had  all  the  constitutional  appetites  and  suscepti- 
bilities of  human  nature.  Had  it  been  otherwise,  he  could 
not  have  been  "-  tempted  in  all  points  like  as  we;"  nor  could 
he  have  been  tempted  in  any  point  as  we  are,  any  further 
than  he  possessed  a  constitution  similar  to  our  own.  Christ 
also  manifested  natural  affection  for  his  mother  and  for  other 
friends.  He  also  showed  that  he  had  a  sense  of  injury  and 
injustice,  and  exercised  a  suitable  resentment  when  he  was 
injured  and  persecuted.  He  was  not  always  in  a  state  of 
great  excitement.  He  appears  to  have  had  his  seasons  of 
excitement  and  of  calm — of  labor  and  rest — of  joy  and  sor- 
row, like  other  good  men.  Some  persons  have  spoken  of  en- 
tire obedience  to  the  law  as  implying  a  state  of  uniform  and 
universal  calmness,  and  as  if  every  kind  and  degree  of  exci- 
ted feeling,  except  the  feelings  of  love  to  God  were  inconsist- 
ent with  this  state.  But  Christ  often  manifested  a  great  de- 
gree of  excitement  when  reproving  the  enemies  of  God  In 
short  his  history  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  his  calm- 
ness and  excitement  were  various,  according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  And  although  he  was  sometimes  so  point- 
ed and  severe  in  his  reproof,  as  to  be  accused  of  being  posses- 
sed of  a  devil,  yet  his  emotions  and  feelings  were  only  those 
that  were  called  for  and  suited  to  the  occasion. 

10.  Nor  does  it  imply  a  state  of  continual  sweetness  of  mind 
without   any  indignation  or  holy  anger   at  sin  and  sinners. 

Anger  at  sin   is  only  a  modification  of  love.     A  sense  of 
justice,  or  a  disposition  to  have  the  wicked  punished  for  the 
benefit  of  the  government,  is  only  another  of  the  modifica- 
tions of  love.     And  such  dispositions  are  essential  to  the  ex- 
17* 


198  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

istence  of  love,  where  the  circumstances  call  for  their  exer- 
cise. It  is  said  of  Christ  that  he  was  angry.  He  often  mani- 
fested anger  and  holy  indignation,  '•'  God  is  angry  with  the 
wicked  every  day."  And  holiness  or  a  state  of  obedience, 
instead  of  being  inconsistent  with,  always  imphes  the  exis- 
tence of  anger,  whenever  circumstances  occur  which  demand 
its  exercise.     Rule  10. 

11.  It  docs  not  imply  a  state  of  mind  that  is  all  compas- 
sion, and  no  sense  of  justice.  Compassion  is  only  one  of  the 
modifications  of  love.  Justice  or  wilUng  the  execution  of 
law  and  the  punishment  of  sin,  is  another  of  its  modifications. 
God,  and  Christ,  and  all  holy  beings,  exercise  all  those  dispo- 
sitions that  constitute  the  ditferent  modifications  of  love  under 
every  possible  circumstance. 

12.  It  does  not  imply  that  we  should  love  or  hate  all  men 
alike  irrespective  of  their  value,  circumstances  and  relations. 
One  being  may  have  a  greater  capacity  for  well-being,  and  be 
of  much  more  importance  to  the  universe  than  another.  Im- 
partiality and  the  law  of  love  require  us  not  to  regard  all 
beings  and  things  alike,  but  all  beings  and  things  according  to 
their  nature,  relations,  circumstances  and  value. 

13.  Nor  does  it  imply  a  perfect  knowledge  of  all  our  rela- 
tions: Rule  7.  Now  such  an  interpretation  of  the  law  as 
would  make  it  necessary,  in  order  to  yield  obedience,  for  us  to 
understand  all  our  relations,  would  imply  in  us  the  possession 
of  the  attribute  of  omniscience;  for  certainly  there  is  not  a 
being  in  the  universe  to  whom  we  do  not  sustain  some  rela- 
tion. And  a  knowledge  of  all  these  relations  plainly  impHes 
infinite  knowledge.  It  is  plain  that,  the  law  of  God  can  not 
require  any  such  thing  as  this;  and  that  entire  obedience  to 
the  law  of  God  therefore  impHes  no  such  thing. 

14.  Nor  does  it  imply  perfect  knowledge  on  any  subject. 
Perfect  knowledge  on  any  subject,  implies  a  perfect  knowl- 
edge of  its  nature,  relations,  bearings,  and  tendencies.  Now 
as  every  single  thing  in  the  universe,  sustains  some  relation 
to,  and  has  some  bearing  upon  every  other  thing,  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  as  perfect  knowledge  on  any  one  subject,  that 
does  not  embrace  universal  or  infinite  knowledge. 

15.  Nor  does  it  imply  freedom  from  mistake  on  any  subject 
whatever.  It  is  maintained  by  some  that  the  grace  of  the 
gospel  pledges  to  every  man  perfect  knowledge,  or  at  least 
such  knowledge  as  to  exempt  him  from  any  mistake.  I  can- 
not stop  here  to  debate  this  question,  but  would  merely  say 
the  law  does  not  expressly  or  impliedly  require  infallibility  of 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  199 

judgment  in  us.     It  only  requires  us  to  make  the  best  use  we 
can  of  all  the  light  we  have.  -^^ 

16  Nor  does  entire  obedience  imply  the  knowledge  of  the 
exact  relative  value  of  different  interests.  I  have  already 
said  in  illustrating  Rule  7,  that  the  second  commandment, 
••'  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,"  does  not  imply 
that  we  should,  in  every  instance,  understand  exactly  the  rela- 
tive value  and  importance  of  every  interest.  This  plainly 
can  not  be  required,  unless  it  be  assumed  that  we  are  omnis- 
cient. •  '-' 

17.  It  does  not  imply  the  same  degree  of  knowledge  that 
we  might  have  possessed,  had  we  always  improved  our  time 
in  its  acquisition.  The  law  can  not  require  us  to  love  God  or 
man  as  well  as  we  might  have  been  able  to  love  them,  had  we 
always  improved  all  our  time  in  obtaining  all  the  knowledge 
we  could,  in  regard  to  their  nature,  character,  and  interests. 
If  this  were  implied  in  the  requisition  of  the  law,  there  is  not  a 
saint  on  earth  or  in  heaven  that  does,  or  ever  can  perfectly  obey.  0< 
What  is  lost  in  this  respect  is  lost,  and  past  neglect  can  never 
be  so  atoned  for  that  we  shall  ever  be  able  to  make  up  in  our 
acquisitions  of  knowledge  what  we  have  lost.  It  will  no 
doubt  be  true  to  all  eternity,  that  we  shall  have  less  knowl- 
edge than  we  might  have  possessed,  had  we  filled  up  all  our 
time  in  its  acquisition.  We  do  not,  can  not,  nor  shall  we  ev- 
er be  able  to  love  God  as  well  as  we  might  have  loved  him, 
had  we  always  applied  our  minds  to  the  acquisition  of  knowl- 
edge respecting  him.  And  if  entire  obedience  is  to  be  un- 
derstood as  implying  that  we  love  God  as  much  as  we  should, 
had  we  all  the  knowledge  we  might  have  had,  then  I  repeat 

it,  there  is  not  a  saint  on  earth  or  in  heaven,  nor  ever  will  be, 
that  is  entirely  obedient.  ^ 

18.  It  does  not  imply  the  same  amount  of  ser\ice  that  we 
might  have  rendered,  had  we  never  sinned.  The  law  of  God 
does  not  imply  or  suppose  that  our  powers  are  in  a  perfect 
state;  that  our  strength  of  body  or  mind  is  what  it  would 
have  been,  had  we  never  sinned.  But  it  simply  requires  us 
to  use  what  strength  we  have.  The  very  wording  of  the  law 
is  proof  conclusive,  that  it  extends  its  demands  only  to  the 
full  amount  of  what  strength  we  have.  And  this  is  true  of 
every  moral  being,  however  great  or  small. 

The  most  perfect  development  and  improvement  of  our 
powers,  must  depend  upon  the  most  perfect  use  of  them. 
And  every  departure  from  their  perfect  use,  is  a  diminishing 
of  their  highest  development,  and  a  curtailing  of  their  capa- 


200  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

bilities  to  serve  God  in  the  highest  and  best  manner.  All 
sin  then  does  just  so  much  towards  crippling  and  curtailing 
the  powers  of  body  and  mind,  and  rendering  them,  by  just 
so  much,  incapable  of  performing  the  service  they  might  oth- 
erwise have  rendered. 

To  this  view  of  the  subject  it  has  been  objected  that  Christ 
taught  an  opposite  doctrine,  in  the  case  of  the  womc^n  who 
washed  his  feet  with  her  tears,  when  he  said,  "To  whom 
much  is  forgiven,  the  same  loveth  much."  But  can  it  be  that 
Christ  intended  to  be  understood  as  teaching,  that  the  more 
we  sin  the  greater  will  be  our  love  and  our  ultimate  virtue] 
If  this  be  so,  I  do  not  see  why  it  does  not  follow  that  the  more 
sin  in  this  life,  the  better,  if  so  be  that  we  are  forgiven.  If 
our  virtue  is  really  to  be  improved  by  our  sins,  I  see  not  why 
it  would  not  be  good  economy  both  for  God  and  man,  to  sin 
as  much  as  we  can  while  in  this  world.  Certainly  Christ  meant 
to  lay  down  no  such  principle  as  this.  He  undoubtedly  meant 
to  teach,  that  a  person  who  was  truly  sensible  of  the  great- 
ness of  his  sins,  would  exercise  more  of  the  love  of  gratitude^ 
than  would  be  exercised  by  one  who  had  a  less  affecting  sense 
of  ill-desert 

19.  Entire  obedience  does  not  imply  the  same  degree  of 
faith  that  might  have  been  exercised  but  for  our  ignorance  and 
past  sin. 

We  can  not  beheve  any  thing  about  God  of  which  we  have 
no  evidence  or  knowledge.  Our  faith  must  therefore  be  limit- 
ed by  our  intellectual  perceptions  of  truth.  The  heathen  are 
not  under  obligation  to  believe  in  Christ  and  thousands  of  oth- 
er things  of  which  they  have  no  knowledge.  Perfection  in  a 
heathen  would  imply  much  less  faith  than  in  a  christian.  Per- 
fection in  an  adult  would  imply  much  more  and  greater  faith 
than  in  an  infant.  And  perfection  in  an  angel  would  imply 
much  greater  faith  than  in  a  man,  just  in  proportion  as  he 
knows  more  of  God  than  man  does.  Let  it  be  always  un- 
derstood that  entire  obedience  to  God  never  implies  that  which 
is  naturally  impossible.  It  is  certainly  naturally  impossible 
for  us  to  believe  that  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge.  En- 
tire obedience  implies  in  this  respect  nothing  more  than  the 
heart's  faith  or  confidence  in  all  the  truth  that  is  perceived  by 
the  intellect. 

20.  Nor  does  it  imply  the  conversion  of  all  men  in  answer 
to  our  prayers.  It  has  been  maintained  by  some  that  entire 
obedience  implies  the  offering  of  prevailing  prayer  for  the 
conversion  of  all  men.    To  this  I  reply, 


MORAL  G0VERN3IENT.  201 

(1.)  Then  Christ  did  not  obey,  for  he  offered  no  such  pray- 
er. 

(2.)  The  law  of  God  makes  no  such  demand  either  ex- 
pressly or  impliedly. 

(3.)  We  have  no  right  to  believe  that  all  men  will  be  con- 
verted in  answer  to  our  prayers,  unless  we  have  an  express 
or  implied  promise  to  that  effect. 

(4.)  As  therefore  there  is  no  such  promise,  we  are  under  no 
obligation  to  offer  such  prayer.  Nor  does  the  non-conversion 
of  the  world  imply  that  there  are  no  saints  in  the  world  who 
fully  obey  God's  law. 

21.  It  does  not  imply  the  conversion  of  any  one  for  whom 
there  is  not  an  express  or  implied  promise  in  the  word  of 
God.  The  fact  that  Judas  was  not  converted  in  answer  to 
Christ's  prayers  does  not  prove  that  Christ  did  not  fully  obey. 

22.  Nor  does  it  imply  that  all  those  things  which  are  ex- 
pressly or  impliedly  promised,  will  be  granted  in  answer  to 
our  prayers,  or  in  other  words,  that  we  should  pray  in  faith 
for  them,  if  we  are  ignorant  of  the  existence  or  apphcation 
of  those  promises.  A  state  of  perfect  love  implies  the  dis- 
charge of  all  known  duty.  And  nothing  strictly  speaking 
can  be  duty,  of  which  the  mind  has  no  knowledge.  It  can 
not  therefore  be  our  duty  to  believe  a  promise  of  which  we 
are  entirely  ignorant  or  the  application  of  which  to  any  spe- 
cific object  we  do  not  understand. 

If  there  is  sin  in  such  a  case  as  this,  it  lies  in  the  fact  that 
the  soul  neglects  to  know  what  it  ought  to  know.  But  it 
should  always  be  understood  that  the  sin  lies  in  this  neglect 
to  know,  and  not  in  the  neglect  of  that  of  which  we  have  no 
knowledge.  Entire  obedience  is  inconsistent  with  any  pres- 
ent neglect  to  know  the  truth;  for  such  neglect  is  sin.  But 
it  is  not  inconsistent  with  our  failing  to  do  that  of  which  we 
have  no  knowledge.  James  says:  '^He  that  knoweth  to  do 
good  and  doeth  it  not,  to  him  it  is  sin."  ''  If  ye  were  blind," 
says  Christ,  '"  ye  should  have  no  sin,  but  because  ye  say  we 
see,  therefore  your  sin  remaineth." 

23.  Entire  obedience  to  the  Divine  law  does  not  imply  that 
others  will  of  course  regard  our  state  of  mind  and  our  out- 
ward life  as  entirely  conformed  to  the  law. 

It  was  insisted  and  positively  believed  by  the  Jews,  that  Je- 
sus Christ  was  possessed  of  a  wicked,  instead  of  a  holy  spirit. 
Such  were  their  notions  of  holiness,  that  they  no  doubt  sup- 
posed him  to  be  actuated  by  any  other  than  the  Spirit  of  God. 
They  especially  supposed  so  on  account  of  his  opposition  to 


202  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  current  orthodoxy,  and  the  ungodliness  of  the  religious 
teachers  of  the  day.  Now,  who  does  not  see  that  when  the 
Church  is  in  a  great  measure  conformed  to  the  world,  a 
spirit  of  holiness  in  any  man  would  certainly  lead  him  to  aim 
the  sharpest  rebukes  at  the  spirit  and  life  of  those  in  this 
state,  whether  in  high  or  low  places?  And  who  does  not  see 
that  this  would  naturally  result  in  his  being  accused  of  pos- 
sessing a  wicked  spirit?  And  who  does  not  know  that  where 
a  religious  teacher  finds  himself  under  the  necessity  of  at- 
tacking a  false  orthodoxy,  he  will  certainly  be  hunted,  almost 
as  a  beast  of  prey,  by  the  religious  teachers  of  his  day,  whose 
authority,  influence,  and  orthodoxy  are  thus  assailed? 

The  most  violent  opposition  that  I  have  ever  seen  mani- 
fested to  any  persons  in  my  life,  has  been  manifested  by  mem- 
bers of  the  Church,  and  even  by  some  ministers  of  the  gos- 
pel, towards  those  who  I  believe  were  among  the  most  ho- 
ly persons  I  ever  knew.  I  have  been  shocked,  and  wounded 
beyond  expression,  at  the  almost  fiendish  opposition  to  such 
persons  that  I  have  witnessed.  I  have  several  times  of  late 
observed  that  writers  in  newspapers  were  calling  for  exam- 
ples of  Christian  Perfection  or  entire  sanctification,  or  which 
is  the  same  thing,  of  entire  obedience  to  the  law  of  God. 
Now  I  would  humbly  inquire,  of  what  use  is  it  to  point  the 
Church  to  examples,  so  long  as  they  do  not  know  what  is,  and 
what  is  not  implied  in  entire  obedience  to  moral  law?  I  would 
ask,  are  the  church  agreed  among  themselves  in  regard  to 
what  constitutes  this  state?  Are  any  considerable  number  of 
ministers  agreed  among  themselves  as  to  what  is  implied  in  a 
state  of  entire  obedience  to  the  law  of  God?  Now  does  not 
every  body  know  that  the  Church  and  the  ministry  are  in  a 
great  measure  in  the  dark  on  this  subject?  Why  then  call  for 
examples?  No  man  can  profess  to  render  this  obedience 
without  being  sure  to  be  set  at  nought  as  a  hypocrite  and  a  self- 
deceiver. 

24.  Nor  does  it  imply  exemption  from  sorrow  or  mental 
suffering. 

It  was  not  so  with  Christ.  Nor  is  it  inconsistent  with  our 
sorrowing  for  our  own  past  sins,  and  sorrowing  that  we  have 
not  now  the  health,  and  vigor,  and  knowledge,  and  love,  that 
we  might  have  had,  if  we  had  sinned  less;  or  sorrow  for 
those  around  us — sorrow  in  view  of  human  sinfulness,  or  suf- 
feiing.  These  are  all  consistent  with  a  state  of  joyful  love  to 
God  and  man,  and  indeed  are  the  natural  results  of  it. 
25.  Nor  is  it  inconsistent  with  our  living  in  human  society 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  203 

— with  mingling  in  the  scenes,  and  engaging  in  the  affairs  of 
this  world,  as  some  have  supposed.  Hence  the  absurd  and 
ridiculous  notions  of  papists  in  retiring  to  monasteries,  and 
convents — in  taking  the  veil,  and  as  they  say,  retiring  to  a  hfe 
of  devotion.  Now  I  suppose  this  state  of  voluntary  exclusion 
from  human  society,  to  be  utterly  inconsistent  with  any  de- 
gree of  holiness,  and  a  manifest  violation  of  the  law  of  love 
to  our  neighbor. 

26.  Nor  does  it  imply  moroseness  of  temper  and  manners. 
Nothing  is  farther  from  the  truth  than  this.  It  is  said  of 
Xavier,  than  whom,  perhaps,  few  holier  men  have  ever  lived, 
that  "  he  was  so  cheerful  as  often  to  be  accused  of  being  gay." 
Cheerfulness  is  certainly  the  result  of  holy  love.  And  entire 
obedience  no  more  implies  moroseness  in  this  world  than  it 
does  in  heaven. 

In  ail  the  discussions  I  have  seen  upon  the  subject  of  Chris- 
tian holiness,  writers  seldom  or  never  raise  the  distinct  inqui- 
ry: What  does  obedience  to  the  law  of  God  imply,  and  what 
does  it  not  imply?  Instead  of  bringing  every  thing  to  this 
test,  they  seem  to  lose  sight  of  it.  On  the  one  hand  they  bring 
in  things  that  the  law  of  God  never  required  of  man  in 
his  present  state.  Thus  they  lay  a  stumbling  block  and  a 
snare  for  the  saints,  to  keep  them  in  perpetual  bondage,  sup- 
posing that  this  is  the  way  to  keep  them  humble,  to  place  the 
standard  entirely  above  their  reach.  Or,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  really  abrogate  the  law,  so  as  to  make  it  no  longer  bind- 
ing. Or  they  so  fritter  away  what  is  really  implied  in  it,  as 
to  leave  nothing  in  its  requirements,  but  a  sickly,  whimsical, 
inefficient  sentimentahsm,  or  perfectionism,  which  in  its  mani- 
festations and  results,  appears  to  me  to  be  any  thing  else  than 
that  which  the  law  of  God  requires. 

27.  It  does  not  imply  that  we  always  or  ever  aim  at  or  in- 
tend to  do  our  duty.  That  is,  it  does  not  imply  that  the  in- 
tention always  or  ever  terminates  on  duty  as  an  ultimate  end. 

It  is  our  duty  to  aim  at  or  intend  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for  its  own  sake. 
This  is  the  infinitely  valuable  end  at  which  we  are  at  all  times 
to  aim.  It  is  our  duty  to  aim  at  this.  While  we  aim  at  this, 
we  do  our  duty,  but  to  aim  at  duty  is  not  doing  duty.  To  in- 
tend to  do  our  duty  is  failing  to  do  our  duty.  We  do  not,  in 
this  case,  intend  the  thing  which  it  is  our  duty  to  intend.  Our 
duty  is  to  intend  the  good  of  being.  But  to  intend  to  do  our 
duty,  is  only  to  intend  to  intend. 

28.  Nor  does  it  imply  that  we  always  think  at  the  time  of 


204  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

its  being  duty,  or  of  our  moral  obligation  to  intend  the  good 
of  being.  This  obligation  is  a  first  truth  and  is  always  and 
necessarily  assumed  by  every  moral  agent,  and  this  assump- 
tion or  knowledge  is  a  condition  of  his  moral  agency.  But  it 
is  not  at  all  essential  to  virtue  or  true  obedience  to  the  moral 
law  that  moral  obligation  should  at  all  times  be  present  to  the 
thoughts  and  the  object  of  attention.  The  thing  that  we  are 
bound  to  intend  is  the  highest  good  of  God  and  of  being  in 
general.  The  good,  the  valuable,  must  be  before  the  mind. 
This  must  be  intended.  We  are  under  moral  obligation  to 
intend  this.  But  we  are  not  under  moral  obligation  to  intend 
moral  obligation  or  to  intend  to  fulfil  moral  obligation  as  an  ul- 
timate end.  Our  obligation  is  a  first  truth  and  necessarily 
assumed  by  us  at  all  times,  whether  it  is  an  object  of  attention 
or  not,  just  as  causality  or  liberty  is. 

29.  Nor  does  it  imply  that  the  Tightness  or  moral  character 
of  benevolence  is  at  all  times  the  object  of  the  mind's  atten- 
tion.    We  may  intend  the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  our 
neighbor  without  at  all  times  thinking  of  the  moral  character 
of  this  intention.     But  the  intention  is  not  the  less  virtuous 
on  this  account.     The  mind  unconsciously  but  necessarily  as- 
sumes the  Tightness  of  benevolence  or  of  willing  the  good  of 
being,  just  as  it  assumes  other  first  truths,  without  being  dis- 
tinctly conscious  of  the  assumption.     First  truths    are  those 
truths  that  are  universally  and  necessarily  known  to  every 
moral  agent,    and  that  are  therefore  always  and    necessarily 
assumed  by  him,  whatever  his  theory  may  be.    Among  them, 
are  the  law  of  causality — the  freedom  of  moral  agents — the 
intrinsic  value  of  happiness  or  blessedness — moral  obligation 
to  will  it  for  or  because  of  its  intrinsic  value — the  infinite  value 
of  God's  well-being  and  the  moral  obHgation  to  wdll  it  on  that 
account — that  to  will  the  good  of  being  is  duty  and  to  comply 
with  moral  obligation   is  right — that    selfishness  is   wrong. 
These  and  many  such  like  truths  are  among  the  class  of  first 
truths   of  reason.     They  are  always  and  necessarily  taken 
along  with  every  moral  agent  at  every  moment  of  his  moral 
agency.     They  five  in  his  mind  as  intuitions  or  assumptions 
of  his  reason.     He  always  and  necessarily  affirms  their  truth 
whether  he  thinks  of  them,  that  is,  whether  he  is  conscious  of 
the  assumption,  or  not.     It  is  not  therefore  at  all  essential  to 
obedience  to  the  law  of  God  that  we  should  at  all  times  have 
before  our  minds  the  virtuousness  or  moral  character  of  be- 
nevolence. 

30  Nor  does  obedience  to  the  moral  law  imply  that  the  law 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  205 

itself  should  be  at  all  times  the  object  of  thought  or  of  the 
mind's  attention.  The  law  lies  developed  in  the  reason  of 
every  moral  agent  in  the  form  of  an  idea.  It  is  the  idea  of 
that  choice  or  intention  which  every  moral  agent  is  bound  to 
exercise.  In  other  words,  the  law  as  a  rule  of  duty  is  a  sub- 
jective idea  always  and  necessarily  developed  in  the  mind  of 
every  moral  agent.  This  idea  he  always  and  necessarily 
takes  along  with  him,  and  he  is  always  and  necessarily  a  law  to 
himself  Nevertheless  this  law  or  idea  is  not  always  the  ob- 
ject of  the  mind's  attention  and  thought.  A  moral  agent  may 
exercise  good  will  or  love  to  God  and  man  without  at  the  time 
being  conscious  of  thinking  that  this  love  is  required  of  him 
by  the  moral  law.  Nay,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  benevolent 
mind  generally  exercises  benevolence  so  spontaneously  as 
not  very  much  of  the  time  so  much  as  to  think  that  this  love 
to  God  is  required  of  him.  But  this  is  not  the  less  virtuous 
on  this  account.  If  the  infinite  value  of  God's  well-being  and 
of  His  infinite  goodness  constrain  me  to  love  Him  with  all  my 
heart,  can  any  one  suppose  that  this  is  regarded  by  Him  as 
the  less  virtuous  because  I  did  not  wait  to  reflect  that  God 
commanded  me  to  love  him  and  that  it  was  my  duty  to  />' 
do  so? 

The  thing  upon  which  the  intention  must  or  ought  to  termi- 
nate is  the  good  of  being,  and  not  the  law  that  requires  me  to 
will  it.  When  I  will  that  end  I  will  the  right  end,  and  thi 
willing  is  virtue,  whether  the  law  be  so  much  as  thought  of 
or  not.  Should  it  be  said  that  I  may  will  that  end  for  a  wrong 
reason  and  therefore  thus  willing  it  is  not  virtue;  that  unless 
I  will  it  because  of  my  obligation  and  intend  obedience  to 
moral  law  or  to  God  it  is  not  virtue;  I  answer,  that  the  objec- 
tion involves  an  absurdity  and  a  contradiction.  I  can  not  will 
the  good  of  God  and  of  being  as  an  ultimate  end,  for  a 
wrong  reason.  The  reason  of  the  choice  and  the  end  chosen 
are  identical,  so  that  if  I  will  the  good  of  being  as  an  ul- 
timate end;  I  will  it  for  the  right  reason. 

Again:  to  will  the  good  of  being,  not  for  its  intrinsic  value, 
but  because  God  commands  it,  and  because  I  am  under  amor- 
al obligation  to  will  it,  is  not  to  will  it  as  an  ultimate  end.  It 
is  willing  the  will  of  God  or  moral  obligation  as  an  ultimate 
end  and  not  the  good  of  being  as  an  ultimate  end.  This  will- 
ing would  not  be  obedience  to  the  moral  law. 

Again:  It  is  absurd  and  a  contradiction  to  say  that  I  can 
love  God,  that  is,  will  his  good  out  of  regard  to  his  authority, 
rather   than   out  of  regard  to  the  intrinsic  value  of  his  well- 
18 


306  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

being.  It  is  impossible  to  will  God's  good  as  an  end  out  of  re- 
gard to  his  authority.  This  is  to  make  his  authority  the 
end  chosen,  for  the  reason  of  a  choice  is  identical  with  the 
end  chosen.  Therefore,  to  will  anything  for  the  reason  that 
God  requires  it,  is  to  will  God's  reqirement  as  an  ultimate 
end.  I  can  not,  therefore,  love  God  with  any  acceptable  love 
primarily  because  He  commands  it.  God  never  expected  to 
induce  His  creatures  to  love  Him  or  to  will  His  good  by  com- 
manding them  to  do  so.  '^The  law"  says  the  apostle  '^was 
not  made  for  a  righteous  man  but  for  sinners."  If  it  be  asked 
then  '^wherefore  serveth  the  law?"     I  answer, 

(1.)  That  the  obligation  to  will  good  to  God  exists  antece- 
dently to  His  requiring  it. 

(2.)  He  requires  it  because  it  is  naturally  obligatory. 

(3.)  It  is  impossible  that  He,  being  benevolent,  should  not 
will  that  we  should  be  benevolent. 

(4.)  His  expressed  will  is  only  the  promulgation  of  the  law 
of  nature.     It  is  rather  declaratory  than  dictatorial. 

(5.)  It  is  a  vindication  or  illustration  of  His  righteousness. 

(6.)  It  sanctions  and  rewards  love.  It  can  not  as  a  mere 
authority  beget  love,  but  it  can  encourage  and  reward  it. 

(7.)  It  can  fix  the  attention  on  the  end  commanded  and 
thus  lead  to  a  fuller  understanding  of  the  value  of  that  end. 
In  this  way,  it  may  convert  the  soul. 

(8.)  It  can  convince  of  sin  in  case  of  disobedience. 

(9.)  It  holds  before  the  mind  the  standard  by  which  it  is  to 
judge  itself  and  by  which  it  is  to  be  judged. 

But  let  it  be  kept  in  constant  remembrance  that  to  aim  at 
keeping  the  law  as  an  ultimate  end  is  not  keeping  it.  It  is  a 
legal  righteousness  and  not  love. 

31.  Obedience  to  the  moral  law  does  not  imply  that  the 
mind  always  or  at  any  time  intends  the  right  for  the  sake  of 
the  right.  This  has  been  so  fully  shown  in  a  former  lecture 
that  it  need  not  be  repeated  here. 

32.  Nor  does  it  imply  that  the  benevolent  mind  always  so 
much  as  thinks  of  the  rightness  of  good  willing.  I  surely 
may  will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  men  as  an  end 
or  from  a  regard  to  its  intrinsic  value,  and  not  at  the  time  or 
at  least  at  all  times  be  conscious  of  having  any  reference  to 
the  rightness  of  this  love.  It  is,  however,  none  the  less  virtu- 
ous on  this  account.  I  behold  the  infinite  value  of  the  well- 
being  of  God  and  the  infinite  value  of  the  immortal  soul  of 
my  neighbor.  My  soul  is  fired  with  the  view.  I  instantly 
consecrate  my  whole  being  to  this  end  and  perhaps  do  not  so 


MORAL  GO\*ERXMENT. 


207 


much  as  think  at  the  time  either  of  moral  obligation  or  of  the 
ri^htness  of  the  choice.  I  choose  the  end  with  a  single  eye  to  its 
intrinsic  value.  Will  any  one  say  that  this  is  not  virtue,  that 
this  is  not  true  and  real  obedience  to  the  law  of  God?  And 
here  I  must  repeat  in  substance  what  I  have  said  on  a  former 
occasion. 

33.  Obedience  to  the  moral  law  does  not  imply  that  we 
should  practically  treat  all  interests  that  are  of  equal  value  accor- 
ding to  their  value.  For  example,  the  precept,  Love  thy  neigh- 
bor as  thyself,  can  not  mean  that  I  am  to  take  equal  care  of  my 
own  soul  and  the  soul  of  every  other  human  being.  This  were 
impossible.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  I  should  take  the  same 
care  and  oversight  of  my  own  and  of  all  the  families  of  the 
earth.  Nor  that  I  should  divide  what  little  of  property  or 
time  or  talent  I  have  equally  among  all  mankind.  This  were, 
(1.)  Impossible. 

(2.)  Uneconomical  for  the  universe.  More  good  will  result 
to  the  universe  by  each  individual's  giving  his  attention  par- 
ticularly to  the  promotion  of  those  interests  that  are  within 
his  reach  and  so  under  his  influence  that  he  possesses  particu- 
lar advantages  for  promoting  them.  Every  interest  is  to  be 
esteemed  according  to  its  relative  value,  but  our  efforts  to 
promote  particular  interests  should  depend  upon  our  relations 
and  capacity  to  promote  them.  Some  interests  of  great  value 
we  may  be  under  no  obHgation  to  promote  for  the  reason  that 
we  have  no  ability  to  promote  them,  while  we  may  be  under 
obligation  to  promote  interests  of  vastly  less  value  for  the 
reason  that  we  are  able  to  promote  them.  We  are  to  aim  at 
promoting  those  interests  that  we  can  most  surely  and  exten- 
sively promote,  but  always  in  a  manner  that  shall  not  inter- 
fere with  others  promoting  other  interests  according  to  their  ^ 
relative  value.  Every  man  is  boimd  to  promote  his  own  and 
the  salvation  of  his  family,  not  because  they  belong  to.  self^  but 
because  they  are  valuable  in  themselves  and  because  they  are 
particularly  '  committed  to  him  as  being  directly  within  his  ^ 
reach.  This  is  a  principle  every  where  assumed  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  God;  (and  I  wish  it  to  be  distinctly  borne  in  mind 
as  we  proceed  in  our  investigations,  as  it  will  on  the  one  hand 
prevent  misapprehension,  and  on  the  other  avoid  the  necessity 
of  circumlocution  when  we  w^ish  to  express  the  same  idea,) 
the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  the  moral  law  no  doubt  is  that 
every  interest  or  good  known  to  a  moral  being  shall  be  esteem- 
I  ed  according  to  its  intrinsic  value,  and  that  in  our  efforts  to 
'^  promote  good  we  are  to  aim  at  securing  the  greatest  practica- 


208  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ble  amount  and  to  bestow  our  efforts  where  and  as  it  appears 
from  our  circumstances  and  relations  we  can  accomplish  the 
greatest  good.  This  ordinarily  can  be  done,  beyond  all  ques- 
tion, only  by  each  one  attending  to  the  promotion  of  those 
particular  interests  which  are  most  within  the  reach  of  his 
influence. 


1 


LECTURE   XIV. 

MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Moral  Law. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  sum  and  spirit  of  the  whole 
law  is  properly  expressed  in  one  word,  Love,  It  has  also 
been  shown  that  this  love  is  benevolence  or  good  willing;  that 
it  consists  in  choosing  the  highest  good  of  God  and  of  uni- 
versal being  as  an  ultimate  end,  or  for  its  own  intrinsic  value; 
in  a  spirit  or  state  of  entire  consecration  to  this  as  the  ultimate 
end  of  existence.  Although  the  whole  law  is  fulfilled  in  one 
word,  love,  yet  there  are  many  things  implied  in  the  state  of 
mind  expressed  by  this  term.  It  is,  therefore,  indispensable 
to  a  right  understanding  of  this  subject,  that  we  inquire  into 
the  characteristics  or  attributes  of  this  love.  We  must  keep 
steadily  in  mind  certain  truths  of  mental  philosophy.  I  will, 
therefore, 

I.  Call  attention  to  certain  facts  in  mental  philosophy  which 
are  revealed  to  us  in  consciousness,  and 

II.  Point  out  the  attributes  of  that  love  that  constitutes  obe- 
dience to  the  law  of  God;  and  as  I  proceed,  I  will  call  atten- 
tion to  those  states  of  the  IntelHgence  and  of  the  Sensibility, 
and  also  to  the  course  of  outward  conduct  imphed  in  the  exis- 
tence of  this  love  in  any  mind,  impHed  in  it  as  necessarily  re- 
sulting from  it  as  an  effect  does  from  its  cause. 

/.  Call  attention  to  certain  facts  in  mental  philosophy  as  they 
are  revealed  in  consciousness. 

1.  Moral  agents  possess  Intelligence  or  the  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge. 

2.  They  also  possess  Sensibility,  or  Sensitivity,  or  in  other 
words,  the  faculty  or  susccptibihty  of  feeling. 

3.  They  also  possess  Will,  or  the  power  of  choosing  or  re- 
fusing in  every  case  of  moral  obUgation. 

4.  These  primary  faculties  are  so  correlated  to  each  other 
that  the  Intellect  or  the  SensibiHty  may  control  the  will,  or 
the  will  may,  in  a  certain  sense,  control  them.  That  is,  the 
will  is  free  to  choose  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the 
intellect,  or  with  the  desires  and  impulses  of  the  sensibiUty. 
It  is  free  to  be  influenced  by  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility, 
or  by  the  dictates  of  the  intelligence,  or  to  control  and  direct 
them  both.  It  can  directly  control  the  attention  of  the  intel- 
lect, and  consequently  its  perceptions,  thoughts,  &c.  It  can 
indirectly  control  the  states  of  the  sensibility,  or  feeling  facul- 
ty, by  controlling  the  perceptions  and  thoughts  of  the  inteili- 

18* 


210  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

gence.  We  also  know  from  consciousness,  as  was  shown  in 
a  former  lecture,  that  the  voluntary  muscles  of  the  hody  are 
directly  controlled  by  the  will,  and  that  the  relation  of  out- 
ward action,  as  well  as  the  states  of  the  intelligence  and  the 
sensibility,  to  the  action  of  the  will,  is  that  of  necessity. 
That  is,  the  law  which  obhges  the  attention,  the  feelings,  and 
the  actions  of  the  body  to  obey  the  decisions  of  the  will,  is 
physical  law  or  the  law  of  necessity.  The  attention  of  the 
intellect  and  the  outward  actions  are  controlled  directly,  and 
the  feelings  indirectly,  by  the  decisions  of  the  will.  The  will 
can  either  command  or  obey.  It  can  suffer  itself  to  be  en- 
slaved by  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility,  or  it  can  assert  its 
sovereignty  and  control  them.  The  will  is  not  influenced  by 
either  the  intellect  or  the  sensibiHty,  by  the  law  of  necessity 
or  force;  so  that  the  will  can  always  resist  either  the  demands 
of  the  intelligence  or  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility.  But 
while  they  can  not  lord  it  over  the  will  through  the  agency  of 
any  law  of  force,  the  will  has  the  aid  of  the  law  of  necessi- 
ty or  force  by  which  to  control  them. 

Again:  We  are  conscious  of  affirming  to  ourselves  our  ob- 
ligation to  obey  the  law  of  the  intelligence  rather  than  the 
impulses  of  the  sensibility;  that  to  act  virtuously  we  must  act 
rationally  or  intelligently,  and  not  give  ourselves  up  to  the 
bhnd  impulses  of  our  feeUngs. 

Now,  inasmuch  as  the  love  required  by  the  moral  law  con- 
sists in  choice,  willing,  intention,  as  has  been  repeatedly 
shown,  and  inasmuch  as  choice,  willing,  intending,  controls 
the  states  of  the  intellect  and  the  outward  actions  directly  by 
a  law  of  necessity,  and  by  the  same  law  controls  the  feehngs 
or  states  of  the  sensibility  indirectly,  it  follows  that  certain 
states  of  the  intellect  and  the  sensibility  and  also  certain 
outward  actions  must  be  implied  in  the  existence  of  the  love 
which  the  law  of  God  requires.  I  say  implied  in  it,  not  as 
making  a  part  of  it,  but  as  necessarily  resulting  from  it.  The 
thoughts,  opinions,  judgments,  feehngs,  and  outward  actions 
must  be  moulded  and  modified  by  the  state  of  the  heart  or 
will. 

Here  it  is  important  to  remark  that  in  common  parlance, 
the  same  word  is  often  used  to  express  either  an  action  or 
state  of  the  will,  or  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  or  both.  This 
is  tme  of  all  the  terms  that  represent  what  are  called  the 
christian  graces  or  virtues,  or  those  various  modifications  of 
virtue  of  which  Christians  are  conscious  and  which  appear  in 
their  life  and  temper. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  211 

Of  this  truth  we  shall  be  constantly  reminded  as  we  pro- 
ceed in  our  investigations,  for  we  shall  find  illustrations  of  it 
at  every  step  of  our  progress.     Before  I  proceed  to  point  out 
the  attributes  of  benevolence,  it  is  important  to  remark  that 
all  the  moral  attributes  of  God  and  of  all  holy  beings,  are 
only  attributes  of  benevolence.     Benevolence  is  a  term  that 
comprehensively  expresses  them  all.     God  is  love.     This  term 
expresses   comprehensively  God's  whole    moral    character. 
This  love,  as  we  have  repeatedly  seen,  is  benevolence.     Be- 
nevolence is  good  willing,  or  the  choice  of  the  highest  good  of 
God  and  the  universe  as  an  end.     But  from  this  comprehen- 
sive statement,  accurate  though  it  be,  we  are  apt  to  receive 
very  inadequate  conceptions  of  what  really  belongs  to  as  im- 
plied in  benevolence.     To  say  that  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the 
whole  law;  that  benevolence  is  the  whole  of  true  religion; 
that  the  whole  duty  of  man  to  God  and  his  neighbor,  is  ex- 
pressed in  one  word,  Iodc — these  statements,  though  true,  are 
so  comprehensive  as  to  need  with  all  minds  much  amplifica- 
tion and  explanation.     The  fact  is,  that  many  things  are  im- 
plied in  love  or  benevolence.*    By  this  is  intended  that  benevo- 
lence needs  to  be  viewed  under  various  aspects  and  in  various 
relations,  and  its  dispositions  or  willings  considered  in  the  va- 
rious relations  in  which  it  is  called  to  act.     Benevolence  is  an 
ultimate  intention,  or  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end.     Now  if 
we  suppose  that  this  is  all  that  is  implied  in  benevolence  we 
shall  egregiously  err.     Unless  we  inquire  into  the  nature  of 
the  end  which  benevolence  chooses,  and  the  means  by  which 
it  seeks  to  accomplish  that  end,  we  shall  understand  but  little 
of  the  import  of  the  word  benevolence.     Benevolence  has 
many  attributes  or  characteristics.     These  must  all  harmonize 
in  the  selection  of  its  end,  and  in  its  efforts  to  realize  it.     Wis- 
dom^  justice^  mercy^  truths  holiness.,  and  many  other  attributes, 
as  we  shall  see,  are  essential  elements  or  attributes  of  benevo- 
lence.    To  understand  what  true  benevolence  is,  we  must  in- 
quire into  its  attributes.     Not  every  thing  that  is  called  love 
has  at  all  the  nature  of  benevolence.     Nor  has    all  that  is 
called  benevolence  any  title  to  that  appellation.     There  are 
various  kinds  of  love.     Natural  affection  is  called  love.     The 
affection  that  exists  between  the  sexes  is  also  called  love. 
Our  preference  of  certain  kinds  of  diet  is  called  love.     Hence 
we  say  we  love  fruit,  vegetables,  meat,  milk,  &c.     Benevo- 
lence is  also  called  love,  and  is  the  kind  of  love,  beyond  all 
question,  required  by  the  law  of  God.     But  there  is  more 
than  one  state  of  mind  that  is  called  benevolence.     There  is 


y/  212  .  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

a  constitutional  or  phrenological  benevolence,  which  is  often 
mistaken  for  and  confounded  with  the  benevolence  which  con- 
stitutes virtue.  This  so  called  benevolence  is  in  truth  only  an 
imposing  form  of  selfishness;  nevertheless  it  is  called  benevo- 
lence. Many  of  its  manifestations  are  like  those  of  true  be- 
nevolence. Care,  therefore,  should  be  taken  in  giving  reli- 
gious instruction,  to  distinguish  accurately  between  them. 
Benevolence,  let  it  be  remembered,  is  the  obedience  of  the 
will  to  the  law  of  the  reason.  It  is  willing  good  as  an  end, 
for  its  own  sake,  and  not  to  gratify  self.  Selfishness  consists 
in  the  obedience  of  the  will  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility. 
It  is  a  spirit  of  self-gratification.  The  will  seeks  to  gratify 
the  desires  and  propensities  for  the  pleasure  of  the  gratifica- 
tion. Self-gratification  is  sought  as  an  end  and  as  the  supreme 
end.  It  is  preferred  to  the  claims  of  God  and  the  good  of 
being.  Phrenological  or  constitutional  benevolence  is  only 
obedience  to  the  impulse  of  the  sensibility — a  yielding  to  a 
feeling  of  compassion.  It  is  only  an  effort  to  gratify  a  desire. 
It  is,  therefore,  as  really  selfishness,  as  is  an  effort  to  gratify- 
any  constitutional  desire  whatever. 
^  It  is  impossible  to  get  a  just  idea  of  what  constitutes  obe- 
dience to  the  Divine  law,  and  what  is  impUed  in  it,  without 
considering  attentively  the  various  attributes  or  aspects  of  be- 
nevolence, properly  so  called.  Upon  this  discussion  we  are 
about  to  enter.  But  before  I  commence  the  enumeration  and 
definition  of  these  attributes,  it  is  important  further  to  remark 
that  the  moral  attributes  of  God,  as  revealed  in  his  works, 
providence,  and  word,  throw  much  light  upon  the  subject  be- 
fore us.  Also  the  many  precepts  of  the  Bible,  and  the  de- 
velopments of  benevolence  therein  revealed,  will  assist  us 
much  as  we  proceed  in  our  inquiries  upon  this  important 
subject.  As  the  Bible  expressly  affirms  that  love  compre- 
,  hends  the  whole  character  of  God — that  it  is  the  whole  that 
the  law  requires  of  man — that  the  end  of  the  commandment 
is  charity  or  love — we  may  be  assured  that  every  form  of 
true  virtue  is  only  a  modification  of  love  or  benevolence,  that 
is,  that  every  state  of  mind  required  by  the  Bible,  and  recog- 
nized as  virtue  is,  in  its  last  analysis,  resolvable  into  love  or 
benevolence.  In  other  words,  every  virtue  is  only  benevo- 
lence viewed  under  certain  aspects,  or  in  certain  relations. 
In  other  words  still,  it  is  only  one  of  the  elements,  peculiari- 
ties, characteristics,  or  attributes  of  benevolence.  This  is 
true  of  God's  moral  attributes.  They  are,  as  has  been  said, 
only  attributes  of  benevolence.     They  are  only  benevolence 


moralgoternmeS^      213 

viewed  in  certain  relations  and  aspects.  All  his  virtues  are 
only  so  many  attributes  of  benevolence.  This  is  and  must 
be  true  of  every  holy  being. 

//.  /  will  now  proceed^  agreeably  to  my  'purpose,  to  point  out 
the  attributes  of  that  love  which  constitutes  obedience  to  the  law 
of  God. 

As  I  proceed  I  will  call  attention  to  the  states  of  the  in- 
telligence and  of  the  sensibility,  and  also  to  the  courses  of 
outward  conduct  implied  in  the  existence  of  this  love  in  any 
mind — implied  in  its  existence  as  necessarily  resulting  from 
it  by  the  law  of  cause  and  effect     These  attributes  are, 

1.  Voluntariness,  That  is,  it  is  a  phenomenon  of  the 
w^ill.  There  is  a  state  of  the  sensibility  often  expressed 
by  the  term  love.  Love  may,  and  often  does  exist,  as  every 
one  knows,  in  the  form  of  a  mere  feehng  or  emotion.  The 
term  is  often  used  to  express  the  emotion  of  fondness  or 
attachment  as  distinct  from  a  voluntary  state  of  mind  or  a 
choice  of  the  will.  This  emotion  or  feeling,  as  we  are  all 
aware,  is  purely  an  involuntary  state  of  mind.  Because  it  is 
a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility,  and  of  course  a  passive 
state  of  mind,  it  has  in  itself  no  moral  character.  The  law 
of  God  requires  voluntary  love  or  good  will,  as  has  been  re- 
peatedly shown.  This  love  consists  in  choice,  intention.  It 
is  choosing  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  of 
sentient  beings  as  an  end.  Of  course  voluntariness  must  be 
one  of  its  characteristics. 

If  it  be  voluntary,  or  consist  in  choice,  if  it  be  a  phenome- 
non of  the  w^ill,  it  must  control  the  thoughts  and  states  of  the 
sensibility  as  well  as  the  outward  action.  This  love,  then, 
not  only  consists  in  a  spirit  or  state  of  consecration  to  God 
and  the  universe,  but  also  implies  deep  emotions  of  love  to 
God  and  man.  Though  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  it  implies 
the  existence  of  all  those  feelings  of  love  and  affection  to  God 
and  man  that  necessarily  result  from  the  consecration  of  the 
heart  or  will  to  their  highest  well-being.  It  also  implies  all 
that  outward  course  of  life  that  necessarily  flows  from  a  state 
of  will  consecrated  to  this  end.  Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that 
when  these  feelings  do  not  arise  in  the  sensibility,  and  when 
this  course  of  life  is  not,  then  the  true  love  or  voluntary  con- 
secration to  God  and  the  universe  required  by  the  law,  is  not. 
These  follow  from  this  by  a  law  of  necessity.  Those,  that 
is,  feelings  or  emotions  of  love  and  a  correct  outward  life, 
may  exist  without  this  voluntary  love,  as  I  shall  have  occasion 
to  show  in  its  proper  place;  but  this  can  not  exist  without 


1 


214  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

those,  as  they  follow  from  it  by  a  law  of  necessity.  These 
emotions  will  vary  in  their  strength  as  constitution  and  cir- 
cumstances vary,  but  exist  they  must  in  some  sensible  degree 
whenever  the  will  is  in  a  benevolent  attitude. 

2.  Liberty  is  an  attribute  of  this  love.  The  mind  is  free 
and  spontaneous  in  its  exercise.  It  makes  this  choice  when  it 
has  the  power  at  every  moment  to  choose  self-gratification  as 
an  end.  Of  this'every  moral  agent  is  conscious.  It  is  a  free 
and  therefore  a  responsible  choice. 

3.  Intelligence,  That  is,  the  mind  makes  choice  of  this  end 
intelligently.  It  not  only  knows  what  it  chooses,  and  why  it 
chooses,  but  also  that  it  chooses  in  accordance  with  the  dic- 
tates of  the  inteUigence;  that  the  end  is  worthy  of  being 
chosen,  and  that  for  this  reason  the  intelligence  demands  that 
it  should  be  chosen;  and  also,  that  for  its  own  intrinsic  value 
it  is  chosen. 

Because  voluntariness,  liberty,  and  intelligence  are  natural 
attributes  of  this  love,  therefore  the  following  are  its  moral 
attributes. 

4.  Virtuousness  or  Tightness  is  an  attribute  of  it.  Moral 
Tightness  is  moral  perfection,  righteousness^  or  uprightness. 
Virtuousness  must  be  a  moral  element  or  attribute.  The  term 
marks  or  designates  its  relation  to  moral  law  and  expresses 
its  conformity  to  it. 

In  the  exercise  of  this  love  or  choice,  the  mind  is  conscious 
of  uprightness  or  of  being  conformed  to  moral  law  or  moral 
obligation.  In  other  words,  it  is  conscious  of  being  virtuous 
or  holy;  of  being  hke  God;  of  loving  what  ought  to  be  loved, 
and  of  consecration  to  the  right  end. 

Because  this  choice  is  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of 
the  intelligence,  therefore  the  mind  in  its  exercise  is  conscious 
of  the  approbation  of  that  power  of  the  intelligence  which  we 
call  conscience.  The  conscience  must  approve  this  love, 
choice,  or  intention. 

Again:  Because  the  conscience  approves  of  this  choice, 
therefore  there  is  and  must  be  a  corresponding  state  of  the 
sensibility.  There  is  and  must  be  in  the  sensibility  a  feeling 
of  happiness  or  satisfaction,  a  feeling  of  complacency  or  de- 
light in  the  love  that  is  in  the  heart  or  will.  This  love,  then, 
always  produces  self-approbation  in  the  conscience,  and  a 
felt  satisfaction  in  the  sensibility,  and  these  feelings  are  often 
very  acute  and  joyous,  in  so  much  that  the  soul  in  the  exer- 
cise of  this  love  of  the  heart  is  sometimes  led  to  rejoice  with 
joy  unspeakable  and  full  of  glory.     This  state  of  mind  does 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  215 

not  always  and  necessarily  amount  to  joy.  Much  depends  in 
this  respect  on  the  clearness  of  the  intellectual  views,  upon  the 
state  of  the  sensibility,  and  upon  the  manifestation  of  Divine 
approbation  to  the  soul.  But  when  peace  or  approbation  of 
conscience,  and  consequently  a  peaceful  state  of  the  sensi- 
bility are  not,  this  love  is  not.  They  are  connected  with  it 
by  a  law  of  necessity,  and  must  of  course  appear  on  the  field 
of  consciousness  where  it  exists.  These,  then,  are  implied 
in  obedience  to  the  law  of  God.  Conscious  peace  of  mind 
and  conscious  joy  in  God  must  be  where  true  love  to  God  is. 

5.  Disinterestedness  is  another  attribute  of  this  love.  By 
disinterestedness  is  not  intended  that  the  mind  takes  no  inte- 
rest in  the  object  loved,  for  it  does  take  a  supreme  interest  in 
it.  But  this  term  expresses  the  mind's  choice  of  an  end  for 
its  own  sake,  and  not  merely  upon  condition  that  the  good  be- 
longs to  self  This  love  is  disinterested  in  the  sense  that  the 
highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  is  chosen,  not 
upon  condition  of  its  relation  to  self,  but  for  its  own  intrinsic 
and  infinite  value.  It  is  this  attribute  particularly  that  distin- 
guishes this  love  from  selfish  love.  Selfish  love  makes  the 
relation  of  good  to  self  the  condition  of  choosing  it.  The 
good  of  God  and  of  the  Universe,  if  chosen  at  all,  is  only 
chosen  as  a  means  or  condition  of  promoting  the  highest  good 
of  self.  But  this  love  does  not  make  good  to  self  its  end; 
but  good  to  God  and  being  in  general  is  its  end. 

As  disinterestedness  is  an  attribute  of  this  love,  it  does  not 
seek  its  own  but  the  good  of  others.  "  Charity  (love)  seeketh 
not  her  own."  It  grasps  the  good  of  being  in  general,  and 
of  course,  of  necessity,  secures  a  corresponding  outward  life 
and  inward  feeling.  The  intelligence  will  be  employed  in 
devising  ways  and  means  for  the  promotion  o{  its  end.  The 
sensibility  will  be  tremblingly  alive  to  the  good  of  all  and  of 
each,  will  rejoice  in  the  good  of  others  as  in  its  own,  and 
will  grieve  at  the  misery  of  others  as  in  its  own.  It  *^  will  re- 
joice with  them  who  do  rejoice,  and  weep  with  them  that 
weep."  There  will  not,  can  not  be  envy  at  the  prosperity  of 
others,  but  unfeigned  joy,  joy  as  real  and  often  as  exquisite 
as  in  its  own.  Benevolence  enjoys  every  body's  good  things, 
while  selfishness  is  too  envious  at  the  good  things  of  others 
even  to  enjoy  its  own.  There  is  a  Divine  economy  in  benevo- 
lence. Each  benevolent  soul  not  only  enjoys  his  own  good 
things  but  also  enjoys  the  good  things  of  all  others  so  far  as 
he  knows  their  happiness.  He  drinks  at  the  river  of  God's 
pleasure.     He  not  only  rejoices  in  doing  good  to  others,  but 


216  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

also  in  beholding  their  enjoyment  of  good  things.  He  joys 
in  God's  joy  and  in  the  joy  of  angels  and  of  saints.  He 
also  rejoices  in  the  good  things  of  all  sentient  existences.  He 
is  happy  in  beholding  the  pleasure  of  the  beasts  of  the  field, 
the  fowls  of  the  air,  and  the  fishes  of  the  sea.  He  sympa- 
thizes with  all  joy  and  all  suffering  known  to  him.  Nor  is 
his  sympathy  with  the  suffering  of  others  a  feeling  of  un- 
mingled  pain.  It  is  a  real  luxury  to  sympathize  in  the  woes 
of  others.  He  would  not  be  without  this  sympathy.  It  so 
accords  with  his  sense  of  propriety  and  fitness,  that  mingled 
with  the  painful  emotion  there  is  a  sweet  feeling  of  self-appro- 
bation, so  that  a  benevolent  sympathy  with  the  woes  of  oth- 
ers is  by  no  means  inconsistent  with  happiness,  and  with  per- 
fect happiness.  God  has  this  sympathy.  He  often  expresses 
and  otherwise  manifests  it.  There  is,  indeed,  a  mysterious 
and  an  exquisite  luxury  in  sharing  the  woes  of  others.  God 
and  angels  and  all  holy  beings  know  what  it  is.  Where  this 
result  of  love  is  not  manifested,  there  love  itself  is  not.  Envy 
at  the  prosperity,  influence,  or  good  of  others,  the  absence  of 
sensible  joy  in  view  of  the  good  enjoyed  by  others,  and  of 
sympathy  with  the  sufferings  of  others,  prove  conclusively 
that  this  love  does  not  exist.  There  is  an  expansiveness,  an 
amplcness  of  embrace,  a  universality  and  a  Divine  disinter- 
estedness in  this  love  that  necessarily  manifests  itself  in  the 
liberal  devising  of  liberal  things  for  Zion,  and  in  the  copious 
outpourings  of  the  floods  of  sympathetic  feeling,  both  of  joys 
and  sorrows,  as  their  occcisions  present  themselves  before  the 
mind. 

5.  Impartiality  is  another  attribute  of  this  love.  By  this 
term  is  not  intended  that  the  mind  is  indifferent  to  the  char- 
acter of  him  who  is  happy  or  miserable;  that  it  would  be  as 
well  pleased  to  see  the  wicked  as  the  righteous  eternally  and 
perfectly  blessed.  But  it  is  intended  that,  other  things  being 
equal,  it  is  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  well-being  which  is 
alone  regarded  by  the  mind.  Other  things  being  equal,  it 
matters  not  to  whom  the  good  belongs.  It  is  no  respecter  of 
persons.  The  good  of  being  is  its  end  and  it  seeks  to  pro- 
mote every  interest  according  to  its  relative  value.  Selfish 
love  is  partial.  It  seeks  to  promote  self-interest  first,  and 
secondarily  those  interests  that  sustain  such  a  relation  to  self  as 
will  at  least  indirectly  promote  the  gratification  of  self.  Sel- 
fish love  has  its  favorites,  its  prejudices,  unreasonable  and  ri- 
diculous. Color,  family,  nation,  and  many  other  things  of 
like  nature  modify  it.     But  benevolence  koows  neither  Jew 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  217 

nor  Greek,  neither  bond  nor  free,  white  nor  hlack,  Babarian, 
Cythian^  European,  Asiatic,  African,  nor  American,  but  ac- 
counts all  men  as  men,  and  by  virtue  of  their  common  manhood 
calls  every  man  a  brother,  and  seeks  the  interest  of  all  and  of 
each.  ImpartiaHty  being  an  attribute  of  this  love,  will  of 
course  manifest  itself  in  the  outward  life  and  in  the  temper 
and  spirit  of  its  subject.  This  love  can  have  no  fellowship 
with  those  absurd  and  ridiculous  prejudices  that  are  so  often 
rife  among  nominal  Christians.  Nor  will  it  cherish  them  for 
a  moment  in  the  sensibility  of  him  who  exercises  it.  Benevo- 
lence recognizes  no  pnvileged  classes  on  the  one  hand,  nor 
proscribed  classes  on  the  other.  It  secures  in  the  sensibility 
an  utter  loathing  of  those  discriminations  so  odiously  mani- 
fested and  boasted  of  and  which  are  founded  exclusively  in  a 
selfish  state  of  the  will.  The  fact  that  a  man  is  a  man,  and 
not  that  he  is  of  our  party,  of  our  complexion,  or  of  our  town, 
state  or  nation — that  he  is  a  creature  of  God,  that  he  is  ca- 
pable of  virtue  and  happiness,  these  are  the  considerations 
that  are  seized  upon  by  this  divinely  impartial  love.  It  is 
the  intrinsic  value  of  his  interests,  and  not  that  they  are  the 
interests  of  one  connected  with  self,  that  the  benevolent  mind 
regards. 

But  here  it  is  important  to  repeat  the  remark  that  the  econo-  ^ 
my  of  benevolence  demands  that  where  two  interests  are,  in 
themselves  considered,  of  equal  value,  in  order  to  secure  the 
greatest  amount  of  good,  each  one  should  bestow  his  ejQTorts 
where  they  can  be  bestowed  to  the  greatest  advantage.  For 
example:  Every  man  sustains  such  relations  that  he  can  ac- 
complish more  good  by  seeking  to  promote  the  interest  and 
happiness  of  certain  persons  rather  than  of  others.  His  fam- 
ily, his  kindred,  his  companions,  his  immediate  neighbors  and 
those  to  whom,  in  the  providence  of  God,  he  sustains  such  re- 
lations as  to  give  him  access  to  them  and  influence  over  them.. 
It  is  not  unreasonable,  it  is  not  partial,  but  reasonable  and  im- 
partial to  bestow  our  efforts  more  directly  upon  them.  There- 
fore, while  benevolence  regards  every  interest  according  to  its 
relative  value,  it  reasonably  puts  forth  its  efforts  in  the  direc- 
tion where  there  is  a  prospect  of  accomplishing  the  most 
good.  This,  I  say,  is  not  partiality,  but  impartiality;  for  be 
it  understood,  it  is  not  the  particular  persons  to  whom  good 
can  be  done,  but  the  amount  of  good  that  can  be  accomplished 
that  directs  the  efforts  of  benevolence.  It  is  not  because  my 
family  is  my  own,  nor  because  their  well-being  is,  of  course,  /X 
more  valuable  in  itself  than  that  of  my  neighbors'  families, 
19 


218  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

but  because  my  relations  afford  me  higher  facilities  for  doing 
them  good,  I  am  under  particular  obligation  to  aim  first 
at  promoting  their  good.  Hence  the  apostle  says:  "If  any 
man  provide  not  for  his  own,  especially  for  those  of  his  own 
household,  he  hath  denied  the  faith  and  is  worse  than  an  in- 
fidel." Strictly  speaking,  benevolence  esteems  every  known 
good  according  to  its  intrinsic  and  relative  value;  but  prac- 
tically treats  every  interest  according  to  the  perceived 
probabihty  of  securing  on  the  whole  the  highest  amount  of 
good.  This  is  a  truth  of  great  practical  importance.  It  is 
developed  in  the  experience  and  observation  of  every  day 
and  hour.  It  is  manifest  in  the  conduct  of  God  and  of  Christ, 
of  apostles  and  of  martyrs.  It  is  every  where  assumed  in 
the  precepts  of  the  Bible,  and  every  where  manifested  in  the 
history  of  benevolent  effort.  Let  it  be  understood,  then,  that 
impartiality,  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  does  not  imply 
that  its  effort  to  do  good  will  not  be  modified  by  relations  and 
circumstances.  But,  on  the  contrary,  this  attribute  implies 
that  the  efforts  to  secure  the  great  end  of  benevolence,  to 
wit,  the  greatest  amount  of  good  to  God  and  the  universe, 
will  be  modified  by  those  relations  and  circumstances  that  af- 
ford the  highest  advantages  for  doing  good. 

The  impartiality  of  benevolence  caases  it  always  to  lay 
supreme  stress  upon  God's  interests,  because  His  well-being 
is  of  infinite  value,  and  of  course  benevolence  must  be  su- 
preme to  Him.  Benevolence  being  impartial  love,  of  course 
accounts  God's  interests  and  well-being,  as  of  infinitely  great- 
er value  than  the  aggregate  of  all  other  interests.  Benevo- 
lence regards  our  neighbor's  interests  as  our  own,  simply  be- 
cause they  are  in  their  intrinsic  value  as  our  own.  Benevo- 
lence, therefore,  is  always  supreme  to  God  and  equal  to  man. 

6.  Another  attribute  of  this  love  is  Universality.  Benevo- 
lence chooses  the  highest  good  of  being  in  general.  It  ex- 
cludes none  from  its  regard;  but  on  the  contrary  embosoms 
all  in  its  ample  embrace.  But  by  this  it  is  not  intended  that 
it  seeks  to  promote  the  good  of  every  individual.  It  seeks  the 
highest  practicable  amount  of  good.  The  interest  of  eYery 
individual  is  estimated  according  to  its  intrinsic  value,  what- 
ever the  circumstances  or  character  of  each  may  be.  But 
character  and  relations  may  and  must  modify  the  manifesta- 
tions of  benevolence,  or  its  efforts  in  seeking  to  promote  this 
end.  A  wicked  character  and  governmental  relations  and 
considerations  may  forbid  benevolence  to  seek  the  good  of 
some.     Nay,  they  may  demand  that  positive  misery  shall  be 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  •  219 

inflicted  on  some  as  a  warning  to  others  to  beware  of  their 
destructive  ways.  By  universality,  as  an  attribute  of  benevo- 
lence, is  intended  that  good  will  is  truly  exercised  towards  all 
Sentient  beings,  whatever  their  character  and  relations  may  be; 
and  that  when  the  higher  good  of  the  greater  number  does  not 
forbid  it,  the  happiness  of  all  and  of  each  will  be  pursued 
with  a  degree  of  stress  equal  to  their  relative  value  and  the 
prospect  of  secuiing  each  interest.  Enemies  as  well  as 
friends,  strangers  and  foreigners  as  well  as  relations  and  im- 
mediate neighbors  will  be  enfolded  in  its  sweet  embrace.  It 
is  the  state  of  mind  required  by  Christ  in  the  truly  Divine 
precept,  "  I  say  unto  you,  love  your  enemies,  pray  for  them 
that  hate  you,  and  do  good  unto  them  that  despitefully  use 
and  persecute  you."  This  attribute  of  benevolence  is  glori- 
ously conspicuous  in  the  character  of  God.  His  love  to  sin- 
ners alone  accounts  for  our  being  to-day  out  of  hell.  His 
aiming  to  secure  the  highest  good  of  the  greatest  number  is 
illustrated  by  the  display  of  his  glorious  justice  in  the  pun- 
ishment of  the  wicked.  His  universal  care  for  all  ranks  and 
conditions  of  sentient  beings  manifested  in  His  works  and 
providence,  beautifully  and  gloriously  illustrates  the  truth  that 
"  His  tender  mercies  are  over  all  His  works." 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  universah ty  must  be  a  modification 
of  true  benevolence.  It  consists  in  good  willing,  that  is,  in 
choosing  the  highest  good  of  being  as  such  and  for  its  own 
sake.  Of  course  it  must,  to  be  consistent  with  itself,  seek 
the  good  of  all  and  of  each,  so  far  as  the  good  of  each  is  con- 
sistent  with  the  greatest  good  upon  the  whole.  Benevolence 
not  only  wills  and  seeks  the  good  of  moral  beings,  but  also 
the  good  of  every  sentient  existence,  from  the  minutest  ani- 
malculum  to  the  highest  order  of  beings.  It  of  course  begets 
a  state  of  the  sensibiHty  that  is  tremblingly  aUve  to  all  happi- 
ness and  to  all  pain.  It  will  be  pained  with  the  agony  of  an 
insect,  and  also  rejoice  in  its  joy.  God  does  this  and  all  ho^ 
ly  beings  do  this.  Where  this  sympathy  with  the  joys  and 
sorrows  of  universal  being  is  not,  there  benevolence  is  not. 
Observe,  good  is  its  end;  where  this  is  promoted  by  the  proper 
means  the  feelings  are  gratified.  Where  evil  is  witnessed 
the  benevolent  spirit  deeply  and  necessarily  sympathizesi 


LECTURE  XV. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

7.  Efficiency  is  another  attribute  or  characteristic  of  be- 
nevolence. Benevolence  consists  in  choice,  intention.  Now 
we  know  from  consciousness  that  choice  or  intention  consti- 
tutes the  mind's  deepest  activity.  If  I  honestly  intend  a  thing 
I  can  not  but  make  efforts  to  accomplish  that  which  I  intend, 
provided  that  I  believe  the  thing  possible.  If  I  choose  an 
end,  this  choice  must  and  will  energize  to  secure  its  end. 
When  benevolence  is  the  supreme  choice,  preference,  in- 
tention of  the  soul,  it  is  plainly  impossible  that  it  should  not 
produce  efforts  to  secure  its  end.  It  must  cease  to  exist  or 
manifest  itself  in  exertions  to  secure  its  end  as  soon  as  and 
whenever  the  intelligence  deems  it  wise  to  do  so.  If  the  will 
has  yielded  to  the  intelligence  in  the  choice  of  an  end,  it  will 
certainly  obey  the  intelUgence  in  pursuit  of  that  end.  Choice, 
intention,  is  the  cause  of  all  the  outward  activity  of  moral 
agents.  They  all  have  chosen  some  end,  either  their  own  grat- 
ification or  the  highest  good  of  being;  and  all  the  busy  bustle 
of  this  world's  teeming  population  is  nothing  else  than  choice 
or  intention  seeking  to  compass  its  end. 

Efficiency  therefore  is  an  attiibute  of  benevolent  intention. 
It  must,  it  will,  it  does  energize  in  God,  in  angels,  in  saints 
on  earth  and  in  Heaven.  It  was  this  attribute  of  benevolence 
that  led  God  to  give  His  only  begotten  Son,  and  that  led  the 
Son  to  give  himself  "that  whosoever  beHeveth  in  him  should 
not  perish  but  have  everlasting  life." 

If  Love  is  efficient  in  producing  outward  action  and  effi- 
cient in  producing  inward  feelings;  it  is  efficient  to  wake  up 
the  intellect  and  set  the  world  of  thought  on  fire  in  devising 
ways  and  means  to  realize  its  end.  It  wields  all  the  infinite 
natural  attributes  of  God.  It  is  the  mainspring  that  moves 
all  heaven.  It  is  the  mighty  power  that  is  heaving  the  mass 
of  mind  and  rocking  the  moral  world  Hke  a  smothered  vol- 
cano. Look  to  the  heavens  above.  It  was  benevolence  that 
hung  them  out.  It  is  benevolence  that  sustains  those  mighty 
rolfing  orbs  in  their  courses.  It  was  good  will  endeavoring 
to  realize  its  end  that  at  first  put  forth  creative  power.  The 
same  power  for  the  same  reason  still  energizes  and  will  con- 
tinue to  energize  for  the  realization  of  its  end  so  long  as  God 
is  benevolent.     And  O  what  a  glorious  thought  that  infinite 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  221 

benevolence  is  wielding  and  will  forever  wield  infinite  attri- 
butes for  the  promotion  of  good.  No  mind  but  an  infinite  one 
can  begin  to  conceive  of  the  amount  of  good  that  Jehovah 
will  secure.  O  blessed  glorious  thoughts!  But  it  is,  it  must 
be  a  reality  as  surely  as  God  and  the  universe  exist.  It  is  no 
imagination,  it  is  one  of  the  most  stable  as  well  as  the  most 
glorious  truths  in  the  universe.  Mountains  of  granite  are  but 
vapor  in  the  comparison  of  it.  But  will  the  truly  benevolent 
on  earth  and  in  heaven  sympathize  with  God?  The  power 
that  energizes  in  him,  energizes  in  them.  One  principle  ani- 
mates and  moves  them  all,  and  that  principle  is  love,  good 
will  to  universal  being.  Well  may  our  souls  cry  out,  Amen, 
go  on,  God-speed,  let  the  mighty  power  heave  and  wield  uni- 
versal mind  until  all  the  ills  of  earth  shall  be  put  aw^ay  and  un* 
til  all  that  can  be  made  holy  are  clothed  in  the  garments  of 
everlasting  gladness. 

Since  benevolence  is  necessarily,  from  its  very  nature,  ac- 
tive and  efiicient  in  putting  forth  efforts  to  secure  its  end,  and 
since  its  end  is  the  highest  good  of  being,  it  follows  that  all 
who  are  truly  religious  will  and  must,  from  the  very  nature  of 
true  religion,  be  active  in  endeavoring  to  promote  the  good  of 
being.     While  effort  is  possible  to  a  christian,  it  is  as  natu- 
ral to  him  as  his  breath.     He  has  within  him  the  very  main- 
spring of  activity,  a  heart  set  on  the  promotion  of  the  highest 
good  of  universal  being.     This  is  the  end  for  which  he  lives 
and  moves  and  has  his  being.     While  he  has  life  and  activity 
at  all,  it  will,  and  it  must  be  directed  to  this  end.     Let  this 
never  be  forgotten.     An  idle,  an  inactive,  inefiicient  christian 
is  a  misnomer.     Religion  is  an  essentially  active  principle,  and 
when  and  while  it  exists,  it  must  exercise  and  manifest  itself. 
It  is  not  merely  good  desire,  but  it  is  good  wilHng.     Men  may 
have  desires,  and  hope  and  live  on  them,  without  making  ef- 
forts to  reahze  their  desires.     They  may  desire  without  ac- 
tion.    If  their  will  is  active,  their  life  must  be.     If  they  really 
choose  an  ultimate  end,  this  choice  must  manifest  itself.     The 
sinner  does  and  must  manifest  his  selfish  choice,  and  so  like- 
wise must  the  saint  manifest  his  benevolence. 

8.  Penitence  must  be  a  characteristic  of  benevolence,  in 
one  who  has  been  a  sinner.  Penitence,  as  we  have  briefly 
said  and  shall  more  fully  illustrate  hereafter,  is  not  a  phenom- 
enon of  the  sensibility,  but  of  the  will.  Every  form  of  virtue 
must,  of  necessity,  be  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  and  not  of 
the  intellect  or  of  the  sensibiUty.  This  word  is  commonlv 
used  also  to  designate  a  certain  phenomenon  of  the  sensibill- 
19* 


222  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY.  i 

tj,  to  wit,  sorrow  for  sin.  This  sorrow,  though  called  peni- 
tence, is  not  penitence  regarded  as  a  virtue.  Evangelical 
penitence  consists  in  a  peculiar  attitude  of  the  will  toward 
our  own  past  sins.  It  is  the  will's  continued  rejection  of  and 
opposition  to  our  past  sins — the  will's  aversion  to  them.  This 
rejection,  opposition,  and  aversion,  is  penitence,  and  is  always 
a  peculiarity  in  the  history  of  those  benevolent  minds  that 
have  been  sinners.  This  change  in  the  will,  most  deeply  and 
permanently  affects  the  sensibihty.  It  will  keep  the  intelli- 
gence thoroughly  awake  to  the  nature,  character,  and  tenden- 
cies of  sin,  to  its  unspeakable  guilt,  and  all  its  intrinsic  odious- 
ness.  This  will  of  course  break  up  the  fountains  of  the  great 
deep  of  feeling;  the  sensibility  will  often  pour  forth  a  torrent 
of  burning  sorrow  in  view  of  past  sin;  and  all  its  loathing 
and  indignation  will  be  kindled  against  it  when  it  is  beheld. 
This  attribute  of  benevolence  will  secure  confession  and  resti- 
tution, that  is,  these  must  necessarily  follow  from  genuine  re- 
pentance. If  the  soul  forsake  sin,  it  will  of  course  make  all 
possible  reparation  when  it  has  done  an  injury.  Benevo- 
lence seeks  the  good  of  all,  of  course  it  will  and  must  seek 
to  repair  whatever  injury  it  has  inflicted  on  any. 

Repentance  will  and  must  secure  a  God-justifying  and  self- 
condemning  spirit.  It  will  take  all  shame  and  all  blame  to 
self,  and  fully  acquit  God  of  blame.  This  deep  self-abase- 
ment is  always  and  necessarily  a  characteristic  of  the  true 
penitent.     Where  this  is  not,  true  repentance  is  not. 

It  should,  however,  be  here  remarked  that  feelings  of  self- 
loathing,  of  self-abasement,  and  of  abhorrence  of  sin,  depend 
upon  the  view  which  the  intelligence  gains  of  the  nature  and 
guilt  and  aggravation  of  sin.  In  a  sensible  and  manifested 
degree,  it  will  always  exist  when  the  will  has  honestly  turned 
or  repented;  but  this  feeling  I  have  described  gains  strength 
as  the  soul  from  time  to  time  gains  a  deeper  insight  into  the 
nature,  guilt  and  tendencies  of  sin.  It  is  probable  that  re- 
pentance as  an  emotion  will  always  gain  strength,  not  only  in 
this  world  but  in  heaven.  Can  it  be  that  the  saints  can  in 
heaven  reflect  upon  their  past  abuse  of  the  Savior,  and  not 
feel  their  sorrow  stirred  within  them?  Nor  will  this  diminish 
their  happiness.  Godly  sorrow  is  not  unhappiness.  There 
is  a  luxury  in  the  exercise.  Remorse  can  not  be  known  in 
heaven,  but  godly  sorrow,  I  think,  must  exist  among  the  saints 
forever.  However  this  may  be  in  heaven,  it  certainly  is  im- 
plied in  repentance  on  earth.  This  attribute  must  and  will 
secure  an  outward  life  conformed  to  the  law  of  love.    There 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  223 

may  be  an  outward  morality  without  benevolence,  but  there 
can  not  be  benevolence  without  corresponding  purity  of  out- 
ward life. 

9.  Another  characteristic  or  attribute  of  benevolence  is 
Faith,  Evangelical  faith  is  by  no  means,  as  some  have  sup- 
posed, a  phenomenon  of  the  intelligence.  The  term,  however, 
is  often  used  to  express  states  both  of  the  sensibility  and  of 
the  intellect.  Conviction,  or  a  strong  perception  of  truth, 
such  as  banishes  doubt,  is  in  common  language  called  faith  or 
belief,  and  this  without  any  reference  to  the  state  of  the  will, 
whether  it  embraces  or  resists  the  truth  perceived.  But,  cer- 
tainly, this  conviction  can  not  be  evangelical  faith.  In  this 
belief,  there  is  no  virtue;  it  is  but  the  faith  of  devils.  The 
term  is  often  used  in  common  parlance  to  express  a  mere  feel- 
ing of  assurance,  or  confidence,  and  as  often  respects  a  false- 
hood as  the  truth.  That  is,  persons  often  feel  the  utmost  con- 
fidence in  a  lie.  But  whether  the  feeling  be  in  accordance 
with  truth  or  falsehood,  it  is  not  faith  in  the  evangelical  sense  V^" 
of  the  term.  It  is  not  virtue.  Faith,  to  be  a  virtue,  must  be 
a  phenomenon  of  the  will.  It  must  be  an  attribute  of  be- 
nevolence or  love.  As  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  it  is  the 
will's  embracing  and  loving  truth.  It  is  the  souFs  yielding  or 
committing  itself  to  the  influence  of  truth.  It  is  trust.  It  is 
the  heart's  embracing  the  truths  of  God's  existence,  attributes, 
works  and  word.  It  implies  intellectual  perception  of  truth, 
and  consists  in  the  heart's  embracing  all  the  truth  perceived. 
It  also  implies  that  state  of  the  sensibility  which  is  called 
faith.  Both  the  state  of  the  intellect  and  the  state  of  the 
sensibility  just  expressed  are  implied  in  faith,  though  neither  > 
of  them  make  any  part  of  it.  Faith  always  begets  a  reali- 
zing state  of  the  sensibihty.  The  intellect  sees  the  truth 
clearly,  and  the  sensibility  feels  it  deeply,  in  proportion  to  the 
strength  of  the  intellectual  perception.  But  the  clearest  pos- 
sible perception  and  the  deepest  possible  felt  assurance  of 
the  truth  may  consist  with  a  state  of  the  utmost  opposition  of 
the  will  to  truth.  But  this  can  not  be  trust,  confidence,  faith. 
The  damned  in  hell,  no  doubt,  see  the  truth  clearly,  and  have 
a  feeling  of  the  utmost  assurance  of  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
but  they  have  no  faith. 

Faith  then  must  certainly  be  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  and 
must  be  a  modification  or  attribute  of  benevolence.  It  is  good 
will  or  benevolence  considered  in  its  relations  to  the  truth  of 
God.  It  is  good  will  to  God,  confiding  in  his  veracity  and 
faithfulness.     It  can  not  be  too  distinctly  borne  in  mind  that 


224  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

every  modification  or  phase  of  virtue  is  only  benevolence 
existing  in  certnin  relations,  or  good  will  to  God  and  the  uni- 
verse manifesting  itself  in  the  various  circumstances  and  rela- 
tions in  which  it  is  called  to  act. 

10.  Complacency  in  holiness  or  moral  excellence,  is  an- 
other attribute  of  benevolence.  This  consists  in  benevo- 
lence contemplated  in  its  relations  to   holy  beings. 

This  term  also  expresses  both  a  state  of  the  intelHgence 
and  of  the  sensibility.  Moral  agents  arc  so  constituted,  that 
they  necessarily  approve  of  moral  worth  or  excellence;  and 
when  even  sinners  behold  right  character,  or  moral  goodness, 
they  are  compelled  to  respect  and  approve  it  by  a  law  of 
their  intelligence.  This  they  not  unfrequently  regard  as 
evidence  of  goodness  in  themselves.  But  this  is  doubtless 
just  as  common  in  hell  as  it  is  on  earth.  The  veriest  sinners 
on  earth  or  in  hell,  have  by  the  unalterable  constitution  of 
their  nature,  the  necessity  imposed  upon  them  of  paying  in- 
tellectual homage  to  moral  excellence.  When  a  moral  agent 
is  intensely  contemplating  moral  excellence,  and  his  intellec- 
tual approbation  is  emphatically  pronounced,  the  natural,  and 
often  the  necessary  result,  is  a  corresponding  feeling  of  com- 
placency or  delight  in  the  sensibility.  But  this  being  alto- 
gether an  involuntary  state  of  mind,  has  no  moral  character. 
Complacency  as  a  phenomenon  of  will  consists  in  willing  the 
actual  highest  blessedness  of  the  holy  being  as  a  good  in  itself 
and  upon  condition  of  his  moral  excellence. 

Tliis  attribute  of  benevolence  is  the  cause  of  a  complacent 
state  of  the  sensibility.  It  is  true  that  feelings  of  complacency 
may  exist  when  complacency  of  will  does  not  exist.  But 
complacency  of  feeling  surely  will  exist  when  complacency 
of  will  exists.  Complacency  of  zuiV/  implies  complacency  of 
conscience^  or  the  approbation  of  the  intelligence.  When 
there  is  a  complacency  of  intelligence  and  of  will,  there  will 
be  of  course  complacency  of  the  sensibility. 

It  is  highly  worthy  of  observation  here,  that  this  com- 
placency of  feeling  is  that  which  is  generally  termed  love  to 
God  and  to  the  saints,  in  the  common  language  of  christians,  and 
often  in  the  popular  language  of  the  bible.  It  is  a  vivid  and 
pleasant  state  of  the  sensibility,  and  very  noticeable  by  con- 
sciousness of  course.  Indeed  it  is  perhaps  the  general  usage 
now  to  call  this  phenomenon  of  the  sensibihty,  love,  and  for 
want  of  just  discrimination,  to  speak  of  it  as  constituting  re- 
ligion. Many  seem  to  suppose  that  this  feeling  of  delight 
in  and  fondness  for  God,  is  the  love  required  by  the  moral 
law. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  225 

They  are  conscious  of  not  being  voluntary  in  it,  as  well 
they  may  be.  They  judge  of  their  religious  state,  not  by  the 
end  for  which  they  live,  that  is,  by  their  choice  or  intention, 
but  by  their  emotions.  If  they  find  themselves  strongly  exer- 
cised with  emotions  of  love  to  God  they  look  upon  themselves 
as  in  a  state  well-pJeasing  to  God.  But  if  their  feelings  or 
emotions  of  love  are  not  active,  they  of  course  judge  them- 
selves to  have  little  or  no  religion.  It  is  remarkable  to  what 
extent  religion  is  regarded  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility 
and  as  consisting  in  mere  feelings.  So  common  is  it,  indeed, 
that  almost  uniformly  when  professed  Christians  speak  of 
their  experience,  they  speak  of  their  feelings  or  the  state  of 
their  sensibility,  instead  of  speaking  of  their  conscious  conse- 
cration to  God  and  the  good  of  being. 

It  is  also  somewhat  common  for  them  to  speak  of  their 
viezi's  of  Christy  and  of  truth,  in  a  manner  that  shows  that  they 
regard  the  states  of  the  inteUigence  as  constituting  a  part  at 
least  of  their  religion.  It  is  of  great  importance  that  just 
views  should  prevail  among  Christians  upon  this  momentous 
subject.  Virtue  or  religion,  as  has  been  repeatedly  said,  must 
be  a  phenomenon  of  the  heart  or  will.  The  attribute  of  be- 
nevolence which  we  are  considering,  that  is,  complacency  of 
heart  or  will  in  God,  is  the  most  common  light  in  which  the 
Scriptures  present  it,  and  also  the  most  common  form  in  which 
it  lies  revealed  on  the  field  of  consciousness.  The  Scriptures 
often  assign  the  goodness  of  God  as  a  reason  for  loving  Him, 
and  Christians  are  conscious  of  having  much  regard  to  His 
goodness  in  their  love  to  Him.  I  mean  in  their  good  will  to 
Him.  '  They  will  good  to  Him  and  ascribe  all  praise  and  glo- 
ry to  Him  upon  the  condition  that  He  deserves  it.  Of  this 
they  are  conscious.  Now,  as  was  shown  in  a  former  lecture, 
in  their  love  or  good  will  to  God  they  do  not  regard  His  good- 
ness as  the  fundamental  reason  for  willing  good  to  Him.  Al- 
though His  goodness  is  that  which  at  the  time  most  strongly 
impresses  their  minds,  yet  it  must  be  that  the  intrinsic  value  of 
His  well-being  is  assumed  and  had  in  view  by  them,  or  they 
would  no  sooner  will  that  than  any  thing  else  to  Him.  In 
willing  His  good  they  must  assume  its  intrinsic  value  to  Him 
as  the  fundamental  reason  fof  willing  it,  and  His  goodness  as 
a  secondary  reason  or  condition,  but  they  are  conscious  of  being 
much  influenced  in  willing  His  good  in  particular  by  a  regard  to 
his  goodness.  Should  you  ask  the  Christian  why  he  loved  God  or 
why  he  exercised  good  will  to  Him,  he  would  probably  reply,  it  is 
because  God  is  good.     But  suppose  he  should  be  further  asked 


226  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

why  he  willed  good  rather  than  evil  to  God,he  would  say  because 
good  is  good  or  valuable  to  Him.  Or  if  he  returned  the  same 
answer  as  before,  to  wit,  because  God  is  good,  he  would  give 
this  answer  only  because  he  would  think  it  impossible  for  any 
one  not  to  assume  and  to  know  that  good  is  willed  instead  of 
evil  because  of  its  intrinsic  value.  The  fact  is,  the  intrinsic 
value  of  well-being  is  necessarily  taken  along  with  the  mind, 
and  always  assumed  by  it  as  a  first  truth.  When  a  virtuous 
being  is  perceived,  this  first  truth  being  spontaneously  and 
necessarily  assumed,  the  mind  thinks  only  of  the  secondary 
reason  or  condition,  or  the  virtue  of  the  being  in  willing  good 
to  Him. 

The  philosophy  of  the  heart's  complacency  in  God  may 
be  illustrated  by  many  familiar  examples.  For  instance: 
The  law  of  causality  is  a  first  truth.  Every  one  knows  it. 
Every  one  assumes  it  and  must  assume  it.  No  one  ever  did 
or  can  practically  deny  it.  Now  I  have  some  important  end 
to  accomplish.  In  looking  around  for  means  to  accomplish 
my  end,  1  discover  a  certain  means  which  I  am  sure  will  ac- 
complish it.  It  is  the  tendency  of  this  to  accomplish  my  end 
that  my  mind  is  principally  aflfected  with  at  the  time.  Should 
I  be  asked  why  I  choose  this  I  should  naturally  answer  be- 
cause of  its  utility  or  tendency,  and  I  should  be  conscious  that 
this  reason  was  upon  the  field  of  consciousness.  But  it  is 
perfectly  plain  that  the  fundamantal  reason  for  this  choice, 
and  one  which  was  assumed,  and  had  in  fact  the  prime  and 
fundamental  influence  in  producing  the  choice  was  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  end  to  which  the  thing  chosen  sustained  the 
relation  of  a  means.  Take  another  illustration:  That  happi- 
ness is  intrinsically  valuable  is  a  first  truth.  Every  body 
knows  and  assumes  it  as  such.  Now  I  behold  a  virtuous 
character.  Assuming  the  first  truth  that  happiness  is  intrinsi- 
cally valuable,  I  affirm  irresistibly  that  he  deserves  happiness 
and  that  it  is  my  duty  to  will  his  happiness.  Now,  in  this  case 
the  aflSrmation  that  he  deserves  happiness,  and  that  I  ought 
to  will  it,  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  happiness  is  in- 
trinsically valuable.  The  thing  with  which  I  am  immedi- 
ately conscious  of  being  affected,  and  which  necessitated  the 
affirmation  of  the  obligation  to  will  his  good,  and  which  in- 
duced me  to  will  it,  was  the  perception  of  his  goodness  or  de- 
sert of  happiness.  Nevertheless,  it  is  certain  that  I  did  as- 
sume, and  was  fundamentally  influenced  both  in  my  affirma- 
tion of  obligation  and  in  my  choice  by  the  first  truth,  that  happi- 
ness is  intrinsically  valuable.     I  assumed  it  and  was  influenced 


MORAL  aOVERNMENT.  227 

by  it,  though  unconscious  of  it.  And  this  is  generally  true  of  first 
truths.  They  are  so  universally  and  so  necessarily  assumed 
in  practice,  that  we  lose  the  direct  consciousness  of  being  in- 
flenced  by  them.  Myriads  of  illustrations  of  this  are  arising 
all  around  us.  We  do  really  love  God,  that  is,  exercise  good 
will  to  Him.  Of  this  we  are  strongly  conscious.  We  are 
also  conscious  of  willing  His  actual  blessedness  upon  condi- 
tion that  He  is  good.  This  reason  we  naturally  assign  to  our- 
selves and  to  others.  But  in  this  we  may  overlook  the  fact 
that  there  is  still  another  and  a  deeper,  and  a  more  fundamen- 
tal reason  assumed  for  willing  His  good,  to  wit,  its  intrinsic 
value.  And  this  reason  is  so  fundamental  that  we  should  ir- 
resistibly affirm  our  obligation  to  will  His  good  upon  the  bare 
perception  of  His  susceptibility  of  Happiness  wholly  irre- 
spective of  His  character. 

Before  I  quit  this  subject,  I  must  advert  again  to  the  sub- 
ject of  complacent  love  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility 
and  also  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  intelligence.  There  are 
sad  mistakes  and  gross  and  ruinous  delusions  entertained  by 
many  upon  this  subject,  if  I  mistake  not.  The  intelligence 
of  necessity,  perfectly  approves  of  the  character  of  God  where 
it  is  apprehended.  The  intelligence  is  so  correlated  to  the 
sensibility  that  where  it  perceives  in  a  strong  light  the  Divine 
excellence,  or  the  excellence  of  the  Divine  law,  the  sensibility 
is  affected  by  the  perception  of  the  intelligence  as  a  thing  of 
course  and  of  necessity.  So  that  emotions  of  complacency 
and  delight  in  the  law,  and  in  the  Divine  character  may  and 
often  do  glow  and  burn  in  the  sensibility  while  the  heart  is  un- 
affected. The  will  remains  in  a  selfish  choice,  while  the 
intellect  and  the  sensibility  are  strongly  impressed  with  the 
perception  of  the  Divine  excellence.  This  state  of  the  intel- 
lect and  the  sensibility  are,  no  doubt,  often  mistaken  for  true 
religion.  We  have  undoubted  illustrations  of  this  in  the  Bible, 
and  great  multitudes  of  cases  of  it  in  common  life.  "  Yet  they 
seek  me  daily,  and  delight  to  know  my  ways,  as  a  nation 
that  did  righteousness,  and  forsook  not  the  ordinance  of  their 
God:  they  ask  of  me  the  ordinances  of  justice,  they  take  de- 
light in  approaching  to  God."  Isaiah  58:  2.  "And,  lo,  thou 
art  unto  them  as  a  very  lovely  song  of  one  that  hath  a  pleas- 
ant voice,  and  can  play  well  on  an  instrument:  for  they  hear 
Ihy  words,  but  they  do  them  not."  Ezekiel  33:  32. 

Nothing  is  of  greater  importance  than  forever  to  under- 
stand that  religion  is  always  and  necessarily  a  phenomenon  of 
the  will ;  that  it  always  and  necessarily  produces  outward  ac- 


228  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

tion  and  inward  feeling;  that  on  account  of  the  correlation  of 
the  intellect  and  sensibility,  almost  any  and  every  variety  of 
feeling  may  exist  in  the  mind,  as  produced  by  the  perceptions 
of  the  intelligence  whatever  the  state  of  the  will  may  be; 
that  unless  we  are  conscious  of  good  will  or  of  consecration 
to  God  and  the  good  of  being^unless  we  are  conscious  of 
living  for  this  end,  it  avails  us  nothing,  whatever  our  views 
and  feelings  may  be. 

And  also  it  behooves  us  to  consider  that  although  these 
views  and  feelings  may  exist  while  the  heart  is  wrong, 
they  will  certainly  exist  when  the  heart  is  right;  that  there 
may  be  feeling,  and  deep  feeling  when  the  heart  is  wrong, 
yet  that  there  will  and  must  be  deep  emotion  and  strenuous 
action  when  the  heart  is  right.  Let  it  be  remembered,  then, 
that  complacency,  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  is  always  a 
striking  characteristic  of  true  love  or  benevolence  to  God; 
that  is,  that  the  mind  is  affected  and  consciously  influenced  in 
wiUing  the  actual  and  infinite  blessedness  of  God  by  a  regard 
to  His  goodness.  The  goodness  of  God  is  not,  as  has  been 
repeatedly  shown,  the  fundamental  influence  or  reason  of  the 
good  will,  but  it  is  one  reason  or  a  condition  both  of  the  possi- 
bility of  willing,  and  of  the  obligation  to  will  his  actual  bles- 
sedness. It  assigns  to  itself  and  to  others,  as  has  been  said, 
this  reason  for  loving  God,  or  willing  His  good,  rather  than 
the  truly  fundamental  one,  to  wit,  the  intrinsic  value  of  good, 
because  that  is  so  universally  and  so  necessarily  assumed, 
that  it  thinks  not  of  menlioning  that,  taking  it  always  for 
granted,  that  that  will  and  must  be  understood. 


LECTURE  XVI. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  entire  obedience  to  the  Law  op  God. 

12.  Opposition  to  sin  is  another  attribute  or  characteristic 
of  true  love  to  God. 

This  attribute  is  simply  benevolence  contemplated  in  its 
relations  to  sin.  This  attribute  certainly  is  implied  in  the 
very  essence  and  nature  of  benevolence.  Benevolence  is 
good  willing,  or  wilUng  the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end. 
Now  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  more  palpably  and  dia- 
metrically opposite  to  this  end  than  sin.  Benevolence  can 
not  do  otherwise  than  be  forever  opposed  to  sin  as  that  abom- 
inable thing  which  it  necessarily  hates.  It  is  absurd  and  a 
contradiction  to  affirm  that  benevolence  is  not  opposed  to  sin. 
God  is  love  or  benevolence.  He  must,  therefore,  be  the  un- 
alterable opponent  of  sin — of  all  sin,  in  every  form  and  degree. 

But  there  is  a  state,  both  of  the  intellect  and  of  the  sensi- 
bility, that  are  often  mistaken  for  the  opposition  of  the  will  to 
sin.  Opposition  to  sin  as  a  virtue,  is  and  must  be  a  pheno- 
menon of  the  will.  But  it  also  often  exists  as  a  phenomenon 
of  the  intellect,  and  likewise  of  the  sensibility.  The  intelli- 
gence cannot  contemplate  sin  without  disapprobation.  This 
disapprobation  is  often  mistaken  for  opposition  of  heart,  or  of 
will,  to  it.  When  the  intellect  strongly  disapproves  of  and 
denounces  sin,  there  is  naturally  and  necessarily  a  corre- 
sponding feehng  of  opposition  to  it  in  the  scnsibihty,  an 
emotion  of  loathing,  of  hatred,  of  abhorrence.  This  is  often 
mistaken  for  opposition  of  the  will,  or  heart.  This  is  mani- 
fest from  the  feet,  that  often  the  most  notorious  sinners  mani- 
fest strong  indignation  in  view  of  oppression,  injustice,  false- 
hood, and  many  forms  of  sin.  This  phenomenon  of  the  sensi- 
bility and  of  the  intellect,  as  I  said,  is  often  mistaken  for  a 
virtuous  opposition  to  sin.  / 

But  let  it  be. remembered,  that  the  only  virtuous  opposition 
to  sin,  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  will.  It  is  a  characteristic  of 
love  to  God  and  man,  or  of  benevolence.  This  opposition  to 
sin  can  not  possibly  co-exist  with  any  degree  of  sin  in  the 
heart.  That  is,  this  opposition  can  not  co-exist  with  a  sinful 
choice.  The  will  can  not  at  the  same  time  be  opposed  to  sin, 
and  commit  sin.  This  is  impossible,  and  the  supposition  in- 
volves a  contradiction.  Opposition  to  sin  as  a  phenomenon  . 
20 


230  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

■  of  the  intellect,  or  of  the  sensibility  may  exist^ — in  other 
words,  the  intellect  may  strongly  disapprove  of  sin,  and  the 
sensibiUty  may  feel  strongly  opposed  to  it,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  will  may  cleave  to  self-indulgence,  or  to  that  which 
constitutes  sin.  This  fact,  no  doubt,  accounts  for  the  common 
mistake,  that  we  can  at  the  same  time  have  a  virtuous  oppo- 
sition to  sin,  and  still  continue  to  commit  it. 
V  Many  are,  no  doubt,  laboring  under  this  fatal  delusion. 
They  are  conscious  not  only  of  an  intellectual  disapprobation 
of  sin,  but  also  at  times  of  strong  feelings  of  opposition  to  it. 
And  yet  they  are  also  conscious  of  continuing  to  commit  it. 
They,  therefore,  conclude  that  they  have  a  principle  of  holiness 
in  them,  and  also  a  principle  of  sin,  that  they  are  partly  holy 
and  partly  sinful  at  the  same  time.  Their  opposition  of  intel- 
lect and  of  feeling,  they  suppose  to  be  a  holy  opposition,  when, 
no  doubt,  it  is  just  as  common  in  hell,  and  even  more  so  than 
it  is  on  earth,  for  the  reason  that  sin  is  more  naked  there  than 
it  generally  is  here. 

'*'  But  now  the  enquiry  may  arise,  how  is  it  that  both  the  in- 
tellect and  the  sensibility  are  opposed  to  it,  and  yet  that  it 
is  persevered  in?  What  reason  can  the  mind  have  for  a  sinful 
choice  when  urged  to  it  neither  by  the  intellect  nor  the  sen- 
sibility? The  philosophy  of  this  phenomenon  needs  explana- 
tion.    Let  us  attend  to  it. 

I  am  a  moral  agent.  My  intelligence  necessarily  disap- 
proves of  sin.  My  sensibiUty  is  so  correlated  to  my  intellect 
that  it  sympathizes  with  it,  or  is  affected  by  its  perceptions 
and  its  judgments.  I  contemplate  sin.  I  necessarily  disap- 
prove of  it  and  condemn  it.  This  affects  my  sensibility.  I 
loathe  and  abhor  it.  I  nevertheless  commit  it.  Now  how  is 
this  to  be  accounted  for?  The  usual  method  is  by  ascribing 
it  to  a  depravity  in  the  will  itself,  a  lapsed  or  corrupted  state 
of  the  faculty,  so  that  it  perversely  chooses  sin  for  its  own  sake. 
Although  disapproved  by  the  intelligence  and  loathed  by  the 
sensibiUty,  yet  such,  it  is  said,  is  the  inherent  depravity  of  the 
will,  that  it  pertinaciously  cleaves  to  sin  notwithstanding,  and 
will  continue  to  do  so  until  the  faculty  is  renewed  by  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  a  holy  bias  or  incUnation  is  impressed  upon  the 
will  itself 

But  here  is  a  gross  mistake.  In  order  to  see  the  truth  upon 
this  subject,  it  is  of  indispensable  importance  to  inquire  what 
sin  is. 

It  is  admitted,  on  all  hands,  that  selfishness  is  sin.  Com- 
paratively few  seem  to  understand  that  selfishness  is  thojw^ole 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


231 


of  sin,  and  that  every  form  of  sin  may  be  resolved  into  selfish- 
ness, just  as  every  form  of  virtue  may  be  resolved  into  benevo- 
lence. It  is  not  my  purpose  now  to  show  that  selfishness  is 
the  whole  of  sin.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present  to  take  the 
admission  that  selfishness  is  sin.  But  what  is  selfishness?  It 
is  the  choice  of  self-gratification  as  an  end.  It  is  the  prefer- 
ence of  our  own  gratification  to  the  highest  good  of  universal 
being.  Self-gratification  is  the  supreme  end  of  selfishness. 
This  choice  is  sinful.  That  is,  the  moral  element,  quaUty  or 
attribute  of  this  selfish  choice  is  sin.  Now  in  no  case  is  or 
can  sin  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  end.  Whenever 
any  thing  is  chosen  to  gratify  self,  it  is  not  chosen  because 
the  choice  is  sinful,  but  notwithstanding  it  is  sinful.  It  is  not 
the  sinfulness  of  the  choice  upon  which  the  choice  fixes  as  an 
end  or  for  its  own  sake,  but  it  is  the  gratification  to  be  aflforded 
by  the  thing  chosen.  For  example:  theft  is  sinful.  But  the 
will  in  an  act  of  theft  does  not  aim  at  and  terminate  on  the 
sinfulness  of  theft,  but  upon  the  gratification  expected  from 
the  stolen  object.  Drunkenness  is  sinful,  but  the  inebriate 
does  not  intend  or  choose  the  sinfulness  for  its  own  sake  or  as 
an  end.  He  does  not  choose  strong  drink  because  the  choice 
is  sinfuL  but  notwithstanding  it  is  so.  We  choose  the  gratifi- 
cation, but  not  the  sin,  as  an  end.  To  choose  the  gratification 
as  an  end  is  sinful,  but  it  is  not  the  sin  that  is  the  object  of 
choice.  Our  mother  Eve  ate  the  forbidden  fruit.  This 
eating  was  sinful.  But  the  thing  that  she  chose  or  intended 
was  not  the  sinfulness  of  eating,  but  the  gratification  expected 
from  the  fruit.  It  is  not,  it  can  not  in  any  case  be  true  that 
sin  is  chosen  as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake.  Sin  is  only  a 
quality  of  selfishness.  Selfishness  is  the  choice,  not  of  sin  as 
an  end  or  for  its  own  sake,  but  of  self-gratification;  and  this 
choice  of  self-gratification  as  an  end  is  sinful.  That  is,  the 
moral  element,  quality  or  attribute  of  the  choice  is  sin.  To 
say  that  sin  is  or  can  be  chosen  for  its  own  sake  is  absurd.  It 
is  the  same  as  saying  that  a  choice  can  terminate  on  an  ele- 
ment, quality  or  attribute  of  itself;  that  the  thing  chosen  is 
really  an  element  of  the  choice  itself     This  is  absurd. 

But  it  is  said  that  sinners  are  sometimes  conscious  of  choos- 
ing sin  for  its  own  sake,  or  because  it  is  sin;  that  they  possess 
such  a  malicious  state  of  mind  that  they  love  sin  for  its  own 
sake;  that  they  "roll  sin  as  a  sweet  morsel  under  their 
tongue;"  that  "they  eat  up  the  sins  of  God's  people  as  they  eat 
bread;"  that  is,  that  they  love  their  sins  and  the  sins  of  others 
as  they  do  their  necessary  food,  and  choose  it  for  that  reason, 


232  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

or  just  as  they  do  their  food.  That  they  not  only  sin  them- 
selves with  greediness,  but  also  have  pleasure  in  them  that  do 
sin.  Now  all  this  may  he  true,  yet  it  does  not  at  all  disprove 
the  position  which  I  have  taken,  namely,  that  sin  never  is  and 
^never  can  be  chosen  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake.  Sin  may 
be  sought  and  loved  as  a  means,  but  never  as  an  end.  The 
choice  of  food  will  illustrate  this.  Food  is  never  chosen  as  an 
ultimate  end:  it  never  can  be  so  chosen.  It  is  always  as  a 
means.  It  is  the  gratification  or  the  utility  of  it  in  some  point 
of  view  that  constitutes  the  reason  for  choosing  it.  Gratifi- 
cation is  always  the  end  for  which  a  selfish  man  eats.  It  may 
not  be  merely  the  present  pleasure  of  eating  which  he  alone 
or  principally  seeks.  But,  nevertheless,  if  a  selfish  man,  he 
has  his  own  gratification  in  view  as  an  end.  It  may  be  that 
it  is  not  so  much  a  present  as  a  remote  gratification  he  has  in 
view.  Thus  he  may  choose  food  to  give  him  health  and 
strength  to  pursue  some  distant  gratification,  tlie  acquisition 
of  wealth  or  something  else  that  will  gratify  him. 

It  may  happen  that  a  sinner  may  get  into  a  state  of  rebel- 
lion against  God  and  the  universe  of  so  frightful  a  character 
that  he  shall  take  pleasure  in  willing  and  in  doing  and  saying 
things  that  are  sinful  because  they  are  sinful  and  displeasing 
to  God  and  to  holy  beings.  But  in  this  case,  sin  is  not  chosen 
as  an  end,  but  as  a  means  of  gratifying  this  malicious  feeling. 
It  is,  after  all,  self-gratification  that  is  chosen  as  an  end,  and 
not  sin.     Sin  is  the  means,  and  self-gratification  is  the  end. 

Now  we  are  prepared  to  understand  how  it  is  that  both  the 
intellect  and  sensibility  can  often  be  opposed  to  sin,  and  yet 
the  will  cleave  to  the  indulgence.  An  inebriate  is  contem- 
plating the  moral  character  of  drunkenness.  He  instantly 
and  necessarily  condemns  the  abomination.  His  sensibility 
sympathizes  with  the  intellect.  He  loathes  the  sinfulness  of 
drinking  strong  drink,  and  himself  on  account  of  it.  He  is 
ashamed,  and  were  it  possible,  he  would  spit  in  his  own 
face.  Now  in  this  state  it  would  surely  be  absurd  to  suppose 
that  he  could  choose  sin,  the  sin  of  drinking  as  an  end,  or  for 
its  own  sake.  This  would  be  choosing  it  for  an  impossible 
reason.^  and  not  for  no  reason.  But  still  he  may  choose  to 
continue  his  drink,  not  because  it  is  sinful,  but  notwithstanding 
it  is  so.  For  while  the  intellect  condemns  the  sin  of  drinking 
strong  drink,  and  the  sensibility  loathes  the  sinfulness  of  the 
indulgence,  nevertheless  there  still  exists  so  strong  an  appetite, 
not  for  the  sin,  but  for  the  liquor,  that  the  will  seeks  the  grati- 
fication notwithstanding  the  sinfulness  of  it. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  233 

So  it  is  and  so  it  must  be  in  every  case  where  sin  is  com- 
mitted in  the  face  of  the  remonstrances  of  the  inteUigence  and 
the  loathing  of  the  sensibihty.  The  sensibility  loathes  the 
sinfulness,  but  more  strongly  desires  the  thing  the  choice  of 
which  is  sinful.  The  will  in  a  selfish  being  yields  to  the  strong- 
est impulse  of  the  sensibility,  and  the  end  chosen  is  in  no  case 
sin,  but  self-gratification.  Those  who  suppose  this  opposition 
of  the  intellect  or  of  the  sensibility  to  be  a  holy  principle,  are 
fatally  deluded.  This  kind  of  opposition  to  sin,  as  I  have  said, 
is  doubtless  common  and  always  must  be  in  hell.  It  is  this 
kind  of  opposition  to  sin  that  often  manifests  itself  among 
wicked  men,  and  that  leads  them  to  take  credit  for  goodness 
which  they  do  not  possess.  They  will  not  believe  themselves 
to  be  morally  and  totally  depraved,  while  they  are  conscious 
of  so  much  hostility  to  sin  within  them.  But  they  should  un- 
derstand that  this  opposition  is  not  of  the  will  or  they  could 
not  go  on  in  sin;  that  it  is  purely  an  involuntary  state  of 
mind,  and  has  no  moral  character  whatever.  Let  it  be  ever 
remembered,  then,  that  a  virtuous  opposition  to  sin  is  always 
and  necessarily  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  a  phenomenon  of 
the  will,  and  that  it  is  naturally  impossible  that  this  opposition 
of  will  should  co-exist  with  the  commission  of  sin. 

As  this  opposition  to  sin  is  plainly  implied  in,  and  is  an  es- 
sential attribute  of  benevolence,  or  true  love  to  God,  it  follows 
that  obedience  to  the  law  of  God  can  not  be  partial  in  the 
sense  that  we  can  both  love  God  and  sin  at  the  same  time. 

13.  Compassion  for  the  miserable  is  also  an  attribute  of  be- 
nevolence, or  of  pure  love  to  God  and  man.  This  is  benevo- 
lence  viewed  in  its  relations  to  misery  and  to  guilt. 

There  is  a  compassion  also  which  is  a  phenomenon  of  the 
sensibility.  It  may,  and  does  often  exist  in  the  form  of  an 
emotion.  But  this  emotion  being  involuntary,  has  no  moral 
character  in  itself  The  compassion  which  is  a  virtue  and 
which  is  required  of  us  as  a  duty,  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  will, 
and  is  of  course  an  attribute  of  benevolence.  Benevolence, 
as  has  been  often  said,  is  good  willing,  or  wilUng  the  highest 
happiness  and  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  for  its  own 
sake,  or  as  an  end.  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  from  its  own 
nature,  that  compassion  for  the  miserable  should  not  be  one 
of  its  attributes.  Compassion  of  will  to  misery  is  the  choice 
that  it  should  not  exist.  Benevolence  wills  that  happiness 
should  exist  for  its  own  sake.  It  must  therefore,  will  that 
misery  should  not  exist.  This  attribute  or  peculiarity  of  be- 
nevolence consists  in  willing  the  happiness  of  the  miserable. 
20* 


234  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Benevolence  simply  considered,  is  willing  the  good  or  happi- 
ness  of  being  in  general.  Compassion  of  will  is  a  willing  par- 
ticularly that  the  miserable  should  be  happy. 

Compassion  of  sensibility  is  a  feeling  of  pity  in  view  of 
misery.  As  has  been  said,  it  is  not  a  virtue.  It  is  only  a 
desire,  but  not  willing;  consequently  does  not  benefit  its 
object.  It  is  the  state  of  mind  of  which  James  speaks: — ■ 
James  2:  15,  16:  "If a  brother  or  sister  be  naked,  and  desti- 
tute of  daily  food,  and  one  of  you  say  unto  them.  Depart  in 
peace,  he  ye  warmed  and  filled;  notwithstanding  ye  give  them 
not  those  things  which  are  needful  to  the  body,  what  doth  it 
profit?"  This  kind  of  compassion  may  consist  and  co-exist 
with  selfishness.  But  compassion  of  heart  or  will  can  not;  for 
it  consists  in  willing  the  happiness  of  the  miserable  for  its  own 
sake,  and  of  course  impartially.  It  will,  and  from  its  very 
nature  must  deny  self  to  promote  its  end  whenever  it  wisely 
can,  that  is,  when  it  is  demanded  by  the  highest  general  good. 
Circumstances  may  exist  that  may  render  it  unwise  to  express 
this  compassion  by  actually  extending  relief  to  the  miserable. 
Such  circumstances  forbid  that  God  should  extend  rehef  to 
the  lost  in  hell.  But  for  their  character  and  governmental 
relations,  God's  compassion  would  no  doubt  make  immediate 
efforts  for  their  relief. 

Many  circumstances  may  exist  in  which  although  compas- 
sion would  hasten  to  the  relief  of  its  object,  yet  on  the  whole 
the  misery  that  exists  is  regarded  as  the  less  of  two  evils,  and 
therefore  the  wisdom  of  benevolence  forbids  it  to  put  forth 
exertions  to  save  its  object. 

But  it  is  of  the  last  importance  to  distinguish  carefully  be- 
tween compassion  as  a  phenonenon  of  the  sensibihty  or 
as  a  mere  feelings  and  compassion  considered  as  a  phenome- 
non of  the  will.  This,  be  it  remembered,  is  the  only  form  of 
virtuous  compassion.  Many,  who  from  the  laws  of  their  men- 
tal constitution,  feel  quickly  and  deeply,  often  take  credit  to 
themselves  for  being  compassionate  while  they  seldom  do 
much  for  the  poor,  the  down-trodden,  the  miserable.  Their 
compassion  is  a  mere  feeling.  It  says,  "  Be  ye  warmed  and 
clothed,"  but  does  not  that  for  them  which  is  needful.  It  is  this 
particular  attribute  of  benevolence  that  was  so  conspicuous 
in  the  life  of  Howard,  Wilberforce  and  many  other  Christian 
philanthropists. 

It  should  be  said  before  I  leave  the  consideration  of  this 
attribute,  that  the  will  is  often  influenced  by  the  feeling  of 
compassion.    In  tliis  case  the  mind  is  no  less  selfish  in  seeking 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  235 

to  promote  the  relief  and  happiness  of  its  object  than  it  is  in 
any  other  form  of  selfishness.  In  such  cases  self-gratifica- 
tion is  the  end  sought,  and  the  relief  of  the  suffering  is  only  a 
means.  Pity  is  stirred,  and  the  sensibility  is  deeply  pained 
and  excited  by  the  contemplation  of  misery.  The  will  is  in- 
fluenced by  tbis  feeling,  and  makes  efforts  to  relieve  the  pain- 
ful emotion  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  gratify  the  desire  to  see 
the  sufferer  happy  on  the  other.  This  is  only  an  imposing 
form  of  selfishness.  We,  no  doubt,  often  witness  this  exhi- 
bition of  self-gratification.  The  happiness  of  the  miserable 
is  not  in  this  case  sought  as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake,  but  as 
a  means  of  gratifying  our  own  feelings.  This  is  not  obedi- 
ence of  will  to  the  law  of  the  intelHgence,  but  obedience  to 
the  impulse  of  the  sensibility.  It  is  not  a  rational  and  intel- 
ligent compassion,  but  just  such  compassion  as  we  often  see 
mere  animals  exercise.  They  will  risk,  and  even  lay  down 
their  lives  to  give  relief  to  one  of  their  number,  or  to  a  man 
who  is  in  misery.  In  them  this  has  no  moral  character.  Hav- 
ing no  reason,  it  is  not  sin  for  them  to  obey  their  sensibility, 
nay,  this  is  a  law  of  their  being.  This  they  can  not  but  do. 
For  them,  then,  to  seek  their  own  gratification  as  an  end  is 
not  sin.  But  man  has  reason;  he  is  bound  to  obey  it.  He 
should  will  and  seek  the  relief  and  the  happiness  of  the  mis- 
erable for  its  own  sake,  or  for  its  intrinsic  value.  When  he 
descends  to  seek  it  for  no  higher  reason  than  to  gratify  his 
feelings,  he  denies  his  humanity.  He  seeks  it,  not  out  of  re- 
gard to  the  sufferer,  but  in  self-defence,  or  to  reheve  his  own 
pain,  and  to  gratify  his  own  desires.     This  in  him  is  sin. 

Many,  therefore,  who  take  to  themselves  much  credit  for 
benevolence,  are  after  all  only  in  the  exercise  of  this  impo- 
sing form  of  selfishness.  They  take  credit  for  hohness  when 
their  holiness  is  only  sin.  What  is  especially  worthy  of  no- 
tice here,  is,  that  this  class  of  persons  appear  to  themselves  and 
to  others  to  be  all  the  more  virtuous  by  how  much  more  mani- 
festly and  exclusively  they  are  led  on  by  the  impulse  of  feel- 
ing. They  are  conscious  of  feeling  deeply,  of  being  most 
sincere  and  earnest  in  obeying  their  feelings.  Every  body 
who  knows  them  can  also  see  that  they  feel  deeply  and  are 
influenced  by  the  strength  of  their  feelings  rather  than  by 
their  intelligence.  Now  so  gross  is  the  darkness  of  most  per- 
sons upon  this  subject,  that  they  award  praise  to  themselves 
and  to  others  just  in  proportion  as  they  are  sure  that  they  are 
actuated  by  the  depth  of  their  feelings  rather  than  by  their 
sober  judgment. 


236  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

But  I  must  not  leave  this  subject  without  also  observing 
that  when  compassion  exists  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will^  it 
will  certainly  also  exist  as  a  feeling  of  the  sensibility.  A 
man  of  a  compassionate  heart  will  also  be  a  man  of  a  com- 
passionate sensibility.  He  will  feel  and  he  will  act.  Nev- 
ertheless his  actions  will  not  be  the  effect  of  his  feelings,  but 
will  be  the  result  of  his  sober  judgment.  These  classes 
suppose  themselves  and  are  generally  supposed  by  others 
to  be  truly  compassionate  persons.  The  one  class  exhibit 
much  feehng  of  compassion;  but  their  compassion  does  not 
influence  their  will,  hence  they  do  not  act  for  the  relief  of 
suffering.  These  content  themselves  with  mere  desires  and 
tears.  They  say,  Be  ye  warmed  and  clothed,  but  give  not 
the  needed  relief.  Another  class  feel  deeply,  and  give  up  to 
their  feelings.  Of  course  they  are  active  and  energetic  in 
the  relief  of  suffering.  But  being  governed  by  feeling,  in- 
stead of  being  influenced  by  their  intelligence,  they  are  not 
virtuous  but  selfish.  Their  compassion  is  only  an  imposing 
form  of  selfishness.  A  third  class  feel  deeply,  but  are  not 
governed  by  blind  impulses  of  feeling.  They  take  a  rational 
view  of  the  subject,  act  wisely  and  energetically.  They 
obey  their  reason.  Their  feelings  do  not  lead  them,  and  they 
do  not  seek  to  gratify  their  feelings.  But  these  last  are  tru- 
ly virtuous,  and  altogether  the  most  happy  of  the  three. 
Their  feelings  are  all  the  more  gratified  by  how  much  less 
they  aim  at  the  gratification.  They  obey  their  intelligence, 
and  therefore  have  the  double  satisfaction  of  the  applause  of 
conscience  while  their  feelings  are  also  fully  gratified  by  see- 
ing their  desire  accomplished. 


LECTURE    XVII. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

14.  Mercy  is  also  an  attribute  of  benevolence.  And  this 
term  likewise  expresses  a  state  of  feeling  and  represents  a 
phenomenon  of  the  sensibility.  Mercy  is  often  understood 
to  be  synonymous  with  compassion,  but  it  is  not  rightly  under- 
stood. 

Mercy,  considered  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  is  a  dispo- 
sition to  pardon  crime.  It  consists  in  willing  the  pardon  and 
the  well-being  of  one  who  deserves  punishment.  It  is  good 
will  viewed  in  relation  to  one  who  deserves  punishment. 
Mercy,  considered  as  a  feeling  or  phenomenon  of  the  sensi- 
biUty,  is  a  desire  for  the  pardon  or  good  of  one  who  deserves 
punishment.  It  is  only  a  feeling,  a  desire;  of  course  it  is  in- 
voluntary, and  has  in  itself  no  moral  character. 

Mercy,  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  is  a  willing  the  par- 
don and  the  good  of  the  culprit.  It  will,  of  course,  manifest 
itself  in  action  and  in  effort  to  pardon  or  to  procure  a  pardon, 
unless  the  attribute  of  wisdom  prevent.  It  may  be  unwise  to 
pardon  or  to  seek  the  pardon  of  a  guilty  one.  In  such  cases, 
as  all  the  attributes  of  benevolence  must  necessarily  harmo- 
nize, no  effort  will  be  made  to  realize  its  end. 

It  was  this  attribute  of  benevolence  modified  and  limited  in 
its  exercise  by  wisdom  and  justice,  that  energized  in  provi- 
ding the  means  and  in  opening  the  way  for  the  pardon  of  our 
guilty  race. 

As  wisdom  and  justice  are  also  attributes  of  benevolence, 
mercy  can  never  manifest  itself  by  efforts  to  secure  its  end 
except  in  a  manner  and  upon  conditions  that  do  not  set  aside 
justice  and  wisdom.  No  one  attribute  of  benevolence  is  or 
can  be  exercised  at  the  expense  of,  or  in  opposition  to  another. 
The  moral  attributes  of  God,  as  has  been  said,  are  only  attri- 
butes of  benevolence,  for  benevolence  comprehends  and  ex- 
presses the  whole  of  them.  From  the  term  benevolence  we 
learn  that  the  end  upon  which  it  fixes  is  good.  And  we  must 
infer  too,  from  the  term  itself,  that  the  means  are  unobjec- 
tionable, because  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  good  would  be 
chosen  because  it  is  good,  and  yet  that  the  mind  that  makes 
this  choice  should  not  hesitate  to  use  objectionable  and  inju- 
rious means  to  obtain  its  end.     This  would  be  a  contradiction, 


238  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

to  will  good  for  its  own  sake  or  out  of  regard  to  its  intrinsic 
value,  and  then  choose  injurious  means  to  accomplish  this  end. 
This  can  not  be.  The  mind  that  can  fix  upon  the  highest 
well-being  of  God  and  the  universe  as  an  end,  can  never  con- 
sent to  use  efforts  for  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  that  are 
seen  to  be  inconsistent  with  it,  that  is,  that  tend  to  prevent 
the  highest  good  of  being. 

Mercy,  I  have  said,  is  that  attribute  of  benevolence  that 
wills  the  pardon  of  the  guilty.  But  this  attribute  can  not  go 
out  in  exercise  but  upon  conditions  that  consist  with  the  other 
attributes  of  benevolence.  Mercy  viewed  by  itself  would 
pardon  without  repentance  or  condition;  would  pardon  with- 
out reference  to  public  justice.  But  viewed  in  connection 
with  the  other  attributes  of  benevolence,  we  learn  that  al- 
though a  real  attribute  of  benevolence,  yet  it  is  not  and  can 
not  be  exercised  without  the  fulfilment  of  those  conditions 
that  will  secure  the  consent  of  all  the  other  attributes  of  be- 
nevolence. This  truth  is  beautifully  taught  and  illustrated  in 
the  doctrine  and  fact  of  atonement,  as  we  shall  see.  Indeed, 
without  consideration  of  the  various  attributes  of  benevo- 
lence, we  are  necessarily  all  in  the  dark  and  in  confusion  in 
respect  to  the  character  and  government  of  God;  the  spirit 
and  meaning  of  his  law;  the  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  gos- 
pel; our  own  spiritual  state,  and  the  developments  of  charac- 
ter around  us.  Without  an  acquaintance  with  the  attributes 
of  love  or  benevolence,  we  shall  not  fail  to  be  perplexed — to 
find  apparent  discrepancies  in  the  Bible  and  in  the  Divine  ad- 
ministration— and  in  the  manifestation  of  christian  character 
both  as  revealed  in  the  Bible  and  as  exhibited  in  common  life. 
For  example:  how  universalists  have  stumbled  for  want  of 
consideration  upon  this  subject!  God  is  love!  Well,  with- 
out considering  the  attributes  of  this  love,  they  infer  that  if 
God  is  love,  He  can  not  hate  sin  and  sinners.  If  He  is  mer- 
ciful He  can  not  punish  sinners  in  hell,  &c.  Unitarians 
have  stumbled  in  the  same  way.  God  is  merciful,  that  is,  dis- 
posed to  pardon  sin.  Well  then,  what  need  of  an  atonement? 
If  merciful,  He  can  and  will  pardon  upon  repentance  with- 
out atonement.  But  we  may  inquire,  if  He  is  merciful,  why 
not  pardon  without  repentance?  If  His  mercy  alone  is  to  be 
taken  into  view,  that  is  simply  a  disposition  to  pardon,  that  by 
itself  would  not  wait  for  repentance.  But  if  repentance  is 
and  must  be  a  condition  of  the  exercise  of  mercy,  may  there 
not  be,  nay  must  there  not  be  other  conditions  of  its  exercise? 
If  wisdom  and  public  justice  are  also  attributes  of  benevo- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


239 


lence  and  conditionate  the  exercise  of  mercy,  and  forbid  that 
it  should  be  exercised  but  upon  condition  of  repentance,  why 
may  they  not,  nay,  why  must  they  not  equally  conditionate  its 
exercise  upon  such  a  satisfaction  of  public  justice  as  would 
secure  as  full  and  as  deep  a  respect  for  the  law  as  the  execu- 
tion of  its  penalty  would  do?  In  other  words,  if  wisdom  and 
justice  be  attributes  of  benevolence,  and  conditionate  the  ex- 
ercise of  mercy  upon  repentance,  why  may  and  must  they 
not  also  conditionate  its  exercise  upon  the  fact  of  an  atone- 
ment? As  mercy  is  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  it  will  natu- 
rally and  inevitably  direct  the  attention  of  the  intellect  to  de- 
vising ways  and  means  to  render  the  exercise  of  mercy  con- 
sistent with  the  other  attributes  of  benevolence.  It  will  em- 
ploy the  intelligence  in  devising  means  to  secure  the  repent- 
ance of  the  sinner,  and  to  remove  all  the  obstacles  out  of  the 
way  of  its  free  and  full  exercise. 

It  will  also  secure  the  state  of  feeling  which  is  also  called 
mercy  or  compassion.  Hence  it  is  certain  that  mercy  will 
secure  efforts  to  procure  the  repentance  and  pardon  of  sin- 
ners. It  will  secure  a  deep  yearning  in  the  sensibility  over 
them,  and  energetic  action  to  accomphsh  its  end,  that  is,  to 
secure  their  repentance  and  pardon.  This  attribute  of  be- 
nevolence led  the  Father  to  give  His  Only  Begotten  and  Well- 
beloved  Son,  and  it  led  the  Son  to  give  Himself  to  die  to  se- 
cure the  repentance  and  pardon  of  sinners.  It  is  this  attri- 
bute of  benevolence  that  leads  the  Holy  Spirit  to  make  such 
mighty  and  protracted  efforts  to  secure  the  repentance  of  sin- 
ners. It  is  also  this  attribute  that  energized  in  prophets  and 
apostles  and  martyrs,  and  in  saints  of  every  age,  to  secure  the 
conversion  of  the  lost  in  sin.  It  is  an  amiable  attribute.  All 
its  sympathies  are  sweet,  and  tender,  and  kind  as  heaven. 

15.  Jws/zce  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

This  term  also  expresses  a  state  or  phenomenon  of  the  sensi- 
bility. As  an  attribute  of  benevolence  it  is  the  opposite  of  mer- 
cy, when  viewed  in  its  relations  to  crime.  It  consists  in  a  dispo- 
sition or  willing  to  treat  every  moral  agent  according  to  his  in- 
trinsic desert  or  merit.  In  its  relations  to  crime,  the  criminal, 
and  the  pubhc,  it  consists  in  a  willing  his  punishment  according 
to  law.  Mercy  would  pardon — justice  would  punish  for  the 
public  good. 

Justice  as  a  feehng  or  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility,  is  a 
feeling  that  the  guilty  deserves  punishment,  and  a  desire  that 
he  may  be  punished.  This  is  an  involuntary  feehng,  and  has 
no  moral  character.     It  is  often  strongly  excited,  and  is  often 


240  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  cause  of  mobs  and  popular  commotions.  When  it  takes 
the  control  of  the  will,  as  it  often  does  with  sinners,  it  leads 
to  lynching,  and  a  resort  to  those  summary  methods  of  exe- 
cuting vengeance  which  are  often  so  appalHng. 

I  have  said  that  the  mere  desire  has  no  moral  character. 
But  when  the  will  is  governed  by  this  desire  and  yields  itself 
up  to  seek  its  gratification,  this  state  of  will  is  selfishness  un- 
der one  of  its  most  odious  and  frightful  forms.  Under  the 
providence  of  God,  however,  this  form  of  selfishness,  like 
every  other  in  its  turn,  is  overruled  for  good,  like  earthquakes, 
tornadoes,  pestilence,  and  war,  to  purify  the  moral  elements  of 
society,  and  scourge  away  those  moral  nuisances  with  which 
communities  are  sometimes  infested.     Even  war  itself  is  often 

4  but  an  instance  and  an  illustration  of  this. 

^  Justice,  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  is  virtue,    and  ex- 

hibits itself  in  the  execution  of  the  penalties  of  law,  and  in 
support  of  public  order,  and  in  various  other  ways. 

^  There  are  several  modifications  of  this  attribute.     That  is, 

it  may  and  must  be  viewed  under  various  aspects  and  in  va- 
rious  relations.     One  of  these  is  public  justice.     This  is  a 
regard  to  the  public  interests,  and  secures  a  due  administra- 
tion of  law  for  the  public  good.     It  will  in  no  case  suffer  the 
execution  of  the  penalty    to  be  set  aside,  unless   something 
be  done  to  support  the  authority  of  the  law  and  of  the  law- 
giver.    It  also  secures  the  due  administration  of  rewards,  and 
looks  narrowly  after  the  public  interests,  always  insisting  that 
the  greater  interest  shall  prevail  over  the  lesser;  that  private 
interest  shall  never  set  aside  or  prejudice  a  public  one  of 
greater  value.     Public  justice  is  modified  in  its  exercise  by 
the  attribute  of  mercy.     It  conditionates  the  exercise  of  mer- 
cy, and  mercy  conditionates  its  exercise.     Mercy  can  not  con- 
sistently with  this  attribute,  extend  a  pardon  but  upon  condi- 
tions of  repentance,  and  an  equivalent  being  rendered  to  the 
government.     So  on  the  other  hand,  justice  is  conditionated 
by  mercy,  and  can  not,  consistently  with  that  attribute,  pro- 
ceed to  take  vengeance  when  the  highest  good  does  not  re- 
quire it,  and  when  punishment  can  be  dispensed  with  without 
public  loss.     Thus   these  attributes  mutually  limit  each  oth- 
er's exercise,  and  render  the  whole  character  of  benevolence 
perfect,  systematical,  and  heavenly. 
^         Justice  is  reckoned  among  the  sterner  attributes  of  benevo- 
lence; but  it  is  indispensable  to  the  filHng  up  of  the  entire 
circle  of  moral  perfections.     Although  solemn  and  awful,  and 
sometimes  inexpressibly  terrific  in  its  exercise,  it  is  neverthe- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  241 

less  one  of  the  glorious  modifications  and  manifestations  of 
benevolence.  Benevolence  without  justice  would  be  any  thing 
but  morally  lovely  and  perfect.  Nay  it  could  not  be  benevo- 
lence. This  attribute  of  benevolence  appears  conspicuous  in 
the  character  of  God  as  revealed  in  His  law,  in  His  gospel,  and 
sometimes  is  indicated  most  impressively  by  His  providence. 

It  is  also  conspicuous  in  the  history  of  inspired  men.  The 
Psalms  abound  with  expressions  of  this  attribute.  We  find 
many  prayers  for  the  punishment  of  the  wicked.  Samuel 
hewed  Agag  in  pieces,  and  David  abounds  in  expressions 
that  show  that  this  attribute  was  strongly  developed  in  his 
mind;  and  the  circumstances  under  which  he  was  placed, 
often  rendered  it  proper  to  express  and  manifest  in  various 
ways  the  spirit  of  this  attribute.  Many  have  stumbled  at 
such  prayers,  expressions,  and  manifestations  as  are  here  al- 
luded to.  But  this  is  for  want  of  due  consideration.  They 
have  supposed  that  such  exhibitions  were  inconsistent  with  a, 
right  spirit.  Oh,  they  say,  how  unevangelical!  How  un- 
christlike!  How  inconsistent  with  the  sweet  and  heavenly 
spirit  of  Christ  and  of  the  gospel!  But  this  is  all  a  mistake. 
These  prayers  were  dictated  by  the  spirit  of  Christ.  Such 
exhibitions  are  only  the  manifestations  of  one  of  the  essential 
attributes  of  benevolence.  Those  sinners  deserved  to  die. 
It  was  for  the  greatest  good  that  they  should  be  made  a 
public  example.  This  the  spirit  of  inspiration  knew,  and 
such  prayers  under  such  circumstances  are  only  an  expres- 
sion of  the  mind  and  will  of  God.  They  are  truly  the  spirit 
of  justice  pronouncing  sentence  upon  them.  These  prayers 
and  such  like  things  found  in  the  Bible  are  no  vindication  of 
the  spirit  of  fanaticism  and  denunciation  that  so  often  have 
taken  shelter  under  them.  As  well  might  fanatics  burn 
cities  and  lay  waste  countries,  and  seek  to  justify  them- 
selves by  an  appeal  to  the  destruction  of  the  old  world  by 
flood  and  the  destruction  of  the  cities  of  the  plain  by  fire 
and  brimstone. 

Retributive  justice  is  another  modification  of  this  attri- 
bute. This  consists  in  a  disposition  to  visit  the  offender  with 
that  punishment  which  he  deserves,  because  it  is  fit  and  prop- 
er that  a  moral  agent  should  be  dealt  with  according  to  his 
deeds.  In  a  future  lecture  1  shall  enlarge  upon  this  modifi- 
cation of  justice. 

Another  modification  of  this   attribute  is  commercial  jus- 
tice.    This  consists  in  willing  exact  equivalents,  and  up- 
rightness in  business  transactions. 
21 


242  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

There  are  some  other  modifications  of  this  attribute,  but 
the  foregoing  may  suffice  to  ilkistrate  sufficiently  the  various 
departments  over  which  this  attribute  presides. 
V  This  attribute,  though  stern  in  its  spirit  and  manifestations, 

is  nevertheless  one  of  prime  importance  in  all  governments  of 
moral  agents  whether  human  or  Divine.  Indeed  without  it 
government  could  not  exist.  It  is  vain  for  certain  philoso- 
phers to  think  to  disparage  this  attribute,  and  to  dispense 
with  it  altogether  in  the  administration  of  government.  They 
will,  if  they  try  the  experiment,  find  to  their  cost  and  confu- 
sion that  no  one  attribute  of  benevolence  can  say  to  another, 
••'  I  have  no  need  of  thee."  In  short,  let  any  one  attribute 
of  benevolence  be  destroyed  or  overlooked,  and  you  have  de- 
stroyed its  perfection,  its  beauty,  its  harmony,  its  propriety, 
its  glory.  It  is  no  longer  benevolence,  but  a  sickly,  and  inef- 
ficient, and  Hmping  sentimentafism,  that  has  no  God,  no  vir- 
tue, no  beauty,  or  form,  or  comeliness  in  it,  that  when  we 
,     see  it  we  should  desire  it. 

This  attribute  stands  by,  nay  it  executes  law.  It  aims  to 
secure  commercial  honesty.  It  aims  to  secure  pubHc  and  pri- 
vate integrity  and  tranquility.  It  says  to  violence,  disorder, 
and  injustice.  Peace,  be  still,  and  there  must  be  a  great  calm. 
We  see  the  evidences  and  the  illustrations  of  this  attribute 
in  the  thunderings  of  Sinai  and  in  the  agony  of  Calvary. 
We  hear  it  in  the  wail  of  a  world  when  the  fountains  of  the 
great  deep  were  broken  up,  and  when  the  windows  of  heaven 
were  opened,  and  the  floods  descended,  and  the  population  of 
a  globe  were  swallowed  up.  We  see  its  manifestations  in  the 
-  descending  torrent  that  swept  the  cities  of  the  plain;  and 
lastly,  we  shall  forever  see  its  bright  but  awful  and  glorious 
displays  in  the  dark  and  curling  folds  of  that  pillar  of  smoke 
of  the  torment  of  the  damned,  that  ascends  up  before  God 
forever  and  ever. 

Many  seem  to  be  afraid  to  contemplate  justice  as  an  attri- 
bute of  benevolence.  Any  manifestation  of  it  among  men, 
causes  them  to  recoil  and  shudder  as  if  they  saw  a  demon. 
But  let  it  have  its  place  in  the  glorious  circle  of  moral  attri- 
butes. It  must  have.  It  will  have.  It  can  not  be  otherwise. 
Whenever  any  poUcy  of  government  is  adopted,  in  family  or 
state,  that  excludes  the  exercise  of  this  attribute,  all  must  be 
failure,  defeat,  and  ruin. 

Again  :  Justice  being  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  will  pre- 
vent the  punishment  of  the  finally  impenitent  from  deroga- 
ting from  the  happiness  of  God  and  of  holy  beings.     They 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  243 

will  never  delight  in  misery  for  its  own  sake.  But  they  will 
take  pleasure  in  the  administration  of  justice.  So  that  when 
the  smoke  of  the  torment  of  the  damned  comes  up  in  the 
sight  of  heaven,  they  will,  as  they  are  represented,  shout 
'•Allelulia!  the  Lord  God  Omnipotent  reigneth."  "Just  and 
righteous  are  thy  ways  thou  King  of  saints!" 

Before  I  rehnquish  the  consideration  of  this  topic,  I  must 
not  omit  to  insist  that  where  true  benevolence  is,  there  must 
be  exact  justice,  commercial  or  business  honesty  and  integrity. 
This  is  as  certain  as  that  benevolence  exists.  The  rendering 
of  exact  equivalents,  or  the  intention  to  do  so,  must  be  a 
characteristic  of  a  truly  benevolent  mind.  Impulsive  benev- 
olence may  exist;  that  is,  phrenological  or  constitutional  be- 
nevolence, falsely  so  called,  may  exist  to  any  extent  and  yet 
justice  will  not  exist.  The  mind  may  be  much  and  very  often 
carried  away  by  the  impulse  of  feeling  so  that  a  man  may 
at  times  have  the  appearance  of  true  benevolence  while  the 
same  individual  is  selfish  in  business  and  overreaching  in  all 
his  commercial  relations.  This  has  been  a  wonder  and  an 
enigma  to  many,  but  the  case  is  a  plain  one.  The  difficulty 
is,  the  man  is  not  just,  that  is,  not  truly  benevolent.  His 
benevolence  is  only  an  imposing  species  of  selfishness.  "He 
that  hath  an  ear  to  hear,  let  him  hear."  His  benevolence 
results  from  feeling  and  is  not  true  benevolence. 

Again:  Where  benevolence  is,  the  golden  rule  will  surely 
be  observed.  "  Whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to 
you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them."  The  justice  of  benevolence 
can  not  fail  to  secure  conformity  to  this  rule.  Benevolence 
is  a  just  state  of  the  will.  It  is  a  wiUing  justly.  It  must  then 
by  a  law  of  necessity,  secure  a  just  exterior.  If  the  heart 
is  just,  the  Hfe  must  be. 

This  attribute  of  benevolence  must  secure  its  possessor 
against  every  species  and  degree  of  injustice.  He  can  not 
be  unjust  to  his  neighbor's  reputation,  his  person,  his  proper- 
ty, his  soul,  his  body,  nor  indeed  be  unjust  in  any  respect  to 
God  or  man.  It  will  and  must  secure  confession  and  restitu- 
tion in  every  case  of  remembered  wrong,  so  far  as  this  is 
practicable.  It  should  be  distinctly  understood,  that  a  benev- 
olent or  a  truly  religious  man  cannot  be  unjust.  He  may  in- 
deed appear  to  be  so  to  others;  but  he  can  not  be  truly  reli- 
gious or  benevolent  and  unjust  at  the  same  time.  If  he  ap- 
pears to  be  so  in  any  instance,  he  is  not  and  can  not  be  really 
50,  if  he  is  at  the  time  in  a  benevolent  state  of  mind.  The 
attributes  of  selfishness,  as  we  shall  see  in  its  proper  place, 


344  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

are  the  direct  opposite  of  those  of  benevolence.  The  two 
states  of  mind  are  as  opposite  as  heaven  and  hell  and  Can  no 
more  co-exist  in  the  same  mind  than  a  thing  can  be  and 
not  be  at  the  same  time.  I  said  that  if  a  man  truly,  in 
the  exercise  of  benevolence,  appears  to  be  unjust  in  any 
thing,  he  is  only  so  in  appearance  and  not  in  fact.  Observe; 
I  am  speaking  of  one  who  is  really  at  the  time  in  a  benevo- 
lent state  of  mind.  He  may  mistake  and  do  that  which 
would  be  unjust,  did  he  see  it  differently  and  intend  different- 
ly. Justice  and  injustice  belong  to  the  intention.  No  out- 
ward act  can  in  itself  be  either  just  or  unjust.  To  say  that 
a  man,  in  the  exercise  of  a  truly  benevolent  intention,  can  at 
the  same  time  be  unjust  is  the  same  absurdity  as  to  say  that 
he  can  intend  justly  and  unjustly  at  the  same  time  and  in  re- 
gard to  the  same  thing;  which  is  a  contradiction.  It  must  all 
along  be  borne  in  mind  that  benevolence  is  one  identical  thing, 
to  wit,  good  will,  willing  for  its  own  sake  the  highest  good  of 
being  and  every  known  good  according  to  its  relative  val- 
ue. Consequently,  it  is  impossible  that  justice  should  not  be 
an  attribute  of  such  a  choice.  Justice  consists  in  regard- 
ing and  treating  or  rather  in  willing  every  thing  just  agreea- 
bly to  its  nature  or  intrinsic  and  relative  value  and  relations. 
To  say,  therefore,  that  present  benevolence  admits  of  any 
degree  of  present  injustice  is  to  affirm  a  palpable  contradic- 
tion. A  just  man  is  a  sanctified  man,  is  a  perfect  man,  in  the 
sense  that  he  is  at  present  in  a  sinless  state. 

16.  Truth  or  Truthfulness  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 
Truth  is  objective  and  subjective.  Objective  truth  may  be 
defined  to  be  the  reality  of  things.  Truthfulness  is  subjective 
truth.  It  is  the  conformity  of  the  will  to  the  reaUty  of  things. 
Truth  in  statement  is  conformity  of  statement  to  the  reality 
of  things.  Truth  in  action  is  action  conformed  to  the  nature 
and  relations  of  things.  Truthfulness  is  a  disposition  to  con- 
form to  the  reality  of  things.  It  is  willing  in  accordance  with 
the  reality  of  things.  It  is  willing  the  right  end  by  the  right 
means.  It  is  willing  the  intrinsically  valuable  as  an  end  and 
the  relatively  valuable  as  a  means.  In  short  it  is  the  willing 
of  every  thing  according  to  the  reality  or  facts  in  the  case. 

Truthfulness,  then,  must  be  an  attribute  of  benevolence. 
It  is,  like  all  the  attributes,  only  benevolence  viewed  in  a 
certain  aspect  or  relation.  It  can  not  be  distinguished  from 
benevolence,  for  it  is  not  distinct  from  it,  but  only  a  phase  or 
form  of  benevolence.  The  universe  is  so  constructed  that  if 
every  thing  proceeds  and  is  conducted  and  willed  according 


J 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  245 

f{o  its  nature  and  relations,  the  highest  possible  good  must  re- 
„^-sult.  Truthfulness  seeks  the  good  as  an  end  and  truth  as  a 
t  means  to  secure  this  end.  It  wills  the  good  and  that  it  shall 
be  secured  only  by  means  of  truth.  It  wills  truth  in  the  end 
^nd  truth  in  the  means.  The  end  is  truly  valuable  and  chosen 
for  that  reason.  The  means  are  truth,  and  truth  is  the  only  y 
appropriate  or  possible  means. 

Truthfulness  of  heart,  begets,  of  course,  a  state  of  the 
sensibility  which  we  call  the  love  of  truth.  It  is  a  feeling  of 
pleasure  that  spontaneously  arises  in  the  sensibility  of  one 
whose  heart  is  truthful,  in  contemplating  truth.  This  feeling 
is  not  virtue;  it  is  rather  a  part  of  the  reward  of  truthfulness 
of  heart. 

Truthfulness  as  a  phenomenon  of  the   will^  is   also  often 
called  and  properly  called  a  love  of  the  truth.     It  is  a  willing 
in  accordance  with  objective  truth.     This  is  virtue,  and  is  an 
attribute  of  benevolence.     Truth  as  an   attribute  of  the  Di- 
vine  benevolence   is   the  ground  of  confidence  in  Hin^as  a 
moral  govenor.     Both  the  physical  and  moral  law  of  the  uni- 
verse evince  and  are  instances  and  illustrations  of  the  truth-     r'r' 
fulness  of  God.     Falsehood,  in  the  sense  of  lying, is  naturally 
regarded   by  a  moral  agent  with  disapprobation,  disgust  and 
abhorrence.     Truth  is  as  necessarily   regarded    by  him  with 
approbation,  and  if  the  will  be   benevolent,  with  pleasure. 
We  necessarily  take  pleasure  in  contemplating  objective  truth 
as  it  lies  in  idea  on  the  field  of  consciousness.     We  also  take 
pleasure  in  the  perception  and  contemplation  of  truthfulness,  ^ 
in  the  concrete  realization  of  the  idea  of  truth.     Truthfulness 
is  moral  beauty.     We  are  pleased  with  it  just  as  we  are  with 
natural  beauty  by  a  law  of  necessity,  when  the  necessary  con- 
ditions are  fulfilled.     This  attribute  of  benevolence  secures 
it  against  every  attempt  to  promote  the  ultimate  good  of  being 
by  means  of  falsehood.     True  benevolence  will  no  more,  can 
no  more   resort   to   falsehood  as  a  means  of  promoting  good     ' 
than  it  can   contradict  or  deny  itself.     The  intelligence  af- 
firms that  the  highest  ultimate   good   can  be   secured  only 
by  a  strict  adherence  to  truth,  for  this  adherence  is  a  demand 
of  the  intelligence,  and  the  mind  can  not  be  satisfied  with  any 
thing  else.     Indeed  to  suppose  the  contrary  is  to  suppose  a 
contradiction.     It  is  the  same  absurdity  as  to  suppose  that 
the  highest  good  could  b^  secured  only  by  the  violation  and 
setting  aside  of  the  nature  and  relations  of  things.     Since  the 
intelligence  affirms  this  unalterable  relation  of  truth  to  the 
highest  ultimate  good,  benevolence  or  that  attribute  of  benev- 
21* 


246  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

olence  which  we  denominate  truthfulness  or  love  of  the  truth, 
can  no  more  consent  to  falsehood  than  it  can  consent  to  relin- 
quish the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end.  And  in  no  case 
then,  does  or  can  a  moral  agent  violate  truth,  except  as  he  has 
for  the  time  being  at  least  become  selfish  and  prefers  a  present 
gratification  to  the  highest  ultimate  good  of  being.  There- 
fore, every  resort  to  falsehood,  every  pious  fraud,  falsely  so 
called,  is  only  a  specious  but  real  instance  of  selfishness.  A 
moral  agent  can  not  lie  for  God,  that  is,  he  can  not  tell  a  sin- 
ful falsehood  thinking  and  intending  thereby  to  please  God, 
He  knows  by  intuition  that  God  can  not  be  pleased  or  truly 
served  by  a  resort  to  lying.  There  is  a  great  difference  be- 
tween concealing  or  withholding  the  truth  for  benevolent  pur- 
poses and  telling  a  wilful  falsehood.  An  innocent  persecuted 
and  pursued  man,  has  taken  shelter  from  one  who  pursued 
him  to  shed  his  blood,  under  my  roof.  His  pursuer  comes 
and  inquires  after  him.  I  am  not  under  obligation  to  declare 
to  him  the  fact  that  he  is  in  my  house.  I  may,  and  indeed 
ought  to  withhold  the  truth  in  this  instance,  for  the  wretch 
has  no  right  to  know  it.  The  public  and  highest  good  de- 
mands that  he  should  not  know  it.  He  only  desires  to  know 
it  for  selfish  and  bloody  purposes.  But  in  this  case  I  should 
not  feel,  or  judge  myself  at  liberty  to  state  a  known  false- 
hood. I  could  not  think  that  this  would  ultimately  conduce  to 
the  highest  good.  The  person  might  go  away  deceived,  or 
under  the  impression  that  his  victim  was  not  there.  But  he 
could  not  accuse  me  of  telling  him  a  lie.  He  might  have 
drawn  his  own  inference  from  my  refusing  to  give  the  desired 
information.  But  even  to  secure  my  own  life  or  the  life  of 
my  friend,  I  am  not  at  liberty  to  tell  a  lie.  If  it  be  said  that 
lying  impHes  telUng  a  falsehood  for  selfish  purposes,  and  that 
therefore  it  is  not  lying  to  tell  a  falsehood  for  benevolent  pur- 
poses, I  reply,  that  our  nature  is  such  that  we  can  no  more 
state  a  wilful  falsehood  with  a  benevolent  intention,  than  we 
can  commit  a  sin  with  a  benevolent  intention.  We  necessa- 
rily regard  falsehood  as  inconsistent  with  the  highest  good  of 
being,  just  as  we  regard  sin  as  inconsistent  with  the  highest 
good  of  being,  or  just  as  we  regard  holiness  and  truthfulness 
as  the  indispensable  conditions  of  the  highest  good  of  being. 
The  correlation  of  the  will  and  the  intelligence  forbids  that  the 
mistake  should  ever  be  fallen  into  that  wilful  falsehood  is  or 
can  be  the  means  or  conditions  of  the  highest  good.  Univ- 
ersal truthfulness,  then,  will  always  characterize  a  truly 
benevolent  man.    While  he  is  truly  benevolent  he  is,  he 


I  MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  247 

must  be,  faithful,  truthful.  So  far  as  his  knowledge  goes,  his 
statements  may  be  depended  upon  with  as  much  safety  as 
the  statements  of  an  angel,  or  as  the  statements  of  God 
himself  Truthfulness  is  necessarily  an  attribute  of  benevo- 
lence in  all  beings.  No  liar  has  or  can  have  a  particle  of 
virtue  or  benevolence  in  him. 


I 


LECTURE    XVIII. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  Moral  Law. 

17.  Pa/ience  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

This  term  is  frequently  used  to  express  a  phenomenon  of 
the  sensibility.  When  thus  used,  it  designates  a  calm  and 
unruffled  state  of  the  sensibility  or  feelings  under  circum- 
stances that  tend  to  excite  anger  or  impatience  of  feeling. 
The  calmness  of  the  sensibility,  or  patience  as  a  phenomenon 
of  the  sensibihty,  is  purely  an  involuntary  state  of  mind,  and 
although  it  is  a  pleasing  and  amiable  manifestation,  yet  it  is 
not  properly  virtue.  It  may  be,  and  often  is  an  effect  of  pa- 
tience as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  and  therefore  an  effect  of 
virtue.  But  it  is  not  itself  virtue.  This  amiable  temper  may, 
and  often  does  proceed  from  the  constitutional  temperament, 
and  from  circumstances  and  habits. 

Patience  as  a  virtue  must  be  a  voluntary  state  of  mind.  It 
must  be  an  attribute  of  love  or  benevolence;  for  all  virtue,  as 
we  have  seen  and  as  the  bible  teaches,  is  resolvable  into  love 
or  benevolence.  The  term,  upomone  so  often  rendered  pa- 
tience in  the  New  Testament,  means  perseverance  under  trials, 
continuance,  bearing  up  under  afflictions  or  privations,  stead- 
fastness of  purpose  in  despite  of  obstacles.  The  word  may  be 
used  in  a  good  or  in  a  bad  sense.  Thus  a  selfish  man  may 
patiently,  that  is,  perseveringly  pursue  his  end,  and  may  bear 
up  under  much  opposition  to  his  course. 

This  is  patience  as  an  attribute  of  selfishness,  and  patience 
in  a  bad  sense  of  the  term.  Patience  in  the  good  sense,  or  in 
the  sense  in  which  I  am  considering  it,  is  an  attribute  of  be- 
nevolence. It  is  constancy  of  intention,  a  fixedness,  a  bear- 
ing up  under  trials,  afflictions,  crosses,  persecutions  or  dis- 
couragements. This  must  be  an  attribute  of  benevolence. 
Whenever  patience  ceases,  when  it  holds  out  no  longer,  when 
discouragement  prevails  and  the  will  reliquishes  its  end,  bene- 
volence ceases  of  course. 

Patience  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  tends  to  patience  as 
a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility.  That  is,  fixedness  and  stead- 
fastness of  intention  naturally  tends  to  keep  down  and  allay 
impatience  of  temper.  As  however  the  states  of  the  sensi- 
bility are  not  directly  under  the  control  of  the  will,  there  may 
be  irritable  or  impatient  feelings  when  the  heart  remains 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  249 

steadfast.  Facts  or  falsehoods  may  be  suggested  to  the  mind 
that  may  in  despite  of  the  will  produce  a  ruffling  of  the  sensi- 
bility even  when  the  heart  remains  patient.  The  only  way  in 
which  a  temptation,  (for  it  is  only  a  temptation  while  the  will 
abides  firm  to  its  purpose,)  I  say  the  only  way  in  which  a 
temptation  of  this  kind  can  be  disposed  of,  is  by  diverting  the 
attention  from  that  view  of  the  subject  that  creates  the  dis- 
turbance in  the  sensibility.  I  should  have  said  before,  that 
although  the  will  controls  the  feehngs  by  a  law  of  necessity, 
yet,  as  it  does  not  do  so  directly  but  indirectly,  it  may 
and  does  often  happen  that  feehngs  corresponding  to  the 
state  of  the  will  do  not  always  exist  in  the  sensibility. 
Nay,  for  a  time,  a  state  of  the  sensibility  may  exist  which 
is  the  opposite  of  the  state  of  the  will.  From  this  source 
arise  many  and  indeed  most  of  our  temptations.  We  could 
never  be  properly  tried  or  tempted  at  all  if  the  feelings 
must  always  by  a  law  of  necessity  correspond  with  the 
state  of  the  will.  Sin  consists  in  willing  to  gratify  our 
feehngs  or  constitutional  impulses  in  opposition  to  the 
law  of  our  reason.  But  if  these  desires  and  impulses  could 
never  exist  in  opposition  to  the  law  of  the  reason,  and  conse- 
quently in  opposition  to  a  present  holy  choice  then  a  holy 
being  could  not  be  tempted.  He  could  have  no  motive  or 
occasion  to  sin.  If  our  mother  Eve  could  have  had  no  feelings 
of  desire  in  opposition  to  the  state  of  her  will,  she  never  could 
have  desired  the  forbidden  fruit,  and  of  course  could  not  have 
sinned.  I  wish  now,  then,  to  state  distinctly  what  I  should 
have  said  before,  that  the  state  or  choice  of  the  will  does  not 
necessarily  so  control  the  feelings,  desires  or  emotions,  but 
that  these  are  sometimes  strongly  excited  by  Satan  or  by  cir- 
cumstances in  opposition  to  the  will,  and  thus  become  power- 
ful temptations  to  seek  their  gratification  instead  of  seeking 
the  highest  good  of  being.  Feelings  the  gratification  of  which 
would  be  opposed  to  every  attribute  of  benevolence,  may  at 
times  co-exist  with  benevolence,  and  be  a  temptation  to  self- 
ishness ;  but  opposing  acts  of  will  can  not  co-exist  with  bene- 
volence. All  that  can  be  truly  said  is,  that  as  the  will  has  an 
indirect  control  of  the  feelings,  desires,  appetites,  passions, 
&c.,  it  can  suppress  any  class  of  feelings  when  they  arise  by 
diverting  the  attention  from  their  causes,  or  by  taking  into  con- 
sideration such  views  and  facts  as  will  calm  or  change  the 
state  of  the  sensibility.  Irritable  feelings,  or  what  is  com- 
monly called  impatience,  may  be  directly  caused  by  ill  health, 
irritable  nerves,  and  by  many  things  over  which  the  will  has 


250  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

no  control.  But  this  is  not  impatience  in  the  sense  of  sin.  If 
these  feelings  are  not  suffered  to  influence  the  will;  if  the  will 
abides  in  patience ;  if  such  feehngs  are  not  cherished  and  are 
not  suffered  to  shake  the  integrity  of  the  will;  they  are  not 
sin.  That  is,  there  can  be  no  sin  in  themselves.  They  are 
only  temptations.  If  they  are  allowed  to  control  the  will,  to 
break  forth  in  words  and  actions,  then  there  is  sin;  but  the  sin 
does  not  consist  in  the  feelings,  but  in  the  consent  of  the  will, 
in  the  will's  consent  to  gratify  them.  Thus,  the  apostle  says 
'^Be  angry  and  sin  not:  let  not  the  sun  go  down  upon  your 
wrath."  That  is,  if  anger  arise  in  the  feelings  and  sensibility, 
do  not  sin  by  suffering  it  to  control  your  will.  Do  not  cherish 
the  feeling,  and  let  the  sun  go  down  upon  it.  For  this  cherish- 
ing it  is  sin.  AVhen  it  is  cherished,  the  will  consents  and 
broods  over  the  cause  of  it;  this  is  sin.  But  if  it  be  not 
clierished,  it  is  not  sin. 

That  the  outward  actions  will  correspond  with  the  states  and 
actions  of  the  will,  provided  the  integrity  of  the  nerves  of 
voluntary  motion  be  preserved,  and  provided  also  that  no  op- 
posing force  of  greater  power  than  that  of  my  volitions  be 
opposed  to  them,  is  a  universal  truth.  But  that  feelings  and  de- 
sires can  not  exist  contrary  to  the  states  or  decisions  of  my  will 
is  not  true.  If  this  were  a  universal  truth,  temptation,  as  I  have 
said,  could  not  exist.  The  outward  actions  will  be  as  the  will 
is  always;  the  feelings  generally.  Feelings  corresponding  to 
the  choice  of  the  will,  will  be  the  rule,  and  opposing  feelings 
the  exception.  But  these  exceptions  may  and  do  exist  in  per- 
fectly holy  beings.  They  existed  in  Eve  before  she  consented 
to  sin,  and  had  she  resisted  them,  she  had  not  sinned.  They 
doubtless  existed  in  Christ  or  he  could  not  have  been  tempted 
in  all  points  like  as  we  are.  If  there  be  no  desires  or  im- 
pulses of  the  sensibility  contrary  to  the  state  of  the  will, 
there  is  not  properly  any  temptation.  The  desire  or  impulse 
must  appear  on  the  field  of  consciousness  before  it  is  a  motive 
to  action,  and  of  course  before  it  is  a  temptation  to  self-indul- 
gence. Just  as  certainly  then  as  a  holy  being  may  be  tempted 
and  not  sin,  just  so  certain  it  is  that  emotions  of  any  kind  or 
of  any  strength  may  exist  in  the  sensibility  without  sin.  If 
they  are  not  indulged,  if  the  will  does  not  consent  to  them 
and  to  their  indulgence  or  gratification,  the  soul  is  not  the 
less  but  all  the  more  virtuous  for  their  presence.  Patience  as 
a  phenomenon  of  the  will  must  strengthen  and  gird  itself 
under  such  circumstances,  so  that  patience  of  will  may  be, 
and  if  it  exist  at  all,  must  te,  in  exact  proportion  to  the  im- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  251 

patience  of  the  sensibility.  The  more  impatience  of  sensibility 
there  is,  the  more  patience  of  will  there  must  be,  or  virtue  will 
cease  altogether.  So  that  it  is  not  always  true  that  virtue  is 
the  strongest  when  the  sensibility  is  the  most  calm,  placid  and 
patient.  When  Christ  passed  through  his  greatest  conflicts, 
his  virtue  as  a  man  was  undoubtedly  most  intense.  When  in 
his  agony  in  the  garden  so  great  was  the  agony  of  his  sensi- 
bility, that  he  sweat  as  it  were  great  drops  of  blood.  This, 
he  says,  was  the  hour  of  the  Prince  of  Darkness.  This  was 
his  great  trial.  But  did  he  sin'  No,  indeed.  But  why? 
Was  he  calm  and  placid  as  a  summer's  evening?  As  far  from 
it  as  possible. 

Patience  then  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence  consists,  not  in 
placid  feehng,butin  perseverance  under  trials  and  states  of  the 
sensibility  that  tend  to  selfishness.  This  is  only  benevolence 
viewed  in  a  certain  aspect.  It  is  benevolence  under  circum- 
stances of  discouragement,  of  trial  or  temptation.  ^'  This  is  the 
patience  of  the  saints." 

Before  I  dismiss  the  subject  of  patience  as  an  emotion,  I 
would  observe  that  the  steadfastness  of  the  heart  tends  so 
strongly  to  secure  it,  that  if  an  opposite  state  of  the  sensibility 
is  more  than  of  momentary  duration,  there  is  strong  presump- 
tion that  the  heart  is  not  steadfast  in  love.  The  first  risings 
of  it  will  produce  an  immediate  effort  to  suppress  it.  If  it  con- 
tinues, this  is  evidence  that  the  attention  is  allowed  to  dwell 
upon  the  cause  of  it.  This  shows  that  the  will  is  in  some 
sense  indulging  it. 

If  it  so  far  influence  the  will  as  to  manifest  itself  in  impa- 
tient words  and  actions  there  must  be  a  yielding  of  the  will. 
Patience  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence  is  overcome.  If 
the  sensibility  were  perfectly  and  directly  under  the  control 
of  the  will,  the  least  degree  of  impatience  would  imply  sin. 
But  as  it  is  not  directly  but  indirectly  under  the  control  of 
the  will,  momentary  impatience  of  feeUng  where  it  does  not 
at  all  influence  the  will,  and  when  it  is  not  at  all  indulged,  is 
not  sure  evidence  of  a  sinful  state  of  the  will.  It  should  al- 
ways be  borne  in  mind  that  neither  patience  nor  impatience 
in  the  form  of  mere  feeling  existing  for  any  length  of  time  and 
in  any  degree  is  in  itself  either  holy  on  the  one  hand  or  sinful 
on  the  other.  All  that  can  be  said  of  these  states  of  the 
sensibility  is,  that  they  indicate  as  a  general  thing  the  attitude 
of  the  will.  When  the  will  is  for  a  long  time  steadfast  in  its 
patience,  the  result  is  great  equanimity  of  temper  and  great 
patience  of  feeling.     This  comes  to  be  a  law  of  the  sensibility 


253  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

insomuch  that  very  advanced  saints  may  and  doubtless  do 
experience  the  most  entire  patience  of  feeling  for  many  years 
together.  This  does  not  constitute  their  holiness,  but  is  a 
sweet  fruit  of  it.  It  is  to  be  regarded  rather  in  the  light  of  a 
reward  of  hoHness  than  of  hoHness  itself. 

18.  Another  attribute  of  this  benevolence  is  Meekness. 

Meekness  considered  as  a  virtue  is  a  phenomenon  of  the 
will.  This  term  also  expresses  a  state  of  the  sensibility. 
When  used  to  designate  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility  it 
is  nearly  synonymous  with  patience.  It  designates  a  sweet 
and  forbearing  temper  under  provocation.  As  a  phenome- 
non of  the  will  and  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  it  repre- 
sents a  state  of  will  which  is  the  opposite  of  resistance  to 
injury  or  retaliation.  It  is  properly  and  strictly  forbearance 
under  injurious  treatment.  This  certainly  is  an  attribute  of 
God,  as  our  existence  and  our  being  out  of  hell  plainly  demon- 
strate. Christ  said  of  himself  that  he  was  "-  meek  and  lowly 
in  heart;"  and  surely  this  was  no  vain  boast.  How  ad- 
mirably and  how  incessantly  did  this  attribute  of  his  love 
manifest  itself!  The  fifty-third  chapter  of  Isaiah  is  a  prophe- 
cy exhibiting  this  attribute  in  a  most  affecting  light.  Indeed 
scarcely  any  feature  of  the  character  of  God  and  of  Christ 
is  more  strikingly  exhibited  than  this.  This  must  be  an  attri- 
bute of  benevolence.  Benevolence  is  good  will  to  all  beings. 
We  are  naturally  forbearing  toward  those  whose  good  we 
honestly  and  diligently  seek.  If  our  hearts  are  set  upon  do- 
ing them  good  we  shall  naturally  exercise  great  forbearance 
toward  them.  God  has  greatly  commended  his  forbearance 
to  us  in  that  while  we  were  yet  His  enemies,  He  forbore  to 
punish  us,  and  gave  His  son  to  die  for  us.  Forbearance  is  a 
sweet  and  amiable  attribute.  How  affectingly  it  displayed 
itself  in  the  hall  of  Pilate,  and  on  the  cross.  '^  As  a  lamb  for 
the  slaughter  and  as  a  sheep  before  its  shearers  is  dumb,  so 
he  opened  not  his  mouth." 

This  attribute  has  in  this  world  abundant  opportunity  to 
develop  and  display  itself  in  the  person  of  the  saints.  There 
are  daily  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  this  form  of  virtue. 
Indeed  all  the  attributes  of  benevolence  are  called  into  fre- 
quent exercise  in  this  school  of  discipline.  This  is  indeed  a 
noble  world  in  which  to  train  God's  children,  to  develop  and 
strengthen  every  modification  of  holiness.  This  attribute 
must  always  appear  where  benevolence  exists,  wherever  there 
is  an  occasion  for  its  exercise. 

It  is  delightful  to  contemplate  the  perfection  and  glory  of 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  253 

that  love  that  constitutes  obedience  to  the  law  of  God.  As 
occasions  arise,  we  behold  it  developing  one  attribute  after 
another,  and  there  may  be  many  of  its  attributes  and  modifi- 
cations of  which  we  have  as  yet  no  idea  whatever.  Circum- 
stances will  call  them  into  exercise.  It  is  probable,  if  not  cer- 
tain, that  the  attributes  of  benevolence  were  very  imperfect- 
ly known  in  heaven  previous  to  the  existence  of  sin  in  the 
universe,  and  that  but  for  sin  many  of  these  attributes  would 
never  have  been  manifested  in  exercise.  But  the  existence  of 
sin,  great  as  the  evil  is,  has  afforded  an  opportunity  for  be- 
nevolence to  manifest  its  beautiful  phases  and  to  develope  its 
sweet  attributes  in  a  most  enchanting  manner.  Thus  the 
Divine  economy  of  benevolence  brings  good  out  of  so  great 
an  evil. 

A  hasty    and    unforbearing   spirit   is  always   demonstra- 
tive evidence  of  a  want  of   benevolence    or  true    religion. 
Meekness  is  and  must  be  a  peculiar  characteristic  of  the  saints 
in  this  world  where  there  is  so  much  provocation.     Christ  fre- 
quently and  strongly  enforced  the  obligation  to  forbearance. 
'■'■But  I  say  unto  you  that  ye  resist  not  evil:  but  whosoever 
shall  smite  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other  al- 
so.    And  if  any  man  will  sue  thee  at  the  law  and  take  away 
thy  coat,  let  him  have  thy  cloak  also.     And  whosoever  shall 
compel  thee  to  gQ  a  mile,  go  with  him  twain."     How  beautiful ! 
19.  Long-suffering  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 
This  attribute  is  hardly  distinguishable  from  meekness  or 
forbearance.     It  seems  to  be  an  intense    form  of  forbear- 
ance; or  it  is  forbearance   exercised  long  and  under   great 
suffering  from  persecution  and  unreasonable  opposition.  God's 
forbearance  is  lengthened  out  to  long  suffering.     Christ's  for- 
bearance also,  was  and  is  often  put  to  the  severest  trial,  and 
is  lengthend  out  to  most  affecting  long-suffering.     This  is  an 
intense  state  or  form  of  benevolence,  when  it  is  most  sorely 
tried,  and  as  it  were  put  upon  the  rack.     The  Prophets,  and 
Christ,  and  the  Apostles,  the  martyrs  and  primitive  saints,  and 
many  in  different  ages  of  the  church  have  given  forth  a  glori- 
ous specimen  and  illustration  of  this  sweet  attribute  of  love. 
But  for  the  existence  of  sin,  however,  it  is  probable  and  per- 
haps certain  that  no  being  but  God  could  have  had  an  idea  of 
its  existence.     The  same  no  doubt  may  be  said  of  many  of 
the  attributes  of  Divine  love.     God  has  no  doubt  intended  to 
strongly  exhibit  this  attribute  in  himself  and  in  all  his  saints 
and  angels.     The  introduction  of  sin,  excuseless  and  abomin- 
able, has  given  occasion  for  a  most  thorough  development  and 
22 


254  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

a  most  affecting  manifestation  of  this  attribute  of  love.  It  is 
a  sweet,  a  heavenly  attribute.  It  is  the  most  opposite  to  the 
spirit  and  maxims  of  this  vrorld.  It  is  the  very  contrast  of 
the  Jaw  and  the  spirit  of  honor  as  it  appears  in  this  world. 
The  law  of  honor  says,  If  you  receive  an  injury  or  an  insult, 
resent  it  and  retaliate.  This  gentle  spirit  says,  If  you  receive 
many  insults  and  injuries,  do  not  resent  them  nor  retaliate, 
but  bear  and  forbear  ever^  to  long  suffering. 

20.  Humility^  is  another  modification  or  attribute  of  love. 

This  term  seems  often  to  be  used  to  express  a  sense  of 
unworthiness,  of  guilt,  of  ignorance,  and  of  nothingness,  to 
express  a  feeling  of  ill-desert.  It  seems  to  be  used  in  com- 
mon parlance  to  express  sometimes  a  state  of  the  intelligence, 
when  it  seems  to  indicate  a  clear  perception  of  our  guilt. 
When  used  to  designate  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  it  represents 
those  feelings  of  shame  and  unworthiness,  of  ignorance  and 
of  nothingness  of  which  those  are  so  conscious  who  have  been 
enlightened  by  the  Holy  Spirit  in  respect  to  their  true  char- 
acter. 

But  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  and  as  an  attribute  of 
love,  it  consists  in  a  zvillingness  to  be  known  and  appreciated  ac- 
cording to  our  real  character.  Humility  as  a.  phenomenon  ei- 
ther of  the  sensibility  or  of  the  intelligence  may  co-exist  with 
great  pride  of  heart.  Pride  is  a  disposition  to  exalt  self,  to 
get  above  others,  to  hide  our  defects  and  to  pass  for  more  than 
we  are.  Deep  conviction  of  sin  and  deep  feelings  of  shame, 
of  ignorance,  and  of  desert  of  hell,  may  co-exist  with  a  great 
unwillingness  to  confess  and  be  known  just  as  we  are,  and  to 
be  appreciated  just  according  to  what  our  real  character  has 
been  and  is.  There  is  no  virtue  in  such  humility.  But  hu- 
mility, considered  as  a  virtue,  consists  in  the  consent  of  the 
will  to  be  known,  to  confess,  and  to  take  our  proper  place  in 
the  scale  of  being.  It  is  that  peculiarity  of  love  that  wills 
the  good  of  being  so  disinterestedly  as  to  will  to  pass  for  no 
other  than  we  really  are.  This  is  an  honest,  a  sweet  and  ami- 
able feature  of  love.  It  must,  perhaps,  be  peculiar  to  those 
who  have  sinned.  It  is  only  love  acting  under  or  in  a  certain 
relation  or  set  of  circumstances.  It  would  under  the  same 
circumstances  develop  and  manifest  itself  in  all  truly  benev- 
olent minds.  This,  attribute  will  render  confession  of  sin  to 
God  and  man  natural,  and  even  make  it  a  luxury.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  but  for  this  attribute  the  saints  could  not  be  happy 
in  heaven.  God  has  promised  to  bring  into  judgment  ewery 
work  and  every  secret  thing  whether  it  be  good  or  whether  it 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  255 

be  evil.  Now  while  pride  exists,  it  would  greatly  pain  the 
soul  to  have  all  the  character  known.  So  that  unless  this  at- 
tribute really  belongs  to  the  saints,  they  would  be  ashamed  at 
the  judgment  and  filled  with  confusion  even  in  heaven  itself. 
But  this  sweet  attribute  will  secure  them  against  that  shame 
and  confusion  of  face  that  would  otherwise  render  heaven  it- 
self a  hell  to  them.  They  will  be  perfectly  willing  and  happy 
to  be  known  and  estimated  according  to  their  characters. 
This  attribute  will  secure  in  all  the  saints  on  earth  that  con- 
fession of  faults  one  to  another  which  is  so  often  enjoined  in 
the  bible.  By  this  it  is  not  intended  that  Christians  always 
think  it  wise  and  necessary  to  make  confession  of  all  their 
secret  sins  to  man.  But  it  is  intended  that  they  will  confess 
to  those  whom  they  have  injured  and  to  all  to  whom  benevo- 
lence demands  that  they  should  confess.  This  attribute  se- 
cures its  possessor  against  spiritual  pride,  against  ambition 
to  get  above  others.  It  is  a  modest  and  unassuming  state  of 
mind. 


LECTURE   XIX. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

2L  Self-denial  is  another  attribute  of  love. 

If  we  love  any  being  better  than  ourselves,  we  of  course 
deny  ourselves  when  our  own  interests  come  in  competition 
with  his.  Love  is  good  will.  If  I  will  good  to  others 
more  than  to  myself,  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  I  shall  not  deny 
myself  when  my  own  inclinations  conflict  with  theirs. 

Now  the  love  required  by  the  law  of  God  we  have  repeat- 
edly seen  to  be  good  will,  or  willing  the  highest  good  of 
being  for  its  own  sake  or  as  an  end. 

As  the  interests  of  self  are  not  at  all  regarded  because  they 
belong  to  self,  but  only  according  to  their  relative  value,  it 
must  be  certain  that  self-denial  for  the  sake  of  promoting  the 
higher  interests  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  is  and  must  be  a 
peculiarity  or  attribute  of  love. 

But  again.  The  very  idea  of  disinterested  benevolence, 
(and  there  is  no  other  true  benevolence,)  implies  the  aban- 
donment of  the  spirit  of  self-seeking  or  of  selfishness.  It  is 
impossible  to  become  benevolent  without  ceasing  to  be  selfish. 
In  other  words,  perfect  self-denial  is  implied  in  beginning  to 
be  benevolent.  Self-indulgence  ceases  when  benevolence 
hegins.  This  must  be.  Benevolence  is  the  consecration  of 
our  powers  to  the  highest  good  of  being  in  general  as  an  end. 
This  is'  utterly  inconsistent  with  consecration  to  self-interest  or 
self-graUfication.  Selfishness  makes  good  to  self  the  end  of 
every  choice.  Benevolence  makes  good  to  being  in  general 
the  end  of  everjf  choice.  Benevolence,  then,  implies  complete 
self-denial.  That  is,  it  implies  that  nothing  is  chosen  merely 
because  it  belongs  to  self,  but  only  because  of  and  in  propor- 
tion to  its  relative  value. 

I  said  there  was  no  true  benevolence  but  disinterested  be- 
nevolence; no  true  love  but  disinterested  love.  There  is 
such  a  thing  as  interested  love  or  benevolence.  That  is,  the 
good  of  others  is  willed,  though  not  as  an  end  or  for  its  in- 
trinsic value  to  them,  but  as  a  means  of  our  own  happiness 
or  because  of  its  relative  value  to  us.  Thus  a  man  might  will 
the  good  of  his  family  or  of  his  neighborhood  or  country  or  of 
any  body  or  any  thing  that  sustained  such  relations  to  self  as 
to  involve  his  own  interests.     When  the  ultimate  reason  of 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  257 

his  willing  good  to  others  is  that  his  own  may  be  promoted, 
this  is  selfishness.  It  is  making  good  to  self  his  end.  This  a 
smner  may  do  toward  God,  toward  the  church,  and  toward 
the  interests  of  rehgion  in  general.  This  is  what  I  call  in- 
terested benevolence.  It  is  willing  good  as  an  end  only  to 
self,  and  to  all  others  only  as  a  means  of  promoting  our  own  ^ 
good. 

But  again.  When  the  will  is  governed  by  feeling  in  will- 
ing the  good  of  others,  this  is  only  the  spirit  of  self-indulgence, 
and  is  only  interested  benevolence.  For  example:  the  feel- 
ing of  compassion  is  strongly  excited  by  the  presence  of 
misery.  The  feeling  is  intense  and  constitutes,  like  all  the 
feeUngs,  a  strong  impulse  or  motive  to  the  will  to  consent  to 
its  gratification.  For  the  time  being,  this  impulse  is  stronger 
than  the  feeHng  of  avarice  or  any  other  feeHng.  1  yield  to  it 
and  give  all  the  money  I  have  to  relieve  the  sufferer.  I  even 
take  my  clothes  from  my  back  and  give  them  to  him.  Now 
in  this  case,  I  am  just  as  selfish  as  if  I  had  sold  my  clothes  to 
gratify  my  appetite  for  strong  drink.  The  gratification  of  my 
feelings  was  my  end.  This  is  one  of  the  most  specious  and 
most  delusive  forms  of  selfishness. 

Again.  When  one  makes  his  own  salvation  the  end  of 
prayer,  of  almsgiving,  and  of  all  his  religious  duties,  this  is 
only  selfishness  and  not  true  rehgion,  however  much  he  may 
abound  in  them.  This  is  only  interested  benevolence  or  be- 
nevolence to  self. 

Again.  From  the  very  nature  oftrue  benevolence  it  is  impos- 
sible that  every  interest  should  not  be  regarded  according  to 
its  relative  value.  When  another  interest  is  seen  by  me  to 
be  more  valuable  in  itself  or  of  more  value  to  God  and  the 
universe  than  my  own,  and  when  I  see  that  by  denying  myself 
I  can  promote  it,  it  is  certain,  if  I  am.  benevolent,  that  I  shall 
do  it.  I  can  not  fail  to  do  it  without  failing  to  be  benevolent. 
Two  things  in  this  case  must  be  apprehended  by  the  mind. 

(1.)  That  the  interest  is  either  intrinsically  or  relatively 
more  valuable  than  my  own. 

(2.)  That  by  denying  myself  I  can  promote  or  secure  a 
greater  good  to  being  than  I  sacrifice  of  my  own.  When 
these  two  conditions  are  fulfilled,  it  is  impossible  that  I  should 
remain  benevolent  unless  I  deny  myself  and  seek  the  higher 
good. 

Benevolence  is  an  honest  and  disinterested  consecration  of  the 
whole  being  to  the  highest  good  of  God  and  of  the  universe. 
The  benevolent  man  will,  therefore,  and  must,  honestly  weigh 


I 


258  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

each  interest  as  it  is  perceived  in  the  balance  of  his  own  best 
judgment,  and  will  always  give  the  preference  to  the  higher 
interest  provided  he  believes  that  he  can  by  endeavor  and  by 
self-denial  secure  it. 

That  self-denial  is  an  attribute  of  the  divine  love,  is  mani- 
fested most  gloriously  and  affectingly  in  the  gift  of  his  Son  to 
die  for  men.  This  attribute  was  also  most  conspicuously  mani- 
fested by  Christ  in  denying  himself  and  taking  up  his  cross 
and  suffering  for  his  enemies.  Observe.  It  was  not  for 
friends  that  Christ  gave  himself.  It  was  not  unfortunate  but 
innocent  sufferers  for  whom  God  gave  his  Son  or  for  whom  he 
gave  himself.  It  was  enemies.  It  was  not  that  he  might 
make  slaves  of  them  that  he  gave  his  Son  nor  from  any  selfish 
consideration  whatever,  but  because  he  foresaw  that  by 
making  this  sacrifice  himself,  he  could  secure  to  the  universe 
a  greater  good  than  he  should  sacrifice.  It  was  this  attribute 
of  benevolence  that  caused  him  to  give  his  son  to  suffer  so 
much.  It  was  disinterested  benevolence  alone  that  led  him 
to  deny  himself  for  the  sake  of  a  greater  good  to  the  universe. 
Now  observe:  this  sacrifice  would  not  have  been  made  unless 
it  had  been  regarded  by  God  as  the  less  of  two  evils.  That 
is,  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  great  and  overwhelming  as  they 
were,  were  considered  as  an  evil  of  less  magnitude  than  the 
eternal  sufferings  of  sinners.  This  induced  him  to  make  the 
sacrifice  although  for  his  enemies.  It  mattered  not  whether 
for  friends  or  for  enemies,  if  so  be  he  could  by  making  a  less 
sacrifice  secure  a  greater  good  to  them.  When  I  come  to  con- 
sider the  economy  of  benevolence  I  may  enlarge  upon  this  topic. 

Let  it  be  understood  that  a  self-indulgent  spirit  is  never  and 
can  never  be  consistent  with  benevolence.  No  form  of  self- 
indulgence,  properly  so  called,  can  exist  where  true  benevo- 
lence exists.  The  fact  is,  self-denial  must  be  and  universally  is 
wherever  benevolence  reigns.  Christ  has  expressly  made 
whole-hearted  self-denial  a  condition  of  discipleship;  which  is 
the  same  thing  as  to  affirm  that  it  is  an  essential  attribute  of 
holiness  or  love;  that  there  can  not  be  the  beginning  of  true 
virtue  without  it. 

Again.  Much  that  passes  for  self-denial  is  only  a  specious 
form  of  self-indulgence.  The  penances  and  self-mortifications, 
as  they  are  falsely  called,  of  the  superstitious,  what  are  they 
but  a  self-indulgent  spirit  after  all?  A  popish  priest  abstains 
from  marriage  to  obtain  the  honor  and  emoluments  and  the 
influence  of  the  priestly  office  here,  and  eternal  glory  here- 
after. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  259 

A  nun  takes  the  vail  and  a  monk  immures  himself  in  a 
monastery;  a  hermit  forsakes  human  society,  and  shuts  him- 
self up  in  a  cave;  a  devotee  makes  a  pilgrimage  to  Mecca,  and 
a  martyr  goes  to  the  stake.  Now  if  these  things  are  done 
with  an  ultimate  reference  to  their  own  glory  and  happiness, 
although  apparently  instances  of  great  self-denial,  yet  they  are 
in  fact  only  a  spirit  of  self-indulgence  and  self-seeking.  They 
are  only  follow^ing  the  strongest  desire.  They  are  instances 
of  making  good  to  self  the  end. 

There  are  many  mistakes  upon  this  subject.  For  example, 
it  is  common  for  persons  to  deny  self  in  one  form  for  the  sake 
of  gratifying  self  in  another  forrn. 

In  one  man  avarice  is  the  ruling  passion.  He  will  labor 
hard,  rise  early,  and  sit  up  late  and  eat  the  bread  of  careful- 
ness, deny  himself  even  the  necessaries  of  life  for  the  sake  of 
accumulating  wealth.  Every  one  can  see  that  this  is  denying 
self  in  one  form  merely  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  self  in  an- 
other form.  Yet  this  man  will  complain  bitterly  of  the  self- 
indulgent  spirit  manifested  by  others,  their  extravagance  and 
want  of  piety. 

One  man  will  deny  all  his  bodily  appetites  and  passions  for 
the  sake  of  a  reputation  with  men.  This  is  also  an  instance 
of  the  same  kind.  Another  will  give  the  fruit  of  his  body  for 
the  sin  of  his  soul;  will  sacrifice  every  thing  else  to  obtain  an 
eternal  inheritance,  and  be  just  as  selfish  as  the  man  who 
sacrifices  to  the  things  of  time  his  soul  and  all  the  riches  of 
eternity. 

But  it  should  be  remarked  that  this  attribute  of  benevo- 
lence does  and  must  secure  the  subjugation  of  all  the  propen- 
sities. It  must,  either  suddenly  or  gradually,  so  far  subdue  and 
quiet  them  that  their  imperious  clamor  will  cease.  They  will 
as  it  were  be  slain  either  suddenly  or  gradually,  so  that  the 
sensibility  will  become  in  a  great  measure  dead  to  those 
objects  that  so  often  and  so  easily  excited  it.  It  is  a  law  of 
the  sensibility — of  all  the  desires  and  passions,  that  their  in- 
dulgence develops  and  strengthens  them  and  their  denial  sup- 
presses them.  Benevolence  consists  in  a  refusal  to  gratify  the 
sensibility  and  in  obeying  the  reason.  Therefore  it  must  be 
true  that  this  denial  of  the  propensities  will  greatly  suppress 
them  until  they  become  tame  and  easily  denied.  While,  on 
the  contrary,  the  denial  of  the  propensities  and  the  indulgence 
of  the  intelligence  and  of  the  conscience  will  greatly  develop 
them.  Thus  selfishness  tends  to  stultify,  while  benevolence 
tends  greatly  to  strengthen  the  intelHgence. 


260  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

22.   Condescension  is  another  attribute  of  love. 

This  attribute  consists  in  a  wilHngness  to  descend  to  the 
poor,  the  ignorant,  or  the  vile  for  the  purpose  of  securing  their 
good.  It  is  a  wilHng  the  good  of  those  whom  Providence  has 
placed  in  any  respect  below  us,  together  with  the  means  of 
securing  their  good,  particularly  our  own  stooping,  descend- 
ing, coming  down  to  them  for  this  purpose.  It  is  a  peculiar 
form  of  self-denial.  God,  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy 
Spirit,  manifest  infinite  condescension  in  efforts  to  secure  the 
well-being  of  sinners,  even  the  most  vile  and  degraded.  This 
attribute  is  called  by  Christ  lowliness  of  heart.  God  is  said 
to  humble  himself,  that  is,  to  condescend  when  He  beholds  the 
things  that  are  done  in  heaven.  This  is  true,  for  every  crea- 
ture is  and  must  forever  be  infinitely  below  Him  in  every 
respect.  But  how  much  greater  must  that  condescension  be 
that  comes  down  to  earth,  and  even  to  the  lowest  and  most 
degraded  of  earth's  inhabitants,  for  purposes  of  benevolence. 
This  is  a  lovely  modification  of  benevolence.  It  seems  to  be 
entirely  above  the  gross  conception  of  infidelity.  Condescen- 
sion seems  to  be  regarded  by  most  people,  and  especially  by 
infidels,  as  rather  a  weakness  than  a  virtue.  Skeptics  clothe 
their  imaginary  God  with  attributes  in  many  respects  the  op- 
posite of  true  virtue.  They  think  it  entirely  beneath  the 
dignity  of  God  to  come  down  even  to  notice,  and  much  more 
to  interfere,  with  the  concerns  of  men.  But  hear  the  word  of 
the  Lord:  *'*'Thus  saith  the  High  and  Lofty  One  who  inhabit- 
eth  eternity,  whose  name  is  Holy. — I  dwell  in  the  high  and 
holy  place;  with  him  also  that  is  of  a  contrite  and  humble 
spirit,  to  revive  the  spirit  of  the  humble  and  to  revive  the 
heart  of  the  contrite  ones."  And  again,  ^^  Thus  saith  the 
liOrd,  the  heaven  is  my  throne  and  the  earth  is  my  footstool, 
where  is  the  house  that  ye  build  unto  me?  and  where  is  the 
place  of  my  rest?  For  all  those  things  hath  my  hand  made, 
and  all  those  things  have  been,  saith  the  Lord.  But  to  this 
man  will  I  look  even  to  him  that  is  poor  and  of  a  contrite 
spirit,  and  trcmbleth  at  my  word."  Thus  the  Bible  repre- 
sents God  as  clothed  with  condescension  as  with  a  cloak. 

This  is  manifestly  an  attribute  of  benevolence  and  of  true 
greatness.  The  natural  perfections  of  God  appear  all  the 
more  wonderful  when  we  consider  that  He  can  and  does  know 
and  contemplate  and  control  not  only  the  highest  but  the  low- 
est of  all  his  creatures;  that  he  is  just  as  able  to  attend  to 
every  want  and  to  every  creature  as  if  this  were  the  sole  ob- 
ject of  attention  with  Him.     So  His  moral  attributes  appear 


.tfORAL  GOVERNMENT.  -261 

all  the  more  lovely  and  engaging  when  we  consider  that  His 
'*  tender  mercies  are  over  all  His  works,"  that  not  a  sparrow 
falleth  to  the  ground  without  Him;"  that  He  condescends  to 
number  the  very  hairs  of  the  heads  of  His  servants,  and  that 
not  one  of  them  can  fall  without  Him.  When  we  consider 
that  no  creature  is  too  low,  too  filthy,  or  too  degraded  for  Him 
to  condescend  to,  this  places  His  character  in  a  most  ravish- 
ing light.  Benevolence  is  good  will  to  all  beings.  Of  course 
one  of  its  characteristics  must  be  condescension  to  those  who 
are  below  us.  This  in  God  is  manifestly  infinite.  He  is  infi- 
nitely above  all  creatures.  For  Him  to  hold  communion  with 
them  is  infinite  condescension. 

This  is  an  attribute  essentially  belonging  to  benevolence  or 
love  in  all  benevolent  beings.     With  the  lowest  of  moral  be- 
ings it  may  have  no  other  development  than  in  its  relations 
to  sentient  existences  below  the  rank  of  moral  agents,  for  the 
reason  that  there  are  no  moral  agents  below  them  to  whom 
they  can  stoop.     God's  condescension  stoops  to  all  ranks  of 
sentient  existences.     This  is  also  true  with  every  benevolent 
mind,  as  to  all  inferiors.     It  seeks  the  good  of  being  in  general, 
and  never  thinks  any  being  too  low  to  have  his  interests  attend- 
ed to  and  cared  for,  according  to  their  relative  value.     Be- 
nevolence can  not  possibly  retain  its  own  essential  nature,  and 
yet  be  above  any  degree  of  condescension  that  can  affect  the 
greatest  good.  Benevolence  does  not,  can  not  know  any  thing 
of  that  loftiness  of  spirit  that  considers  it  too  degrading  to  stoop 
any  where  or  to  any  being  whose  interests  need  to  be  and  can 
be  promoted  by  such  condescension.    Benevolence  has  its  end, 
and  it  can  not  but  seek  this,  and  it  does  not,  can  not  think 
any  thing  below  it  that  is  demanded  to  secure  that  end.     O, 
the  shame,  the  infinite  folly  and  madness  of  pride,  and  every 
form  of  selfishness!     How  infinitely  unlike  God  it  is!     Christ 
could  condescend  to  be  born  in  a  manger;  to  be  brought  up 
in  humble  life;  to  be  poorer  than  the  fox  of  the  desert  or  the 
fowls  of  heaven;  to  associate  with  fishermen;  to  mingle  with 
and  seek  the  good  of  all  classes;  to  be  despised  in  life,  and 
die  between  two  thieves  on  the  cross.     His  benevolence  "  en- 
dured the  cross  and  despised  the  shame."     He  was  ^^  meek 
and  lowly  in  heart."     The  Lord  of  heaven  and  earth  is  as 
much  more  lowly  in  heart  than  any  of  his  creatures  as  he  is 
above  them  in  his  infinity.     He  can  stoop  to  any  thing  but 
sin.     He  can  stoop  infinitely  low. 

23.  Candor  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

Candor  is  a  disposition  to  treat  every  subject  with  fairness 


262  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and  honesty ;  to  examine  and  weigh  all  the  evidence  in  the 
case,  and  decide  according  to  testimony.  It  is  a  state  of  mind 
which  is  the  opposite  of  prejudice.  Prejudice  is  pre-judg- 
ment. It  is  a  decision  made  up  with  but  partial  information. 
It  is  not  a  mere  opinion.     It  is  a  committal  of  the  will. 

Candor  is  holding  the  intelligence  open  to  conviction.  It 
is  that  state  of  the  will  in  which  all  the  light  is  sought  upon 
all  questions,  that  can  he  obtained.  Benevolence  is  an  im- 
partial, a  disinterested  choice  of  the  highest  good  of  being — 
not  of  some  parts  of  it — not  of  self — but  of  being  in  general. 
It  inquires  not  to  whom  an  interest  belongs,  but  what  is  its 
intrinsic  and  relative  value,  and  what  is  the  best  means  of 
promoting  it.  Selfishness,  as  we  shall  see,  is  never  candid. 
It  never  can  be  candid.  It  is  contrary  to  its  very  nature. 
Benevolence  can  not  but  be  candid.  It  has  no  reasons  for 
being  otherwise.  Its  eye  is  single.  It  seeks  to  know  all  truth 
for  the  sake  of  doing  it.  It  has  no  by-ends,  no  self-will  or 
self-interest  to  consult.  It  is  not  seeking  to  please  or  profit 
self.  It  is  not  seeking  the  interest  of  some  favorite.  No,  it 
is  impartial  and  must  be  candid. 

It  should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  where  there  is  preju- 
dice, benevolence  is  not,  can  not  be.  There  is  not,  can  not 
be  such  a  thing  as  honest  prejudice.  There  may  be  an  hon- 
est mistake  for  want  of  light,  but  this  is  not  prejudice.  If 
there  be  a  mistake  and  it  be  honest,  there  will  be  and  must  be 
a  readiness  to  receive  light  to  correct  the  mistake.  But  where 
the  will  is  committed,  and  there  is  not  candor  to  receive  evi- 
dence, there  is  and  there  must  be  selfishness.  Few  forms  of 
sin  are  more  odious  and  revolting  than  prejudice.  Candor  is 
an  amiable  and  a  lovely  attribute  of  benevolence.  It  is  cap- 
tivating to  behold  it.  To  see  a  man  where  his  own  interest 
is  deeply  concerned,  exhibit  entire  candor,  is  to  witness  a 
charming  exhibition  of  the  spirit  of  the  law  of  love. 

24.  Stability  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence.  This  love 
is  not  a  mere  feeling  or  emotion,  that  effervesces  for  a  mo- 
ment, and  then  cools  down  and  disappears.  But  it  is  choice, 
not  a  mere  volition  which  accomplishes  its  object  and  then 
rests.  It  is  the  choice  of  an  end,  a  supreme  end.  It  is  an 
intelligent  choice — the  most  intelligent  choice  that  can  be 
made.  It  is  considerate  choice — none  so  much  so;  a  delibe- 
rate choice;  a  reasonable  choice  which  will  always  commend 
itself  to  the  highest  perceptions  and  intuitions  of  the  intelli- 
gence. It  is  intelligent  and  impartial,  and  universal  conse- 
cration to  an  end,  above  all  others  the  most  important  and 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  263 

captivating  in  its  influence.  Now,  stability  must  be  a  charac- 
teristic of  such  a  choice  as  this.  By  stabiUty  it  is  not  intend- 
ed that  the  choice  may  not  be  changed.  Nor  that  it  never  is 
changed;  but  that  when  the  attributes  of  the  choice  are  con- 
sidered, it  appears  as  if  stabiUty,  as  opposed  to  instability, 
must  be  an  attribute  of  this  choice.  It  is  a  new  birth,  a  new 
nature,  a  new  creature,  a  new  heart,  a  new  life.  These  and 
such  like  are  the  representations  of  Scripture.  Are  these 
representations  of  an  evanescent  state?  The  beginning  of 
benevolence  in  the  soul — this  choice  is  represented  as  the 
death  of  sin,  as  a  burial,  a  being  planted,  a  crucifixion  of  the 
old  man,  and  many  such  Hke  things.  Are  these  representa- 
tions of  what  we  so  often  see  among  professed  converts  to 
Christ?  Nay  verily.  The  nature  of  the  change  itself  would 
seem  to  be  a  guaranty  of  its  stability.  We  might  reasonably 
suppose  that  any  other  choice  would  be  relinquished  sooner 
than  this;  that  any  other  state  of  mind  would  fail  sooner  than 
benevolence.  It  is  vain  to  reply  to  this  that  facts  prove  the 
contrary  to  be  true.  I  answer,  what  facts?  Who  can  prove 
them  to  be  facts?  Shall  we  appeal  to  the  apparent  facts  in 
the  instability  of  many  professors  of  religion;  or  shall  we 
appeal  to  the  very  nature  of  the  choice  and  to  the  Scriptures? 
To  these,  doubtless.  So  far  as  philosophy  can  go,  we  might 
defy  the  world  to  produce  an  instance  of  choice  whith  has  so 
many  chances  for  stabiUty.  The  representations  of  Scripture 
are  such  as  I  have  mentioned  above.  What  then  shall  we 
conclude  of  those  effervescing  professors  of  religion,  who  are 
soon  hot  and  soon  cold;  whose  reUgion  is  a  spasm;  '''whose 
goodness  as  the  morning  cloud  and  the  early  dew  goeth 
away?"  Why,  we  must  conclude  that  they  have  never  had 
the  root  of  the  matter  in  them.  That  they  are  not  dead  to 
sin  and  to  the  world,  we  see.  That  they  are  not  new  creatures; 
that  they  have  not  the  spirit  of  Christ;  that  they  do  not  keep 
his  commandments,  we  see.  What  then  shall  we  conclude 
but  this,  that  they  are  stony  ground  Christians? 

25.  Kindness  is  another  attribute  of  Love. 

The  original  word  rendered  kindness  is  sometimes  render- 
ed gentleness.  This  term  designates  that  state  of  the  heart 
that  begets  a  gentleness  and  kindness  of  outward  demeanor 
towards  those  around  us.  Benevolence  is  good  will.  It  must 
possess  the  attribute  of  kindness  or  gentleness  toward  its  ob- 
ject. Love  seeks  to  make  others  happy.  It  can  not  be  oth- 
erwise than  that  the  beloved  object  should  be  treated  kindly 
and   gently,  unless  circumstances  and  character  demand ; 


264  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

f 

different  treatment.  A  deportment  regardless  of  the  sensi- 
bilities of  those  around  us,  indicates  a  decidedly  and  detest- 
ably selfish  state  of  mind.  Love  always  manifests  a  tender 
regard  for  the  feelings  and  well-being  of  its  object;  and  as 
benevolence  is  universal  love,  it  will  and  must  manifest  the 
attribute  of  gentleness  and  liindness  toward  all  except  in 
those  cases  when  either  the  good  of  the  individual  or  of 
the  public  shall  demand  a  diiferent  treatment.  In  such 
cases  it  will  be  love  and  only  love  that  leads  to  different  treat- 
ment; and  in  no  case  will  benevolence  treat  any  even  the 
worst  of  beings  more  severely  than  is  demanded  by  the  high- 
est good.  Benevolence  is  a  unit.  It  does  every  thing  for  one 
reason.  It  has  but  one  end,  and  that  is  the  highest  good  of  being 
in  general.  It  will  and  must  treat  all  kindly  unless  the  pub- 
lic good  demands  a  different  course.  But  it  punishes  when  it 
does  punish  for  the  same  reason  that  it  forgives  when  it  does 
forgive.  It  gives  life  and  takes  it  away.  It  gives  health  and 
sickness,  poverty  and  riches;  it  smiles  and  frowns;  it  blesses 
and  curses,  and  does,  and  says,  and  omits,  gives  and  withholds 
every  thing  for  one  and  the  same  reason,  to  wit,  the  promo- 
tion of  the  highest  good  of  being.  It  will  be  gentle  or  severe 
as  occasions  arise  which  demand  either  of  these  exhibitions. 
Kindness  is  its  rule,  and  severity  is  its  exception.  Both,  how- 
ever, as  we  shall  soon  see,  are  equally  and  necessarily  attri- 
butes of  benevolence. 

The  gentleness  and  kindness  of  God  and  of  Christ  are  stri- 
kingly manifested  in  providence  and  in  grace.  Christ  is 
called  a  Lamb  no  doubt  because  of  the  gentleness  and  kind- 
ness of  his  character.  He  is  called  the  good  shepherd  and 
represented  as  gently  leading  his  flock  and  carrying  the  lambs 
in  his  bosom.  Many  such  affecting  representations  are  made 
of  him  in  the  bible,  and  he  often  makes  the  same  manifesta- 
tions in  his  actual  treatment  of  his  servants  not  only,  but  also 
of  his  enemies.  Who  has  not  witnessed  this?  and  who  can 
not  testify  to  this  attribute  of  his  character  as  a  thousand 
times  affectingly  manifested  in  his  own  history?  Who  can 
call  to  mind  the  dealings  of  his  Heavenly  Father  without  be- 
ing deeply  penetrated  with  the  remembrances  of  his  kindness 
not  only,  but  his  loving  kindness^  and  tender  mercy,  its  ex- 
ceeding greatness?  There  is  a  multitude  of  tender  represen- 
tations in  the  bible  which  are  all  verified  in  the  experience  of 
every  saint.  ^^  As  the  eagle  stirreth  up  her  nest,  fluttereth 
over  her  young,  spreadeth  abroad  her  wings,  taketh  them, 
beareth  them  on  her  wings:  so  the  Lord  alone  did  lead  him 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  265 

and  there  was  no  strange  God  with  him."  This  lovely  attri- 
buie  will  and  must  always  appear  where  benevolence  is.  It 
is  important  however  to  remark  that  constitutional  tempera- 
ment will  often  greatly  modify  the  expression  of  it.  '^Chari- 
ty is  kind" — this  is  one  of  its  attributes;  yet  as  I  just  said, 
its  manifestations  will  be  modified  by  constitution,  education 
&c.  A  manifest  absence  of  it  in  cases  where  it  would  be 
appropriate  is  sad  evidence  that  benevolence  is  wanting. 

26.  Severity  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence.     "Behold" 
says  the  Apostle  "  the  goodness  and  severity  of  God*"     They 
greatly   err  who  suppose  that  benevolence  is  all  softness  un- 
der  all   circumstances.     Severity  is  not  cruelty,  but  is  love 
manifesting  strictness,  rigor,  purity,  when  occasion  demands. 
Love  is  universal  good-will,  or  wilHng  the  highest  good  of  be- 
ing in  general.     When  therefore  any  one  or  any  number  so 
conduct  as  to  interfere  with  and  endanger  the  public  good, 
severity  is  just  as  natural  and  as  necessary  to  benevolence  as 
kindness  and  forbearance  under  other  circumstances.     Christ 
is  not  only  a  Lamb,  but  a  Lion  also.     He  is  not  only  gentle  as 
mercy,  but  stern  as  justice;  not  only  yielding  a»  the  tender 
bowels  of  mercy,  but  as  inflexibly  stern  as  infinite  purity  and 
justice.     He  exhibits  the  one  attribute  or  the  other  as  Occasion 
demands.     At  one  time  we  hear  him  praying  for  his  murder- 
ers, ""Father,  forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do." 
At  another  time,  we  hear  him  say  by  the  pen  of  an  apo&tle, 
*''  If  any  man  love  not  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,   let  him  be  ac- 
cursed."    At  another  time,  we  hear  him  in  the  person  of  the 
Psalmist  praying  for  vengeance  on  his  enemies:  '''■Reproach 
hath  broken  my  heart,  and  I  am  full  of  heaviness,  and  I  looked 
for  some  to  take  pity,  but  there  was  none,  and  for  comforters 
but  I  found  none.     They  gave  me  gall  for  my  meat,  and  in 
my  thirst  they  gave  me  vinegar  to  drink.     Let  their  table  be- 
come a  snare  before  them,  and  that  which  should  have  been 
for  their  welfare,  let  it  become  a  trap.     Let  their  eyes  be  dark- 
end   that   they  see  not,  and  make  their  loins  continually  to 
shake.     Pour  out  thine  indignation  upon  them,   and  let  thy 
wrathful  anger  take  hold  upon  them.     Let  their  habitation  be 
desolate,  and  let  none  dwell   in  their  tents.     Add  iniquity 
(punishment)  to  their  iniquity  and  let  them  not  come  into  thy 
righteousness.     Let  them  be  blotted  out  of  the  book  of  the 
living  and  not  be   written  with  the  righteous."     Many  such 
like  passages  might  be  quoted  from  the  records  of  inspiration 
as  the  breathings  of  the  Spirit  of  the  God  of  Love. 

Now  it  is  perfectly  naanifest  that  good  will  to  the  universe 
23 


266  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  being  implies  opposition  to  whatever  tends  to  prevent  the 
highest  good.  Benevolence  is  and  must  be  severe  in  a  good 
sense  towards  incorrigible  sinners  Hke  those  against  whom 
Christ  prays  in  the  Psalm  just  quoted. 

The  term  severity  is  used  sometimes  in  a  good  and  some- 
times in  a  bad  sense.  When  used  in  a  bad  sense,  it  desig- 
nates an  unreasonable  slate  of  mind  and  of  course  a  selfish 
state.  It  then  represents  a  state  which  is  the  opposite  of  be- 
nevolence. But  when  used  in  a  good  sense,  as  it  is  when 
applied  to  God  and  Christ,  and  when  spoken  of  as  an  attribute 
of  benevolence,  it  designates  the  sternness,  firmness,  purity 
and  justice  of  love,  acting  for  the  public  good  in  cases  where 
sin  exists  and  where  the  pubhc  interests  are  at  stake.  In  such 
circumstances,  if  severity  were  not  developed  as  an  attribute 
of  benevolence,  it  would  demonstrate  that  benevolence  could 
not  be  the  whole  of  virtue,  even  if  it  could  be  virtue  at  all. 
The  intelligence  of  every  moral  being  would  affirm  in  such 
circumstances,  that  if  severity  did  not  appear,  something  was 
wanting  to  make  the  character  perfect,  that  is,  to  make  the 
character  answ'erable  to  the  emergency. 

It  is  truly  wonderful  to  witness  the  tendency  among  men  to 
fasten  upon  some  one  attribute  of  benevolence  and  overlook 
the  rest.  They  perhaps  have  been  affected  particularly  by 
the  manifestation  of  some  one  attribute,  which  leads  them  to 
represent  the  character  of  God  as  all  summed  up  in  that  attri- 
bute. But  this  is  fatally  to  err,  and  fatally  to  misrepresent  j 
God.  God  is  represented  in  the  Bible  as  being  slow  to  anger,|| 
and  of  tender  mercy;  as  being  very  pitiful;  long-suffering; 
abundant  in  goodness  and  truth;  keepingmercy  for  thousands; 
forgiving  iniquity,  transgression,  and  sin;  but  as  also  visiting 
the  iniquity  of  the  fathers  upon  the  children,  and  that  will  by 
no  means  clear  the  guilty;  and  as  being  angry  with  the  wicked 
every  day.  These  are  by  no  means  contradictory  representa- 
tions. They  only  exhibit  benevolence  manifesting  itself  un- 
der different  circumstances,  and  in  different  relations.  These 
are  just  the  attributes  that  we  can  see  must  belong  to  benevo- 
lence, and  just  what  it  ought  to  be  and  must  be  when  these 
occasions  arise.  Good  will  to  the  universe  ought  to  be  and 
must  be,  in  a  good  sense,  severe  where  the  public  weal  de- 
mands it,  as  it  often  does.  It  is  one  of  the  most  shallow  of 
dreams  that  the  Divine  character  is  all  softness  and  sweet- 
ness in  all  its  manifestations  and  in  all  circumstances.  The 
fact  is  that  sin  has  "  enkindled  a  fire  in  the  Divine  anger  that 
shall  set  on  fire  the  foundations  of  the  mountains  and  shall 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


267 


burn  to  the  lowest  hell."  Severity  is  also  always  and  necessa- 
rily an  attribute  of  benevolence  in  good  angels  and  in  good 
men.  When  occasions  arise  that  plainly  demand  it,  this  attri- 
bute must  be  developed  and  manifested  or  benevolence  must 
cease.  It  is,  indeed,  impossible  that  good  will  to  the  whole 
should  not  manifest  severity  and  indignation  to  a  part  who 
should  rebel  against  the  interests  of  the  whole.  Benevolence 
will  seek  the  good  of  all  so  long  as  there  is  hope.  It  will  bear 
and  forbear,  and  be  patient,  kind,  meek  even  to  long  suffering, 
while  there  is  not  a  manifestation  of  incorrigible  wickedness. 
But  where  there  is,  the  Lamb  is  laid  aside  and  the  Lion  is 
developed;  and  his  "  wrathful  anger"  is  as  awful  as  his  ten- 
der mercies  are  affecting.  Innumerable  instances  of  this  are 
on  record  in  this  world's  history.  Why  then  should  we  seek 
to  represent  God's  character  as  all  made  up  of  one  attribute? 
It  is,  indeed,  all  comprehensively  expressed  in  one  word,  love. 
But  it  should  be  forever  remembered  that  this  is  a  word  of 
vast  import,  and  that  this  love  possesses,  and  as  occasions 
arise,  developes  and  manifests  a  great  variety  of  attributes; 
all  harmonious,  and  perfect,  and  glorious.  This  attribute  al- 
ways developes  itself  in  the  character  of  holy  men  when  oc- 
casions offer  that  demand  it.  Behold  the  severity  of  Peter  in 
the  case  of  Ananias  and  Sapphira.  Witness  the  rebuke  ad- 
ministered by  Paul  to  Peter  when  the  latter  dissembled  and 
endangered  the  purity  of  the  church.  Witness  also  his  seve- 
rity in  the  case  of  Ely  mas,  the  sorcerer,  and  hear  him  say  to 
the  Galatians,  "I  would  that  they  who  trouble  you  were  even 
cut  off," — and  many  such  like  things  in  the  conduct  and  spirit 
of  holy  men.  Now,  I  know  that  such  exhibitions  are  some- 
times regarded  as  unchristlike,  as  legal,  and  not  evangelical. 
But  they  are  evangelical.  These  are  only  manifestations  of 
an  essential  attribute  of  benevolence,  as  every  one  must  see 
who  will  consider  the  matter.  It  very  often  happens  that  such 
manifestations,  whatever  the  occasion  may  be,  are  denounced 
as  the  manifestations  of  a  wicked  spirit,  as  anger,  and  as  sin- 
ful anger.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  be  assumed  by  many  that  every 
kind  and  degree  of  anger  is  sinful,  of  course.  But  so  far  is 
all  this  from  the  truth,  that  occasions  often,  or  at  least  some- 
times, arise,  that  call  for  such  manifestations;  and  to  be  any 
otherwise  than  indignant,  to  manifest  any  other  than  indigna- 
tion and  severity,  were  to  be  and  manifest  any  thing  but  that 
which  is  demanded  by  the  occasion. 

I  know  that  this  truth  is  liable  in  a  selfish  world  to  abuse. 
But  I  know  also  that  it  is  a  truth  of  revelation;  and  God  has 


368  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

not  withheld  it  for  fear  of  its  being  abused.  It  is  a  truth  of 
reason,  and  commends  itself  to  the  intuitions  of  every  mind. 
It  is  a  truth  abundantly  manifested  in  the  moral  and  providen- 
tial government  of  God.  Let  it  not  be  denied  nor  concealed; 
but  let  no  one  abuse  and  pervert  it. 


i 


I 


LECTURE    XX. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

27.  Holiness,  or  purity^  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

Holitress  is  a  term  that  seems  sometimes  to  be  used  as  ex- 
pressive of  all  the  moral  attributes  of  God.  As  an  attribute 
of  benevolence,  it  signifies  purity.  It  denotes  the  moral 
purity  or  moral  character  or  quality  of  God's  benevolence, 
and  indicates  or  expresses  the  intention  to  promote  the  happi- 
ness of  moral  beings  by  means  of  moral  purity  or  virtue. 
Benevolence  simply  considered,  is  a  willing  or  choosing  the 
highest  good  of  being,  and  especially  of  moral  agents.  Holi- 
ness as  an  attribute  of  benevolence,  is  that  element  of  the 
choice  that  aims  to  secure  the  end  of  benevolence  by  means 
of  virtue.  Moral  purity  is  uprightness  or  righteousness. 
This  attribute  is  hardly  distinguishable  from  righteousness  or 
uprightness.  Uprightness  or  integrity  are  generally  used  as 
synonymous  with  holiness. 

That  holiness  is  an  attribute  of  God  is  every  where  as- 
sumed and  frequently  asserted  in  the  bible. 

If  an  attribute  of  God,  it  must  be  an  attribute  of  love;  for 
God  is  love.  This  attribute  is  celebrated  in  heaven  as  one  of 
those  aspects  of  the  divine  character  that  give  ineffable  de- 
light. Isaiah  saw  the  seraphim  standing  around  the  throne 
of  Jehovah,  and  crying  one  to  another.  Holy!  holy!  holy! 
John  also  had  a  vision  of  the  worship  of  heaven,  and  says 
"they  rest  not  day  nor  night  saying  Holy!  holy!  holy!  Lord 
God  Almighty."  When  Isaiah  beheld  the  holiness  of  Jehovah 
he  cried  out  ''Wo  is  me!  I  am  undone.  I  am  a  man  of  un- 
clean lips,  and  I  dwell  in  the  midst  of  a  people  of  unclean  lips; 
for  mine  eyes  have  seen  the  King,  the  Lord  of  Hosts !"  God's 
holiness  is  infinite,  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  a  perception  of  it 
should  thus  affect  the  prophet. 

Finite  holiness  must  forever  stand  and  feel  itself  to  be  com- 
parative rottenness  and  impurity  when  brought  into  compari- 
son with  infinite  holiness.  The  seraphim  are  represented  as 
being  affected  much  as  the  prophet  was.  At  least,  had  the 
vision  of  his  holiness  been  as  new  to  them  as  it  was  to  him, 
it  might  no  doubt  have  impressed  them  as  it  did  him.  Their 
holiness  in  the  comparison  or  light  of  his  might  have  appeared 
to  them  like  pollution.  They  vailed  their  faces  in  his  pres- 
23* 


270  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ence.  They  covered  their  faces  as  if  afraid,  or  as  if  they  had 
considered  that  in  his  eyes  the  most  holy  creatures  in  the  uni- 
verse vrere  comparatively  unclean.  Every  christian  of  much 
experience  knows  well  what  it  is  to  be  confounded  in  the  pres- 
ence of  his  awful  holiness.  Job  says,  '•^  I  have  heard  of  thee 
by  the  hearing  of  the  ear,  but  now  mine  eye  seeth  thee:  where- 
fore I  abhor  myself  and  repent  in  dust  and  ashes."  There  is 
no  comparing  finite  with  infinite.  The  time  will  never  come 
when  creatures  can  behold  the  awful  holiness  of  Jehovah 

pjprithout  shrinking  into  comparative  rottenness  in  his  presence. 

jThis  must  be,  and  yet  in  another  sense  they  may  be  and  are 
as  holy  as  he  is.  They  may  be  as  perfectly  conformed  to  what 
light  or  truth  they  have  as  he  is.  This  is  doubtless  what 
Christ  intended  when  he  said  "•  Be  ye  perfect  even  as  your 
Father  which  is  in  heaven  is  perfect."  The  meaning  is,  that 
they  should  live  to  the  same  end  and  be  as  entirely  conse- 
crated to  it  as  he  is.  This  they  must  be  to  be  truly  virtuous 
or  holy  in  any  degree.     But  when  they  are  so,  a  full  view  of 

[the  holiness  of  God  would  confound  and  overwhelm  them.  If 
any  one  doubts  this,  he  has  not  considered  the  matter  in  a 
proper  light.  He  has  not  lifted  up  his  thoughts  as  he  needs 
to  do  to  the  contemplation  of  Infinite  HoUness.  No  creature^ 
however  benevolent  he  be,  can  witness  the  divine  benevolence 
without  being  overwhelmed  with  a  clear  vision  of  it.  This  is 
no  doubt  true  of  every  attribute  of  the  divine  love.  However 
perfect  creature  virtue  may  be,  it  is  finite,  and  brought  into  the 
light  of  the  attributes  of  infinite  virtue,  it  will  appear  as  com- 
parative rottenness.  Let  the  most  just  man  on  earth  or  in 
heaven  witness  and  have  a  clear  apprehension  of  the  infinite 
justice  of  Jehovah,  and  it  would  no  doubt  fill  him  with  unut- 
terable awe  of  him.  So,  could  the  most  merciful  saint  on 
earth  or  in  heaven  have  a  clear  perception  of  the  divine 
mercy  in  its  fulness,  it  would  swallow  up  all  thought  and 
imagination  and  no  doubt  overwhelm  him.  And  so  also  of 
every  attribute  of  God.  Oh!  when  we  speak  of  the  attributes 
of  Jehovah,  we  often  do  not  know  what  we  say.  Should  God 
unvail  himself  to  us  our  bodies  would  instantly  perish. 
*^No  man,"  says  he,  "can  see  my  face  and  live."  When 
Moses  prayed.  Show  me  thy  glory,  God  condescendingly  hid 
him  in  the  cleft  of  a  rock  and  covering  him  with  his  hand,  he 
passed  by  and  let  Moses  see  only  his  back  parts,  informing 
him  that  he  could  not  behold  his  face,  that  is,  his  unvailed 
glories  and  live. 
Holiness  is  an  essential  attribute  of  disinterested  love.    It 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


271 


must  be  so  from  the  laws  of  our  being,  and  from  the  very 
nature  of  benevolence.     In  man  it  manifests  itself  in  great 
purity  of  conversation  and  deportment,  in  a  great  loathing  of 
all  impurity  of  flesh  and   spirit.     Let  no  man  profess  piety 
who  has  not  this  attribute  developed.     The  love  required  by 
the  law  of  God  is  pure  love.     It  seeks  to  make  its  object 
happy  only  by  making  him  holy.     It  manifests  the  greatest 
abhorrence  of  sin  and  all  uncleanness.     In  creatures  it  pants 
and  doubtless  ever  will  pant  and  struggle  towards  infinite^ 
purity  or  hoUness.     IJ^ffilLneYer  find  a  resting^plcice  in  such  | 
a  sense  as  to  desire  to  ascend  no  higher.     As  it  perceives  ^ 
more  and  more  of  the  fullness  and  infinity  of  God's  holiness, 
it  will  no  doubt  pant   and  struggle  to  ascend  the    eternal 
heights  where  God  sits  in  light  too  dazzling  for  the  strong 
vision  of  the  highest  cherubim. 

Holiness  of  heart  begets  a  desire  or  feeling  and  love  of 
purity  in  the  sensibility.  The  feelings  become  exceedingly 
alive  to  the  beauty  of  holiness  and  to  the  hatefulness  and  de- 
formity of  all  spiritual  and  even  physical  impurity.  The 
sensibility  becomes  ravished  with  the  great  loveliness  of  holi- 
ness, and  unutterably  disgusted  with  the  opposite.  The  least 
impurity  of  conversation  or  of  action  exceedingly  shocks  one 
who  is  holy.  Impure  thoughts,  if  suggested  to  the  mind  of  a 
holy  being,  are  exceedingly  detestable,  and  the  soul  heaves 
and  struggles  to  cast  them  out  as  the  most  loathsome  abomi- 
nations. 

28.  Modesty  is  another  attribute  of  love. 

This  may  exist  either  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility, 
or  of  the  will. 

As  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility,  it  consists  in  sl  feeling 
of  delicacy  or  shrinking  from  whatever  is  impure,  unchaste; 
or  from  all  boasting,  vanity  or  egotism;  a  feeling  like  retiring 
from  public  observation,  and  especially  from  public  applause. 
It  is  a  feeling  of  self-diffidence,  and  is  as  a  feeling  the  oppo- 
site of  self-esteem  and  self-complacency.  It  takes  on  as  a 
mere  feeling  a  great  variety  of  types,  and  when  it  controls 
the  will,  often  gives  its  subject  a  very  lovely  and  charming 
exterior;  especially  is  this  true  when  manifested  by  a  female. 
But  when  this  is  only  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility,  and 
manifests  itself  only  as  this  feeling  takes  control  of  the  will, 
^t  is  not  virtue  but  only  a  specious  and  delusive  form  of  selfish- 
less.  It  appears  lovely  because  it  is  the  counterfeit  of  a 
gweet  and  charming  form  of  virtue. 

As  a  phenomenon  of  the  will  and  as  an  attribute  of  bene* 


272  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

volence  it  consists  in  a  disposition  opposed  to  display  and 
self-exaltation.  It  is  nearly  allied  to  humility.  It  is  a  state 
of  heart  the  opposite  of  an  egotistical  spirit.  It  seeks  not  per- 
sonal applause  or  distinction.  It  is  the  unostentatious  cha- 
racteristic of  benevolence.  "•  Love  seeketh  not  its  own,  is 
not  puffed  up,  doth  not  behave  itself  unseemly."  Benevo- 
lence seeketh  not  its  own  profit,  nor  its  own  honor.  It 
seeks  the  good  of  being,  with  a  single  eye,  and  it  is  no  part  of 
its  design  to  set  off  self  to  advantage.  Hence  modesty  is  one 
of  its  lovely  characteristics.  It  manifests  itself  very  much  as 
the  feeling  of  modesty  manifests  itself  when  it  takes  control 
of  the  will,  so  that  often  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  modesty  as 
a  virtue,  or  as  an  attribute  of  religion,  from  that  modesty  of 
feeling  which  is  a  pecuHarity  of  the  constitution  of  some,  and 
which  comes  to  control  the  will. 

True  piety  is  always  modest.  It  is  unassuming,  unosten- 
tatious, anti-egotistical,  content  to  seek  with  a  single  eye  its 
object,  the  highest  good  of  being.  In  this  work  it  seeks  not 
public  notice  or  applause.  It  finds  a  luxury  in  doing  good  no 
matter  how  unobserved.  If  at  any  time  it  seeks  to  be  known, 
it  is  entirely  disinterested  in  this.  It  seeks  to  be  known  only 
to  make  ^'manifest  that  its  deeds  are  wrought  in  God,"  and  to 
stimulate  and  encourage  others  to  good  works.  Modesty  as 
a  virtue  shrinks  from  self-display,  from  trumpeting  its  own 
deeds.  It  is  prone  to  "esteem  others  better  than  self;"  to 
give  the  preference  to  others,  and  hold  self  in  very  moderate 
estimation.  It  is  the  opposite  of  self-confidence  and  self-ex- 
altation.    It  aims  not  to  exhibit  self,  but  God  and  Christ. 

This  formof  virtue  is  often  conspicuous  in  men  and  women 
whom  the  providence  of  God  has  placed  on  high,  so  that  they 
are  exposed  to  the  public  gaze.  They  seem  never  to  aim  at 
the  exhibition  or  exaltation  of  self;  they  never  appear  flat- 
tered by  applause,  nor  to  be  disheartened  by  censure  and 
abuse.  Having  this  attribute  largely  developed,  they  pursue 
their  way  very  much  regardless  both  of  the  praise  and  the 
censure  of  men.  Like  Paul  they  can  say  "With  me  it  is  a 
small  thing  to  be  judged  of  man's  judgment."  It  seeks  only 
to  commend  itself  to  God  and  to  the  consciences  of  men. 

29.  Sobriety  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

Sobriety  as  a  virtue  is  the  opposite  of  levity.  There  is,  as 
every  one  knows,  a  remarkable  difference  in  the  constitutional 
temperament  of  different  persons  in  regard  to  levity  and  so- 
briety considered  as  a  tendency  of  the  sensibility.  Sobriety 
considered  as  a  constitutional  peculiarity,  is  often  attributable 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  273 

to  a  diseased  state  of  the  organs  of  organic  life,  and  is  then 
not  unfrequentlj  termed  hypochondriasis.  In  other  instances 
it  seems  not  to  result  from  or  to  indicate  ill  health,  but  is  a 
peculiarity  not  to  be  accounted  for  by  any  philosophy  of  ours. 

Sobriety  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility  often  results 
from  conviction  of  sin  and  fear  of  punishment,  and  from 
worldly  troubles,  and  indeed  from  a  multitude  of  causes. 

But  sobriety  considered  as  a  virtue  and  as  a  characteristic 
or  attribute  of  benevolence,  consists  in  that  solemn  earnest- 
ness which  must  belong  to  an  honest  intention  to  pursue  to 
the  utmost  the  highest  good  of  being. 

Sobriety  is  not  synonymous  with  moroseness.  It  is  not  a 
sour, fault-finding,  censorious  spirit.  Neither  is  it  inconsistent 
with  cheerfulness — I  mean  the  cheerfulness  of  love.  It  is  the 
contrast  of  levity  and  not  of  cheerfulness.  Sobriety  is  serious 
earnestness  in  the  choice  and  promotion  of  the  highest  good 
of  being.  It  has  no  heart  for  levity  and  folly.  It  can  not 
brook  the  spirit  of  gossip  and  of  giggling.  Sober  earnestness 
is  one  of  the  essential  attributes  of  love  to  God  and  souls.  It 
can  not  fail  to  manifest  this  characteristic.  Bene^volence  su- 
premely values  its  object.  It  meets  with  many  obstacles  in 
attempting  to  secure  it.  It  too  deeply  prizes  the  good  of 
being,  and  sees  too  plainly  how  much  is  to  be  done  to  have 
any  time  or  inclination  to  levity  and  folly.  God  is  always  in 
serious  earnest.  Christ  was  always  serious  and  in  earnest. 
Trifling  is  an  abomination  to  God  and  to  benevolence  also. 

But  let  it  never  be  forgotten  that  sobriety,  as  an  attribute 
of  benevolence,  has  nothing  in  it  of  the  nature  of  moroseness 
and  peevishness.  It  is  not  melancholy.  It  is  not  sorrowful- 
ness. It  is  not  despondency.  It  is  a  sober,  honest,  earnest, 
intense  state  of  choice  or  of  good  will.  It  is  not  an  affected 
but  a  perfectly  natural  and  serious  earnestness.  Benevolence 
is  in  earnest  and  it  appears  to  be  so  by  a  law  of  its  own  nature. 
It  puts  on  no  affectation  of  solemnity.  It  has  need  of  none. 
It  can  laugh  and  weep  for  the  same  reason  and  at  the  same 
time.  It  can  do  either  without  levity  on  the  one  hand  and 
without  moroseness,  melancholy  or  discouragement  on  the 
other.  Abraham  fell  on  his  face  and  laughed  when  God 
promised  him  a  son  by  Sarah.  But  it  was  not  levity.  It 
was  benevolence  rejoicing  in  the  promise  of  a  faithful  God. 

We  should  always  be  careful  to  distinguish  between  so- 
briety as  a  mere  feeling  and  the  sobriety  of  the  heart.  The 
former  is  often  easily  dissipated  and  succeeded  by  trifling  and 
levity.     The  former  is  stable  as  benevolence  itself  because  it 


274  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

is  one  of  its  essential  attributes.  A  trifling  Christian  is  a 
contradiction.  It  is  as  absurd  as  a  light  and  foolish  benevo- 
lence. These  are  of  a  piece  with  a  sinful  holiness.  Benevo- 
lence has  and  nnust  have  its  changeless  attributes.  Some  of 
them  are  manifest  only  on  particular  occasions  that  develop 
them.  Others  are  manifest  on  all  occasions  as  every  occa- 
sion calls  them  into  exercise.  This  attribute  is  one  of  that 
class.  Benevolence  must  be  in  serious  earnest  on  all  occa- 
sions. The  benevolent  soul  may  and  will  rejoice  with  those 
who  rejoice  and  weep  with  those  that  weep.  He  may  be 
always  cheerful  in  faith  and  in  hope,  yet  he  always  has  too 
great  business  on  hand  to  have  a  heart  for  trifling  or  for  folly. 
y  30.  Sinceriiy  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

Sincerity  is  the  opposite  of  hypocrisy.     The  terms  sincerity 
and  perfection  seem,  as  used  in  the  bible,  to  be  synonymous. 
Sincerity  as  an  attribute  of  benevolence  implies  whole-hearted 
honesty,  singleness    of  aim,    true   uprightness   of  purpose. 
Where  this  attribute  is,  there  is  a  consciousness  of  its  presence. 
The  soul  is  satisfied  that  it  is  really  and  truly  whole-hearted. 
It  can  not  but  respect  its  own  honesty  of  intention  and  of  pur- 
pose.    It  has  not  to  affect  sincerity — it  has  it.     When  the  soul 
has  this  attribute  developed  it  is  as  deeply  conscious  of  whole- 
heartedness  as  of  its  own  existence.      It  is    honest.      It  is 
earnest.     It  is  deeply  sincere.     It  knows  it,  and  never  thinks 
of  being  suspected  of  insincerity,  and  of  course  has  no  reason 
for  affectation. 
^      This  also  is  one  of  those  attributes  of  benevolence  that  are 
manifest  on  all  occasions.     There  is  a  manifestation  of  sin- 
cerity that  carries  conviction  in  the  spirit  and  deportment  of 
the  truly  benevolent  man.     It  is  exceedingly  difficult  so  to 
counterfeit  it  that  the  deception  shall  not  be  seen.     The  very 
attempt  to  counterfeit  sincerity  will  manifest  hypocrisy  to  a 
discerning  mind.     There  is  a  cant,  a  grimace,  a  put-on  seri- 
ousness, a  hollow,  shallow,  long-facedness  that  reveals  a  want 
of  sincerity;  and  the  more  pains  is  taken  to  cover  up  insin- 
cerity, the  more  surely  it  reveals  itself.     There  is  a  simplicity 
and  unguardedness,  a  right  up  and  down  frankness,  an  open- 
heartedness,  a  transparency  in  sincerity  that  is  charming.    It 
tells  the  whole  story,  and  carries  with  it  on  its  very  face  the 
demonstration  of  its  honesty.     Sincerity  is  its  own  passport, 
its  own  letter  of  commendation.     It  is  transparent  as  light  and 
as  honest  as  justice,  as  kind  as  mercy,  and  as  faithful  as  truth. 
^     It  is  all  lovely  and  praiseworthy.     It  needs  no  hoods  or  gowns 
or  canonicals  or  ceremonials  to  set  it  off;  it  stands  on  its  own 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  275 

foundation.  It  walks  abroad  unsuspecting,  and  generally 
unsuspected  of  hypocrisy.  It  lives  and  moves  and  has  its 
being  in  open  day-light.  It  inhabits  love  as  its  dwelling 
place;  and  where  benevolence  is,  there  is  its  rest. 

31.  Another  attribute  of  benevolence  is  Zeal.  Zeal  is  not 
always  a  phenomenon  of  will,  but  this  term  often  expresses 
an  effervescing  state  of  the  sensibility.  It  often  expresses 
enthusiasm  in  the  form  of  excited  feeling.  Zeal  is  also  often 
an  attribute  of  selfishness.  The  term  expresses  inteMsity 
whether  used  of  the  will  or  of  the  emotions,  whether  desig- 
nating a  characteristic  of  selfishness  or  of  benevolence.  Be- 
nevolence is  an  intense  action  of  the  will  or  an  intense  state 
of  choice.  The  intensity  is  not  uniform,  but  varies  with  vary- 
ing perceptions  of  the  intellect.  When  the  intellectual  appre- 
hensions of  truth  are  clear,  when  the  Holy  Spirit  shines  on 
the  souj,  the  actings  of  the  will  become  proportionably  in- 
tense. This  must  be,  or  benevolence  must  cease  altogether. 
Benevolence  is  the  honest  choice  of  the  highest  good  of  being 
as  an  end.  Of  course  it  has  no  sinister  or  bye  ends  to  prevent 
it  from  laying  just  that  degree  of  stress  upon  the  good  of 
being  which  its  importance  seems  to  demand.  Benevolence 
is  yielding  the  will  up  unreservedly  to  the  demands  of  the  in- 
telligence. Nothing  else  is  benevolence.  Hence  it  follows 
that  the  intensity  of  benevolence  will  and  must  vary  with 
varying  light.  When  the  light  of  God  shines  strongly  upon 
the  soul,  there  is  often  a  consuming  intensity  in  the  action  of 
the  will,  and  the  soul  can  adopt  the  language  of  Christ,  "  The 
zeal  of  thy  house  hath  eaten  me  up." 

In  its  lowest  estate,  benevolence  is  zealous.  That  is,  the 
intellectual  perceptions  never  sink  so  low  as  to  leave  benevo- 
lence to  become  a  stagnant  pool.  It  is  never  lazy,  never  slug- 
gish, never  inactive.  It  is  aggressive  in  its  nature.  It  is  es- 
sential activity  in  itself  It  consists  in  choice,  the  supreme 
choice  of  an  end — in  consecration  to  that  end.  Zeal,  there- 
fore, must  be  one  of  its  essential  attributes.  A  lazy  benevo- 
lence is  a  misnomer.  In  a  world  where  sin  is,  benevolence 
must  be  aggressive.  In  such  a  world  it  can  not  be  conserva- 
tive. It  must  be  reformatory.  This  is  its  essential  nature. 
In  such  a  world  as  this  a  conservative,  anti-reform  benevo- 
lence is  sheer  selfishness.  To  baptize  anti-reform  and  con- 
servatism with  the  name  of  Christianity,  is  to  steal  a  robe  of 
light  to  cover  the  black  shoulders  of  a  fiend.  Zeal,  the  zeal 
of  benevolence,  will  not,  can  not  rest  while  sin  is  in  the 
world.     God  is  represented  as  clothed  with  zeal  as  with  a 


276  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

cloak;  and  after  making  some  of  his  exceeding  great  and 
precious  promises,  he  concludes  by  saying,  ^'  The  zeal  of  the 
Lord  of  Hosts  will  perform  this." 

32.   Unity  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 
Benevolence  or  love  has  but  one  end.     It  consists  in  one 
choice,  one  ultimate  intention.     It  is  always  one  and  indi- 
visible.    It  possesses  many  attributes  or  characteristics;  but 
they  are  all  only  so  many  phases  of  one  principle.     Every 
modification  of  virtue,  actual  or  conceivable,  may  be  and  must 
be  resolvable  into  love,  for  in  fact  it  is  only  a  modification  of 
love  or  benevolence.     It  is  easy  to  see  that  an  honest  choice  of 
the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end^  will  sufficiently  and  fully 
account  for  every  form  in  which  virtue  has  appeared,  or  ever 
can  appear.     The  love  or  good  will  of  God  is  a  unit.     He 
has  but  one  end.     All  he  does  is  for  one  and  the  same  reason. 
So  it  is  and  must  be  with  love  or  benevolence  in  all  beings. 
God's  conduct  is  all  equally  good  and  equally  praiseworthy. 
(1.)  Because  he  always  has  one  intention. 
(2.)  Because  he  always  has  the  same  degree  of  light 
With  creatures  this  light  varies,  and  consequently  they,  al- 
though  benevolent,   are  not   always  equally   praiseworthy. 
Their  virtue  increases  as  their  light  increases,  and  must  forever 
do  so  if  they  continue  benevolent.     But  their  end  is  always 
one  and  the  same.     In  this  respect  their  virtue  never  varies. 
They  have  the  same  end  that  God  has. 

It  is  of  great  importance  that  the  unity  of  virtue  should  be 
understood.  Else  that  which  really  constitutes  its  essence  is 
overlooked.  If  it  be  supposed  that  there  can  be  various  sorts 
of  virtue,  this  is  a  fatal  mistake.  The  fact  is,  virtue  consists 
in  whole-hearted  consecration  to  one  end,  and  that  end  is,  as 
it  ought  to  be  and  must  be,  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and 
of  the  universe.  This  and  nothing  else,  more  nor  less,  is  vir- 
tue. It  is  one  and  identical  in  all  moral  agents,  in  all  worlds, 
and  to  all  eternity.  It  can  never  be  changed.  It  can  never 
consist  in  any  thing  else.  God  could  not  alter  its  nature,  nor 
one  of  its  essential  attributes.  The  inquiry  and  the  only  in- 
quiry is,  for  what  end  do  I  live?  To  what  end  am  I  consecra- 
ted? Not,  how  do  I  feel,  and  what  is  my  outward  deport- 
ment? These  may  indicate  the  state  of  my  will.  But  these 
can  not  settle  the  question!  If  a  man  know  any  thing,  it 
must  be  that  he  knows  what  his  supreme  intention  is.  That 
is,  if  he  considers  at  all  and  looks  at  the  grand  aim  of  his 
mind,  he  cannot  fail  to  see  whether  he  is  really  living  for 
God  and  the  universe  or  for  himself. 


HORAL  GOVERNMENT.  277 

If  God  is  love,  His  virtue  or  love  must  be  a  unit.  If  all 
the  law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word ;  if  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the 
kw;  then  all  virtue  must  resolve  itself  into  love;  and  this 
unity  is  and  must  be  an  attribute  of  benevolence. 

33.  Simplicity  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence.  » 
Bj  simplicity  is  intended  singleness,  without  mixture.  It 
has  and  can  have  but  one  simple  end.  It  does  not,  and  can 
not  mingle  with  selfishness.  It  m  simple  or  single  in  its  aim. 
It  is  and  must  be  simple  or  single  in  all  its  efforts  to  secure  its 
end.  It  does  not,  can  not  attempt  to  serve  God  and  mammon. 
But  as  I  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  this  subject  in  a  former 
lecture,  I  must  ffefer  you  to  that  and  not  enlarge  upon  it  here. 


24 


/o 


LECTURE  XXI. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  LOVE. 

What  is  implied  in  obedience  to  the  Law  op  (tod. 


34.  Gratitude  haLnother  characteristic  of  Love. 

This  term  also  designates  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  or  a  mere 
feeling  of  being  obliged  or  benefitted  by  another.  This  feel- 
ing includes  an  emotion  of  love  and  attachment  to  the  bene- 
factor who  has  shown  us  favor.  It  also  includes  a  feeling  of 
obligation  and  of  readiness  to  make  such  returns  as  we  are 
able,  to  the  being  who  has  shown  us  favor.  But  as  a  mere 
feeling  or  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility  gratitude  has  no 
moral  character.  It  may  exist  in  the  sensibility  of  one  who 
is  entirely  selfish.  For  selfish  persons  love  to  be  obliged,  and 
love  those  who  love  to  oblige  them,  and  can  feel  grateful  for 
favors  shown  to  themselves. 

Gratitude,  as  a  virtue,  is  only  a  modification  or  an  attribute 
of  benevolence  or  of  good  will.  It  consists  in  willing  good 
to  a  benefactor  either  of  ourselves  or  of  others  upon  condition 
of  favor  bestowed.  Gratitude  always  assumes  of  course 
the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good  willed  as  the  fundamental  rea- 
son for  willing  it.  But  it  always  has  particular  reference  to 
the  relation  of  benefactor  as  a  secondary  reason  for  willing 
good  to  him.  This  relation  can  not  be  the  foundation  of  the 
obligation  to  love  or  will  the  good  of  any  being  in  the  uni- 
verse; for  the  obligation  to  will  his  good,  would  exist  if  this 
relation  did  not  exist,  and  even  if  the  relation  of  persecutor 
existed  in  its  stead.  But  gratitude  always  assuming  the  ex-, 
istence  of  the  fundamental  reason,  to  wit,  the  intrinsic  value 
of  the  well-being  of  its  object  for  its  own  sake,  has,  as  I  have 
just  said,  particular  reference  to  the  relation  of  benefactor; 
so  particular  reference  to  it  that  if  asked  why  he  loved  or 
willed  the  good  of  that  individual,  he  would  naturally  assign 
this  relation  as  a  reason.  He  would,  as  has  been  formerly 
shown,  assign  this  as  the  reason,  not  because  it  is  or  can  be 
or  ought  to  be  the  fundamental  reason,  but  because  the  other 
reason  lies  in  the  mind  as  a  first  truth,  and  is  not  so  much 
noticed  on  the  field  of  consciousness  at  the  time  as  the  se- 
condary reason,  to  wit,  the  relation  just  referred  to. 

This  attribute  of  benevolence  may  never  have  occasion  for 
its  exercise  in  the  divine  mind.  No  one  can  sustain  to  him 
the  relation  o^  benefactor.     Yet  in  his  mind,  it  may  and  no 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  279 

doubt  does  exist  in  the  form  of  good  will  to  those  who  are  the 
benefactors  of  others,  and  for  that  reason,  just  as  finite  minds 
may  be  affected  by  that  relation. 

That  love  will  ever  have  an  opportunity  to  develop  all  its 
attributes  and  manifest  all  its  loveliness  and  take  on  every  pos- 
sible peculiarity,  is  more  than  we  can  know.  All  its  loveliness 
can  never  be  known  nor  conceived  of  by  finite  minds  except 
so  far  as  occasions  develop  its  charming  attributes.  The  love 
of  gratitude  finds  abundant  occasions  of  development  in  all 
finite  minds,  and  especially  among  sinners  of  our  race.  Our 
ill-desert  is  so  infinite,  and  God's  goodness,  mercy  and  long- 
suffering  are  so  infinite  and  so  manifested  to  us,  that  if  we  have 
any  attribute  of  benevolence  largely  developed,  it  must  be 
that  of  gratitude.  Gratitude  to  God  will  manifest  itself  to 
God  in  a  spirit  of  thanksgiving,  and  in  a  most  tender  regard 
to  his  feelings,  his  wishes,  and  all  his  commandments.  A 
grateful  soul  will  naturally  raise  the  question  on  all  occasions, 
will  this  or  that  please  God?  There  will  be  a  constant  en- 
deavor of  the  grateful  soul  to  please  him.  This  must  be; 
it  is  the  natural  and  inevitable  result  of  gratitude.  It 
should  be  always  borne  in  mind  that  gratitude  is  good  will 
modified  by  the  relation  of  benefactor.  It  is  not  a  mere  feel- 
ing of  thankfulness,  but  will  always  beget  that  feeling.  It  is 
a  living,  energizing  attribute  of  benevolence  and  will  and  must 
manifest  itself  in  corresponding  feeling  and  action. 

It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  a  selfish  feeling  of 
gratitude  or  thankfulness  often  exists,  and  imposes  upon  its 
subject  and  often  upon  others  who  witness  its  manifestation. 
It  conceals  its  selfish  foundation  and  character  and  passes  in 
this  world  for  virtue;  but  it  is  not.  I  recollect  well  weeping 
with  gratitude  to  God  years  previous  to  my  conversion.  The 
same  kind  of  feeling  is  often  no  doubt  mistaken  for  evangeli- 
cal gratitude. 

Benevolence  is  a  unifying  principle.  The  benevolent 
soul  regards  all  interests  as  his  own  and  all  beings  as  parts 
of  himself  in  such  a  sense  as  to  feel  obligations  of  gratitude  for 
favors  bestowed  on  others  as  well  as  himself  Gratitude,  as 
an  attribute  of  benevolence,  recognizes  God  as  a  benefactor 
to  self  in  bestowing  favors  on  others.  Benevolence  regarding 
all  interests  as  our  own  acknowledges  the  favors  bestowed 
upon  any  and  upon  all.  It  will  thank  God  for  favors  bestowed 
upon  the  beasts  of  the  field  and  the  fowls  of  the  air,  and  for 
"opening  his  hand  and  supplying  the  wants  of  every  living 
thing." 

35.   Wisdom  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 


280  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Wisdom  is  love  directed  by  knowledge.  It  consists  in  the 
choice  of  the  best  and  most  valuable  end  and  of  the  most  ap- 
propriate means  of  obtaining  it.  It  is  like  all  the  other  attri- 
butes, only  benevolence  viewed  in  a  certain  relation,  or  only 
a  particular  aspect  of  it. 

Wisdom  is  a  term  that  expresses  the  perfectly  intelligent 
character  of  love.  It  represents  it  as  not  a  blind  and  unintel- 
hgent  choice,  but  as  being  guided  only  by  the  highest  intelli- 
gence. This  attribute  like  all  the  others  is  perfect  in  God  in 
an  infinitely  higher  sense  than  in  any  creature.  It  must  be 
perfect  in  creatures  in  such  a  sense  as  to  be  sinless,  but  can  in 
them  never  be  perfect  in  such  a  sense  as  to  admit  of  no  increase. 

The  manifold  displays  of  the  divine  wisdom  in  creation, 
providence  and  grace,  are  enough  when  duly  considered  to 
overwhelm  a  finite  mind.  An  inspired  apostle  could  cele- 
brate this  attribute  in  such  a  strain  as  this:  '^O  the  depths  of 
the  riches  both  of  the  wisdom  and  knowledge  of  God!  how 
unsearchable  are  his  judgments  and  his  ways  past  finding  out!" 
The  wisdom  of  the  saints  appears  in  their  choice  of  an  end. 
They  choose  invariably  the  same  end  that  God  does,  but  do  not, 
for  want  of  knowledge,  always  use  the  best  means.  This, 
however,  is  not  a  sinful  defect  in  them,  provided  they  act  ac- 
cording to  the  best  light  within  their  reach. 

Wisdom  is  a  term  that  is  often  and  justly  used  to  express 
true  religion  and  to  distinguish  it  from  every  thing  else. 

It  expresses  both  benevolence  or  good  will  and  the  intelli- 
gent character  of  that  choice,  that  is,  that  the  choice  is  dictated 
by  the  intelligence  as  distinguished  from  selfish  choice  or 
choice  occasioned  by  the  impulses  of  feeling. 

36.  Grace  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

Grace  is  a  disposition  to  bestow  gratuitous  favor,  that  is, 
favor  on  the  undeserving  and  on  the  ill-deserving. 

Grace  is  not  synonymous  with  mercy.  It  is  a  term  of 
broader  meaning. 

Mercy  is  a  disposition  to  forgive  the  guilty.  Grace  expres- 
ses not  only  a  willingness  to  pardon,  but  to  bestow  other  favors. 

Mercy  might  pardon  but  unless  great  grace  were  bestowed 
our  pardon  would  by  no  means  secure  our  salvation. 
"  Grace  first  contrived  the  way 
To  save  rebellious  man  ; 
And  all  the  steps  that  grace  display, 
That  drew  the  wondrous  plan." 

Grace  does  not  wait  for  merit  as  a  condition  of  bestowing 
favor.  It  causes  its  sun  to  shine  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good 
and  sends  its  rain  upon  the  just  and  the  unjust. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  281 

•  Grace  in  the  saints  manifests  itself  in  acts  of  beneficence 
to  the  most  unworthy  as  well  as  to  the  deserving.  It  seeks  to 
do  good  to  all  whether  meritorious  or  not.  It  seeks  to  do 
good  from  a  love  to  being.  It  rejoices  in  opportunities  to  be- 
stow its  gratuities  upon  all  classes  that  need  them.  To 
grace,  necessity  or  want  is  the  great  recommendation.  When 
we  come  to  God  his  grace  is  delighted  with  the  opportunity 
to  supply  our  wants.  The  grace  of  God  is  a  vast  ocean 
without  shore  or  bound  or  bottom.  It  is  infinite.  It  is  an 
ever  overflowing  ocean  of  beneficence.  Its  streams  go  forth 
to  make  glad  the  universe.  All  creatures  are  objects  of  his 
grace  to  a  greater  or  less  extent.  All  are  not  objects  of  his 
saving  grace,  but  all  are  or  have  been  the  recipients  of  his 
bounty.  Every  sinner  that  is  kept  out  of  hell,  is  sustained 
every  moment  by  grace.  Every  thing  that  any  one  receives 
who  has  ever  sinned  which  is  better  than  hell,  is  received  of 
grace. 

Repentance,  is  a  condition  of  the  exercise  of  mercy.  But 
grace  is  exercised  in  a  thousand  forms  without  any  reference 
to  character.  Indeed,  the  very  term  expresses  good  will 
to  the  undeserving  and  ill-deserving.  Surely  it  must  have  been 
a  gracious  disposition,  deep  and  infinite,  that  devised  and  exe- 
cuted the  plan  of  salvation  for  sinners  of  our  race.  A  sym- 
pathy with  the  grace  of  God  must  manifest  itself  in  strenuous 
and  self-denying  efforts  to  secure  to  the  greatest  possible 
number  the  benefits  of  this  salvation.  A  gracious  heart  in 
man  will  leap  forth  to  declare  the  infinite  riches  of  the  grace 
of  God  in  the  ears  of  a  dying  world.  No  man  certainly  has 
or  can  have  a  sympathy  with  Christ  who  will  or  can  hesitate 
to  do  his  utmost  to  carry  the  gospel  and  apply  his  grace  to  a 
perishing  world.  What!  shall  the  gracious  disposition  of 
Christ  prepare  the  way,  prepare  the  feast;  and  can  they 
have  any  sympathy  with  him  who  can  hesitate  to  go  or  send  to 
invite  the  starving  poor?  If  Christ  both  lived  and  died  to  re- 
deem man,  is  it  a  great  thing  for  us  to  live  to  serve  them? 
No,  indeed:  he  only  has  the  spirit  of  Christ  who  would,  not 
merely  live,  but  also  die  for  them. 

37.  Economy  is  another  attribute  of  benevolence. 

This  term  expresses  that  pecuUarity  of  benevolence  that 
makes  the  best  use,  and  the  most  that  can  be  made  of  every 
thing  to  promote  the  public  good.  This  attribute  appears  at 
every  step  in  the  works  and  government  of  God.  It  is  truly 
wonderful  to  see  how  every  thing  is  made  and  conducted  to 
one  end;  and  nothing  exists  or  can  exist  in  the  universe  which 
24* 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

God  will  not  overrule  to  some  good  account  Even  '^the 
wrath  of  man  shall  praise  Him,  and  the  remainder  of  wrath 
He  will  restrain.  "  A  most  Divine  economy  is  every  where 
manifest  in  the  works  and  ways  of  God.  If  He  is  love,  we 
might  expect  this.  Nay  if  He  is  love,  it  is  impossible  that 
this  should  not  be.  He  lives  only  for  one  end.  All  things 
were  created  and  are  ruled  or  overruled  by  Him.  All  things, 
then,  must  directly  or  indirectly  work  together  for  good.  He 
will  secure  some  benefit  from  every  thing.  Nothing  has  oc- 
curred, or  will  occur,  or  can  ever  occur  to  all  eternity  that 
will  not  in  some  way  be  used  to  promote  the  good  of  being. 
Even  sin  and  punishment  will  not  be  without  their  use.  God 
has  created  nothing,  nor  has  He  suffered  any  thing  to  occur 
in  vain.  There  is  nothing  without  its  use.  Sin,  inexcusable 
and  ruinous  as  it  is,  is  not  without  its  use.  And  God  will 
take  care  to  glorify  Himself  in  sinners  whether  they  consent 
or  not.  He  says,  *■'  He  has  created  all  things  for  Himsslf, 
even  the  wicked  for  the  day  of  evil."  That  is,  He  created 
no  man  wicked,  but  He  created  those  who  have  become  wick- 
ed. He  created  them  not  for  the  sake  of  punishing  them, 
but  knowing  that  they  would  become  incorrigible  sinners,  He 
designed  to  punish  them,  and  by  making  them  a  public  exano- 
ple,  render  them  useful  to  His  government.  He  created  them, 
not  because  He  delighted  in  their  punishment  for  its  own  sake, 
but  that  He  might  make  their  deserved  punishmsnt  useful  to 
the  universe.  In  this  sense,  it  may  be  truly  said,  that  he  cre- 
ated them  for  the  day  of  evil.  Foreseeing  that  they  would 
become  incorrigible  sinners,  He  designed,  when  He  created 
them,  to  make  them  a  public  example. 

God's  glorious  economy  in  husbanding  alt  events  for  the 
public  good,  is  affectingly  displayed  in  the  fact  that  all  things 
are  made  to  work  together  far  good  to  them  who  love  God. 
All  beings,  saints  and  sinners,  good  and  evil  angr^Is,  sin  and 
holiness;  in  short  there  is  not  a  being  nor  an  event  in  the 
universe  that  is  not  all  used  up  for  the  promotion  of  the  high- 
est good.  Whether  men  mean  it  or  not,  God  means  it.  If 
men  do  not  mean  it,  no  thanks  to  them  whatever  use  God  may 
make  of  them  He  will  give  them,  as  he  says,  according  to 
their  endeavors  or  intention?,  but  He  will  take  care  to  use 
them  in  one  way  or  another  for  His  glory.  If  sinners  will  con- 
sent to  live  and  die  for  His  glory  and  the  good  of  being,  well; 
they  shall  have  their  reward.  But  if  they  will  not  consent. 
He  will  take  care  to  dispose  of  them  for  the  public  benefit. 
He  will  make  the  best  use  of  Ihem  He  can.    If  they  are  wilK 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  283 

ing,  and  obedient,  if  they  sympathize  with  Him  in  promoting 
the  good  of  the  universe,  well.  But  if  not,  He  can  make 
them  a  public  example,  and  make  the  influence  of  their  pun- 
ishment useful  to  His  kingdom.  Nothing  shall  be  lost  in  the 
sense  that  God  will  not  make  it  answer  some  useful  purpose. 
No,  not  even  sin  with  all  its  deformities  and  guilt,  and  blas- 
phemy with  all  its  guilt  and  desolating  tendencies  shall  be 
suffered  to  exist  in  vain.  It  will  be  made  useful  in  innumera- 
ble ways.  But  no  thanks  to  the  sinner;  he  means  no  such 
thing  as  that  his  sin  shall  be  useful.  He  is  set  upon  his  own 
gratification  regardless  of  consequences.  Nothing  is  farther 
from  his  heart  than  to  do  good  and  glorify  God.  But  God 
has  His  eye  upon  him;  has  laid  His  plans  in  view  of  his  fore- 
seen wickedness;  and  so  surely  as  Jehovah  lives,  so  surely 
shall  the  sinner  in  one  way  or  another  be  used  all  up  for  the 
glory  of  God  and  the  highest  good  of  being. 

Economy  is  necessarily  an  attribute  of  benevolence  in  all 
minds.  The  very  nature  of  benevolence  shows  that  it  must 
be  so.  It  is  consecration  to  the  highest  good  of  being.  It 
lives  for  no  other  end.  Now  all  choice  must  respect  means 
or  ends.  Benevolence  has  but  one  end;  and  all  its  activity, 
every  volition  tliat  it  puts  forth,  must  be  to  secure  that  end. 
The  intellect  will  be  used  to  devise  means  to  promote  that 
end.  The  whole  life  and  activity  of  a  benevolent  being  is 
and  must  be  a  life  of  strenuous  economy  for  the  promotion  of 
the  one  great  end  of  benevolence.  Extravagance,  self-indul-, 
gence,  waste,  are  necessarily  foreign  to  love.  Every  thing  is 
devoted  to  one  end.  Every  thing  is  scrupulously  and  wisely 
directed  to  secure  the  highest  good  of  God  and  being,  in  gene- 
ral. This  is,  this  must  be  the  universal  and  undeviating  aim 
of  every  mind  just  so  far  as  it  is  truly  benevolent.  "He  that 
hath  an  car  to  hear,  let  him  hear." 

There  are  many  other  attributes  of  benevolence  that  might 
be  enumerated  and  enlarged  upon,  all  of  which  are  implied 
in  entire  obedience  to  the  law  of  God.  Enough  has  been 
said  I  hope  to  fix  your  attention  strongly  upon  the  fact  that 
every  modification  of  virtue,  actual,  conceivable  or  possible, 
is  only  an  attribute  or  form  of  benevolence.  That  atttribute 
is  always  a  phenomenon  of  will  and  an  attribute  of  benevo- 
lence. And  where  benevolence  is,  there  all  virtue  is  and 
must  be,  and  every  form  in  which  virtue  does  or  can  exist, 
must  develop  itself  as  its  occasions  shall  arise,  if  benevolence 
really  exists. 


LECTURE  XXII. 
MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

What  constitutes  disobedience  to  Moral  Law. 

In  discussing  this  question,  I  will, 

/.  Revert  to  some  points  that  have  been  settled, 

IL  Show  what  disobedience  to  the  Moral  Law  can  not  consist  in. 

III.    What  it  must  consist  in. 

L  Revert  to  some  points  that  have  been  settled. 

1.  That  moral  law  requires  love  or  benevolence,  and  that 
this  is  the  sum  of  its  requirements. 

2.  That  benevolence  is  good  will  to  being  in  general.  In 
other  words,  that  it  consists  in  the  impartial  choice  of  the  good 
of  being,  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake. 

3.  That  obedience  to  moral  law  is  a  unit  or  that  it  invari- 
ably consists  in  disinterested  benevolence.  That  consecra- 
tion to  the  highest  good  of  being  is  virtue  and  the  whole  of 
virtue. 

4.  That  feeling  and  outward  action  are  only  results  of  ulti- 
mate intention,  and  in  themselves  neither  virtue  nor  vice. 

5.  That  all  choice  and  volition  must  terminate  upon  some 
object,  and  that  this  object  must  be  chosen  as  an  end  or  as  a 
means,  • 

6.  That  the  choice  of  any  thing  as  a  means  to  an  end  is  in 
fact  only  carrying  into  execution  the  ultimate  choice  or  the 
choice  of  an  end. 

7.  That  the  mind  must  have  chosen  an  end,  or  it  can  not 
choose  the  means.  That  is,  the  choice  of  means  implies  the 
previous  choice  of  an  end. 

8.  That  moral  character  belongs  to  the  ultimate  intention 
only,  or  to  the  choice  of  an  end. 

9.  Thatvirtue  or  obedience  to  moral  law  consists  in  choos- 
ing in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  intelligence  in  op- 
position to  following  the  feelings,  desires,  or  impulses  of  the 
sensibility. 

10.  That  whatever  is  chosen  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  as  a 
means  to  an  end,  is  and  must  be  chosen  as  an  end. 

11.  That  the  mind  must  always  have  an  end  in  view,  or  it 
can  not  choose  at  all.  That  is,  as  has  been  said,  the  will 
must  have  an  object  of  choice,  and  this  object  must  be  re- 
garded as  an  end  or  as  a  means. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  285 

12.  That  the  fundamental  reason  for  choosing  an  end  and 
the  end  chosen  are  identical.  That  is,  the  fundamental  rea- 
son of  the  obligation  to  choose  a  thing  must  be  found  in  the 
nature  of  the  thing  itself,  and  this  reason  is  the  end  or  thing 
chosen.  Example:  If  the  intrinsic  value  of  a  thing  be  the 
foundation  of  the  obligation  to  choose  it,  the  intrinsically  val- 
uable is  the  end  or  thing  chosen. 

//.  Show  zohat  disobedience  to  moral  law  can  not  consist  in, 

1.  It  can  not  consist  in  malevolence,  or  in  the  choice  of  evil 
or  misery  as  an  ultimate  end.     This  will  appear  if  we  consider, 

(1.)  That  the  choice  of  an  end  implies  the  choice  of  it  not  for 
no  reason,  but  for  a  reason  and  for  its  own  intrinsic  value,  or 
because  the  mind  prizes  it  on  its  own  account.  But  moral 
agents  are  so  constituted  that  they  can  not  regard  misery  as 
intrinsically  valuable.  They  can  not,  therefore,  choose  it  as 
an  ultimate  end,  nor  prize  it  on  its  own  account. 

(2.)  To  will  miser}'  as  an  ultimate  end,  would  imply  the 
choice  of  universal  misery  and  every  degree  of  it  according  to 
its  relative  amount. 

(3.)  The  choice  of  universal  misery  as  an  end  implies  the 
choice  of  all  the  means  necessary  to  that  end. 

(4.)  The  end  chosen  is  identical  with  the  reason  for  choos- 
ing it.  To  say  that  a  thing  can  be  chosen  without  any  rea- 
son is  to  say  that  nothing  is  chosen,  or  that  there  is  no  object 
of  choice,  or' that  there  is  no  choice.  Misery  may  be  chosen 
to  assert  our  own  sovereignty,  but  this  were  to  choose  self- 
gratification  and  not  misery  as  an  ultimate  end.  To  choose 
misery  as  an  ultimate  end  is  to  choose  it,  not  to  assert  my  own 
sovereignty,  nor  for  any  other  reason  than  because  it  is  misery. 

(b.)  To  choose  an  end  is  not  to  choose  without  any  reason, 
as  nas  hecn  said,  but  for  a  reason. 

(6.)  To  choose  misery  as  an  end  is  to  choose  it  for  the  rea- 
son that  it  is  misery,  and  that  misery  is  preferred  to  happiness 
for  its  own  sake,  which  is  absurd.  Such  a  supposition  over- 
looks the  very  nature  of  choice. 

(7.)  To  will  misery  as  a  means  is  possible,  but  this  is  not 
malevolence,  but  might  be  either  benevolence  or  selfishness. 

(8.)  The  constitution  of  moral  beings  renders  malevolence, 
or  the  willing  of  misery  for  its  own  sake  impossible.  There- 
fore disobedience  to  moral  law  can  not  consist  in  it. 

2.  Disobedience  to  moral  law  can  not  consist  in  the  consti- 
tution of  soul  or  body.  The  law  does  not  command  us  to  have 
a  certain  constitution,  nor  forbid  us  to  have  the  constitution 
with  wliich  we  came  into  being. 


286  ^         SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

3.  It  can  not  consist  in  any  state  either  of  the  sensibility  or 
of  the  intelHgence;  for  these,  as  we  have  seen,  are  involunta- 
ry and  are  dependent  upon  the  actings  of  the  w^ill. 

4.  It  can  not  consist  in  outward  actions;  for  these,  we  have 
seen,  are  controlled  by  the  actions  of  the  will,  and  therefore 
can  have  no  moral  character  in  themselves. 

5.  It  can  not  consist  in  inaction:  for  total  inaction  is  to  a 
moral  agent  impossible.  Moral  agents  are  necessarily  active. 
That  is,  they  can  not  exist  as  moral  agents  without  choice. 
They  must  by  a  law  of  necessity  choose  either  in  accordance 
with,  or  in  opposition  to  the  law  of  God.  They  are  free  to 
choose  in  either  direction,  but  they  are  not  free  to  abstain  from 
choice  altogether.  Choose  they  must.  The  law  directs  how 
they  shall  or  ought  to  choose.  If  they  do  not  choose  thus,  it 
must  be  because  they  choose  otherwise,  and  not  because  they 
do  not  choose  at  all. 

6.  It  can  not  consist  in  the  choice  of  moral  evil  or  sin  as  an 
ultimate  end.  Sin  is  but  an  element  or  attribute  of  choice  or 
intention,  or  it  is  intention  itself.  If  it  be  intention  itself,  then 
to  make  sin  an  end  of  intention  would  be  to  make  intention  or 
choice  terminate  on  itself,  and  the  sinner  must  choose  his  own 
choice  or  intend  his  own  intention  as  an  end:  this  is  absurd. 

If  sin  is  but  an  element  or  attribute  of  choice  or  intention, 
then  to  suppose  the  sinner  to  choose  it  as  an  end,  were  to  make 
choice  or  intention  terminate  on  an  element  or  attribute  of  it- 
self, to  suppose  him  to  choose  as  an  end  an  element  of  his  own 
choice.     This  also  is  absurd  and  a  contradiction. 

The  nature  of  a  moral  being  forbids  that  he  should  choose 
sin  for  its  own  sake.  He  may  choose  those  things  the  choosing 
of  which  is  sinful,  but  it  is  not  the  sinfulness  of  the  choice  upon 
which  the  intention  terminates.  This  is  naturally  impossible. 
Sin  may  be  chosen  as  a  means  of  gratifying  a  malicious  feel- 
ing, but  this  is  not  choosing  it  as  an  end,  but  as  a  means.  Ma- 
levolence, strictly  speaking,  is  impossible  to  a  moral  agent. 
That  is,  the  choice  of  moral  or  natural  evil  for  its  own  sake 
contradicts  the  nature  of  moral  agents  and  the  nature  of  ulti- 
mate choice,  and  is  therefore  impossible. 

///.    What  disobedience  to  moral  law  must  consist  in. 

1.  It  must  consist  in  choice  or  ultimate  intention,  for  moral 
character  belongs  strictly  only  to  ultimate  intention. 

2.  As  all  choice  must  terminate  on  an  end  or  on  means,  and 
as  the  means  can  not  be  chosen  until  the  end  is  chosen  and  but 
for  its  sake,  and  as  the  choice  of  means  for  the  sake  of  an  end 
is  but  an  endeavor  to  secure  the  end  chosen,  therefore  it  fol- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  287 

lows  that  disobedience  to  the  moral  law  must  consist  in  the 
choice  of  some  end  or  ends  inconsistent  with  its  requisitions. 

3.  We  have  seen  that  misery  or  natural  evil  can  not  be  cho- 
sen as  an  end  by  a  moral  agent.  So  this  can  not  be  the  end 
chosen. 

4.  We  have  seen  also  that  moral  evil  or  sin  can  not  be  cho- 
sen as  an  ultimate  end. 

5.  Disobedience  to  God's  law  must  consist  in  the  choice  of 
self-gratification  as  an  end.  In  other  words,  it  must  consist  in 
selfishness. 

Self-gratification  is  generally  distinguished  from  self-love, 
but  I  apprehend  without  foundation.  Self-love  has  been  de- 
fined to  be  the  desire  of  happiness.  But  desire  is  not  love. 
Men  constitutionally  desire,  not  only  their  own  happiness,  but 
the  happiness  of  others;  but  this  desire  for  the  happiness  of 
others  is  not  benevolence.  It  is  not  the  love  of  being  in  gen- 
eral. But  why  may  it  not  as  properly  be  called  the  love  of 
being  in  general,  as  the  desire  of  our  own  happiness  may  be 
called  self-love?  Love,  properly  speaking  is  a  voluntary  state 
of  mind.  Self-love,  properly  speaking,  is  a  choice  lo  gratify 
our  desires  as  an  end,  that  is,  for  the  sake  of  the  gratification. 
The  desire  is  not  self-love.  It  is  constitutional,  and  has  no 
moral  character.  Self-love,  strictly  speaking,  is  the  choice  to 
gratify  our  desires.  So  that  selfishness  and  self-love  are  iden- 
tical. But  as  this  distinction  between  selfishness  and  self- 
love  has  been  common,  and  as  the  error  lies  only  in  giving  a 
false  definition  to  self-love,  and  in  calling  desire  love,  I  will  not 
insist  on  the  identity  of  selfishness  and  self-love,  but  proceed 
to  estabUsh  the  position  that  disobedience  to  the  moral  law, 
or  sin,  consists  wholly  and  exclusively  in  selfishness,  or  in  ma- 
king good  to  self  and  not  the  good  of  God  and  the  universe  of 
sentient  beings  an  ultimate  end. 

In  other  words  still,  sin  consists  in  choosing  self  gratifica- 
tion as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake,  instead  of  choosing,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  law  of  the  reason,  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  of  the  universe  as  an  ultimate  end.  In  other  words 
still,  sin  or  disobedience  to  the  moral  law  consists  in  the  con- 
secration of  the  heart  and  life  to  the  gratification  of  the  consti- 
tutional and  artificial  desires  rather  than  in  obedience  to  the 
law  of  the  intelligence.  Or,  to  state  it  once  more,  sin  consists 
in  being  governed  by  the  sensibility  instead  of  being  govern- 
ed by  the  law  of  God  as  it  lies  revealed  in  the  reason. 

That  this  is  sin  and  the  whole  of  sin  will  appear  if  we  con- 
sider: 


288  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

1.  That  this  state  of  mind,  or  this  choice  is  the  *'•  carnal  mind 
or  the  minding  of  the  flesh  which  the  Apostle  affirms  to  be 
enmity  against  God." 

2.  It  is  the  universal  representation  of  Scripture  that  sin 
consists  in  the  spirit  of  self  seeking. 

3.  This  spirit  of  self-seeking  is  always  in  the  Bible  repre- 
sented as  the  contrast  or  opposite  of  disinterested  benevo- 
lence, or  the  love  which  the  law  requires.  '*  Ephraim  bringeth 
forth  fruit  to  himself,"  is  the  sum  of  God's  charges  against 
sinners. 

4.  Selfishness  is  always  spoken  of  in  terms  of  reprobation 
in  the  Bible. 

5.  It  is  known  by  every  moral  agent  to  be  sinful. 

6.  It  is  the  end  in  fact  which  all  unregencrate  men  pui^ 
sue,  and  the  only  end  they  pursue. 

7.  When  we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  attributes  of 
selfishness,  it  will  be  seen  that  every  form  of  sin,  not  only 
may,  but  must  resolve  itself  into  selfishness  just  as  we  have 
seen  that  every  form  of  virtue  does  and  must  resolve  itself 
into  love  or  benevolence. 

6.  From  the  laws  of  its  constitution,  the  mind  is  shut  up 
'to  the  necessity  of  choosing  that  as  an  ultimate  end  which  is 
regarded  by  the  mind  as  intrinsically  good  or  valuable  in  itself. 
This  is  the  very  idea  of  choosing  an  end,  to  wit,  something 
chosen  for  its  own  sake,  or  for  whatit  is  in  and  of  itself,  that  is, 
because  it  is  regarded  by  the  mind  as  intrinsically  valuable  to 
self,  or  to  being  in  general,  or  to  both. 

6.  The  gratification  or  good  of  being  is  necessarily  regard- 
ed by  the  mind  as  a  good  in  itself,  or  as  intrinsically  valuable. 

7.  Nothing  else  is  or  can  be  regarded  as  valuable  in  itself 
but  the  good  of  being. 

8.  Moral  agents  are,  therefore,  shut  up  to  the  necessity  of  will- 
ing thegood  of  being  either  partiall)'  or  impartially.  Nothing 
else  can  possibly  be  chosen  as  an  end  or  forits  own  sake.  Will- 
ing the  good  of  being  impartially,  we  have  seen  is  virtue.  To 
will  it  partially  is  to  will  it  not  for  its  own  sake,  but  upon  con- 
dition of  its  relation  to  self.  That  is,  it  is  to  will  self  good  or 
good  to  self  In  other  words,  it  is  to  will  the  gratification  of 
self  as  an  end,  in  opposition  to  willing  the  good  of  universal 
being  as  an  end,  and  every  good,  or  the  good  of  every  being 
according  to  its  intrinsic  value. 

9.  But  may  not  one  will  the  good  of  a  part  of  being  as  an 
end,  or  for  the  sake  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  their  good?  This 
would  not  be  benevolence,  for  that,  as  we  have  seen,  must 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  289 

consist  in  willing  good  for  its  own  sake,  and  implies  the  will- 
ing of  every  good  and  of  the  highest  good  of  universal  being. 
It  would  not  be  selfishness,  as  it  would  not  be  willing  good  to, 
or  the  gratification  of,  self.  It  would  be  sin,  for  it  would  be 
the  partial  love  or  choice  of  good.  It  would  be  loving  some 
of  my  neighbors,  but  not  all  of  them.  It  would  therefore  be 
sin,  but  not  selfishness.  If  this  can  be,  then  there  is  such  a 
thing  possible,  whether  actual  or  not,  as  sin  that  does  not  con- 
sist in  selfishness. 

To  say  that  I  choose  good  for  its  own  sake  or  because  it  is 
valuable  to  being,  that  is,  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  my  rea- 
son, implies  that  I  choose  all  possible  good,  and  every  good 
according  to  its  relative  value.  If  then  a  being  chooses  his 
own  good  or  the  good  of  any  being  as  an  ultimate  end,  in  obe- 
dience to  the  law  of  reason,  it  must  be  that  he  chooses,  for 
the  same  reason,  the  highest  possible  good  of  all  sentient  be- 
ing- 

The  partial  choice  of  good  implies  the  choice  of  it,  not  mere- 
ly for  its  own  sake,  but  upon  condition  of  its  relations  to  self, 
or  to  certain  particukr  persons.  It  is  its  relations  that  con- 
ditionate  the  choice.  When  its  relations  to  self  conditionate 
the  choice  so  that  it  is  chosen,  not  for  its  intrinsic  value  irre- 
spective of  its  relations,  but  for  its  relations  to  self,  this  is 
selfishness.  It  is  the  partial  choice  of  good.  If  I  choose  the 
good  of  others  besides  myself  and  choose  good  because  of  its 
relations  to  them^  it  must  be  either, 

(1.)  Because  I  love  their  persons  with  the  love  of  fondness, 
and  will  their  good  for  that  reason,  that  is,  so  gratify  my  affec- 
tion for  them,  which  is  selfishness ;  or, 

(2.)  Because  of  their  relations  to  me  so  that  good  to  them 
is  in  some  way  a  good  to  me,  which  also  is  selfishness;  or, 

(3.)  Upon  condition  that  they  are  worthy,  which  is  benev- 
olence: for  if  I  will  good  to  a  being  upon  condition  that  he  is 
worthy,  I  must  value  the  good  for  its  own  sake,  and  will  it  par- 
ticularly to  him,  because  he  deserves  it.  This  is  benevolence 
and  not  the  partial  choice  of  good,  because  it  is  obeying  the 
law  of  my  reason.  If  I  will  the  good  of  any  being  or  number 
of  beings,  it  must  be  for  some  reason.  I  must  will  it  as  an  end, 
or  as  a  means.  If  I  will  it  as  an  end,  it  must  be  the  universal 
or  impartial  choice  of  good.  If  I  will  it  as  a  means,  it  must  be 
as  a  means  to  some  end.  The  end  can  not  be  their  good  for 
its  own  sake,  for  this  would  be  willing  it  as  an  end  and  not  as 
a  means.  If  I  will  it  as  a  means,  it  must  be  as  a  means  of  my 
own  gratification. 

25 


290  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Again:  If  I  will  the  good  of  any  number  of  beings,  I  must 
do  it  in  obedience  to  the  law  either  of  my  intelligence  or  of 
my  sensibility.  But  if  I  will  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  my  in- 
telligence, it  must  be  the  choice  of  the  highest  good  of  univer- 
sal being.  But  if  I  will  in  obedience  to  the  law  or  impulse  of 
.my  sensibility,  it  must  be  to  gratify  my  feelings  or  desires. 
This  is  selfishness. 

Again:  As  the  will  must  either  follow  the  law  of  the  reason, 
or  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility,  it  follows  that  moral  agents 
are  shut  up  to  the  necessity  of  being  selfish  or  benevolent,  and 
that  there  is  no  third  way,  because  there  is  no  third  medium 
through  which  any  object  of  choice  can  be  presented.  The 
mind  can  absolutely  know  nothing  as  an  object  of  choice  that 
is  not  recommended  by  one  of  these  faculties.  Selfishness, 
then,  and  benevolence  are  the  only  two  alternatives. 

Therefore,  disobedience  to  the  moral  law  must  consist  in  sel- 
fishness and  in  selfishness  alone. 

It  has  been  said  that  a  moral  agent  may  will  the  good  of  oth- 
ers for  its  own  sake,  and  yet  not  will  the  good  of  all.  That  is, 
that  he  may  will  the  good  of  some  for  its  intrinsic  value,,  and 
yet  not  will  universal  good.  But  this  is  absurd.  To  make 
the  valuable  the  object  of  choice  for  its  own  sake  without  re- 
spect to  any  conditions  or  relations,  is  the  same  as  to  will  ail 
possible  and  universal  good;  that  is,  the  one  necessarily  impHes 
and  includes  the  other.  It  has  been  asserted,  for  example, 
;,hat  an  infidel  abolitionist  may  be  conscious  of  willing  and 
seeking  the  good  of  the  slave  for  its  own  sake  or  disinter- 
estedly, and  yet  not  exercise  universal  benevolence.  I  reply, 
he  deceives  himself  just  as  a  man  would  who  should  say  he 
chooses  fruit  for  its  own  sake.  The  fact  is,  he  is  conscious  of 
desiring  fruit  for  its  own  sake.  But  he  does  not  and  can  not 
choose  it  for  its  own  sake.  He  chooses  it  in  obedience  to  his 
desire,  that  is,  to  gratify  his  desire.  So  it  is  and  must  be  with 
the  infidel  abolitionist.  It  can  not  be  that  he  chooses  the 
good  of  the  slave  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  his  intelligence; 
for  if  he  did,  his  benevolence  would  be  universal.  It  must  be, 
then,  that  he  chooses  the  good  of  the  slave  because  he  desires 
it,  or  to  gratify  a  constitutional  desire.  Men  naturally  desire 
their  own  happiness  and  the  happiness  of  others.  This  is 
constitutional.  But  when  in  obedience  to  these  desires  they 
will  their  own  or  others'  happiness,  they  seek  to  gratify  their 
sensibility  or  desires.     This  is  selfishness. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  291 

Let  it  be  remembered,  then,  that  sin  is  a  unit,  and  always 
apd  necessarily  consists  in  selfish  ultimate  intention  and  in  no- 
thing else.  This  intention  is  sin ;  and  every  phase  of  sin  re- 
solves itself  into  selfishness.  This  will  appear  more  and  more, 
as  we  proceed  to  unfold  the  subject  of  moral  depravity. 


LECTURE    XXIII. 
MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

What  is  not  implied  in  disobedience  to  Moral  Law. 

In  this  discussion,  I  will 

I.  State  briefly  what  constitutes  disobedience. 

II.  Show  what  is  not  implied  in  it. 

I.  What  constitutes  disobedience. 

We  have  seen  that  all  sin  or  disobedience  to  moral  law 
is  a  unit,  and  that  it  consists  in  selfishness,  or  in  the  choice  of 
self-gratification  as  an  end;  in  other  words,  that  it  consists  in 
committing  the  will  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility,  to  the 
desires,  emotions,  feelings  and  passions,  instead  of  committing 
it  to  the  good  of  being  in  general  in  obedience  to  the  law  of 
the  reason  or  to  the  law  of  God  as  it  is  revealed  in  the  reason. 
Selfishness  is  the  intention  to  gratify  self  as  an  end.  It  is  the 
preference  of  self-interest  to  other  and  higher  interests. 

II.  What  is  not  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  law  of  God. 

I.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply  an  intention  to  do  wrong. 
The  thing  intended  in  selfishness  is  to  gratify  self  as  an  end. 
This  is  wrong;  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  its  being  wrong 
that  the  wrongness  should  be  aimed  at  or  intended.  There 
may  be  a  state  of  malicious  feeling  in  a  moral  agent  that 
would  be  gratified  by  the  commission  of  sin.  A  sinner  may 
have  knowingly  and  intentionally  made  war  upon  God  and 
man,  and  this  may  have  induced  a  state  of  the  sensibility  so 
hostile  to  God  as  that  the  sinner  has  a  malicious  desire  to 
offend  and  abuse  God,  to  violate  his  law,  and  trample  upon  his 
authority.  This  state  of  feeling  may  take  the  control  of  the 
will,  and  he  may  deliberately  intend  to  violate  the  law  and  to 
do  what  God  hates  for  the  purpose  of  gratifying  this  feeling. 
This,  however,  it  will  be  seen,  is  not  malevolence  or  willing 
either  natural  or  moral  evil  for  its  own  sake,  but  as  a  means  of 
self-gratification.     It  is  selfishness,  and  not  malevolence. 

But  in  the  vast  majority  of  instances,  where  the  law  is  vio- 
lated and  sin  committed,  it  is  no  part  of  the  aim  or  intention 
of  the  sinner  to  do  wrong.  He  intends  to  gratify  himself  at 
all  events.  This  intention  is  wrong.  But  it  is  not  an  inten- 
tion to  do  wrong,  nor  is  the  wrong  the  object  in  any  case, 
or  end  upon  which  the  intention  terminates.  There  is  a 
great  mistake  often  entertained  upon  this  subject.  Many  seem 
to  think  that  they  do  not  sin  unless  they  intend  to  sin.    The 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  293 

irrrpoTtant  truth  that  sin  belongs  only  to  the  ultimate  inten- 
tfon,  than  which  nothing  is  more  true  or  more  important, 
has  been  perverted  in  this  manner.  It  has  been  assumed  by 
some  that  they  had  not  done  wrong  nor  intended  wrong,  be- 
cause they  were  conscious  that  the  wrong  was  not  the  end  at 
Avhich  they  aimed.  ^*  I  did  not  intend  the  wrong,"  say  they, 
and  '''  therefore  I  did  not  sin."  Now  here  is  a  fatal  mistake, 
and  a  total  perversion  of  the  great  and  important  truth  that 
sin  and  holiness  belong  only  to  the  ultimate  intention. 

2.  Disobedience  to  the  moral  law  does  not  imply  that 
wrong,  or  sin,  or  in  other  words,  disobedience  is  ever  intended 
as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake.  Gross  mistakes  have  been 
fallen  into  upon  this  subject.  Sinners  have  been  represented 
as  loving  sin  and  as  choosing  it  for  its  own  sake.  They  have 
been  represented  as  having  a  natural  and  constitutional  crav- 
ing or  appetite  for  sin,  such  as  carnivorous  animals  have  for 
flesh.  Now,  if  this  craving  existed,  still  it  would  not  prove 
that  sin  is  sought  or  intended  for  its  own  sake.  I  have  a  con- 
stitutional desire  for  food  and  drink.  My  desires  terminate 
on  these  objects,  that  is,  they  are  desired  for  their  own  sake. 
But  they  are  never  and  never  can  be  chosen  for  their  own 
sake  or  as  an  end.  They  are  chosen  as  a  means  of  gratifying 
the  desire,  or  may  be  chosen  as  a  means  of  glorifying  God. 
Just  so,  if  it  were  true  that  sinners  have  a  constitutional  appe- 
tency for  sin,  the  sin  would  be  desired  for  its  own  sake  or  as 
an  end,  but  could  not  be  chosen  except  as  a  means  of  self- 
gratification. 

But  again.  It  is  not  true  that  sinners  have  a  constitutionaF 
appetency  and  craving  for  sin.  They  have  a  constitutional 
appetite  or  desire  for  a  great  many  things  around  them. 
They  crave  food  and  drink  and  knowledge.  So  did  our  first 
parents;  and  when  these  desires  were  strongly  excited,  they 
were  a  powerful  temptation  to  prohibited  indulgence.  Eve 
craved  the  fruit,  and  the  knowledge  which  she  supposed  she 
might  attain  by  partaking  of  it.  These  desires  led  her  to  seek 
their  indulgence  in  a  prohibited  manner.  She  desired  and 
craved  the  food  and  the  knowledge,  and  not  the  sin  of  eating. 
So  all  sinners  have  constitutional  and  artificial  appetites 
and  desires  enough.  But  not  one  of  them  is  a  craving  for  sin, 
unless  it  be  the  exception  already  named  when  the  mind  has 
come  into  such  relations  to  God  as  to  have  a  mali- 
cious satisfaction  in  abusing  him.  But  this  is  not  natural  to 
man,  and  if  it  ever  exists,  is  only  brought  about  by  rejecting 
great  light  and  inducing  a  most  terrible  perversion  of  the 
25* 


294  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sensibility.  But  such  cases  are  extremely  rare;  whereas  it 
has  been  strangely  and  absurdly  maintained  that  all  sinners  in 
consequence  of  the  fall  of  Adam,  have  a  sinful  constitution  or 
one  that  craves  sin  as  it  craves  food  and  drink.  This  is  false 
in  fact  and  absurd  in  philosophy,  and  wholly  inconsistent  with 
Scripture,  as  we  shall  see  when  we  make  moral  depravity  the 
special  subject  of  attention.  The  facts  are  these:  men  have 
constitutional  desires,  appetites  and  passions.  These  are  not 
sinful.  They  all  terminate  on  their  respective  objects.  Self- 
ishness or  sin  consists  in  choosing  the  gratification  of  these 
desires  as  an  end  or  in  preferring  their  gratification  to  other 
and  higher  interests.  This  choice  or  intention  is  sinful.  But 
as  I  have  said,  sin  is  not  the  object  intended,  but  self-gratifi- 
cation is  the  end  intended. 

Again.  That  disobedience  to  the  law  of  God  does  not 
imply  the  choice  of  sin  or  the  wrong  for  its  own  sake,  has 
been  shown  in  a  former  lecture.  But  I  must  so  far  repeat 
as  to  say  that  it  is  impossible  that  sin  should  be  chosen 
as  an  end.  Sin  belongs  to  the  ultimate  intention.  It  either 
consists  in  and  is  identical  with  selfish  intention  or  it  is  the 
moral  element  or  attribute  of  that  intention.  If  it  be  identical 
with  it,  then  to  intend  sin  as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake,  were 
to  intend  my  own  intention  as  an  end.  If  sin  be  but  the 
moral  element,  quality  or  attribute  of  the  intention,  then  to 
intend  sin  as  an  end,  I  must  intend  an  attribute  of  my  inten- 
tion as  an  end.     Either  alternative  is  absurd  and  impossible. 

3.  Disobedience  to  moral  law  does  not  imply  that   the 
wrongness  or  sinfulness  of  the  intention  is  so  much  as  thought 
of  at  the  time  the  intention  is  formed.     The  sin  not  only  need 
not  be  intended,  but  it  is  not  essential  to  sin  that  the  moral 
character  of  the  intention  be  at  all  taken  into  consideration  or 
so  much  as  thought  of  at  the  time  the  intention  is  formed. 
The  sinner  ought  to  will  the  good  of  being.     This  he  knows,' 
and  if  he  be  a  moral  agent,  which  is  implied  in  his  being  a  ■ 
sinner,  he  can  not  but  assume  this  as  a  first  truth  that  he  ought'* 
to  will  the  good  of  being  in  general  and  not  his  own  gratifica- 
tion as  an  end.     This  truth  he  always  and  necessarily  takes 
with  him  in  the  form  of  an  assumption  of  a  universal  truth. 
He  knows  and  can  not  but  know  that  he  ought  to  will  the  good 
of  God  and  of  the  universe  as  an  end  instead  of  willing  his 
own  good  as  an  end.     Now  this  being  necessarily  assumed 
by  him  as  a  first  truth,  it  is  no  more  essential  to  sin  that  he 
should  think  at  the  time  that  a  particular  intention  is  or  would 
be  sinful,  than  it  is  essential  to  murder  that  the  law  of  caus- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  295 

alitj  should  be  distinctly  before  the  mind  as  an  object  of  at- 
tention when  the  murderer  aims  the  fatal  weapon  at  his  vic- 
tim. Murder  consists  in  a  selfish  intention  to  kill  a  human 
being.  I  aim  a  pistol  at  my  neighbor's  head  with  an  intention 
to  gratify  a  spirit  of  revenge  or  of  avarice  or  some  desire  by 
taking  his  life.  I  am,  however,  so  exasperated  and  so  intent 
on  self-indulgence  as  not  to  think  of  the  law  of  God  or  of  God 
himself  or  of  my  obligation  to  do  otherwise.  Now,  am  I 
hereby  justified?  No,  indeed.  I  no  more  think  of  that  law 
of  causality  which  alone  will  secure  the  effect  at  which  I  aim, 
than  I  do  of  my  obligation  and  of  the  moral  character  of  my 
intention.  Nevertheless  I  assume  and  can  not  but  assume 
these  first  truths  at  the  moment  of  my  intention.  The  first 
truths  of  reason  are  those,  as  has  been  repeatedly  said,  that 
are  necessarily  known  and  assumed  by  all  moral  agents. 
Among  these  truths  are  those  of  causality,  moral  obligation, 
right,  wrong,  human  free  agency,  &c.  Now  whether  I  think 
of  these  truths  or  not  at  every  moment,  I  can  not  but  assume 
their  truth  at  all  times.  In  every  endeavor  to  do  any  thing  I 
assume'the  truth  of  causahty,  and  generally  without  being  con- 
scious of  any  such  assumption.  I  also  assume  the  truth  of 
my  own  free  agency,  and  equally  without  being  conscious  of 
the  assumption.  I  also  assume  that  happiness  is  a  good,  for  I 
am  aiming  to  realize  it.  I  assume  that  it  is  valuable  to  myself, 
and  can  not  but  assume  that  it  is  equally  valuable  to  others.  I 
can  not  but  assume  also  that  it  ought  to  be  chosen  because  of 
its  intrinsic  value,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  chosen  impartially, 
that  is,  that  the  good  of  each  should  be  chosen  according  to  its 
relative  or  intrinsic  value.  This  is  assuming  my  obhgation 
to  will  it  as  an  end,  and  is  also  assuming  the  rightness  of 
such  willing  and  the  wrongness  of  selfishness. 

Now  every  moral  agent  does  and  must  (and  this  fact  consti- 
tutes him  a  moral  agent)  assume  all  these  and  divers  other 
truths  at  every  moment  of  his  moral  agency.  He  assumes 
them  all,  one  as  really  and  as  much  as  the  other,  and  they  are 
all  assumed  as  first  truths;  and  in  the  great  majority  of  in- 
stances, the  mind  is  not  more  taken  up  with  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  assumption  or  with  attending  to  those  truths  as  a 
subject  of  thought  than  it  is  with  the  first  truths  that  space 
exists  and  is  infinite,  that  duration  exists  and  is  infinite.  It  is 
of  the  highest  importance  that  this  should  be  distinctly  under- 
stood— that  sin  does  not  imply  that  the  moral  character  of  an 
act  or  intention  should  be  distinctly  before  the  mind  at  the 
time  of  its  commission.    Indeed  it  is  perfectly  common  for 


296  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sinners  to  act  thoughtlessly  as  they  say,  that  is  without  reflect- 
ing upon  the  moral  character  of  their  intentions.  But  hereby 
they  are  not  justified.  Indeed  this  very  fact  is  often  but 
an  evidence  and  an  instance  of  extreme  depravity.  Think 
you  that  an  angel  could  sin  thoughtlessly?  Could  he  form  a 
selfish  intention  without  reflection  or  thinking  of  its  wicked- 
ness? Sinners  in  sinning  thoughtlessly^  give  the  highest  evi- 
dence of  their  desperate  depravity.  A  sinner  may  become  so 
hardened  and  his  conscience  so  stupified,  that  he  may  go  on 
from  day  to  day  without  thinking  of  God,  of  moral  obhgation, 
of  right  or  wrong;  and  yet  his  sin  and  his  guilt  are  real.  He 
does  and  must  know  and  assume  all  these  truths  at  every  step, 
just  as  he  assumes  his  own  existence,  the  law  of  causaHty,  his 
own  liberty  or  free  agency,  &c.  None  of  these  need  to  be 
made  the  object  of  the  mind's  attention:  they  are  known  and 
not  to  be  learned.  They  are  first  truths,  and  we  can  not  act 
at  all  without  assuming  them. 

4.  Disobedience  to  moral  law  does  not  necessarily  imply 
an  outwardly  immoral  life.  A  sinner  may  outwardly  conform 
to  every  precept  of  the  Bible  from  selfish  motives  or  with  a 
selfish  intention,  to  gratify  himself,  to  secure  his  own  reputa- 
tion here  and  his  salvation  hereafter.  This  is  sin;  but  it  is 
not  outward  immorality,  but  on  the  contrary  is  outward  mo- 
rality. 

5.  Disobedience  to  moral  law  does  not  necessarily  imply 
feeUngs  of  enmity  to  God  or  to  man.     The  will  may  be  set 
upon  self  indulgence,  and  yet  as  the  sinner  does  not  appre- 
hend God's  indignation  against  him  and  his  opposition  tO; 
him   on   that    account,   he   may  have   no  hard   feelings 
feelings   of  hatred   to  God.     Should  God  reveal  to  him  Hit 
abhorrence  of  him  on  account  of  his  sins.  His  determination  U 
punish  him  for  them,  the  holy  sovereignty  with  which  He  will 
dispose  of  him;  in  this  case  the  sinner  might  and  probablj 
would  feel  deeply  malicious  and  revengeful  feelings  toward^ 
God.     But  sin  does  not  consist  in  these  feelings,  nor  necess? 
rily  imply  them. 

6.  Sin  or  disobedience  to  moral  law  does  not  imply  in  any 
instance  a  sinful  nature;  or  a  constitution  in  itself  sinful. 
Adam  and  Eve  sinned.  Holy  angels  sinned.  Certainly  in 
their  case  sin  or  disobedience  did  not  imply  a  sinful  nature  or 
constitution.  Adam  and  Eve,  certainly,  and  holy  angels  also, 
must  have  sinned  by  yielding  to  temptation.  The  constitu- 
tional desire  being  excited  by  the  perception  of  their  cor- 
related objects,  they  consented  to  prefer  their  own  gratifica- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  297 

tion  to  obedience  to  God,  in  other  words,  to  make  their  grati- 
fication an  end.  This  was  their  sin.  But  in  this  there  was 
no  sin  in  their  constitutions,  and  no  other  tendency  to  sin  than 
this,  that  these  desires,  when  strongly  excited,  are  a  tempta- 
tion to  unlawful  indulgence. 

It  has  been  strangely  and  absurdly  assumed  that  sin  in  action 
implies  a  sinful  nature.  But  this  is  contrary  to  fact  and  to 
sound  philosophy,  as  well  as  contrary  to  the  Bible,  which  we 
shall  see  in  its  proper  place. 

As  it  was  with  Adam  and  Eve,  so  it  is  with  every  sinner. 
There  is  not,  there  can  not  be  sin  in  the  nature  or  the  consti- 
tution. But  there  are  constitutional  appetites  and  passions, 
and  when  these  are  strongly  excited,  they  are  a  strong  temp- 
tation or  inducement  to  the  will  to  seek  their  gratification  as 
an  ultimate  end.  This,  as  I  have  said,  is  sin,  and  nothing  else 
is  or  can  be  sin.  It  is  selfishness.  Under  its  appropriate  head, 
I  shall  show  that  the  nature  or  constitution  of  sinners  has  be- 
come physically  depraved  or  diseased,  and  that  as  a  conse- 
quence, the  appetites  and  passions  are  more  easily  excited, 
and  are  more  clamorous  and  despotic  in  their  demands;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  constitution  of  man  in  its  present  state, 
tends  more  strongly  than  it  otherwise  would,  to  sin.  But  to 
affirm  that  the  constitution  is  in  itself  sinful,  is  to  talk  mere 
nonsense. 


LECTURE    XXIV. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  SELFISHNESS. 

What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  moral   law. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  question  I  must, 

/.  Remind  you  of  what  constitutes  disobedience  to  moral  law. 

II.  Show  what  is  implied  in  it. 

I.   What  constitutes  disobedience  to  moral  law  ? 

I.  We  have  seen  that  disobedience  to  moral  law  consists 
always  in  selfishness. 

2  Selfishness  consists  in  the  ultimate  choice  of  our  own 
gratification. 

3.  An  ultimate  choice  is  the  choice  of  an  end,  or  the  choice 
of  something  for  its  own  sake  or  for  its  own  intrinsic  value. 

4.  The  choice  of  our  own  gratification  as  an  ultimate  end, 
is  the  preference  of  our  own  gratification,  not  merely  because 
gratification  is  a  good,  but  because  and  upon  condition  that  it 
is  our  own  gratification  or  a  good  to  self. 

5.  Selfishness  chooses  and  cares  for  good  only  upon  condi- 
tion that  it  belongs  to  self.  It  is  not  the  gratification  of  be- 
ing in  general,  but  self  gratification  upon  which  selfishness 
terminates.  It  is  a  good  because  it  belongs  to  self  or  is  cho- 
sen upon  that  condition.  But  when  it  is  affirmed  that  selfish- 
ness is  sin  and  the  whole  of  sin,  we  are  in  danger  of  miscon- 
ceiving the  vast  import  of  the  word  and  of  taking  a  very  nar- 
row and  superficial  and  inadequate  view  of  the  subject.  It  is 
therefore  indispensable  to  raise  and  push  the  inquiry,  What 
is  implied  in  selfishness?  What  are  its  characteristics  and  es- 
sential elements?  What  modifications  or  attributes  does  it 
develop  and  manifest  under  the  various  circumstances  in  which 
in  the  providence  of  God  it  is  placed?  It  consists  in  the 
committal  of  the  will  to  the  gratification  of  desire.  The  Apos- 
tle calls  it  "fulfilling  the  desires  of  the  flesh  and  of  the  mind." 
What  must  be  implied  in  the  state  of  mind  which  consists  in 
the  committal  of  the  whole  being  to  the  gratification  of  self 
as  an  end?  What  must  be  the  effect  upon  the  desires  them- 
selves to  be  thus  indulged?  What  must  be  the  effect  upon 
the  intellect  to  have  its  high  demands  trampled  und<er  foot?' 
What  must  be  the  developments  of  it  in  the  outward  life  ?: 
What  must  be  the  effect  upon  the  temper  and  spirit  X&  have- 
self-indulgence  the  law  of  the  soul?  This  leads  to  the  inves- 
ligation  of  the  point  before  us  namely, 

i/.  What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  moral  law  ? 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  299 

The  inquiry,  it  will  be  seen,  naturally  divides  itself  into 
two  branches.  The  first  respects  the  moral  character  of  sel- 
fishness. The  second  respects  the  attributes  of  selfishness. 
We  will  attend  to  these  two  inquiries  in  their  order,  and, 

1.  What  is  implied  in  the  fact  that  selfishness  is  a  breach 
of  moral  law?  Why  is  selfishness  blame-worthy?  Why  is 
not  a  spirit  of  self-seeking  in  mere  animals  or  brute  beasts 
as  much  a  breach  of  moral  law  as  is  the  same  spirit  in  man? 
If  this  spirit  of  self-seeking  in  man  is  sin,  what  is  implied  in 
this  fact?  In  other  words,  what  conditions  are  necessary  to 
render  a  spirit  of  self-seeking  a  breach  of  moral  law?  These 
conditions  whatever  they  are,  must  be  implied  in  disobedi- 
ence to  moral  law.  This  brings  us  to  the  direct  consideration 
of  the  things  that  belong  to  the  first  branch  of  our  inquiry, 

(1.)  Disobedience  to  moral  law  implies  the  possession  of  the 
powers  of  moral  agency.  These  have  been  so  often  enumer- 
ated as  to  render  any  enlargement  upon  this  point  unnecessa- 
ry, except  to  say  that  it  is  impossible  for  any  but  a  moral 
agent  to  violate  moral  law.  Mere  animals  may  do  that  which 
the  moral  law  prohibits  in  moral  agents.  But  the  moral  law 
does  not  legislate  over  them;  therefore  those  things  in  them 
are  not  sin,  not  a  violation  of  moral  law. 

(2.)  It  impHes  knowledge  of  the  end  which  a  moral  agent  is 
bound  to  choose.  We  have  seen  that  the  moral  law  requires 
love  and  that  this  love  is  benevolence,  and  that  benevolence 
is  the  disinterested  and  impartial  choice  of  the  highest  good 
of  God  and  of  being  in  general  as  an  end.  Now  it  follows 
that  this  end  must  be  apprehended  before  we  can  possibly 
choose  it.  Therefore  obligation  to  choose  it  implies  the  per- 
ception or  knowledge  of  it.  Disobedience  to  moral  law,  then, 
implies  the  development  in  the  reason  of  the  idea  of  the  good 
or  valuable  to  being.  A  being  therefore  who  has  not  reason, 
or  the  ideas  of  whose  reason  on  moral  subjects  are  not  at  all 
developed,  can  not  vioJate  the  law  of  God;  for  over  such  the 
moral  law  does  not  extend  its  claims. 

(3.)  It  implies  the  development  of  the  correlative  of  the  idea 
of  the  good  or  the  valuable,  to  wit,  the  idea  of  moral  obliga- 
tion to  will  or  choose  it  for  the  sake  of  its  intrinsic  value. 
When  the  idea  of  the  valuable  to  being  is  once  developed,  the 
mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  can  not  but  instantly  or  simulta- 
neously afiirm  its  obligation  to  will  it  as  an  end  and  every 
good  according  to  its  perceived  relative  value. 

(4.)  Disobedience  to  moral  law  implies  the  development  of 
ihe. correlative  of  the  idea  of  moral  obligation,  to  wit,  the 


300  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

idea  of  right  and  wrong.  That  it  is  right  to  will  good  and 
wrong  not  to  will  it,  or  to  will  it  only  partially.  This  idea  is 
the  correlative  of  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  and  the  devel- 
opment of  the  former  necessitates  the  development  of  the 
latter. 

(5.)  Disobedience  &c.,  also  implies  the  development  of  the 
correlative  of  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  namely:  The 
idea  of  praise  or  blame-worthiness,  or  of  virtue  and  vice,  or 
in  other  words  of  guilt  and  innocence.  This  idea,  that  is, 
the  idea  of  moral  character  is  the  correlative  of  that  of  right 
and  wrong  in  such  a  sense  that  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong 
necessitates  and  implies  the  idea  of  moral  character  or  of 
praise  and  blame-worthiness.  When  these  conditions  are  ful- 
filled and  not  till  then  does  the  spirit  of  self-seeking  or  the 
choice  of  our  own  gratification  as  an  end  become  sin  or  con- 
stitute a  breach  of  moral  law.  It  will  follow  that  no  beings 
are  subjects  of  moral  government  and  capable  of  disobedience 
to  moral  law  but  such  as  are  moral  ag-ents,  that  is,  such  as 
possess  both  the  powers  of  moral  agency  and  have  these 
powers  in  such  a  state  of  development  and  in  tegrity  as  to  render 
obedience  possible.  It  will  follow  that  neither  brute  animals 
nor  idiots,  nor  lunatics,  nor  somnambulists,  nor  indeed  any 
being  who  is  not  ra//o?ia/ and  free,  can  disobey  the  moral  law. 

2.  We  come  now  to  the  second  branch  of  the  inquiry, 
namely:  What  is  implied  in  selfishness,  what  are  its  attributes, 
and  what  states  of  the  sensibility,  and  what  outward  devel- 
opments are  implied  in  selfishness?  This,  it  will  be  seen, 
brings  us  to  the  immensely  interesting  and  important  task  of 
contrasting  selfishness  with  benevolence.  But  a  Httle  time 
since  we  considered  the  attributes  of  benevolence,  and  also 
what  states  of  the  sensibility  and  of  the  intellect,  and  also 
what  outward  actions  were  implied  in  it,  as  necessarily  result- 
ing from  it.  We  are  now  to  take  the  same  course  with  self- 
ishness, and, 
j/     (1.)   Voluntariness  is   an  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Selfishness  has  often  been  confounded  with  mere  desire.  But 
these  things  are  by  no  means  identical.  Desire  is  constitutional. 
It  is  a  phenomenon  of  the  sensibility.  It  is  a  purely  involun- 
tary state  of  mind,  and  can  in  itself  produce  no  action,  and 
can  in  itself  have  no  moral  character.  Selfishness  is  a  phe- 
nomenon of  the  will,  and  consists  in  committing  the  will  to 
the  gratification  of  the  desires.  The  desire  itself  is  not  self- 
ishness, but  submitting  the  will  to  be  governed  by  the  desires 
is  selfishness.    It  should  be  understood  that  no  kind  of  mere 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  301 

desire,  and  no  strength  of  mere  desire  constitutes  selfishness. 
Selfishness  commences  when  the  will  yields  to  the  desire  and 
seeks  to  obej  it  in  opposition  to  the  law  of  the  intelHgence. 
It  matters  not  what  kind  of  desire  it  is;  if  it  is  the  desire  that 
governs  the  will,  this  is  selfishness.  It  must  be  the  will  in  a 
state  of  committal  to  the  gratification  of  desire. 

(2.)  Liberty  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

That  is,  the  choice  of  self-gratification  is  not  necessitated 
by  desire.  But  the  will  is  always  free  to  choose  in  opposition 
to  desire.  This  every  moral  agent  is  as  conscious  of  as  of  his 
own  existence.  The  desire  is  not  ivee^  but  the  choice  to  grati- 
fy it  is  and  must  be  free.  There  is  a  sense,  as  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  show,  in  which  slavery  is  an  attribute  of  selfish- 
ness, but  not  in  the  sense  that  the  will  chooses  to  gratify  de- 
sire by  a  law  of  necessity.  Liberty,  in  the  sense  of  ability  to 
make  an  opposite  choice,  must  ever  remain  an  attribute  of 
selfishness,  while  selfishness  continues  to  be  a  sin,  or  while  it 
continues  to  sustain  any  relation  to  moral  law. 

3.  Intelligence  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

By  this  it  is  not  intended  that  intelligence  is  an  attribute  or 
phenomenon  of  will,  nor  that  the  choice  of  self- gratifica- 
tion is  in  accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  intelligence. 
But  it  is  intended  that  the  choice  is  made  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  moral  character  that  will  be  involved  in  it.  The  mind 
knows  its  obligation  to  make  an  opposite  choice.  It  is  not  a 
mistake.  It  is  not  a  choice  made  in  ignorance  of  moral  obli- 
gation to  choose  the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end  in  oppo- 
sition to  self-gratification.  It  is  an  intelHgent  choice  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  a  known  resistance  of  the  demands  of  the  in- 
telligence. It  is  a  known  rejection  of  its  claims.  It  is  a  known 
setting  up  self-gratification,  and  preferring  it  to  all  higher  in- 
terests. 

4.  Unreasonableness  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

By  this  it  is  intended  that  the  selfish  choice  is  in  direct  op- 
position to  the  demands  of  the  reason.  The  reason  was  given 
to  rule.  It  imposes  law  and  moral  obligation.  Obedience  to 
moral  law  as  it  is  revealed  in  the  reason,  is  virtue.  Obedience 
to  the  sensibiUty  in  opposition  to  the  reason  is  sin.  Selfish- 
ness consists  in  this.  It  is  a  dethroning  of  reason  from  the 
seat  of  government,  artd  an  enthroning  of  blind  desire  in  op- 
position to  it.  Selfishness  is  always  and  necessarily  unrea- 
sonable. It  is  a  denial  of  that  Divine  attribute  that  allies 
man  to  God,  makes  him  capable  of  virtue,  and  is  a  sinking 
bim  to  the  level  of  a  brute.  It  is  a  denial  of  his  manhood,  of 
26 


302  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

his  rational  nature.  It  is  a  contempt  of  the  voice  of  God 
within  him,  and  a  dehberate  trampling  down  the  sovereignty 
of  his  own  intelligence.  Shame  on  selfishness!  It  dethrones 
human  reason  and  would  dethrone  the  Divine,  and  place  mere 
blind  lust  upon  the  throne  of  the  universe. 

5.  Interestedness  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

By  interestedness  is  meant  5e//^interestedness.  It  is  not  the 
disinterested  choice  of  good,  that  is,  it  is  not  the  choice  of  the 
good  of  being  in  general  as  an  end,  but  it  is  the  choice  of 
self-good,  of  good  to  self  Its  relation  to  self  is  the  condition 
of  the  choice  of  it.  But  for  its  being  the  good  of  self  it 
would  not  be  chosen.  The  fundamental  reason,  or  that  which 
should  induce  choice,  to  wit,  the  intrinsic  value  of  good,  is 
rejected  as  insufficient,  and  the  secondary  reason,  namely,  its 
relation  to  self,  is  the  condition  of  determining  the  will.  This 
is  really  making  self-good  the  Supreme  end.  In  other 
words  it  is  ma^dn^  self-gratification  the  end.  Nothing  is  prac- 
tically regarded  as  worthy  of  choice  except  as  it  sustains  to 
self  the  relation  of  a  means  of  self-gratification. 

This  attribute  of  selfishness  secures  a  corresponding  state 
of  the  sensibility.  The  sensibihty  under  the  indulgence,  at- 
tains to  a  monstrous  development,  sometimes  generally,  but 
more  frequently  in  some  particular  directions.  Selfishness  is 
the  committal  of  the  will  to  the  indulgence  of  the  propensi- 
ties. But  from  this  it  by  no  means  follows  that  all  of  the  pro- 
pensities will  be  indiscriminately  indulged  and  thereby  great- 
ly developed.  Sometimes  one  propensity  and  sometimes 
another  has  the  greatest  natural  strength,  and  thereby  gains 
the  ascendency  in  the  control  of  the  will.  Sometimes  cir- 
cumstances tend  more  strongly  to  the  development  of  one  ap- 
petite or  passion  than  another.  Whatever  propensity  is  most 
indulged  will  gain  the  greatest  development.  The  propensi- 
ties can  not  all  be  indulged  at  once,  for  they  are  often  op- 
posed to  each  other.  But  they  may  all  be  indulged  and  de- 
veloped in  their  turn.  For  example:  The  licentious  propen- 
sities, the  propensities  to  various  indulgences  can  not  be  in- 
dulged consistently  with  the  simultaneous  indulgence  of  the 
avaricious  propensities,  the  desire  of  reputation  and  of  ulti- 
mate happiness.  Each  of  these,  and  of  all  the  propensities 
may  come  in  for  a  share,  and  in  some  instances  may  gain 
so  equal  a  share  of  indulgence  as  upon  the  whole  to  be  about 
equally  developed.  But  in  general,  either  from  constitutional 
temperament,  or  from  circumstances,  some  one  or  more  of 
the  propensities  will  gain  so  uniform  a  control  of  the  will  as 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


303 


to  occasion  its  monstrous  development.  It  may  be  the  love 
of  reputation;  and  then  there  will  be  at  least  a  public  decent 
exterior,  more  or  less  strict  according  to  the  state  of  morals 
in  the  society  in  which  the  individual  dwells.  If  it  be  ama- 
tiveness  that  gains  the  ascendency  over  the  other  propensi- 
ties, licentiousness  will  be  the  result.  If  it  be  alimentiveness, 
then  gluttony  and  epicurianism  will  be  the  result.  The  re- 
sult of  selfishness  must  be  to  develop  in  general,  or  in  par- 
ticular, the  propensities  of  the  sensibihty,  and  to  beget  a  cor- 
responding exterior. 

If  avarice  take  the  control  of  the  will,  we  have  the  hag- 
gard and  ragged  miser.  All  the  other  propensities  wither 
under  the  reign  of  this  detestable  one. 

Where  the  love  of  knowledge  prevails,  we  have  the  scholar, 
the  philosopher,  the  man  of  learning.  This  is  one  of  the 
most  decent  and  respectable  forms  of  selfishness,  but  is  nev- 
ertheless as  absolutely  selfishness  as  any  other  form. 

When  compassion,  as  a  feeling,  prevails,  we  have  as  a  re- 
sult the  philanthropist  and  often  the  reformer;  not  the  re- 
former in  a  virtuous  sense,  but  the  selfish  reformer.  Where 
love  of  kindred  prevails,  we  often  have  the  kind  husband,  the 
affectionate  father,  mother,  brother,  sister,  and  so  on.  These 
are  the  amiable  sinners,  especially  among  their  own  kindred. 
When  the  love  of  country  prevails,  we  have  the  patriot,  the 
statesman,  and  the  soldier.  This  picture  might  be  drawn  at 
full  length,  but  with  these  traits  I  must  leave  you  to  fill  up  the 
outUne.  I  would  only  add  that  several  of  these  forms  of 
selfishness  so  nearly  resemble  certain  forms  of  virtue  as  often 
to  be  confounded  with  them  and  mistaken  for  them. 

6.  Partiality  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness.  Partiality 
consists  in  giving  the  preference  to  certain  interests  on  ac- 
count of  their  being  either  directly  the  interests  of  self,  or  so 
connected  with  self-interest  as  to  be  preferred  on  that  account. 
It  matters  not  whether  the  interest  to  which  the  preference  is 
given  be  of  greater  or  of  less  value,  if  so  be  it  is  preferred  not 
for  the  reason  of  its  greater  value,  but  because  of  its  relation 
to  self  In  some  instances  the  prad/ca/ preference  may  justly 
be  given  to  a  less  interest  on  account  of  its  sustaining  such  a 
relation  to  us  that  we  can  secure  it,  when  the  greater  interest 
could  not  be  secured  by  us.  If  the  reason  of  the  preference 
in  such  case  be  not  that  it  is  5e//^interest  but  an  interest  that 
can  be  secured  while  the  greater  can  not,  the  preference  is  a 
just  one,  and  not  partiality.  My  family,  for  example,  sus- 
tain such  relations  to  me  that  I  can  more  readily  and  surely 


304  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

secure  their  interests  than  I  can  those  of  my  neighbor  or  of  a 
stranger.  For  this  reason  I  am  under  obUgation  to  give  the 
practical  preference  to  the  interests  of  my  own  family,  not  be- 
cause they  are  my  own,  or  because  their  interests  sustain 
such  a  relation  to  my  ow  n,  but  because  I  can  more  readily 
secure  their  interests,  although  they  may  be  of  no  greater,  or 
even  of  less  intrinsic  value  than  the  interests  of  many  other 
families. 

The  question  here  turns  upon  the  amount  I  am  able  to  secure^ 
and  not  on  their  intrinsic  value  merely.  It  is  a  general  truth 
that  we  can  secure  more  readily  and  certainly  the  interests  of 
those  to  whom  we  sustain  certain  relations,  and  therefore, 
God  and  reason  point  out  these  interests  as  particular  objects 
of  our  attention  and  effort.  This  is  not  partiaHty  but  impar- 
tiality.    It  is  treating  interests  as  they  should  be  treated. 

But  selfishness  is  always  partial.  If  it  gives  any  interest 
whatever  the  preference,  it  is  because  of  its  relation  to  self 
It  always,  and  continuing  to  be  selfishness,  necessarily  lays 
the  greatest  stress  upon,  and  gives  the  preference  to  those  in- 
terests the  promotion  of  which  will  gratify  self. 

Here  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  delusion.  Oftentimes 
selfishness  appears  to  be  very  disinterested  and  very  impartial. 
For  example;  Here  is  a  man  whose  compassion,  as  a  mere 
feeling  or  state  of  the  sensibility,  is  greatly  developed.  He 
meets  a  beggar,  an  object  that  strongly  excites  his  ruling  pas- 
sion. He  empties  his  pockets,  and  even  takes  off  his  coat  and 
gives  it  to  him,  and  in  his  paroxysm  he  will  divide  his  all  with 
him  or  even  give  him  all.  Now  this  would  generally  pass  for 
most  undoubted  virtue,  as  a  rare  and  impressive  instance  of 
moral  goodness.  But  there  is  no  virtue,  no  benevolence  in  it. 
It  is  the  mere  yielding  of  the  will  to  the  control  of  feeling  and 
has  nothing  in  it  of  the  nature  of  virtue.  Innumerable  exam- 
ples of  this  might  be  adduced  as  illustrations  of  this  truth.  It 
is  only  an  instance  and  an  illustration  of  selfishness.  It  is 
the  will  seeking  to  gratify  the  feeling  of  compassion. 

We  constitutionally  desire  not  only  our  own  happiness  but 
also  that  of  men  in  general,  when  their  happiness  in  no  way 
conflicts  with  our  own.  Hence  selfish  men  will  often  mani- 
fest a  deep  interest  in  the  welfare  of  those  whose  welfare  will 
not  interfere  with  their  own.  Now,  should  the  will  be  yield- 
ed up  to  the  gratification  of  this  desire,  this  would  often  be  re- 
garded as  virtue.  For  example:  A  few  years  since  much  in- 
terest and  feehng  was  excited  in  this  country  by  the  cause  and 
sufferings  of  the  Greeks  in  tb'^ir  struggle  for  liberty,  and  since 


I 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  305 

in  the  cause  of  the  Polanders.  A  spirit  of  enthusiasm  appear- 
ed, and  many  were  ready  to  give  and  do  almost  any  thing  for 
the  cause  of  liberty.  They  gave  up  their  will  to  the  gratifica- 
tion of  this  excited  state  of  feeling.  This,  they  may  have 
supposed,  was  virtue ;  but  it  was  not,  nor  was  there  a  semblance 
of  virtue  about  it,  when  it  is  once  understood  that  virtue  con- 
sists in  yielding  the  will  to  the  law  of  the  intelligence,  and 
not  to  the  impulse  of  excited  feelings. 

Some  writers  have  fallen  into  the  strange  mistake  of  making 
virtue  to  consist  in  seeking  the  gratification  of  certain  desires, 
because,  as  they  say,  these  desires  are  virtuous.  They  make 
some  of  the  desires  selfish  and  some  benevolent.  To  yield 
the  will  to  the  control  of  the  selfish  propensities  is  sin.  To 
yield  the  will  to  the  control  of  the  benevolent  desires,  such 
as  the  desire  of  my  neighbor's  happiness  and  of  the  public 
happiness,  is  virtue,  because  these  are  good  desires  while  the 
selfish  desires  are  evil.  Now  this  is  and  has  been  a  very 
common  view  of  virtue  and  vice.  But  it  is  fundamentally  er- 
roneous. None  of  the  constitutional  desires  are  good  or  evil 
in  themselves.  They  are  all  alike  involuntary  and  all  alike 
terminate  on  their  correlated  objects.  To  yield  the  will  to 
the  control  of  any  one  of  them,  no  matter  which,  is  sin.  It  is 
following  a  bhnd  feeling,  desire  or  impulse  of  the  sensibility 
instead  of  yielding  to  the  demands  of  the  intelligence.  To 
will  the  good  of  my  neighbor  or  of  my  country  and  of  God 
because  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  those  interests,  that  is  to  will 
them  as  an  end  and  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  the  reason,  is 
virtue;  but  to  will  them  to  gratify  a  constitutional  but  blind 
desire  is  selfishness  and  sin.  The  desires  to  be  sure  ter- 
minate on  their  respective  objects,  but  the  will  in  this  case 
seeks  the  objects,  not  for  their  own  sake,  but  because  they  are 
desired,  that  is  to  gratify  the  desires.  This  is  choosing  them, 
not  as  an  end,  but  as  a  means  of  self-gratification.  This  is 
making  self-gratification  the  end  after  all.  This  must  be  a 
universal  truth  when  a  thing  is  chosen  in  obedience  to  desire. 
The  benevolence  of  these  writers  is  sheer  selfishness,  and 
their  virtue  is  vice. 

The  choice  of  any  thing  whatever  because  it  is  desired,  is 
selfishness  and  sin.  It  matters  not  what  it  is.  The  very  state- 
ment that  I  choose  a  thing  because  I  desire  it,  is  only  another 
form  of  saying  that  I  choose  it  for  my  own  sake,  or  for  the 
sake  of  appeasing  the  desire,  and  not  on  account  of  its  own 
intrinsic  value.  All  such  choice  is  alway  s  and  necessarily  par- 
tial. It  is  giving  one  interest  the  preference  over  another 
26* 


306  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

not  because  of  its  perceived  intrinsic  and  superior  value,  but 
because  it  is  an  object  of  desire.  If  I  yield  to  desire  in  any 
case  it  must  be  to  gratify  the  desire.  This  is,  and  in  the  case 
supposed,  must  be  the  end  for  which  the  choice  is  made.  To 
deny  this  is  to  deny  that  the  will  seeks  the  object  because  it 
is  desired.  Partiality  consists  in  giving  one  thing  the  prefer- 
ence of  another  for  no  good  reason.  That  is,  not  because  the 
intelligence  demands  this  preference,  but  because  the  sensi- 
bility demands  it.  Partiality  is  therefore  always  and  neces- 
sarily an  attribute  of  selfishness. 

7.  Impenitence  is  another  modification  of  selfishness.  Per- 
haps it  is  more  proper  to  say  that  impenitence  is  only  anoth- 
er name  for  selfishness.  Penitence  or  repentance  is  the  turn- 
ing of  the  heart  from  selfishness  to  benevolence.  Impenitence 
is  the  heart's  cleaving  to  the  commission  of  sin,  or  more  prop- 
erly cleaving  to  that,  the  willing  and  doing  of  which  is  sin. 

8.  Unbelief  is  another  modification  or  attribute  of  selfish- 
ness. Unbelief  is  not  a  mere  negation  or  the  mere  absence 
of  faith.  Faith  is  the  reposing  of  confidence  in  God.  Unbe- 
lief is  the  withholding  of  confidence  in  Him.  Faith  is  a  com- 
mittal or  yielding  up  of  the  will  to  be  moulded  and  influenced 
by  truth.  Unbelief  is  trusting  in  self  and  refusing  to  trust  our 
souls  and  our  interests  in  God's  hands  and  to  commit  them  to  his 
disposal.  It  is  saying,  I  will  take  care  of  my  own  interests  and 
let  God  take  care  of  His.  ''  Who  is  God  that  I  should  serve 
Him,  and  what  profit  should  I  have  should  I  pray  unto  Him?" 
It  is  a  refusal  to  commit  ourselves  to  the  guidance  of  God  and 
trusting  to  our  own  guidance.  It  is  self-trust,  self-dependence; 
and  what  is  this  but  selfishness  and  self-seeking?  Christ  says  to 
the  Jews,  "  How  can  ye  believe  which  seek  honor  one  of  an- 
other, and  seek  not  the  honor  that  cometh  from  God  only?" 
This  assumes  that  unbelief  is  a  modification  of  selfishness; 
that  their  regard  to  their  reputation  with  men,  rendered 
faith,  while  that  self-seeking  spirit  was  indulged,  impossible. 
They  withheld  confidence  in  Christ  because  it  would  cost 
them  their  reputation  with  men  to  believe.  So  every  sin- 
ner who  ever  heard  the  gospel  and  has  not  embraced  it, 
withholds  confidence  in  Christ  because  it  will  cost  self  too 
much  to  yield  this  confidence.  This  is  true  in  every  case  of 
unbelief.  Confidence  is  withheld  because  to  yield  it  involves 
and  implies  the  denying  of  ourselves  all  ungodliness  and  every 
worldly  lust.  Christ  requires  the  abandonment  of  every 
form  and  degree  of  selfishness.  To  believe  is  to  receive 
with  the  heart  Christ's  instruction,  and  requirements.    To 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


30^ 


trust  in  them — to  commit  our  whole  being  to  be  moulded  by 
them.  Now  who  does  not  see  that  unbelief  is  only  a  selfish 
withholding  of  this  confidence,  this  committal?  The  fact  is 
that  faith  implies  and  consists  in  the  yielding  up  of  selfishness; 
and  unbelief  is  only  selfishness  contemplated  in  its  relations 
to  Christ  and  His  gospel. 


LECTURE   XXV. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  SELFISHNESS. 

What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  Law  op  God. 

9.  Efficiency  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Desire  never  produces  action  until  it  influences  the  will. 
It  has  no  efficiency  or  causality  in  itself.  It  can  not  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  will,  command  the  attention  of  the 
intellect,  or  move  a  muscle  of  the  body.  The  whole  causality 
of  the  mind  resides  in  the  will.  In  it  lies  the  power  of  ac- 
complishment. 

Again.  The  whole  efficiency  of  the  mind  as  it  respects  ac- 
complishment, resides  in  the  choice  of  an  end  or  in  the  ulti- 
mate intention.  All  action  of  the  will  or  all  willing  must 
consist  in  choosing  either  an  end  or  the  means  of  accomplish- 
ing an  end.  If  there  is  choice,  something  is  chosen.  That 
something  is  chosen  for  some  reason.  To  deny  this  is  a  deni- 
al that  any  thing  is  chosen.  The  reason  for  the  choice  and 
the  thing  chosen  are  identical.  This  we  have  repeatedly 
seen. 

Again:  We  have  seen  that  the  means  can  not  be  chosen 
until  the  end  is  chosen.  The  choice  of  the  end  is  distinct 
from  the  volitions  or  endeavors  of  the  mind  to  secure  the  end. 
But  although  the  choice  of  an  end  is  not  identical  with  the 
subordinate  choices  and  volitions  to  secure  the  end,  yet  it  ne- 
cessitates them.  The  choice  once  made,  secures  or  necessi- 
tates the  executive  volitions  to  secure  the  end.  By  this  it  is  not 
intended  that  the  mind  is  not  free  to  relinquish  its  end,  and  of 
course  to  relinquish  the  use  of  the  means  to  accomplish  it; 
but  only  that,  while  the  choice  or  intention  remains,  the  choice 
of  the  end  is  efficient  in  producing  efforts  to  realize  the  end. 
This  is  true  both  of  benevolence  and  selfishness.  They  are 
both  choices  of  an  end,  and  are  necessarily  efficient  in  produ- 
cing the  use  of  the  means  to  realize  this  end.  They  are 
choices  of  opposite  ends,  and  of  course  will  produce  their  re- 
spective results. 

The  bible  represents  sinners  as  having  eyes  full  of  adultery 
and  that  can  not  cease  from  sin;  that  while  the  will  is  com- 
mitted to  the  indulgence  of  the  propensities,  they  can  not 
cease  from  the  indulgence.  There  is  no  way  therefore  for  the 
sinner  to  escape  from  the  commission  of  sin,  but  to  cease  to 
be  selfish.    While  selfishness  continues  you  may  change  the 


(^ 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  309 

form  of  outward  manifestation,  you  may  deny  one  appetite 
oc  desire  for  the  sake  of  indulging  another;  but  it  is  and  must 
be  sin  still.  The  desire  to  escape  hell  and  to  obtain  heaven 
may  become  the  strongest,  in  which  case  selfishness  will  take 
on  a  most  sanctimonious  type.  But  if  the  will  is  following 
desire,  it  is  selfishness  still;  and  all  your  rehgious  duties  as 
you  call  them,  are  only  selfishness  robed  in  the  stolen  habili-  y' 
ments  of  love. 

Be  it  remembered  then  that  selfishness  is  choice.  It  is 
ultimate  intention.  It  is  and  must  be  efficient  in  producing 
its  effects.  It  is  cause;  the  effect  must  follow.  The  whole 
life  and  activity  of  sinners  is  founded  in  it.  'It  constitutes 
their  life,  or  rather  their  spiritual  death.  They  are  dead  in 
trespasses  and  in  sins.  It  is  in  vain  for  them  to  dream  of  do- 
ing any  thing  good  until  they  relinquish  their  selfishness. 
While  this  continues,  they  can  not  act  at  all  except  as  they  use 
the  means  to  accomplish  a  selfish  end.  It  is  impossible  while 
the  will  remains  committed  to  a  selfish  end  or  to  the  promotion 
of  self-interest  or  self-gratification  that  it  should  use  the  means 
to  promote  a  benevolent  end.  The  first  thing  is  to  change  the 
end,  and  then  the  sinner  can  cease  from  outward  sin.  Indeed, 
if  the  end  be  changed,  the  same  acts  which  were  before  sinful 
will  become  holy.  While  the  selfish  end  continued  whatever 
the  sinner  did,  was  all  selfish.  Whether  he  ate,  or  drank,  or 
labored,  or  preached,  or  in  short  whatever  he  did,  was  to  pro- 
mote some  form  of  self-interest.  The  end  being  wrong,  all 
was  and  must  have  been  wrong. 

But  let  the  end  be  changed;  let  benevolence  take  the 
place  of  selfishness,  and  all  is  right.     With  this  end  in  view 

the   mind  is  absolutely  incapable  of  doing  any  thing  or  of 

choosing  any  thing  except  as  a  means  of  promoting  the   good 

of  the  universe. 
I  wish  to  impress  this  truth  deeply  upon  the  mind.     Let  me 

therefore  give  the  substance  of  the  preceding  remarks  in  the 

form  of  definite  propositions. 

1.  All  action  consists  in  or  results  from  choice. 

2.  All  choice  must  respect  or  consist  in  the  choice  of  an  end 
or  of  means.  The  mind  is  incapable  of  choosing  unless  it  has 
an  object  of  choice,  and  that  object  must  be  Regarded  by  the 
mind  either  as  an  end  or  as  a  means. 

3.  The  mind  can  have  but  one  ultimate  end  at  the  same  time. 

4.  It  can  not  choose  the  means  until  it  has  chosen  the  end. 

5.  It  can  not  choose  one  end  and  use  means  to  accomplish 
'another,  at  the  same  time. 


310  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

6.  Therefore,  while  the  will  is  benevolent  or  committed  to 
the  glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  being,  it  can  not  use  the 
means  of  self-gratification,  or  in  other  words  it  can  not  put 
forth  selfish  volitions. 

7.  When  the  will  is  committed  to  self-indulgence  "  it  can  not 
use  the  means  designed  to  glorify  God  and  promote  the  good 
of  men  as  an  end.     This  is  impossible. 

8.  The  carnal  heart  or  mind  cannot  but  sin;  it  is  not  sub- 
ject to  the  law  of  God  neither  indeed  can  be,"  because  it  is 
"enmity  against  God." 

V  9.  The  new  or  regenerate  heart  can  not  sin.  It  is  benevo- 
lence, love  to  God  and  man.  This  can  not  sin.  These  are 
both  ultimate  choices  or  intentions.  They  are  from  their 
own  nature  efficient  each  excluding  the  other,  and  each  se- 
curing for  the  time  being,  the  exclusive  use  of  means  to  pro- 
mote its  end.  To  deny  this,  is  the  same  absurdity  as  to  main- 
tain, either  that  the  will  can  at  the  same  time  choose  two  op- 
posite ends,  or  that  it  can  choose  one  end  only,  but  at  the 
same  time  choose  the  means  to  accomplish  another  end  not 
yet  chosen.  Now  either  alternative  is  absurd.  Then  holi- 
ness and  sin  can  never  co-exist  in  the  same  mind.  Each  as 
has  been  said,  for  the  time  being,  necessarily  excludes  the  oth- 
er. Selfishness  and  benevolence  co-exist  in  the  same  mind! 
A  greater  absurdity  and  a  more  gross  contradiction  was  never 
conceived  or  expressed.  No  one  for  a  moment  ever  supposed 
that  selfishness  and  benevolence  could  co-exist  in  the   same 

^    mind,  who    had  clearly    defined  ideas   of  what  they   are. 

^  When  desire  is  mistaken  on  the  one  hand  for  benevolence,  and 
on  the  other  for  selfishness,  the  mistake  is  natural  that  selfish- 
ness and  benevolence  can  co-exist  in  the  same  mind.  But  as 
soon  as  it  is  seen  that  benevolence  and  selfishness  are  supreme 
ultimate  opposite  choices,  the  affirmation  is  instantaneous  and 
irresistible  that  they  can  neither  co-exist,  nor  can  one  use 
means  to  promote  the  other.  While  benevolence  remains  the 
mind's  whole  activity  springs  from  it  as  from  a  fountain.  This 
is  the  philosophy  of  Christ.  ''  Either  make  the  tree  good, 
and  his  fruit  good;  or  else  make  the  tree  corrupt,  and  his  fruit 
corrupt:  for  the  tree  is  known  by  his  fruit.  A  good  man  out 
of  the  good  treasure  of  the  heart  bringeth  forth  good  things: 
and  an  evil  man  out  of  the  evil  treasure  bringeth  forth  evil 
things."— Matt.  12:  33,  35.  "Doth  a  fountain  send  forth  at 
the  same  place  sweet  -water  and  bitter?  Can  the  fig  tree,  my 
brethren,  bear  olive  berries?  either  a  vine  figs?  so  can  no 
fountain  both  yield  salt  water  and  fresh." — James  3:  11, 12, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  311 

*^Fora  good  tree  bringeth  not  forth  corrupt  fruit;  neither 
doth  a  corrupt  tree  bring  forth  good  fruit.  For  every  tree  is 
known  by  his  own  fruit:  for  of  thorns  men  do  not  gather  figs, 
nor  of  a  bramble  bush  gather  they  grapes.  A  good  man  out 
of  the  good  treasure  of  his  heart,  bringeth  forth  that  which  is 
good;  and  an  evil  man  out  of  the  evil  treasure  of  his  heart, 
bringeth  forth  that  which  is  evil;  for  out  of  the  abundance  of 
the  heart  his  mouth  speaketh.^' — Luke  6:43,  44,45. 

10.  Opposition  to  benevolence  or  to  virtue^  or  to  holiness  and 
true  religion,  is  one  of  the  attributes  of  selfishness. 

Selfishness  is  not,  in  its  relations  to  benevolence  a  mere 
negation.  It  can  not  be.  It  is  the  choice  of  self-gratifi- 
cation as  the  supreme  and  ultimate  end  of  life.  While  the 
will  is  committed  to  this  end,  and  benevolence  or  a  mind 
committed  to  an  opposite  end  is  contemplated,  the  will  can 
not  remain  in  a  state  of  indifference  to  benevolence.  It  must 
either  yield  its  preference  of  self-indulgence,  or  resist  the  be- 
nevolence which  the  intellect  perceives.  The  will  can  not 
remain  in  the  exercise  of  this  selfish  choice  without  as  it  were 
bracing  and  girding  itself  against  that  virtue  which  it  does  not 
imitate.  If  it  does  not  imitate  it,  it  must  be  because  it  refuses 
to  do  so.  The  intelligence  does  and  must  strongly  urge  the 
will  to  imitate  benevolence  and  to  seek  the  same  end.  The 
will  must  yield  or  resist,  and  the  resistance  must  be  more  or 
less  resolute  and  determined  as  the  demands  of  the  intelli- 
gence are  more  or  less  emphatic.  This  resistance  to  benevo- 
lence or  to  the  demands  of  the  intelHgence  in  view  of  it,  is 
what  the  bible  calls  hardening  the  heart.  It  is  obstinacy  of 
will  under  the  light  of  the  presence  of  true  religion  and  the 
claims  of  benevolence. 

This  opposition  to  benevolence  or  true  religion  must  be  de- 
veloped whenever  the  mind  apprehends  true  rehgion,  or  self- 
ishness must  be  abandoned.  Not  only  must  this  opposition 
be  developed,  or  selfishness  abandoned  under  such  circum- 
stances, but  it  must  increase  as  true  religion  displays  more  and 
more  of  its  loveliness.  As  the  light  from  the  radiant  sun  of 
benevolence  is  poured  more  and  more  upon  the  darkness  of 
selfishness,  the  opposition  of  the  heart  must  of  necessity  in- 
:  crease  in  the  same  proportion,  or  selfishness  must  be  aban- 
-  doned.  Thus  selfishness  remaining  under  light,  must  mani- 
fest more  and  more  opposition  just  in  proportion  as  light  in- 
creases and  the  soul  has  less  the  color  of  an  apology  for  its 
opposition. 

This  peculiarity  of  selfishness  has  always  been  manifested 


312  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

just  in  proportion  as  it  has  been  dragged  into  the  light  of  true 
religion.  This  accounts  for  all  the  opposition  that  has  been 
made  to  true  religion  since  the  world  began.  It  also  proves 
that  where  there  are  impenitent  sinners,  and  they  retain  their 
impenitence  and  manifest  no  hostility  to  the  rehgion  which  they 
witness,  that  there  is  something  defective  in  the  professed  pie- 
ty which  they  behold,  or  at  least  they  do  not  contemplate  all 
the  attributes  of  true  piety.  It  also  proves  that  persecution 
will  always  exist  where  much  true  religion  is  manifested  to 
those  who  hold  fast  their  selfishness. 

The  fact  is,  that  selfishness  and  benevolence  are  just  as 
much  opposed  to  each  other,  and  just  as  much  and  as  neces- 
sarily at  war  with  each  other  as  God  and  Satan,  as  heaven 
and  hell.  There  can  never  be  a  truce  between  them;  they 
are  essential  and  eternal  opposites.  They  are  not  merely 
opposites,  but  they  are  opposite  causes.  They  are  essential 
activities.  They  are  the  two,  and  the  only  two  great  antago- 
nistic principles  in  the  universe  of  mind.  Each  is  heaving 
and  energizing  like  a  volcano  to  realize  its  end.  A  war  of 
mutual  and  uncompromising  extermination  necessarily  exists 
between  them.  Neither  can  be  in  the  presence  of  the  other 
without  repellance  and  opposition.  Each  energizes  to  sub- 
due and  overcome  the  other;  and  already  selfishness  has  shed 
an  ocean  of  the  blood  of  the  saints,  and  also  the  precious 
blood  of  the  Prince  of  life.  There  is  not  a  more  gross  and 
injurious  mistake  than  to  suppose  that  selfishness  ever,  under 
any  circumstances,  becomes  reconciled  to  benevolence.  The 
supposition  is  absurd  and  contradictory;  since  for  selfishness 
to  become  reconciled  to  benevolence,  were  the  same  thing  as 
for  selfishness  to  become  benevolence.  Selfishness  may 
change  the  mode  of  attack  or  of  its  opposition,  but  its  real  op- 
position it  can  never  change  while  it  retains  its  own  nature 
and  continues  to  be  selfishness. 

The  opposition  of  the  heart  to  benevolence  often  begets 
deep  opposition  of  feeling.  The  opposition  of  the  will  en- 
gages the  intellect  in  fabricating  excuses,  and  cavils,  and 
lies,  and  refuges,  and  often  greatly  perverts  the  thoughts, 
and  begets  the  most  bitter  feelings  imaginable  toward  God 
and  toward  the  saints.  Selfishness  will  strive  to  justify  its 
opposition  and  to  shield  itself  against  the  reproaches  of  con- 
ficience,  and  will  resort  to  every  possible  expedient  to  cover 
up  its  real  hostility  to  holiness.  It  will  pretend  that  it  is  not 
holiness,  but  sin  that  it  opposes.  But  the  fact  is,  it  is  not  sin 
but  holiness  to  which  it  stands  forever  opposed.     The  opposi- 


MORAL    GOVERNMENT.  313 

tion  of  feeling  is  only  developed  when  the  heart  is  brought 
into  a  strong  light  and  makes  deep  and  strong  resistance.  In 
such  cases  the  sensibihtj  sometimes  boils  with  feelings  of 
bitter  opposition  to  God  and  Christ  and  to  all  good. 

The  question  is  often  asked,  may  not  this  opposition  exist  in 
the  sensibiUty,  and  those  feelings  of  hostility  to  God  exist 
when  the  heart  is  in  a  truly  benevolent  state?  To  this  inqui- 
ry I  would  reply:  If  it  can  it  must  be  produced  by  infernal 
or  some  other  influence  that  misrepresents  God  and  places 
His  character  before  the  mind  in  a  false  Hght.  Blasphemous 
thoughts.may  be  suggested,  and  as  it  were  injected  into  the 
mind.  These  thoughts  may  have  their  natural  effect  in  the 
sensibility,  and  feelings  of  bitterness  and  hostility  may  exist 
without  the  consent  of  the  will.  The  will  may  all  the  while  h^e 
endef^voring  to  repel  these  suggestions,  and  divert  the  atten- 
tion from  such  thoughts,  yet  Satan  may  continue  to  hurl  his 
fiery  darts,  and  the  soul  may  be  racked  with  torture  under  the 
poison  of  hell,  which  seenis  to  be  taking  effect  in  the  Sensi- 
biUty. The  mind,  at  such  tirhes,  seems  to  itself  to  be  filled, 
so  far  as  feehng  is  concerned,  with  all  the  bitterness  of  hell. 
And  so  it  is,  and  yet  it  may  be  that  in  all  this  there  is  no  self- 
ishness. If  the  will  holds  fast  its  integrity;  if  it  holds  out  in 
the  struggle,  and  where  God  is  maligned  and  misrepresented 
by  the  infernal  suggestions,  it  says  with  Job,  '•'•  Altliough  Hje 
slay  me  yet  will  I  trust  in  Him."  However  sharp  thq  conflict 
in  such  cases,  we  can  look  back  and  say,  we  are  more  than 
conquerors  through  Him  that  loved  us.  In  such  cases  it  is 
the  selfishness  of  Satan  and  not  our  own  selfishness  tnat  kin- 
dled up  those  fires  of  hell  in  our  sensibility^.  "Blessed  is  he 
that  endureth  temptation;  for  when  he  is  tried"4iej,shall  have 
a  crown  of  life." 

11.  Cruelty  \^  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

This  term  is  often  used  to  designate  a  state  of  the  sensi- 
bility. It  then  represents  that  state  of  feeling  that  has  a  bar- 
barous or  savage  pleasure  in  the  misery  of  others. 

Cruelty,  as  a  phenomenon  of  the  will,  or  as  an  attribute  of 
selfishness,  consists,  first,  in  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  well- 
being  of  God  and  the  universe,  and,  secondly,  in  persevering 
in  a  course  that  must  ruin  the  souls  of  the  subjects  of  it,  and 
so  far  as  they  have  influence,  ruin  the  souls  of  others.  What 
should  we  think  of  a  man  who  was  so  intent  on  securing  some 
petty  gratification  that  he  would  not  give  the  alarm  if  a  city 
were  on  fire,  and  the  sleeping  citizens  in  imminent  danger  of 
perishing  in  the  flames?  Suppose  that  sooner  than  deny  hinj- 
27 


314  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

self  some  momentary  gratification,  he  would  jeopard  many 
lives.  Should  we  not  call  this  cruelty  ?  Now  there  are  many 
forms  of  cruelty.  Because  sinners  are  not  always  brought 
into  circumstances  where  they  exercise  certain  forms  of  it, 
they  flatter  themselves  that  they  are  not  cruel.  But  the  fact 
is,  that  selfishness  is  always  and  necessarily  cruel — cruel  to 
the  soul  and  highest  interests  of  the  subject  of  it;  cruel  to  the 
souls  of  others  in  neglecting  to  care  and  do  for  their  salvation 
what  may  be  done;  cruel  to  God  in  abusing  Him  in  ten  thou- 
sand ways;  cruel  to  the  whole  universe.  If  we  should  be 
shocked  at  the  cruelty  of  him  who  should  see  his  neighbor's 
bouse  on  fire,  and  the  family  asleep,  and  neglect  to  give  them 
warning  because  too  self-indulgent  to  rise  from  his  bed,  what 
shall  we  say  of  the  cruelty  of  one  who  shall  see  his  neigh- 
bor's soul  in  peril  of  eternal  death,  and  yet  neglect  to  give 
him  warning? 

Sinners  are  apt  to  possess  very  good  dispositions,  as  they 
express  it.  They  suppose  they  are  the  reverse  of  being  cruel. 
They  possess  tender  feelings,  are  often  very  compassionate  in 
their  feelings  toward  those  who  are  sick  and  in  distress,  and 
who  are  in  circumstances  of  any  affliction.  They  are  ready 
to  do  many  things  for  them.  Such  persons  would  be  shock- 
ed, should  they  be  called  cruel.  And  many  professors  would 
take  their  part,  and  consider  them  abused.  Whatever  else,  it 
would  be  said,  is  an  attribute  of  their  character,  surely  cruelty 
is  not.  Now  it  is  true  that  there  are  certain  forms  of  cruelty 
with  which  such  persons  are  not  chargable.  But  this  is  only 
because  God  has  so  moulded  their  constitution  that  they  are 
not  delighted  in  the  misery  of  their  fellow  men.  However, 
there  is  no  virtue  in  their  not  being  gratified  at  the  sight  of 
suffering,  nor  in  their  painstaking  to  prevent  it  while  they 
continue  selfish.  They  follow  the  impulses  of  their  feelings, 
and  if  their  temperament  were  such  that  it  would  gratify  them 
to  inflict  misery  on  others;  if  this  were  the  strongest  tenden- 
cy of  their  sensibiUty;  their  selfishness  would  instantly  take 
on  that  type.  But  notwithstanding  cruelty  in  all  its  forms  is 
not  common  to  all  selfish  persons;  it  is  still  true  that  some  form 
of  cruelty  is  practised  by  every  sinner.  God  says:  '^the  ten- 
der mercies  of  the  wicked  are  cruel."  The  fact  that  they  live 
in  sin,  that  they  set  an  example  of  selfishness,  that  they  do 
nothing  for  their  own  souls  or  for  the  souls  of  others; — these 
are  really  most  atrocious  forms  of  cruelty,  and  infinitely  ex- 
ceed all  those  comparatively  petty  forms  that  relate  to  the 
miseries  of  men  in  this  life. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  315 

12.   Unreasonableness  is   another  attribute   of  selfishness. 

The  very  definition  of  selfishness  implies  that  unreasona- 
bleness is  one  of  its  attributes.  Selfishness  consists  in  the 
will's  yielding  itself  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility  in  op- 
position to  the  demands  of  the  intelligence.  Therefore,  every 
act  or  choice  of  the  will  is  necessarily  altogether  unreasona- 
ble. The  sinner,  while  he  continues  such,  never  says  or  does 
one  thing  that  is  in  accordance  with  right  reason.  Hence  the 
Bible  says  that  ''madness  is  in  their  heart  while  they  live." 
They  have  made  an  unreasonable  choice  of  an  end,  and  all 
their  choices  of  means  to  secure  their  end  are  only  a  carrying 
out  of  their  ultimate  choice.  They  are,  every  one  of  them, 
put  forth  ,to  secure  an  end  contrary  to  reason.  Therefore, 
no  sinner  who  has  never  been  converted,  has,  even  in  a  single 
instance,  chosen  otherwise  than  in  direct  opposition  to  rea- 
son. 

They  are  not  merely  sometimes  unreasonable,  but  uniform- 
ly, and  while  they  remain  selfish,  necessarily  so.  The  very 
first  time  that  a  sinner  acts  or  wills  reasonably,  is  when  he 
turns  to  God,  or  repents  and  becomes  a  christian.  This  is 
the  first  instance  in  which  he  practically  acknowledges  that 
he  has  reason.  All  previous  to  this,  every  one  of  the  actions 
of  his  will  and  of  his  life,  is  a  practical  denial  of  his  manhood, 
of  his  rational  nature,  of  his  obligation  to  God  or  his  neigh* 
bor.  We  sometimes  hear  impenitent  sinners  spoken  of  as 
being  unreasonable,  and  in  such  a  mar.ner  S5  to  imply  t\t?^t 
all  sinners  are  not  so.  But  this  only  favors  the  delusion  of 
sinners  by  leaving  them  to  suppose  that  they  are  not  all  of 
them  at  all  times  altogether  unreasonable.  But  the  fact  is, 
that  there  is  not,  and  there  never  can  be  in  earth  or  hell  one 
impenitent  sinner  who  in  any  instance  acts  otherwise  than  in 
direct  and  palpable  opposition  to  his  reason. 

It  had,  therefore,  been  infinitely  better  for  sinners  if  they 
had  never  been  endowed  with  reason.  They  do  not  merely 
act  without  consulting  their  reason,  but  in  stout  and  deter- 
mined opposition  to  it. 

Again:  They  act  as  directly  in  opposition  to  it  as  they  pos- 
sibly can.  They  not  only  oppose  it,  but  they  oppose  it  as 
much  and  in  as  aggravated  a  manner  as  possible.  What  can 
be  more  directly  and  aggravatedly  opposed  to  reason  than 
the  choice  which  the  sinner  makes  of  an  end?  Reason  was 
given  him  to  direct  him  in  regard  to  the  choice  of  the  great 
end  ofHfe.  It  gives  him  the  idea  of  the  eternal  and  the  infi- 
nite.    It  spreads  out  before  him  the  interests  of  God  and  of 


316  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  universe  as  t)f  absolutely  infinite  value.  It  affirms  their 
value  and  the  infinite  obligation  of  the  sinner  to  consecrate 
himself  to  these  interests  and  it  promises  him  endless  rev^ards 
if  he  will  4^80,  On  the  contrary  it  lays  before  him  the  con- 
sequences of  refusal.  It  thunders  in  his  ear  the  terrible  sanc- 
tions of  the  law.  It  points  him  to  the  coming  doom  that 
awaits  his  refusal  to  comply  with  its  demands.  But  behold 
in  the  face  of  all  this  the  sinner,  unhesitatingly  in  the  face  of 
these  affirmations,  demands  and  threatens,  turns  away  and 
consecrates  himself  to  the  gratification  of  his  desires  with  the 
certainty  that  he  could  not  do  greater  despite  to  his  own  na- 
ture than  in  this  most  mad,  most  preposterous,  most  blasphe- 
mous choice.  Why  do  not  sinners  consider  that  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  them  to  offer  a  greater  insult  to  God  who  gave  them 
reason,  or  more  truly  and  deeply  to  shame  and  degrade  them- 
selves, than  they  do  in  their  beastly  selfishness.  Total,  uni- 
versal, and  shameless  unreasonableness  is  the  universal  char- 
acteristic of  every  selfish  mind. 

13.  Injustice  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Justice  is  a  disposition  to  treat  every  being  and  interest 
according  to  its  intrinsic  worth. 

Injustice  is  the  opposite  of  this.  It  is  a  disposition  to  give 
the  preference  to  self-interest,  regardless  of  the  relative  value 
of  the  interests.  The  nature  of  selfishness  demonstrates  that 
injustice  is  always  and  necessarily  one  of  its  atttributes,  and 
one  \h?l  ia  universaiiy  and  toiistantiy  manifested. 

(L)  There  is  the  utmost  injustice  in  the  end  chosen.  It  is 
the  practical  preference  of  a  petty  self-interest  over  infinite 
interests.  This  is  injustice  as  great  as  possible.  This  is 
universal  injustice  to  God  and  man.  It  is  the  most  palpable 
and  most  flagrant  piece  of  injustice  possible  to  every  being  in 
the  universe.  Not  one  known  by  him  to  exist  has  not  reason 
to  bring  against  him  the  charge  of  most  flagrant  and  shocking 
injustice.  This  injustice  extends  to  every  act  and  to  every 
moment  of  life.  He  is  never  in  the  least  degree  just  to  any 
being  in  the  universe.  Nay  he  is  perfectly  unjust.  He  cares 
nothing  for  the  rights  of  others  as  such,  and  never  even  in  ap- 
pearance regards  them  except  for  selfish  reasons.  This,  then, 
is  and  can  be  only  the  appearance  of  regarding,  while  in  fact 
no  right  of  any  being  in  the  universe  is  or  can  be  respected  by 
a  selfish  mind  any  farther  than  in  appearance.  To  deny  this, 
is  to  deny  his  selfishness.  He  performs  no  act  whatever  but 
for  one  reason,  that  is,  to  promote  his  own  gratification.  This 
is  his  end.     For  the  realization  of  this   end  every  effort 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  317 

is  made  and  every  individual  act  and  volition  put  forth. 
Remaining  selfish,  it  is  impossible  that  he  should  act  at 
all  but  with  reference  directly  or  indirectly  to  this  end. 
But  this  end  has  been  chosen  and  must  be  pursued,  if  pursued 
at  all,  in  the  most  palpable  and  outrageous  violation  of  the 
rights  of  God  and  of  every  creature  in  the  universe.  Justice 
demands  that  he  should  devote  himself  to  the  promotion  of  the 
highest  good  of  God  and  the  universe,  that  he  should  love  God 
with  all  his  heart  and  his  neighbor  as  himself  Every  sinner 
is  openly  and  universally  and  as  perfectly  unjust  as  possible 
at  every  moment  of  his  impenitence. 

It  should,  therefore,  always  be  understood  that  no  sinner  at 
any  time  is  at  all  just  to  any  being  in  the  universe.  All  his 
paying  of  his  debts,  and  all  his  apparent  fairness  and  justice, 
is  only  a  specious  form  of  selfishness.  He  has,  and  if  a  sinner 
it  is  impossible  that  he  should  not  have,  some  selfish  reason  for 
all  he  does,  is,  says,  or  omits.  His  entire  activity  is  selfish- 
ness, and  while  he  remains  impenitent,  it  is  impossible  for  him 
to  think,  or  act,  or  will,  or  do,  or  be,  or  say,  any  thing  more  or 
less  than  he  judges  expedient  to  promote  his  own  interest. 
He  is  not  just.  He  can  not  be  just,  nor  begin  in  any  instance 
or  in  the  least  degree  to  be  truly  just  either  to  God  or  man 
until  he  begins  life  anew,  gives  God  his  heart,  and  consecrates^ 
his  entire  being  to  the  promotion  of  the  good  of  universal  be-'  ^ 
ing.  This,  justice  demands.  There  is  no  beginning  to  be 
just  unless  the  sinner  begin  here.  Begin  and  be  just  in  the 
choice  of  the  great  end  of  life,  and  then  you  can  not  but  be 
just  in  the  use  of  means.  But  be  unjust  in  the  choice  of  an 
end,  and  it  is  impossible  for  you,  in  any  instance,  to  be  other- 
wise than  totally  unjust  in  the  use  of  means.  In  this  case 
your  entire  activity  is,  and  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  tissue 
of  the  most  abominable  inj  ustice.  >/ 

The  only  reason  why  every  sinner  does  not  openly  and 
daily  practice  every  species  of  outward  commercial  injus- 
tice, is  that  he  is  so  circumstanced  that  upon  the  whole  he 
judges  it  not  for  his  interest  to  practice  those  things.  This 
is  the  reason  universally,  and  no  thanks  to*  any  sinner  for  ab- 
staining in  any  instance  from  any  kind  or  degree  of  injustice 
in  practice,  for  he  is  only  restrained  and  kept  from  it  by  sel- 
fish considerations.  That  is,  he  is  too  selfish  to  do  it.  His 
selfishness  and  not  the  love  of  God  or  man  prevents.  '     ^  \ 

He  may  be  prevented  by  a  constitutional  or  phrenological        f  ' 
conscientiousness,  or  sense  of  justice.     But  this  is  only  a  feel- 
ing of  the  sensibility,  and  if  restrained  only  by  this,  he  is  just 
27* 


o< 


318  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

^  as  absolutel)'  selfish  as  if  he  had  stolen  a  horse  in  obedience 
to  acquisitiveness.  God  so  tempers  the  constitution  as  to  re- 
strain men,  that  is,  that  one  form  of  selfishness  shall  prevail 
over  another.  Approbativeness  is  in  most  persons  so  large 
that  a  desire  to  be  applauded  by  their  fellow  men  so  modi- 
fies the  developments  of  their  selfishness  that  it  takes  on  a 
type  of  outward  decency  and  appearance  of  justice.  But  this 
is  no  less  selfishness  than  if  it  took  on  altogether  a  different 
(/  type. 


wmmmim 


LECTURE   XXVI.  .ii|^^.- 

ATTRIBUTES  OF  SELFISHNESS. 

What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

14.   Oppression  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Oppression  is  the  spirit  of  slaveholding.  It  consists  in  a 
disposition  to  deprive  others  of  their  rights  for  the  purpose  of 
contributing  to  our  own  interest  or  gratification.  To  define 
it  comprehensively:  it  is  a  disposition  to  enslave  God  and  all 
the  universe;  to  make  them  all  give  up  their  interest  and 
happiness  and  glory  and  seek  and  live  for  ours.  It  is  a  will- 
ing that  all  beings  should  live  to  and  for  2is;  that  all  interests 
should  bend  and  be  sacrificed  to  ours.  It  is  a  practical  denial 
of  all  rights  but  our  own,  and  a  practical  setting  up  the  claim 
that  all  beings  are  ours,  our  goods  and  chattels,  our  property. 
It  is  a  spirit  that  aims  at  making  all  beings  serve  us  and  all 
interests  subserve  our  own. 

This  must  be  an  attribute  of  selfishness.  Self-interest  is 
the  ultimate  end;  and  the  whole  life  and  activity  and  aim  and 
effort  is  to  secure  this  end.  The  sinner,  while  he  remains 
such  has  absolutely  no  other  end  in  view  and  no  other  ulti- 
mate motive  in  any  thing  he  does.  Selfishness  or  self-grati- 
fication under  some  form  is  the  reason  for  every  volition, 
action  and  omission.  For  this  end  alone  he  lives  and  moves 
and  has  his  being.  This  being  his  only  end,  it  is  impossible 
that  oppression  should  not  be  an  attribute  of  his  character. 
The  whole  of  oppression  is  included  in  the  choice  of  the  end  of 
life.  Nothing  can  be  more  oppressive  to  the  whole  universe 
than  for  a  being  to  set  up  his  interest  as  the  sole  good  and 
account  all  other  interests  as  of  no  value  except  as  they  con- 
tribute to  his  own.  This  is  the  perfection  of  oppression,  and 
it  matters  not  what  particular  course  it  takes  to  secure  its 
end.  They  are  all  equally  oppressive.  If  he  does  not  seek 
the  good  of  others  for  its  own  sake,  but  simply  as  a  means  of 
securing  his  own,  which  must  be  the  fact,  it  matters  not  at  all 
whether  he  pamper  and  fatten  his  slaves  or  whether  he 
starve  them,  whether  he  work  them  hard  or  let  them  lounge, 
whether  he  lets  them  go  naked  or  arrays  them  in  costly  at- 
tire. All  is  done  for  one  and  but  one  ultimate  reason,  and 
that  is  to  promote  self-interest  and  not  at  all  for  the  intrinsic 
value  of  any  interest  but  that  of  self  If  such  an  one  prays 
to  God  it  is  because  he  is  unable  to  command  and  govern  him 


320  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

by  authority,  and  not  at  all  out  of  any  true  regard  to  the 
rights  or  character  or  relations  of  God.  He  desires  God's 
services;  and  because  he  can  not  get  them  by  force,  he  in- 
treats.  God's  interests  and  rights  are  practically  treated  as 
of  no  value  by  every  sinner  in  the  universe.  They  care  no- 
thing for  God  except  to  enslave  him,  that  is,  to  make  Him 
serve  them  without  wages.  They  have  no  design  to  live  to 
and  for  Him  but  that  He  should  live  to  and  for  them.  They 
regard  all  other  beings  just  in  the  same  manner.  If  there  is 
in  any  instance  the  semblance  of  a  regard  to  their  interest  for 
its  own  sake,  it  is  only  a  semblance  and  not  a  reahty.  It  is 
not,  and  it  can  not  be  a  reality.  The  assertion  that  it  is  any 
thing  more  than  a  hypocritical  pretence,  is  absurd  and  con- 
tradicts the  supposition  that  he  is  a  sinner,  or  selfish. 

There  are  innumerable  specious  forms  of  oppression  that 
to  a  superficial  observer  appear  very  like  a  regard  to  the  real 
interest  of  the  oppressed  for  its  own  sake. 

It  may  be  gratifying  to  the  pride,  the  ambition  or  to  some 
^       other  feeling  of  a  slaveholder  to  see  his  slaves  well  fed,  well 
clad,  full  fleshed,  cheerful,  contented,  attached  to  their  mas- 
ter.    For  the  same  reason  he  might  feed  his  dog,  provide  him 
a  warm  kennel,  and  ornament  his  neck  with  a  brazen  collar. 
He  might  do  the  same  for  his  horse  and  for  his  swine.     But 
what  is  the  reason  of  all  this?     Why  to  gratify  himself.     God 
has  so  moulded  his  constitution  that  it  would  give  him  pain 
to  whip  his  slave  or  his  dog  or  his  horse,  or  to  see  them  hun- 
gry or  naked.     It  would  trouble  his  conscience  and  endanger 
his  peace  and  his  soul.     There  may  often  be  the  appearance 
of  virtue  in  a  slaveholder  and  in  slaveholding;  but  it  can  ab- 
solutely be  only  an  appearance.     If  it  be  properly  slavehold- 
ing it  is  and  must  be  oppression;  it  is  and  must  be  selfishness. 
Can  it  be  that  slaveholding  is  designed  to  promote  the  good 
of  the  slave  for  its  own  sake.     But  this  could  not  be  slave- 
holding. 
Q        Should  an  individual  be  held  to  service  for  his  own  benefit; 
should  the  law  of  benevolence  really  demand  it;  this  could  no 
more  be  the  crime  of  slaveholding  and  oppression  than  it  is 
murder  or  any  other  crime.     It  would  not  be  selfishness,  but 
benevolence,  and  therefore  no  crime  at  all,  but  virtue.     But 
selfishness  embodies  and  includes  every  element  of  oppression. 
Its  end,  the  means,  and  its  every  breath  is  but  an  incessant 
denial  of  all  rights  but  those  of  self.     All  sinners  are  oppres- 
sors and  slaveholders  in  heart  and  in  fact.     They  practice 
continual  oppression  and  nothing  else.     They  make  God 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  321 

serve  them  without  wages,  and  they,  as  he  says,  "  make  Him 
to  serve  with  their  sins."  God,  all  men  and  all  things  and 
events  are  as  far  as  possible  made  to  serve  them  without  the 
return  of  the  least  disinterested  regard  to  their  interests. 
Disinterested  regard!  Why  the  very  term  contradicts  the  sup- 
position that  he  is  a  sinner.  He  has,  he  can  have  in  no  in- 
stance any  other  than  selfish  aims  in  appearing,  to  care  for 
any  one's  interest  for  its  own  sake. 

All  unconverted  abolitionists  are  slaveholders  in  heart  and  so 
far  as  possible  in  life.  There  is  not  one  of  them  who  would 
not  enslave  every  slave  at  the  South  and  his  master  too  and  all 
at  the  North  and  the  whole  universe  and  God  himself  so  far 
as  he  could.  Indeed  he  does,  and  remaining  selfish,  he  can 
not  but  aim  to  enslave  all  beings,  to  make  them  so  far  as  pos- 
sible contribute  to  his  interest  and  pleasure  without  the  least 
disinterested  regard  to  their  interest  in  return. 

Oppression  is  an  essential  attribute  of  selfishness  and  always 
develops  itself  according  to  circumstances.  When  it  has 
power,  it  uses  the  chain  and  the  whip.  When  it  has  not 
power,  it  resorts  to  other  means  of  securing  the  services  of 
others  without  disinterested  return.  Sometimes  it  supplicates ; 
but  this  is  only  because  it  is  regarded  as  necessary  or  expe- 
dient. It  is  oppression  under  whatever  form  it  assumes.  It 
is  in  fact  a  denial  of  all  rights  but  those  of  self,  and  a  practical 
claiming  of  God  and  of  all  beings  and  events  as  ours.  It  is  to 
all  intents  the  chattel  principle  universally  applied.  So  that 
all  sinners  are  both  slaves  and  slaveholders;  in  heart  and  en- 
deavor they  enslave  God  and  all  men;  and  other  sinners  in 
heart  and  endeavor  enslave  them.  Every  sinner  is  endea- 
voring in  heart  to  appropriate  to  himself  all  good. 

15.   War  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

War  is  strife.  It  is  opposed  to  peace  or  amity.  Selfish- 
ness on  the  very  face  of  it,  is  a  declaration  of  war  with  all 
beings.  It  is  setting  up  self-interest  in  opposition  to  all  other 
interests.  It  is  an  attempt  and  a  deliberate  intention  to  seize 
upon  and  subordinate  all  interests  to  our  own.  It  is  impossi- 
ble that  there  should  not  be  a  state  of  perpetual  hostility  be- 
tween a  selfish  being  and  all  benevolent  beings.  They  are 
mutually  and  necessarily  opposed  to  each  other.  The  benev- 
olent are  seeking  the  universal  good,  and  the  selfish  are  seek- 
ing their  own  gratification  without  the  least  voluntary  regard 
to  any  interest  but  that  of  self.  Here  is  opposition  and  war 
of  course  and  of  necessity. 

But  it  is  no  less  true  that  every  selfish  being  is  at  war  with 


322  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ejery  other  selfish  being.  Each  is  seeking  and  fully  conse- 
crated to  his  own  interest  and  denying  all  rights  but  his  own. 
Here  is  and  must  be  war.  There  is  no  use  in  talking  of  put- 
ting away  slavery  or  war  from  earth  while  selfishness  is  in  it; 
for  they  both  inhere  in  the  very  nature  of  selfishness;  and 
every  selfish  being  is  an  oppressor,  a  slaveholder,  a  tyrant,  a 
warrior,  a  duelist,  a  pirate,  and  all  that  is  implied  in  making 
war  upon  all  beings.  This  is  no  railing  accusation,  but  sober 
verity.  The  forms  of  war  and  of  oppression  may  be  modified 
indefinitely.  The  bloody  sword  may  be  sheathed.  The 
manacle  and  the  lash  may  be  laid  aside,  and  a  more  refined 
mode  of  oppression  and  of  war  may  be  carried  on;  but  op- 
pression and  war  must  continue  under  some  form  so  long  as 
selfishness  continues.  It  is  impossible  that  it  should  not. 
Nor  will  the  more  refined  and  specious,  and  if  you  please, 
baptized  forms  of  oppression  and  war  that  may  succeed  those 
now  practised  involve  less  guilt  and  be  less  displeasing  to  God 
than  the  present.  No  indeed.  As  light  increases  and  com- 
pels selfishness  to  lay  aside  the  sword  and  bury  the  manacle 
and  the  whip  and  profess  the  religion  of  Christ  the  guilt  of 
selfishness  increases  every  moment.  The  former  manifesta- 
tion is  changed,  compelled  by  increasing  light  and  advancing 
civilization  and  christianization.  Oppression  and  war,  al- 
though so  much  changed  in  form  are  not  at  all  abandoned  in 
fact.  Nay,  they  are  only  strengthened  by  iicreasing  light. 
Nor  can  it  be  told  or  so  much  as  rationally  conjectured 
whether  the  more  refined  modifications  of  oppression  and  war 
that  may  succeed,  will  upon  the  whole  be  a  real  benefit  to 
mankind.  Guilt  will  certainly  increase  as  light  increases* 
Sin  abounds  and  becomes  exceeding  sinful  just  in  proportion 
as  the  light  of  truth  is  poured  upon  the  selfish  mind;  and 
whether  it  is  a  real  good  to  promote  mere  outward  reform 
without  reforming  the  heart,  who  can  tell  ?  The  fact  is  self- 
ishness must  be  done  away;  the  ax  must  be  laid  at  the  root 
of  the  tree.  It  is  a  mistaken  zeal  that  wastes  its  energies 
in  merely  modifying  the  forms  in  which  selfishness  manifests 
itself  in  changing  the  modes  of  oppression  and  war  and  bring- 
ing about  mere  refinements  in  sin.  I  can  not  for  my  life  re- 
spect in  myself  or  in  others  such  efforts.  What  do  they 
amount  to  after  all  but  to  whitewash  and  baptize  a  sinner  and 
gather  about  him  a  delusion  deep  as  death  and  send  him  by 
§ie  shortest  way  to  hell  ?  All  such  efforts  remind  me  of  an 
affirmation  I  once  heard  a  preacher  make,  namely,  "  that  self- 
righteousness  is  good  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  is  like  a  coat  without 
sleeves." 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  323 

Many  seem  to  think  that  to  bring  about  mere  outward  re- 
form is  a  good  so  far  as  it  goes.  But  it  is  no  real  good  un- 
less true  virtue  and  happiness  be  gained.  Unless  selfishness 
be  put  away  it  is  no  positive  good.  Whether,  then,  outward 
reforms  will  prove  to  be  the  less  of  two  evils,  who  can  tell? 
Do  you  ask,  then,  what  shall  we  do?  Shall  we  do  nothing, 
but  let  things  go  on  as  they  are?  I  answer,  no,  by  no  means. 
Do,  if  possible,  ten  times  more  than  ever  to  put  away  these  and 
all  the  evils  that  are  under  the  sun.  But  aim  at  the  annihila- 
tion of  selfishness,  and  when  you  succeed  in  reforming  the 
heart,  the  life  can  not  but  be  reformed.  Put  away  selfishness, 
and  oppression  and  war  are  no  more.  But  engage  in  bring- 
ing about  any  other  reform,  and  you  are  but  building  dams  of 
sand.  Selfishness  will  force  for  itself  a  channel;  and  who 
can  say  that  its  desolations  may  not  be  more  fearful  and  ca- 
lamitous in  this  new  modification  than  before?  Attempting 
to  reform  selfishness  and  teach  it  better  manners,  is  like  dam- 
ing  up  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi.  It  will  only  surely 
overflow  its  banks,  and  change  its  channel,  and  carry  devasta- 
tion and  death  in  its  course.  I  am  aware  that  many  will  re- 
gard this  as  heresy.  But  God  seeth  not  as  man  seeth.  Man 
looketh  on  the  outward  appearance,  but  God  looketh  on  the 
heart.  All  the  wars  and  filthiness  of  heathenism  God  winks 
at  as  comparatively  a  light  thing  when  put  into  the  .scale 
against  the  most  refined  form  of  intelligent  but  heartless  Chris- 
tianity that  ever  existed. 

But  to  return.  Let  it  be  forever  understood  that  selfishness 
is  at  war  with  all  nations  and  with  all  beings.  It  has  no  ele- 
ment of  peace  in  it  any  further  than  all  beings  and  all  inte- 
rests are  yielded  to  the  gratification  of  self.  This  is  its  essen- 
tial, its  unalterable  nature.  This  attribute  can  not  cease 
while  selfishness  remains. 

All  selfish  men  who  are  advocates  of  peace  principles,  are 
necessarily  hypocrites.  They  say  and  do  not.  They  preach 
but  do  not  practice.  Peace  is  on  their  Hps,  but  war  is  on 
their  hearts.  They  proclaim  peace  and  good  will  to  men, 
while  under  their  stolen  robe  of  peace,  they  conceal  their 
poisoned  implements  of  war  agaist  God  and  the  universe. 
This  is,  this  must  be.  I  am  anxious  to  make  the  impression 
and  lodge  it  deep  in  your  inmost  hearts,  so  that  you  shall  al- 
ways practically  hold,  and  teach,  and  regard  this  as  a  funda- 
mental truth  both  of  natural  and  revealed  religion,  that  a 
selfish  man,  be  he  who  he  may,  instead  of  being  a  christian,  a 
man  of  peace,  and  a  servant  of  the  Prince  of  peace,  is,  in 


324  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

heart,  in  character,  in  spirit,  in  fact,  a  rebel,  an  enemy,  a  war- 
rior, truly  and  in  fact  at  war  with  God  and  all  beings, 

16.   Unmercifulness  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Mercy  is  a  disposition  to  pardon  crime,  and  will  and  must 
manifest  itself  in  efforts  to  secure  the  conditions  upon  which 
crime  can  be  reasonably  forgiven,  if  such  condition  can 
be  secured.  Unmercifulness  is  an  unwillingness  to  forgive 
sin,  and  of  course  manifests  itself  either  by  resisting  efforts 
to  secure  its  forgiveness,  or  by  treating  such  efforts  with  cold- 
ness or  contempt.  The  manner  in  which  sinners  treat  the 
plan  of  salvation,  the  atonement  of  Christ,  the  means  used  by 
God  and  the  church  to  bring  about  the  pardon  of  sin,  demon- 
strates that  their  tender  mercies  are  cruelty.  The  apostle 
charges  them  with  being  '^ implacable^  unmercifaW  Their 
opposition  to  the  gospel,  to  revivals  of  religion,  and  to  all  the 
exhibitions  of  the  mercy  of  God  which  he  has  made  to  our 
world,  show  that  unmercifulness  is  an  attribute  of  their  char- 
acter. 

Sinners  generally  profess  to  be  the  friends  of  mercy.  They 
with  their  lips  extol  the  mercy  of  God.  But  how  do  they 
treat  it?  Do  they  embrace  it?  Do  they  honor  it  as  some- 
thing which  they  favor?  Do  they  hold  it  forth  to  all  men  as 
worthy  of  all  acceptation?  Or  do  they  wage  an  unrelenting, 
war  with  it?  How  did  they  treat  Christ  when  he  came  on  his| 
errand  of  mercy?  They  brought  forth  the  appalling  demons 
stration  that  unmercifulness  is  an  essential  attribute  of  theii 
character.  They  persecuted  unto  death  the  very  impersona-^ 
tion  and  embodiment  of  mercy.  And  this  same  attribute  ol^ 
selfishness  has  always  manifested  itself  under  some  form  when- 
ever a  development  and  an  exhibition  of  mercy  has  beei 
made.  Let  the  blood  of  prophets  and  apostles,  the  blood  oi 
millions  of  martyrs — and  above  all  let  the  blood  of  the  God 
of  mercy  speak.  What  is  their  united  testimony?  Why, 
this — that  the  perfection  of  unmercifiilness  is  one  of  the  es- 
sential and  eternal  attributes  of  selfishness. 

Whenever,  therefore,  a  selfish  being  appears  to  be  of  a 
merciful  disposition,  it  is,  it  can  be,  only  in  appearance.  His 
feelings  may  be  sensitive,  and  he  may  sometimes,  nay  often, 
or  always  yield  to  them,  but  this  is  only  selfishness.  The  rea- 
son and  the  only  reason  why  cwqtj  sinner  does  not  exhibit 
every  appalling  form  of  unmercifulness  and  cruelty,  is,  that 
God  has  so  tempered  his  sensibility,  and  so  surrounded  him 
with  influences  as  to  modify  the  manifestation  of  selfishness 
and  to  develop  other  attributes  more  prominently  than  this. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


325 


Unmerciful  he  is,  and  unmerciful  he  must  be  while  he  remains 
in  sin.  To  represent  him  as  other  than  an  unmerciful  wretch 
were  to  misrepresent  him.  No  matter  who  it  is.  That  delicate 
female  who  would  faint  at  the  sight  of  blood!  if  she  is  a  sin- 
ner, she  is  spurning  and  scorning  the  mercy  of  God.  She  lets 
others  go  down  to  hell  unpardoned  without  an  effort  to  secure 
their  pardon.  Shall  she  be  represented  as  other  than  unmer- 
ciful? No  language  can  describe  the  hardness  of  her  heart. 
See!  the  cup  of  salvation  is  presented  to  her  lips  by  a  Savior's 
bleeding  hand.  She  nevertheless  dashes  it  from  her,  and  tram- 
ples its  contents  beneath  her  feet.  It  passes  from  lip  to  lip.  But 
she  offers  no  prayer  that  it  may  be  accepted;  or  if  she  does, 
it  is  only  the  prayer  of  a  hypocrite  while  she  rejects  it  her- 
self. No,  with  all  her  delicacy,  her  tender  mercies  are  utter 
cruelty.  With  her  own  hands  she  crucifies  the  Son  of  God 
afresh  and  would  put  him  to  open  shame!  O  monstrous!  a 
woman  murdering  the  Savior  of  the  world!  Her  hands  and 
garments  all  stained  with  blood !  And  call  her  merciful  \  O 
shame,  where  is  thy  blush? 

17.  Falsehood  or  Lying  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness.     ' 

Falsehood  may  be  objective  or  subjective.  Objective  false- 
hood is  that  which  stands  opposed  to  truth.  Subjective  false- 
hood is  a  heart  conformed  to  error  and  to  objective  falsehood. 
Subjective  falsehood  is  a  state  of  mind  or  an  attribute  of  sel- 
fishness. It  is  the  will  in  the  attitude  of  resisting  truth  and 
embracing  error  and  lies.  This  is  always  and  necessarily  an 
attribute  of  selfishness. 

Selfishness  consists  in  the  choice  of  an  end  opposed  to  all 
truth,  and  can  not  but  proceed  to  the  reaHzation  of  that  end 
in  conformity  with  error  or  falsehood  instead  of  truth.  If  at 
any  time  it  seize  upon  objective  truth,  as  it  often  does,  it  is 
with  a  false  intention.  It  is  with  an  intention  at  war  with 
the  truth,  the  nature,  and  the  relations  of  things.  s/' 

If  any  sinner,  at  any  time  and  under  any  circumstances,  tell 
the  truth,  it  is  for  a  selfish  reason;  it  is  to  compass  a  false  end. 
He  has  a  He  in  his  heart  and  a  lie  in  his  right  hand.  He 
stands  upon  falsehood.  He  lives  for  it,  and  if  he  does  not  uni- 
formly and  openly  falsify  the  truth,  it  is  because  objective 
truth  is  consistent  with  subjective  falsehood.  His  heart  is 
false,  as  false  as  it  can  be.  It  has  embraced  and  sold  itself  to 
the  greatest  lie  in  the  universe.  The  selfish  man  has  practi- 
cally proclaimed  that  his  good  is  the  supreme  good ;  nay,  that 
fhere  is  no  other  good  but  his  own,  that  there  are  no  other  .^ 
rights  but  his  own,  that  all  are  bound  to  serve  him,  an(l 
28 


326  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

that  all  interests  are  to  yield  to  his.  Now  all  this,  as  I  said,  is 
the  greatest  falsehood  that  ever  was  or  can  be.  Yet  this  is 
the  solemn  practical  declaration  of  every  sinner.  His  choice 
affirms  that  God  has  no  rights,  that  he  ought  not  to  be  loved 
and  obeyed,  that  he  has  no  right  to  govern  the  universe,  but 
that  God  andr'all  beings  ought  to  obey  and  serve  the  sinner. 
Can  there  be  a  greater,  a  more  shameless  falsehood  than  all 
this?  And  shall  such  an  one  pretend  to  regard  the  truth? 
Nay,  verily.  The  very  pretence  is  only  an  instance  and  an 
illustration  of  the  truth  that  Falsehood  is  an  essential  element 
of  his  character. 

If  every  sinner  on  earth  does  not  openly  and  at  all  times 
falsify  the  truth,  it  is  not  because  of  the  truthfulness  of  his 
heart,  but  for  some  purely  selfish  reason.  This  must  be. 
His  heart  is  utterly  false.  It  is  impossible  that,  remaining  a 
sinner,  he  should  have  any  true  regard  to  the  truth.  He  is  a 
liar  in  his  heart:  this  is  an  essential  and  an  eternal  attribute  of 
his  character.  It  is  true  that  his  intelhgence  condemns  false- 
hood and  justifies  truth,  and  that  oftentimes  through  the  intel- 
ligence, a  deep  impression  is  or  may  be  made  on  his  sensibil- 
ity in  favor  of  the  truth;  but  if  the  heart  is  unchanged,  it 
holds  on  to  lies,  and  perseveres  in  the  practical  proclamation  of 
the  greatest  lies  in  the  universe,  to  wit:  that  God  ought  not  to 
be  trusted;  that  Christ  is  not  worthy  of  confidence;  that  one's 
own  interest  is  the  supreme  good;  and  that  all  interests  ought 
to  be  accounted  of  less  value  than  one's  ow^n. 

18.  Pride  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Pride  is  a  disposition  to  exalt  self  above  others,  to  get  out 
of  one's  proper  place  in  the  scale  of  being,  and  to  climb  up 
over  the  heads  of  our  equals  or  superiors.  Pride  is  a  species 
of  injustice  on  the  one  hand,  and  is  nearly  allied  to  ambition 
on  the  other.  It  is  not  a  term  of  so  extensive  an  import  as 
either  injustice  or  ambition.  It  sustains  to  each  of  them  a 
near  relation,  but  is  not  identical  with  either.  It  is  a  kind  of 
self-praise,  self-worship,  self-flattery,  self-adulation,  a  spirit  of 
self-consequence,  of  self-importance.  It  is  an  exalting  not 
merely  one's  interest,  but  one's  person  above  others,  and 
above  God,  and  above  all  other  beings.  A  proud  being  su- 
premely regards  himself.  He  worships  and  can  worship  no 
one  but  self  He  does  not,  and  remaining  selfish,  he  can  not, 
practically  admit  that  there  is  any  one  so  good  and  worthy  as 
himself.  He  aims  at  conferring  supreme  favor  upon  himself, 
and  practically  admits  no  claim  of  any  being  in  the  universe 
to  any  good  or  interest  that  will  interfere  with  his  own.     He 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


as: 


fan  stoop  to  give  preference  to  the  interest,  the  reputation, 
the  authority  of  no  one,  no  not  of  God  himself.  His  practical 
language  is,  Who  is  Jehovah  that  /should  bow  down  to  him? 
It  is  impossible  that  a  selfish  soul  should  be  humble.  Pride 
is  an  essential  modification  or  attribute  of  selfishness.  Sin- 
ners are  represented  in  the  bible  as  proud,  as  '•'•flattering  them- 
selves in  their  own  eves." 

Pride  is  not  a  vice  distinct  from  selfishness,  but  is  only  a 
modification  of  selfishness.  Selfishness  is  the  root  or  stock  in 
which  every  form  of  sin  inheres.  This  it  is  important  to  show. 
Selfishness  has  been  scarcely  regarded  by  many  as  a  vice, 
much  less  as  constituting  the  Avhole  of  vice;  consequently, 
when  selfishness  has  been  most  apparent,  it  has  been  suppo- 
sed and  assumed  that  there  might  be  along  with  it  many  forms 
of  virtue.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I  take  up  your  time  and 
my  own  in  showing  what  are  the  essential  elements  of  selfish- 
ness. So  it  has  been  supposed  that  selfishness  might  exist  in 
any  heart  without  implying  every  form  of  sin;  that  a  man 
might  be  selfish  and  yet  not  proud.  In  short,  it  has  been  over- 
looked that  where  selfishness  is,  there  must  be  every  form  of 
sin,  that  where  there  is  one  form  of  selfishness  manifested, 
it  is  a  breach  of  every  commandment  of  God  and  implies  in 
fact  the  real  existence  of  every  possible  form  of  sin  and  abom- 
ination in  the  heart.  My  object  is  to  pursue  this  course  of 
instruction  so  far  and  no  farther  than  will  fully  develop  in 
your  minds  the  great  truth  that  where  selfishness  is,  there 
must  be  in  a  state  either  of  development  or  of  undevelopment 
every  form  of  sin  that  exists  in  earth  or  hell;  that  all  sin  is  a 
unit,  and  some  form  of  selfishness;  and  that  where  this  is,  all 
sin  must  be. 

The  only  reason  that  pride,  as  a  form  of  selfishness,  does  not 
appear  in  all  sinners  in  the  most  disgusting  forms  is  only  this, 
that  their  constitutional  temperament  and  providential  circum- 
stances are  such  as  to  give  a  more  prominent  development  to 
some  other  attribute  of  selfishness.  It  is  important  to  remark 
that  where  any  one  form  of  unqualified  sin  exists,  there  selfish- 
ness must  exist,  and  there  of  course  every  form  of  sin  must 
exist,  at  least  in  embryo,  and  waiting  only  for  providential  cir- 
cumstances to  develop  it.  When  therefore  you  see  any  form 
of  sin,  know  assuredly  that  selfishness,  the  root,  is  there,  and 
expect  nothing  else,  if  selfishness  continues,  than  to  see  devel- 
oped, one  after  one,  every  form  of  sin  as  the  providence  of 
God  shall  present  the  occasion.  Selfishness  is  a  volcano, 
sometimes  smothered,  but  which  must  have  vent.     The  prov- 


328  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

idence  of  God  cannot  but  present  occasions  upon  which  its 
lava-tides  will  burst  forth  and  carry  desolation  before  them. 

That  all  these  forms  of  sin  exist  has  been  known  and  admit- 
ted. But  it  does  not  appear  to  me  that  the  philosophy  of  sin 
has  been  duly  considered  by  many.  It  is  important  that  we 
should  get  at  the  fundamental  or  generic  form  of  sin,  that  form 
which  include  sand  implies  all  others,  or  more  properly,  which 
constitutes  the  whole  of  sin.  Such  is  selfishness.  "Let  it  be 
written  with  the  point  of  a  diamond  and  engraved  in  the  rock 
forever,"  that  it  may  be  known  that  where  selfishness  is,  there 
every  precept  of  the  law  is  violated,  there  is  the  whole  of  sin. 
Its  guilt  and  ill  desert  must  depend  upon  the  light  with 
which  the  selfish  mind  is  surrounded.  But  sin,  the  whole  of 
sin,  is  there. 


LECTURE    XXVII.  4||pp^ 

ATTRIBUTES  OF  SELFISHNESS. 

What  is  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

19.  Enmity  against  God  is  also  an  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Enmity  is  hatred.  Hatred  may  exist  either  as  a  phenome- 
non of  the  sensibility  or  as  a  state  or  attitude  of  the  will.  Of 
course  I  am  now  to  speak  of  enmity  of  heart  or  will.  It  is 
selfishness  viewed  in  its  relations  to  God.  That  selfishness 
is  enmity  against  God  will  appear, 

(I.)  From  the  Bible.  The  Apostle  expressly  says  that 
'■•the  carnal  mind  (minding  the  flesh)  is  enmity  against  God." 
It  is  fully  evident  that  the  Apostle  by  the  carnal  mind  means 
obeying  the  propensities  or  gratifying  the  desires.  But  this 
is  selfishness  as  I  have  defined  it. 

(2.)  Selfishness  is  directly  opposed  to  the  will  of  God  as 
expressed  in  his  law.  That  requires  benevolence.  Selfish- 
ness is  its  opposite,  and  therefore  enmity  against  the  lawgiver. 

(3.)  Selfishness  is  as  hostile  to  God's  government  as  it  can 
be.  It  is  directly  opposed  to  every  law  and  principle  and 
measure  of  his  government. 

(4.)  Selfishness  is  opposition  to  God's  existence.  Opposi- 
tion to  a  government,  is  opposition  to  the  will  of  the  governor. 
It  is  opposition  to  his  existence  in  that  capacity.  It  is  and  must 
be  enmity  against  the  existence  of  the  ruler  as  such.  Selfish- 
ness must  be  enmity  against  the  existence  of  God's  govern- 
ment, and  as  He  does  and  must  sustain  the  relation  of  Sov- 
reign  Ruler,  selfishness  must  be  enmity  against  his  Hfe. 
Selfishness  will  brook  no  restraint  in  respect  to  securing  its 
end.  There  is  nothing  in  the  universe  it  will  not  sacrifice  to 
self.  This  is  true,  or  it  is  not  selfishness.  If  then  God's 
happiness,  or  government,  or  Hfe  come  into  competition  with 
it,  they  must  be  sacrificed. 

(5.)  But  God  is  the  uncompromising  enemy  of  selfishness. 
It  is  the  abominable  thing  his  soul  hateth.  He  is  more  in  the 
way  of  selfishness  than  all  other  beings.  The  opposition  of 
selfishness  to  Him  is  and  must  be  supreme  and  perfect. 

(6.)  That  selfishness  is  mortal  enmity  against  God,  is  not 
left  to  conjecture  nor  to  a  mere  deduction  or  inference.  God 
once  took  to  himself  human  nature  and  tried  the  experiment. 
Men  could  not  brook  his  presence  upon  earth,  and  they  rested 
not  until  they  had  murdered  him. 
28* 


330  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(7.)  Again.  Selfishness  is  supreme  enmity  against  God. 
That  is,  it  is  more  opposed  to  God  than  to  all  other  beings. 

[1.]  This  must  be  because  God  is  more  opposed  to  it  and 
more  directly  and  eternally  in  its  way.  Selfishness  must  be 
relinquished  or  put  itself  in  supreme  opposition  to  God. 

[2.]  Enmity  against  any  body  or  thing  besides  God  can  be 
overcome  more  easily  than  against  him.  All  earthly  enmities 
can  be  overcome  by  kindness  and  change  of  circumstances; 
but  what  kindness,  what  change  of  circumstances  can  change 
the  human  heart,  can  overcome  the  selfishness  and  enmity 
that  reigns  there  ? 

(8.)  Selfishness  offers  all  manner  and  every  possible  degree 
of  resistance  to  God.  It  disregards  God's  commands.  It 
contemns  his  authority.  It  spurns  his  mercy.  It  tramples 
on  his  feelings.  It  tempts  his  forbearance.  Selfishness  in 
short  is  the  universal  antagonist  and  adversary  of  God.  It 
can  no  more  be  reconciled  to  God  or  subject  to  his  law  than 
it  can  cease  to  be  selfishness. 

20.  Madness  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Madness  is  used  sometimes  to  mean  anger,  sometimes  to 
mean  intellectual  insanity,  and  sometimes  to  mean  moral  in- 
sanity. 

I  speak  of  it  now  in  the  last  sense. 

Moral  insanity  is  not  insanity  of  the  intelHgence,  but  of  the 
heart.  Insanity  of  the  intelhgence  destroys  for  the  time 
being  moral  agency  and  accountability. 

Moral  insanity  is  a  state  in  which  the  intellectual  powers 
are  not  deranged,  but  the  heart  refuses  to  be  controlled  by 
the  intelhgence  and  acts  unreasonably  as  if  the  intellect  were 
deranged.  That  madness  or  moral  insanity  is  an  attribute  of 
selfishness  or  of  a  sinful  character  is  evident, 

(1.)  From  the  bible.  '-'  The  heart  of  the  sons  of  men  is  full 
of  evil,  and  madness  is  in  their  heart  while  they  live.''"' — Eccles. 
9:  3. 

(2.)  It  has  been  shown  that  sinners  or  selfish  persons  act  in 
every  instance  directly  opposite  to  right  reason.  Indeed,  no- 
thing can  be  plainer  than  the  moral  insanity  of  every  selfish 
soul.  He  prefers  to  seek  his  own  interest  as  an  end  and  pre- 
fers a  straw  to  a  universe.  But  not  only  so:  he  does  this 
with  the  certain  knowledge  that  in  this  way  he  can  never 
secure  his  own  highest  interest.  What  an  infinitely  insane 
course  that  must  be,  first  to  prefer  his  own  petty  gratification 
to  the  infinite  interests  of  God  and  of  the  universe,  and  se- 
condly, to  do  this  with  the  knowledge  that  in  this  way  nothing 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  331 

can  be  ultimately  gained  even  to  self,  and  that  if  the  course  is 
persis>ted  in,  it  must  result  in  endless  evil  to  self,  the  very 
thing  which  is  supremely  dreaded!  Sin  is  the  greatest  mys- 
tery and  the  greatest  absurdity,  and  the  greatest  contradic- 
tion in  the  universe. 

But  madness  is  an  essential  element  or  attribute  of  selfish- 
ness. All  sinners,  without  any  exception,  are  and  must  be 
mad.  Their  choice  of  an  end  is  madness.  It  is  infinitely 
unreasonable.  Their  pursuit  of  it  is  madness  persisted  in. 
Their  treatment  of  every  thing  that  opposes  their  course  is 
madness.  All,  all  is  madness  infinite.  This  world  is  a  moral 
Bedlam,  an  insane  hospital  where  sinners  are  under  regimen. 
If  they  can  be  cured,  well.  If  not,  they  must  be  confined  in 
the  mad-house  of  the  universe  for  eternity. 

The  only  reason  why  sinners  do  not  perceive  their  own  and 
each  other's  madness  is,  that  they  are  all  mad  together  and 
their  madness  is  all  of  one  type.  Hence  they  imagine  that  they 
are  sane,  and  pronounce  Christians  mad.  This  is  no  wonder. 
What  other  conclusion  can  they  come  to  unless  they  can  dis- 
cover that  they  are  mad  ? 

But  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  their  madness  is  of  the 
heart,  and  not  of  the  intellect.  It  is  voluntary  and  not  una- 
voidable. If  it  were  unavoidable  it  would  involve  no  guilt. 
But  it  is  a  choice  made  and  persisted  in  in  the  integrity  of 
their  intellectual  powers,  and  therefore  they  are  without  ex- 
cuse. 

Sinners  are  generally  supposed  to  act  rationally  on  many 
subjects.  But  this  is  an  evident  mistake.  They  do  every 
thing  for  the  same  ultimate  reason  and  are  as  wholly  irra- 
tional in  one  thing  as  another.  There  is  nothing  in  their 
whole  history  and  fife,  not  an  individual  thing,  that  is  not 
entirely  and  infinitely  unreasonable.  The  end  is  mad;  the 
means  are  mad;  all,  all  is  madness  and  desperation  of  spirit. 
They  no  doubt  appear  so  to  angels,  and  so  they  do  to  saints; 
and  were  it  not  so  common  to  see  them  their  conduct  would 
fill  the  saints  and  angels  with  utter  amazement. 

21.  Impatience  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

This  term  expresses  both  a  state  of  the  sensibiUty  and  of 
the  will.  Impatience  is  a  resistance  of  Providence.  When 
this  term  is  used  to  express  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  it  de- 
signates fretfulness,  ill  temper,  anger  in  the  form  of  emotion. 
It  is  an  unsubmissive  and  rebellious  state  of  feeling  in  regard 
to  those  trials  that  occur  under  the  administration  of  the 
providential  government  of  God. 


332  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

When  the  term  is  used  to  express  a  state  of  the  will,  it  de- 
signates an  attitude  of  resistance  to  God's  providential  dis- 
pensations. Selfishness  has  no  faith  in  God,  no  confidence  in 
his  wisdom  and  goodness,  and  being  set  upon  self-gratification, 
is  continually  exposed  to  disappointment.  God  is  infinitely 
wise  and  benevolent.  He  also  exercises  a  universal  provi- 
dence. He  is  conducting  every  thing  with  reference  to  the 
greatest  good  of  the  whole  universe.  He  of  course  will  often 
interfere  with  the  selfish  projects  of  those  who  are  pursuing 
an  opposite  end  to  that  which  He  pursues.  They  will  of 
course  be  subject  to  almost  continual  disappointment  under  the 
providence  of  one  who  disposes  of  all  events  in  accordance 
with  a  design  at  war  with  their  own.  It  is  impossible  that 
the  schemes  of  selfishness  under  such  a  government  should  not 
frequently  be  blown  to  the  winds,  and  that  such  an  one  should 
not  be  the  subject  of  incessant  crosses,  vexations  and  trials. 
Self-will  can  not  but  be  impatient  under  a  benevolent  govern- 
ment. Selfishness  would  of  course  have  every  thing  so  dis- 
posed as  to  favor  self-interest  and  self-gratification.  But  infi- 
nite wisdom  and  benevolence  can  not  accommodate  itself  to 
this  state  of  mind.  The  result  must  be  a  constant  rasping 
and  collision  between  the  selfish  soul  and  the  providence  of 
God,  Selfishness  must  cease  to  be  selfishness  before  it  can 
be  otherwise. 

A  selfish  state  of  will  must  of  course  not  only  resist  crosses 
and  disappointments,  but  must  also  produce  a  feverish  and 
fretful  state  of  feeling  in  relation  to  the  trials  incident  to  life. 
Nothing  but  deep  sympathy  with  God  and  that  confidence  in 
his  wisdom  and  goodness  and  universal  providence  that  anni- 
hilates self-will  and  begets  universal  and  unqualified  submis- 
sion to  him,  can  prevent  impatience.  Impatience  is  always 
a  form  of  selfishness.  It  is  resistance  to  God.  It  is  self-will. 
Selfishness  must  be  gratified  or  displeased  of  course.  It 
should  always  be  understood  that  when  trials  produce  impa- 
tience of  heart  the  will  is  in  a  selfish  attitude.  The  trials  of 
this  life  are  designed  to  develop  a  submissive,  confiding  and 
patient  state  of  mind.  A  selfish  spirit  is  represented  in  the 
bible  as  being,  under  the  providence  of  God,  like  a  bullock  un- 
accustomed to  the  yoke,  restive,  self-willed,  impatient  and  re- 
bellious. 

When  selfishness  or  self-will  is  subdued  and  benevolence 
is  in  exercise,  we  are  in  a  state  not  to  feel  disappointments, 
trials  and  crosses.  Having  no  way  or  will  of  our  own  about 
any  thing,  and  having  deep  sympathy  with  and  confidence  in 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  333 

God,  we  can  not  be  disappointed  in  any  such  sense  as  to  vex 
the  spirit  and  break  the  peace  of  the  soul. 

The  fact  is  that  selfishness  must  be  abandoned,  or  there  is, 
there  can  be  no  peace  to  us.  ''There  is  no  peace  to  the 
wicked,  saith  my  God."  '^  The  wicked  are  like  the  troubled 
sea,  when  it  can  not  rest,  whose  waters  cast  up  mire  and  dirt." 
An  impressive  figure  this  to  represent  the  continually  agitated 
state  in  which  a  selfish  mind  must  be  under  a  perfectly  bene- 
volent providence.  Selfishness  demands  partiality  in  provi- 
dence that  will  favor  self.  But  benevolence  will  not  bend  to 
its  inclinations.  This  must  produce  resistance  and  fretting, 
or  selfishness  must  be  abandoned.  Let  it  be  borne  in  mind 
that  impatience  is  an  attribute  of  selfishness  and  will  always 
be  developed  under  crosses  and  trials. 

Selfishness  will  of  course  be  patient  while  providence  favors 
its  schemes,  but  when  crosses  come,  then  the  peace  of  the 
soul  is  broken. 

22.  Intemperance  is  also  a  form  or  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Selfishness  is  self-indulgence.  It  consists  in  the  committal 
of  the  will  to  the  indulgence  of  the  propensities.  Of  course 
some  one,  or  more,  of  the  propensities  have  taken  the  control 
of  the  will.  Generally  there  is  some  ruling  passion  or  pro- 
pensity the  influence  of  which  becomes  overshadowing  and 
overrules  the  will  for  its  own  gratification.  Sometimes  it  is 
acquisitiveness  or  avarice,  the  love  of  gain;  sometimes  ali- 
mentiveness  or  epicurianism ;  sometimes  it  is  amativeness  or 
sexual  love;  sometimes  philoprogenitiveness  or  the  love  of  our 
own  children;  sometimes  self-esteem  or  a  feeling  of  confidence 
in  self;  sometimes  one  and  sometimes  another  of  the  great 
variety  of  the  propensities,  is  so  largely  developed  as  to  be 
the  ruling  tyrant  that  lords  it  over  the  will  and  over  all  the 
other  propensities.  It  matters  not  which  of  the  propensities 
or  whether  their  united  influence  gains  the  mastery  of  the 
will:  whenever  the  will  is  subject  to  them,  this  is  selfishness. 
It  is  the  carnal  mind. 

Intemperance  consists  in  the  undue  or  unlawful  indulgence 
of  any  propensity.  It  is  therefore  an  essential  element  or 
attribute  of  selfishness.  All  selfishness  is  intemperance:  of 
course  it  is  an  unlawful  indulgence  of  the  propensities.  In- 
temperance has  as  many  forms  as  there  are  constitutional  and 
artificial  appetites  to  gratify.  A  selfish  mind  can  not  be  tem- 
perate. If  one  or  more  of  the  propensities  is  restrained,  it  is 
only  restrained  for  the  sake  of  the  undue  and  unlawful  indul- 
gence of  another.    Sometimes  the  tendencies  are  intellectual, 


334  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and  the  bodily  appetites  are  denied  for  the  sake  of  gratifying 
the  love  of  study.  But  this  is  no  less  intemperance  and  selfish- 
ness than  the  gratification  of  amativeness  or  alimentiveness. 
Selfishness  is  always  and  necessarily  intemperate.  It  does  not 
always  or  generally  develop  every  form  of  intemperance  in 
the  outward  life,  but  a  spirit  of  self-indulgence  must  be  the 
spirit  of  intemperance. 

Some  develop  intemperance  most  prominently  in  the  form 
of  self-indulgence  in  eating;  others  in  sleeping;  others  in 
lounging  and  idleness;  others  are  gossippers;  others  love  ex- 
ercise and  indulge  that  propensity;  others  study  and  impair 
health  and  induce  derangement  or  seriously  impair  the 
nervous  systems.  Indeed  there  is  no  end  to  the  forms  which 
intemperance  assumes  because  of  the  great  number  of  pro- 
pensities natural  and  artificial  that  in  their  turns  seek  and 
obtain  indulgence. 

It  should  be  always  borne  in  mind  that  any  form  of  self-in- 
dulgence is  equally  an  instance  of  selfishness  and  wholly  in- 
consistent with  any  degree  of  virtue  in  the  heart.  But  it  may 
be  asked,  are  we  to  have  no  regard  whatever  to  our  tastes, 
appetites  and  propensities?  I  answer  we  are  to  have  no  such 
regard  to  them  as  to  make  their  gratification  the  end  for  which 
we  live  even  for  a  moment.  But  there  is  a  kind  of  regard 
to  them  which  is  lawful  and  therefore  a  virtue.  For  exam- 
ple: I  am  on  a  jouiney  for  the  glory  of  God.  Two  ways  are 
before  me.  One  aflfords  nothing  to  regale  the  senses;  the 
other  conducts  me  through  variegated  scenery,  sublime  moun- 
tain passes,  deep  ravines;  along  brawling  brooks  and  mean- 
dering rivulets;  through  beds  of  gayest  flowers  and  woods  of 
richest  foliage;  through  aromatic  groves  and  forests  vocal 
with  feathered  songsters.  The  two  paths  are  equal  in  dis- 
tance and  in  all  respects  that  have  a  bearing  upon  the  busi- 
ness I  have  in  hand.  Now  reason  dictates  and  demands  that 
I  should  take  the  path  that  is  most  agreeable  and  edifying. 
But  this  is  not  being  governed  by  the  propensities,  but  by  the 
reason.  It  is  its  voice  which  I  hear  and  to  which  I  listen 
when  I  take  the  sunny  path.  The  delights  of  this  path  are  a 
real  good.  As  such  they  are  not  to  be  despised  or  neglected. 
But  if  taking  this  path  would  embarrass  and  hinder  the  end 
of  my  journey,  I  am  not  to  sacrifice  the  greater  public  good 
for  a  less  one  of  my  own.  I  must  not  be  guided  by  my  feel- 
ings but  by  my  reason  and  honest  judgment  in  this  and  in 
every  case  of  duty.  God  has  not  given  us  propensities  to  be 
our  masters  and  to  rule  us  but  to  be  our  servants  and  to 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  335 

to  minister  to  our  enjoyment  when  we  obey  the  biddings 
of  reason  and  of  God.  They  are  given  to  render  duty 
pleasant,  and  as  a  reward  of  virtue;  to  make  the  ways 
of  wisdom  pleasant.  The  propensities  are  not  therefore  to 
be  despised,  nor  is  their  annihilation  to  be  desired.  Nor 
is  it  true  that  their  gratification  is  always  selfish.  But  when 
their  gratification  is  sanctioned  and  demanded  as  in  the  case 
just  supposed  and  in  myriads  of  other  cases  that  occur  to 
the  intelligence,  the  gratification  is  not  a  sin  but  a  virtue.  It 
is  not  selfishness  but  benevolence.  But  let  it  be  remem- 
bered that  the  indulgence  must  not  be  sought  in  obedience 
to  the  propensity  itself,  but  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  reason 
and  of  God.  When  reason  and  the  will  of  God  are  not  con- 
sulted, it  must  be  selfishness. 

Intemperance,  as  a  sin,  does  not  consist  in  the  outward  act 
of  indulgence,  but  in  an  inward  disposition.  A  dyspeptic  who 
can  eat  but  just  enough  to  sustain  life,  may  be  an  enor- 
mous glutton  at  heart.  He  may  have  a  disposition,  that  is,  he 
may  not  only  desire^  but  he  may  be  willing  to  eat  all  before 
him,  but  for  the  pain  indulgence  occasions  him.  But  this  is 
only  the  spirit  of  self-indulgence.  He  denies  himself  the 
amount  of  food  he  craves  to  avoid  pain  or  togratify  a  stronger 
propensity,  lo  wit,  the  dread  of  pain.  So  a  man  who  was  nev- 
er intoxicated  in  his  life,  may  be  guilty  of  the  crime  of  drunk- 
enness every  day.  He  may  be  prevented  from  drinking  to 
inebriation  every  day  only  by  a  regard  to  reputation  or  healthy 
or  by  an  avaricious  disposition.  It  is  only  because  he  is  pre- 
vented by  the  greater  power  of  some  other  propensity.  If 
one  is  in  such  a  state  of  mind  that  he  would  indulge  all  his 
propensities  without  restraint  were  it  not  that  it  is  impossible 
on  account  of  the  indulgence  of  some  being  inconsistent  with 
the  indulgence  of  the  others,  he  is  just  as  guilty  as  if  he  did 
indulge  them  all.  For  example:  He  has  a  disposition,  that  is^ 
a  will  to  accumulate  property.  He  is  avaricious  in  heart. 
He  also  has  a  strong  tendency  to  luxury,  to  licentiousness  and 
prodigality.  The  indulgence  of  these  propensities  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  indulgence  of  avarice.  But  for  this  contrari- 
ety he  would  in  his  state  of  mind  indulge  them  all.  Now  he 
is  really  guilty  of  all  those  forms  of  vice,  and  just  as  blame-^ 
worthy  as  if  he  indulged  in  them. 

Again:  That  selfishness  is  the  aggregate  of  all  sin,  and  that, 
he  who  is  selfish,  is  actually  chargeable  with  breaking  the 
whole  law,  and  of  every  form  of  iniquity,  will  appear,  if  we 
consider, 


336  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(1.)  That  it  is  the  committal  of  the  will  to  self-indulgence  5 
and  of  course  and  of  necessity, 

(2.)  No  one  propensity  will  be  denied  but  for  the  indulgence 
of  another. 

(3.)  But  if  no  better  reason  than  this  exists  for  denying  any 
propensity,  then  the  selfish  man  is  chargeable  in  the  sight  of 
God  with  actually  in  heart  gratifying  every  propensity. 

(4.)  And  this  conducts  to  the  plain  conclusion  that  a  selfish 
man  is  full  of  sin  and  actually  in  heart  guilty  of  every  possi- 
ble or  conceivable  abomination. 

(5.)  "  He  that  looketh  on  a  woman  to  lust  afer  her  hath  com- 
mitted adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart."  He  may  not 
have  committed  the  outward  act  for  want  of  opportunity,  or 
for  the  reason  that  the  indulgence  is  inconsistent  with  the  love 
of  reputation  or  fear  of  disgrace,  or  with  some  other  propen- 
sity.    Nevertheless  he  is  in  heart  guilty  of  the  deed. 

Intemperance,  as  a  crime  is  a  state  of  mind.  It  is  the  atti- 
tude of  the  will.  It  is  an  attribute  of  selfishness.  It  consists 
in  the  choice  or  disposition  to  gratify  the  propensities  regard- 
less of  the  law  of  benevolence.  This  is  intemperance;  and 
so  far  as  the  mind  is  considered,  it  is  the  whole  of  it.  Now 
inasmuch  as  the  will  is  committed  to  self-indulgence,  and  no- 
thing but  the  contrariety  there  is  betwen  the  propensities  pre- 
vents the  unlimited  indulgence  of  them  all,  it  follows  that  every 
selfish  person,  or  in  other  words  every  sinner,  is  chargeable 
in  the  sight  of  God  with  every  species  of  intemperance  actual 
or  conceivable.  His  lusts  have  the  reign.  They  conduct 
him  whithersoever  they  list.  He  has  sold  himself  to  self-in- 
dulgence. If  there  is  any  form  of  self-indulgence  that  is  not 
actually  developed  in  him,  no  thanks  to  him.  The  provi- 
dence of  God  has  restrained  the  outward  indulgence  while 
there  has  been  in  him  a  readiness  to  do  it. 

23.  Recklessness  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness.  Reck- 
lessness is  carelessness,  or  a  state  of  mind  that  seeks  to  grat- 
ify self  regardless  of  consequences.  It  is  a  spirit  of  infatua- 
tion, a  rushing  upon  ruin  heedless  of  what  may  come. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  attributes  of  selfishness. 
It  is  universally  prominent  and  manifest.  What  can  be  more 
manifest  and  striking  and  astonishing  than  the  recklessness  of 
every  sinner  ?  Self-indulgence  is  his  motto;  and  the  only  ap- 
pearance of  consideration  and  moderation  about  him  is,  that 
he  is  careful  to  deny  one  propensity  for  the  sake  and  only  for  the 
sake  of  indulging  another.  He  hesitates  not  whether  he  shall 
indulge  himself,  but  sometimes  hesitates  and  ponders  and  de- 


HORAL  GOVERNMENT.  337 

liberates  in  respect  to  the  particular  propensity  to  be  indulged 
or  denied.  He  is  at  all  times  perfectly  reckless  as  it  respects 
self-indulgence.  This  is  settled.  Whenever  he  hesitates 
about  any  given  course,  it  is  because  of  the  strength  of  the 
self-indulgent  spirit  and  with  design  upon  the  whole  to  realize 
the  greatest  amount  of  self-indulgence.  When  sinners  hesi- 
tate about  remaining  in  sin  and  think  of  giving  up  self-indul- 
gence, it  is  only  certain  forms  of  sin  that  they  contemplate 
reUnquishing.  They  consider  what  they  shall  lose  to  them- 
selves by  continuing  in  sin,  and  what  they  shall  gain  to  them- 
selves by  reUnquishing  sin  and  turning  to  God.  It  is  a  ques- 
tion of  loss  and  gain  with  them.  They  have  no  idea  of  giv- 
ing up  every  form  of  selfishness;  nor  do  they  consider  that 
until  they  do,  they  are  at  every  moment  violating  the  whole 
law,  whatever  interest  of  self  they  may  be  plotting  to  secure, 
whether  the  interest  be  temporal  or  eternal,  physical  or  spir- 
itual. In  respect  to  the  denial  or  indulgence  of  one  or  anoth- 
er of  the  propensities,  they  may  and  indeed  can  not  but  be 
considerate  consistently  with  selfishness.  But  in  respect  to 
duty;  in  respect  to  the  commands  and  threatenings  of  God; 
in  respect  to  every  moral  consideration,  they  are  entirely  and 
universally  reckless.  And  when  they  appear  not  to  be  so,  but 
to  be  thoughtful  and  considerate,  it  is  only  selfishness  plot- 
ting its  own  indulgence  and  calculating  its  chances  of  loss 
and  gain.  Indeed  it  would  appear,  when  we  take  into  con- 
sideration the  known  consequences  of  every  form  of  selfish- 
ness, and  the  sinner's  pertinacious  cleaving  to  self-indulgence 
in  the  face  of  such  considerations,  that  every  sinner  is  appal- 
lingly reckless,  and  that  it  may  be  said  that  his  recklessness 
is  infinite. 

24.   Unity  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

By  unity  is  intended  that  selfishness,  and  consequently  all 
sin  is  a  unit.  That  is,  there  are  not  various  kinds  of  sin,  nor 
various  kinds  of  selfishness,  nor,  strictly  speaking,  are  there 
various  forms  of  selfishness.  Selfishness  is  always  one  and 
but  one  thing.  It  has  but  one  end,  and  not  diverse  ends. 
The  indulgence  of  one  appetite  or  passion,  or  another,  does 
not  imply  different  ends  or  forms  of  selfishness,  strictly  speak- 
ing. It  is  only  one  choice,  or  the  choice  of  one  end  antl 
the  different  forms  are  only  the  use  of  different  means  to  ac- 
complish this  one  end.  Strictly  speaking,  there  is  but  one 
form  of  virtue;  and  when  we  speak  of  various  forms,  we 
speak  loosely  and  in  accommodation  to  the  general  notions  ol" 
mankind.  Virtue,  as  we  have  before  seen,  is  a  unit.  It 
29 


338  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

always  consists  in  ultimate  intention;  and  this  ultimate  inten- 
tion is  always  one  and  the  same.  It  is  the  choice  of  the  high- 
est well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  as  an  tind.  This 
intention  never  changes  its  form,  and  all  the  efforts  which  the 
mind  makes  to  realize  this  end,  and  w^hich  we  loosely  call  dif- 
ferent forms  of  virtue,  are  after  all  only  the  one  unchanged 
and  unchangable,  uncompounded  and  indivisible  intention, 
energizing  to  realize  its  one  great  end.  Just  so  with  selfishness. 
It  is  one  choice,  or  the  choice  of  one  and  only  one  end,  to 
wit,  self-gratification  or  self-indulgence.  All  the  various,  and 
every  varying  shifts  and  turns  and  modes  of  indulgence  which 
make  up  the  entire  history  of  the  sinner,  imply  no  complexi- 
ty in  the  form  or  substance  of  his  choice.  All  are  resorted 
to  for  one  and  only  one  reason.  They  are  only  this  one  un- 
compounded and  uncompoundable,  this  never  varying  choice 
of  self  indulgence,  energizing  and  using  various  means  to  re- 
alize its  one  simple  end.  The  reason  why  the  idea  is  so  com- 
mon, and  why  the  phraseology  of  men  implies  that  there  are 
really  various  forms  of  sin  and  of  holiness  is,  that  they  unwit- 
tingly lose  sight  of  that  in  which  sin  and  holiness  alone  con- 
sist, and  conceive  of  them  as  belonging  to  the  outward  act,  or  to 
the  causative  volition  that  is  put  forth  by  the  intention  to  se- 
cure its  end.  Let  it  but  always  be  remembered  that  holiness 
and  sin  are  but  the  moral  attributes  of  selfishness  and  benevo- 
lence, and  that  they  are  each  the  choice  of  one  end  and  only 
one;  and  the  delusion  that  there  are  various  forms  and  kinds 
of  sin  and  holiness  will  flee  away  forever. 

Holiness  is  holiness,  in  form  and  essence  one  and  indivisi- 
ble. It  is  the  moral  element  or  quality  of  disinterested  be- 
nevolence. Sin  is  sin,  in  form  and  essence  one  and  indivisi- 
ble; and  is  the  moral  attribute  of  selfishness  or  of  the  choice 
of  self-indulgence  as  the  end  of  life.  This  conducts  us  to  the 
real  meaning  of  those  Scriptures  which  assert  "  that  all  the 
law  is  fulfilled  in  one  word,  love,"  that  this  is  the  whole  of 
virtue,  and  comprises  all  that  we  loosely  call  the  different 
virtues,  or  different  forms  of  virtue.  And  it  also  explains 
this,  '•'  Whosoever  shall  keep  the  whole  law  and  yet  offend  in 
one  point,  he  is  guilty  of  all."  That  is,  offending  in  one  point 
implies  the  real  commission  of  all  sin.  It  implies,  and  is  self- 
ishness, and  this  is  the  whole  of  sin.  It  is  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance that  religious  teachers  should  understand  this,  and 
no  longer  conceive  of  sin  as  original  and  actual;  as  sins  of 
heart  and  sins  of  life;  as  sins  of  omission  and  commission; 
as  sins  of  licentiousness  and  gluttony,  intemperance  and  the 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  339 

like.  Now  such  notions  and  such  phraseology  will  do  for 
those  who  can  not,  or  have  no  opportunity  to  look  deeper  into 
the  philosophy  of  moral  government;  hut  it  is  time  that  the 
veil  were  taken  away,  and  both  sin  and  hoUness  laid  open  to 
the  pubUc  gaze. 

Let  it  not  be  inferred  that  because  there  is  but  one  form  or 
kind  of  sin  or  of  holiness,  strictly  speaking,  that  therefore  all 
sin  is  equally  blameworthy,  and  that  all  holiness  is  equally 
praiseworthy.  This  does  not  follow,  as  we  shall  see  under 
its  proper  head.  Neither  let  it  be  called  a  contradiction  that 
I  have  so  often  spoken  and  shall  so  often  speak  of  the  differ- 
ent forms  of  sin  and  of  holiness.  All  this  is  convenient  and 
as  I  judge  indispensable  in  preparing  the  way,  and  to  con- 
duct the  mind  to  the  true  conception  and  apprehension  of 
this  great  and  fundamental  truth;  fundamental  in  the  sense 
that  it  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  truly  clear  and  just  con- 
ceptions of  either  holiness  or  sin.  They  are  both  units  and 
eternal  and  necessary  opposites  and  antagonists.  They  can 
never  dwell  together  or  coalesce  any  more  than  heaven  and 
hell  can  be  wedded  to  each  other. 


LECTURE  XXVIII. 
ATTRIBUTES  OF  SELFISHNESS. 

What  is  implied  in  Disobedience  to  the  Law  of  God. 

25.  Egotism  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

Egotism,  when  properly  considered,  does  not  consist  in  ac- 
tually talking  about  and  praising  self;  but  in  that  disposition 
of  mind  that  manifests  itself  in  self-laudation.  Parrots  talk 
almost  exclusively  of  themselves,  and  yet  we  do  not  accuse 
them  of  egotism,  nor  feel  the  least  disgust  toward  them  on  that 
account. 

Moral  agents  may  be  under  circumstances  that  render  it 
necessary  to  speak  much  of  themselves.  God's  character  and 
relations  are  such  and  the  ignorance  of  men  so  great  that  it  is 
necessary  for  Him  to  reveal  himself  to  them,  and  consequent- 
ly to  speak  to  them  very  much  about  Himself.  The  same  is 
true  of  Christ.  Christ's  principal  object  was  to  make  the 
world  acquainted  with  himself  and  with  the  nature  and  design , 
of  his  mission.  Of  course  he  spake  much  of  himself.  But 
who  ever  thought  of  accusing  either  the  Father  or  the  Son  of 
egotism? 

The  fact  is  that  real  egotism  is  a  selfish  state  of  the  will. 
It  is  a  selfish  disposition.  Selfishness  is  the  supreme  prefer- 
ence of  self,  of  self-interest,  self-indulgence;  of  course,  this 
state  of  mind  can  not  but  manifest  egotism.  The  heart  is  ego-' 
tistical,  and  the  language  and  deportment  must  be. 

An  egotistical  state  of  mind  manifests  itself  in  a  great  vari- 
ety of  ways;  not  only  in  self-commendation  and  laudation, 
but  also  in  selfish  aims  and  actions,  exalting  self  in  action  as 
well  as  in  word.  An  egotistical  spirit  speaks  of  itself  and  its 
achievments  in  such  a  way  as  reveals  the  assumption  that  self 
is  a  very  important  personage.  It  demonstrates  that  self  is 
the  end  of  every  thing  and  the  great  idol  before  which  all 
ought  to  bow  down  and  worship.  This  is  not  too  strong  lan- 
guage. The  fact  is,  that  selfishness  is  nothing  short  of  a  prac- 
tical setting  up  of  the  shameless  claim  that  self  is  of  more  im- 
portance than  God  and  the  whole  universe ;  that  self  ought  to 
be  universally  worshiped;  that  God  and  all  other  beings  ought 
to  be  entirely  consecrated  to  its  interests  and  to  the  promoti9n 
of  its  glory.  Now  what  but  the  most  disgusting  egotism  can  be 
expected  from  such  a  state  of  mind  as  this  ?  This  state  of 
mind  is  essentially  and  necessarily  egotistical.     If  it  does  not 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  341 

manifest  itself  in  one  way,  it  will  and  must  in  another.  The 
thoughts  are  upon  self;  the  heart  is  upon  self  Self-flattery  is 
a  necessary  result  or  rather  attribute  of  selfishness.  A  selfish 
man  is  always  a  self-flatterer,  and  a  self-deceiver,  and  a  self- 
devotee.     This  must  be. 

Self  may  speak  very  sparingly  of  self  for  the  reason  that  it 
thinks  too  much  of  self  to  willingly  incur  the  charge  of  egotism. 
A  man  may  have  a  spirit  too  egotistical  to  speak  out,  and  may 
reveal  his  superlative  disposition  to  be  praised  by  a  studied 
abstinence  from  self-commendation.  Nay,  he  may  speak  of 
himself  in  terms  the  most  reproachful  and  self-abasing  in  the 
spirit  of  supreme  egotism;  to  evince  his  humility  and  the  deep 
self-knowledge  which  he  possesses.  But  a  spirit  of  self  deifica- 
tion, which  selfishness  always  is,  if  it  does  not  manifest  itself 
in  words,  must  and  will  in  deeds.  The  great  and  supreme 
importance  of  self  is  assumed  by  the  heart,  and  can  not  but 
in  some  way  manifest  itself  It  may,  and  often  does  put  on 
the  garb  of  the  utmost  self-abasement.  It  stoops  to  conquer, 
and  to  gain  universal  praise,  affects  to  be  most  empty  of  self 

But  this  is  only  a  refined  egotism.  It  is  only  saying,  Come 
see  my  perfect  humiUty  and  selfemptiness.  Indeed  there 
are  myriads  of  ways  in  which  an  egotistical  spirit  manifests 
itself,  and  so  subtle  and  refined  are  many  of  them  that  they  re- 
semble Satan  robed  in  the  stolen  habiliments  of  an  angel  of 
light. 

An  egotistical  spirit  often  manifests  itself  in  self-consequen- 
tial airs,  and  by  thrusting  self  into  the  best  seat  at  table,  in  a 
stage  coach,  a  rail  road  car,  or  into  the  best  state  room  in  a 
steam  boat.  In  short,  it  manifests  in  action  what  it  is  apt  to 
manifest  in  word,  to  wit:  a  sense  of  supreme  self-importance. 

I  said  that  the  mere  fact  of  speaking  of  self  is  not  of  itself 
proof  of  an  egotistical  spirit.  The  thing  to  be  regarded  is  the 
manner  and  manifest  design  of  speaking  of  self.  A  benevo- 
lent man  may  speak  much  of  self  because  it  may  be  important 
to  others  that  he  should  do  so,  on  account  of  his  relations. 
When  the  design  is  the  benefit  of  others  and  the  glory  of  God, 
it  is  as  far  as  possible  from  the  spirit  of  egotism.  A  benevo- 
lent man  might  speak  of  himself  just  as  he  would  of  others. 
He  has  merged  his  interests  in,  or  rather  identified  them  with 
the  interests  of  others  and  of  course  would  naturally  treat  oth- 
ers and  speak  of  them  much  as  he  treats  and  speaks  of  him- 
self If  he  sees  and  censures  the  conduct  of  others,  and  has 
ever  been  guilty  of  the  like,  he  will  censure  his  own  baseness 
quite  as  severely  as  he  does,  the  same  thing  in  others.  If  he 
29* 


^2  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

commends  the  virtues  of  others,  it  is  hut  for  the  glorj  of  God; 
and  for  the  verj  same  reason,  he  might  speak  of  virtues  of 
which  he  is  conscious  in  himself,  that  God  may  have  glory.  A 
perfectly  simple-hearted  and  guileless  state  of  mind  might  na- 
turally enough  manifest  itself  in  tliis  manner.  An  egotistical 
spirit  in  another  might,  and  doubtless  would  lead  him  to  misun- 
derstand such  open  heartedness  and  transparency  of  character. 
There  would  be  nevertheless  a  radical  difference  in  the  spirit 
with  which  two  such  men  would  speak  either  of  their  own 
faults  or  virtues. 

26.  Simplicity  is  another  attribute  of  selfishness. 

By  this  term  it  is  intended  to  express  two  things,  to  wit: 

(1.)  Singleness,  unmixed  or  unmingled,  and 

(2.)  That  selfishness  is  always  as  intense  as  under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  can  be.  I  will  consider  these  two  branches  of 
the  subject  separately  and  in  order. 

(1.)  Selfishness  is  simple  in  the  sense  of  uncompounded  or 
unmixed. 

It  consists,  as  we  have  repeatedly  seen  in  ultimate  choice  or 
intention.  It  is  the  choice  of  an  end,  of  course  the  supreme 
as  well  as  the  ultimate  choice  of  the  soul.  Now  it  must  be 
self-evident  that  no  other  and  opposing  choice  can  consist 
with  it.  Nor  can  the  mind  while  in  the  exercise  of  this  choice 
of  an  end  possibly  put  forth  any  volitions  inconsistent  with  it. 
Volitions  are  never  and  can  never  be  put  forth  but  to  secure 
some  end,  or  in  other  words,  for  some  reason.  If  they  could, 
such  volitions  would  have  no  moral  character  because  there 
would  be  no  intention.  Volitions  always  imply  intention. 
It  is  therefore  impossible  that  benevolent  volitions  should  co- 
exist with  a  selfish  intention  or  that  selfish  volitions  should  co- 
exist with  a  benevolent  intention.  SimpHcity,  in  the  sense 
of  uncompounded  or  unmixed,  must  be  an  attribute  of  selfish- 
ness. This  is  evidently  the  philosophy  assumed  in  the  teach- 
ings of  Christ  and  of  inspiration.  '•*'Ye  can  not  serve  two 
masters" — (that  is,  certainly,  at  the  same  time)  says  Christ. 
And  again:  ^''Ye  can  not  serve  God  and  Mammon" — that  is, 
of  course  at  the  same  time.  ''  Can  a  fountain  at  the  same 
place  send  forth  sweet  water  and  bitter?"  says  James.  Thus 
we  see  that  the  bible  assumes  and  expressly  teaches  the  phi- 
losophy here  insisted  on. 

(2.)  Selfishness  is  always  as  intense  as  under  the  circum- 
stances it  can  be. 

It  is  a  choice.     It  is  the  choice  of  self-indulgence  as  an  ulti- 
mate end.    Therefore,  if  it  lounge,  it  is  only  because  the  pro- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  343 

pensity  to  lounge  at  the  time  preponderates.  If  energetic,  it 
is  to  secure  some  form  of  self-indulgence,  which,  at  the  time, 
is  preferred  to  ease.  If  at  one  time  it  is  more  or  less  intense 
than  at  another,  it  is  only  because  self-gratification  at  the 
time  demands  it.  Indeed  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  it  is  more 
intense  at  one  time  than  at  another  except  as  its  intensity  is 
increased  by  the  pressure  of  motives  to  abandon  it,  and  be- 
come benevolent  If  a  selfish  man  give  himself  up  to  idleness, 
lounging,  and  sleeping,  it  is  not  for  want  of  intensity  in  the 
action  of  his  will,  but  because  his  disposition  to  self  indulgence 
in  this  form  is  so  strong.  So  if  his  selfishness  take  on  any 
pos^ble  type,  it  is  only  because  of  the  strength  of  his  disposi- 
tion to  indulge  self  in  that  particular  way.  Selfishness 
lives  only  for  one  end,  and  it  is  impossible  that  that  end  while 
it  continues  to  be  chosen  should  not  have  the  supreme  con- 
trol. Indeed,  the  choice  of  an  ultimate  end  implies  the  con- 
secration of  the  will  to  it,  and  it  is  a  contradiction  to  say  that 
the  will  is  not  true  to  the  end  which  it  chooses,  and  that  it 
acts  less  intensely  than  is  demanded  by  the  nature  of  the  end 
and  the  apprehensions  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  the  readiest 
way  to  realize  it.  The  end  is  chosen  without  qualification  or 
not  at  all  as  an  ultimate  end.  The  moment  any  thing  should 
intervene  that  should  cause  the  mind  to  withhold  the  requisite 
energy  to  secure  it,  that  moment  it  would  cease  to  be  chosen  as 
an  ultimate  end.  That  which  has  induced  the  will  to  with- 
hold the  requisite  energy  has  become  the  supreme  object 
of  regard.  It  is  palpably  absurd  to  say  that  the  spirit  of 
self-indulgence  should  not  always  be  as  intense  as  will  most 
indulge  self  The  intensity  of  the  spirit  of  self-indulgence  is 
always  just  what  and  as  it  is,  because,  and  only  because  self  is 
the  most  indulged  and  gratified  thereby.  If  upon  the  whole 
self  would  be  more  indulged  and  gratified  by  greater  or  less 
intensity,  it  is  impossible  that  that  should  not  be.  The  pres- 
ence of  considerations  inducing  to  benevolence  must  either 
annihilate  or  strengthen  selfishness.  The  choice  must  be 
abandoned,  or  its  intensity  and  obstinacy  must  increase  with, 
and  in  proportion  to  increasing  light.  But  at  every  moment 
the  intensity  of  the  selfish  choice  must  be  as  great  as  is  con- 
sistent with  its  nature,  that  is,  with  its  being  the  choice  of  self- 
indulgence. 

27.  Total  Moral  Depravity  is  implied  in  selfishness  as  one 
of  its  attributes. 

By  this  I  intend  that  every  selfish  being  is  at  every  moment 
as  wicked  and  as  blameworthy  as  with  his  knowledge  he  can 
be.     To  estabhsh  this  proposition,  I  must 


344  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(1.)  Remind  you  of  that  in  which  moral  character  consists. 

(2.)  Of  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation. 

(3.)  Of  the  conditions  of  moral  obligation. 

(4.)  Show  the  unity  of  moral  obligation. 

(5.)  The  unity  of  virtue  and  of  vice. 

(6.)  How  to  measure  moral  obligation. 

(7.)  The  guilt  of  transgression  to  be  equal  to  the  degree  of 
obligation. 

(8.)  Moral  agents  are  at  all  times  either  as  holy  or  as  sinful 
as  with  their  knowledge  they  can  be. 

(9.)  Consequently,  total  moral  depravity  is  an  attribute  of 
selfishness  in  the  sense  that  every  sinner  is  as  wicked  as  with 
his  present  light  he  can  be. 

(1.)  In  what  moral  character  consists.  1 

It  has  been  repeatedly  shown  that  moral  character  belongs 
only  to  ultimate  intention,  or  that  it  consists  in  the  choice  of 
an  ultimate  end,  or  the  end  of  life. 

(2.)   The  foundation  of  moral  obligation, 

[1.]  Moral  character  implies  moral  obligation. 

[2.]  Moral  obligation  respects  ultimate  intention. 

[3.  Ultimate  choice  or  intention  is  the  choice  of  an  ulti- 
mate end,  or  the  choice  of  something  for  its  own  sake. 

[4.]  The  foundation  of  the  obligation  to  choose  or  intend 
an  end  or  something  for  its  own  sake,  must  consist  in  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  thing  to  be  chosen. 

[5.]  The  highest  good  or  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
verse is  of  intrinsic  and  infinite  value. 

[6.]  Therefore  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the 
universe  of  sentient  beings  is  the  foundation  of  moral  obliga- 
tion, that  is,  this  is  the  ultimate  end  to  which  all  moral  agents 
ought  to  consecrate  themselves. 

(3.)  Conditions  of  moral  obligation. 

[1.]  The  powers  of  moral  agency:  Intellect,  Sensibility, 
and  Free  Will. 

[2.]  The  existence  and  perception  of  the  end  that  ought  to 
be  chosen. 

(4.)  Uniti/  of  Moral  Obligation. 

[I.]  Moral  obligation  strictly  belongs  only  to  the  ultimate 
intention. 

[2.]  It  requires  but  one  ultimate  choice  or  intention. 

[3.]  It  requires  universally  and  only  that  every  moral  agent 
should  at  all  times,  and  under  all  circumstances,  honestly  will, 
choose,  intend  the  highest  good  of  being  as  an  end,  or  for  its 


MORAL    GOVERNMENT.  345 

own  intrinsic  value.     Therefore  moral  obligation  is  a  unit. 

(5.)   Unity  of  virtue  and  vice. 

[1]  Virtue  must  be  a  unit,  for  it  always  and  only  consists 
in  compliance  with  moral  obligation,  which  is  a  unit. 

[2.]  It  always  and  only  consists  in  one  and  the  same  choice, 
or  in  the  choice  of  one  and  the  same  end. 

[3.]  It  has  been  fully  shown  that  sin  consists  in  selfishness 
and  that  selfishness  is  an  ultimate  choice,  to  wit,  the  choice 
of  self-gratification  as  an  end  or  for  its  own  sake. 

[4.]  Selfishness  is  always  one  and  the  same  choice  or  the 
choice  of  one  and  the  same  end. 

[5.]  Therefore,  selfishness  or  sin  must  be  a  unit. 

[6.]  Or  more  strictly  virtue  is  the  moral  element  or  attri- 
bute of  disinterested  benevolence  or  good  willing.  And  sin 
or  vice  is  the  moral  element  or  attribute  of  selfishness.  Vir- 
tue is  always  the  same  attribute  of  the  same  choice.  They 
are  therefore  always  and  necessRrily  units. 

(6.)  How  to  measure  moral  obligation. 

[I.]  It  is  affirmed  both  by  reason  and  revelation  that  there 
are  degrees  of  guilt;  that  some  are  more  guilty  than  others; 
and  that  the  same  individual  may  be  more  guilty  at  one  time 
than  at  another. 

[2.]  The  same  is  true  of  virtue.  One  person  may  be  more 
virtuous  than  another  when  both  are  truly  virtuous.  And 
also  the  same  person  may  be  more  virtuous  at  one  time  than 
at  another,  although  he  may  be  virtuous  at  all  times.  In  oth- 
er words,  it  is  affirmed  both  by  reason  and  revelation  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  growth  both  in  virtue  and  vice. 

[3.]  It  is  matter  of  general  belief  also  that  the  same  indi- 
vidual with  the  same  degree  of  light  or  knowledge,  is  more  or 
less  praise  or  blameworthy  as  he  shall  do  one  thing  or  anoth- 
er; or  in  other  words,  as  he  shall  pursue  one  course  or  anoth- 
er, to  accomplish  the  end  he  has  in  view;  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  that  the  same  individual  with  the  same  knowl- 
edge or  light,  is  more  or  less  virtuous  or  vicious  according  to 
the  course  of  outward  life  which  he  shall  pursue.  This  I  shall 
attempt  to  show  is  human  prejudice,  and  a  serious  and  most 
injurious  error. 

[4.]  It  is  also  generally  held  that  two  or  more  individuals 
having  precisely  the  same  degree  of  light  or  knowledge,  and 
being  both  equally  benevolent  or  selfish,  may  nevertheless 
differ  in  their  degree  of  virtue  or  vice  according  as  they  pur- 
sue different  courses  of  outward  conduct.  This  also  I  shall 
attempt  to  show  is  fundamental  error. 


346  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

We  can  arrive  at  the  truth  upon  this  suhject  only  by  clearly 
understanding  how  to  measure  moral  obligation,  and  of  course 
how  to  ascertain  the  degree  of  virtue  and  sin.  The  amount 
or  degree  of  virtue  or  vice  or  of  praise  or  blame-worthiness 
is  and  must  be  decided  by  reference  to  the  degree  of  obliga- 
tion. 

It  is  very  important  to  remark  here  that  virtue  does  not 
merit  so  much  praise  and  reward  as  vice  does  blame  and  pun- 
ishment. This  is  the  universal  and  necessary  affirmation  of 
reason  and  the  plain  doctrine  of  inspiration.  The  reason  is 
this:  Virtue  is  a  comphance  with  obligation.  Christ  says, 
^'^ When  you  have  done  all,  say,  we  are  unprofitable  servants: 
we  have  done  what  it  was  our  duty  to  do."  To  suppose  that 
virtue  is  as  deserving  of  reward  as  vice  is  of  punishment  were 
to  overlook  obligation  altogether,  and  make  virtue  a  work  of 
supererogation,  or  that  to  which  we  are  under  no  obligation. 
Suppose  I  owe  you  a  hundred  dollars.  When  I  pay  you  I  only 
discharge  my  obhgation,  and  lay  you  under  no  further  obliga- 
tion to  me,  except  to  treat  me  as  an  honest  man  when  and  as 
long  as  I  am  such.  This  is  all  the  reward  which  the  discharge 
of  duty  merits. 

But  suppose  I  refuse  to  pay  you  when  it  is  in  my  power. 
Here  my  desert  of  blame,  as  every  body  must  know,  and  as 
the  Bible  every  where  teaches,  is  vastly  greater  than  my 
desert  of  praise  in  the  former  case.  The  difference  lies  in 
this,  namely,  that  virtue  is  nothing  more  than  a  compliance 
with  obligation.  It  is  the  doing  of  that  which  could  not  have 
been  neglected  without  sin.  Hence  all  the  reward  which  it 
merits  is  that  the  virtuous  being,  so  long  as  he  is  virtuous, 
shall  be  regarded  and  treated  as  one  who  does  his  duty  and 
complies  with  his  obhgations. 

But  vice  is  the  violation  of  obligation.  It  is  a  refusal  to  do 
what  ought  to  be  done.  In  this  case  it  is  clear  that  the  guilt 
is  equal  to  the  obligation,  that  is,  the  measure  of  obligation  is 
the  measure  of  guilt.  This  brings  us  to  the  point  of  inquiry 
now  before  us,  namely,  now  is  moral  obhgation  to  be  meas- 
ured? What  is  the  criterion,  the  rule,  or  standard  by  which 
the  amount  or  degree  of  obligation  is  to  be  estimated? 

And  here  I  would  remind  you, 

a  That  moral  obligation  is  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of 
the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  the  universe,  and, 

b  That  the  conditions  of  the  obligation  are  the  possession 
of  the-powers  of  moral  agency  and  hght,  or  the  knowledge  of 
the  end  to  be  chosen. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  347 

c  Hence  it  follows  that  the  obligation  is  to  be  measured  by 
the  mind's  honest  apprehension  or  judgment  of  the  intrinsic  val- 
ue of  the  end  to  he  chosen.  That  this  and  nothing  else  is  the 
rule  or  standard  by  which  the  obligation,  and  consequently 
the  guilt  of  violating  it  is  to  be  measured,  will  appear  if  we 
consider, 

a  That  the  obligation  can  not  be  measured  by  the  infinity 
of  God,  apart  from  the  knowledge  of  the  infinite  value  of  His 
interests.  He  is  an  infinite  being,  and  His  well-being  must 
be  of  intrinsic  and  of  infinite  value.  But  unless  this  be  known 
to  a  moral  agent,  he  can  not  be  under  obligation  to  will  it  as 
an  ultimate  end.  If  he  knows  it  to  be  of  some  value  he  is 
bound  to  choose  it  for  that  reason.  But  the  measure  of  his 
obligation  must  be  just  equal  to  the  clearness  of  his  apprehen- 
sion of  its  intrinsic  value. 

Besides  if  the  infinity  of  God  were  alone  or  without  refer- 
ence to  the  knowledge  of  the  agent  the  rule  by  which  moral 
obligation  is  to  be  measured,  it  would  follow  that  obligation  is 
in  all  cases  the  same,  and  of  course  that  the  guilt  of  disobe- 
dience would  also  in  all  cases  be  the  same.  But  this,  as  has 
been  said,  contradicts  both  reason  and  revelation.  Thus  it 
appears  that  moral  obhgation,  and  of  course  guilt,  can  not  be 
measured  by  the  infinity  of  God  without  reference  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  agent. 

b  It  can  not  be  measured  by  the  infinity  of  His  authority 
without  reference  to  the  knowledge  of  the  agent  for  the  same 
reasons  as  above. 

c  It  can  not  be  measured  by  the  infinity  of  his  moral  excel- 
lence without  reference  both  to  the  infinite  value  of  his  inte- 
rests and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  agent;  for  his  interests  are 
to  be  chosen  as  an  end  or  for  their  own  value,  and  without 
knowledge  of  their  value,  there  can  be  no  obligation;  nor  can 
obligation  exceed  knowledge. 

d  If,  again,  the  infinite  excellence  of  God  were  alone  or  with- 
out reference  to  the  knowledge  of  the  agent  to  be  the  rule  by 
which  moral  obligation  is  to  be  measured,  it  would  follow  that 
guilt  in  all  cases  of  disobedience,  is  and  must  be  equal.  This 
we  have  seen  can  not  be. 

e  It  can  not  be  measured  by  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good 
or  well  being  of  God  and  the  universe  without  reference  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  agent,  for  the  same  reason  as  above. 

f  It  can  not  be  measured  by  the  particular  course  of  life 
pursued  by  the  agent.  That  the  guilt  of  sin  can  not  be  meas- 
ured by  the  particular  course  of  life  pursued,  will  appear,  if 


348  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

we  consider  that  moral  obligation  has  directly  nothing  to  do 
with  the  outward  life.  It  respects  the  ultimate  intention  only 
and  that  decides  the  course  of  outward  action  or  life.  The 
guilt  of  any  outward  action  can  not  be  decided  by  reference 
to  the  kind  of  action  without  regard  to  the  intention,  for  the 
moral  character  of  the  act  must  be  found  in  the  intention,  and 
not  in  the  outward  act  or  life.     This  leads  me, 

g  To  remark  that  the  degree  of  moral  obligation,  and  of 
course  the  degree  of  the  guilt  of  disobedience  can  not  be 
properly  estimated  by  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  inten- 
tion without  respect  to  the  degree  of  the  knowledge  of  the 
agent.  Selfish  intention  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  unit,  always 
the  same;  and  if  this  were  the  standard  by  which  the  degree 
of  guilt  is  to  be  measured,  it  would  follow  that  it  is  always 
the  same. 

h  Nor  can  obligation,  nor  of  course  guilt,  be  measured  by 
the  tendeMcy  of  sin.  All  sin  tends  to  infinite  evil,  to  ruin  the 
sinner,  and  from  its  contagious  nature,  to  spread  and  ruin  the 
universe.  Nor  can  any  finite  mind  know  what  the  ultimate 
results  of  any  sin  may  be,  nor  to  what  particular  evil  it  may 
tend.  As  all  sin  tends  to  universal  and  eternal  evil,  if  this 
were  the  criterion  by  which  the  guilt  is  to  be  estimated,  all 
sin  would  be  equally  guilty,  which  can  not  be. 

Again:  That  the  guilt  of  sin  can  not  be  measured  by  the. 
tendency  of  sin  is  manifest  from  the  fact  that  moral  obligation 
is  not  founded  in  the  tendency  of  action  or  intention,  but  in 
the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  to  be  intended.  Estimating 
moral  obligation  or  measuring  sin  or  holiness  by  tendency^  is 
in  accordance  with  the  utiUtarian  philosophy  which  we  have 
seen  to  be  false.  Moral  obligation  respects  the  choice  of  an 
end,  and  is  founded  upon  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end,  and  is 
not  so  much  as  conditionated  upon  the  tendency  of  the  choice 
to  secure  its  end.  Therefore  tendency  can  never  be  the  rule 
by  which  obligation  can  be  measured,  nor,  of  course,  the 
rule  by  which  guilt  can  be  estimated. 

I  Nor  can  moral  obligation  be  estimated  by  the  results  of  a 
moral  action  or  course  of  action.  Moral  obligation  respects 
intention  and  respects  results  no  farther  than  they  were  inten- 
ded. Much  good  may  result,  as  in  the  death  of  Christ,  with- 
out any  virtue  but  with  much  guilt.  So,  much  evil  may  result 
as  in  the  creation  of  the  world,  witliput  guilt,  but  with  great 
virtue.  If  moral  obligation  is  not  founded  or  conditionated 
on  results,  it  follows  that  guilt  can  not  be  duly  estimated  by 
results  without  reference  to  knowledge  and  intention. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  349 

j  What  has  been  said  has,  I  trust,  rendered  it  evident  that 
moral  obHgation  is  to  be  measured  by  the  mind's  honest  appre- 
hension or  judgment  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  to  be  cho- 
sen and  which  is  rejected,  to  wit,  the  highest  well-being  of 
God  and  the  universe. 

It  should  be  distinctly  understood  that  selfishness  implies 
the  rejection  of  the  interests  of  God  and  of  the  universe  for 
the  sake  of  one's  own.  It  refuses  to  will  good  but  upon  con- 
dition that  it  belongs  to  self.  It  spurns  God's  interests  and 
those  of  the  universe,  and  seeks  only  self-interest  as  an  ulti- 
mate end.  It  must  follow  that  the  selfish  man's  guilt  is  just 
equal  to  his  knowledge  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  those  interests 
that  he  rejects.  This  is  undeniably  the  doctrine  of  the  bible. 
I  will  introduce  a  few  paragraphs  from  one  of  my  reported 
sermons  upon  this  subject. 

1.   The  scriptures  assume  and  affirm  it. 

Acts  17:  30  affords  a  plain  instance.  The  apostle  alludes 
to  those  past  ages  when  the  heathen  nations  had  no  written 
revelation  from  God,  and  remarks  that  '-'-  those  times  of  igno- 
rance God  winked  at."  This  does  not  mean  that  God  conni- 
ved at  their  sin  because  of  their  darkness,  but  it  does  mean  that 
he  passed  over  it  with  comparatively  slight  notice,  regarding 
it  as  a  sin  of  far  less  aggravation  than  that  which  men  would 
now  commit  if  they  turned  away  when  God  commanded  them 
all  to  repent.  True,  sin  is  never  absolutely  ahght  thing;  but 
comparatively,  some  sins  incur  small  guilt  when  compared 
with  the  great  guilt  of  other  sins.  This  is  implied  in  our 
text. 

I  next  cite  James  4:  17.  "To  him  that  knoweth  to  do 
good,  and  doeth  it  not,  to  him  it  is  sin."  This  plainly  impHes 
that  knowledge  is  indispensable  to  moral  obligation ;  and  even 
more  than  this  is  implied,  namely,  that  the  guilt  of  any 
sinner  is  always  equal  to  the  amount  of  his  knowledge  on  the 
subject.  It  always  corresponds  to  the  mind's  perception  of  the 
value  of  the  end  which  should  have  been  chosen,  but  is  rejec- 
ted. If  a  man  knows  he  ought  in  any  given  case  to  do  good,  and 
yet  does  not  do  it,  to  him  this  is  sin — the  sin  plainly  lying  in  the 
fact  of  not  doing  good  when  he  knew  he  could  do  it,  and  be- 
ing measured  as  to  its  guilt  by  the  degree  of  that  knowledge. 

John  9:  41 — ""Jesus  said  unto  them,  if  ye  were  blind,  ye 
should  have  no  sin:  but  now  ye  say,  we  see;  therefore  your 
sin  remaineth."  Here  Christ  asserts  that  men  without  knowl- 
edge would  be  without  sin :  and  that  men  who  have  knowledge, 
and  sin  notw^ithstanding,  are  held  guilty.     This  plainly  affirms 


I 


350  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

that  the  presence  of  light  or  knowledge  is  requisite  to  the 
existence   of  sin,   and  obviously  implies  that  the  amount  of- 
knowledge  possessed  is  the  measure   of  the  guilt  of  sin. 

It  is  remarkable  that  the  Bible  everywhere  assumes  first 
truths.  It  does  not  stop  to  prove  them,  or  even  assert  them — 
it  always  assumes  their  truth,  and  seems  to  assume  that  every 
one  knows  and  will  admit  them.  As  I  have  been  recently 
writing  on  moral  government  and  studying  the  Bible  as  to  its 
teachings  on  this  class  of  subjects,  I  have  been  often  struck 
with  this  remarkable  fact. 

John  15;  22 — 24  ^'  If  I  had  not  come  and  spoken  unto  them, 
they  had  not  had  sin:  but  now  they  have  no  cloak  for  their 
sin.  He  that  hateth  me,  hateth  my  Father  also.  If  I  had 
not  done  among  them  the  works  which  none  other  man  did, 
they  had  not  had  sin :  but  now  have  they  both  seen  and  hated 
both  me  and  my  Father."  Christ  holds  the  same  doctrine  here 
as  in  the  last  passage  cited;  light  essential  to  constitute  sin,  and 
the  degree  of  light,  constituting  the  measure  of  its  aggravation. 

Let  it  be  observed,  however,  that  Christ  probably  did 
not  mean  to  affirm  in  the  absolute  sense  that  if  he  had 
not  come,  the  Jews  would  have  had  no  sin;  for  they  would 
have  had  some  light  if  He  had  not  come.  He  speaks,  as  I 
suppose,  comparatively.  Their  sin  if  He  had  not  come  would 
have  been  so  much  less  as  to  justify  his  strong  language. 

Luke,  12:  47,  48 — ''And  that  servant  which  knew  his 
Lord's  will,  and  prepared  not  himself,  neither  did  according 
to  his  will,  shall  be  beaten  with  many  stripes.  But  he  that 
knew  not  and  did  commit  things  worthy  of  stripes,  shall  be 
beaten  with  few  stripes.  For  unto  whomsoever  much  is  given, 
of  him  shall  be  much  required;  and  to  whom  men  have  com- 
mitted much,  of  him  they  will  ask  the  more." 

Here  we  have  the  doctrine  laid  down  and  the  truth  assumed 
that  men  shall  be  punished  according  to  knowledge.  To  whom 
much  light  is  given,  of  him  shall  much  obedience  be  required. 
This  is  precisely  the  principle,  that  God  requires  of  men  ac- 
cording to  the  light  they  have. 

1  Tim.  1:  13 — '•'•Who  was  before  a  blasphemer,  and  a 
persecutor,  and  injurious:  but  I  obtained  mercy,  because  I 
did  it  ignorantly  in  unbelief."  Paul  had  done  things  in 
form  as  bad  as  well  they  could  be;  yet  his  guilt  was  far  less 
because  he  did  them  under  the  darkness  of  unbelief;  hence 
he  obtained  mercy,  when  otherwise,  he  might  not.  The  plain 
assumption  is  that  his  ignorance  abated  from  the  malignity  of 
bis  sin  and  favored  his  obtaining  mercy. 


KORAL  GOVERNMENT.  351 

In  another  passage,  (Acts  26:  9)  Paul  says  of  himself— 
''I  verily  thought  with  myself,  that  I  ought  to  do  many  things 
contrary  to  the  name  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth."  This  had  every 
thing  to  do  with  the  degree  of  his  guilt  in  rejecting  the  Mes- 
siah, and  also  with  his  obtaining  pardon. 

Luke,  23:  34 — '■'-  Then  said  Jesus,  Father  forgive  them:  for 
they  know  not  what  they  do."  This  passage  presents  to  us 
the  suffering  Jesus,  surrounded  with  Roman  soldiers  and  ma- 
licious scribes  and  priests  yet  pouring  out  his  prayer  for  them, 
and  making  the  only  plea  in  their  behalf  which  could  be 
made — "•for  they  know  not  what  they  do,''"'  This  does  not  im- 
ply that  they  had  no  guilt,  for  if  this  were  true  they  would 
not  have  needed  forgiveness;  but  it  did  imply  that  their  guilt 
was  greatly  palHated  by  their  ignorance.  If  they  had  known 
him  to  be  the  Messiah,  their  guilt  might  have  been  unpardon- 
able. 

Matt.  II:  20 — 24 — "Then  began  he  to  upbraid  the  cities 
wherein  most  of  his  mighty  works  were  done  because  they 
repented  not.  Woe  unto  thee,  Chorazin! — woe  unto  thee, 
Bethsaida!  for  if  the  mighty  works  which  were  done  in  you 
had  been  done  in  Tyre  and  Sidon,  they  would  have  repented 
long  ago  in  sackcloth  and  ashes.  But  I  say  unto  you  it  shall  be 
more  tolerable  for  Tyre  and  Sidon  in  the  day  of  judgment 
than  for  you.  And  thou,  Capernaum,  which  art  exalted  unto 
heaven,  shalt  be  brought  down  to  hell:  for  if  the  mighty 
works  which  have  been  done  in  thee,  had  been  done  in  Sodom, 
it  would  have  remained  until  this  day.  But  I  say  unto  you, 
that  it  shall  be  more  tolerable  for  the  land  of  Sodom,  in  the 
day  of  judgment,  than  for  thee."  But  why  does  Christ  thus 
upbraid  these  cities?  Why  denounce  so  fearful  a  woe  on 
Chorazin  and  Capernaum  ?  Because  most  of  his  mighty  works 
had  been  wrought  there.  His  oft-repeated  miracles  which 
proved  him  to  be  the  Messiah  had  been  wrought  before  their 
eyes.  Among  them  he  had  taught  daily,  and  in  their  synagogues 
every  Sabbath  day.  They  had  great  light — hence  their  great 
— their  unsurpassed  guilt.  Not  even  the  men  of  Sodom  had 
guilt  to  compare  with  theirs.  The  city  most  exalted,  even  as 
it  were  to  heaven,  must  be  brought  down  to  the  deepest  hell. 
Guilt  and  punishment,  evermore,  according  to  light  enjoyed, 
but  resisted. 

Luke  II:  47 — 51 — ^^  Woe  unto  you!  for  ye  build  the  sepul- 
chres of  the  prophets,  and  your  fathers  killed  them.  Truly 
ye  bear  witness  that  ye  allow  the  deeds  of  your  fathers:  for 
they  indeed  killed  them,  and  ye  build  their  sepulchres.     There- 


352  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

fore  also  said  the  wisdom  of  God,  I  will  send  them  prophets 
and  apostles,  and  some  of  them  they  shall  slay  and  persecute: 
that  the  blood  of  all  the  prophets,  which  was  shed  from  the 
foundation  of  the  world  may  be  required  of  this  generation. 
From  the  blood  of  Abel  unto  the  blood  of  Zacharias,  which 
perished  between  the  altar  and  the  temple:  verily  I  say  unto 
you  it  shall  be  required  of  this  generation."  Now  here,  I  ask, 
on  what  principle  was  it  that  all  the  blood  of  martyred  pro- 
phets ever  since  the  world  began  was  required  of  that  genera- 
tion? Because  they  deserved  it;  for  God  does  no  such  thing 
as  injustice.  It  never  was  known  that  he  punished  any  peo- 
ple or  any  individual  beyond  their  desert. 

But  why  and  how  did  they  deserve  this  fearful  and  aug- 
mented visitation  of  the  wrath  of  God  for  past  centuries  of 
persecution? 

The  answer  is  two-fold:  they  sinned  against  accumulated 
lights  and  they  virtually  endorsed  all  the  persecuting  deeds  of 
their  fathers^  and  concurred  most  heartily  in  their  guilt.  They 
had  all  the  oracles  of  God.  The  whole  history  of  the  nation 
lay  in  their  hands.  They  knew  the  blameless  and  holy  char- 
acter of  those  prophets  who  had  been  martyred;  they  could 
read  the  guilt  of  their  persecutors  and  murderers.  Yet  un- 
der all  this  light,  themselves  go  straight  on  and  perpetrate 
deeds  of  the  same  sort,  but  of  far  deeper  malignity. 

Again:  in  doing  this  they  virtually  endorse  all  that  their 
fathers  did.  Their  conduct  towards  the  Man  of  Nazareth  put 
into  words  would  read  thus — "  The  holy  men  whom  God  sent 
to  teach  and  rebuke  our  fathers,  they  maliciously  traduced 
and  put  to  death;  they  did  rights  and  we  will  do  the  same 
thing  toward  Christ."  Now  it  was  not  possible  for  them  to 
give  a  more  decided  sanction  to  the  bloody  deeds  of  their 
fathers.  They  underwrote  for  every  crime — assumed  upon 
their  own  consciences  all  the  guilt  of  their  father.  In  inten- 
tion^ they  do  those  deeds  over  again.  They  say,  "  if  we  had 
lived  then,  we  should  have  done  and  sanctioned  all  they  did." 

On  the  same  principle  the  accumulated  guilt  of  all  the 
blood  and  miseries  of  Slavery  since  the  world  began  rests  on 
this  natiion  now.  The  guilt  involved  in  every  pang,  every 
tear,  every  blood-drop  forced  out  by  the  knotted  scourge — all 
lie  at  the  door  of  this  generation. 

Why?  Because  the  history  of  all  the  past  is  before  the 
pro-slavery  men  of  this  generation,  and  they  endorse  the 
whole  by  persisting  in  the  practice  of  the  same  system  and  of 
the  same  wrongs.     No  generation  before  us  ever  had  the  light 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  353 

on  the  evils  and  the  wrongs  of  Slavery  that  we  have;  hence 
pur  guilt  exceeds  that  of  any  former  generation  of  slave-hold- 
ers; and  moreover,  knowing  all  the  cruel  wrongs  and  miseries 
of  the  system  from  the  history  of  the  past,  every  persisting 
slave-holder  endorses  all  the  crimes  and  assumes  all  the  guilt 
involved  in  the  system  and  evolved  out  of  it  since  the  world 
began. 

Rom.  7:  13 — "-Was  then  that  which  is  good  made  death 
unto  me?  God  forbid.  But  sin,  that  it  might  appear  sin, 
worketh  death  in  me  by  that  which  is  good,  that  sin  by  the 
commandment  might  become  exceeding  sinful."  The  last 
clause  of  this  verse  brings  out  clearly  the  principle  that  under 
the  light  which  the  commandment,  that  is,  the  law  affords, 
sin  becomes  exceeding  guilty.  This  is  the  very  principle, 
which,  we  have  seen,  is  so  clearly  taught  and  implied  in  nu- 
merous passages  of  Scripture. 

The  diligent  reader  of  the  Bible  knows  that  these  are  only 
a  part  of  the  texts  which  teach  the  same  doctrine:  we  need 
not  adduce  any  more. 

2.  I  remark  that  this  is  the  rule  and  the  only  just  rule  bv 
which  the  guilt  of  sin  can  be  measured.  If  I  had  time  to  turn 
the  subject  over  and  over — time  to  take  up  every  other  con- 
ceivable supposition,  I  could  show  that  none  of  them  can  pos- 
sibly be  true.  No  supposition  can  abide  a  close  examination 
except  this,  that  the  rule  or  measure  of  guilt  is  the  mind's 
knowledge  pertaining  to  the  value  of  the  end  to  be  chosen. 

There  can  be  no  other  criterion  by  which  guilt  can  be  mea- 
sured. It  is  the  value  of  the  end  that  ought  to  be  chosen  which 
constitutes  sin  guilty,  and  the  mind's  estimate  of  that  value 
measures  its  own  guilt.  This  is  true  according  to  the  Bible,  as 
we  have  seen;  and  every  man  needs  only  consult  his  own  con- 
sciousness faithfully,  and  he  will  see  that  it  is  equally  affirmed 
by  the  mind's  own  intuitions  to  be  right. 

(7.)  The  guilt  of  transgression  is  just  equal  to  the  degree 
of  obligation. 

[I.]  The  guilt  of  sin  lies  in  its  being  the  violation  of  an  obli- 
gation. 

[2.]  It  must  follow  that  the  degree  of  the  guilt  of  violation 
must  be  just  equal  to  the  degree  of  obHgation.  This,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  not  true  of  virtue,  for  obvious  reasons.  But  it  must 
be  true  of  vice. 

[3.]  Moral  obligation  respects  the  choice  of  an  end.      The 
amount  of  the  obligation  must  be  just  equal  to  the  mind's  ap^ 
prehension  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  ii  be  chosen.     The 
30* 


354  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

guilt  of  transgression  is  and  must  be  just  equal  to  the  amount 
of  the  obHgation.  This  conducts  us  to  the  conclusion  or 
truth  to  be  demonstrated,  namely: 

(8.)  That  moral  agents  are  at  all  times  either  as  holy  or  as 
sinful  as  with  their  knowledge  they  can  be. 

This  will  more  fully  appear  if  we  consider, 

[L]  That  moral  obligation  respects  ultimate  intention 
alone. 

[2.]  That  obHgation  to  choose  or  intend  an  end  is  founded 
in  the  apprehended  intrinsic  value  of  the  end. 

[3,]  That  when  this  end  is  chosen  in  accordance  with  ap- 
prehended value  all  present  obligation  is  met  or  complied  with. 
Virtue  is  now  complete  in  the  sense  that  it  can  only  be  in- 
creased by  increased  light  in  regard  to  the  value  of  the  end. 
New  relations  and  interests  may  be  discovered,  or  the  mind 
may  come  to  apprehend  more  clearly  the  intrinsic  value  of 
those  partially  known  before.  In  this  case  virtue  may  in- 
crease and  not  otherwise.  It  matters  not  what  particular 
course  is  taken  to  realize  this  end.  The  intention  is  honest. 
It  is  and  must,  to  be  honest,  be  intense  according  to  the  mind's 
apprehension  of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.  The  mind 
can  not  but  act  in  accordance  with  its  best  judgment  in  regard 
to  the  use  of  means  to  compass  its  end.  Whatever  it  does  it 
does  for  one  and  the  same  reason.  Its  virtue  belongs  to  its 
intention.  The  intention  remaining,  virtue  does  not,  can  not 
vary  but  with  varying  Hght.  This  renders  it  evident  that  the 
virtuous  man  is  as  virtuous  as  with  his  present  light  he  can  be. 

The  same  must  be  true  of  sin  or  selfishness.  We 
have  seen  in  former  lectures  that  malevolence,  strictly  speak- 
ing, is  impossible;  that  selfishness  is  ultimate  intention,  or  the 
choice  of  self-gratification  as  an  end;  that  the  obligation  to 
benevolence  is  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good  of 
God  and  the  universe,  that  the  amount  of  obligation  is  equal  to 
the  mind's  apprehension  or  knowledge  of  the  value  of  the  end; 
that  sin  is  a  unit  and  always  consists  in  violating  this  obligation 
by  the  choice  of  an  opposite  end;  that  the  guilt  of  this  viola- 
tion depends  upon  and  is  equal  to  the  mind's  apprehen- 
sion of  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end  it  ought  to  choose. 

Selfishness  is  the  rejection  of  all  obligation.  It  is  the  vio- 
lation of  all  obligation.  The  sin  of  selfishness  is  then  com- 
plete; that  is,  the  guilt  of  selfishness  is  as  great  as  with  its 
present  light  it  can  be.  What  can  make  it  greater  with  pres- 
ent light?  Can  the  course  that  it  takes  to  realize  its  end  miti- 
gate its  guilt?    No:  for  whatever  course  it  takes  it  is  for  a 


MORAL  GOVERXMENT.  355 

selfish  reason,  and  therefore  in  no  wise  lessens  the  guilt  of  the 
intention.  Can  the  course  it  takes  to  realize  its  end  without 
more  or  less  light  increase  the  guilt  of  the  sin?  No:  for  the 
sin  lies  exclusively  in  having  the  selfish  intention.  The  inten- 
tion necessitates  the  use  of  the  means;  and  whatever  means 
the  selfish  person  uses,  it  is  for  one  and  the  same  reason,  to  grat- 
ify himself.  As  I  said  in  a  former  lecture,  if  the  selfish  man 
were  to  preach  the  gospel,  it  would  be  only  because  upon  the 
whole  it  was  most  pleasing  or  gratifying  to  himself,  and  not  at 
all  for  the  sake  of  the  good  of  being,  as  an  end.  If  he  should 
become  a  pirate,  it  would  be  for  exactly  the  same  reason,  to 
wit,  that  this  course  is  upon  the  whole  most  pleasing  or  grati- 
fying to  himself,  and  not  at  all  for  the  reason  that  that  course 
is  evil  in  itself.  Whichever  course  he  takes,  he  takes  it  for 
precisely  the  same  reason;  and  with  the  same  degree  of  light 
it  must  involve  the  same  degree  of  guilt.  Which  of  these 
courses  may  tend  ultimately  to  the  most  evil,  no  finite  being 
can  say,  nor  which  shall  result  in  the  greatest  evil;  and  if  one 
could,  guilt  is  not  to  be  measured  by  tendency  nor  by  results, 
but  belongs  to  the  intention;  and  its  degree  is  to  be  measured 
alone  by  the  mind's  apprehension  of  the  reason  of  the  obliga- 
tion violated,  namely  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  good  of  God 
and  the  universe  which  selfishness  rejects.  Now  it  should  be 
remembered  that  whichever  course  the  sinner  takes  to  realize 
his  end,  it  is  the  end  at  which  he  aims.  He  intends  the  end. 
If  he  become  a  preacher  of  the  gospel  for  a  selfish  reason,  he 
has  no  right  regard  to  the  good  of  being.  If  he  regards  it  at 
all,  it  is  only  as  a  means  of  his  own  good.  So,  if  he  becomes 
a  pirate,  it  is  not  from  malice  or  a  disposition  to  do  evil  for  its 
own  sake,  but  only  to  gratify  himself  If  he  has  any  regard 
at  all  to  the  evil  he  may  do,  it  is  only  to  gratify  himself  that 
he  regards  it.  Whether  therefore  he  preach  or  pray,  or  rob  and 
plunder  upon  the  high  seas,  he  does  it  only  for  one  end,  that 
is,  for  precisely  the  same  reason;  and  of  course  his  sinfulness 
is  complete  in  the  sense  that  it  can  be  varied  only  by  varying 
light.  This  I  know  is  contrary  to  common  opinion,  but  it  is 
the  truth  and  must  be  known ;  and  it  is  of  the  highest  import- 
ance that  these  fundamental  truths  of  morality  and  of  immo- 
rality should  be  held  up  to  the  minds  of  all. 

Should  the  sinner  abstain  from  any  course  of  vice  because 
it  is  wicked,  it  cannot  be  because  he  is  benevolent,  for  this 
would  contradict  the  supposition  that  he  is  selfish  or  that  he 
is  a  sinner.  If  in  consideration  that  an  act  or  course  is  wick- 
ed he  abstains  from  it,  it  must  be  for  a  selfish  rccison.     It  may 


356  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

be  in  obedience  to  phrenological  conscientiousness,  or  it  may 
be  from  fear  of  hell,  or  of  disgrace,  or  from  remorse;  at  all 
events,  it  can  not  but  be  for  some  selfish  reason. 

(9.)  Total  moral  depravity  is  an  attribute  of  selfishness,  in 
the  sense  that  every  selfish  person  is  at  all  times  just  as  wick- 
ed and  blame-vrorthy  as  with  his  present  light  he  can  be. 

[1.]  He,  remaining  selfish,  can  take  no  other  course  than  to 
please  himself,  and  only  that  course  which  is  upon  the  whole 
most  pleasing  to  him  for  the  time  being.  If  he  takes  one 
course  of  outward  conduct  rather  than  another,  it  is  only  to 
please  and  gratify  himself. 

[2,]  But  if  for  this  reason  he  should  take  any  other  out- 
ward course  than  he  does,  it  would  not  vary  his  guilt,  for  his 
guilt  lies  in  the  intention  and  is  measured  by  the  light  under 
which  the  intention  is  maintained. 

A  few  inferences  may  be  drawn  from  our  doctrine. 

1.  Guilt  is  not  to  be  meaaured  by  the  nature  of  the  inten- 
tion; for  sinful  intention  is  always  a  unit — always  one  and 
the  same  thing — being  nothing  more  nor  less  than  an  intention 
to  gratify  seJf 

2.  Nor  can  it  be  measured  by  the  particular  type  of  self- 
gratification  which  the  mind  may  prefer.  No  matter  which  of 
his  numerous  appetites  or  propensities  the  man  may  choose 
to  indulge — whether  for  food,  or  strong  drink — for  power, 
pleasure,  or  gain — it  is  the  same  thing  in  the  end — self-gratifi- 
cation, and  nothing  else.  For  the  sake  of  this  he  sacrifices 
every  other  conflicting  interest,  and  herein  lies  his  guilt. 
Since  he  tramples  on  the  greater  good  of  others  with  equal 
recklessness,  whatever  type  of  self-gratification  he  prefers,  it  • 
is  clear  that  we  can  not  find  in  this  type  the  true  measure  of 
his  guilt. 

3.  Nor  again  is  the  guilt  to  be  decided  by  the  amount  of 
evil  which  the  sin  may  bring  into  the  universe.  An  agent  not 
enlightened  may  introduce  great  evil,  and  yet  no  guilt  attach 
to  this  agent.  This  is  true  of  evil  often  done  by  brute  ani- 
mals. In  fact  it  matters  not  how  much  or  how  little  evil  may 
result  from  the  misdeeds  of  a  moral  agent,  you  can  not  deter- 
mine the  amount  of  his  guilt  from  this  circumstance.  God 
may  overrule  the  greatest  sin  so  that  but  little  evil  shall  re- 
sult from  it,  or  he  may  leave  its  tendencies  uncounteracted, 
so  that  great  evils  shall  result  from  the  least  sin.  Who  can 
tell  how  much  or  how  little  overruling  agency  may  inter- 
pose between  any  sin,  great  or  small,  and  its  legitimate  re- 
sults? 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  357 

Satan  sinned  in  tempting  Judas,  and  Judas  sinned  in  be- 
traying Christ.  Yet  God  so  overruled  these  sins,  that  most 
blessed  results  to  the  universe  followed  from  Christ's  betrayal 
and  consequent  death.  Shall  the  sins  of  Satan  and  Judas  be 
estimated  from  the  evils  actually  resulting  from  them?  If  it 
should  appear  that  the  good  immensely  overbalanced  the  evil, 
does  their  sin  thereby  become  holiness — meritorious  holiness? 
Is  their  guilt  at  all  the  less  for  God's  vi^isdom  and  love  in  over- 
ruHng  it  for  good  ? 

It  is  not  therefore  the  amount  of  resulting  good  or  evil 
which  determines  the  amount  of  guilt,  but  is  the  degree  of 
light  enjoyed  under  which  the  sin  is  committed. 

4.  Nor  again  can  guilt  be  measured  by  the  common  opin- 
ions of  men.  Men  associated  in  society  are  wont  to  form 
among  themselves  a  sort  of  public  sentiment  which  becomes 
a  standard  for  estimating  guilt;  yet  how  often  is  it  errone- 
ous! Christ  warns  us  against  adopting  this  standard,  and  al- 
so against  ever  judging  according  to  the  outward  appearance. 
Who  does  not  know  that  the  common  opinions  of  men  are 
exceedingly  incorrect?  It  is  indeed  wonderful  to  see  how 
far  they  diverge  in  all  directions  from  the  Bible  standard. 

5.  The  amount  of  guilt  can  be  determined,  as  I  have  said, 
only  by  the  degree  in  which  those  ideas  are  developed  which 
throw  light  upon  obligation.  Just  here  sin  lies,  in  resisting 
the  light  and  acting  in  opposition  to  it,  and  therefore  the  de- 
gree of  light  should  naturally  measure  the  amount  of  guilt 
incurred. 

REMARKS. 

1.  We  see  from  this  subject  the  principle  on  which  many 
passages  of  scripture  are  to  be  explained.  It  might  seem 
strange  that  Christ  should  charge  the  blood  of  all  the  martyr- 
ed prophets  of  past  ages  on  that  generation.  But  the  subject 
before  us  reveals  the  principle  upon  which  t^is  is  done  and 
ought  to  be  done. 

Whatever  of  apparent  mystery  may  attach  to  the  fact  de- 
clared in  our  text — "The  times  of  this  ignorance  God  wink- 
ed at" — finds  in  our  subject  an  adequate  explanation.  Does 
it  seem  strange  that  for  ages  God  should  pass  over  almost 
without  apparent  notice  the  monstrous  and  reeking  abomi- 
nations of  the  heathen  world?  The  reason  is  found  in  their 
ignorance.  Therefore  God  winks  at  those  odious  and  cruel 
idolatries.  For  all,  taken  together,  are  a  trifle  compared  with 
the  guilt  of  a  single  generation  of  enlightend  men. 

2.  One  sinner   may  be  in   such  circumstances  as  to  have 


358  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

more  light  and  knowledge  than  the  whole  heathen  world. 
Alas !  how  little  the  heathen  know!  How  little  compared 
with  what  is  known  by  sinners  in  this  land,  even  by  very 
young  sinners ! 

Let  me  call  up  and  question  some  impenitent  sinner  of 
Oberlin.  It  matters  but  little  whom — let  it  be  any  Sabbath 
School  child. 

What  do  you  know  about  God?  I  know  that  there  is  one 
God  and  only  one. — The  heathen  beUeve  there  are  hundreds 
of  thousands. 

What  do  you  know  about  God? 

I  know  that  he  is  infinitely  great  and  good. — But  the  heath- 
en thinks  some  of  his  gods  are  both  mean  and  mischievous — 
wicked  as  can  be  and  the  very  patrons  of  wickedness  among 
men. 

What  do  you  know  about  salvation?  I  know  that  God  so 
loved  the  world  as  to  give  his  only  begotten  Son  that  whoso- 
ever would  believe  on  him  might  live  forever.  O,  the  heath- 
en never  heard  of  that.  They  would  faint  away  methinks  in 
amazement  if  they  should  hear  and  really  believe  the  start- 
ling, glorious  fact.  And  that  Sabbath  School  child  knows  that 
God  gives  his  Spirit  to  convince  of  sin.  He  has  perhaps  often 
been  sensible  of  the  presence  and  power  of  that  Spirit.  But 
the  heathen  know  nothing  of  this. 

You  too  know  that  you  are  immortal — that  beyond  death 
there  is  still  a  conscious  unchanging  state  of  existence,  bliss- 
ful or  wretched  according  to  the  deeds  done  here.  But  the 
heathen  have  no  just  ideas  on  this  subject.  It  is  to  them 
as  if  all  were  a  blank. 

The  amount  of  it  then  is  that  you  know  every  thing — the 
heathen  almost  nothing.  You  know  all  you  need  to  know  to 
be  saved,  to  be  useful — to  honor  God  and  serve  your  genera- 
tion according  to  his  will.  The  heathen  sit  in  deep  dark- 
ness, wedded  to  their  abominations,  groping,  yet  finding  no- 
tliing. 

As  your  light,  therefore,  so  is  your  guilt  immeasurably  great- 
er than  theirs.  Be  it  so  that  their  idolatries  are  monstrous — 
guilt  in  your  impenitence  under  the  light  you  have  is  vastly 
more  so.  See  that  heathen  mother  dragging  her  shrieking 
child  and  tumbling  it  into  the  Ganges !  See  her  rush  with  an- 
other to  throw  him  into  the  burning  arms  of  Moloch.  Mark; 
see  that  pile  of  wood  flashing,  lifting*  up  its  lurid  flames  to- 
ward heaven.  Those  men  are  dragging  a  dead  husband — 
they  heave  his  senseless  corpse  on   that  burning  pile. — 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  359 

There  comes  the  widow — ^her  hair  all  disheveled  and  flying — 
gaily  festooned  for  such  a  sacrifice; — she  dances  on; — she 
rends  the  air  with  her  howls  and  her  wailings; — she  shrinks 
and  yet  she  does  not  shrink — she  leaps  on  the  pile,  and  the 
din  of  music  with  the  yell  of  spectators  buries  her  shrieks  of 
agony;  she  is  gone!  O,  my  blood  curdles  and  runs  cold  in 
my  veins; — my  hair  stands  on  end;  I  am  horrified  with  such 
scenes — but  what  shall  we  say  of  their  guilt?  Ah  yes — what 
do  they  know  of  God — of  worship — of  the  claims  of  God  upon 
their  heart  and  life?  Ah,  you  may  well  spare  your  censure  of 
the  Heathen  for  their  fearful  orgies  of  cruelty  and  lust,  and 
give  it  where  light  has  been  enjoyed  and  resisted. 

3.  You  see  then  that  often  a  sinner  in  some  of  our  congre- 
gations may  know  more  than  all  the  heathen  world  know. 
If  this  be  true,  what  follows  from  it  as  to  the  amount  of  his 
comparative  guilt  ?  This,  inevitably,  that  such  a  sinner  deserves 
a  direr  and  deeper  damnation  than  all  the  heathen  world!  This 
conclusion  may  seem  startling;  but  how  can  we  escape  from 
it?  We  can  not  escape.  It  is  as  plain  as  any  mathematical 
demonstration.  This  is  the  principle  asserted  by  Christ 
when  he  said — ""That  servant  which  knew  his  Lord's  will  and 
prepared  not  himself,  neither  did  according  to  his  will  shall  be 
beaten  with  many  stripes;  but  he  that  knew  not  and  did  com- 
mit things  worthy  of  stripes,  shall  be  beaten  with  few  stripes." 
How  solemn  and  how  pungent  the  application  of  this  doctrine 
would  be  in  this  congregation !  I  could  call  out  many  a  sin- 
ner in  this  place  and  show  him  that  beyond  question  his  guilt 
is  greater  than  that  of  all  the  heathen  world.  Yet  how  few 
ever  estimated  their  own  guilt. 

Not  long  since,  an  ungodly  young  man,  trained  in  tliis  coun- 
try, wrote  back  from  the  Sandwich  Islands  a  glowing  and 
perhaps  a  just  description  of  their  horrible-abominations,  mor- 
alizing on  their  monstrous  enormities,  and  thanking  God  that 
he  had  been  born  and  taught  in  a  Christian  land.  Indeed!  he 
might  well  have  spared  this  censure  of  the  dark-minded  heath- 
en! His  own  guilt  in  remaining  an  impenitent  sinner  under 
all  the  light  of  Christian  America  was  greater  than  the  whole 
aggregate  guilt  of  all  those  Islands. 

So  we  may  all  well  spare  our  expressions  of  abhorrence  at 
the  guilty  abominations  of  idolatry.  You  are  often  perhaps 
saying  in  your  heart:  Why  does  Qod  endure  these  horrid 
abominations  another  day  ?  See  tliat  rolling  car  of  Juggernaut. 
Its  wheels  move  axle-deep  in  the  gushing  blood  and  crushed 
bones  of  its  deluded  worshipers!    And  yet  God  looks  on  and 


360  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

no  red  bolt  leaps  from  his  right  hand  to  smite  such  wicked- 
ness. They  are  indeed  guilty;  but  O  how  small  their  guilt 
compared  with  the  guilt  of  those  who  know  their  duty  per- 
fectly, yet  never  do  it !  God  sees  their  horrible  abominations, 
yet  does  he  wink  at  them  because  they  are  done  in  so  much 
ignorance. 

But  see  that  impenitent  sinner.  Convicted  of  his  sin  under 
the  clear  gospel  light  that  shines  all  around  him,  he  is  driven 
to  pray.  He  knows  he  ought  to  repent,  and  almost  thinks  he 
is  willing  to,  and  will  try.  Yet  still  he  cHngs  to  his  sins  and  will 
not  give  up  his  heart  to  God.  Still  he  holds  his  heart  in  a 
state  of  impenitence.  Now  mark  me; — his  sin,  in  thus  with- 
holding his  heart  from  God  under  so  much  light,  involves 
greater  guilt  than  all  the  abominations  of  the  heathen  world. 
Put  together  the  guilt  of  all  those  widows  who  immolate  them- 
selves on  the  funeral  pile — of  those  who  hurl  their  children 
into  the  Ganges,  or  into  the  burning  arms  of  Moloch — all  does 
not  begin  to  approach  the  guilt  of  that  convicted  sinner's 
prayer  wlio  comes  before  God  under  the  pressure  of  his  con- 
science, and  prays  a  heartless  prayer,  determined  all  the 
while  to  withhold  his  heart  from  God.  O,  why  docs  this  sin- 
ner thus  tempt  God,  and  thus  abuse  his  love,  and  thus  tram- 
ple <on  his  authority?  O,  that  moment  of  impenitence, 
while  his  prayers  are  forced  by  conscience  from  his  burning 
lips,  and  yet  he  will  not  yield  the  controversy  with  his  Maker 
— that  moment  involves  direr  guilt  than  rests  on  all  the 
heathen  world  together!  He  knows  more  than  they  all,  yet 
sins  despite  of  all  his  knowledge.  The  many  stripes  belong 
to  him — the  few  to  them. 

4.  This  leads  me  to  remark  again  that  the  Christian  world 
may  very  vrell  spare  their  revilings  and  condemnations  of  the 
heathen.  Of  all  the  portions  of  earth's  population,  Christen- 
dom is  infinitely  the  most  guilty — Christendom,  where  the 
gospel  peals  from  ten  thousand  pulpits — where  its  praises  are 
sung  by  a  thousand  choirs,  but  where  many  thousand  hearts 
that  know  God  and  duty,  refuse  either  to  reverence  the  one 
or  perform  the  other!  All  the  abominations  of  the  heathen 
world  are  a  mere  trifle  compared  with  the  guilt  of  Christen- 
dom. We  may  look  down  upon  the  filth  and  meanness  and 
degredation  of  a  heathen  people,  and  feel  a  most  polite  disgust 
at  the  spectacle — and  far  be  it  from  me  to  excuse  these  degra- 
ding, filthy  or  cruel  practices;  but  how  small  their  light  and 
consequently  their  guilt,  compared  with  our  own !  We  there- 
fore ask  the  Christian  world  to  turn  away  from  the  spectacle  of 


MORAL   GOVERNMENT.  ,  361 

Heathen  degradation,  and  look  nearer  home  upon  the  specta- 
cle of  Christian  guilt!     Let  us  look  upon  ourselves. 

5.  Again :  let  us  not  fear  to  say  what  you  must  all  see  to  be 
true,  that  the  nominal  church  is  the  most  guilty  part  of  Christ- 
endom. It  can  not  for  a  moment  be  questioned,  that  the 
church  has  more  light  than  any  other  portion;  therefore  has 
she  more  guilt.  Of  course  I  speak  of  the  nominal  church — 
not  the  real  church  whom  He  has  pardoned,  and  cleansed 
from  her  sins.  But  in  the  nominal  church,  think  of  the  sins 
that  live  and  riot  in  their  corruption.  See  that  backslider. 
He  has  tasted  the  waters  of  life.  He  has  been  greatly  en- 
lightened. Perhaps  he  has  really  known  the  Lord  by  true 
faith — and  then  see,  he  turns  away  to  eat  the  husks  of  earth- 
ly pleasure!  He  turns  his  back  on  the  bleeding  Lamb!  Now, 
put  together  all  the  guilt  of  every  Heathen  soul  that  has  gone 
to  hell — of  every  soul  that  has  gone  from  a  state  of  utter  mor- 
al darkness;  and  your  guilt,  backsUding  Christian,  is  greater 
than  all  theirs ! 

Do  you,  therefore,  say :  may  God  then  have  mercy  on  my 
soul  ?  So  say  we  all ;  but  we  must  add,  if  it  he  possible  ;  for  who 
can  say  that  such  guilt  as  yours  can  be  forgiven!  Can  Christ 
pray  for  you  as  he  prayed  for  his  murderers — ^^''Father,  forgive 
them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do?"  Can  he  plead  in 
your  behalf  that  you  know  not  what  you  are  doing?  Awful! 
awful ! !  Where  is  the  sounding  line  that  shall  measure  the 
ocean-depth  of  your  guilt! 

6.  Again:  if  our  children  remain  in  sin  we  may  cease  to 
congratulate  ourselves  that  they  were  not  born  in  Heathenism 
or  Slavery!  How  often  have  I  done  this!  How  often,  as  I 
have  looked  upon  my  sons  and  daughters,  have  I  thanked 
God  that  they  were  not  born  to  be  thrown  into  the  burning 
arms  of  a  Moloch,  or  to  be  crushed  under  the  wheels  of 
Juggernaut!  But  if  they  will  live  in  sin,  we  must  suspend 
our  self-congratulations  for  their  having  Christian  light  and 
privileges.  If  they  will  not  repent,  it  were  infinitely  better 
for  them  to  have  been  born  in  the  thickest  Pagan  darkness — 
better  to  have  been  thrown  in  their  tender  years  into  the 
Ganges,  or  into  the  fires  which  idolatry  kindles — better  be 
any  thing  else,  or  suffer  any  thing  earthly,  than  have  the  gos- 
pel's light  only  to  shut  it  out  and  go  to  hell  despite  of  its  ad- 
monitions. 

Let  us  not,  then,  be  hasty  in  congratulating  ourselves,  as 
if  this  great  light  enjoyed  by  us  and  by  our  children,  were  of 
course  a  certain  good  to  them;  but  this  we  may  do — we  may 
31 


362  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

rejoice  that  God  will  honor  himself — his  mercy  if  he  can,  and 
his  justice  if  he  must.  God  will  be  honored,  and  we  may  glo- 
ry in  this.  But  oh,  the  sinner,  the  sinner!  Who  can  meas- 
ure the  depth  of  his  guilt,  or  the  terror  of  his  final  doom!  It 
will  be  more  tolerable  for  ail  the  heathen  world  together  than 
for  you. 

7.  It  is  time  that  we  all  understood  this  subject  fully,  and 
appreciated  all  its  bearings.  It  is  no  doubt  true,  that  howev- 
er moral  our  children  may  be,  they  are  more  guilty  than  any 
other  sinners  under  heaven,  if  they  live  in  sin,  and  will  not 
yield  to  the  light  under  which  they  live.  We  may  be  per- 
haps congratulating  ourselves  on  their  fair  morality;  but  if  we 
saw  their  case  in  all  its  real  bearings,  our  souls  would  groan 
with  agony — our  bowels  would  be  all  liquid  with  anguish — 
our  very  hearts  within  us  would  heave  as  if  volcanic  fires 
were  kindled  there — so  deep  a  sense  should  we  have  of  their 
fearful  guilt  and  of  the  awful  doom  they  incur  in  denying  the 
Lord  that  bought  them,  and  setting  at  nought  a  known  salva- 
tion. O,  if  we  ever  pray,  we  should  pour  out  our  prayers  for 
our  offspring  as  if  nothing  could  ever  satisfy  us  or  stay  our  im- 
portunity, but  the  blessings  of  a  full  salvation  realized  in  their 
souls. 

Let  the  mind  contemplate  the  guilt  of  these  children.  I 
could  not  find  a  Sabbath  School  child,  perhaps  not  one  in  all 
Christendom,  who  could  not  tell  me  more  of  God's  salvation 
than  all  the  heathen  world  know.  That  dear  little  boy  who 
comes  from  his  Sabbath  school  knows  all  about  the  gospel.  He 
is  almost  ready  to  be  converted,  but  not  quite  ready;  yet  that 
little  boy,  if  he  knows  his  duty  and  yet  will  not  do  it,  is  cov- 
ered with  more  guilt  than  all  the  heathen  world  together. 
Yes,  that  boy,  who  goes  alone  and  prays,  yet  holds  back  his 
l^eart  from  God,  and  then  his  mother  comes  and  prays  over 
him,  and  pours  her  tears  on  his  head,  and  his  little  heart  al- 
most melts,  and  he  seems  on  the  very  point  of  giving  up  his 
whole  heart  to  the  Savior;  yet  if  he  will  not  do  it,  he  commits 
more  sin  in  that  refusal  than  all  the  sin  of  all  the  heathen 
world — his  guilt  is  more  than  the  guilt  of  all  the  murders,  all 
the  drownings  of  children,  and  burnings  of  widows,  and  deeds 
of  cruelty  and  violence  in  all  the  heathen  world.  All  this 
combination  of  guilt  shall  not  be  equal  to  the  guilt  of  the  lad 
who  knows  his  duty,  but  will  not  yield  his  heart  to  its  righte- 
ous claims. 

8.  '^The  Heathen,"  says  an  apostle,  ''sin  without  law  and 
shall  therefore  perish  without  law."    In  their  final  doom  they 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


363 


will  be  cast  away  from  God:  this  will  be  perhaps  about  all. 
The  bitter  reflection,  ^'I  had  the  light  of  the  gospel  and  would 
not  yield  to  it — I  knew  all  my  duty,  yet  did  it  not" — this  can 
not  be  a  part  of  their  eternal  doom.  This  is  reserved  for 
those  who  gather  themselves  into  our  sanctuaries  and  around 
our  family  altars,  yet  will  not  serve  their  own  Infinite  Father. 

9.  One  more  remark.  Suppose  I  should  call  out  a  sinner 
by  name — one  of  the  sinners  of  this  congregation,  a  son  of 
pious  parents,  and  should  call  up  the  father  also. — I  might  say 
Is  this  your  son?  Yes.  What  testimony  can  you  bear  about 
this  son  of  yours?  I  have  endeavored  to  teach  him  all  the 
ways  of  the  Lord.  Son,  what  can  you  say?  I  knew  my  duty 
— I  have  heard  it  a  thousand  times.  I  knew  I  ought  to  repent, 
but  I  never  would. 

O,  if  we  understood  this  matter  in  all  its  bearings,  it  would 
fill  every  bosom  with  consternation  and  grief  How  would 
our  bowels  yearn  and  our  bosoms  heave  as  a  volcano.  There 
would  be  one  universal  outcry  of  anguish  and  terror  at  the 
awful  guilt  and  fearful  doom  of  such  a  sinner! 

Young  man,  are  you  going  away  this  day  in  your  sins? 
Then,  what  angel  can  compute  your  guilt?  O  how  long  has 
Jesus  held  out  his  hands,  yes,  his  bleeding  hands,  and  besought 
you  to  look  and  live?  A  thousand  times,  and  in  countless  va- 
ried ways  has  he  called,  but  you  have  refused;  stretched  out 
his  hand,  and  you  have  not  regarded.  O,  will  you  not  repent? 
Why  not  say  at  once:  It  is  enough  that  I  have  sinned  so  long. 
I  can  not  live  so  any  longer!  O,  sinner,  why  will  you  live  so? 
Would  you  go  down  to  hell — ah,  to  the  deepest  hell — where, 
if  we  would  findyou,  we  must  work  our  way  down  for  a  thou- 
sand years  through  ranks  of  lost  spirits  less  guilty  than  you, 
ere  we  could  reach  the  fearful  depth  to  which  you  have  sunk! 
O,  sinner,  what  a  hell  is  that  which  can  adequately  punish 
such  guilt  as  thine ! 


LECTURE    XXIX. 
MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

I.  Obedience  to  Moral   Law   is   and  must  be,  under 

EVERY   dispensation  OF   THE  DiVINE  GOVERNMENT,  THE    UNAL- 
TERABLE CONDITION  OF   SALVATION. 

II.  Under  a  gracious  dispensation  Obedience  to  Moral 
Law  is  not  dispensed  with  as  the  condition  of  salvation, 
but  that  Obedience  to  Law  is  secured  by  the  indwelling 
spirit  and  grace  of  Christ. 

I.  Obedience  to  Moral  Law   is  and   must  be,  under 

EVERY  dispensation  OF   THE  DiVINE    GOVERNMENT  THE  UNAL- 
TERABLE CONDITION  OF  SALVATION. 

In  discussing  this  proposition  I  will, 

1.  Show  what  is  not  intended  by  it. 

2.  What  is  intended  hy  it.,  and 

3.  Show  that  it  must  he  true* 

1.  What  is  not  intended  by  it. 

It  is  not  intended  that  no  one  can  be  saved  who  has  at  any 
time  broken  the  law.  For  this  would  shut  all  sinners  out 
from  the  possibility  of  salvation. 

2.  What  is  intended. 

That  no  one  can  be  saved  who  does  not  return  to  full  obe- 
dience to  the  law. 

3.  Prove  the  proposition. 

(1.)  Salvation  upon  any  other  condition  is  naturally  impos- 
sible. Without  holiness  salvation  is  out  of  the  question. 
But  holiness  and  full  obedience  to  the  moral  law  are  the  same 
thing. 

(2.)  The  gospel  is  not  a  repeal  of  the  law,  but  designed  to 
establish  it. 

(3.)  As  the  moral  law  is  the  law  of  nature,  it  is  absurd  to 
suppose  that  entire  obedience  to  it  should  not  be  the  unalter- 
able condition  of  salvation,  that  is,  that  salvation  should  be 
possible  upon  a  less  condition  than  a  return  on  the  part  of 
sinners  to  the  state  of  mind  required  by  this  law  of  nature. 

(4.)  The  bible  everywhere  represents  the  perfect  love  re- 
quired by  the  law  as  indispensable  to  salvation.  It  is  natu- 
rally indispensable. 

Perhaps  some  one  will  say  that  it  is  true  indeed  that  one  can 
not  enter  heaven  without  first  becoming  entirely  obedient  to 
the  divine  law,  but  that  this  obedience  may  first  take  place 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  365 

immediately  after  death.  I  reply, — that  the  uniform  re- 
presentation of  the  bible  is  that  men  shall  be  judged  accord- 
ing to  the  deeds  done  in  the  body,  and  that  the  state  of  mind 
in  which  they  enter  the  eternal  world  shall  decide  their  destiny 
forever.  It  is  nowhere  so  much  as  hinted  in  the  bible  that 
men  shall  be  saved  in  consequence  or  upon  condition  of  a 
change  that  takes  place  after  death.  But  the  opposite  of  this 
is  the  unvarying  teaching  of  the  bible.  If  men  are  not  holy 
here,  they  never  will  be  holy.  If  they  are  not  sanctified  by 
the  Spirit  and  the  belief  of  the  truth  in  this  life,  there  is  no  in- 
timation in  the  bible  that  they  ever  will  be ;  but  the  contrary 
of  this  is  the  plain  and  unequivocal  teaching  of  the  bible. 
The  work  of  regeneration  and  sanctification  is  always  repre- 
sented as  being  instrumentally  effected  by  the  instrumentality 
and  agency  of  those  means  that  Christ  has  provided  in  this 
world.  "But  unto  every  one  of  us  is  given  grace  according 
to  the  measure  of  the  gift  of  Christ.  Wherefore  he  saith, 
When  he  ascended  up  on  high,  he  led  captivity  captive,  and 
gave  gifts  unto  men.  (Now  that  he  ascended,  what  is  it  but 
that  he  also  descended  first  into  the  lower  parts  of  the  earth. 
He  that  descended  is  the  same  also  that  ascended  up  far 
above  all  heavens,  that  he  might  fill  all  things.)  And  he  gave 
some,  apostles;  and  some,  prophets;  and  some,  evangelists; 
and  some,  pastors  and  teachers ;  for  the  perfecting  of  the  saints 
for  the  work  of  the  ministry,  for  the  edifying  of  the  body  of 
Christ:  till  we  all  come  in  the  unity  of  the  faith,  and  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  Son  of  God  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the 
measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fullness  of  Christ." — Eph.  4:  7 — 
13.  This  passage  is  only  a  specimen  of  scripture  declara- 
tions and  teachings  upon  this  subject.  It  unequivocally 
teaches  the  entire  sanctification  of  the  whole  mystical  body  or 
church  of  Christ  in  this  life  or  by  the  means  which  he  has  pro- 
vided, and  which  means  relate  exclusively  to  this  life. 

II.  Under  a  gracious  dispensation,  a  return  to  full 

OBEDIENCE  TO  MoRAL  LaW^  IS  NOT  DISPENSED  WITH  AS  A  CON- 
DITION OF  SALVATION,  BUT  THIS  OBEDIENCE  IS  SECURED  BY  THE 
INDWELLING  SPIRIT  OP  ChRIST  RECEIVED  BY  FAITH  TO  REIGN 
IN  THE  HEART. 

In  discussing  this  proposition  I  shall  endeavor  to  show, 

1.  That  salvation  by  grace  does  not  dispense  with  a  return 
to  full  obedience  to  law  as  a  condition  of  salvation^  and 

2.  That  the  grace  of  the  gospel  is  designed  to  restore  sinners 
to  full  obedience  to  the  law* 

3.  That  the  efficient  influence  that  secures  this  conformity  to 

oJL 


366  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

law  is  the  Spirit  of  Christ  or  the  Holy  Spirit  received  into  and 
reigning  in  the  heart  by  faith. 

1.  Salvation  by  grace  does  not  dispense  with  a  return  to  full 
obedience  as  a  coiidition  of  salvation. 

There  is  a  class  of  scripture  texts  which  have  been  quoted 
bj  antinomians  in  support  of  the  doctrine  that  salvation  is  not 
conditionated  upon  personal  holiness  or  upon  a  return  to  full 
obedience.  It  has  been  found  very  convenient  by  many  who 
were  lovers  of  sin  and  never  conscious  of  personal  holiness, 
to  adopt  the  idea  of  an  imputed  holiness,  contenting  them- 
selves with  an  outward  righteousness  imputed  to  them  instead 
of  submitting  by  faith  to  have  the  righteousness  of  God 
wrought  in  them.  Unwilling  to  \)q  personally  pious  they  be- 
take themselves  to  an  imputed  piety.  Because  the  scriptures 
declare  that  men  are  not  saved  by  works  of  the  law^  they  infer 
that  a  return  to  that  state  of  love  required  by  the  law  is  not 
even  a  condition  of  salvation.  The  texts  above  referred  to  are 
such  as  these.  ^^  Knowing  that  a  man  is  not  justified  by  the 
works  of  the  law,  but  by  the  faith  of  Jesus  Christ,  even  we 
have  believed  in  Jesus  Christ,  that  we  might  be  justified  by 
the  faith  of  Christ,  and  not  by  the  works  of  the  law:  for  by 
the  works  of  the  law  shall  no  flesh  be  justified." — Gal.  2:  16. 
This  and  sundry  other  passages  that  hold  the  same  language 
nre  grossly  misunderstood  and  misapplied  by  antinomians. 
They  merely  declare  that'men  are  not  justified  and  saved  by 
their  own  works,  which  of  course  they  can  not  be  if  they 
have  committed  even  one  sin.  But  they  do  not  intimate,  and 
there  is  no  passage  rightly  understood  that  does  intimate, 
that  men  are  saved  or  justified  upon  conditions  short  of  per- 
sonal holiness  or  a  return  to  full  obedience  to  the  moral  law. 

Again:  James  wrote  his  epistle  to  establish  this  point. 
Grace  can  not  save  by  dispensing  with  personal  holiness  or  a 
return  to  full  obedience  to  the  law.  Grace  must  not  only 
pardon,  but  secure  personal  holiness,  or  the  soul  is  not  fitted 
either  for  the  employments  or  enjoyments  of  heaven.  It  is 
naturally  impossible  for  grace  to  save  the  soul  but  upon  con- 
dition of  entire  sanctification. 

2.  The  grace  of  the  Gospel  was  designed  to  restore  sinners  to 
full  obedience  to  the  moral  law. 

This  is  abundantly  evident  from  almost  every  part  of  the 
Bible.  "  And  the  Lord  thy  God  will  circumcise  thine  heart, 
and  the  heart  of  thy  seed,  to  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all 
thine  heart,  and  with  all  thy  soul  that  thou  mayest  live." — 
Deuteronomy  30:  7.     ••' And  I  will  give  them  a  heart  to  know 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  367 

me,  that  I  am  the  Lord ;  and  they  shall  be  my  people,  and  I 
will  be  their  God:  for  they  shall  return  unto  me  with  their 
whole  heart." — Jeremiah  24:7.     '^Behold,  the  days  come, 
saith  the  Lord,  that  I  will  make  a  new  covenant  with  the  house 
of  Israel,  and   with  the  house  of  Judah.     And  they  shall 
teach  no  more  every  man  his  neighbor,  and  every  man  his 
brother,  saying,  Know  the  Lord:  for  they  shall  all  know  me, 
from  the  least  of  them  unto  the   greatest  of  them,  Sciith  the 
Lord:  for  I  will  forgive  their  iniquity,  and  I  will  remember 
their  sin  no  more." — Jeremiah  31:  31 — 34.     '•'■And  I  will 
give  them  one  heart,  and  I  will  put  a  new  spirit  within  you: 
and  I  will  take  the  stony  heart  out  of  their  flesh,  and  will  give 
them  a  heart  of  flesh."— Eze.  11:  19.     ^^Then  will  I  sprinkle 
clean  water  upon  you,  and  ye  shall  be  clean:  from  all  your 
filthiness  and  from  all  your  idols  I  will  cleanse  you." — Eze. 
36:  25.     '■'For  finding  fault  with  them,  he  saith,  Behold  the 
days  come,  saith  the  Lord,  when  I  will  make  a  new  cove- 
nant with  the  house  of  Israel,  and  with  the  house  of  Judah, 
not  according  to  the  covenant  that  I  made  with  their  fathers 
in  the  day  when  I  took  them  by  the  hand  to  lead  them  out  of 
the  land  of  Egypt,  because  they  continued  not  in  my  covenant, 
and  I  regarded  them  not,  saith  the  Lord.     For  this  is  the  co- 
venant that  I  will  make  with  the  house  of  Israel;  After  those 
days  saith  the  Lord,  I  will  put  my  laws  into  their  mind,  and 
write  them  in  their  hearts ;  and  I  will  be  to  them  a  God,  and 
they  shall  be  to  me  a  people:  and  they  shall  not  teach  every 
man  his  neighbor,  and  every  man  his  brother,  saying.  Know 
the  Lord:  for  all  shall  know  me,  from  the  least  to  the  greatest. 
For  I  will  be  merciful  to  their  unrighteousness,  and  their 
sins   and  their  iniquities  will  I   remember  no  more." — He- 
brews 8:  8 — 12.     '•'And  he  shall  bring  forth  a  son,  and  thou 
shalt  call  his  name  JESUS;  for  he  shall  save  his  people  from 
their   sins."— Matt.    I:  21.     ""'And  the  very  God  of  peace 
sanctify  you  wholly:  and  I  pray  God  your  whole  spirit,  and 
soul,  and  body,  be  preserved  blameless  unto  the  coming  of 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.     Faithful  is  he  that  calleth  you,  who 
also  will  do  iV."— 1.  Thess.  5:  23, 24.     ^^For  sin  shall  not  have 
dominion  over  you:  for  ye  are  not  under  the  law,  but  under 
grace." — Rom.  6:  14.     These  and  many  other  passages  of 
like  import  plainly  teach  the  truth  of  the  proposition  we  are 
considering,  namely,  that  grace  was  designed  to  secure  per- 
sonal holiness  and  full  return  to  the  love  required  by  the  law 
rather  than  to  dispense  with  this  holiness  or  obedience  as  a 
condition  of  salvation. 


368  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

3.  The  efficient  influence  that  secures  this  return  to  full  obe- 
dience to  the  law  is  the  Holy  Spirit  received  to  reign  in  the  heart 
by  faith. 

That  God  writes  his  law  in  the  heart  by  his  indwelling 
Spirit,  is  abundantly  taught  in  the  bible.  Writing  his  law  in 
the  heart  is  begetting  the  spirit  or  love  required  by  the  law 
in  their  heart. 

By  his  reigning  in  the  heart  is  intended  his  setting  up  and 
continuing  his  dominion  in  the  heart  by  writing  his  law  there, 
or  as  is  said  just  above,  by  begetting  the  love  required  by 
the  law  in  the  heart. 

Also  by  reigning  in  the  heart  is  intended  that  He  leads, 
guides  and  controls  the  soul  by  enlightening  and  drawing  it 
into  conformity  in  all  things  to  his  will.  Thus  it  is  said,  "  It 
is  God  that  worketh  in  you  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good 
pleasure." 

By  the  assertion  that  the  Holy  Spirit  or  the  Spirit  of  Christ 
is  received  by  faith  to  reign  in  the  heart  it  is  intended  that 
He  is  actually  trusted  in  or  submitted  to  by  faith,  and  His  in- 
fluence suffered  to  control  us.  He  does  not  guide  and  control 
us  by  irresistible  power  or  force,  but  faith  confides  the  gui- 
dance of  our  souls  to  Him.  Faith  receives  and  confides  in 
Him,  and  consents  to  be  governed  and  directed  by  Him.  As 
His  influence  is  moral  and  not  physical,  it  is  plain  that  He 
can  influence  us  no  farther  than  we  have  confidence  in  Him, 
that  is,  no  farther  than  we  trust,  confide  in  Him.  But  I 
must  cite  some  passages  that  sustain  these  positions.  "  That 
the  blessing  of  Abraham  might  come  on  the  Gentiles  through 
Jesus  Christ;  that  we  might  receive  the  promise  of  the  Spirit 
through  faith."— Gal.  3:  14.  ^' Until  the  Spirit  be  poured 
upon  us  from  on  high,  and  the  wilderness  be  a  fruitful  field, 
and  the  fruitful  field  be  counted  for  a  forest." — Isaiah  32:  15. 
"  For  I  will  pour  water  upon  him  that  is  thirsty,  and  floods 
upon  the  dry  ground:  I  will  pour  my  Spirit  upon  thy  seed, 
and  my  blessing  upon  thine  offspring." — Isaiah  44:  3.  '^But 
this  shall  be  the  covenant  which  I  will  make  with  the  house 
of  Israel;  After  those  days  saith  the  Lord,  I  will  put  my  law 
in  their  inward  parts,  and  write  it  in  their  hearts,  and  will  be 
their  God,  and  they  shall  be  my  people." — Jer.  31 :  33.  ^'  And 
I  will  make  an  everlasting  covenant  with  them,  that  I  will 
not  turn  away  from  them,  to  do  them  good;  but  I  will  put 
my  fear  in  their  hearts,  that  they  shall  not  depart  from  me." — 
Jer.  32:  40.  "  And  it  shall  come  to  pass  afterward,  that  I  will 
pour  out  my  Spirit  upon  all  flesh;  and  your  sons  and  your  daugh- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


369 


ters  shall  prophesy,  your  old  men  shall  dream  dreams,  your 
young  men  shall  see  visions." — Joel  2:  28,  29.  *■' And  I  will 
pour  upon  the  house  of  David,  and  upon  the  inhabitants  of 
Jerusalem  the  spirit  of  grace  and  supplication;  and  they  shall 
look  upon  me  whom  they  have  pierced,  and  they  shall  mourn 
for  him  as  one  mourneth  for  his  only  son,  and  shall  be  in  bit- 
terness for  him,  as  one  that  is  in  bitterness  for  his  first  born." 
— Zechariah  12:  10.  "But  this  spake  he  of  the  Spirit  which 
they  that  believe  on  him  should  receive:  for  the  Holy  Ghost 
was  not  yet  given;  because  that  Jesus  was  not  yet  glorified." 
John  7:  39.  "Therefore  being  by  the  right  hand  of  God 
exalted,  and  having  received  of  the  Father  the  promise  of 
the  Holy  Ghost,  he  hath  shed  forth  this  which  ye  now  see  and 
hear."— Acts  2:  33.  "Even  the  Spirit  of  truth;  whom  the 
world  can  not  receive,  because  it  seeth  him  not,  neither 
knoweth  him:  but  ye  know  him;  for  he  dwelleth  with  you 
and  shall  be  in  you."— John  14:  17.  "There  is  therefore 
now  no  condemnation  to  them  which  are  in  Christ  Jesus,  who 
walk  not  after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit.  For  they  that 
are  after  the  flesh  do  mind  the  things  of  the  flesh;  but  they 
that  are  after  the  Spirit  the  things  of  the  Spirit.  But  ye  are 
not  in  the  flesh,  but  in  the  Spirit,  if  so  be  that  the  Spirit  of 
God  dwell  in  you.  Now  if  any  man  have  not  the  Spirit  of 
Christ  he  is  none  of  his.  But  if  the  Spirit  of  him  that  raised 
up  Jesus  from  the  dead  dwell  in  you,  he  that  raised  np  Christ 
from  the  dead  shall  also  quicken  your  mortal  bodies  by  his 
Spirit  that  dwelleth  in  you.  For  if  ye  live  after  the  flesh,  ye 
shall  die;  but  if  ye  through  the  Spirit  do  mortify  the  deeds  of 
the  body,  ye  shall  live.  For  as  many  as  are  led  by  the  Spirit 
of  God,  they  are  the  sons  of  God.  For  ye  have  not  received 
the  spirit  of  bondage  again  to  fear;  but  ye  have  received  the 
Spirit  of  adoption,  whereby  we  cry,  Abba,  Father.  The 
Spirit  itself  beareth  witness  with  our  spirit,  that  we  are  the 
children  of  God."— Romans  8:  1—5—9—11—13, 14, 15, 16. 
"  But  if  ye  be  led  of  the  Spirit,  ye  are  not  under  the  law." — 
Gal.  5:  18.  '^  Know  ye  not  that  ye  are  the  temple  of  God, 
and  that  the  Spirit  of  God  dwelleth  in  you?"— 1  Cor.  3:  16. 
'^  What?  know  ye  not  that  your  body  is  the  temple  of  the 
Holy  Ghost  which  is  in  you,  which  ye  have  of  God,  and  ye 
are  not  your  own?" — 1  Cor.  6:  19.  "But  the  fruit  of  the 
Spirit  is  love,  joy,  peace,  long-suffering,  gentleness,  goodness, 
faith.  If  we  live  in  the  Spirit,  let  us  also  walk  in  the  Spirit." 
—Gal.  5:  22—25.  "That  Christ  may  dwell  in  your  hearts 
by  faith,  that  ye,  being  rooted  and  grounded  in  love." — Eph. 


370  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

3:  17.  "For  by  grace  are  ye  saved  through  faith;  and  that 
not  of  yourselves:  it  is  the  gift  of  God." — Eph.  2:8.  ^*  And 
be  found  in  him,  not  having  mine  own  righteousness,  which 
is  of  the  law,  but  that  which  is  through  the  faith  of  Christ, 
the  righteousness  which  is  of  God  by  faith." — Phil.  3:  9. 
"Buried  with  him  in  baptism,  wherein  also  ye  are  risenjwith 
him  through  the  faith  of  the  operation  of  God,  who  hath  raised 
him  from  the  dead."— Col.  2:  12. 

These  passages  abundantly  support  the  position  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  which  they  are  quoted.  It  is  only  necessary 
to  remark  here, 

1.  That  the  Holy  Spirit  controls,  directs,  and  sanctifies  the 
soul,  not  by  a  physical  influence,  nor  by  impulses  or  by  impres- 
sions made  on  the  sensibility,  but  by  enhghtening  and  con- 
vincing the  intelHgence. 

2.  The  fundamentally  important  doctrine  of  an  in  dwelHng 
Christ,  that  the  Spirit  of  Christ  must  be  received  by  faith  to 
reign  in  the  heart,  has  been  extensively  overlooked.  '-'  Christ 
our  sanctification!"  said  a  minister  to  me  a  few  months  since, 
*'•  I  never  heard  of  such  a  thing."  Also  said  a  Doctor  of  Di- 
vinity tome,  "I  never  heard  Christ  spoken  of  as  our  sanctifi- 
cation until  the  Perfectionists  affirmed  it."  Indeed  it  is  ama- 
zing to  see  how  this  blessed  truth  has  been  overlooked. 
Christ,  by  his  Spirit,  must  actually  dwell  within  and  reign 
over  us,  and  this  is  an  unalterable  condition  of  salvation. 
He  is  our  King.  He  must  be  received  by  faith  to  set  up  and 
establish  His  kingdom  in  the  heart,  or  salvation  is  impossible. 


LECTURE  XXX. 

MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 

Sanctions  of  moral  law,  natural  and  governmental. 
Ir  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  I  shall  show, 
/.    IVhat  constitutes  the  sanctions  of  law, 
IL   That  there  can  be  no  law  without  sanctions, 

III,  In  what  light  the  sanctions  of  law  are  to  be  regarded, 

IV,  The  end  to  be  secured  by  law  and  the  execution  of  penal 
sanctions. 

V,  The  rule  by  which  sanctions  ought  to  be  graduated, 
I,    What  constitutes  the  sanctions  of  law, 

1.  The  sanctions  of  law  are  the  motives  to  obedience,  that 
which  is  to  be  the  natural  and  the  governmental  consequence 
or  result  of  obedience  and  of  disobedience. 

2.  They  are  remuneratory^  that  is,  they  promise  reward  to 
obedience. 

3.  They  are  vindicatory,  that  is,  they  threaten  the  diso- 
bedient with  punishment. 

4.  They  are  natural,  that  is, 

(1.)  All  moral  law  is  that  rule  of  action  which  is  in  exact 
accordance  with  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings. 

(2.)  Happiness  is  to  some  extent  naturally  connected  with, 
and   the  necessary  consequence  of  obedience  to  moral  law.  ' 

(3.)  Misery  is  naturally  and  necessarily  connected  with  and 
results  from  disobedience  to  moral  law,  or  from  acting  contrary 
to  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings. 

5.  Sanctions  are  governmental.  By  governmental  sanctions 
are  intended, 

(1.)  The  favor  of  the  government  as  due  to  obedience. 

(2.)  A  positive  reward  bestowed  upon  the  obedient  by  gov- 
ernment. 

(3.)  The  displeasure  of  government  towards  the  disobe- 
dient • 

(4.)  Direct  punishment  inflicted  by  the  government  as  due 
to  disobedience. 

6.  All  happiness  and  misery  resulting  from  obedience  or 
disobedience,  either  natural  or  from  the  favor  or  frown  of  gov- 
ernment, are  to  be  regarded  as  constituting  the  sanctions  of 
law. 

//.   There  can  be  no  law  without  sanctions. 
1.  It  has  been  said  in  a  former  lecture  that  precepts  without 
sanctions  are  only  counsel  or  advice,  and  no  law. 


372  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

2.  Nothing  is  law,  but  the  rule  of  action  which  is  founded 
in  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral  beings.  It  is  therefore 
absurd  to  say,  that  there  should  be  no  natural  sanctions  to 
this  rule  of  action.  It  is  the  same  absurdity  as  to  say,  that  con- 
formity to  the  laws  of  our  being  would  not  produce  happi- 
ness, and  that  disconformity  to  the  laws  of  our  being  would 
not  produce  misery:  which  is  a  contradiction;  for  what  do  we 
mean  by  acting  in  conformity  to  the  laws  of  our  being,  but 
that  course  of  conduct  in  which  all  the  powers  of  our  being 
will  sweetly  harmonize,  and  produce  happiness?  And  what 
do  we  mean  by  disconformity  to  the  laws  of  our  being,  but 
that  course  of  action  that  creates  mutiny  among  our  powers 
themselves,  that  produces  discord  instead  of  harmony,  misery 
instead  of  happiness? 

3.  A  precept,  to  have  the  nature  and  the  force  of  law,  must 
be  founded  in  reason,  that  is,  it  must  have  some  reason 
for  its  existence.  And  it  were  unjust  to  hold  out  no  motives  to 
obedience  where  a  law  is  founded  in  a  necessity  of  our 
nature. 

4.  But  whatever  is  unjust  is  no  law.  Therefore  a  precept 
without  a  sanction  is  not  law. 

5.  Necessity  is  the  condition  of  all  rightful  government.  There 
would  be  and  could  be  no  just  government,  but  for  the  neces- 
sities of  the  universe.  But  these  necessities  can  not  be  met, 
the  great  end  of  government  can  not  be  secured  without  mo- 
tives or  sanctions.  Therefore  that  is  no  government,  no  law, 
that  has  no  sanctions. 

///.  In  what  light  sanctions  are  to  he  regarded, 

1.  Sanctions  are  to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  be- 
nevolent regard  of  the  law-giver  for  his  subjects:  the  motives 
which  he  exhibits  to  induce  in  the  subjects  the  course  of  con- 
duct that  will  secure  their  highest  well-being. 

2.  They  are  to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  his  estima- 
tion of  the  justice,  necessity,  and  value  of  the  precept. 

3.  They  are  to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  amount 
or  strength  of  his  desire  to  secure  the  happiness  of  his  sub- 
jects. 

4.  They  are  to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  his  opinion 
in  respect  to  the  desert  of  disobedience. 

The  natural  sanctions  are  to  be  regarded  as  a  demonstra- 
tion of  the  justice,  necessity,  and  perfection  of  the  precept. 

IV.  The  end  to  he  secured  by  law,  and  the  execution  of  penal 
sanctions, 

1.  The  ultimate  end  of  all  government  is  blessedness. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  373 

2  This  is  the  ultimate  end  of  the  precept  and  the  sanction 
of  law. 

3.  This  can  be  secured  only  by  the  prevention  of  sin  and 
the  promotion  of  holiness. 

4.  Confidence  in  the  government  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  all 
virtue. 

5.  Confidence  results  from  a  revelation  of  the  lawgiver  to 
his  subjects.  Confidence  in  God  results  from  a  revelation  of 
himself  to  his  creatures. 

6.  The  moral  law,  in  its  precepts  and  sanctions,  is  a  revela- 
tion of  God. 

7.  The  execution  of  penal  sanctions,  is  also  a  revelation  of 
the  mind,  will,  and  character  of  the  lawgiver. 

8.  The  highest  and  most  influential  sanctions  of  govern- 
ment are  those  motives  that  most  fully  reveal  the  true  charac- 
ter of  God. 

V.  By  what  rule  sanctions  ought  to  he  graduated, 

1.  We  have  seen  in  a  former  lecture  that  moral  obligation  is 
founded  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  well-being  of  God  and  of 
the  universe,  and  conditionated  upon  the  perception  of  its 
value. 

2.  That  guilt  ought  always  to  be  measured  by  the  perceiv- 
ed value  of  the  end  which  moral  beings  ought  to  choose. 

3.  The  sanctions  of  law  should  be  graduated  by  the  intrin- 
sic merit  or  demerit  of  hoHness  and  sin. 

SANCTIONS    OF    GOD's    LAW. 

I.  God's  law  has  sanctions. 

II.  What  constitutes  the  remuneratory  sanctions  of  the  law  of 
God, 

III.  The  perfection  and  duration  of  the  remuneratory  sanctions 
of  the  law  of  God. 

IV.  What  constitutes  the  vindicatory  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God. 

V.  Their  duration. 

I.  God^s  law  has  sanctions. 

1.  That  sin  or  disobedience  to  the  moral  law,  is  attended 
with,  and  results  in  misery,  is  a  matter  of  consciousness. 

2.  That  virtue  or  holiness  is  attended  with  and  results 
in  happiness,  is  also  attested  by  consciousness. 

3.  Therefore  that  God's  law  has  natural  sanctions,  both 
remuneratory  and  vindicatory,  is  a  matter  of  fact. 

4.  That  there  are  governmental  sanctions  added  to  the 
natural,  must  be  true,  or  God  in  fact  has  no  Government. 

5.  The  Bible  expressly  and  in  every  variety  of  form  teach- 

32 


374  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

es  that  God  will  reward  the  righteous  and  punish  the  wicked. 

//.  What  constitutes  the  remuneratory  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God. 
1.    The  happiness  that  is  naturally  and  necessarily  con- 
nected with,  and  results  from  hoKness  or  obedience. 

%    The  merited  favor,  protection,  and  blessing  of  God. 
3.    All  the  natural  and  governmental  rewards  of  virtue. 

///.  The  perfection  and  duration  of  the  remuneratory  sanc- 
tions of  the  law  of  God. 

1.  The  perfection  of  the  natural  reward  is  and  must  be 
proportioned  to  the  perfection  of  virtue. 

2.  The  duration  of  the  remuneratory  sanction  must  be 
equal  to  the  duration  of  obedience.  This  can  not  possibly  be 
otherwise. 

3.  If  the  existence  and  virtue  of  man  are  immortal  his  hap- 
piness must  be  endless. 

4.  The  Bible  most  unequivocally  asserts  the  immortality 
both  of  the  existence  and  virtue  of  the  righteous,  and  also  that 
their  happiness  shall  be  endless. 

5.  The  very  design  and  end  of  government  make  it  ne- 
cessary that  governmental  rewards  should  be  as  perfect  and 
unending  as  virtue. 

IV.  What  constitutes  the  vindicatory  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God. 

1.  The  misery  naturally  and  necessarily  connected  with, 
and  the  result  of  disobedience  to  moral  law.  Here  again  let 
it  be  understood  that  moral  law  is  nothing  else  than  that  rule 
of  action  which  accords  with  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral 
beings.  Therefore  the  natural  vindicatory  sanction  of  the 
law  of  God  is  misery  resulting  from  a  violation  of  man's  own 
nature. 

2.  The  displeasure  of  God,  the  loss  of  his  protection  and 
governmental  favor,  together  with  that  punishment  which  it  is 
his  duty  to  inflict  upon  the  disobedient. 

3.  The  rewards  of  holiness  and  the  punishment  of  sin,  are 
described  in  the  Bible  in  figurative  language.  The  rewards  of 
virtue  are  called  eternal  life.  The  punishment  of  vice  is  call- 
ed death.  By  life  is  intended,  not  only  existence,  but  that  hap- 
piness which  makes  life  desirable.  By  death  is  intended,  not 
annihilation,  but  that  misery  which  renders  existence  an  evil. 

V.  Duration  of  the  penal  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God. 

1.  Examine  the  question  in  the  light  of  natural  theology. 

2.  In  the  light  of  revelation. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  375 

In  examining  it  in  the  light  of  natural  theology,  I  shall, 

1.  Inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  term  infinite. 

2.  Show  that  infinites  maj  differ  indefinitely  in  amount. 

3.  Remind  you  of  the  rule  by  which  the  degrees  of  guilt  are 
to  be  estimated. 

4.  That  all  and  every  sin  must,  from  its  very  nature,  involve 
infinite  guilt,  in  the  sense  of  deserving  endless  punishment. 

5.  That  notwithstanding  all  sin  deserves  endless  punishment, 
yet  the  guilt  of  different  persons  may  vary  indefinitely,  and 
that  punishment  although  always  endless  in  duration  may  and 
ought  to  and  must  vary  in  degree,  in  proportion  as  guilt  varies. 

6.  That  the  duration  of  penal  inflictions  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God  will  be  endless. 

/.  Inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  term  Infinite.  v 

I.  It  literally  and  properly  means  not  finite^  not  limited^ 
no^^ownofec^,  or  unlimited,  boundless.  This  is  the  meaning  of 
the  term  and  the  sense  in  which  I  shall  use  it  in  this  discus- 
sion. ^.■ 

II.  Infinites  may  differ  indefinitely  in  amount. 

1.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  and  of  natural 

and  mathematical  science,  as   most  persons  at  all  acquainted        \J- 
with  this  subject  know.  / 

2.  It  is  a  plain  matter  of  fact.  For  example:  suppose  that 
from  this  point  radiate  mathematical  lines  endlessly  in  every 
direction.  Let  each  two  of  these  lines  make  an  angle  of  one 
degree  and  let  the  points  be  sufficiently  numerous  to  till  up  the 
whole  circle.  Now  as  these  lines  extend  endlessly  in  every  di- 
rection every  pair  of  them  form  the  legs  of  a  triangle  whose  sides 
extend  endlessly  and  which  has  no  base  or  which  has  no 
bound  in  one  direction.  It  is  self-evident  that  the  superficial 
area  contained  between  any  two  of  those  radii  is  infinite  in 
the  sense  that  its  superficial  amount  is  unlimited.  Thus  the 
whole  of  space  is  no  more  than  infinite,  and  yet  there  is  in  the 
sense  of  unUmited  an  infinite  amount  of  space  between  every 
two  of  those  radii.  ^ 

The  same  would  be  true  upon  the  supposition  of  parallel 
mathematical  fines  of  infinite  length  no  matter  how  near  to- 
gether: the  superfices  or  area  between  them  must  be  infinite 
in  amount.  Any  thing  is  infinite  which  has  no  whole,  which  /-/ 
is  boundless  in  any  sense.  In  the  sense  in  which  it  is  bound- 
less it  is  infinite.  For  example,  in  the  cases  supposed  the 
area  between  any  two  of  the  radii  of  the  circle  or  of  the  paral- 
lel lines  is  not  infinite  in  the  sense  that  it  has  no  bounds  in 
any  direction.     For  it  is  bounded  on  its  sides.     But  it  is  infi- 


S76 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 


nite  in  the  sense  of  its  superficial  measure  or  contents.  So, 
endless  happiness  or  misery  may  be  finite  in  one  sense  aud  in- 
finite in  another.  They  may  be  infinite  in  amount  taking  into 
view  their  endlessness,  however  small  they  may  be  in  degree. 
So  that  in  degree  they  may,  and  with  finite  creatures  must 
be  finite  in  degree  but  infinite  in  amount.  There  is  and  can 
be  no  whole  of  them  and  therefore  in  amount  they  are  infinite. 
God's  happiness  may  be  and  is  infinite  both  in  degree  and  in 
duration,  which  amounts  to  infinite  in  the  absolute  sense. 

///.  /  must  remind  you  of  the  rule  by  which  degrees  of  guilt 
are  to  he  estimated. 

And  here  let  it  be  remembered, 

1.  That  moral  obligation  is  founded  in  the  intrinsic  value 
of  those  interests  which  moral  agents  are  bound  to  choose  as 
an  end. 

2.  That  the  obligation  is  conditionated  upon  the  knowl- 
edge of  this  end,  and, 

3.  That  the  degree  of  obligation  is  just  equal  to  the  degree 
of  light  which  the  mind  has  in  regard  to  the  intrinsic  value 
of  those  interests  which  it  is  bound  to  choose. 

4.  That  the  guilt  of  refusal  to  will  these  interests  is  in  pro- 
portion, or  is  equal  to  the  amount  of  the  obligation,  and, 

5.  That  consequently  the  mind's  honest  apprehension  or 
judgment  of  the  value  of  those  interests  which  it  refuses  to 
will,  is  and  must  be  the  rule  by  which  the  degree  of  guilt  in- 
volved in  that  refusal  ought  to  be  measured.  I  do  not  mean 
that  guilt  is  to  be  measured  by  the  mind's  actual  but  dishonest 
estimate  of  the  value  of  the  interests  it  rejects;  but  guilt  is  to 
be  measured  by  the  light  enjoyed  or  by  the  estimate  which  the 
mind  would  have  with  the  light  that  now  shines  around  it,  were 
it  honest  and  disposed  to  receive  the  Hght  and  judge  according- 

IV,  That  all  and  every  sin  must  from  its  very  nature  involve 
infinite  guilt  in  the  sense  of  deserving  endless  punishment. 

1.  Sin  implies  moral  obHgation. 

2.  Moral  obligation  implies  moral  agency. 

3.  Moral  agency  implies  light,  or  the  knowledge  of  the 
end  that  moral  agents  ought  to  will. 

4.  This  end  is  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the 
universe. 

5.  The  idea  or  apprehension  of  this  end  implies  the  knowl- 
edge that  the  intrinsic  value  of  those  endless  interests  must 
be  infinite. 

If  the  idea  of  God  and  of  the  good  of  being  be  developed, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


S77 


which  is  implied  in  moral  agency,  there  must  be  in  the  mind 
the  idea  or  first  truth  that  the  good  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
'  verse  is  infinitely  valuable.  The  idea  may  lie  in  comparative 
obscuration.  Nevertheless  it  is  and  must  be  in  the  mind.  If 
this  is  so,  (and  it  must  be  so,)  it  follows  that  every  refusal  to  * 
will  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  universe  in- 
volves infinite  guilt.  Every  moral  agent  must  be  able  to 
affirm,  and  indeed  must  affirm  to  himself  that  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  happiness  of  God  and  the  universe  must  be  bound- 
less, unlimited,  infinite.  He  must  affirm  that  there  can  be  no 
limit  to  it.  By  this  affirmation  or  by  the  apprehension  that 
necessitates  this  affirmation,  his  guilt  ought  to  be  measured,  if 
he  refuses  to  consecrate  himself  to  the  promotion  of  those  in- 
terests. 

V.  JVotwithstanding  all  sin  deserves  endless  punishment^ 
yet  the  guilt  of  different  persons  may  vary  indefinitely^  and 
punishment^  although  always  endless  in  duration,^  may  and 
ought  to  vary  in  degree  according  to  the  guilt  of  each  indi- 
vidual. 

The  guilt  of  different  persons  may  vary  indefinitely. — 
This  also  may  be  true  of  the  same  person  at  different  periods  of 
life.  Observe;  the  degree  of  guilt  depends  on  the  degree  of 
intellectual  development  on  moral  subjects — upon  the  clear- 
ness with  which  the  mind  apprehends  moral  relations,  espe- 
cially the  intrinsic  value  of  those  interests  which  it  ought  to 
choose.  These  apprehensions  vary,  as  every  moral  agent  is 
conscious,  almost  continually.  The  obligation  to  will  an  end 
lies  in  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  end.  The  obligation  is  great- 
er or  less  as  the  mind's  honest  estimate  of  the  value  of  it  is 
greater  or  less.  Every  moral  agent  knows  that  the  value  of  the 
end  is  unbounded.  Yet  some  have  an  indefinitely  larger  con-  ^ 
ception  of  what  infinite  and  boundless  means.  Some  minds 
mean  indefinitely  more  by  such  language  than  others  do.  As 
light  increases  and  the  mind  obtains  enlarged  conceptions  of 
God,  of  the  universe,  of  endless  happiness  or  misery,  and  of  all 
those  great  truths  that  cluster  around  these  subjects,  its  obli- 
gation increases  in  exact  proportion  to  increasing  light,  and  so 
does  the  guilt  of  selfishness. 

VI.  That  penal  infiictions  under  the  government  of  God  must 
be  endless* 

Here  the  inquiry  is,  what  kind  of  death  is  intended  where 
death  is  denounced  against  the  transgressor  as  the  penalty  of 
the  law  of  God? 

L  It  is  not  merely  natural  death,  for, 
32* 


378  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

1.  This  would  in  reality  be  no  penalty  at  all.  But  it  would 
be  offering  a  reward  to  sin.  If  natural  death  is  all  that  is  in- 
tended, and  if  persons,  as  soon  as  they  are  naturally  dead  \ 
have  suffered  the  penalty  of  the  law,  and  their  souls  go  imme- 
diately to  heaven,  the  case  stands  thus :  If  your  obedience  is 
perfect  and  perpetual,  you  shall  live  in  this  world  forever:  but 
if  you  sin,  you  shall  die  and  go  right  to  heaven.  This  would 
be  hire  and  salary,  and  not  punishment. 

2.  If  natural  death  be  the  penalty  of  God's  law,  the  righte- 
ous who  are  forgiven,  should  not  die  a  natural  death. 

3.  If  natural  death  be  the  penalty  of  God's  law,  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  forgiveness,  but  all  must  actually  endure  the 
penalty. 

4.  If  natural  death  be  the  penalty,  then  infants  and  animals 
suffer  this  penalty  as  well  as  the  most  abandoned  transgress- 
ors. 

5.  If  natural  death  be  the  penalty  it  sustains  no  proportion 
whatever  to  the  guilt  of  sin. 

6.  Natural  death  would  be  no  adequate  expression  of  the 
importance  of  the  precept. 

II.  The  penalty  of  God's  law  is  not  spiritual  death. 

1.  Because  spiritual  death  is  a  state  of  entire  sinfulness. 

2.  To  make  a  state  of  entire  sinfulness  the  penalty  of  the 
law  of  God,  would  be  to  make  the  penalty  and  the  breach  of 
the  precept  identical. 

3.  It  would  be  making  God  the  author  of  sin,  and  would 
represent  him  as  compelling  the  sinner  to  commit  one  sin  as 
the  punishment  for  another,  as  forcing  him  into  a  state  of  to- 
tal depravity  as  the  reward  of  his  first  transgression. 

III.  But  the  penal  sanction  of  the  law  of  God  is  eternal 
death  or  that  state  of  suffering  which  is  the  natural  and  govern- 
mental result  of  sin  or  spiritual  death. 

Before  I  proceed  to  the  proof  of  this,  I  will  notice  an  ob- 
jection which  is  often  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  eternal 
punishments.  The  objection  is  one^  but  it  is  stated  in  three  dif- 
ferent forms.  This,  and  every  other  objection  to  the  doctrine 
of  endless  punishment,  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  is  leveled 
against  the  justice  of  such  a  governmental  infliction. 

1.  It  is  said  that  endless  punishment  is  unjust  because  life 
is  so  short  that  men  do  not  live  long  enough  in  this  world  to 
commit  so  great  a  number  of  sins  as  to  deserve  endless  pun- 
ishment.    To  this  I  answer, 

(I.)  That  it  is  founded  in  a  ridiculous  ignorance  or  disre- 
gard of  a  universal  principle  of  government,  viz:  that  one 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  379 

breach  of  the  precept  always  incurs  the  penalty  of  the  law, 
whatever  that  penalty  is. 

(2.)  The  length  of  time  employed  in  committing  a  sin,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  its  blameworthiness  or  guilt.  It  is  the  de- 
sign which  constitutes  the  moral  character  of  the  action,  and 
not  the  length  of  time  required  for  its  accomplishment. 

(3.)  This  objection  takes  for  granted  that  it  is  the  number 
of  sins  and  not  the  intrinsic  guilt  of  sin  that  constitutes  its 
blameworthiness,  whereas  it  is  the  intrinsic  desert  or  guilt  of 
sin,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  that  renders  it  deserving  of  endless 
punishment. 

2.  Another  form  of  the  objection  is,  that  a  finite  creature 
can  not  commit  an  infinite  sin.  But  none  but  an  infinite  sin 
can  deserve  endless  punishment:  therefore  endless  punish- 
ments are  unjust. 

(1.)  This  objection  takes  for  granted  that  man  is  so  diminu- 
tive a  creature,  so  much  less  than  the  Creator,  that  he  can 
not  deserve  his  endless  frown. 

(2.)  The  fact  is,  the  greater  the  distance  between  the  crea- 
ture and  the  creator,  the  more  aggravated  is  the  guilt  of  in- 
sult or  rebellion  in  the  creature.  Which  is  the  greater  crime, 
for  a  child  to  insult  his  playfellow  or  his  parent?  Which 
would  involve  the  most  guilt,  for  a  man  to  smite  his  neighbor 
and  his  equal,  or  his  lawful  sovereign? 

(3.)  The  higher  the  ruler  is  exalted  above  the  subject  in 
his  nature,  character,  and  rightful  authority,  the  greater  is  the 
guilt  of  transgression  in  the  subject.  Therefore  the  fact  that 
man  is  so  infinitely  below  his  Maker  but  enhances  the  guilt 
of  his  rebellion  and  renders  him  worthy  of  his  endless  frown. 

3.  A  third  form  of  the  objection  is,  that  sin  is  not  an  infi- 
nite evil,  and  therefore  does  not  deserve  endless  punishment. 

This  objection  may  mean  either  that  sin  would  not 
produce  infinite  mischief  if  unrestrained,  or  that  it  does  not 
involve  infinite  guilt.  It  can  not  mean  the  first,  for  it  is  agreed 
on  all  hands  that  misery  must  continue  as  long  as  sin  does, 
and  therefore  that  sin  unrestrained  would  produce  endless 
evil.  The  objection  therefore  must  mean  that  sin  does  not 
involve  infinite  guilt.  Observe  then,  the  point  at  issue  is, 
what  is  the  intrinsic  demerit  or  guilt  of  sin?  What  does  all 
sin  in  its  own  nature  deserve?  They  who  deny  the  justice 
of  endless  punishment,  manifestly  consider  the  guilt  of  sin  as 
a  mere  trifle.  They  who  maintain  the  justice  of  endless  pun- 
ishment, consider  sin  as  an  evil  of  immeasurable  magnitude, 


380  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and,  in  its  own  nature,  as  deserving  of  endless  punishment. 
Proof: 

1.  The  guilt  or  hlameworthiness  of  an  action  consists  in  its 
being  the  violation  of  an  obHgation.  Example:  Should  a  child 
refuse  obedience  to  his  fellow  who  has  no  natural  or  acquired 
claims  upon  his  obedience,  he  would  not  be  blameworthy. 
But  should  he  refuse  obedience  to  his  parent  who  has  both  a 
natural  and  acquired  claim  to  his  obedience,  this  conduct 
would  be  blameworthy.  This  shows  in  what  blameworthi- 
ness consists. 

2.  The  guilt  or  blameworthiness  of  an  action  is  equal  to  the 
amount  of  obligation  to  do  or  omit  that  thing.  We  have  just 
seen  that  the  blameworthiness  lies  in  its  being  the  violation 
of  an  obligation.  Hence  the  amount  of  blameworthiness  must 
be  equal  to  the  amount  of  obHgation.  If  a  child  refuse  to  obey 
his  fellow,  he  contracts  no  guilt.  If  he  refuse  to  obey  his  pa- 
rent, he  contracts  a  degree  of  guilt  equal  to  the  amount  of  his 
obHgation  to  obey.  Suppose  that  some  one  upon  whom  he  is 
a  thousand  times  as  dependent  as  upon  his  parent,  and  who 
therefore  has  a  thousand  times  higher  claim  upon  his  obedi- 
ence than  his  parent  has,  should  command  him  to  do  or  omit  a 
certain  thing.  Should  he  in  this  case  disobey,  his  guilt  would 
be  a  thousand  times  as  great  as  when  he  disobeyed  his  pa- 
rents. Now  suppose  that  God,  upon  whom  every  moral  be- 
ing is  not  only  perfectly  but  endlessly  dependent,  requires  the 
creature  to  love  him  with  all  his  heart;  who  does  not  see  that 
his  guilt  in  refusing  obedience  must  be  as  great  as  his  obHga- 
tion to  obey  ? 

Having  shown  that  moral  obligation  is  founded  in  the  in- 
trinsic value  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  that  it  is  always  equal  to  the  light  afforded  to  the 
mind  or  to  the  soul's  knowledge  of  the  value  of  those  inter- 
ests, and  having  shown  also  that  every  moral  agent  neces- 
sarily has  the  idea  more  or  less  clearly  developed  that  the 
value  of  those  interests  is  infinite,  it  follows: 

That  the  law  is  infinitely  unjust,  if  its  penal  sections  are 
not  endless.     Law  must  be  just  in  two  respects. 

The  precept  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  na- 
ture. 

The  penalty  must  be  equal  to  the  importance  of  the 
precept.  That  which  has  not  these  two  pecuHarities  is  not 
iust,  and  therefore  is  not  and  can  not  be  law.  Either,  then, 
God  has  no  law,  or  its  penal  sanctions  are  endless. 

1.  That  the  penal  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God  are  endless, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  381 

is  evident  from  the  fact  that  a  less  penalty  vrould  not  exhibit 
as  high  motives  as  the  nature  of  the  case  admits,  to  restrain  sin 
and  promote  virtue. 

2.  Natural  justice  demands  that  God  should  exhibit  as  high 
motives  to  secure  obedience  as  the  vahie  of  the  law  demands, 
and  the  nature  of  the  case  admits. 

3.  The  justice,  holiness  and  benevolence  of  God  demand 
that  the  penal  sanctions  of  his  law  should  be  endless;  and  if 
they  are  not,  God  can  not  be  just,  holy  or  benevolent. 

4.  Unless  the  penal  sanctions  of  the  law  of  God  are  end- 
less, they  are  virtually  and  really  no  penalty  at  all.  If  a  man 
be  threatened  with  punishment  for  one  thousand,  or  ten  thou- 
sand, or  ten  millions,  or  ten  hundred  millions  of  years,  after 
which  he  is  to  come  out,  as  a  matter  of  justice,  and  go  to 
heaven,  there  is  beyond  an  absolute  eternity  of  happiness. 
Now  there  is  no  sort  of  proportion  between  the  longest  finite 
period  that  can  be  named,  or  even  conceived,  and  endless  du- 
ration. If,  therefore,  limited  punishment,  ending  in  an  eter- 
nity of  heaven,  be  the  penalty  of  God's  law,  the  case  stands 
thus:  Be  perfect,  and  you  live  here  forever.  Sin,  and  receive 
finite  suffering,  with  an  eternity  of  heaven.  This  would  be, 
after  all,  offering  reward  to  sin. 

5.  Death  is  eternal  in  its  nature.  The  fact,  therefore,  that 
this  figure  is  used  to  express  the  future  punishment  of  the 
wicked  affords  a  plain  inference  that  it  is  endless. 

6.  The  tendency  of  sin  to  perpetuate  and  aggravate  itself, 
afibrds  another  strong  inference  that  the  sinfulness  and  misery 
of  the  wicked  will  be  eternal. 

7.  The  fact  that  punishment  has  no  tendency  to  beget 
disinterested  love  in  a  selfish  mind  towards  him  who  inflicts 
the  punishment,  also  affords  a  strong  presumption  that  future 
punishment  will  be  eternal. 

8.  The  law  makes  no  provision  for  terminating  future  pun- 
ishment. 

9.  Sin  deserves  endless  punishment  just  as  fully  as  it  de- 
serves any  punishment  at  all.  If,  therefore,  it  is  not  forgiven, 
if  it  be  punished  at  all  with  penal  suffering,  the  punishment 
must  be  endless. 

10.  To  deny  the  justice  of  eternal  punishments,  involves 
the  same  principle  as  a  denial  of  the  justice  of  any  degree  of 
punishment. 

11.  To  deny  the  justice  of  endless  punishment,  is  virtually 
to  deny  the  fact  of  moral  evil.  But  to  deny  this  is  to  deny 
moral  obligation.     To  deny  moral  obligation  is  to  deny  moral 


382  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

agency.  But  of  both  moral  obligation  and  moral  agency  we 
are  absolutely  conscious.  Therefore  it  follows  to  a  demon- 
stration, not  only  that  moral  evil  docs  exist,  but  that  it  de- 
serves endless  punishment. 

//.  Examine  this  question  in  the  light  of  Revelation, 
The  bible  in  a  great  many  ways  represents  the  future 
punishment  of  the  wicked  as  eternal.  It  expresses  the  dura- 
tion of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked  by  the  same 
terms,  and  in  every  way  as  forcibly  as  it  expresses  the  duration 
of  the  future  happiness  of  the  righteous.] 

I  will  here  introduce  without  comment  some  passages  of 
scripture  confirmatory  of  this  last  remark.  "  The  hope  of  the 
righteous  shall  be  gladness:  but  the  expectation  of  the  wicked 

shall  perish." Prov.  10:  28.     "-When  a  wicked  man  dieth, 

his  expectation  shall  perish;  and  the  hope  of  unjust  men 
perisheth." — Prov.  11:7.  "And  many  of  them  that  sleep  in 
the  dust  of  the  earth  shall  wake,  some  to  everlasting  life,  and 
some  to  shame  and  everlasting  contempt." — Dan.  12:  2. 
"  Then  shall  he  say  also  unto  them  on  the  left  hand.  Depart 
from  me  ye  cursed,  into  everlasting  fire,  prepared  for  the 
devil  and  his  angels:  for  I  was  an  hungered,  and  ye  gave  me 
no  meat:  I  was  thirsty,  and  ye  gave  me  no  drink.  And  these 
shall  go  away  into  everlasting  punishment:  but  the  righteous 
into  life  eternal."— Matt.  25:  41,  42,  46.  ^'And  if  thy  hand 
offend  thee,  cut  it  off:  it  is  better  for  thee  to  enter  into  life 
maimed,  than  having  two  hands  to  go  into  hell,  into  the  fire 
that  never  shall  be  quenched;  where  their  worm  dieth  not, 
and  the  fire  is  not  quenched." — Mark  9:  43,  44.  "The 
Son  of  man  goeth  as  it  is  written  of  him:  but  woe  unto  that 
man  by  whom  the  Son  of  man  is  betrayed!  it  had  been  good 
for  that  man  if  he  had  not  been  born." — Matt.  26:  24. 
'••  Whose  fan  is  in  his  hand,  and  he  will  thoroughly  purge  his 
floor,  and  will  gather  the  wheat  into  his  garner;  but  the  chaff 
he  will  burn  with  fire  unquenchable." — Luke  3:  17.  "And 
besides  all  this,  between  us  and  you  there  is  a  great  gulf  fixed: 
so  that  they  which  would  pass  from  hence  to  you  can  not; 
neither  can  they  pass  to  us,  that  would  come  from  thence." — ' 
Luke  16:  26.  "He  that  believeth  on  the  Son  hath  everlast- 
ing life:  and  he  that  believeth  not  the  Son  shall  not  see  life; 
but  the  wrath  of  God  abideth  on  him."— John  3:  36.  "And 
to  you  who  are  troubled,  rest  with  us,  when  the  Lord  Jesus 
shall  be  revealed  from  heaven  with  his  mighty  angels,  in 
flaming  fire  taking  vengeance  on  them  that  know  not  God, 
and  that  obey  not  the  gospel  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ:  who 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  383 

shall  be  punished  with  everlasting  destruction  from  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Lord,  and  from  the  glory  of  his  power." — 2  Thess. 
1':  7 — 9.  ^-And  the  angels  which  kept  not  their  first  estate, 
but  left  their  own  habitation,  he  hath  reserved  in  everlasting 
chains,  under  darkness,  unto  the  judgment  of  the  great  day. 
Even  as  Sodom  and  Gomorrha,  and  the  cities  about  them,  in 
like  manner,  giving  themselves  over  to  fornication,  and  going 
after  strange  flesh,  are  set  forth  for  an  example,  suffering  the 
vengeance  of  eternal  fire.  Raging  waves  of  the  sea,  foaming 
out  their  own  shame;  wandering  stars,  to  whom  is  reserved 
the  blackness  of  darkness  forever." — Jude,  6,  7,  13.  ""And 
the  third  angel  followed  them,  saying  with  a  loud  voice.  If 
any  man  worship  the  beast  and  his  image,  and  receive  his 
mark  in  his  forehead,  or  in  his  hand,  the  same  shall  drink  of 
the  wine  of  the  wrath  of  God,  which  is  poured  out  without 
mixture  into  the  cup  of  his  indignation;  and  he  shall  be  tor- 
mented with  fire  and  brimstone  in  the  presence  of  the  holy 
angels,  and  in  the  presence  of  the  Lamb:  and  the  smoke  of 
their  torment  ascendeth  up  for  ever  and  ever:  and  they  have 
no  rest  day  nor  night,  who  worship  the  beast  and  his  image, 
and  whosoever  receive th  the  mark  of  his  name." — Rev.  14:  9 
— 11.  "And  the  devil  that  deceived  them  was  cast  into  the 
lake  of  fire  and  brimstone,  where  the  beast  and  the  false 
prophet  ore,  and  shall  be  tormented  day  and  night  for  ever 
and  ever." — Rev.  20:  10.  ""He  that  is  unjust,  let  him  be  un- 
just still:  and  he  which  is  filthy,  let  him  be  filthy  still:  and  he 
that  is  righteous,  let  him  be  righteous  still:  and  he  that  is 
holy  let  him  be  holy  still." — Rev.  22:  11.  But  there  is 
scarcely  any  end  to  the  multitude  of  passages  that  teach 
directly  or  by  inference  both  the  fact  and  the  endless- 
ness of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked.  But  the  fuller 
consideration  of  this  subject  belongs  more  appropriately  to  a 
future  place  in  this  course  of  instruction,  my  object  here  being 
only  to  consider  the  penal  sanctions  of  moral  law  didatically, 
reserving  the  polemic  discussion  of  the  question  of  endless 
pjinishment  for  a  future  occasion. 


LECTURE  XXXI. 

ATONEMENT. 

We  come  now  to  the  consideration  of  a  very  important 
feature  of  the  moral  government  of  God ;  namely  the  atone- 
ment. 

In  discussing  this  subject  I  will, 

I.  Call  att^jntion  to  several  well  established  gov- 
ernmental PRINCIPLES,  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  WHICH  OUR  INVES- 
TIGATION WILL  PROCEED. 

II.  Define  the  term  Atonement  as  used  in  this  dis- 
cussion. 

III.  Inquire  into  the  teachings  of  natural  theology, 

OR    INTO    the  a    priori    AFFIRMATIONS    OF    REASON   UPON    THIS 
SUBJECT. 

IV.  Show  the  fact  of  Atonement. 

V.  The  design  of  Atonement. 

VI.  Extent  of  Atonement. 

VII.  Answer  objections. 

I,  /  will  call  attention  to  several  well  established  governmen- 
tal principles. 

1.  We  have  already  seen  that  moral  law  is  not  founded  in 
the  mere  arbitrary  will  of  God  or  of  any  other  being,  but 
that  it  has  its  foundation  in  the  nature  and  relations  of  moral 
agents,  that  it  is  that  rule  of  action  or  of  willing  which  is  im- 
posed on  them  by  the  law  of  their  own  intelligence. 

2.  As  the  will  of  ho  being  can  create  moral  law,  so  the  will 
of  no  being  can  repeal  or  alter  moral  law.  It  being  just 
that  rule  of  action  that  is  agreeable  to  the  nature  and  relations 
of  moral  agents,  it  is  as  immutable  as  those  natures  and  re- 
lations. 

3.  There  is  a  distinction  between  the  letter  and  the  spirit 
of  moral  law.  The  letter  is  the  language  in  which  it  is  ex- 
pressed. The  spirit  is  its  true  and  proper  meaning.  For  ex- 
ample: the  spirit  of  the  moral  law  requires  disinterested  be- 
nevolence and  is  all  expressed  in  one  word  love.  The  letter 
of  the  law  is  found  in  the  commandments  of  the  Decalogue 
and  in  divers  other  precepts. 

4.  To  the  letter  of  the  law  there  may  be  many  exceptions, 
but  to  the  spirit  of  moral  law  there  can  be  no  exceptions. 
That  is,  the  spirit  of  the  moral  law  may  sometimes  admit  and 
require  that  the  letter  of  the  law  shall  be  disregarded  or  vio- 
lated; but  the  spirit  of  the  law  ought  never  to  be  disregar- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  385 

ded  or  violaied.  For  example :  the  letter  of  the  law  prohibits 
all  labor  on  the  Sabbath  day.  But  the  spirit  of  the  law  often 
requires  labor  on  the  sabbath.  The  spirit  of  the  law  requires 
the  exercise  of  universal  and  perfect  love  or  benevolence  to 
God  and  man,  and  the  law  of  benevolence  often  requires  that 
labor  shall  be  done  on  the  sabbath;  as  administering  to 
the  sick,  relieving  the  poor,  feeding  animals;  and  in  short 
whatever  is  plainly  the  work  of  necessity  or  mercy,  in  such  a 
sense  that  enlightened  benevolence  demands  it,  is  required 
by  the  spirit  of  moral  law  upon  the  sabbath  as  well  as  all 
other  days.  This  is  expressly  taught  by  Christ  both  by  pre- 
cept and  example.  So  again,  the  letter  of  the  law  says  the 
soul  that  sinneth,  it  shall  die;  but  the  spirit  of  the  law  admits 
and  requires  that  upon  certain  conditions,  to  be  examined  in 
the  proper  place,  the  soul  that  sinneth  shall  live.  The  letter 
makes  no  exceptions:  the  spirit  makes  many  exceptions. 
The  letter  of  the  law  is  inexorable  and  condemns  and  sen- 
tences to  death  all  riolators  of  its  precepts  without  regard  to 
atonement  or  repentance.  The  spiiit  of  moral  law  allows 
and  requires  that  upon  condition  of  satisfaction  being  made 
to  public  justice  and  the  return  of  the  sinner  to  obedience, 
he  shall  live  and  not  die. 

5.  In  estabUshing  a  government  and  promulgating  law,  the 
lawgiver  is  always  understood  as  pledging  himself  duly  to 
administer  the  laws  in  support  of  public  order  and  for  the 
promotion  of  public  morals,  to  reward  the  innocent  with  his 
favor  and  protection  and  to  punish  the  disobedient  with  the 
loss  of  his  protection  and  his  favor. 

6.  Laws  are  public  property  in  which  every  subject  of  the 
government  has  an  interest.  Every  obedient  subject  of  gov- 
ernment is  interested  to  have  law  supported  and  obeyed,  and 
wherever  the  law  is  violated,  every  subject  of  the  govern- 
ment is  injured  and  his  rights  are  invaded;  and  each  and  all 
have  a  right  to  expect  the  government  to  duly  execute  the 
penalties  of  law  when  it  is  violated. 

7.  There  is  an  important  distinction  between  distributive  and 
public  justice.  Distributive  justice  consists,  in  its  exercise, 
in  distributing  to  every  subject  of  government  according  to 
his  character.  It  respects  the  intrinsic  merit  or  demerit  of 
each  individual,  and  deals  with  him  accordingly.  Public  jus- 
tice, in  its  exercise,  consists  in  the  promotion  and  protection 
of  the  public  interests  by  such  legislation  and  such  an  admin- 
istration of  law  as  is  demanded  by  the  highest  good  of  the 
public.     It  implies  the  execution  of  the  penalties  of  law  where 

33 


386  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  precept  is  violated,  unless  something  else  is  done  that  will 
as  effectually  secure  the  public  interests.  When  this  is  done, 
public  justice  demands  that  the  execution  of  the  penalty 
shall  be  dispensed  with  by  extending  pardon  to  the  criminal. 
Distributive  justice  makes  no  exceptions,  but  punishes  with- 
out mercy  in  every  instance  of  crime.  Public  justice  makes 
exceptions  as  often  as  this  is  permitted  or  required  by  the 
public  good.  Public  justice  is  identical  with  the  spirit  of 
the  moral  law  in  its  relations  to  the  public  interests,  or,  in  its 
exercise,  regards  only  the  spirit  of  the  law.  Distributive 
justice  cleaves  to  the  letter,  and  makes  no  exceptions  to  the 
rule,  "  the  soul  that  sinneth  it  shall  die." 

8.  The  design  of  penalties  to  laws  is  prevention,  or  to  se- 
cure obedience  to  the  precept.  The  same  is  also  the  design 
of  executing  them  when  the  precept  is  violated.  The  sanc- 
tions are  to  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  views  of  the 
lawgiver  in  respect  to  the  importance  of  his  law;  and  the  exe- 
cution of  penalties  is  designed  and  calculated  to  evince  his 
sincerity  in  enacting,  and  his  continued  adherence  to,  and  de- 
termination to  abide  by  the  principles  of  his  government  as 
revealed  in  the  law;  his  abhorrence  of  all  crime;  his  regard 
to  the  public  interests;  and  His  unalterable  determination 
to  carry  out,  support  and  establish  the  authority  of  His  law, 

9.  It  is  a  fact  well  established  by  the  experience  of  all  ages 
and  nations  that  the  exercise  of  mercy  in  setting  aside  the 
execution  of  penalties  is  a  matter  of  extreme  delicacy  and 
danger.  The  influence  of  law,  as  might  be  expected,  is  found 
very  much  to  depend  upon  the  certainty  felt  by  the  subjects 
that  it  will  be  duly  executed.  It  is  found  to  be  true  that  the 
exercise  of  mercy  in  every  government  where  no  atonement 
is  made,  weakens  government  by  begetting  and  fostering  a 
hope  of  impunity  in  case  sin  is  committed  or  the  precept  vio- 
lated. 

10.  Since  the  head  of  the  government  is  pledged  to  protect 
and  promote  the  pubUc  interests  by  a  due  administration  of 
law,  if  in  any  instance  he  would  dispense  with  the  execution 
of  penalties  in  case  of  a  violation  of  the  precept,  public  just- 
ice requires  that  he  shall  see  that  a  substitute  for  the  execu- 
tion of  law  is  provided,  or  that  something  is  done  that  shall 
as  effectually  secure  the  influence  of  law  as  the  execution  of 
the  penalty  would  do.  He  can  not  make  exceptions  to  the 
spirit  of  the  law.  Either  the  soul  that  sinneth  must  die,  ac- 
cording to  the  letter  of  the  law,  or  a  substitute  must  be  provi- 
ded in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  law. 


MORAL   GOVERNMENT.  387 

1 1.  Whatever  will  as  fully  evince  the  regard  of  the  lawgiver 
to  his  law — his  determination  to  support  it — his  abhorrence  of 
all  violations  of  its  precepts — and  withal  guard  as  effectually 
against  the  inference  that  violators  of  the  precept  might  expect 
to  escape  with  impunity,  as  the  execution  of  the  penalty  would 
do,  is  a  full  satisfaction  of  public  justice.  When  these  condi- 
tions are  fulfilled,  and  the  sinner  has  returned  to  obedience,  pub- 
lic justice  not  only  admits,  but  absolutely  demands  that  the 
penalty  shall  be  set  aside  by  extending  pardon  to  the  offender. 
The  offender  still  deserves  to  be  punished,  and  upon  the  prin- 
ciples of  distributive  justice,  might  be  punished  according  to 
his  deserts.  But  the  public  good  admits  and  requires  that 
upon  the  above  conditions  he  should  live,  and  hence,  public 
justice,  in  comphance  with  the  public  interests  and  the  spirit  of 
the  law  of  love,  spares  and  pardons  him. 

12.  If  mercy  or  pardon  is  to  be  extended  to  any  who  have 
violated  law,  it  ought  to  be  done  in  a  manner  and  upon  condi- 
tions that  will  settle  the  question  and  establish  the  truth  that 
the  execution  of  penalties  is  not  to  be  dispensed  with  merely 
upon  condition  of  the  repentance  of  the  offender.  In  other 
words,  if  pardon  is  to  be  extended,  it  should  be  known  to  be 
upon  a  condition  not  within  the  power  of  the  offender.  Else 
he  may  know  that  he  can  violate  the  law  and  yet  be  sure  to 
escape  with  impunity  by  fulfilling  the  conditions  of  forgive- 
ness, which  are,  upon  the  supposition,  all  within  his  own 
power. 

13.  So,  if  mercy  is  to  be  exercised,  it  should  be  upon  a 
condition  that  is  not  to  be  repeated.  The  thing  required  by 
public  justice  is  that  nothing  shall  be  done  to  undermine  or 
disturb  the  influence  of  law.  Hence  it  can  not  consent  to 
have  the  execution  of  penalties  dispensed  with  upon  any  con- 
dition that  shall  encourage  the  hope  of  impunity.  Therefore, 
public  justice  can  not  consent  to  the  pardon  of  sin  but  upon 
condition  of  an  atonement,  and  also  upon  the  assumption 
that  atonement  is  not  to  be  repeated,  nor  to  extend  its  bene- 
fits beyond  the  limits  of  the  race  for  whom  it  was  made,  and 
that  only  for  a  limited  time.  If  an  atonement  were  to  extend 
its  benefits  to  all  worlds  and  to  all  eternity,  it  would  nullify 
its  own  influence  and  encourage  the  universal  hope  of  impu- 
nity in  case  the  precepts  of  the  law  were  violated.  This 
would  be  indefinitely  worse  than  no  atonement;  and  public 
justice  might  as  well  consent  to  have  mercy  exercised  without 
any  regard  to  securing  the  authority  and  influence  of  law. 

14.  The  spirit  of  the  moral  law  can  no  more  be  dispensed 


388  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

with  by  the  law  giver  than  it  can  be  repealed.  The  spirit  of 
the  law  requires  that  when  the  precept  is  violated  the  penalty 
shall  he  executed  or  that  something  shall  he  done  that  will 
as  effectually  and  impressively  negative  the  inference  or  as- 
sumption that  sin  can  escape  with  impunity  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God,  beyond  the  limits  of  the  race  for  whom  the 
atonement  was  especially  made,  as  the  execution  of  the  law 
would  do.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  following  things  must  he 
true  under  a  perfect  government,  as  has  been  said  above. 

(1.)  That  sin  can  not  he  forgiven  merely  upon  condition  of 
repentance;  for  this  condition  is  within  the  power  of  the  sub- 
ject, so  that  he  might  be  sure  of  impunity. 

(2.)  Nor  can  it  be  forgiven  upon  a  condition  that  shall  be 
repeated,  for  this  would  encourage  the  hope  of  impunity. 

(3.)  Nor  can  it  be  forgiven  upon  a  condition  that  will  extend 
to  all  worlds  and  throughout  all  eternity,  for  this  would  be 
equivalent  to  forgiving  sin  merely  upon  condition  of  repen- 
lance  without  any  reference  to  the  authority  of  law  or  to 
public  justice. 

//.  Define  the  term  Atonement, 

The  English  word  Atonement  is  synonymous  with  the  He- 
brew word  Cofer,  This  is  a  noun  from  the  verb  caufar^  to 
cover.  The  cofer  or  cover,  was  the  name  of  the  lid  or  cover 
of  the  ark  of  the  covenant,  and  constituted  what  was  called 
the  mercy  seat.  The  Greek  word  rendered  Atonement  is 
katallage.  This  means  reconciliation  to  favor,  or  more  strictly, 
the  means  or  conditions  of  reconciHation  to  favor;  fromkatal- 
lasso^  to  change,  or  exchange.  The  term  properly  means  sub- 
stitution. An  examination  of  these  original  words,  in  the 
connection  in  which  they  stand,  will  show  that  the  Atonement 
is  the  governmental  substitution  of  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
for  the  sufferings  of  sinners.  It  is  a  covering  of  their  sins, 
by  his  sufferings. 

///.  I  am  to  inquire  into  the  teachings  of  natural  theology^  or 
into  the  a  priori  affirmations  of  reason  upon  this  subject. 

1.  The  doctrine  of  atonement  has  been  regarded  as  so 
purely  a  doctrine  of  revelation  as  to  preclude  the  supposition 
that  reason  could,  a  ;?non,  make  any  affirmations  about  it.  It 
has  been  generally  regarded  as  lying  absolutely  without  the 
pale  of  natural  theology  in  so  high  a  sense  that  aside  from  re- 
velation no  assumption  could  be  made  nor  even  a  reasona- 
ble conjecture  indulged.  But  there  are  certain  facts  in 
this  world's  history  that  render  this  assumption  exceedingly 
doubtful.     It  is  true  indeed  that  natural  theology  could  not 


HORAL  GOVERNMENT.  389 

ascertain  and  establish  the  fact  that  an  atonement  had  been 
made,  or  that  it  certainly  would  be  made;  but  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken, it  might  have  been  reasonably  inferred,  the  true  cha- 
racter of  God  being  known  and  assumed,  that  an  atonement 
of  some  kind  would  be  made  to  render  it  consistent  with  his 
relations  to  the  universe  to  extend  mercy  to  the  guilty  inhabi- 
tants of  this  world.  The  manifest  necessity  of  a  divine  reve- 
lation has  been  supposed  to  afford  a  strong  presumptive  argu- 
ment that  such  a  revelation  has  been  or  will  be  made.  From 
the  benevolence  of  God  as  manifested  in  his  works  and  provi- 
dence it  has  been,  as  I  suppose,  justly  inferred  that  he  would 
make  arrangements  to  secure  the  holiness  and  salvation  of 
men,  and  as  a  condition  of  this  result  that  he  would  grant 
them  a  further  revelation  of  his  will  than  had  been  given  in 
creation  and  providence.     The  argument  stands  thus: 

(1.)  From  consciousness  and  observation  we  know  that  this 
is  not  a  state  of  retribution;  and  from  all  the  facts  in  the  case 
that  lie  open  to  observation,  this  is  evidently  a  state  of  trial 
or  probation. 

(2.)  The  providence  of  God  in  this  world  is  manifestly  dis- 
ciplinary and  designed  to  reform  mankind. 

(3.)  These  facts  taken  in  connection  with  the  great  ignor- 
ance and  darkness  of  the  human  mind  on  moral  and  rehgious 
subjects  afford  a  strong  presumption  that  the  benevolent  Cre- 
ator will  make  to  the  inhabitants  of  this  world  who  are  so  evi- 
dently yet  in  a  state  of  trial,  a  further  revelation  of  his  will. 

Now  if  this  argument  is  good,  so  far  as  it  goes,  I  see  not  why 
we  may  not  reasonably  go  still  further. 

Since  the  above  are  facts,  and  since  it  is  also  a  fact  that 
when  the  subject  is  duly  considered  (and  the  more  thoroughly 
the  better)  there  is  manifestly  a  great  difficulty  in  the  exercise 
of  mercy  without  satisfaction  being  made  to  publish  justice, 
and  since  the  benevolence  of  God  would  not  allow  him  on  the 
one  hand  to  pardon  sin  at  the  expense  of  public  justice,  or  on 
the  other  to  punish  or  execute  the  penalty  of  law  if  it 
could  be  wisely  and  consistently  avoided,  these  facts  being 
understood  and  admitted,  it  might  naturally  have  been  inferred 
that  the  wisdom  and  benevolence  of  God  would  devise  and 
execute  a  method  of  meeting  the  demands  of  public  justice 
that  should  render  the  forgiveness  of  sin  possible.  That  the 
philosophy  of  government  would  render  this  possible  is  to  us 
very  manifest.  I  know  indeed  that  with  the  light  the  gospel 
has  afforded  U5,  we  much  more  clearly  discern  this  than  they 
could  who^had  no  other  light  than  that  of  nature.  Whatever 
33* 


390  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOOY. 

might  have  been  known  to  the  ancients  and  those  who  have 
not  the  bible,  I  think  that  when  the  facts  are  announced  by 
revelation,  we  can  see  that  such  a  governmental  expedient 
was  not  only  possible,  but  just  what  might  have  been  expected 
of  the  benevolence  of  God.  It  would  of  course  have  been 
impossible  for  us,  a  priori^  to  have  devised  or  reasonably  con- 
jectured the  plan  that  has  been  adopted.  So  little  was  known 
or  knowable  on  the  subject  of  the  trinity  of  God  without  reve- 
lation that  natural  theology  could  perhaps  in  its  best  estate 
have  taught  nothing  farther  than  that  if  it  was  possible,  some 
governmental  expedient  would  be  resorted  to  and  was  in  con- 
templation, for  the  ultimate  restoration  of  the  sinning  race 
who  were  evidently  spared  hitherto  from  the  execution  of  law 
and  placed  under  a  system  of  discipline. 

But  since  the  gospel  has  announced  the  fact  of  the  atone- 
ment, it  appears  that  natural  theology  or  governmental  phi- 
losophy can  satisfactorily  explain  it;  that  reason  can  discern 
a  divine  philosophy  in  it. 

Natural  theology  can  teach, 

1.  That  human  nature  is  in  a  fallen  state,  and  that  the  law 
of  selfishness,  and  not  the  law  of  benevolence,  is  that  to  which 
unreformed  men  conform  their  lives. 

2.  It  can  teach  that  God  is  benevolent,  and  hence  that  mer- 
cy must  be  an  attribute  of  God. 

3.  Consequently  that  no  atonement  was  needed  to  satisfy 
any  implacable  spirit  in  the  divine  mind;  that  he  was  suffi- 
ciently and  infinitely  disposed  to  extend  pardon  to  the  peni- 
tent, if  this  could  be  wisely  and  safely  done, 

4.  It  can  also  abundantly  teach  that  there  is  a  real  and  a 
great  difficulty  and  danger  in  the  exercise  of  mercy  under  a 
moral  government,  and  supremely  great  under  a  government 
so  vast  and  so  enduring  as  the  government  of  God;  that  under 
such  a  government  the  danger  is  very  great  that  the  exercise 
of  mercy  will  be  understood  as  encouraging  the  hope  of  im- 
punity in  the  commission  of  sin. 

5.  It  can  also  show  the  indispensable  necessity  of  such  an 
administration  of  the  Divine  government  as  to  secure  the 
fullest  confidence  throughout  the  universe  in  the  sincerity  of 
God  in  promulging  his  law  with  its  tremendous  penalty,  and 
of  his  unalterable  adherence  to  its  spirit  and  determination 
not  to  falter  in  carrying  out  and  securing  its  authority  at  all 
events.  That  this  is  indispensable  to  the  well  being  of  the 
universe,  is  entirely  manifest. 

6.  Hence  it  is  very  obvious  to  natural  theology,  that  sin  caa 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  391 

not  be  pardoned  without  something  is  done  to  forbid  the  oth- 
erwise natural  inference  that  sin  will  be  forgiven  under  the 
government  of  God  upon  condition  of  repentance  alone  and 
of  course  upon  a  condition  within  the  power  of  the  sinner  him- 
self It  must  be  manifest  that  to  proclaim  throughout  the 
universe  that  sin  would  be  pardoned  universally  upon  condi- 
tion of  repentance  alone,  would  be  a  virtual  repeal  of  the  Di- 
vine law.  All  creatures  would  instantly  perceive  that  no  one 
need  to  fear  punishment  in  any  case  as  his  forgiveness  was  se- 
cure, however  much  he  might  trample  on  the  Divine  authori- 
ty, alone  upon  a  condition  which  he  could  at  will  perform. 

7.  Natural  theology  is  abundantly  competent  to  show  that 
God  could  not  be  just  to  his  own  intelligence,  just  to  his  char- 
acter, and  hence  just  to  the  universe  in  dispensing  with  the 
execution  of  the  Divine  law  except  upon  the  condition  of  pro- 
viding a  substitute  of  such  a  nature  as  to  as  fully  reveal  and 
as  deeply  impress  the  lessons  that  would  be  taught  by  the 
execution  as  the  execution  itself  would  do.  The  great  design 
of  penalties  is  prevention,  and  this  is  of  course  the  design  of 
executing  penalties.  The  head  of  any  government  is  pledg-' 
ed  to  sustain  the  authority  of  law  by  a  due  administration  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  and  has  no  right  in  any  instance  to 
extend  pardon  except  upon  conditions  that  will  as  effectually 
support  the  authority  of  law  as  the  execution  would  do.  It 
was  never  found  to  be  safe,  or  even  possible  under  any  gov- 
ernment to  make  the  universal  offer  of  pardon  to  violators  of 
law  upon  the  bare  condition  of  repentance  for  the  very  obvi- 
ous reason  already  suggested,  that  it  would  be  a  virtual  repeal 
of  all  law.  Public  justice,  by  which  every  executive  magis- 
trate in  the  universe  is  bound,  sternly  and  peremptorily  for- 
bids that  mercy  shall  be  extended  to  any  culprit  without  some 
equivalent  being  rendered  to  the  government,  that  is,  with- 
out something  being  done  that  will  fully  answer  as  a  substitute 
for  the  execution  of  penalties.  This  principle  God  fully  ad- 
mits to  be  binding  upon  him,  and  hence  He  affirms  that  he 
gave  his  son  to  justify  or  to  render  it  just  in  him  to  forgive 
sin.  Rom.  3:24 — 26;  "Being  justified  freely  by  his  grace, 
through  the  redemption  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus,  whom  God 
hath  set  forth  to  be  a  propitiation  through  faith  in  his  blood, 
to  declare  his  righteousness  for  the  remission  of  sins  that  are 
past,  through  the  forbearance  of  God;  to  declare,  I  say,  at 
this  time  his  righteousness;  that  he  might  be  just,  and  the 
justifier  of  him  which  befieveth  in  Jesus." 

8.  All  nations  have  felt  the  necessity  of  expiatory  sacrifices. 


392  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  all  nations  have  offered  them. 
Hence  antipsucha^  or  ransoms  for  their  souls,  have  been  offered 
by  nearly  every  nation  under  heaven.  (See  Buck's  Theo.  Die. 
p.  539.) 

9.  The  wisest  heathen  philosophers,  who  saw  the  intrinsic 
inefficacy  of  animal  sacrifices,  held  that  God  could  not  forgive 
sin.  This  proves  to  a  demonstration,  that  they  felt  the  ne- 
cessity of  an  atonement  or  expiatory  sacrifice.  And  having 
too  just  views  of  God  and  his  government,  to  suppose  that  ei- 
ther animal,  or  merely  human  sacrifices  could  be  efficacious 
under  the  government  of  God,  they  were  unable  to  under- 
stand upon  what  principles  sin  could  be  forgiven. 

10.  Public  justice  required  either  that  an  atonement  should 
be  made,  or  that  the  law  should  be  executed  upon  every  offend- 
er. By  pubHc  justice  is  intended,  that  due  administration  of 
law,  that  shall  secure  in  the  highest  manner  the  nature  of 
the  case  admits,  private  and  public  interests,  and  establish  the 
order  and  well-being  of  the  universe.  In  estabhshing  the 
government  of  the  universe,  God  had  given  the  pledge,  both 
impliedly  and  expressly,  that  he  would  regard  the  public  in- 
terests and,  by  a  due  administration  of  the  law,  secure  and  pro- 
mote, as  far  as  possible,  public  and  individual  happiness. 

11.  Public  justice  could  strictly  require  only  the  execution 
of  law;  for  God  had  neither  expressly  or  impliedly  given 
a  pledge  to  do  any  thing  more  for  the  promotion  of  virtue  and 
happiness,  than  to  administer  due  rewards  to  both  the  righte- 
ous and  the  wicked.  Yet  an  Atonement,  as  we  shall  see, 
would  more  fully  meet  the  necessities  of  the  government,  and 
act  as  a  more  efficient  preventive  of  sin,  and  a  more  powerful 
persuasive  to  holiness,  than  the  infliction  of  the  penalty  of  his 
law  would  do. 

12.  An  Atonement  was  needed  for  the  removal  of  obsta- 
cles to  the  free  exercise  of  benevolence  toward  our  race. 
Without  an  Atonement,  the  race  of  man  after  the  fall,  sustain- 
ed to  the  government  of  God  the  relation  of  rebels  and  out- 
laws. And  before  God,  as  the  great  executive  magistrate  of 
the  universe,  could  manifest  his  benevolence  toward  them, 
an  Atonement  must  be  decided  upon  and  made  known,  as 
the  reason  upon  which  his  favorable  treatment  of  them  was 
founded. 

13.  An  Atonement  was  needed  to  promote  the  glory  and 
influence  of  God  in  the  universe.     But  more  of  this  hereafter. 

14.  An  Atonement  was  needed  to  present  overpowering 
motives  to  repentance. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  393 

15.  All  Atonement  was  needed,  that  the  offer  of  pardon 
might  not  seem  like  connivance  at  sin. 

16.  An  Atonement  was  needed  to  manifest  the  sincerity  of 
God  in  his  legal  enactments. 

17.  An  Atonement  was  needed  to  make  it  safe  to  present 
the  offer  and  promise  of  pardon. 

18.  Natural  theology  can  inform  us  that  if  the  Lawgiver 
would  or  could  condescend  so  much  to  deny  himself  as  to  at- 
test his  regard  to  his  law,  and  his  determination  to  support  it 
by  suffering  its  curse  in  such  a  sense  as  was  possible  and  con- 
sistent with  his  character  and  relations,  and  so  far  forth  as 
emphatically  to  inculcate  the  great  lesson  that  sin  was  not  to 
be  forgiven  upon  the  bare  condition  of  repentance  in  any  case, 
and  also  to  establish  the  universal  conviction  that  the  execu- 
tion of  law  was  not  to  be  dispensed  with,  but  that  it  is  an  unal- 
terable rule  under  his  Divine  government  that  where  there  is 
sin  there  must  be  inflicted  suffering — this  would  be  so  com- 
plete a  satisfaction  of  public  justice  that  sin  might  safely  be 
forgiven. 

IV.   The  fact  of  Atonement, 

This  is  purely  a  doctrine  of  revelation  and  in  the  establish- 
ment of  this  truth  appeal  must  be  made  to  the  scriptures  alone. 

1.  The  whole  Jewish  scriptures,  especially  the  whole  cer- 
emonial dispensation  of  the  Jews  attest,  most  unequivocally, 
the  necessity  of  an  Atonement. 

2.  The  New  Testament  is  just  as  unequivocal  in  its  testi- 
mony to  the  same  point.  The  Apostle  expressly  asserts,  that 
^'-without  the  shedding  of  blood,  there  is  no  remission  of  sin." 

I  shall  here  take  it  as  established  that  Christ  was  properly 
"God  manifest  in  the  flesh,"  and  proceed  to  cite  a  few  out  of 
the  great  multitude  of  passages  that  attest  the  fact  of  his 
death,  and  also  its  vicarious  nature,  that  is,  that  it  was  for 
us  and  as  a  satisfaction  to  public  justice  for  our  sins  that  his 
blood  was  shed.  I  will  first  quote  a  few  passages  to  show 
that  the  Atonement  and  redemption  through  it  was  a  matter 
of  understanding  and  covenant  between  the  Father  and  the 
Son.  ""I  have  made  a  covenant  with  my  chosen,  I  have  sworn 
unto  David  my  servant.  Thy  seed  will  I  establish  forever, 
and  build  up  thy  throne  to  all  generations.  Selah."-Ps.  89: 3,4. 
"  Yet  it  pleased  the  Lord  to  bruise  him;  he  hath  put  him  to 
grief:  when  thou  shalt  make  his  soul  an  offering  for  sin  he  shall 
see  his  seed,  he  shall  prolong  his  days,  and  the  pleasure  of  the 
Lord  shall  prosper  in  his  hand.  He  shall  see  of  the  travail  of  his 
soul  and  shall  be  satisfied ;  by  his  knowledge  shall  my  righteous 


394  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

servant  justify  many ;  for  he  shall  hear  their  iniquities.  There- 
fore will  I  divide  him  a  portion  with  the  great,  and  he  shall  di- 
vide the  spoil  with  the  strong;  because  he  hath  poured  out 
his  soul  unto  death:  and  he  was  numbered  with  the  trans- 
gressors; and  he  bare  the  sin  of  many,  and  made  intercession 
for  the  transgressors." — Isaiah  53:  10,  11,  12.  ^'All  that  the 
Father  giveth  me  shall  come  to  me:  and  he  thatcometh  to  me 
I  will  in  no  wise  cast  out.  For  I  came  down  from  heaven, 
not  to  do  mine  own  will,  but  the  will  of  him  that  sent  me. 
And  this  is  the  Father's  will  which  hath  sent  me,  that  of  all 
which  he  hath  given  me  1  should  lose  nothing,  but  should  raise 
it  up  again  at  the  last  day."— John  6:  37,  38,  39.  ^'1  have 
manifested  thy  name  unto  the  men  which  thou  gavest  me  out 
of  the  world:  thine  they  were,  and  thou  gavest  them  me;  and 
they  have  kept  thy  word.  I  pray  for  them:  I  pray  not  for  the 
world,  but  for  them  which  thou  hast  given  me;  for  they  are 
thine.  And  now  1  am  no  more  in  the  world,  but  these  are  in 
the  world,  and  I  come  to  thee.  Holy  Father  keep  through 
thine  own  name  those  whom  thou  hast  given  me,  that  they 
may  be  one,  as  we  are." — John  17:  6,  9,  11. 

1  will  next  quote  some  passages  to  show  that  if  sinners 
were  to  be  saved  at  all,  it  must  be  through  an  Atonement. 
"■Neither  is  there  salvation  in  any  other:  for  there  is  none  other 
name  under  heaven  given  among  men  whereby  we  must  be 
saved." — Acts  4:  12.  "Be  it  known  unto  you  therefore  men 
and  brethren,  that  through  this  man  is  preached  unto  you  the 
forgiveness  of  sins:  And  by  him  all  that  believe  are  justified 
from  all  things,  from  which  ye  could  not  be  justified  by  the 
law  of  Moses."— Acts  13:  38,  39.  ^^Now  we  know,  that 
what  things  soever  the  law  saith,  it  saith  to  them  who  are 
under  the  law;  that  every  mouth  may  be  slopped,  and  all  the 
world  may  become  guilty  before  God.  Therefore  by  the 
deeds  of  the  law  there  shall  no  flesh  be  justified  in  his  sight: 
for  by  the  law  is  the  knowledge  of  sin." — Romans  3:  19,  20. 
"Knowing  that  a  man  is  not  justified  by  the  works  of  the  law, 
but  by  the  faith  of  Jesus  Christ,  even  we  have  believed  in 
Jesus  Christ,  that  we  might  be  justified  by  the  faith  of  Christ, 
and  not  by  the  works  of  the  law:  for  by  the  works  of  the  law 
shall  no  flesh  be  justified.  I  do  not  frustrate  the  grace  of  God: 
for  if  righteousness  come  by  the  law,  then  Christ  is  dead  in 
vain." — Galatians  2:  16,  21.  "For  as  many  as  are  of  the 
works  of  the  law  are  under  the  curse :  for  it  is  written,  Cursed 
is  every  one  that  continueth  not  in  all  things  which  are  writ- 
ten in  the  book  of  the  law  to  do  them.    But  that  no  man  is 


MORAL  GM3VERNMENT.  395 

justified  by  the  law  in  the  sight  of  God,  it  is  evident:  for,  The 
just  shall  live  by  faith.  And  the  law  is  not  of  faith:  but  the 
man  that  doeth  them  shall  live  in  them.  For  if  the  inheri- 
tance be  of  the  law,  it  is  no  more  of  promise:  but  God  gave 
it  to  Abraham  by  promise.  Wherefore  then  serveth  the  law? 
It  was  added  because  of  transgressions,  till  the  seed  should 
come  to  whom  the  promise  was  made ;  and  it  was  ordained  by 
angels  in  the  hand  of  a  mediator.  Now  a  mediator  is  not  a 
mediator  of  one,  but  God  is  one.  Is  the  law  then  against  the 
promises  of  God?  God  forbid  for  if  there  had  been  a  law  giv- 
en which  could  have  given  life,  verily  righteousness  should 
have  been  by  the  law.  Wherefore  the  law  was  our  school- 
master to  bring  us  unto  Christ,  that  we  might  be  justified  by 
faith."--Galatians  3:  10,  11,  12,  18,  19,  20,  21,  24.  "And 
almost  all  things  are  by  the  law  purged  with  blood;  and  with- 
out shedding  of  blood  is  no  remission.  It  was  therefore  ne- 
cessary that  the  patterns  of  things  in  the  heavens  should  be 
purified  with  these;  but  the  heavenly  things  themselves  with 
better  sacrifices  than  these." 

I  will  now  cite  some  passages  that  estabHsh  the  fact  of  the 
vicarious  ^death  of  Christ  and  redemption  through  his  blood, 
"But  he  was  wounded  for  our  transgressions,  he  was  bruised 
for  our  iniquities :  the  chastisement  of  our  peace  was  upon 
him,  and  with  his  stripes  we  are  healed.  All  we  like  sheep 
have  gone  astray ;  we  have  turned  every  one  to  his  own  way ; 
and  the  Lord  hath  laid  on  him  the  iniquity  of  us  all." — Isaiah 
53 >  5, 6 — 11.  "Even  as  the  Son  of  man  came  not  to  be  min- 
istered unto,  but  to  minister,  and  to  give  his  life  a  ransom  for 
many." — Mat.  20:  28.  "For  this  is  my  blood  of  the  new 
testament  which  is  shed  for  many  for  the  remission  of.  sins." — 
Mat.  26:  28.  "And  as  Moses  lifted  up  the  serpent  in  the 
wilderness,  even  so  must  the  Son  of  man  be  lifted  up:  that 
whosoever  beUeveth  in  him  should  not  perish  but  have  eternal 
life." — John  3:  14,  15.  "I  am  the  living  bread  which  came 
down  from  heaven:  if  any  man  eat  of  this  bread,  he  shall  live 
forever:  and  the  bread  that  I  will  give  is  my  flesh,  which 
I  will  give  for  the  fife  of  the  world." — John  6:  51.  "Take 
heed  therefore  unto  yourselves,  and  to  all  the  flock,  over  the 
which  the  Holy  Ghost  hath  made  you  overseers,  to  feed  the 
church  of  God,  which  he  hath  purchased  with  his  own  bloods" 
— Acts  20:  28.  "Being  justified  freely  by  his  grace  through 
the  redemption  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus.  To  declare,  /  sai/^  at 
this  time  his  righteousness:  that  he  might  be  just,  and  the 
justifier  of  him  which  believeth  in  Jesus.    For  when  we  were 


396  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

yet  without  strength,  in  due  time  Christ  died  for  the  ungodly. 
For  scarcely  for  a  righteous  man  will  one  die:  yet  peradVent- 
ure  for  a  good  man  some  would  even  dare  to  die.     But  God 
commendeth  his  love  toward  us,  in  that  while  we  were  yet 
sinners  Christ  died  for  us.     Much  more  then,  being  now  just- 
ified by  his  blood,  we  shall  be  saved  from  wratli  through  him. 
And  not  only  so,  but  we  also  joy  in  God  through  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  by  whom  we  have  now  received  the  atonement.  There- 
fore, as  by  the  offence  of  one  judgment  came  upon  all  men  to 
condemnation ;  even  so  by  the  righteousness  of  one  the  free 
gift  came  upon  all  men  unto  justification  of  life.     For  as  by 
one  man's  disobedience  many  were  made  sinners,  so  by  the 
obedience  of  one  shall  many  be  made  righteous."-Ro.  3:  24 — 
26;  5:  9—11, 18,  19.     "Purge  out  therefore  the  old  leaven, 
that  ye  may  be  a  new  lump,  as  ye  are  unleavened.     For  even 
Christ  our  passover  is  sacrificed  for  us:     For  I  delivered  unto 
you  first  of  all  that  which  I  also  received,  how  that  Christ  died 
for  our  sins  according  to  the  scriptures." — 1  Cor.  5:  7;  15:3. 
^'•I  am  crucified  with  Christ:  nevertheless  1  live;  yet  not  I,  but 
Christ  liveth  in  me:  and  the  life  which  1  now  live  in  the  flesh  I 
live  by  the  faith  of  the  Son  of  God,  who  loved  me,  and  gave 
himself  for  me.     Christ  hath  redeemed  us  from,  the  curse  of 
the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us:  for  it  is  written.  Cursed  is 
every  one  that  hangeth  on  a  tree:     That  the  blessing  of  Abra- 
ham might  come  on  the  Gentiles  through  Jesus  Christ;  that 
we  might  receive  the  promise  of  the  Spirit  through  faith." — 
Gal.  2:  20;  3:   13,14.     "But   now  in  Christ  Jesus  ye  who 
sometimes  were  far  off  are  made  nigh  by  the  blood  of  Christ. 
And  walk  in  love,  as  Christ  also  hath  loved  us,  and  hath  given 
himself  for  us  an  offering  and  a  sacrifice  to  God  for  a  sweet 
smelHng  savor." — Eph.  2:  13;  5:  2.     "•  Neither  by  the  blood  of 
goats  and  calves,  but  by  his  own  blood  he  entered  in  once  into 
the   holy  place,  having  obtained  eternal  redemption  for  us. 
For  if  the  blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats,   and  the  ashes  of  an 
heifer  sprinkling  the  unclean,  sanctifieth  to  the  purifying  of 
the  flesh:    How  much  more  shall  the  blood  of  Christ,  who 
through  the  eternal  Spirit  offered  himself  without  spot  to  God, 
purge  your  conscience  from  dead  works  to  serve  the  living 
God?     And   almost  all  things  are  by   the  law  purged  with 
blood;  and  without  shedding  of  blood  is  no  remission.     It  was 
therefore  necessary  that  the  patterns  of  things  in  the  heavens 
should  be  purified  with  these,  but  the  heavenly  things  them- 
selves with  better  sacrifices  than  these.     For  Christ  is  not  en- 
tered into  the  holy  places  made  with  hands,  which  are  the  fig- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


397 


ures  of  the  true;  but  into  heaven  itself,  now  to  appear  in  the 
presence  of  God  for  us :  Nor  yet  that  he  should  otTer  himself 
often,  as  the  high  priest  entereth  into  the  holy  place  every 
year  with  blood  of  others ;  for  then  must  he  often  have  sui- 
fered  since  the  foundation  of  the  world:  but  now  once  in  the 
end  of  the  world  hath  he  appeared  to  put  away  sin  by  the  sa- 
crifice of  himself  And  as  it  is  appointed  unto  men  once  to 
die,  but  after  this  the  judgment:  so  Christ  was  once  oflfered 
to  bear  the  sins  of  many;  and  unto  them  that  look  for  him 
shall  he  appear  the  second  time  without  sin  unto  salvation." 
Heb.  9:  12—14,  22—28.  "•  By  the  which  will  we  are  sancti- 
fied through  the  offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for 
all.  And  every  priest  standeth  daily  ministering  and  offering 
oftentimes  the  same  sacrifices,  which  can  never  take  away  sins: 
But  this  man,  after  he  had  offered  one  sacrifice  for  sius,  for- 
ever sat  down  on  the  right  hand  of  God;  from  henceforth  ex- 
pecting till  his  enemies  be  made  his  footstool.  For  by  one 
offering  he  hath  perfected  for  ever  them  that  are  sanctified." 
— Heb.  10:  10 — 14.  ^'Having  therefore,  brethren,  boldness 
to  enter  into  the  holiest  by  the  blood  of  Jesus,  by  a  new  and 
living  way  which  he  hath  consecrated  for  us  through  the  vail,  that 
is  to  say,  his  flesh,"  &c.-Heb.  10:  19,20.  '' Forasmuch  as  je 
know  that  ye  were  not  redeemed  with  corruptible  things,  as  sil- 
ver and  gold,  from  your  vain  conversation  received  by  tradi- 
tion from  your  fathers:  but  with  the  precious  blood  of 
Christ,  as  of  a  lamb  without  blemish  and  without  spot." — 
1.  Pet.  1:  18,  19.  '■'•Who  his  own  self  bare  our  sins  in 
his  own  body  on  the  tree,  that  we,  being  dead  to  sins, 
should  live  unto  righteousness;  by  whose  stripes  ye  were 
healed."— 1.  Pet.  2:  24.  '-'•  For  Christ  also  hath  once  suffered 
for  sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust,  that  he  might  bring  us  to  God, 
being  put  to  death  in  the  flesh,  but  quickened  by  the  Spirit." — 
1.  Peter  3:  18.  ''But  if  we  walk  in  the  light  as  he  is  in  the 
light,  we  have  fellowship  one  with  another,  and  the  blood  of 
Jesus  Christ  his  Son  cleanseth  us  from  all  sin." — 1  John  1 :  7. 
••'  And  ye  know  that  he  was  manifested  to  take  away  our  sins; 
and  in  him  is  no  sin." — 1.  John  3:  5.  ^'In  this  was  mani- 
fested the  love  of  God  toward  us,  because  that  God  sent  his 
only  begotten  Son  into  the  world  that  we  might  live  through 
him.  Herein  is  love,  not  that  we  loved  God,  but  that  he  loved 
us,  and  sent  his  son  to  be  the  propitiation  jfor  our  sins." — I 
John  4:  9,  10. 

These,  as  every  reader  of  the  Bible  must  know,  are  only 
some  of  the  passages  that  teach  the  doctrine  of  atonement 
34 


dds 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 


and  redemption  bj  the  death  of  Christ.  It  is  truly  wonder- 
ful in  how  many  ways  this  doctrine  is  taught,  assumed,  and 
implied  in  the  Bible.  Indeed  it  is  emphatically  the  great 
theme  of  the  Bible.  It  is  expressed  or  implied  upon  nearly 
every  page  of  Divine  inspiration. 

V.  The  next  inquiry  is  into  the  design  of  the  atonement. 

The  answer  to  this  inquiry  has  been,  already,  in  part, 
unavoidably  anticipated.     Under  this  head  I  will  show, 

First.  That  ChrisCs  obedience  to  the  moral  law  as  a  cove- 
nant of  works,  did  not  constitute  the  atonement. 

1.  Christ  owed  obedience  to  the  moral  law  both  as  God 
and  man.  He  was  under  as  much  obligation  to  be  perfectly 
benevolent  as  any  moral  creature  is.  It  was  therefore  impos- 
sible for  him  to  perform  any  works  of  supererogation;  that  is, 
so  far  as  obedience  to  law  was  concerned,  he  could,  neither 
as  God  nor  as  man,  do  any  thing  more  than  his  duty. 

2.  Had  he  obeyed  for  us,  he  would  not  have  suffered  for  us. 
Were  his  obedience  to  be  substituted  for  our  obedience,  he 
need  not  certainly  have  both  fulfilled  the  law  for  us,  as  our 
substitute  under  a  covenant  of  works,  and  at  the  same  time 
have  suffered,  a  substitute  for  the  penalty  of  the  law. 

3.  If  he  obeyed  the  law  as  our  substitute,  then  why  should 
our  own  personal  obedience  be  insisted  upon  as  a  sine  qua 
non  of  our  salvation? 

4.  The  idea  that  any  part  of  the  atonement  consisted  in 
Christ's  obeying  the  law  for  us,  and  in  our  stead  and  behalf, 
represents  God  as  requiring: 

(1.)  The  obedience  of  our  substitute. 

(2.)  The  same  suffering  as  if  no  obedience  had  been  ren- 
dered. 

(3.)  Our  repentance. 

(4.)  Oi\r  personal  obedience, 

(5.)  And  then  represents  him  as,  after  all,  ascribing  our  sal- 
vation to  grace.  Strange  grace  this,  that  requires  a  debt  to 
be  paid  several  times  over  before  the  obligation  is  discharged! 

Second.  /  mTist  show  that  the  atonement  was  not  a  commercial 
transaction. 

Some  have  regarded  the  atonement  simply  in  the  hght  of 
the  payment  of  a  debt;  and  have  represented  Christ  as  pur- 
chasing the  elect  of  the  Father  and  paying  down  the  same 
amount  of  suffering  in  his  own  person  that  justice  would  have 
exacted  of  them.     To  this  I  answer: 

1.  It  is  naturally  impossible,  as  it  would  require  that  satis- 
faction should  be  made  to  retributive  justice.     Strictly  speak- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


399 


ing,  retributive  or  distributive  justice  can  never  be  satisfied 
in  the  sense  that  the  guilty  can  be  punished  as  much  and  as 
long  as  he  deserves ;  for  this  would  imply  that  he  was  pun- 
ished until  he  ceased  to  be  guilty,  or  became  innocent.  When 
law  is  once  violated  the  sinner  can  make  no  satisfaction.  He 
can  never  cease  to  be  guilty  or  to  deserve  punishment,  and 
no  possible  amount  of  suffering  renders  him  the  less  guilty  or 
the  less  deserving  of  punishment;  therefore  to  satisfy  retribu- 
tive justice  is  impossible.  V 

2.  But  as  we  have  seen  in  a  former  lecture,  retributive  jus- 
tice must  have  inflicted  on  him  eternal  death.  To  suppose, 
therefore,  that  Christ  suffered  in  amount  all  that  was  due  to 
the  elect,  is  to  suppose  that  he  suffered  an  eternal  punishment 
multiplied  by  the  whole  number  of  the  elect.  ^ 

Third.  The  atonement  of  Christ  was  intended  as  a  satisfac- 
tion of  public  justice. 

1.  The  moral  law  did  not  originate  in  the  divine  will, 
but  is  founded  in  his  self-existent  and  immutable  nature. 
He  can  not  therefore  repeal  or  alter  it.  To  the  letter 
of  the  moral  law  there  may  be  exceptions,  but  to  the  spirit 
of  the  law  no  being  can  make  exceptions.  God  can  not 
repeal  the  precept,  and  just  for  this  reason  he  can  not  set 
aside  the  spirit  of  the  sanctions.  For  to  dispense  with  the 
sanctions  were  a  virtual  repeal  of  the  precept.  He  can  not 
therefore  set  aside  the  execution  of  the  penalty  when  the  pre- 
cept has  been  violated  without  something  being  done  that  shall 
meet  the  demands  of  the  true  spirit  of  the  law.  "Being  just- 
ified freely  by  his  grace  through  the  redemption  that  is  in 
Christ  Jesus:  whom  God  hath  set  forth  to  be  a  propitiation 
through  faith  in  his  blood,  to  declare  his  righteousness  for  the 
remission  of  sins  that  are  past,  through  the  forbearance  of  God ; 
to  declare,  Isay^  at  this  time  his  righteousness:  that  he  might 
be  just,  and  the  justifier  of  him  which  believeth  in  Jesus." — 
Ro.  3:  24 — 26.  This  passage  assigns  the  reason  or  declares 
the  design  of  the  Atonement,  to  have  been  to  justify  God  in  the  ^' 
pardon  of  sin  or  in  dispensing  with  the  execution  of  law. 

Isa.  43:  10 — 12:  '^ Yet  it  pleased  the  Lord  to  bruise  him; 
he  hath  put  him  to  grief:  when  thou  shalt  make  his  soul  an 
offering  for  sin,  he  shall  see  his  seed,  he  shall  prolong  his 
days,  and  the  pleasure  of  the  Lord  shall  prosper  in  his  hand. 
He  shall  see  of  the  travail  of  his  soul,  and  shall  be  satisfied: 
by  his  knowledge  shall  my  righteous  servant  justify  many;  for 
he  shall  bear  their  iniquities.  Therefore  will  I  divide  him  a 
portion  with  the  great,  and  he  shall  divide  the  spoil  with  the 


400  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOSY. 

Strong:  because  he  hath  poured  out  his  soul  unto  death:  and 
he  was  numbered  with  the  transgressors:  and  he  bare  the  sin 
of  many,  and  made  intercession  for  the  transgressors.'' 
2.  PubHc  justice  requires: 

1.  That  penalties  shall  be  annexed  to  laws  that  are  equal 
to  the  importance  of  the  precept. 

2.  That  when  these  penalties  are  incurred  they  shall  be 
inflicted  for  the  pubUc  good,  as  an  expression  of  the  lawgiver's 
regard  to  law,  of  his  determination  to  support  pubUc  order, 
and  by  a  due  administration  of  justice  to  secure  the  highest 
well-being  of  the  pubHc.  A  leading  design  of  the  sanctions 
of  law  is  prevention;  and  the  execution  of  penal  sanctions  is 
demanded  by  pubHc  justice.  The  great  design  of  sanctions, 
both  remuneratory  and  vindicatory,  is  to  prevent  disobedience 
and  secure  obedience  and  universal  happiness.  This  is  done 
by  such  a  revelation  of  the  heart  of  the  lawgiver,  through  the 
precept,  sanctions,  and  execution  of  his  law,  as  to  beget  awe 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  most  entire  confidence  and  love  on 
the  other. 

3.  Whatever  can  as  effectually  reveal  God,  make  known 
his  hatred  to  sin,  his  love  of  order,  his  determination  to  sup- 
port government,  and  to  promote  the  holiness  and  happiness 
of  his  creatures,  as  the  execution  of  his  law  would  do,  is  a  full 
satisfaction  of  public  justice. 

4.  Atonement  is,  therefore,  a  part,  and  a  most  influential 
part  of  moral  government.  It  is  an  auxiliary  to  a  strictly  le- 
gal government.  It  does  not  take  the  place  of  the  execution 
of  law  in  such  a  sense  as  to  exclude  penal  inflictions  from  the 
universe.  The  execution  of  law  still  holds  a  place  and  makes 
up  an  indispensable  part  of  the  great  circle  of  motives  essen- 
tial to  the  perfection  of  moral  government.  Fallen  angels, 
and  the  finally  impenitent  of  this  world,  will  receive  the  full 
execution  of  the  penalty  of  the  Divine  law.  Atonement 
is  an  expedient  above  the  letter,  but  in  accordance  with  the 
spirit  of  law,  which  adds  new  and  vastly  influential  motives 
to  induce  obedience.  I  have  said  it  is  an  auxiUary  to  law, 
adding  to  the  precept  and  sanctions  of  law  an  overpower- 
ing  exhibition  of  love  and   compassion. 

5.  The  Atonement  is  an  illustrious  exhibition  of  commuta- 
tive justice,  in  which  the  government  of  God,  by  an  act  of 
infinite  grace,  commutes  or  substitutes  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
for  the  eternal  damnation  of  sinners. 

6.  An  atonement  was  needed,  and  therefore  doubtless  de- 
signed, to  contradict  the  slander  of  Satan.     He  had  seduced 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  401 

our  first  parents  by  the  insinuation  that  God  was  selfish,  in 
prohibiting  their  eating  the  fruit  of  a  certain  tree.  Now  the 
execution  of  the  penalty  of  his  law  would  not  so  thoroughly 
refute  this  abominable  slander  as  would  the  great  self-denial 
of  God  exhibited  in  the  Atonement. 

7.  An  atonement  was  needed  to  inspire  confidence  in  the 
offers  and  promises  of  pardon,  and  in  all  the  promises  of  God 
to  man.  Guilty  selfish  man  finds  it  difficult,  when  thoroughly 
convicted  of  sin,  to  realize  and  believe  that  God  is  actually 
sincere  in  his  promises  and  offers  of  pardon  and  salvation. 
But  whenever  the  soul  can  apprehend  the  reality  of  the 
Atonement,  it  can  then  believe  every  offer  and  promise  as  the 
very  thing  to  be  expected  from  a  being  who  could  give  his  Son 
to  die  for  enemies. 

An  Atonement  was  needed,  therefore,  as  the  great  and  only 
means  of  sanctifying  sinners: 

Rom.  8:  3,  4.  "For  what  the  law  could  not  do,  in  that  it 
was  weak  through  the  flesh,  God,  sending  his  own  Son  in  the 
likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for  sin,  condemned  sin  in  the  flesh: 
that  the  righteousness  of  the  law  might  be  fulfilled  in  us,  who 
walk  not  after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit."  The  law  was 
calculated,  when  once  its  penalty  was  incurred,  to  shut  the 
sinner  up  in  a  dungeon,  and  only  to  develop  more  and  more  his 
depravity.  Nothing  could  subdue  his  sin  and  cause  him  to 
love  but  the  manifestation  to  him  of  disinterested  benevolence. 
The  atonement  is  just  the  thing  to  meet  this  necessity  and 
subdue  rebellion. 

8.  An  Atonement  was  needed,  not  to  render  God  merciful, 
but  to  reconcile  pardon  with  a  due  administration  of  justice. 
This  has  been  virtually  said  before,  but  needs  to  be  repeated 
in  this  connection. 

Rom.  3:  22 — 26.  ^'  For  all  have  sinned,  and  come  short  of 
the  glory  of  God;  being  justified  freely  by  his  grace,  through 
the  redemption  that  is  in  Christ  Jesus:  whom  God  has  set 
forth  to  be  a  propitiation  through  faith  in  his  blood,  to  de- 
clare his  righteousness  for  the  remission  of  sins  that  are  past, 
through  the  forbearance  of  God;  to  declare,  I  say,  at  this 
time,  his  righteousness:  that  he  might  be  just,  and  the  justi- 
fier  of  him  which  beUeveth  in  Jesus." 

I  present  several  farther  reasons  why  an  Atonement  under 
the  government  of  God  was  preferable  in  the  case  of  the  in- 
habitants of  this  world  to  punishment,  or  to  the  execution  of 
the  Divine  law.  Several  reasons  have  already  been  assigned, 
to  which  I  will  add  the  following,  some  of  which  are  plainly 
34* 


402  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

revealed  in  the  Bible;  others  are  plainly  inferable  from  what 
the  Bible  does  reveal;  and  others  still  are  plainly  inferable 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  case: 

1.  God's  great  and  disinterested  love  to  sinners  themselves 
was  a  prime  reason  for  the  Atonement. 

John  3:  16.  "  For  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his 
only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should 
not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life." 

2.  His  great  love  to  the  universe  at  large  must  have  been 
another  reason,  inasmuch  as  it  Wcis  impossible  that  the  Atone- 
ment should  not  exert  an  amazinginfluence  over  moral  beings, 
in  whatever  world  they  might  exist,  and  the  fact  of  atone- 
ment should  be  known. 

3.  Another  reason  for  substituting  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
in  the  place  of  the  eternal  damnation  of  sinners  is,  that  an 
infinite  amount  of  suffering  might  be  prevented.  The  rela- 
tion of  Christ  to  the  universe  rendered  his  sufferings  so  infi- 
nitely valuable  and  influential  as  an  expression  of  God's  ab- 
horrence of  sin  on  the  one  hand,  and  great  love  to  his  sub- 
jects on  the  other,  that  an  infinitely  less  amount  of  suffering 
m  bim  than  must  have  been  inflicted  on  sinners,  would  be 
equally,  and  no  doubt  vastly  more  influential  in  supporting  the 
government  of  God,  than  the  execution  of  the  law  upon  them 
would  have  been.  Be  it  borne  in  mind  that  Christ  was  the 
lawgiver,  and  his  suffering  in  behalf  of  sinners  is  to  be  regard- 
ed as  the  lawgiver  and  executive  magistrate  suffering  in  the 
behalf  and  stead  of  a  rebelHous  province  of  his  empire.  As 
a  governmental  expedient  it  is  easy  to  see  the  great  value  of 
such  a  substitute;  that  on  the  one  hand  it  fully  evinced  the 
determination  of  the  ruler  not  to  yield  the  authority  of  his 
law,  and  on  the  other  to  evince  his  great  and  disinterested 
love  for  his  rebellious  subjects. 

4.  By  this  substitution,  an  immense  good  might  be  gained, 
the  eternal  happiness  of  all  that  can  be  reclaimed  from  sin, 
together  with  all  the  augmented  happiness  of  those  who  have 
never  sinned  that  must  result  from  this  glorious  revelation  of 
God. 

5.  Another  reason  for  preferring  the  Atonement  to  the 
punishment  of  sinners,  must  have  been,  that  sin  had  afforded 
an  opportunity  for  the  highest  manifestation  of  virtue  in  God: 
the  manifestation  of  forbearance,  mercy,  self-denial,  and  suf- 
fering for  enemies  that  were  within  his  own  power,  and  for 
those  from  whom  he  could  expect  no  equivalent  in  return. 

It  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  a  higher  order  of  virtues 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT,  403 

than  are  exhibited  in  the  Atonement  of  Christ. 

It  was  vastly  desirable  that  God  should  take  advantage 
of  such  an  opportunity  to  exhibit  his  true  character,  and  shew 
to  the  universe  what  was  in  his  heart.  The  strength  and  sta- 
bility of  any  government  of  moral  law  must  depend  upon  the 
estimation  in  which  the  sovereign  is  held  by  his  subjects.  It 
was  therefore  indispensable  that  God  should  improve  the  op- 
portunity which  sin  had  afforded,  to  manifest  and  make  known 
his  true  character  and  thus  secure  the  highest  confidence  of 
his  subjects. 

6.  Another  reason  for  preferring  Atonement  was  God's  de- 
sire to  lay  open  his  heart  to  the  inspection  and  imitation  of 
moral  beings. 

7.  Another  reason  is,  because  God  is  love,  and  prefers  mer- 
cy when  it  can  be  safely  exercised.  The  Bible  represents 
him  as  delighting  in  mercy,  and  affirms  that  "judgment  is  his 
strange  work." 

Because  he  so  much  prefers  mercy  to  judgment  as  to  be 
willing  to  suffer  as  the  sinner's  substitute,  to  afford  himself  the 
opportunity  to  exercise  pardon  on  principles  that  are  consist- 
ent with  a  due  administration  of  justice. 

8.  In  the  Atonement  God  consulted  his  own  happiness 
and  his  own  glory.  To  deny  himself  for  the  salvation  of  sin- 
ners was  a  part  of  his  own  infinite  happiness,  always  intend- 
ed by  him,  and  therefore  always  enjoyed.  This  was  not  self- 
ishness in  him  as  his  own  well-being  is  of  infinitely  greater 
value  than  that  of  all  the  universe  besides,  he  ought  so  to 
regard  and  treat  it  because  of  its  supreme  and  intrinsic  value. 

9.  In  making  the  Atonement,  God  complied  with  the  laws 
of  his  own  intelligence  and  did  just  that,  all  things  consider- 
ed, in  the  highest  degree  promotive  of  the  universal  good. 

10.  The  Atonement  would  present  to  creatures  the  high- 
est possible  motives  to  virtue.  Example  is  the  highest  mor- 
al influence  that  can  be  exerted.  If  God  or  any  other  being 
would  make  others  benevolent  he  must  manifest  benevolence 
himself.  If  the  benevolence  manifested  in  the  Atonement  does 
not  subdue  the  selfishness  of  sinners  their  case  is  hopeless. 

11.  It  would  beget  among  creatures  the  highest  kind  and 
degree  of  happiness,  by  leading  them  to  contemplate  and  im- 
itate his  love. 

12.  The  circumstances  of  his  government  rendered  an 
Atonement  necessary ;  as  the  execution  of  law  was  not,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  a  sufficient  preventive  of  sin-    The  annihi- 


404  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

lation  of  the  wicked  would  not  answer  the  purposes  of  gov- 
ernment. A  full  revelation  of  mercy  blended  with  such  an 
exhibition  of  justice,  was  called  for  by  the  circumstances  of 
the  universe. 

13.  To  confirm  holy  beings.  Nothing  could  be  more  high- 
ly calculated  to  establish  and  confirm  the  confidence,  love, 
and  obedience  of  holy  beings  than  this  disinterested  manifest- 
ation of  love  to  sinners  and  rebels. 

14.  To  confound  his  enemies.  How  could  any  thing  be 
more  directly  calculated  to  silence  all  cavils  and  to  shut  every 
mouth,  and  forever  close  up  all  opposing  lips,  than  such  an 
exhibition  of  love  and  willingness  to  make  sacrifices  for  sin- 
ners? 

15.  A  just  and  necessary  regard  to  his  own  reputation 
made  him  prefer  Atonement  to  the  punishment  of  sinners. 

A  desire  to  sustain  his  own  reputation,  as  the  only  mor- 
al power  that  could  support  his  own  moral  government,  must 
have  been  a  leading  reason  for  the  Atonement. 

The  Atonement  was  preferred  as  the  best  and  perhaps  on- 
ly way  to  inspire  an  affectionate  confidence  in  him. 

It  must  have  been  the  most  agreeable  to  God,  and  the  most 
beneficial  to  the  universe. 

16.  Atonement  would  afford  him  an  opportunity  always  to 
gratify  his  love  in  his  kindness  to  sinners  in  using  means  for 
their  salvation,  in  forgiving  and  saving  them  when  they  re- 
pent, without  the  danger  of  its  being  inferred  in  the  universe 
that  he  had  not  a  sufficient  abhorrence  for  their  sin. 

17.  Another  reason  for  the  Atonement  was  to  counteract 
the  influence  of  the  Devil,  whose  whole  influence  is  exerted 
in  this  world  for  the  promotion  of  selfishness. 

18.  To  make  the  final  punishment  of  the  wicked  more  im- 
pressive in  the  fight  of  the  infinite  love  manifest  in  the  Atone- 
ment. 

19.  The  Atonement  is  the  highest  testimony  that  God  can 
bear  against  selfishness.  It  is  the  testimony  of  his  own  ex- 
ample. 

20.  The  Atonement  is  a  higher  expression  of  his  regard 
for  the  public  interest  than  the  execution  of  law.  It  is  there- 
fore a  fuller  satisfaction  to  public  justice. 

*21.  The  Atonement  so  reveals  all  the  attributes  of  God  as 
to  complete  the  whole  circle  of  motives  needed  to  influence 
the  minds  of  moral  beings. 

22.  By  dying  in  human  nature,  Christ  exhibited  his  heart 
to  both  worlds. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


405 


23.  The  fact  that  the  execution  of  the  law  of  God  on  re- 
bel angels  had  not  and  could  not  arrest  the  progress  of  rebel- 
lion in  the  universe,  proves  that  something  more  needed  to  be 
done,  in  support  of  the  authority  of  law,  than  would  be  done  in 
the  execution  of  its  penalty  upon  rebels.  While  the  execution 
of  law  may  have  a  strong  tendency  to  prevent  the  beginning  of 
rebellion  among  loyal  subjects  and  to  restrain  rebels  themselves ; 
yet  penal  inflictions,  do  not  as  a  matter  of  fact,  subdue  the 
heart,  under  any  government,  whether  human  or  divine. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  law,  was  only  exasperating 
rebels,  without  confirming  holy  beings.  Paul  affirmed  that 
the  action  of  the  law  upon  his  own  mind,  while  in  impeni- 
tence, was,  to  beget  in  him  all  manner  of  concupisence.  One 
grand  reason  for  giving  the  law  was,  to  develop  the  nature 
of  sin,  and  to  show  that  the  carnal  mind  is  not  subject  to  the 
law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be.  The  law  was,  therefore, 
given  that  the  offence  might  abound,  that  thereby  it  might  be 
demonstrated,  that  without  an  Atonement  there  could  be  no 
salvation  for  rebels  under  the  government  of  God. 

24.  The  nature,  degree,  and  execution  of  the  penalty  of 
the  law,  made  the  holiness  and  justice  of  God  so  prominent, 
as  to  absorb  too  much  of  public  attention  to  be  safe.  Thpse 
features  of  his  character  were  so  fully  revealed,  by  the  exe- 
cution of  his  law  upon  the  rebel  angels,  that  to  have  pursued 
the  same  course  with  the  inhabitants  of  this  world,  without 
the  offer  of  mercy,  might  have  had,  and  doubtless  would  have 
had  an  injurious  influence  upon  the  universe,  by  creating 
more  of  fear  than  of  love  to  God  and  his  government. 

Hence,  a  fuller  revelation  of  the  love  and  compassion 
of  God  was  necessary,  to  guard  against  the  influence  of  sla- 
vish fear. 

Fourth.  His  taking  human  nature,  and  obeying  unto  death, 
under  such  circumstances^  constituted  a  good  reason  for  our  be- 
ing treated  as  righteous. 

1.  It  is  a  common  practice  in  human  governments,  and 
one  that  is  founded  in  the  nature  and  laws  of  mind,  to  reward 
distinguished  public  service  by  conferring  favors  on  the  chil- 
dren of  those  who  have  rendered  this  service,  and  treating 
them  as  if  they  had  rendered  it  themselves.  This  is  both  be- 
nevolent and  wise.  Its  governmental  importance,  its  wisdom 
and  excellent  influence  have  been  most  abundantly  attested 
in  the  experience  of  nations.  j 

2.  As  a  governmental  transaction,  this  same  principle  pre- 
vails, and  for  the  same  reason,  under  the  government  of  God. 


406  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

All  that  are  Christ's  children  and  belong  to  him,  are  received 
for  his  sake,  treated  with  favor,  and  the  rewards  of  the  righ- 
teous are  bestowed  upon  them  for  his  sake.  And  the  yublic 
service  which  he  has  rendered  the  universe  by  lajing  down 
his  life  for  the  support  of  the  divine  government,  has  render- 
ed it  eminently  wise  that  all  who  are  united  to  him  bj  faith 
should  be  treated  as  righteous  for  his  sake. 


LECTURE  XXXII. 

EXTENT  OF  ATONEMENT. 

In  discussing  this  part  of  the  subject  I  must  inquire  brief- 
\j  into  the  governmental  value  and  bearings  of  the  Atone- 
ment. 

1.  It  is  valuable  only  as  it  tends  to  promote  the  glory  of 
God,  and  the  virtue  and  happiness  of  the  universe. 

2.  In  order  to  understand,  in  what  the  value  of  the  Atone- 
ment consists,  we  must  understand: 

(1.;  That  happiness  is  an  ultimate  good. 

(2.)  That  virtue  is  indispensable  to  happiness. 

(3.)  That  the  knowledge  of  God  is  indispensable  to  virtue. 

(4.)  That  Christ,  who  made  the  Atonement,  is  God. 

(5.)  That  the  work  of  Atonement  was  the  most  interesting 
and  impressive  exhibition  of  God  that  ever  was  made  in  this 
world  and  probably  in  the  universe. 

(6.)  That,  therefore,  the  Atonement  is  the  highest  means 
of  promoting  virtue  that  exists  in  this  world,  and  perhaps  in 
the  universe.  And  that  it  is  valuable  only,  and  just  so  far  as 
it  reveals  God,  and  tends  to  promote  virtue  and  happiness. 

(7.)  That  the  work  of  Atonement  was  a  gratification  of  the 
infinite  benevolence  of  God. 

(8.)  It  was  a  work  eternally  designed  by  him,  and  there- 
fore eternally  enjoyed. 

(9.)  The  design  to  make  an  Atonement,  together  with  the 
foreseen  results  which  were  in  an  important  sense  always 
present  to  him,  have  eternally  made  no  small  part  of  the  hap- 
piness of  God. 

(10.)  The  development  or  carrying  out  of  this  design,  in 
the  work  of  Atonement,  highly  promotes  and  will  for  ever 
promote  his  glory  in  the  universe. 

(11.)  Its  value  consists  in  its  adaptedness  to  promote  the 
virtue  and  happiness  of  holy  angels,  and  all  moral  agents 
who  have  never  sinned.  As  it  is  a  new  and  most  stupendous 
revelation  of  God,  it  must  of  course  greatly  increase  their 
knowledge  of  God,  and  be  greatly  promotive  of  their  virtue  y 
and  happiness.  ^^ 

(12.)  Its  value  consists  in  its  adaptedness  to  prevent  far- 
ther rebellion  against  God  in  every  part  of  the  universe. 
The  Atonement  exhibits  God  in  such  a  light,  as  must  greatly, 
strengthen  the  confidence  of  holy  beings  in  his  character  and        / 
government.     It  is  therefore  calculated  in  the  highest  degree, 


408        '  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLGY. 

to  confirm  holy  beings  in   their  allegiance  to  God,  and  thus 
prevent  the  further  progress  of  rebellion. 

Let  it  be  remembered,  the  value  of  the  Atonement  consists 
in  its  moral  power  or  tendency  to  promote  virtue  and  happi- 
ness. 

Moral  power  is  the  power  of  motive. 

The  highest  moral  power  is  the  influence  of  example* 
Advice  has  moral  power.  Precept  has  moral  power.  Sanc- 
tion has  moral  power.  But  example  is  the  highest  moral  in- 
fluence that  can  be  exerted  by  any  being. 

Moral  beings  are  so  created  as  to  be  naturally  influenced 
by  the  example  of  each  other.  The  example  of  a  child,  as 
a  moral  influence,  has  power  upon  other  children.  The  ex- 
ample of  an  adult,  as  a  moral  influence,  has  power.  The 
example  of  great  men  and  of  angels  has  great  moral  power. 
But  the  example  of  God  is  the  highest  moral  influence  in  the 
universe. 

The  word  of  God  has  power.  His  commands,  threaten- 
ings,  promises;  but  his  example  is  a  higher  moral  influence 
than  his  precepts  or  his  threatenings. 

Virtue  consists  in  benevolence.  God  requires  benevo- 
lence, threatens  all  his  subjects  with  punishment,  if  they  are 
not  benevolent,  and  promises  them  eternal  life  if  they  are. 
All  this  has  power.  But  his  example,  his  own  benevolence, 
his  own  disinterested  love,  as  expressed  in  the  Atonement,  is 
a  vastly  higher  moral  influence  than  his  word,  or  any  other  of 
his  ways. 

Christ  is  God.  In  the  Atonement  God  has  given  us  the 
influence  of  his  own  example,  has  exhibited  his  own  love; 
his  own  compassion,  his  own  self-denial,  his  own  patience, 
his  own  long-suffering,  under  abuse  from  enemies.  In  the 
Atonement  he  has  exhibited  all  the  highest  and  most  perfect 
forms  of  virtue,  has  united  himself  with  human  nature,  has 
exhibited  these  forms  of  virtue  to  the  inspection  of  our  senses, 
and  labored,  wept,  suffered,  bled,  and  died  for  man.  This  is 
not  only  the  highest  revelation  of  God,  that  could  be  given 
to  man;  but  is  giving  the  whole  weight  of  his  own  example  in 
favor  of  all  the  virtues  which  he  requires  of  man. 

This  is  the  highest  possible  moral  influence.  It  is  pro- 
perly moral  omnipotence;  that  is — the  influence  of  the  Atone- 
ment, when  apprehended  by  the  mind,  will  accomplish  what- 
ever is  an  object  of  moral  power.  It  can  not  compel  a  moral 
agent,  and  set  aside  his  freedom,  for  this  is  not  an  object  of 
moral  power;  but  it  will  do  all  that  motive  can,  in  the  na- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  409 

ture  of  the  case,  accomplish.  It  is  the  highest  and  most 
weighty  motive  that  the  mind  of  a  moral  being  can  conceive. 
It  is  the  most  moving,  impressive,  and  influential  considera- 
tion in  the  universe. 

Its  value  may  be  estimated,  by  its  moral  influence  in  the 
promotion  of  holiness  among  all  holy  beings: 

1.  Their  love  to  God  must  depend  upon  their  knowledge 
of  him. 

2.  As  he  is  infinite,  and  all  creatures  are  finite,  finite  be- 
ings know  him  only  as  he  is  pleased  to  reveal  himself 

3.  The  Atonement  has  disclosed  or  revealed  to  the  uni- 
verse of  holy  beings,  a  class  and  an  order  of  virtues,  as  resi- 
dent in  the  divine  mind,  which,  but  for  the  Atonement,  would 
probably  have  forever  remained  unknown. 

4.  As  the  Atonement  is  the  most  impressive  revelation  of 
God,  of  which  we  have  any  knowledge,  or  can  form  any  con- 
ception, we  have  reason  to  believe  that  it  has  greatly  increas- 
ed the  holiness  and  happiness  of  all  holy  creatures,  that  it 
has  done  more  than  any  other  and  perhaps  every  other  reve- 
lation of  God,  to  exalt  his  character,  strengthen  his  govern- 
ment, enlighten  the  universe,  and  increase  its  happiness. 

5.  The  value  of  the  Atonement  may  be  estimated  by  the 
amount  of  good  it  has  done  and  will  do  in  this  world.  The 
Atonement  is  an  exhibition  of  God  suffering  as  a  substitute 
for  his  rebeUious  subjects.  His  relation  to  the  law  and  to 
the  universe,  is  that  which  gives  his  suflferings  such  infinite 
value.  I  have  said,  in  a  former  lecture,  that  the  utihty  of 
executing  penal  sanctions  consists  in  the  exhibition  it  makes 
of  the  true  character  and  designs  of  the  lawgiver.  It  cre- 
ates public  confidence,  makes  a  public  impression,  and  thus 
strengthens  the  influence  of  government,  and  is  in  this  way 
promotive  of  order  and  happiness.  The  Atonement  is  the 
highest  testimony  that  God  could  give  of  his  holy  abhorrence 
of  sin;  of  his  regard  to  his  law;  of  his  determination  to  sup- 
port it;  and,  also,  of  his  great  love  for  his  subjects,  his  great 
compassion  for  sinners ;  and  his  wilUngness  to  suffer  himself 
in  their  stead;  rather,  on  the  one  hand,  than  to  punish  them, 
and  on  the  other,  than  to  set  aside  the  penalty  without  satis-  ^ 
faction  being  made  to  public  justice. 

6.  The  Atonement  may  be  viewed  in  either  of  two  points 
of  light. 

(I.)  Christ  may  be  considered  as  the  law-giver,  and  attesting 
his  sincerity,  love  of  holiness,  approbation  of  the  law,  and 
35 


410  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

compassion  for  his  subjects,  by  laying  down  his  Ufe  as  their 
substitute. 

(2.)  Or  Christ  may  be  considered  as  the  Son  of  the  Su- 
preme Ruler;  and  then  we  have  the  spectacle  of  a  sovereign, 
giving  his  only  begotten  and  well  beloved  Son,  his  greatest 
treasure,  to  die  a  shameful  and  agonizing  death,  in  testimony 
of  his  great  compassion  for  his  rebeUious  subjects,  and  of  his 
high  regard  for  pubhc  justice. 

7.  The  value  of  the  Atonement  may  be  estimated,  by  con- 
sidering the  fact  that  it  provides  for  the  pardon  of  sin,  in  a 
way  that  forbids  the  hope  of  impunity  in  any  other  case. 
This,  the  good  of  the  universe  imperiously  demanded.  If 
sin  is  to  be  forgiven  at  all,  under  the  government  of  God,  it 
should  be  known  to  be  forgiven  upon  principles  that  will  by 
no  means  encourage  rebellion,  or  hold  out  the  least  hope  of 
impunity,  should  rebellion  break  out  in  any  other  part  of  the 
universe. 

8.  The  Atonement  has  settled  the  question,  that  sin  can 
never  be  forgiven,  under  the  government  of  God,  simply  on 
account  of  the  repentance  of  any  being.  It  has  demonstra- 
ted, that  sin  can  never  be  forgiven  without  full  satisfaction 
being  made  to  public  justice,  and  that  public  justice  can  ne- 
ver be  satisfied  with  any  thing  less  than  an  Atonement  made 
by  God  himself.  Now,  as  it  can  never  be  expected,  that  the 
Atonement  will  be  repeated,  it  is  for  ever  settled,  that  rebel- 
lion in  any  other  world  than  this,  can  have  no  hope  of  impu- 
nity. This  answers  the  question  so  often  asked  by  infidels, 
"•If  God  was  disposed  to  be  merciful,  why  could  he  not  for- 
give without  an  Atonement?"  The  answer  is  plain;  he  could 
not  forgive  sin,  but  upon  such  principles  as  would  for  ever 
preclude  the  hope  of  impunity,  should  rebelHon  ever  break 
out  in  any  other  part  of  the  universe. 

9.  From  these  considerations,  it  is  manifest  that  the  value 
of  the  Atonement  is  infinite.  We  have  reason  to  believe, 
that  Christ,  by  his  Atonement,  is  not  only  the  Savior  of  this 
world,  but  the  Savior  of  the  universe  in  an  important  sense. 
Rebellion  once  broke  out  in  Heaven,  and  upon  the  rebel  an- 
gels God  executed  his  law,  and  sent  them  down  to  hell.  It 
next  broke  out  in  this  world;  and  as  the  execution  of  law 
was  found  by  experience  not  to  be  a  sufficient  preventive 
of  rebelUon,  there  was  no  certainty  that  rebellion  would  not 
have  spread  until  it  had  ruined  the  universe,  but  for  that 
revelation  of  God  which  Christ  has  made  in  the  Atonement. 
This  exhibition  of  God  has  proved  itself,  not  merely  able  to 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


411 


prevent  rebellion  among  holy  beings,  but  to  reclaim  and  re- 
form rebels.  Millions  of  rebels  have  been  reclaimed  and 
reformed.  This  world  is  to  be  turned  back  to  its  allegiance 
to  God,  and  the  blessed  Atonement  of  Christ  has  so  unbo- 
somed God  before  the  universe,  as,  no  doubt,  not  only  to 
save  other  worlds  from  going  into  rebellion,  but  to  save  myri- 
ads of  our  already  rebellious  race  from  the  depths  of  an 
eternal  hell. 

For  whose,  benefit  the  Atonement  was  intended. 

1.  God  does  all  things  for  himself;  that  is,  he  consults  his 
own  glory  and  happiness,  as  the  supreme  and  most  influential 
reason  for  all  his  conduct.  This  is  wise  and  right  in  him,  be- 
cause his  own  glory  and  happiness,  are  infinitely  the  greatest 
good  in  the  universe.  He  does  what  he  does,  because  his  intelli- 
gence demands  it.  He  made  the  atonement  to  satisfy  himself; 
"God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son, 
that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not  perish,  but  have 
everlasting  life."  God  himself,  then  was  greatly  benefitted 
by  the  Atonement.  In  other  words,  his  happiness,  in  a  great 
measure  consisted  in  its  contemplation,  execution  and  results. 

2.  He  made  the  Atonement  for  the  benefit  of  the  universe. 
All  holy  beings  are  and  must  be  benefitted  by  it,  from  its  very 
nature,  as  it  gives  them  a  higher  knowledge  of  God,  thajl 
ever  they  had  before,  or  ever  could  have  gained  in  any  other 
way.  The  Atonement  is  the  greatest  work  that  he  could  have 
wrought  for  them,  the  most  blessed,  and  excellent,  and  benev- 
olent thing  he  could  have  done  for  them.  For  this  reason, 
angels  are  described  as  desiring  to  look  into  the  Atonement. 
The  inhabitants  of  Heaven  are  represented  as  being  deeply 
interested  in  the  work  of  Atonement  and  those  displays  of 
the  character  of  God  that  are  made  in  it.  The  Atonement 
is  then,  no  doubt,  one  of  the  greatest  blessings  that  ever  God 
conferred  upon  the  universe  of  holy  beings. 

3.  The  Atonement  was  made  for  the  benefit  particularly  of 
the  inhabitants  of  this  world,  from  its  very  nature,  as  it  is  cal^ 
culated  to  benefit  all  the  inhabitants  of  this  world;  as  it  is  a 
most  stupendous  revelation  of  God  to  man.  Its  nature  is 
adapted  to  benefit  all  mankind.  All  mankind  can  be  pardon- 
ed, if  they  will  be  rightly  affected  and  brought  to  repentance 
by  it,  as  well  as  any  part  of  mankind  can. 

4.  The  Bible  declares  that  Christ  tasted  death  for  every    | 
man. 

5.  All  do  certainly  receive  many  blessings  on  account  of  it. 
There  is  reason  to  believe,  that  but  for  the  Atonement,  none 


412  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  our  race,  except  the  first  human  pair,  would  ever  have  had 
an  existence. 

6.  But  for  the  Atonement,  no  man  could  have  been  treated 
with  lenity  and  forbearance  any  more  than  Satan  can. 

7.  The  lives,  and  all  the  blessings  which  all  mankind 
enjoy,  are  conferred  on  them  on  account  of  the  Atonement 
of  Christ;  that  is — God  could  not  consistently  wait  on  sinners, 
and  bless,  and  do  all  that  the  nature  of  the  case  admits  to  save 
them,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  of  atonement. 

8.  That  it  was  made  for  all  mankind,  is  evident,  from  the 
fact  that  it  is  offered  to  all,  indiscriminately. 

9.  Sinners  are  universally  condemned,  for  not  receiving  it. 

10.  If  the  Atonement  is  not  intended  for  all  mankind,  God 
is  insincere  in  making  them  the  offer  of  salvation  through  the 
Atonement. 

11.  If  not,  sinners  in  hell  will  see  and  know  that  their  sal- 
vation was  never  possible;  that  no  Atonement  was  made  for 
them;  and  that  God  was  insincere  in  offering  them  salvation. 

12.  If  the  Atonement  is  not  for  all  men,  no  one  can  know 
for  whom,  in  particular,  it  was  intended,  without  direct  reve- 
lation.    Hence, 

13.  If  the  Atonement  is  for  none  but  the  elect,  no  man  can 
know  whether  he  has  a  right  to  embrace  it,  until  by  a  direct 
revelation,  God  has  made  known  to  him  that  he  is  one  of  the 
elect. 

14.  If  the  Atonement  was  made  but  for  the  elect,  no  man 
can  by  any  possibility  embrace  it  without  such  a  revelation. 
Why  can  not  Satan  believe  in,  embrace,  and  be  saved  by  the 
Atonement?  Simply  because  it  was  not  made  for  him.  If  it 
was  not  made  for  the  non-elect,  they  can  no  more  embrace 
and  be  saved  by  it  than  Satan  can.  If,  therefore,  the  Atone- 
ment was  made  but  for  a  part  of  mankind,  it  is  entirely  nuga- 
tory, unless  a  further  revelation  make  known  for  whom  in  par- 
ticular it  was  made. 

15.  If  it  was  not  made  for  all  men,  ministers  do  not  know  to 
V   whom  they  should  offer  it. 

^*^-  16.  If  ministers  do  not  believe  that  it  was  made  for  all  men, 
j  they  can  not  heartily  and  honestly  press  its  acceptance  upon 
\    any  individual,  or  congregation  in  the  world ;  for  they  can  not 

L assure  any  individual  or  congregation,  that  there  is  any 
Atonement  for  him  or  them,  any  more  than  there  is  for  Satan. 
But  upon  this  subject,  let  the  Bible  speak  for  itself:  "  The 
next  day  John  seeth  Jesus  coming  unto  him,  and  saith.  Behold 
the  Lamb  of  God,  which  taketh  away  the  sin  oi  the  world." 


MORAL   GOVERNMENT.  413 

^^For  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten 
Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not  perish,  but 
"have  everlasting  life.  For  God  sent  not  his  Son  into  the  world, 
to  condemn  the  world:  but  that  the  world  through  him  might 
be  saved."  '•'•  And  said  unto  the  woman,  Now  we  believe, 
not  because  of  thj  saying;  for  we  have  heard  him  ourselves, 
and  know  that  this  is  indeed  the  Christ,  the  Savior  of  the 
world."— Jno.  1:  29;  3:  16, 17;  4:42.  "  Therefore,  as  by  the 
offence  of  one,  judgment  came  upon  all  men  to  condemnation; 
even  so  by  the  righteousness  of  one,  the  free  gift  came  upon  all 
men  unto  justification  of  life."-Rom.  5:  18.  '•''For  the  love  of 
Christ  constraineth  us ;  because  we  thus  judge,  that  if  one  died 
for  all,  then  were  all  dead:  And  that  he  died  for  all,  that  they 
which  live  should  not  henceforth  live  unto  themselves,  but  unto 
him  which  died  for  them,  and  rose  again." — 2d  Cor.  5;  14,  15. 
^'Who  gave  himself  _a  ransom  for  all,  to  be  testified  in  due 
time."  ""^For  therefore  we  both  labor  and  suffer  reproach,  be- 
cause we  trust  in  the  living  God,  who  is  the  Savior  of  all  men, 
especially  of  those  that  believe." — 1st.  Tim.  2:  6;  4:  10. 
'•''And  he  is  the  propitiation  for  our  sins;  and  not  for  ours  only, 
but  also  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world." — 1  Jno.  2:  2. 

That  the  atonement  is  sufficient  for  all  men,  and,  in  that 
sense,  general,  as  opposed  to  particular,  is  also  evident  from 
the  fact  that  the  invitations  and  promises  of  the  gospel  are  ad- 
dressed to  all  men,  and  all  are  freely  offered  salvation  through 
Christ.  ^'Look  unto  me,  and  be  ye  saved,  all  the  ends  of  the 
earth:  for  I  am  God,  and  there  is  none  else."  ^^Ho!  every  one 
that  thirsteth,  come  ye  to  the  waters,  and  he  that  hath  no  mo- 
ney; come  ye,  buy  and  eat;  yea,  come,  buy  wine  and  milk 
without  money  and  without  price.  Wherefore  do  ye  spend 
money  for  that  which  is  not  breads  and  your  labor  for  that 
which  satisfieth  not?  hearken  difigently  unto  me,  and  eat  ye 
that  which  is  good,  and  let  your  soul  deHght  itself  in  fatness. 
IncHne  your  ear,  and  come  unto  me:  hear  and  your  soul  shall 
live;  and  I  will  make  an  everlasting  covenant  with  you,  even 
the  sure  mercies  of  David." — Isa.  45:  22;  55:  1,  2,  3.  ^'Come 
unto  me  all  ye  that  are  weary  and  heavy  laden,  and  I  will 
give  you  rest.  Take  my  yoke  upon  you,  and  learn  of  me;  for 
I  am  meek  and  lowly  in  heart;  and  ye  shall  find  rest  unto  your 
souls.  For  my  yoke  is  easy  and  my  burden  is  light."  '^Again, 
he  sent  forth  other  servants,  saying.  Tell  them  which  are  bid- 
den, Behold,  I  have  prepared  my  dinner;  my  oxen  and  my  fat- 
lings  are  killed,  and  all  things  are  ready;  come  unto  the  mar- 
riage."—Mat.  11 :  28, 29,  30;  22: 4.  ^^And  sent  his  servant  at 
35* 


414  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

supper  time  to  say  to  them  that  were  bidden,  Come,  for  all 
things  are  now  ready." — Luke  14:  17.  ^^In  the  last  day,  the 
great  day  of  the  feast,  Jesus  stood  and  cried,  saying.  If  any 
man  thirst,  let  him  come  unto  me,  and  drink.." — Jno.  7:  37. 
''•Behold  I  stand  at  the  door  and  knock,  if  any  man  hear  my 
voice,  and  open  the  door,  1  will  come  in  to  him,  and  will  sup 
with  him,  and  he  with  me."  ^-And  the  spirit  and  the  bride  say 
Come.  And  let  him  that  heareth  say,  Come.  And  let  him 
that  is  athirst  come.  And  whosoever  will,  let  him  take  the 
water  of  life  freely." — Rev.  22:  17. 

Again:  1  infer  that  the  atonement  was  made,  and  is  suffi- 
cient for  all  men,  from  the  fact  that  God  not  only  invites  all, 
but  expostulates  with  them  for  not  accepting  his  invitations. 
•'  Wisdom  crieth  without;  she  uttereth  her  voice  in  the  streets: 
She  crieth  in  the  chief  place  of  concourse,  in  the  openings  of 
the  gates;  in  the  city  she  uttereth  her  words,  saying,  how 
long  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  simplicity?  and  the  scorners 
delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools  hate  knowledge?  Turn 
you  at  my  reproof:  behold  I  will  pour  out  my  spirit  unto  you, 
I  will  make  known  my  words  unto  you." — Prov.  1:  20 — 23. 
"Come  now,  and  let  us  reason  together,  saith  the  Lord:  though 
your  sins  be  as  scarlet,  they  shall  be  white  as  snow,  though 
they  be  red  like  crimson,  they  shall  be  as  wool." — Isaiah  1:  18. 
"  Thus  saith  the  Lord,  thy  Redeemer,  the  Holy  One  oi  Israel, 
1  am  the  Lord  thy  God  which  teacheth  thee  to  profit,  which 
leadeth  thee  by  the  way  that  thou  shouldst  go.  Oh  that  thou 
hadst  hearkened  to  ray  commandments!  then  had  thy  peace 
been  as  a  river,  and  thy  righteousness  as  the  waves  of  the 
sea. "^Isaiah  48:  17,  18,  ^^Say  unto  them,  as  1  live  saith  the 
Lord  God,  1  have  no  pleasure  in  the  death  of  the  wicked;  but 
that  the  wicked  turn  from  his  way  and  live;  turn  ye,  turn  ye 
from  your  evil  ways;  for  why  will  ye  die,  O  house  of  Israel?" 
— Eze.  33:  11.  "Hear  ye  now  what  the  Lord  saith:  Arise, 
contend  thou  before  the  mountains,  and  let  the  hills  hear  thy 
voice.  Hear  ye,  O  mountains,  the  Lord'$  controversy,  and  ye 
strong  foundations  of  the  earth;  for  the  JLord  hath  a  contro- 
versy with  his  people,  and  he  will  plead  with  Israel.  O  my 
people  what  have  I  done  unto  thee?  and  wherein  have  I  wea- 
ried thee?  testify  against  me. — Micah  6:  1^3.  "-'O  Jerusa- 
lem, Jerusalem,  thou  that  killest  the  prophets,  and  stonest 
them  which  are  sent  unto  thee,  how  often  would  I  have  gath- 
ered thy  children  together,  even  as  a  hen  gathereth  her  chick- 
ens under  her  wings,  and  ye  would  not!"— Mat.  23:  37. 

Again.  The  same  may  be  inferred  from  the  professed  sin-. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  415 

cerity  of  God  in  his  invitations.  ""  O  that  there  were  such  an 
heart  in  them,  that  they  would  fear  me,  and  keep  all  my  com- 
mandments always,  that  it  might  be  well  with  them,  and  with 
their  children  forever!" — Deut.  5:  39.  "O  that  they  were 
wise,  that  they  understood  this,  that  they  would  consider  their 
latter  end!"— Deut.  32:  29.  '^For  thou  art  not  a  God  that 
hath  pleasure  in  wickedness;  neither  shall  evil  dwell  with 
thee." — Ps.  5:4.  "Oh  that  my  people  had  hearkened  unto 
me,  and  Israel  had  walked  in  my  ways!  I  should  soon  have 
subdued  their  enemies,  and  turned  my  hand  against  their  ad- 
versaries. The  haters  of  the  Lord  should  have  submitted 
themselves  unto  him:  but  their  time  should  have  endured  for 
ever." — Ps.  81 :  13 — 15.  "O  that  thou  hadst  hearkened  unto 
my  commandments!  then  had  thy  peace  been  as  a  river,  and 
thy  righteousness  as  the  waves  of  the  sea." — Isaiah  48:  18. 
"For  I  have  no  pleasure  in  the  death  of  him  that  dieth,  saith 
the  Lord  God:  wherefore  turn  T/ourselves,  and  live  ye." — 
Eze.  18:  32.  "And  when  he  was  come  near,  he  beheld  the 
city,  and  wept  over  it,  saying.  If  thou  hadst  known,  even 
thou,  at  least  in  this  thy  day,  the  things  which  belong  unto 
thy  peace!  But  now  they  are  hid  from  thine  eyes." — Luke 
19:  41,  42.  "For  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  gave 
his  only-begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him 
should  not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life.  For  God  sent 
not  his  Son  into  the  world  to  condemn  the  world;  but  that  the 
world  through  him  might  be  saved." — John  3:  16,17.  '•^I 
exhort  therefore,  that  first  of  all,  supplications,  prayers,  inter- 
cessions, and  giving  of  thanks  be  made  for  all  men:  for 
kings,  and  for  all  that  are  in  authority;  that  we  may  lead  a 
quiet  and  peaceable  life  in  all  godhness  and  honesty.  For 
this  is  good  and  acceptable  in  the  sight  of  God  our  Savior; 
Who  will  have  all  men  to  be  saved,  and  to  come  unto  the 
knowledge  of  the  truth." — 1  Tim.  1 — 4.  "  The  Lord  is  not 
slack  concerning  his  promise,  as  some  men  count  slackness; 
but  is  long-suffering  to  us-ward,  not  willing  that  any  should 
perish,  but  that  all  should  come  to  repentance." — 2  Peter  3:  9. 
Again  the  same  inference  is  forced  upon  us  by  the  fact 
that  God  complains  of  sinners  for  rejecting  his  overtures  of 
mercy:  '^Because  I  have  called,  and  ye  refused;  I  have 
stretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  regarded." — Prov.  1 :  24. 
"But  they  refused  to  hearken,  and  pulled  away  the  shoulder, 
and  stopped  their  ears,  that  they  should  not  hear.  Yea,  they 
made  their  hearts  as  an  adamant  stone,  lest  they  should  hear 
the  law,  and  the  words  which  the  Lord  of  hosts  hath  sent  in 


416  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

his  Spirit  by  the  former  prophets:  therefore  came  a  great 
wrath  from  the  Lord  of  hosts.  Therefore  it  is  come  to  pass; 
that  as  he  cried  and  they  would  not  hear:  so  they  cried,  and 
I  would  not  hear,  saith  the  Lord  of  hosts." — Zechariah  7:  11. 
12,  13.  "The  kingdom  of  heaven  is  like  unto  a  certain  king 
which  made  a  marriage  for  his  son.  And  sent  forth  his  ser- 
vants to  call  them  that  were  bidden  to  the  wedding:  and  they 
would  not  come.  Again,  he  sent  forth  other  servants,  saying, 
Tell  them  which  are  bidden.  Behold,  1  have  prepared  my 
dinner;  my  oxen  and  my  fatlings  are  killed,  and  all  things  are 
ready:  come  unto  the  marriage.  But  they  made  light  of  it, 
and  went  their  ways,  one  to  his  farm,  another  to  his  merchan- 
dise: and  the  remnant  took  his  servants,  and  treated  them 
spitefully,  and  slew  them."— Matthew  22 :  2, 3, 4,  5, 6.  "And 
sent  his  servant  at  supper-time  to  say  to  them  that  were  bid- 
den. Come ;  for  all  things  are  now  ready.  And  they  all  with 
one  consent  began  to  make  excuse.  The  first  said  unto  him, 
I  have  bought  a  piece  of  ground,  and  I  must  needs  go  and 
see  it:  I  pray  thee  have  me  excused.  And  another  said,  I 
have  bought  five  yoke  of  oxen,  and  I  go  to  prove  them:  I 
pray  thee  have  me  excused.  And  another  said  I  have  mar- 
ried a  wife;  and  therefore  I  can  not  come." — Luke  14:  17, 18, 
19,  20.  "And  ye  will  not  come  to  me,  that  ye  might  have 
life." — John  5:  40.  ""'Ye  stiff-necked  and  uncircumcised  in 
heart  and  ears,  ye  do  always  resist  the  Holy  Ghost:  as  your 
fathers  did,  so  do  ye." — Acts  7:  51.  "And  as  he  reasoned  of 
righteousness,  temperance,  and  judgment  to  come,  Felix 
trembled,  and  answered.  Go  thy  way  for  this  time;  when  I 
have  a  convenient  season  I  will  call  for  thee." — Acts  24:  25. 

Again,  the  same  is  inferable  from  the  fact  that  sinners  are 
represented  as  having  no  excuse  for  being  lost  and  for  not  be- 
ing saved  by  Christ.  "And  he  saith  unto  him,  Friend,  how 
camest  thou  in  hither,  not  having  a  wedding-garment?  And 
he  was  speechless." — Matthew  22:  12.  "For  the  invisible 
things  of  him  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are  clearly  seen, 
being  understood  by  the  things  that  are  made,  even  his  eter- 
nal power  and  Godhead;  so  that  they  are  without  excuse." — 
Romans  1 :  20.  "And  ye  will  not  come  to  me,  that  ye  might 
have  life." — John  5:  40.  "Now  we  know,  that  what  things 
soever  the  law  saith,  it  saith  to  them  who  are  under  the  law, 
that  every  mouth  may  be  stopped,  and  all  the  world  may 
become  guilty  before  God." — Romans  3:  19. 

VII.  I  now  proceed  to  answer  objections. 

L  To  the /ad  of  atonement.  It  is  said  that  the  doctrine 
of  atonement  represents  God  as  unmerciful. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  417 

Ans.  1.  This  objection  supposes  that  the  atonement  was 
demanded  to  satisfy  retributive  instead  of  public  justice. 

2.  The  atonement  was  the  exhibition  of  a  merciful  dispo- 
sition. It  was  because  God  was  disposed  to  pardon  that  he 
consented  to  give  his  own  Son  to  die  as  the  substitute  of  sinners. 

3.  The  atonement  is  infinitely  the  most  illustrious  exhibi- 
tion of  mercy  ever  made  in  the  universe.  The  mere  pardon 
of  sin,  as  an  act  of  mercy,  can  not  compare  with  the  merciful 
disposition  displayed  in  the  atonement  itself. 

II.  It  is  objected  that  the  atonement  is  unnecessary. 
Ans.  I.  The  testimony  of  the  world  and  of  the  consciences 

of  all  men  is  against  this  objection.  This  is  universally  at- 
tested by  their  expiatory  sacrifices.  These,  as  has  been 
said,  have  been  offered  by  nearly  every  nation  of  whose 
religious  history  we  have  any  reliable  account.  This  shows 
that  human  beings  afe  universally  conscious  of  being  sinners 
and  under  the  government  of  a  sin-hating  God;  that  their 
intelligence  demands  either  the  punishment  of  sinners,  or  that 
a  substitute  should  be  offered  to  public  justice;  that  they 
all  own  and  have  the  idea  that  substitution  is  possible,  and 
hence  they  offer  their  sacrifices  as  expiatory. 

A  heathen  philosopher  can  answer  this  objection,  and  re- 
buke the  folly  of  him  who  makes  it. 

III.  It  is  objected  that  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  is  in- 
consistent with  the  idea  of  mercy  and  forgiveness. 

Ans,  1.  This  takes  for  granted  that  the  atonement  was  the 
literal  payment  of  a  debt,  and  that  Christ  suffered  all  that  was 
due  to  all  the  sinners  for  whom  he  died,  so  that  their  dis- 
charge or  pardon  is  an  act  of  justice  and  not  of  mercy.  But 
this  was  by  no  means  the  nature  of  the  atonement.  The  atone- 
ment, as  we  have  seen,  had  respect  simply  to  public,  and  not 
at  all  to  retributive  justice.  Christ  suffered  what  was  neces- 
sary to  illustrate  the  intention  of  God  in  respect  to  sin  and  in 
respect  to  his  law.  But  the  amount  of  his  sufferings  had  no 
respect  to  the  amount  of  punishment  that  might  have  justly 
been  inflicted  on  the  wicked. 

2.  The  punishment  of  sinners  is  just  as  much  deserved  by 
them  as  if  Christ  had  not  suffered  at  all. 

3.  Their  forgiveness,  therefore,  is  just  as  much  an  act  of 
mercy  as  if  there  had  been  no  atonement. 

IV.  It  is  objected  that  it  is  unjust  to  punish  an  innocent 
being  instead  of  the  guilty. 

Ans.  I.  Yes,  it  would  not  only  be  unjust,  but  it  is  impossible 
to  punish  an  innocent  individual  at  all.     jPunishment  implies 


418  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

guilt.  An  innocent  being  may  suffer,  but  he  can  not  be  pun- 
ished. Christ  voluntarily  "suffered,  the  just  for  the  unjust." 
He  had  a  right  to  exercise  this  self-denial;  and  as  it  was  by 
his  own  voluntary  consent,  no  injustice  was  done  to  any  one. 

2.  If  he  had  no  right  to  make  an  atonement,  he  had  no  right 
to  consult  and  promote  his  own  happiness;  for  it  is  said  that 
^*  for  the  joy  that  was  set  before  him,  he  endured  the  cross,  de- 
spising the  shame."    , 

V.  It  is  objected  that  the  doctrine  of  atonement  is  utterly 
incredible. 

To  this  I  have  replied  in  a  former  lecture ;  but  will  here 
again  state,  that  it  is  utterly  incredible  upon  any  other  suppo- 
sition than  that  God  is  love.  But  if  God  is  love,  as  the  Bible 
expressly  affirms  that  he  is,  the  work  of  Atonement  is  just 
what  might  be  expected  of  him  under  the  circumstances;  and 
the  doctrine  of  Atonement  is  the  most  reasonable  doctrine  in 
the  universe. 

VI.  It  is  objected  to  the  doctrine  of  Atonement,  that  it  is 
of  a  demoralizing  tendency. 

Ans.  1.  There  is  a  broad  distinction  between  the  natural 
tendency  of  a  thing  and  such  an  abuse  of  a  good  thing  as  to 
make  it  the  instrument  of  evil.  The  best  things  and  doc- 
trines may  be,  and  often  are,  abuse'd,  and  their  natural  tend- 
ency perverted. 

3.  The  natural  tendency  of  the  Atonement  is  the  direct 
opposite  of  demoralizing.  Is  the  manifestation  of  deep  dis- 
interested love  naturally  calculated  to  beget  enmity?  Who 
does  not  know  that  the  natural  tendency  of  manifested  love  is 
to  beget  love  in  return? 

3.  Those  who  have  the  most  fully  believed  in  the  Atone- 
ment, have  exhibited  the  purest  morality  that  has  ever  been 
exhibited  in  this  world;  while  the  rejecters  of  the  Atonement, 
almost  without  exception,  exhibit  a  loose  moraUty.  This  is 
as  might  be  expected  from  the  very  nature  of  Atonement. 

""^VIl.  To  ?i  general  xitonement,  it  is  objected  that  the  Bible 
represents  Christ  as  laying  down  his  life  for  his  sheep,  or  for 

Jthe  elect  only,  and  not  for  all  mankind. 
\    Ans.  I.  It  does  indeed  represent  Christ  as  laying  down  his 
life  for  his  sheep,  and  also  for  all  mankind. 

I  John  2:2.  "  And  he  is  the  propitiation  for  our  sins;  and 
not  for  ours  only,  but  also  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world." 

John  3:  17.  "For  God  sent  not  his  Son  into  the  world  to 
condemn  the  world;  but  that  the  world  through  him  might  be 
saved." 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


419 


Heb.  2:  9.  "  But  we  see  Jesus,  who  was  made  a  little  lower 
than  the  angels  for  the  suffering  of  death,  crowned  with  glory 
and  honor;  that  he  by  the  grace  of  God  should  taste  death 
for  every  man." 

2.  Those  who  object  to  the  general  Atonement,  take  sub- 
stantially the  same  course  to  evade  this  doctrine  that  Unitari- 
ans do  to  set  aside  the  doctrine  of  the  Tiinity,  and  the  Divinity 
of  Christ.  They  quote  those  passages  that  prove  the  unity*  of 
God  and  the  humanity  of  Christ,  and  then  take  it  for  granted 
that  they  have  disproved  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and 
Christ's  Divinity.  The  asserters  of  limited  atonement  in  like 
manner  quote  those  passages  that  prove  that  Christ  died  foj^ 
the  elect  and  for  his  saints,  and  then  take  it  for  granted  that 
he  died  for  none  else.  To  the  Unitarian  we  reply,  we  admit 
the  unity  of  God,  and  the  humanity  of  Christ,  and  the  full 
meaning  of  those  passages  of  Scripture  .which  you  quote  in 
proof  of  these  doctrines;  but  we  insist  that  this  is  not  the 
whole  truth,  but  there  are  still  other  passages  which  prove 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  the  Divinity  of  Christ.  JusO 
so  to  the  asserters  of  limited  Atonement  we  reply,  we  believe  [ 
that  Christ  laid  down  his  life  for  his  sheep,  as  well  as  you;  but 
we  also  believe  that  he  tasted  death  for  every  man. 

John  3:  16.  "  For  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  ^ 
only  begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  / 
not  perish,  but  have  everlasting  life." 

VIII.  To  the  doctrine  of  general  Atonement  it  is  objected, 
that  it  would  be  folly  in  God  to  provide  what  he  knew  would 
be  rejected;  and  that  to  suffer  Christ  to  die  for  those  who 
he  foresaw  would  not  repent,  would  be  a  useless  expenditure 
of  blood  and  suffering. 

Ans.  1.  This  objection  assumes  that  the  Atonement  was  a 
literal  payment  of  a  debt,  which  we  have  seen  is  not  the  na- 
ture of  the  Atonement. 

2.  If  sinners  do  not  accept  it,  no  particle  of  the  Atonement 
can  be  useless,  as  the  great  compassion  of  God  in  providing 
an  atonement  and  offering  them  mercy  will  forever  exalt  His 
character  in  the  estimation  of  holy  beings,  greatly  strengthen 
his  government,  and  therefore  benefit  the  whole  universe. 

3.  If  all  men  rejected  the  Atonement  it  would  neverthe- 
less be  of  infinite  value  to  the  universe,  as  it  is  the  most  glo- 
rious revelation  of  God  that  was  ever  made. 

IX.  To  the  general  atonement  it  is  objected,  that  it  impKes 
universal  salvation. 

Ans.  It  does  indeed  imply  this,  upon  the  supposition  that    ^ 


V 


420  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  atonement  is  the  literal  payment  of  a  debt.  It  was  upon 
this  view  of  the  atonement  that  Universalism  first  took  its 
stand.  Universalists  taking  it  for  granted  that  Christ  had 
paid  the  debt  of  those  for  whom  he  died,  and  finding  it  fully 
revealed  in  the  bible  that  he  died  for  all  mankind,  naturally, 
and  if  this  were  correct,  properly  inferred  the  doctrine  of  uni- 
versal salvation.  But  we  have  seen  that  this  is  not  the  nature 
of  atonement.     Therefore  this  inference  falls  to  the  ground. 

X.  It  is  objected  that  if  the  atonement  was  not  a  payment 
of  the  debt  of  sinners,  but  general  in  its  nature,  as  we  have 
mentioned,  it  secures  the  salvation  of  no  one. 

Arts.  It  is  true  that  the  atonement  itself  does  not  secure  the 
salvation  of  any  one;  but  the  promise  and  oath  of  God  that 
Christ  shall  have  a  seed  to  serve  him  does. 

REMARKS  ON  THE  ATONEMENT. 

1.  The  execution  of  the  law  of  God  on  rebel  angels  must 
have  created  great  awe  in  heaven. 

2.  Its  action  may  have  tended  too  much  to  fear. 

3.  The  forbearance  of  God  toward  men  previous  to  the 
atonement  of  Christ  may  have  been  designed  to  counteract 
the  superabundant  tendency  to  fear,  as  it  was  the  beginning 
of  a  revelation  of  compassion. 

4.  Sinners  will  not  give  up  their  enmity  against  God,  nor 
believe  that  his  is  disinterested  love,  until  they  realize  that  he 
actually  died  as  their  substitute. 

5.  In  this  can  be  seen  the  exceeding  strength  of  unbelief 
and  of  prejudice  against  God. 

6.  But  faith  in  the  atonement  of  Christ  rolls  a  mountain 
weight  of  crushing  considerations  upon  the  heart  of  the 
sinner. 

7.  Thus  the  blood  of  Christ  when  apprehended  and  be- 
lieved in,  cleanses  from  all  sin. 

8.  God's  forbearance  toward  sinners  must  increase  the 
wonder,  admiration,  love  and  happiness  of  the  universe. 

9.  The  means  which  he  uses  to  save  mankind  must  produce 
the  same  effect. 

10.  Beyond  certain  limits,  forbearance  is  no  virtue,  but 
would  be  manifestly  injurious,  and  therefore  wrong.  A  de- 
gree of  forbearance  that  might  justly  create  the  impression 
Siat  God  was  not  infinitely  holy  and  opposed  to  sin,  would 
work  infinite  mischief  in  the  universe. 

IL  When  the  forbearance  of  God  has  fully  demonstrated 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  421 

his  great  love,  and  done  all  it  can  to  sustain  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  God,  without  a  fresh  display  of  holiness  and  justice, 
He  will  no  doubt  come  forth  to  execution,  and  make  parallel 
displays  of  justice  and  mercy  forever,  by  setting  heaven  and 
hell  in  eternal  contrast. 

12.  Then  the  law  and  gospel  will  be  seen  to  be  one  har- 
monious system  of  moral  government,  developing  in  the  ful- 
lest manner  the  glorious  character  of  God. 

13.  From  this  you  can  see  the  indispensable  necessity  of 
faith  in  the  atonement  of  Christ,  and  why  it  is  that  the  gospel 
is  the  power  of  God  unto  salvation  only  to  every  one  that  be- 
lieveth.  If  the  atonement  is  not  believed  in,  it  is  to  that  mind 
no  revelation  at  all,  and  with  such  a  mind  the  gospel  has  no 
moral  power. 

14.  But  the  Atonement  tends  in  the  highest  manner  to  be- 
get in  the  believer  the  spirit  of  entire  and  universal  conse- 
cration to  God. 

15.  The  Atonement  shows  how  solid  a  foundation  the 
saints  have  for  unbroken  and  eternal  repose  and  confidence 
in  God.  If  God  could  make  an  Atonement  for  men,  surely 
it  is  infinitely  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  he  will  withhold 
from  those  that  believe  any  thing  which  could  be  to  them  a 
real  good. 

16.  We  see  that  selfishness  is  the  great  hindrance  to  the 
exercise  of  faith.  A  selfish  mind  finds  it  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  understand  the  Atonement,  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  exhi- 
bition of  a  state  of  mind  which  is  the  direct  opposite  of  all 
that  the  sinner  has  ever  experienced.  His  experience  being 
wholly  selfish  renders  it  difficult  for  him  to  conceive  aright 
what  true  rehgion  is,  and  heartily  to  beheve  in  the  infinitely 
great  and  disinterested  love  of  God. 

17.  The  Atonement  renders  pardon  consistent  with  the 
perfect  administration  of  justice. 

18.  The  Atonement,  as  it  was  made  by  the  lawgiver,  mag- 
nifies the  law,  and  renders  it  infinitely  more  honorable  and 
influential  than  the  execution  of  the  penalty  upon  sinners 
would  have  done. 

19.  It  is  the  highest  and  most  glorious  expedient  of  moral 
government.  It  is  adding  to  the  influence  of  law  the  whole 
weight  of  the  most  moving  manifestation  of  God  that  men 
or  angels  ever  saw  or  will  see. 

20.  It  completes  the  circle  of  governmental  motives.  It 
is  a  filling  up  of  the  revelation  of  God.  It  is  a  revealing  of 
a  department  of  his  character,  with  which  it  w  ould  seem  that 

36 


422  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

nothing  else  could  have  made  his  creatures  acquainted.  It 
is,  therefore,  the  highest  possible  support  of  moral  govern- 
ment. 

21.  It  greatly  glorifies  God,  far  above  all  his  other  works 
and  ways. 

22.  It  must  be  to  him  a  source  of  the  purest,  most  exalted, 
and  eternal  happiness. 

23.  It  opens  the  channels  of  divine  benevolence  to  state 
criminals. 

24.  It  has  united  God  with  human  nature. 

25.  It  has  opened  a  way  of  access  to  God,   never  opened 
to  any  creatures  before. 

26.  It  has  abolished  natural  death,  by  procuring  a  universal 
resurrection : 

1  Cor.  15:  22,  Tor  as  in  Adam  all  die,  even  so  in  Christ 
shall  all  be  made  alive.' 

27.  It  restores  the  life  of  God  to  the  soul,  by  restoring  to 
man  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 

28.  It  has  introduced  a  new  method  of  salvation,  and  made 
Christ  the  head  of  the  New  Covenant. 

29.  It  has  made  Christ  our  surety: 

Heb.  7:  22.  '■By  so  much  was  Jesus  made  a  surety  of  a  bet- 
ter testament.' 

30.  It  has  arrayed  such  a  public  sentiment  against  rebel- 
ion,  as  to  crush  it  whenever  the  Atonement  is  fairly  under- 
stood and  applied  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 

31.  It  has  procured  the  offer  of  pardon  to  all  sinners  of 
our  race. 

32.  It  has  been  the  occasion  of  a  new  and  most  aggrava- 
ted kind  of  sin. 

33.  It  has,  no  doubt,  added  to  the  happiness  of  heaven. 

34.  It  has  more  fully  developed  the  nature  and  importance 
of  the  government  of  God. 

35.  It  has  more  fully  developed  the  nature  of  sin. 

36.  It  has  more  fully  developed  the  strength  of  sin. 

37.  It  has  more  fully  developed  the  total  depravity  and 
utter  madness  of  sinners. 

38.  It  has  given  scope  to  the  long-suffering  and  forbear- 
ance of  God. 

39.  It  has  formed  a  more  intimate  union  between  God  and 
man,  than  between  him  and  any  other  order  of  creatures. 

40.  It  has  elevated  human  nature,  and  the  saints  of  God, 
into  the  stations  of  kings  and  priests  to  God. 

41.  It  has  opened  new  fields  of  usefulness,  in  which  the 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


423 


benevolence  of  God,  angels,  and  men  may  luxuriate  in  doing 
good. 

42.  It  has  developed  and  fully  revealed  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity. 

43.  It  has  revealed  the  most  influential  and  only  efficacious 
method  of  government. 

44.  It  has  more  fully  developed  those  laws  of  our  being 
upon  which  the  strength  of  moral  government  depends. 

45.  It  has  given  a  standing  illustration  of  the  true  intent 
meaning,  and  excellency  of  the  law  of  God.  In  the  Atone- 
ment God  has  illustrated  the  meaning  of  his  law  by  his  own 
example. 

46.  The  Atonement  has  fully  illustrated  the  nature  of  vir- 
tue, and  demonstrated  that  it  consists  in  disinterested  benev- 
olence. 

47.  It  has  for  ever  condemned  all  selfishness,  as  entirely 
inconsistent  with  virtue. 

48.  It  has  established  all  the  great  principles  and  completed 
the  power  of  moral  government. 


LECTURE  XXXIIL 

HUMAN  GOVERNMENT. 

Human  governments  a  part  of  the  moral  government 
OF  God. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  subject  I  will, 

I.  Inquire  into  the  ultimate  end  of  God  in  the  crea- 
tion OF  THE  UNIVERSE. 

II.  Show  that  Providential   and  moral    government 

ARE  indispensable  MEANS  OF  SECURING  THIS  END. 

III.  That  civil,  and  family  governments  are  indispensa- 
ble TO  THE  SECURING  OF  THIS  END,  AND  ARE  THEREFORE  TRU- 
ly a  part  of  the  providential  and  moral  government  of 
God. 

IV.  Inquire  into  the  foundation  of  the  right  of  human 

GOVERNMENTS. 

V.  Point  out  the  limits  or  boundaries  of  this  right. 

VI.  Make  several  remarks  respecting  the  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, THE  right  and  DUTY  OF  REVOLUTION,  &C. 

VII.  Apply  the  foregoing  principles  to  the  rights  and 

i/CTIES  OF  governments  AND  SUBJECTS  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  EX- 
ECUTION OF  NECCSSARY  PENALTIES;  THE  SUPPRESSION  OF  MOBS, 
INSURRECTIONS,  REBELLION;  AND  IN  RELATION  TO  WAR,  SLAVE- 
RY, Sabbath  desecration,  &c. 

/.   The  ultimate  end  of  God  in  creation. 

We  have  seen  in  former  lectures  that  God  is  a  moral  agent 
and  is,  therefore,  the  subject  of  moral  law.  That  is.  His  own 
infinite  intelligence  must  affirm  that  a  certain  course  of  will- 
ing is  suitable,  fit,  and  right  in  Him.  This  idea  or  affirma- 
tion is  law  to  Him,  and  to  this  His  will  must  be  conformed  or 
He  is  not  good.  This  is  moral  law,  a  law  founded  in  the 
eternal  and  self-existent  nature  of  God.  This  law  does  and 
must  demand  benevolence  in  God.  Benevolence  is  good- 
wilHng.  God's  intelHgence  must  affirm  that  He  ought  to  will 
good  for  its  own  intrinsic  value.  It  must  affirm  His  obligation 
to  choose  the  highest  possible  good  as  the  great  end  of  His 
being.  If  God  is  good,  the  highest  good  of  himself  and  of 
the  universe  must  have  been  the  end  which  He  had  in  view 
in  the  work  of  creation.  This  is  of  infinite  value  and  ought 
to  be  willed  by  God.  If  God  is  good  this'must  have  been  His 
end.     We  have  also  seen, 

IL  That  Providential  and  Moral  Governments  are  indispensa- 
ble means  of  securing  the  highest  good  of  the  universe. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  425 

The  highest  good  of  moral  agents  is  conditionated  upon   | 
their  holiness.     Holiness  consists  in  conformity  to  moral  law.   J 
Moral  law  implies  moral  government.     Moral  government  is   ' 
a  government  of  moral  law  and  of  motives.     Motives  are  pre- 
sented by  Providential  government,  and  Providential  govern- 
ment is  therefore  a  means  of  moral  government.     Providen- 
tial and  moral  government  must  be  indispensable  to  securing 
the  highest  good  of  the  universe.  , 

///.  Civil  and  family  governments  are  indispensable  to  the  se-  j 
curing  of  this  end^  and  are  therefore  really  a  part  of  the  Providen-  j 
tial  and  moral  government  of  God. 

In  the  discussion  of  this  question  I  will  show, 

First,  That  Human  Governments  are  a  necessity  of  hu- 
man nature. 

Second,  That  this  necessity  will  continue  as  long  as  men 
exist  in  the  present  world. 

Third,  That  Human  Governments  are  plainly  recognized 
in  the  Bible  as  a  part  of  the  government  of  God. 

Fourth,  That  it  is  the  duty  of  all  men  to  aid  in  the  estab- 
lishment and  support  of  Human  Government. 

Fifth,  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  Human  Government 
can  ever  be  dispensed  with  in  this  world. 

Sixth,  I  shall  answer  objections.  / 

/.  Human  Governments  are  a  necessity  of  human  nature. 

1.  There  must  be  real  estate.  Human  beings  have  nu- 
merous physical  and  moral  wants  that  can  not  possibly  be 
supplied  without  the  cultivation  and  improvement  of  the  soil. 
Buildings  must  be  erected,  &c. 

2.  It  must  belong  to  somebody.  Somebody  must  have  the 
right,  the  care,  the  responsibility,  and  therefore  the  avails  of 
real  estate. 

3.  There  must,  therefore,  be  all  the  forms  of  conveyanc- 
ing, registry,  and  in  short,  all  the  forms  of  legal  government, 
to  settle  and  manage  the  real  estate  affairs  of  men. 

4.  Moral  beings  will  not  agree  in  opinion  on  any  subject 
without  similar  degrees  of  knowledge. 

5.  Hence,  no  human  community  exists  or  ever  will  exist, 
the  members  of  which  on  all  subjects  will  agree  in  opinion. 

6.  This  creates  a  necessity  for  human  legislation  and  adju- 
dication, to  apply  the  great  principles  of  moral  law  to  all  hu- 
man affairs. 

7.  There  arc  multitudes  of  human  wants  and  necessities 
that  cannot  properly  be  met,  except  through  the  instrumen-     / 
tality  of  human  governments. 

36* 


426  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

//.  This  necessity  will  continue  as  long  as  human  beings  ex- 
ist in  this  world. 

1.  This  is  as  certain  as  that  the  human  body  will  always 
need  sustenance,  clothing,  and  that  the  human  soul  will  al- 
ways need  instruction,  and  that  the  means  of  instruction  will 
not  grow  spontaneously,  without  expense  or  labor. 

2.  It  is  as  certain  as  that  men  of  all  ages  and  circum- 
stances will  never  possess  equal  degrees  of  information  on  all 
subjects. 

If  all  men  were  perfectly  holy  and  disposed  to  do  right, 
the  necessity  of  human  governments  would  not  be  set  aside, 
because  this  necessity  is  founded  in  the  ignorance  of  man- 
kind, though  aggravated  by  their  wickedness. 

3.  The  decisions  of  legislators  and  judges  must  be  authori- 
tative, so  as  to  settle  questions  of  disagreement  in  opinion, 
and  bind  and  protect  all  parties. 

4.  The  Bible  represents  human  governments  not  only  as 
existing,  but  as  giving  their  authority  and  power  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  Church  in  its  most  prosperous  state.  This  proves 
that  human  government  will  not  be  dispensed  with  when  the 
world  is  holy : 

^-^'  Isa.  49:  22,  23,  Thus  saith  the  Lord  God,  Behold,  I  will 
lift  up  my  hand  to  the  Gentiles,  and  set  up  my  standard  to  the 
people :  and  they  shall  bring  thy  sons  in  their  arms ,  and  thy 
daughters  shall  be  carried  upon  their  shoulders.  And  kings 
shall  be  thy  nursing  fathers,  and  their  queens  thy  nursing 
mothers:  they  shall  bow  down  to  thee  with  their  faces  toward 
the  earth,  and  lick  up  the  dust  of  thy  feet;  and  thou  shalt 
know  that  I  am  the  Lord :  for  they  shall  not  be  ashamed  that 
wait  for  me.' 

///.  Human  Governments  are  plainly  recognized  in  the  Bible 
as  a  part  of  the  moral  government  of  God. 

I.  Dan.  2:  21.  'He  changeth  the  times  and  the  seasons:  he 
removeth  kings,  and  setteth  up  kings :  he  giveth  wisdom  unto 
the  wise,  and  knowledge  to  them  that  know  understanding.' 
Dan.  4:  17,  25.  This  matter  is  by  the  decree  of  the 
watchers,  and  the  demand  by  the  word  of  the  holy  ones;  to 
the  intent  that  the  living  may  know  that  the  Most  High  ruleth 
in  the  kingdom  of  men,  and  giveth  it  to  whomsoever  he  will, 
and  setteth  up  over  it  the  basest  of  men.'  '•They  shall  drive 
thee  from  men,  and  thy  dwelling  shall  be  with  the  beasts  of 
the  field,  and  they  shall  make  thee  to  eat  grass  as  oxen,  and 
they  shall  wet  thee  with  the  dew  of  heaven,  and  seven  times 
shall  pass  over  thee,  till  thou  know  that  the  Most  High  ruleth 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  427 

in  the  kingdom  of  men,  and  giveth  it  to  whomsoever  he  will.' 

Dan.  5;  21.  "He  was  driven  from  the  sons  of  men;  and  his 
heart  was  made  like  the  beasts,  and  his  dwelling  was  with  the 
wild  asses:  they  fed  him  with  grass  like  oxen,  and  his  body 
was  wet  with  the  dew  of  heaven;  till  he  knew  that  the  Most 
High  God  ruleth  in  the  kingdom  of  men,  and  that  he  appoint- 
eth  over  it  whomsoever  he  will.' 

Rom.  13:  1 — 7.  ""Let  every  soul  be  subject  unto  the  higher 
powers.  For  there  is  no  power  but  of  God :  the  powers  that  be 
are  ordained  of  God.  Whosoever  therefore  resisteth  the  pow- 
er, resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God:  and  they  that  resist  shall 
receive  to  themselves  damnation.  For  rulers  are  not  a  ter- 
ror to  good  works  but  to  the  evil.  Wilt  thou  then  not  be  a- 
fraid  of  the  power?  Do  that  which  is  good,  and  thou  shalt 
have  praise  of  the  same:  for  he  is  the  minister  of  God  to 
thee  for  good.  But  if  thou  do  that  which  is  evil,  be  afraid; 
for  he  beareth  not  the  sword  in  vain:  for  he  is  the  minister  of 
God,  a  revenger  to  execute  wrath  upon  him  that  doeth  evil. 
Wherefore  ye  must  needs  be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath  but 
also  for  conscience  sake.  For,  for  this  cause  pay  ye  tribute 
also:  for  they  are  God's  ministers,  attending  continually  upon 
this  very  thing.  Render  therefore  to  all  their  dues;  tribute 
to  whom  tribute  is  due;  custom  to  whom  custom;  fear  to 
whom  fear;  honor  to  whom  honor.' 

Titus  3:  1.  Tut  them  in  mind  to  be  subject  to  principali- 
ties and  powers,  to  obey  magistrates,  to  be  ready  to  every 
good  work.' 

1  Peter  2:  13,  14.  'Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of 
man  for  the  Lord's  sake :  whether  it  be  to  the  king,  as  su- 
preme, or  unto  governors,  as  unto  them  that  are  sent  by  him 
for  the  punishment  of  evil  doers,  and  for  the  praise  of  them 
that  do  well.' 

These  passages  prove  conclusively,  that  God  establishes 
human  governments,  as  parts  of  moral  government. 

2.  It  is  a  matter  of  fact,  that  God  does  exert  moral  influ- 
ences through  the  instrumentality  of  human  governments. 

3.  It  is  a  matter  of  fact,  that  he  often  executes  his  law, 
punishes  vice,  and  rewards  virtue,  through  the  instrumentali- 
ty of  human  governments. 

4.  Under  the  Jewish  Theocracy,  where  God  was  King,  it 
was  found  indispensable  to  have  the  forms  of  the  executive 
department  of  government. 

IV.  It  is  the  duty  of  all  men  to  aid  in  the  establishment  and 
support  of  Human  Government, 


428  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

V'  1.  Because  human  governments  are  plainly  a  necessity  of 

human  beings. 

2.  As  all  men  are  in  some  way  dependent  upon  them,  it  is  the 
duty  of  every  man  to  aid  in  their  estabhshment  and  support. 

3.  As  the  great  law  of  benevolence,  or  universal  good-wil- 
ling, demands  the  existence  of  human  governments,  all  men 
are  under  a  perpetual  and  unalterable  moral  obligation  to  aid 
in  their  establishment  and  support. 

4.  In  popular  or  elective  governments,  every  man  having  a 
right  to  vote,  and  every  human  being  who  has  moral  influ- 
ence, is  bound  to  exert  that  influence,  in  the  promotion  of 
virtue  and  happiness.  And  as  human  governments  are  plain- 
ly indispensable  to  the  highest  good  of  man,  they  are  bound 
to  exert  their  influence  to  secure  a  legislation  that  is  in  accor- 
dance with  the  law  of  God. 

5.  The  obligation  of  human  beings  to  support  and  obey 
human  governments,  while  they  legislate  upon  the  principles 

^        of  the  moral  law,  is  as  unalterable  as  the  moral  law  itself. 

V,  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  human  governments  can  ever  be 
dispensed  with  in  the  present  world. 

1.  Because  such  a  supposition  is  entirely  inconsistent  with 
the  nature  of  human  beings. 

2.  It  is  equally  inconsistent  with  their  relations  and  circum- 
stances. 

V  3.  Because  it  assumes  that  the  necessity  of  government  is 

founded  alone  in  human  depravity:  whereas  the  foundation  of 
[   ■        this  necessity  is  iiuman  ignorance,  and  human  depravity  is  on- 
.    "       ly  an  additional  reason  for  the  existence  of  human    govern- 
ments.    The  primary  idea  of  law  is  to  teach;  hence  law  has 
/    a  precept.     It  is  authoritative,  and  therefore  has  a  penalty. 

4.  Because  it  assumes  that  men  would  always  agree  in 
judgment,  if  their  hearts  were  right,  irrespective  of  their  de- 
grees of  information.  But  this  is  as  far  as  possible  from  the 
truth. 

5.  Because  it  sets  aside  one  of  the  plainest  and  most  une- 
quivocal doctrines  of  revelation. 

VI.  lam  to  answer  objections, 

^  Obj.  1,  The  kingdom  of  God  is  represented  in  the  Bible  as 

subverting  all  other  kingdoms. 

Ans.  This  is  true,  and  all  that  can  be  meant  by  this  is,  that 
the  time  shall  come  when  God  shall  be  regarded  as  the  su- 
preme and  universal  sovereign  of  the  universe,  when  his  law 
shall  be  regarded  as  universally  obhgatory;  when  all  Kings, 
Legislators,  and  Judges  shall  act  as  his  servants,  declaring, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  429 

applying,  and  administering  the  great  principles  of  his  law  to 
all  the  affairs  of  human  beings.  Thus  God  will  be  the  Supreme 
Sovereign,  and  earthly  rulers  will  be  Governors,  Kings,  and 
Judges  under  him,  and  acting  by  his  authority  as  revealed  in 
the  Bible. 

Obj.IL  It  is  objected  that  God  only  providentially  estab- 
lishes human  governments,  and  that  he  does  not  approve  of 
their  selfish  and  wicked  administration;  that  he  only  uses  them 
providentially  as  he  does  Satan  for  the  promotion  of  his  own 
designs. 

Ans.  1.  God  no  where  commands  mankind  to  obey  Satan, 
but  he  does  command  them  to  obey  magistrates  and  rulers. 

Rom.  13:  1.  ••'  Let  every  soul  be  subject  unto  the  higher 
powers:  for  there  is  no  power  but  of  God:  the  powers  that  be 
are  ordained  of  God." 

1  Pet.  2:  13,  14.  '•'Submit  yourselves  to  every  ordinance  of 
man  for  the  Lord's  sake:  whether  it  be  to  the  king  as  supreme; 
or  unto  governors,  as  unto  them  that  are  sent  by  him  for  the  pun- 
ishment of  evil  doers,  and  for  the  praise  of  them  that  do  well." 

2.  He  no  where  recognizes  Satan  as  his  servant,  sent  and 
set  by  him  to  administer  justice  and  execute  wrath  upon  the 
wicked;  but  he  does  this  in  respect  to  human  governments. 

Rom.  13:  2 — 6.  '•'Whosoever  therefore  resisteth  the  power, 
resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God;  and  they  that  resist  shall  re- 
ceive to  themselves  damnation.  For  rulers  are  not  a  terror 
to  good  works,  but  to  the  evil.  Wilt  thou  then  not  be  afraid 
of  the  power?  Do  that  which  is  good,  and  thou  shalt  have 
praise  of  the  same.  For  he  is  the  minister  of  God  to  thee  for 
good.  But  if  thou  do  that  which  is  evil,  be  afraid :  for  he  bear- 
eth  not  the  sword  in  vain:  for  he  is  the  minister  of  God,  a  re- 
venger to  execute  wrath  upon  him  that  doeth  evil.  Where- 
fore ye  must  needs  be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath,  but  also  for 
conscience'  sake.  For,  for  this  cause  pay  ye  tribute  also:  for 
they  are  God's  ministers,  attending  continually  upon  this  very 
thing." 

3.  It  is  true  indeed  that  God  approves  of  nothing  that  is  un- 
godly and  selfish  in  human  governments.  Neither  did  he  ap- 
prove of  what  was  ungodly  and  selfish  in  the  Scribes  and  Phar- 
isees; and  yet  Christ  said  to  his  disciples,  "•The  Scribes  and 
Pharisees  sit  in  Moses'  seat.  Therefore  whatsoever  things 
they  command  you,  that  observe  and  do;  but  do  ye  not  after 
their  works,  for  they  say,  and  do  not."  Here  the  plain  com- 
mon sense  principle  is  recognized,  that  we  are  to  obey  when 
the  requirement  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  moral  law,  what- 


^ 


v 


43^  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ever  may  be  the  character  or  the  motive  of  the  ruler.  We 
are  always  to  obey  heartily  as  unto  the  Lord,  and  not  unto 
men,  and  render  obedience  to  magistrates  for  the  honor  and 
glory  of  God,  and  as  doing  service  to  him. 

Obj.  III.  It  is  objected  that  Christians  should  leave  human 
governments  to  the  management  of  the  ungodly,  and  not  be 
diverted  from  the  work  of  saving  souls  to  intermeddle  with 
human  governments. 

Ans.  1.  This  is  not  being  diverted  from  the  work  of  saving 
souls.  The  promotion  of  pubHc  and  private  order  and  hap- 
piness is  one  of  the  indispensable  means  of  saving  souls. 

2.  It  is  nonsense  to  admit  that  Christians  are  under  an  obli- 
gation to  obey  human  government,  and  still  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  choice  of  those  who  shall  govern. 

Obj,  IV,  It  is  objected  that  we  are  commanded  not  to  avenge 
ourselves,  that  '•'Vengeance  is  mine,  and  I  will  repay  saith  the 
Lord."  It  is  said,  that  if  I  may  not  avenge  or  redress  my 
own  wrongs  in  my  own  person,  I  may  not  do  it  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  human  government. 

Ans.  I.  It  does  not  follow  that  because  you  may  not  take 
it  upon  you  to  redress  your  own  wrongs  by  a  summary  and 
personal  infliction  of  punishment  upon  the  transgressor,  that 
human  governments  may  not  punish  them. 

2.  Because  all  private  wrongs  are  a  public  injury;  and  irre- 
spective of  any  particular  regard  to  your  personal  interest, 
magistrates  are  bound  to  punish  crime  for  the  public  good. 

3.  It  does  not  follow,  because  that  while  God  has  express- 
ly forbidden  you  to  redress  your  own  wrongs  by  administering 
personal  and  private  chastisement,  he  has  expressly  recogni- 
zed the  right  and  made  it  the  duty  of  a  public  magistrate  to 
punish  crimes. 

Obj.  V,  It  is  objected  that  love  is  so  much  better  than  law 
that  where  love  reigns  in  the  heart,  law  can  be  universally 
dispensed  with. 

Ans.  1.  This  supposes  that  if  there  is  only  love  there  need 
be  no  rule  of  duty. 

2.  This  objection  overlooks  the  fact  that  law  is  in  all 
worlds  the  rule  of  duty,  and  that  legal  sanctions  make  up  an  in- 
dispensable part  of  that  circle  of  motives  that  are  suited 
to  the  nature,  relations,  and  government  of  moral  beings. 
'  3.  The  law  requires  love;  and  nothing  is  law,  either  human 
or  divine,  that  is  inconsistent  with  universal  benevolence.  And 
to  suppose  that  love  is  better  than  law,  is  to  suppose  that  obe- 
dience to  law  sets  aside  the  necessity  of  law. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  431 

Obj,  VI,  It  is  objected  that  Christians  have  something  else 
to  do  besides  meddle  with  poHtics. 

Ans.  1.  In  a  popular  government,  politics  are  an  indispensa- 
ble part  of  religion.  No  man  can  possibly  be  benevolent  or 
religious  without  concerning  himself  to  a  greater  or  less  ex- 
tent with  the  affairs  of  human  government. 

2.  It  is  true  that  Christians  have  something  else  to  do  than 
to  go  with  a  party  to  do  evil,  or  to  meddle  with  politics  in  a 
selfish  or  ungodly  manner.  But  they  are  bound  to  meddle 
with  politics  in  popular  governments,  for  the  same  reason  that 
they  are  bound  to  seek  the  universal  good  of  all  men. 

Obj.  VIL  It  is  said  that  human  governments  are  no  where 
expressly  authorized  in  the  Bible. 

Ans.  1.  This  is  a  mistake.  Both  their  existence  and  law- 
fulness are  as  expressly  recognized  in  the  above  quoted  scrip- 
tures as  they  can  be. 

2.  If  God  did  not  expressly  authorize  them,  it  would  still  be 
both  the  right  and  the  duty  of  mankind  to  institute  human 
governments,  because  they  are  plainly  demanded  by  the  ne- 
cessities of  human  nature.  It  is  a  first  truth,  that  whatever 
is  essential  to  the  highest  good  of  moral  beings  in  any  world, 
they  have  a  right  and  are  bound  to  do.  So  far,  therefore,  are 
men  from  needing  any  express  authority  to  establish  human 
governments,  that  no  possible  prohibition  could  render  their 
establishment  unlawful.  It  has  been  shown,  in  these  lectures 
on  moral  government,  that  moral  law  is  a  unit — that  it  is  that 
rule  of  action  which  is  in  accordance  wdth  the  nature,  rela- 
tions, and  circumstances  of  moral  beings — that  whatever  is  in 
accordance  with,  and  demanded  by  the  nature,  relations,  and 
circumstances  of  moral  beings,  is  obligatory  on  them.  It  is 
moral  law,  and  no  power  in  the  universe  can  set  it  aside. 
Therefore,  were  the  scriptures  entirely  silent  on  the  subject  of 
human  governments,  and  on  the  subject  of  family  govern- 
ment, as  they  actually  are  on  a  great  many  important  sub- 
jects, this  would  be  no  objection  to  the  lawfulness,  and  expedi-  > 
ency,  necessity,  and  duty  of  establishing  human  governments. 

Obj.  VIIL  It  is  said  that  human  governments  are  founded 
in  and  sustained  by  force,  and  that  this  is  inconsistent  with 
the  spirit  of  the  gospel. 

Ans.  I.  There  cannot  be  a  difference  between  the  spirit  o£ 
the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  or  between  the  spirit  of  the  law 
and  the  gospel,  unless  God  has  changed,  and  unless  Christ 
has  undertaken  to  make  void  the  law,  through  faith,  which 
cannot  be. 


/ 


432  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Rom.  3:  32.  ''Do  we  then  make  void  the  law  through  faith? 
God  forbid:  yea,  we  establish  the  law.' 

2.  Just  human  governments,  and  such  governments  only 
are  contended  for,  will  not  exercise  force  unless  it  is  demand- 
ed to  promote  the  highest  public  good.  If  it  be  necessary  to 
this  end  it  can  never  be  wrong.  Nay,  it  must  be  the  duty  of 
human  governments  to  inflict  penalties,  when  their  infliction  is 
demanded  by  the  public  interest. 

Obj,  IX.  It  is  said  that  there  should  be  no  laws  with  pen- 
alties. 

Ans.  This  is  the  same  as  to  say  that  there  should  be  no  law 
at  all;  for  that  is  no  law  which  has  no  penalty,  but  only  advice. 

Obj.  X.  It  is  said  that  Church  government  is  sufficient  to 
meet  the  necessities  of  the  world,  without  secular  or  state 
governments. 
^  Ans.    What!     Church    governments  regulate    commerce, 

make  internal  improvements,  and  undertake  to  manage  all 
the  business  affairs  of  the  world ! 

Church  government  was  never  established  for  any  such 
end;  but  simply  to  regulate  the  spiritual,  in  distinction  from 
!  the  secular  concerns  of  men — to  try  offenders  and  inflict  spir- 
itual chastisement,  and  never  to  perplex  and  embarrass  itself 
with  managing  the  business  and  commercial  operations  of  the 
world. 
/  Obj.  XL  It  is  said  that  were  all  the.  world  holy,  legal  penal- 
ties would  not  be  needed. 

Ans.  Were  all  men  perfectly  holy,  the  execution  of  penal- 
ties would  not  be  needed;  but  still,  if  there  were  law,  there 
would  be  penalties;  and  it  would  be  both  the  right  and  the 
duty  of  magistrates  to  inflict  them,  should  their  execution  be 
called  for. 

Obj.  XII.  It  is  asserted  that  family  government  is  the  only 
form  of  government  approved  of  God. 

Ans.  This  is  a  ridiculous  assertion: 

1.  Because  God  as  expressly  commands  obedience  to  ma- 
gistrates as  to  parents. 

2.  He  makes  it  as  absolutely  the  duty  of  magistrates  to 
punish  crime,  as  of  parents  to  punish  their  own  disobedient 

^    children. 
^        3.  The  right  of  family  government  is  not  founded  in  the  ar- 
bitrary will  of  God,  but  in  the  highest  good  of  human  beings; 
so  that  family  government  would  be  both  allowable  and  obhg- 
atory,  had  God  said  nothing  about  it. 
4.  So,  the  right  of  human  government  has  not  its  founda- 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


433 


tion  in  the  arbitrary  will  of  God,  but  in  the  necessities  of  hu- 
man beings.  The  larger  the  community  the  more  absolute 
the  necessity  of  government.  If,  in  the  small  circle  of  the 
family,  laws  and  penalties  are  needed,  how  much  more  in  the 
larger  communities  of  states  and  nations.  Now,  neither  the 
ruler  of  a  family,  nor  of  any  other  form  of  human  government, 
has  a  right  to  legislate  arbitrarily,  or  enact,  or  enforce  any 
other  laws,  than  those  that  are  in  accordance  with  the  nature, 
relations,  and  circumstances  of  human  beings.  Nothing  can 
be  obligatory  on  moral  beings,  but  that  which  is  consistent 
with  the  nature,  relations,  and  circumstances  of  moral  beings. 
But  human  beings  are  bound  to  establish  family  governments, 
state  governments,  national  governments,  and,  in  short,  what- 
ever government  may  be  requisite  for  the  universal  instruction,  ^ 
government,  virtue,  and  happiness  of  the  world. 

5.  All  the  reasons,  therefore,  for  family  government,  hold 
equally  in  favor  of  the  state  and  national  governments. 

6.  There  are  vastly  higher  and  weightier  reasons  for  gov- 
ernments over  states  and  nations,  than  in  the  small  communi- 
ties of  families. 

7.  Therefore,  neither  family  nor  state  governments  need 
the  express  sanction  of  God,  to  render  them  obligatory;  for 
both  the  right  and  duty  of  establishing  and  maintaining  these 
governments  would  remain,  had  the  bible  been  entirely  silent 
on  the  subject.  But  on  this,  as  on  many  other  subjects,  God 
has  spoken  and  declared,  what  is  the  common  and  universal 
law,  plainly  recognizing  both  the  right  and  duty  of  family  and 
civil  governments.  ^ 

8.  Christians,  therefore,  have  something  else  to  do,  than  to 
confound  the  right  of  government  with  the  abuse  of  this  right 
by  the  ungodly.  Instead  of  destroying  human  governments, 
Christians  are  bound  to  reform  them. 

9.  To  attempt  to  destroy,  rather  than  reform  human  govern- 
ments, is  the  same  in  principle  as  is  often  plead  for  by  those 
who  are  attempting  to  destroy,  rather  than  reform  the  Church. 
There  are  those,  who,  disgusted  with  the  abuses  of  Chris- 
tianity practised  in  the  Church,  seem  bent  on  destroying  the 
Church  altogether,  as  the  means  of  saving  the  world.  But  fj 
what  mad  policy  is  this! 

10.  It  is  admitted  that  selfish  men  need  and  must  have  th3 
restraints  of  law;  but  contended  that  Christians  should  have 
no  part  in  restraining  them  by  law.  But  suppose  the  wick- 
ed should  agree  among  themselves  to  have  no  law,  and  therefore 
should  not  attempt  to  restrain  themselves  nor  each  other  by 


434  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

law;  would  it  be  neither  the  right  nor  the  duty  of  Christ- 
ians to  attempt  their  restraint,  through  the  influence  of  whole- 
some government? 

11.  It  is  strange  that  selfish  men  should  need  the  restraints 
of  law,  and  yet  that  Christians  have  no  right  to  meet  this  ne- 
cessity, by  supporting  governments  that  will  restrain  them. 
What  is  this  but  admitting,  that  the  world  really  needs  the 
restraints  of  governments — that  the  highest  good  of  the  uni- 
verse demands  their  existence;  and  yet,  that  it  is  wicked  for 
Christians  to  seek  the  highest  good  of  the  world,  by  meeting 
this  necessity  in  the  establishment  and  support  of  human  gov- 
ernments! It  is  right  and  best  that  there  should  be  law.  It 
is  necessary  that  there  should  be  law.  Therefore,  universal 
benevolence  demands  it;  but  it  is  wicked  in  Christians,  to  have 
any  thing  to  do  with  it  I     This  is  singular  logic. 

IF.  Inquire  into  the  foundation  of  the  right  of  human  govern- 
ments. 

1.  Men  are  moral  agents,  and  are  therefore  subjects  of 
moral  government  and  of  moral  obligation. 

2.  They  are  bound  to  aim  at  the  same  end  at  which  God 
ought  to  aim,  to  wit,  the  highest  good  of  universal  being. 

3.  Since  human  governments  arc  the  indispensable  means 
of  promoting  the  highest  good  of  human  beings,  they  have  a 
right,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  establish  and  maintain  them. 
The  right  of  human  government  must  he  founded  in  the  in- 
trinsic value  of  the  good  that  is  to  be  secured  by  them  and 
conditionated  upon  the  fact  that  they  sustain  to  the  highest 
good  of  human  beings,  and  consequently  to  the  glory  of  God, 
through  them,  the  relation  of  a  necessary  means  to  this  end. 

V.  Point  out  the  limits  or  boundary  of  this  right. 

1.  Observe,  the  end  of  government  is  the  highest  good  of 
human  beings,  as  a  part  of  universal  good.  All  valid  human 
legislation  must  propose  this  as  its  end,  and  no  legislation  can 
have  any  authority  that  has  not  the  highest  good  of  the  whole 
for  its  end. 

2.  Observe,  no  being  can  create  law.  All  law  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  moral  agents  must  be  moral  law.  That  is,  it  must 
be  that  rule  of  action  that  is  suited  to  their  natures  and  rela- 
tions. The  moral  law  or  the  law  of  nature,  in  other  words,  the 
common  law  of  the  universe  of  moral  agents,  by  which  God 
and  every  moral  being  is  or  ought  to  be  governed,  is  the  only 
law  that  can  be  obligatory  on  human  beings.  All  valid  human 
legislation  must  be  only  declaratory  of  this  one  only  law. 
Nothing  else  than  this  can  by  any  possibility  be  law.     God 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT. 


435 


/T' 


puts  forth  no  enactments  but  such  as  are  declaratory  of  the 
common  law  of  the  universe,  and  should  he  do  otherwise  they      > 
would  not  be  obligatory.     Arbitrary  legislation  can  never  be  '^ 
obligatory. 

3.  Human  governments  may  declare  and  apply  the  great 
principle  of  moral  law  to  human  conduct,  and  legislate  in  ac- 
cordance with  and  in  support  of  the  divine  government,  so  far    ^Y 
as  this  is  necessary,  but  no  farther. 

4.  The  right  of  human  government  \%  founded  \w  the  intrin- 
sic value  of  the  good  of  being  and  conditionated  upon  their  neces- 
sity as  a  means  to  that  end.  They  may  therefore,  and  ought  to 
extend  their  legislation  and  control  just  so  far  and  no  farther  than 
this  necessity  goes.  This  end  is  the  promotion  of  the  highest 
good.  So  far  as  legislation  and  control  are  indispensable  to 
this  end,  so  far  and  no  farther  does  the  right  to  govern  extend. 

5.  Human  beings  have  no  right  to  establish  a  government 
upon  any  other  basis  than  the  moral  law.  No  human  consti- 
tution or  law  can  be  obligatory  upon  human  beings  any  far- 
ther than  it  is  in  accordance  with  and  declaratory  of  moral 
law.  All  legislation  and  all  constitutions  not  founded  upon 
this  basis  and  not  recognizing  the  moral  law  as  the  only  law 
of  the  universe  are  null  and  void,  and  all  attempts  to  establish 
and  enforce  them  are  odious  tyranny  and  usurpation.  Hu- 
man beings  may  form  constitutions,  establish  governments  and 
enact  statutes  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  highest  virtue 
and  happiness  of  the  world,  and  for  the  declaration  and  en- 
forcement of  moral  law,  and  in  so  far  forth  as  human  govern-  ^ 
ments  are  essential  to  this  end  and  absolutely  no  farther. 

6.  It  follows  that  no  government  is  lawful  or  innocent  that 
does  not  recognize  the  moral  law  as  the  only  universal  law, 
and  God  as  the  Supreme  Lawgiver  and  Judge  to  whom  na- 
tions in  their  national  capacity  as  well  as  all  individuals  are 
amenable.  The  moral  law  of  God  is  the  only  law  of  indi- 
viduals and  of  nations,  and  nothing  can  be  rightful  govern- 
ment but  such  as  is  founded  and  administered  in  its  support.  0^ 


LECTURE  XXXIV. 

HUMAN  GOVERNMENT, 

VI.  I  am  to  make  several  remarks  respecting  forms  of  gov- 
ernment^ the  right  and  duty  of  Revolution  &;c. 
In  this  lecture  I  shall  show: 

I.  The  reasons  why  God  has  made  no  particular  form 
QF  Church  or  civil  Governments  universally  obligatory. 

II.  The   particular  forms  of  Church   and  civil  Gov- 

ERN3IENT  MUST  AND  WILL  DEPEND  UPON  THE  INTELLIGENCE  AND 
VIRTUE  OF  THE  PEOPLE. 

III.  That  form  of  Government  is  obligatory,  that  is 

BEST  suited  to  MEET  THE  NECESSITIES  OF  THE  PEOPLE. 

IV.  Revolutions    become   necessary    and    obligatory, 

WHEN  THE  VIRTUE  AND  INTELLIGENCE,  OR  THE  VICE  AND  IGNOR- 
ANCE OF  THE  PEOPLE  DEMAND  THEM. 

V.  In  what  CASES  Hu3ian  Legislation  is  valid,  and  in 

WHAT  CASES  IT  IS  NULL  AND  VOID. 

VI.  In  what  cases  we  are  bound  to  disobey  Human 
Government. 

/.  The  reasons  rchy  God  has  made  no  form  of  Church  or 
civil  Government  universally  obligatory, 

1.  That  God  has  no  where  in  the  Bible  given  directions  in 
regard  to  any  particular  form  of  church  or  secular  govern- 
ment, is  a  matter  of  fact. 

2.  That  he  did  not  consider  the  then  existing  forms,  either 
of  church  or  state  government,  as  of  perpetual  obligation,  is 
also  certain. 

3.  He  did  not  give  directions  in  regard  to  particular  forms 
of  government,  either  of  church  or  state; 

(1.)  Because  no  such  directions  could  be  given,  without 
producing  great  revolutions  and  governmental  opposition  to 
Christianity.  The  governments  of  the  world  are  and  always 
have  been  exceedingly  various  in  form.  To  attempt,  there- 
fore, to  insist  upon  any  particular  form,  as  being  universally 
obligatory,  would  be  calling  out  great  national  opposition  to 
religion. 

(2.)  Becauset  no  particular  form,  of  church  or  state  gov- 
ernment, either  now  is,  or  ever  has  been  suited  to  all  degrees 
of  intelligence,  and  all  states  of  society. 

(3.)  Because  the  forms  of  both  church  and  state  govern- 
ments, need  to  be  changed,  with  any  great  elevations  or  de- 
pressions of  society  in  regard  to  their  intelligence  and  virtue. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  437 

//.  The  particular  forms  of  Church  and  State  Government^ 
must  and  will  depend  upon  the  virtue  and  intelligence  of  the 
people.  ^  ^ 

1.  Democracy  is  self-government,  and  can  never  be  safe  or 
useful,  except  so  far  as  there  are  sufficient  intelligence  and  vir- 
tue in  the  community  to  impose,  by  mutual  consent,  salutary 
self-restraints,  and  to  enforce  by  the  power  of  public  senti- 
ment, and  by  the  fear  and  love  of  God,  the  practice  of  those 
virtues  which  are  indispensable  to  the  highest  good  of  any 
community. 

2.  Republics  are  another  and  less  pure  form  of  self-gov- 
ernment. 

3.  When  there  are  not  sufficient  intelligence  and  virtue 
among  the  people,  to  legislate  in  accordance  with  the  highest 
good  of  the  state  or  nation,  then  both  democracies  and  repub- 
lics are  improper  and  impracticable,  as  forms  of  government. 

4.  When  there  is  too  little  intelligence  and  virtue  in  the 
mass  of  the  people,  to  legislate  on  correct  principles,   mon-      . 
archies  are  better  calculated  to  restrain  vice  and  promote  virtue.  ** 

5.  In  the  worst  states  of  society,  despotisms,  either  civil 
or  military,  are  the  only  proper  and  efficient  forms  of  govern- 
ment. It  is  true  indeed  that  a  resort  to  despotic  government 
is  an  evil,  and  all  that  can  be  truly  said  is,  that  in  certain 
states  of  desperate  anarchy,  despotic  government  is  the  less  of 
two  evils. 

6.  When  virtue  and  intelligence  are  nearly  universal  de- 
mocratic forms  of  government  are  well  suited  to  promote  the 
public  good. 

7.  In  such  a  state  of  society,  democracy  is  greatly  condu* 
cive  to  the  general  diffiision  of  knowledge  on  governmental 
subjects. 

8.  Although  in  some  respects  less  convenient  and  more  ex- 
pensive, yet  in  a  suitable  state  of  society,  a  democracy  is  in 
many  respects  the  most  desirable  form,  either  of  church  or 
state  government: 

(1.)  It  is  conducive,  as  has  been  already  said,  to  general 
intelligence. 

(2.)  Under  a  democracy,  the  people  are  more  generally 
acquainted  with  the  laws. 

(3.)  They  are  more  interested  in  them. 

(4.)  This  form  of  government  creates  a  more  general  feel- 
ing of  individual  responsibility. 

(5.)  Governmental  questions  are  more  apt  to  be  thoroughly 
discussed  and  understood  before  they  are  adopted. 
37* 


438  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(6.)  As  the  diffusion  of  knowledge  is  favorable  to  indivi- 
dual and  public  virtue,  democracy  is  highly  conducive  to  vir- 
tue and  happiness. 

9.  God  has  always  providentially  given  to  mankind  those 
forms  of  government  that  were  suited  to  the  degrees  of  vir- 
tue and  intelligence  among  them. 

10.  If  they  have  been  extremely  ignorant  and  vicious,  he 
has  restrained  them  by  the  iron  rod  of  human  despotism. 

11.  If  more  intelligent  and  virtuous,  he  has  given  them  the 
milder  forms  of  limited  monarchies. 

12.  If  still  more  intelligent  and  virtuous,  he  has  given  them 
still  more  liberty,  and  providentially  established  republics  for 
their  government. 

13.  Whenever  the  general  state  of  intelligence  has  per- 
mitted it,  he  has  put  them  to  the  test  of  self-government  and 
self-restraint,  by  establishing  democracies. 

14.  If  the  world  ever  becomes  perfectly  virtuous  both 
church  and  state  governments  will  be  proportionally  modified, 
and  employed  in  expounding  and  applying  the  great  princi- 
ples of  moral  law  to  the  spiritual  and  secular  concerns  of 
men. 

15.  The  above  principles  are  equally  applicable  to  church 
and  civil  governments.  Episcopacy  is  well  suited  to  a  state 
of  general  ignorance  among  the  people,  Presbyterianism, 
or  Church  Republicanism  is  better  suited  to  a  more  advanced 
state  of  intelUgence  and  the  prevalence  of  Christian  princi- 
ple. While  Congregationalism,  or  spiritual  Democracy,  is 
best  suited  and  only  suited  to  a  state  of  general  intelligence, 
and  the  prevalence  of  Christian  principle. 

16.  God's  providence  has  always  modified  both  church  and 
state  governments,  so  as  to  suit  the  intelligence  and  virtue  of 
the  people.  As  churches  and  nations  rise  and  fall  in  the 
scale  of  virtue  and  intelligence,  these  various  forms  of  gov- 
ernment naturally  and  necessarily  give  place  to  each  other. 
So  that  ecclesiastical  and  state  despotism  or  liberty,  depend 
naturally,  providentially,  and  necessarily  upon  the  virtue  and 
intelligence  of  the  people. 

17.  God  is  infinitely  benevolent,  and  from  time  to  time, 
gives  the  people  as  much  liberty  as  they  can  bear. 

///.  That  form  of  Government  is  obligatory^  that  is  best  suited 
to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  people. 

1.  This  follows  as  a  self-evident  truth,  from  the  considera- 
tion, that  necessity  is  the  condition  of  the  right  of  human  gov- 
ernment.   To  meet  this  necessity  is  the  object  of  government; 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  439 

and  that  government  is  obligatory  and  best,  which  is  demand- 
ed by  the  circumstances,  intelligence  and  morals  of  the  people. 

2.  Consequently,  in  certain  states  of  society,  it  would  be  a 
Christian's  duty  to  pray  for  and  sustain  even  a  military  despot- 
ism; in  a  certain  other  state  of  society,  to  pray  for  and  sus- 
tain a  monarchy;  and  in  other  states,  to  pray  for  and  sustain 
a  republic;  and  in  a  still  more  advanced  stage  of  virtue  and 
intelligence,  to  pray  for  and  sustain  a  democracy ;  if  indeed  a 
democracy  is  the  most  wholesome  form  of  self-government, 
which  may  admit  a  doubt.  It  is  ridiculous  to  set  up  the  claim 
of  a  Divine  Right  for  any  stereotyped  form  of  government 
That  form  of  Government  which  is  demanded  by  the  state  of 
society  and  the  virtue  and  intelligence  of  the  people,  has,  of 
necessity,  the  Divine  right  and  sanction,  and  none  other  has  or 
can  have. 

IV,  Revolutions  becoxne  necessary  and  obligatory^  when  the 
virtue  and  intelligence  or  the  vice  and  ignorance  of.  the  people  de- 
mand them. 

1.  This  is  a  thing  of  course.  When  one  form  of  govern- 
ment fails  to  meet  any  longer  the  necessities  of  the  people,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  people  to  revolutionize. 

2.  In  such  cases  it  is  in  vain  to  oppose  revolution ;  for  in 
some  way  the  benevolence  of  God  will  bring  it  about.     Upon 
this  principle  alone,  can  what  is  generally  termed  the  Ameri-      I 
can  Revolution  be  justified.     The  intelligence  and  virtue  of      ' 
our  Puritan  fore-fathers  rendered  a  monarchy  an  unnecessary 
burden,  and  a  repubhcan  form  of  government  both  appropri- 
ate and  necessary;  and  God  always  allows  his  children  as     ,, 
much  liberty  as  they  are  prepared  to  enjoy. 

3.  The  stability  of  our  republican  institutions  must  depend 
upon  the  progress  of  general  intelligence  and  virtue.  If  in 
these  respects  the  nation  falls,  if  general  intelligence,  public 
and  private  virtue  sink  to  that  point  below  which  self-control 
becomes  impossible,  we  must  fall  back  into  monarchy,  limited 
or  absolute;  or  into  civil  or  miUtary  despotism;  just  according 
to  the  national  standard  of  intelUgence  and  virtue.  This  is 
just  as  certain  as  that  God  governs  the  world,  or  that  causes 
produce  their  effects. 

4.  Therefore,  it  is  the  madest  conceivable  policy,  for  Christ-      ^ 
ians  to  attempt  to  uproot  human  governments,  while  they  ought 

to  be  engaged  in  sustaining  them,  upon  the  great  principles  of 
the  moral  law.     It  is  certainly  stark  nonsense,  if  not  abomina- 
ble wickedness,  to  overlook  either  in  theory  or  practice,  these        / 
plain,  common  sense  and  universal  truths.  ^ 


440  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY, 

V  V.  In  what  cases  human  legislation  is  valid^  and  in  what  cases 

'    it  is  null  and  void. 

1.  Human  legislation  is  valid,  when  called  for  by  the  neces- 
sities, that  is,  bj  the  nature,  relations  and  circumstances  of 
the  people. 

2.  Just  that  kind  and  degree  of  human  legislation  which 
are  demanded  by  the  necessities  of  the  people  are  obligatory. 

3.  Human  legislation  is  utterly  null  and  void  in  all  other  ca- 
ses whatsoever;  and  I  may  add,  that  divine  legislation  would 
be  equally  null  and  void;  unless  demanded  by  the  nature,  rela- 
tions, and  necessities  of  the  universe.  Consequently  human 
beings  can  never  legislate  in  opposition  to  the  moral  law. 
Whatever  is  inconsistent  with  supreme  love  to  God  and  equal 
love  to  our  neighbor,  can,  by  no  possibility,  be  obHgatory. 

VI,  In  what  cases  we  are  bound  to  disobey  human  governments. 

1.  We  may  yield  obedience,  when  the  thing  required  does 
not  involve  a  violation  of  moral  obligation. 

2.  We  are  bound  to  yield  obedience,  when  legislation  is  in 
accordance  with  the  law  of  nature. 

3.  We  are  bound  to  obey  when  the  thing  required  has  no 
moral  character  in  itself;  upon  the  principle,  that  obedience, 
in  this  case,  is  a  less  evil  than  revolution  and  misrule.     But, 

4.  We  are  bound  in  all  cases  to  disobey,  when  human  legisla- 
tion contravenes  moral  law,  or  invades  the  rights  of  conscience. 

VII.  Apply  the  foregoing  principles  to  the  rights  and  duties  of 
*>    governments  and  subjects  in  relation  to  the  execution  of  the  neces- 
sary penalties  of  lazv : — the  suppression  of  mobs^  insurrections., 
rebellion;  and  also  in  relation  to  war^  slavery.^  Sabbath  desecra- 
tion., ^c. 

In  discussing  this  branch  of  the  subject  I  must, 

1.  Notice  some  principles  that  have  been  settled. 

2.  Apply  these  settled  principles  to  the  subjects  first 
named. 

1.  Notice  some  principles  that  have  been  settled. 
In  the  preceding  lectures  it  has  been  shown, 

1.  That  all  government  is  a  means  to  an  end,  and  that  the 
end  of  all  righteous  government  is  and  must  be  the  highest 
good  of  both  the  ruler  and  the  ruled. 

2.  We  have  seen  that  all  law  is  either  moral  or  physical. 

3.  That  all  law  for  the  government  of  free  moral  agents  is 
and  must  be  moral  law. 

4.  That  moral  law  is  that  rule  of  willing  and  acting  that  is 
suited  to  the  natures,  relations  and  circumstances  of  moral 
agents. 


MORAL   GOVERNMENT.  441 

5.  We  have  seen  that  the  right  to  govern  is  founded  in  the 
value  of  the  end  to  be  secured  by  government,  and  condi- 
tionated, 

(1.)  Upon  the  necessity  of  government  as  a  means  to  this 
end,  and 

(2.)  Upon  the  natural  and  moral  attributes  of  the  ruler,  and 
also  upon  his  ability  and  willingness  to  so  administer  gov- 
ernment as  to  secure  the  end  of  government. 

6.  We  have  seen  that  the  right  to  govern  implies: 

[Let  the  reader  here  recur  to  what  is  written  under  this 
head  on  pages  21  and  22.] 

7.  We  have  seen  that  the  right  to  govern  is  bounded  only 
but  absolutely  by  the  necessity  of  government;  that  just 
that  kind  and  degree  of  government  is  lawful  which  is  neces- 
sary as  a  means  of  promoting  the  highest  good  of  both  ruler 
and  ruled;  that  arbitrary  legislation  is  invalid  and  tyrannical 
legislation,  and  that  in  no  case  can  arbitrary  enactments  be 
law. 

8.  We  have  seen  that  no  unequal  or  inequitable  enactment 
can  be  law,  and  nothing  can  by  any  possibility  be  law  but  the 
rule  ''Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself" 

9.  We  have  seen  also  that  human  rulers  can  justly  legislate 
only  in  support  of  divine  government  but  never  against  it. 
That  no  enactment  can  by  any  possibility  be  law  that  contra- 
venes the  moral  law  or  law  of  God. 

10.  Let  us  now  proceed  to  apply  these  immutable  and  well 
established  principles. 

1.  To  the  rights  and  duties  of  government  in  relation  to 
mobs,  riots,  &c.  It  is  plain  that  the  right  and  duty  to 
govern  for  the  security  and  promotion  of  the  public  interests 
implies  the  right  and  duty  to  use  any  means  necessary  to 
this  result.  It  is  absurd  to  say  that  the  ruler  has  the  right  to 
govern,  and  yet  that  he  has  not  a  right  to  use  the  necessary 
means.  Some  have  taken  the  ground  of  the  inviolability  of 
human  life,  and  have  insisted  that  to  take  life  is  wrong |)cr  5e, 
and  of  course  that  governments  are  to  be  sustained  without 
taking  Hfe.  Others  have  gone  so  far  as  to  assert  that  govern- 
ments have  no  right  to  resort  to  physical  force  to  sustain  the 
authority  of  law.  But  this  is  a  most  absurd  philosophy,  and 
amounts  to  just  this: — The  ruler  has  a  right  to  govern  while 
the  subject  is  pleased  to  obey;  but  if  the  subject  refuse  obe- 
dience, why  then  the  right  to  govern  ceases,  for  it  is  impossible 
that  the  right  to  govern  should  exist  when  the  right  to  enforce 
obedience  does  not  exist.     This  philosophy  is  in  fact  a  denial 


442  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  the  right  to  use  the  necessary  means  for  the  promotion  of 
the  great  end  for  which  all  moral  agents  are  bound  to  live. 
And  yet  strange  to  tell,  this  philosophy  professes  to  deny  the 
right  to  use  force  and  to  take  life  in  support  of  government 
on  the  ground  of  benevolence,  that  is,  that  benevolence  for- 
bids it.  What  is  this  but  maintaining  that  the  law  of  benevo- 
lence demands  that  we  should  love  others  too  much  to  use  the 
indispensable  means  to  secure  their  good?  Or  that  we  should 
love  the  whole  too  much  to  execute  the  law  upon  those  who 
would  destroy  all  good?  Shame  on  such  a  philosophy.  It 
overlooks  the  foundation  of  moral  obligation  and  of  all  morality 
and  religion.  Just  as  if  an  enlightened  benevolence  could 
forbid  the  due,  wholesome  and  necessary  execution  of  law. 
This  philosophy  impertinently  urges  the  commandment, "  Thou 
shah  not  kill,"  as  prohibiting  all  taking  of  human  life.  But  it 
may  be  asked,  why  say  human  life.  The  commandment,  so 
far  as  the  letter  is  concerned,  as  fully  prohibit  the  killing  of 
animals  or  vegetables  as  it  does  of  men.  The  question  is 
what  kind  of  kilHng  does  this  commandment  prohibit?  Cer- 
tainly not  all  kilHng  of  human  beings,  for  in  the  next  chapter 
we  are  commanded  to  kill  human  beings  for  certain  crimes. 
The  ten  commandments  are  precepts,  and  the  lawgiver,  after 
laying  down  the  precepts,  goes  on  to  specify  the  penalties 
that  are  to  be  inflicted  by  men  for  a  violation  of  these  pre- 
cepts. Some  of  these  penalties  are  death,  and  the  penalty 
for  the  violation  of  the  precept  under  consideration  is  death. 
It  is  certain  that  this  precept  was  not  intended  to  prohibit 
the  taking  of  life  for  murder.  A  consideration  of  the  law  in 
its  tenor  and  spirit  renders  it  most  evident  that  the  precept  in 
question  prohibits  murder,  and  the  penalty  of  death  is 
added  by  the  lawgiver  to  the  violation  of  this  precept.  Now 
how  absurd  and  impertinent  it  is  to  quote  this  precept  in  pro- 
hibition of  taking  life  under  all  circumstances ! 

Men  have  an  undoubted  right  to  do  whatever  is  plainly 
indispensable  to  the  highest  good  of  man,  and  therefore  no- 
thing can  by  any  possibility  be  law  that  should  prohibit  the 
taking  of  human  life  when  it  became  indispensable  to  the 
great  end  of  government.  This  right  is  every  where  recog- 
nized in  the  Bible,  and  if  it  were  not,  still  the  right  would 
exist.  This  philosophy  that  I  am  opposing,  assumes  that  the 
will  of  God  creates  law,  and  that  we  have  no  right  to  take 
life  without  an  express  warrant  from  him.     But  the  facts  are, 

(1.)  That  God  has  given  us  an  express  warrant  and  injunc- 
tion to  take  life  for  certain  crimes,  and, 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  443 

(2.)  If  he  had  not,  it  would  be  duty  to  do  so  whenever  the 
public  good  required  it.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  the  moral 
law  is  the  law  of  nature,  and  that  every  thing  is  lawful  and 
right  that  is  plainly  demanded  for  the  promotion  of  the  high- 
est good  of  being. 

The  philosophy  of  which  I  am  speaking  lays  much  stress 
upon  what  it  calls  inalienable  rights.  It  assumes  that  man 
has  a  title  or  right  to  Hfe  in  such  a  sense  that  he  can  not  for- 
feit it  by  crime.  But  the  fact  is,  there  are  no  right?:  inaliena- 
ble in  this  sense.  There  can  be  no  such  rights.  Whenever 
any  individual,  by  the  commission  of  crime,  comes  into  such 
a  relation  to  the  public  interest  that  his  death  is  a  necessary 
means  of  securing  the  highest  public  good,  his  life  is  forfeited, 
and  to  take  the  forfeiture  at  his  hands  is  the  duty  of  the  gov-  ^, 
ernment. 

2.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  same  principles  are  equally  ap- 
plicable to  insurrections,  rebellion,  &:c.  While  government 
is  right,  it  is  duty,  and  while  it  is  right  and  duty  because  ne- 
cessary as  a  means  to  the  great  end  upon  which  benevolence 
terminates,  it  must  be  both  the  right  and  the  duty  of  govern- 
ment, and  of  all  the  subjects,  to  use  any  indispensable  means 
for  the  suppression  of  insurrections,  rebellion,  &c.,  as  also 
for  the  due  administration  of  justice  in  the  execution  of  law. 

3.  These  principles  will  guide  us  in  ascertaining  the  rights,  ^ 
and  of  course  the  duty  of  governments  in  relation  to  war. 

War  is  one  of  the  most  heinous  and  horrible  forms  of  sin 
unless  it  be  evidently  demanded  by  and  prosecuted  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  moral  law.  Observe,  war  to  be  in  any  case  a 
virtue  or  to  be  less  than  a  crime  of  infinite  magnitude,  must 
not  only  be  honestly  believed  by  those  who  engage  in  it,  to 
be  demanded  by  the  law  of  benevolence,  but  it  must  also  be 
engaged  in  by  them  with  an  eye  single  to  the  glory  of  God 
and  the  highest  good  of  being.  That  war  has  been  in  some 
instances  demanded  by  the  spirit  of  the  moral  law  there  can 
be  no  reasonable  doubt,  since  God  has  sometimes  commanded 
them,  which  he  could  not  have  done  had  they  not  been  de- 
manded by  the  highest  good  of  the  universe.  In  those  cases, 
if  those  who  were  commanded  to  engage  in  them  had  benev- 
olent intentions  in  prosecuting  them  as  God  had  in  command- 
ing them,  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  they  sinned.  Rulers  are 
represented  as  God's  ministers  to  execute  wrath  upon  the 
guilty.  If  in  the  Providence  of  God  He  should  find  it  duty 
to  destroy  or  to  rebuke  a  nation  for  his  own  glory  and  the 
highest  good  of  being,  he  may,  beyond  question,  command  that 


444  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

they  should  be  chastised  by  the  hand  of  man.  But  in  no 
case  is  war  any  thing  else  than  a  most  horrible  crime  unless 
it  is  plainly  the  will  of  God  that  it  should  exist,  and  unless  it 
be  actually  engaged  in  in  obedince  to  his  will.  This  is  true 
of  all,  both  of  rulers  and  of  subjects  who  engage  in  war. 
Selfish  war  is  wholesale  murder.  For  a  nation  to  declare  war 
or  for  persons  to  enUst  or  in  any  way  to  designedly  aid  or 
abet  in  the  declaration  or  prosecution  of  war  upon  any  other 
conditions  than  those  just  specified  involves  the  guilt  of  mur- 
der. 
\^  There  can  scarcely  be  conceived  a  more  abominable 
and  fiendish  maxim  than  "our  country  right  or  wrong."  Re- 
cently this  maxim  seems  to  have  been  adopted  and  avowed  in 
relation  to  the  present  war  of  the  United  States  with  Mexico. 
It  seems  to  be  supposed  by  some  that  it  is  the  duty  of  good 
subjects  to  sympathize  with  and  support  government  in  the 
prosecution  of  a  war  in  which  they  have  unjustly  engaged, 
and  to  which  they  have  committed  themselves,  upon  the 
ground  that  since  it  is  commenced  it  must  be  prosecuted  as 
the  less  of  two  evils.  The  same  class  of  men  seem  to  have 
adopted  the  same  philosophy  in  respect  to  slavery.  Slavery, 
as  it  exists  in  this  country,  they  acknowledge  to  be  indefen- 
sible on  the  ground  of  right;  that  it  is  a  great  evil  and  a 
great  sin,  but  it  must  be  let  alone  as  the  less  of  two  evils.  It 
exists,  say  they,  and  it  can  not  be  abolished  without  disturb- 
ing the  friendly  relations  and  federal  union  of  the  States, 
therefore  the  institution  must  be  sustained.  The  philosophy 
is  this:  war  and  slavery  as  they  exist  in  this  nation  are  un- 
just, but  they  exist,  and  to  sustain  them  is  duty,  because  their 
existence,  under  the  circumstances,  is  the  less  of  two  evils. 
To  this  I  answer: 
^^  1.  That  of  moral  evils  or  sins  we  can  not  know  which  is 
the  least,  that  is,  which  involves  the  least  or  the  greatest 
guilt. 

2.  I  would  ask,  do  these  philosophers  intend  to  admit  that 
the  prosecution  of  a  war  unjustly  waged  is  sin,  and  that  the 
support  of  slavery  in  this  country  is  sin,  but  that  the  sin  of 
supporting  them  is  less  than  would  be  the  sin  of  abandoning 
them  under  the  circumstances?  If  they  mean  this,  to  be  sure 
this  were  singular  logic.  To  repent  of  a  sin  and  forsake  it 
-were  a  greater  sin  than  to  persist  in  it!  True  and  genuine 
repentance  of  a  sin  is  sin,  and  even  a  greater  sin  than  that  re- 
pented of!  Who  does  not  know  that  it  can  never  be  sin  to 
repent  of  sin  ?    To  repent  and  forsake  all  sin  is  always  right 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT.  445 

always  duty  and  can  in  no  case  be  sin.  If  war  has  been  un- 
justly waged,  if  slavery  or  any  thing  else  exists  that  involves 
injustice  and  oppression  or  sin  in  any  form,  it  cannot  be  sin  to 
abandon  it.  To  abhor  and  reject  it  at  once  must  be  duty, 
and  to  persevere  in  it  is  only  to  add  insult  to  injury.  y 

Nothing  can  sanctify  any  crime  but  that  which  renders  it 
no  crime,  but  a  virtue.  But  the  philosophers  w^hose  views  I 
am  examining,  must  if  consistent,  take  the  ground  that  since 
war  and  slavery  exist,  although  their  commencement  was  un- 
just and  sinful,  yet  since  they  exist,  it  is  no  crime  but  a  virtue 
to  sustain  them  as  the  least  of  two  natural  evils.  But  I  '^ 
would  ask  to  whom  are  they  the  least  of  two  evils?  To  our- 
selves or  to  being  in  general?  The  least  of  two  present,  or  of 
two  ultimate  evils?  Our  duty  is  not  to  calculate  the  evils  in 
respect  merely  to  ourselves  or  to  this  nation  and  those  imme- 
diately oppressed  and  injured,  but  to  look  abroad  upon  the 
world  and  the  universe,  and  inquire  what  are  the  evils  result- 
ing and  Hkely  to  result  to  the  world,  to  the  church,  and  to  the 
universe  from  the  declaration  and  prosecution  of  such  a  war, 
and  from  the  support  of  slavery  by  a  nation  professing  what 
we  profess;  a  nation  boasting  of  liberty;  who  have  drawn 
the  sword  and  bathed  it  in  blood  in  defence  of  the  principle 
that  all  men  have  an  inalienable  right  to  liberty;  that  they 
are  born  free  and  equal.  Such  a  nation  proclaiming  such  a 
principle  and  fighting  in  the  defence  of  it,  standing  with  its 
proud  foot  on  the  neck  of  three  millions  of  crushed  and 
prostrate  slaves!  O  horrible!  This  a  less  evil  to  the  world  than 
emancipation  or  even  than  the  dismemberment  of  our  hypo- 
critical union!  "O  shame,  where  is  thy  blush!"  The  prosecu- 
tion of  a  war  unjustly  engaged  in  a  less  evil  than  repentance 
and  restitution?  It  is  impossible.  Honesty  is  always  and  ne-  ^ 
cessarily  the  best  policy.  Nations  are  bound  by  the  same 
law  as  individuals.  If  they  have  done  wrong  it  is  always  du- 
ty and  hoyorable  for  them  to  repent,  confess,  and  make  resti- 
tution. TTo  adopt  the  maxim,  ^-Our  country  right  or  wrong," 
and  to  sympathise  with  the  government  'in  the  prosecution 
of  a  war  unrighteously  waged  must  involve  the  guilt  of  mur- 
der.^ To  adopt  the  maxim,  "Our  union  even  with  perpetual 
slav^el'y,"  is  an  abomination  so  execrable  as  not  to  be  named 
by  a  just  mind  without  indignation.  ^ 

4.^The  same  principles  apply  to  governmental  sabbath  des- 
ecration.    The  Sabbath  is  plainly  a  Divine  Institution  found- 
ed in  the  necessities  of  human  beings.     The  letter  of  the  law 
of  the  Sabbath  forbids  all  labor  of  every  kind,  and  under  all 
38 


446  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

circumstances  on  that  day.  But,  as  has  heen  said  in  a  former 
lecture,  the  spirit  of  the  law  of  the  Sabhatb,  being  identical 
with  the  law  of  benevolence,  sometimes  requires  the  violation 
of  the  letter  of  the  law.  Both  governments  and  individuals 
may,  and  it  is  their  duty  to  do,  on  the  Sabbath,  whatever  is 
plainly  required  by  the  great  law  of  benevolence.  But  no- 
thing more,  absolutely.  No  human  legislature  can  nullify  the 
moral  law.  No  human  legislation  can  make  it  right  or  lawful 
to  violate  any  command  of  God.  All  human  enactments  re- 
quiring or  sanctioning  the  violation  of  any  command  of  God 
are  not  only  null  and  void,  but  they  are  a  blasphemous  usurp- 
ation and  invasion  of  the  prerogatives  of  God. 

5.  The  same  principles  apply  to  slavery.     No  human  con- 
stitution or  enactment  can,  by  any  possibility,  be  law  that  re- 
cognizes the  right  of  one  human  being  to  enslave  another  in 
a  sense  that  implies  selfishness  on  the  part  of  the  slaveholder. 
Selfishness  is  wrong  per  ^e.     It  is  therefore  always  and  unal- 
terably wrong.     No  enactment,  human  or  Divine,  can  legalize 
selfishness  and  make  it  right,  under  any  conceivable  circum- 
stances.    Slavery  or  any  other  evil,  to  be  a  crime,  must  imply 
selfishness.     It  must  imply  a  violation  of  the  command,  "Thou 
shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."     If  it  implies  a  breach  of 
this,  it  is  wrong  invariably  and  necessarily,  and  no  legislation 
or  any  thing  else  can  make  it  right.     God  can  not  authorize  it. 
The  Bible  can  not  sanction  it,  and  if  both  God  and  the  Bible 
were  to  sanction  it,  it  could  not  be  lawful.     God's  arbitrary 
will  is  not  law.     The  moral  law,  as  we  have  seen,  is  as  inde- 
pendent of  his  will  as  his  own  necessary  existence  is.     He 
can  not  alter  or  repeal  it.     He  could  not  sanctify  selfishness 
and  make  it  right.     Nor  can  any  book  be  received  as  of  Divine 
authority  that  sanctions  selfishness.     God  and  the  Bible  quo- 
ted to  sustain  and  sanctify  slaveholding  in  a  sense  implying 
selfishness!     'Tis blasphemous!     That  slaveholding,  as  it  ex- 
ists in  this  country,  impUes   selfishness  at  least,  in  almost  all 
instances,  is  too  plain  to  need  proof.     The  sinfulness  of  slave- 
holding  and  war,  in  almost  all  cases,  and  in  every  case  where 
the  terms  slaveholding  and  war  are  used  in  their  popular  sig- 
nification, will  appear  irresistible,  if  we  consider  that  sin  is 
selfishness,  and  that  all  selfishness  is  necessarily  sinful.     De- 
prive  a  human  being  of  liberty  who  has  been  guilty  of  no 
crime !     Rob  him  of  himself — his  body — his  soul — his  time  and 
his  earnings  to  promote  the  interest  of  his  master,  and  attempt 
to  justify  this  on  the  principles  of  moral  law !     It  is  the  great- 
est absurdity,  and  the  most  revolting  wickedness. 


LECTURE  XXXV. 
MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 

In  discussing  the  subject  of  human  depravity,  I  shall, 

I.  Define  the  term  Depravity. 

II.  Point  out  the  Distinction  between  Physical  and 
Moral  Depravity. 

III.  Show  of  what  Physical  Depravity  can  be  predi- 
cated. 

IV.  Of  what  Moral  Depravity  can  be  predicated. 

V.  That  Mankind  are  both  Physically  and  Morally 
Depraved. 

VI.  That  subsequent  to  the  commencement  of  Moral 
Agency,  and  previous  to  Regeneration,  the  Moral  De- 
pravity of  Mankind  is  Universal. 

VII.  That  during  the  above  period  the  Moral  De- 
pravity OF  Mankind  is  Total. 

VIII.  The  proper  method  of  accounting  for  the  Uni- 
versal Total  Moral  Depravity  of  the  Unregenerate 
Moral  Agents  of  our  Race. 

/.  Definition  of  the  term  Depravity. 

The  word  is  derived  from  the  Latin  de  and  pravus.  Pravus 
means  crooked.  De  is  intensive.  Depravo  literally  and 
primarily  means  crooked,  not  in  the  sense  of  original  or  con- 
stitutional crookedness,  but  in  the  sense  of  having  become 
crooked.  The  term  does  not  imply  original  mal-conforma- 
tion,  but  lapsed,  fallen,  departed  from  right  or  straight.  It 
always  implies  deterioration,  or  fall  from  a  former  state  of 
moral  or  physical  perfection. 

Depravity  always  implies  a  departure  from  a  state  of  ori- 
ginal integrity,  or  from  conformity  to  the  laws  of  the  being 
who  is  the  subject  of  depravity.  Thus  we  should  not  call  that 
being  depraved  who  abode  in  a  state  of  conformity  to  the  ori- 
ginal laws  of  his  being,  physical  and  moral.  But  we  justly 
call  a  being  depraved,  who  has  departed  from  conformity  to 
those  laws,  whether  those  laws  be  physical  or  moral. 

//.  Point  out  the  distinction  between  physical  and  moral  de- 
pravity. 

Physical  depravity,  as  the  word  denotes,  is  the  depravity 
of  constitution,  or  substance,  as  distinguished  from  depravity 
of  free  moral  action.  It  may  be  predicated  of  body  or  of 
mind.     Physical  depravity,  when  predicated  of  the  body,  is 


448  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

commonly  and  rightlj  termed  disease.     It  consists  in  a  physi- 
cal departure  from  the  laws  of  life  and  health,  a  lapsed,  or 
fallen  state  of  the  constitution  or  physical  organization,  a 
state  in  which  the  bodily  organization  is  imperfect  and  im- 
paired, and  in  which  healthy  organic  action  is  not  sustained. 
/     When  physical  depravity  is  predicated  of  mind,  it  is  intended 
»C^  that  the  powers  of  the  mind,  either  in  substance,  or  in  conse- 
/quence  of  their  connection  with  and  dependence  upon  the 
/  body,  are  in  a  diseased,  lapsed,  fallen,  degenerate  state,  so 
Vthat    the  healthy  action  of  those  powers  is  not  sustained. 
/Physical  depravity,  being  depravity  of  substance  as    op- 
posed to  3fepravity  of  the  actions  of  free  will,  can  have  no 
(moral  character.     It  may,  as  we  shall  see,  be  caused  by  moral 
depravity;  and  a  moral  agent  may  be  blameworthy  for  hav- 
ing rendered  himself  physically  depraved,  either  in  body  or 
mind.     But  physical  depravity,  whether  of  body  or  of  mind, 
can  have  no  moral  character  in  itself,  for  the  plain  reason  that 
it  is  involuntary,  and  in  its  nature  disease,  and  not  sin. 

Moral  depravity  is  the  depravity  of  free  will,  not  of  the  fa- 
culty itself,  but  of  its  free  action.  It  consists  in  a  violation  of 
moral  law.  Depravity  of  the  will,  as  a  faculty^  is,  or  would 
be  physical,  and  not  moral  depravity.  It  would  be  depravity 
of  substance,  and  not  of  free,  responsible  choice.  Moral  de- 
pravity is  depravity  of  choice.  It  is  a  choice  at  variance  with 
moral  law,  moral  right.  It  is  synonymous  with  sin  or  sinful- 
ness. It  is  moral  depravity,  because  it  consists  in  a  violation 
of  moral  law,  and  because  it  has  moral  character. 
III.   Of  what  physical  depravity  can  he  predicated. 

1.  It  can  be  predicated  of  any  organized  substance.  That 
is,  every  organized  substance  is  liable  to  become  depraved. 
Depravity  is  a  possible  state  of  every  organized  body  or  sub- 
stance in  existence. 

2.  Physical  depravity  may  be  predicated  of  mind,  as  has 
already  been  said,  especially  in  its  connection  with  an  organ- 
ized body.  As  mind  in  connection  with  body,  manifests  itself 
through  it,  acts  by  means  of  it,  and  is  dependent  upon  it,  it  is 
plain,  that  if  the  body  become  diseased,  or  physically  de- 
praved, the  mind  can  not  but  be  affected  by  this  state  of  the 
body,  through  and  by  means  of  which  it  acts.  The  normal 
manifestations  of  mind  can  not,  in  such  case,  be  reasonably 
expected.  Physical  depravity  may  be  predicated  of  all  the 
powers  and  involuntary  states  of  mind,  of  the  intelligence,  of 
the  sensibility,  and  of  the  faculty  of  will.  That  is,  the  actings 
and  states  of  the  intelligence,  may  become  disordered,  de- 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  449 

praved,  deranged,  or  fallen  from  the  state  of  integrity  and 
healthiness.  This,  every  one  knows,  as  it  is  matter  of  daily 
experience  and  observation.  Whether  this  in  all  cases  is,  and 
must  be  caused  by  the  state  of  the  bodily  organization,  that 
is,  whether  it  is  always  and  necessarily  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
depraved  state  of  the  brain  and  nerv^ous  system,  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  us  to  know\  It  may,  for  aught  we  know,  in  some  in- 
stances at  least,  be  a  depravity  or  derangement  of  the  sub- 
stance of  the  mind  itself. 

The  sensibility,  or  feeling  department  of  the  mind,  may  be 
sadly  and  physically  depraved.  This  is  a  matter  of  common 
experience.  The  appetites  and  passions,  the  desires  and 
cravings,  the  antipathies  and  repellencies  of  the  feelings  fall 
into  great  disorder  and  anarchy.  Numerous  artificial  appe- 
tites are  generated,  and  the  whole  sensibility  becomes  a  wil- 
derness, a  chaos  of  conflicting  and  clamorous  desires,  emotions, 
and  passions.  That  this  state  of  the  sensibility  is  often,  and 
perhaps  always,  owing  in  some  measure  at  least,  to  the  state 
of  the  nervous  system  with  which  it  is  connected,  through  and 
by  which  it  manifests  itself,  there  can  be  but  little  room  to 
doubt.  But  whether  this  is  always  and  necessarily  so,  no  one 
can  tell.  We  know  that  the  sensibility  manifests  great  physi- 
cal depravity.  Whether  this  depravity  belong  exclusively  to 
the  body,  or  to  the  mind,  or  to  both  in  connection,  I  will  not 
venture  to  affirm.  In  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge,  or 
of  my  knowledge,  I  dare  not  hazard  an  affirmation  upon  the 
subject.  The  human  body  is  certainly  in  a  state  of  physical 
depravity.  The  human  mind  also  certainly  manifests  physic- 
al depravity. 

IV.  Of  what  moral  depravity  can  he  predicated. 

1.  Not  of  substance;  for  over  involuntary  substance  the 
moral  law  does  not  legislate. 

%  Moral  depravity  can  not  be  predicated  of  any  involunta- 
ry acts  or  states  of  mi«nd.  These  surely  can  not  be  violations 
of  moral  law,  for  moral  law  legislates  only  over  free,  intelli- 
gent choices. 

3.  Moral  depravity  can  not  be  predicated  of  any  unintelli- 
gent act  of  will,  that  is,  of  acts  of  will  Ihat  are  put  forth  in  a 
state  of  idiocy,  of  intellectual  derangement,  or  of  sleep.  Mor- 
al depravity  implies  moral  obligation;  moral  obligation  implies 
moral  agency;  and  moral  agency  implies  intelligence,  or  knowl- 
edge of  moral  relations.  Moral  agency  implies  moral  law,  or 
the  development  of  the  idea  of  duty,  and  a  knowledge  of  what 
duty  is. 

38* 


450  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

V'  4.  Moral  depravity  can  only  be  predicated  of  violations  of 
moral  law.  Moral  law,  as  we  have  seen,  requires  love,  and 
only  love  to  God  and  man,  or  to  God  and  the  universe.  This 
love,  as  we  have  seen,  is  good  will,  choice,  the  choice  of  an 
end,  the  choice  of  the  highest  well  being  of  God  and  of  the 
universe  of  sentient  existences. 

Moral  depravity  is  sin.  Sin  is  a  violation  of  moral  law. 
We  have  seen  that  sin  must  consist  in  choice,  in  the  choice 
of  self-indulgence  or  self-gratification  as  an  end. 

5.  Moral  depravity  can  not  consist  in  any  attribute  of  na- 
ture or  constitution,  nor  in  any  lapsed  and  fallen  state  of  na- 
ture; for  this  is  physical  and  not  moral  depravity. 
5*^  6.  It  can  not  consist  in  any  thing  that  is  a  part  of  mind  or 
body.  Nor  in  any  involuntary  action  or  state  of  either  mind 
or  body, 
y/  7.  It  can  not  consist  in  any  thing  back  of  choice,  and  that 
sustains  to  choice  the  relation  of  a  cause.  Whatever  is  back 
of  choice,  is  without  the  pale  of  legislation.  The  law  of  God 
as  has  been  said,  requires  good  wilhng  only,  and  sure  it  is,  that 
nothing  but  acts  of  will  can  constitute  a  violation  of  moral  law. 
Outward  actions,  and  involuntary  thoughts  and  feelings,  may 
be  said,  in  a  certain  sense,  to  possess  moral  character,  because 
they  are  produced  by  the  will.  But  strictly  speaking,  moral 
character  belongs  only  to  choice,  or  intention. 
''^  It  was  shown  in  a  former  lecture,  that  sin  does  not,  and  can 
not  consist  in  malevolence,  properly  speaking,  or  in  the  choice 
of  sin  or  misery  as  an  end,  or  for  its  own  sake.  It  was  also 
shown,  that  all  sin  consists,  and  must  consist  in  selfishness,  or 
in  the  choice  of  self-gratification  as  an  end. 

Moral  depravity,  then,  strictly  speaking,  can  only  be  predi- 
cated of  selfish  ultimate  intention. 

V.  Mankind  are  both  physically  and  morally  depraved. 

1.  There  is,  in  all  probability,  no  perfect  health  of  body 
among  all  the  ranks  and  classes  of  human  beings  that  inhabit 
this  world.  The  physical  organization  of  the  whole  race  has 
become  impaired,  and  beyond  all  doubt  has  been  becoming 
more  and  more  so  since  intemperance  of  any  kind  was  first 
introduced  into  our  world.  This  is  illustrated  and  confirmed 
by  the  comparative  shortness  of  human  life.  This  also  is  a 
physiological  fact. 

2.  As  the  human  mind,  in  this  state  of  existence,  is  depend- 
ent upon  the  body  for  all  its  manifestations,  and  as  the  human 
body  is  universally  in  a  state  of  greater  or  less  physical  de- 
pravity or  disease,  it  follows  that  the  manifestations  of  mind 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  451 

thus  dependent  on  a  physically  depraved  organization,  will  be 
physically  depraved  manifestations.     Especially  is  this  true 
of  the  human  sensibility.     The  appetites,  passions,  and  pro- 
pensities are  in  a  state  of  most  unhealthy  development.     This 
is  too  evident  and  too  much  a  matter  of  universal  notoriety  to 
need  proof  or  illustration.     Every  person  of  reflection  has  ob- 
served that  the  human  mind  is  greatly  out  of  balance  in  con- 
sequence of  the  monstrous  development  of  the  sensibility. 
The  appetites,  passions,  and  propensities  have  been  indulged, 
and  the  intelligence  and  conscience  stultified  by  selfishness. 
Selfishness,  be  it  remembered,  consists  in  a  disposition  or  choice 
to   gratify  the  propensities,   desires  and  feelings.     This,  of 
course  and  of  necessity,  produces  just  the  unhealthy  and  mon- 
strous developments  which  we  daily  see:  sometimes  one  ruling 
passion  or  appetite  lording  it  not  only  over  the   intelligence 
and  over  the  will,  but  also  over  all  the  other  appetites  and 
passions,  crushing  and  sacrificing  them  all  upon  the  altar  of  its 
own  gratification.     See  that  bloated  wretch — an  inebriate! 
His  appetite  for  strong  drink  has  played  the  despot.     The  v 
whole  mind  and  body,  reputation,  family,  friends,  health,  time,    J 
eternity,  all,  all  have  been  laid  upon  its  filthy  altar.     There 
are  the  debauchee,  and  the  glutton,  and  the  gambler,  and  the    "* 
miser,  and  a  host  of  others  each  in  his   turn   giving  striking     \ 
and  melancholy  proof  of  the  monstrous  development  and  phys-    / 
ical  depravity  of  the  human  sensibility. 

3.  That  men  are  morally  depraved  is  one  of  the  most  noto- 
rious facts  of  human  experience,  observation,  and  history. 

Indeed  I  am  not  aware  that  it  has  ever  been  doubted  when 
moral  depravity  has  been  understood  to  consist  in  selfishness. 
The  moral  depravity  of  the  race  of  man  is  every  where  as- 
sumed and  declared  in  the  Bible,  and  so  universal  and  notori- 
ous is  the  fact  of  human  selfishness  that  should  any  man  prac- 
tically call  it  in  question — should  he  in  his  business  transac- 
tions and  in  his  intercouse  with  men  assume  the  contrary,  he 
would  justly  subject  himself  to  the  charge  of  insanity.  Indeed 
there  is  not  a  fact  in  the  world  more  notorious  and  undenia- 
ble than  this.  Human  moral  depravity  is  as  palpably  evident 
as  human  existence.  It  is  a  fact  every  where  assumed  in  all 
governments,  in  all  the  arrangements  of  society,  and  has  im- 
pressed its  image  and  written  its  name  upon  every  thing  hu- 
man. 

VI.  Subsequent  to  the  commencement  of  mx>ral  agency  and 
previous  to  regeneration  the  moral  depravity  of  mankind  is  uni- 
versaL 


452        .  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

By  this  it  is  not  intended  to  deny  that  in  some  instances 
the  Spirit  of  God  may  from  the  first  moment  of  moral  agency 
have  so  enlightened  the  mind  as  to  have  secured  conformity  to 
moral  law  as  the  first  moral  act.  This  may  or  may  not  be 
true.  It  is  not  my  present  purpose  to  affirm  or  to  deny  this 
as  a  possibility  or  as  a  fact. 

But  by  this  is  intended,  that  every  moral  agent  of  our  race 
is  from  the  dawn  of  moral  agency  to  the  moment  of  regene- 
ration by  the  Holy  Spirit,  morally  depraved,  unless  we  except 
those  possible  cases  just  alluded  to.  The  Bible  exhibits 
proof  of  it  in, 

1.  Those  passages  that  represent  all  the  unregenerate  as 
possessing  one  common  wicked  heart  or  character.  '^And 
God  saw  that  the  wickedness  of  man  was  great  in  the  earth, 
and  that  every  imagination  of  the  thoughts  of  his  heart  was 
only  evil  continually." — Gen.  6:  5.  '•^This  is  an  evil  among 
all  things  that  are  done  under  the  sun,  that  there  is  one  event 
unto  all:  yea,  also  the  heart  of  the  sons  of  men  is  full  of  evil, 
and  madness  is  in  their  heart  while  they  live,  and  after  that 
they  go  to  the  dead." — Eccl.  9:  3.  ''The  heart  is  deceitful 
above  all  things  and  desperately  wicked:  who  can  know  it?" 
— Jer.  17:  9.  '*  Because  the  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against 
God:  for  it  is  not-  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed 
can  be."— Ro.  8:  7. 

2.  Those  passages  that  declare  the  universal  necessity  of 
regeneration.  '•'Jesus  answered  and  said  unto  him,  Verily, 
verily,  I  say  unto  thee,  Except  a  man  be  born  again,  he  can 
not  seethe  kingdom  of  God." — John  3:  3. 

3.  Passages  that  expressly  assert  the  universal  moral  de- 
pravity of  all  unregenerate  ijioral  agents  of  our  race.  "  What 
then?  are  we  better  than  they?  No,  in  no  wise:  for  we  have 
before  proved  both  Jews  and  Gentiles,  that  they  are  all  un- 
der sin;  As  it  is  written.  There  is  none  righteous,  no,  not 
one:  There  is  none  that  understandeth,  there  is  none  that 
seeketh  after  God.  They  are  all  gone  out  of  the  way,  they 
are  together  become  unprofitable;  there  is  none  that  doeth 
good,  no,  not  one.  Their  throat  is  an  open  sepulchre;  with 
their  tongues  they  have  used  deceit;  the  poison  of  asps  is 
under  their  lips:  Whose  mouth  is  full  of  cursing  and  bitter- 
ness: Their  {ee^t  are  swift  to  shed  blood:  Destruction  and 
misery  are  in  their  ways:  And  the  way  of  peace  have  they 
not  known:  There  is  no  fear  of  God  before  their  eyes.  Now 
We  know  that  what  things  soever  the  law  saith,  it  saith  to 
them  who  are  under  the  law;  that  every  mouth  may  be  stop- 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  453 

ped,  and  all  the  world  may  become  guilty  before  God.  There- 
fore by  the  deeds  of  the  law  there  shall  no  flesh  be  justified 
in  his  sight;  for  by  the  law  is  the  knowledge  of  sin. — Ro.  3: 
9—20. 

4.  Universal  history  proves  it.  What  is  this  world's  histo- 
ry but  the  shameless  chronicle  of  human  wickedness? 

5.  Universal  observation  attests  it.  Who  ever  saw  one 
unregenerate  human  being  that  was  not  selfish,  that  did  not 
obey  his  feehngs  rather  than  the  law  of  his  intelligence,  that 
was  not  under  some  form  or  in  some  way  living  to  please  self? 
Such  an  unregenerate  human  being  I  may  safely  aftirm  was 
never  seen  since  the  fall  of  Adam. 

6.  1  may  also  appeal  to  the  univesal  consciousness  of  the 
unregenerate.  They  know  themselves  to  be  selfish,  to  be 
aiming  to  please  themselves. 

VIL  The  moral  depravity  of  the  unregenerate  moral  agents 
of  our  race,  is  total. 

By  this  is  intended,  that  the  moral  depravity  of  the  un- 
regenerate is  without  any  mixture  of  moral  goodness  or  vir- 
tue, that  while  they  remain  unregenerate,  they  never,  in  any 
instance,  nor  in  any  degree  exercise  true  love  to  God  and  to 
man.  It  is  not  intended,  that  they  may  not  perform  many 
outward  actions,  and  have  many  inward  feelings,  that  are  such 
as  the  regenerate  perform  and  experience.  But  it  is  intended 
that  virtue  does  not  consist  either  in  involuntary  feehngs  or 
in  outward  actions,  and  that  it  consists  alone  in  entire  conse- 
cration of  heart  and  life  to  God  and  the  good  of  being,  and 
that  no  unregenerate  sinner  previous  to  regeneration,  is  or 
can  be  for  one  moment  in  this  state. 

When  virtue  is  clearly  defined  and  apprehended,  and  when 
it  is  seen  not  to  consist  in  any  thing  but  the  heart's  entire 
consecration  to  God  and  the  good  of  being,  it  must  be  seen, 
that  the  unregenerate  are  not,  and  that  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  aflirm  that  they  are,  or,  remaining  unregenerate,  can  be, 
for  one  moment  in  this  state.  It  is  amazing,  that  some  philos- 
ophers and  theologians  have  admitted  and  maintained,  that 
the  unregenerate  do  sometimes  do  that  which  is  truly  virtu- 
ous. But  in  these  admissions  they  necessarily  assume  a  false 
philosophy  and  overlook  that  in  which  all  virtue  does  and 
must  consist,  namely,  supreme  ultimate  intention.  They 
speak  of  virtuous  actions  and  of  virtuous  feelings,  as  if  virtue 
consisted  in  them,  and  not  in  the  intention. 

Henry  P.  Tappan,  for  example,  for  the  most  part  an  able, 
truthful  and  beautiful  writer,  assumes,  or  rather  affirms,  that 


454  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

volitions  may  be  put  forth  inconsistent  with,  and  contrary  to 
the  present  choice  of  an  end,  and  that  consequently,  unregen- 
erate  sinners,  whom  he  admits  to  be  in  the  exercise  of  a  sel- 
fish choice  of  an  end,  may,  and  do  sometimes  put  forth  right 
•volitions,  and  perform  right  actions,  that  is,  right  in  the  sense 
of  virtuous  actions.  But  let  us  examine  this  subject.  "We 
have  seen  that  all  choice  and  all  volition  must  respect  either 
an  end  or  means,  that  is,  that  every  thing  willed  or  chosen,  is 
willed  or  chosen  for  some  reason.  To  deny  this  is  the  same 
as  to  deny  that  any  thing  is  willed  or  chosen,  because  the  rea- 
son for  a  choice  and  the  thing  chosen  are  identical.  There- 
fore, it  is  plain,  as  was  shown  in  a  former  lecture,  1,  that  the 
will  cannot  embrace  at  the  same  time,  two  opposite  ends;  and 
2,  that  while  but  one  end  is  chosen,  the  will  cannot  put  forth 
voUtions  to  secure  some  other  end,  which  end  is  not  yet  cho- 
sen. In  other  words,  it  certainly  is  absurd  to  say,  that  the 
will,  while  maintaining  the  choice  of  one  end,  can  use  means 
for  the  accomplishment  of  another  and  opposite  end. 

Again.  The  choice  of  an  end,  or  of  means,  when  more 
than  one  end  or  means  is  known  to  the  mind,  implies  prefer- 
ence. The  choice  of  one  end  or  means,  implies  the  rejection 
of  its  opposite.  If  one  of  two  opposing  ends  be  chosen,  the 
other  is,  and  must  be  rejected.  Tlierefore  the  choice  of  the 
two  ends  can  never  co-exist.  And  as  was  shown  in  a  former 
lecture, 

1.  The  mind  cannot  will  at  all  without  an  end.  As  all 
choice  and  volition  must  respect  ends,  or  means,  and  as  means 
cannot  be  willed  without  the  previous  choice  of  an  end,  it  fol- 
lows, that  the  choice  of  an  end  is  necessarily  the  first  choice. 

2.  When  an  end  is  chosen,  that  choice  confines  all  volition 
to  securing  its  accomplishment,  and  for  the  time  being,  and 
until  another  end  is  chosen,  and  this  one  relinquished,  it  is  im- 
possible for  the  will  to  put  forth  any  volition  inconsistent  with 
the  present  choice.  It  therefore  follows,  that  while  sinners 
are  selfish,  or  unregenerate,  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  put 
forth  a  holy  volition. 

They  are  under  the  necessity  of  first  changing  their  hearts, 
or  their  choice  of  an  end,  before  they  can  put  forth  any  voli- 
tions to  secure  any  other  than  a  selfish  end.  And  this  is 
plainly  the  every  where  assumed  philosophy  of  the  Bible. 
That  uniformly  represents  the  unregenerate  as  totally  de- 
praved, and  calls  upon  them  to  repent,  to  make  to  them- 
selves a  new  heart,  and  never  admits  directly,  or  by  way 
of  implication,  that  they  can  do  any  thing  good  or   accepta- 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  455 

ble  to  God  while  in  the  exercise  of  a  wicked  or  selfish  heart. 

When  examining  the  attributes  of  selfishness,  it  was  shown 
that  total  depravity  was  one  of  its  essential  attributes;  or  ra- 
ther, that  it  was  the  moral  attribute  in  these  senses,  to  wit: 

(1.)  That  selfishness  did  not,  could  not  co-exist  with  virtue 
or  benevolence. 

(2.)  That  selfishness  could  admit  of  no  volitions  or  actions 
inconsistent  with  it  while  it  continued. 

(3.)  That  selfishness  was  not  only  wholly  inconsistent  with 
any  degree  of  love  to  God,  but  was  enmity  against  God,  the 
very  opposite  of  his  wdll,  and  constituted  deep  and  entire  op- 
position of  will  to  God. 

(4.)  That  selfishness  was  mortal  enmity  against  God,  as 
manifested  in  the  murder  of  Christ: 

(5.)  That  selfishness  was  supreme  opposition  to  God. 

(6.)  That  every  selfish  being  is,  and  must  be  at  every  mo- 
ment, just  as  wicked  and  blameworthy,  as  with  his  light  he 
could  be,  that  he  at  every  moment  violated  all  his  moral  obli- 
gations and  rejected  and  trampled  down  all  the  Hght  he  had, 
and  that  whatever  course  of  outward  life  any  sinner  pursues, 
it  is  all  directed  exclusively  by  selfishness,  and  whether  he 
goes  into  the  pulpit  to  preach  the  gospel,  or  becomes  a  pi- 
rate upon  the  high  seas,  he  is  actuated  in  either  case  solely 
by  a  regard  to  self-interest,  and  that,  let  him  do  one  or  the 
other,  it  is  for  the  same  reason,  to  wit,  to  please  himself,  so 
that  it  matters  not,  so  far  as  his  guilt  is  concerned,  which  he 
does.  One  course  may,  or  it  may  not  result  in  more  or  less 
evil  than  the  other.  But,  as  was  then  shown,  the  tendency  of 
one  course  or  the  other,  is  not  the  criterion  by  which  his  guilt 
is  to  be  measured,  but  his  apprehension  of  the  value  of  the 
interests  rejected  for  the  sake  of  securing  his  own  gratification. 


b 


LECTURE  XXXVI.  ^fef^-.- 

MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 

VIIL  Proper  method  of  accounting  for  the  universal  and  total 
moral  depravity  of  the  unregenerate  moral  agents  of  our  race. 
In  the  discussion  of  this  subject,  I  will, 

1.  Endeavor  to  show  how  it  is  not  to  be  accounted  for. 

2.  How  it  is  to  be  accounted  for. 

1.  How  the  moral  depravity  of  mankind  is  not  to  be  ac- 
counted for. 

In  examining  this  part  of  the  subject,  it  is  necessary  to 
have  distinctly  in  view,  that  which  constitutes  moral  depravi- 
ty. All  the  error  that  has  existed  upon  this  subject,  has  been 
founded  in  false  assumptions  in  regard  to  the  nature  or  es- 
sence of  moral  depravity.  It  has  been  almost  universally 
true,  that  no  distinction  has  been  made  between  moral  and 
physical  depravity;  and  consequently  physical  depravity  has 
been  confounded  with  and  treated  of  as  moral  depravity. 
This,  of  course,  has  led  to  vast  confusion  and  nonsense  upon 
this  subject.  Let  the  following  facts,  which  have  been  shown 
in  former  lectures,  be  distinctly  borne  in  mind. 

/.  That  moral  depravity  consists  in  selfishness^  or  in  the  choice 
of  self-interest^  self  gratification.,  or  self  indulgence^  as  an  end. 
Consequently  it  can  not  consist, 

1.  In  a  sinful  constitution.,  or  in  a  constitutional  appetency 
or  craving  for  sin.  This  has  been  shown  in  a  former  lecture, 
on  what  is  not  implied  in  disobedience  to  the  moral  law. 

2.  Moral  depravity  is  sin  itself,  and  not  the  cause  of  sin. 
It  is  not  something  back  of  sin  that  sustains  to  it  the  relation 
of  a  cause,  but  it  is  the  essence  and  the  whole  of  sin. 

3.  It  can  not  be  an  attribute  of  human  nature,  for  this  would 
be  physical,  and  not  moral  depravity. 

4.  Moral  depravity  is  not  then  to  be  accounted  for  by 
ascribing  it  to  a  nature  or  constitution  sinful  in  itself.  To 
talk  of  a  sinful  nature,  or  sinful  constitution,  in  the  sense  of 
physical  sinfulness,  is  to  talk  stark  nonsense.  It  is  to  over- 
look the  essential  nature  of  sin,  and  to  make  sin  a  physical 
virus,  instead  of  a  voluntary  and  responsible  choice.  Both 
sound  philosophy,  and  the  Bible,  make  sin  to  consist  in  obey- 
ing the  flesh,  or  in  the  spirit  of  self-pleasing,  or  self-indul- 
gence, or  which  is  the  same  thing,  in  selfishness — in  a  carnal 
mind,  or  in  minding  the  flesh.  But  writers  on  moral  depravi- 
ty have  assumed,  that  moral  depravity  was  distinct  from,  and 


MORAL   DEPRAVITY.  457 

the  cause  of  sin,  that  is,  of  actual  transgression.  They  call 
it  original  sin,  indwelling  sin,  a  sinful  nature^  an  appetite  for 
stn^  an  attribute  of  human  nature,  and  the  like.  We  snail 
soon  see  what  has  led  to  this  view  of  the  subject.  V 

I  will,  in  the  next  place,  notice  a  modern,  and  perhaps  the 
most  popular  view  of  this  subject,  which  has  been  taken  by 
any  late  writer  who  has  fallen  into  the  error  of  confounding 
physical  and  moral  depravity.  I  refer  to  the  prize  essay  of 
Dr.  Woods,  of  Andover,  Mass.  A  reward  of  §300  was  of- 
fered for  the  best  treatise  upon  the  subject  of  moral  depravi- 
ty. The  prize  was  awarded  to  Dr.  Leonard  Woods.  In  his 
essay,  he  defines  moral  depravity  to  be  the  same  as  *■'  sinful- 
ness." He  also,  in  one  part  of  his  essay,  holds  and  maintains, 
that  it  is  always  and  necessarily,  voluntary.  Still,  his  great 
effort  is  to  prove  that  sinfulness  or  moral  depravity,  is  an  at- 
tribute of  human  nature.  It  is  no  part  of  my  design  to  ex- 
pose the  inconsistency  of  holding  moral  depravity  to  be  a  volun- 
tary state  of  mind,  and  yet  a  natural  attribute,  but  only  to 
examine  the  philosophy,  the  logic,  and  theology  of  his  main  /y 
argument.  The  following  quotation  will  show  the  sense  in 
which  he  holds  moral  depravity  to  belong  to  the  nature  of 
man.     On  page  54  he  says: 

'♦The  word  depravity,  relating  as  it  here  does  to  man's  moral  character, 
means  the  same  as  sinfulness,  being  the  opposite  of  moral  purity  or  holiness. 
In  this  use  of  the  word  there  is  a  general  agreement.  But  what  is  the  meaning 
of  native  or  natural?  Among  the  variety  of  meanings  specified  by  Johnson, 
We"bster,  and  others,  I  refer  to  the  following,  as  relating  particularly  to  the 
subject  before  us. 

"  Native.  Produced  by  nature.  Natural,  or  such  as  is  according  to  nature; 
belonging  by  birth;  original.  Natural  has  substantially  the  same  meaning: 
•'  produced  by  nature;  not  acquired." — So  Crabbe.  '*  Of  a  person  we  say,  his 
worth  is  native,  to  designate  it  as  some  valuable  property  bom  icith  hiin,  not 
foreign  to  him  or  iagrafted  upon  him;  but  we  say  of  his  disposition,  that  it  is 
natural,  as  opposed  to  that  which  is  acquired  by  habit."  And  Johnson  defines 
nature  to  be  "  the  native  state  or  properties  of  any  thing,  by  which  it  is  discrimi- 
nated from  others.'^  He  quotes  the  definition  of  Boyle;  "  Nature  sometimes 
means  what  belongs  to  a  living  creature  at  its  nativity,  or  accrues  to  it  by  its 
birth,  as  when  we  say  a  man  is  noble  by  nature,  or  a  ciiild  is  naturally  forward. 
"  This,"  he  says,  "  may  be  expressed  by  saying,  themanwas  born  so." 

After  these  brief  definitions,  which  come  to  nearly  the  same  thing,  I  proceed 
to  inquire,  what  are  the  marks  or  evidences  which  show  any  thing  in  man  to  be 
natural  or  native;  and  how  far  these  marks  are  found  in  relation  to  depravity.  / 

Again,  page  66,  he  says: 

"  The  evil  then  can  not  be  supposed  to  originate  in  any  unfavorable  exter- 
nal circumstances,  auch  as  corrupting  examples,  or  insinuating  and  strong 
temptations;  for  if  we  suppose  these  entirely  removed,  all  human  beings  would 
still  be  sinners.  With  such  a  moral  nature  as  they  now  have,  they  would  not 
wait  for  strong  temptations  to  sin.  Nay,  they  would  be  sinners  in  opposition 
to  the  strongest  motives  to  the  contrary.  Indeed  we  know  that  human  beings 
will  turn  those  very  motives  which  most  powerfully  urge  to  holiness,  into  occa- 

39 


458  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sioBS  of  sin.  Now  does  not  the  confidence  and  certainty  with  which  we  foretell 
the  commission  of  sin,  and  of  sin  unmixed  with  moral  purity,  presuppose  a  full 
conviction  in  us,  and  a  conviction  resting  upon  what  we  regard  as  satisfactory 
evidence,  that  sin,  in  all  its  visible  actings,  arises  from  that  which  is  within  tha 
mind  itself,  and  which  belongs  to  our  very  nature  as  moral  beings?  Have  we 
not  as  much  evidence  that  this  is  the  case  with  moral  evil,  as  with  any  of  our 
natural  affections  or  bodily  appetites?" 

This  quotation,  together  with  the  whole  argument,  shows 
that  he  considers  moral  depravity  to  be  an  attribute  of  human 
nature  in  the  same  sense  that  the  appetites  and  passions  are. 

Before  I  proceed  directly  to  the  examination  of  his  argu- 
ment to  establish  the  position  that  sinfulness,  or  moral  de- 
pravity is  an  "  attribute  of  human  nature^''  I  would  premise,  that 
an  argument^  orfact^  that  may  equally  zcell  consist  with  either  of 
two  opposing  theories  can  prove  neither.  The  author  of  the 
treatise  in  question,  presents  the  following  facts  and  consid- 
erations in  support  of  his  great  position,  that  moral  depravity, 
or  sinfulness,  is  an  attribute  of  human  nature;  and  thr^  Presi- 
dents of  colleges  underwrite  for  the  soundness  and  conclusive- 
ness of  the  argument.     He  argues  this, 

1.  From  the  "universality  of  moral  depravity.'^'*  To  this  I 
answer,  that  this  argument  proves  nothing  to  the  purpose,  un- 
less it  be  true,  and  assumed  as  a  major  premise,  that  whatever 
is  universal  among  mankind,  must  be  a  natural  attribute  of 
man  as  such;  that  whatever  is  common  to  all  men,  must  be  an 
attribute  of  human  nature.  If  this  be  not  assumed  as  a  truth, 
and  if  it  be  not  true  in  fact,  it  will  not  follow,  that  the  univer- 
sality of  moral  depravity,  proves,  or  is  any  evidence,  that  it  is 
an  attribute  of  human  nature.  But  do  not  all  men  breathe, 
and  eat,  and  drink,  and  sleep,  and  wake,  and  think,  and  will, 
and  perform  various  actions?  These,  and  many  other  things, 
are  universal,  and  common  to  all  men.  But  are  these — 
choices  and  volitions,  for  example — attributes  of  human  na- 
ture? An  attribute  of  a  thing,  is  that  which  belongs  to  its 
essence,  substance,  nature.  Volition,  thought,  feeling,  &c.; 
are  they  natural  attributes?  Are  they  inherent  in,  and  do 
they  belong  to  the  nature  or  substance  qf  man?  Who  does 
not  know,  that  they  are  not  attributes  of  his  nature,  although 
common  to  all  men.  This  argument,  then,  amounts  to  no- 
thing. 

Again.  Selfishness  is  common  to  all  unregenerate  men.     Is 

selfishness  a  natural  attribute?    "We  have  seen,  in  a  former 

lecture,  that  it  consists  in  choice.    Can  choice  be  an  attribute 

of  human  nature? 

Again.  This  argument  is  just  as  consistent  with  the  oppo- 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  459 

site  theory,  to  wit,  that  moral  depravity  is  selfishness.  The 
universality  of  selfishness  is  just  what  might  be  expected,  if 
selfishness  consists  in  the  committal  of  the  will  to  the  gratifi- 
cation of  self.  This  will  be  a  thing  of  course,  unless  the  Holy 
Spirit  interpose,  to  greatly  enhghten  the  intelligence,  and 
break  up  the  force  of  habit,  and  change  the  attitude  of  the 
will,  already  at  the  first  dawn  of  reason,  as  has  been  shown, 
committed  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility.  If  moral  de- 
pravity is  to  be  accounted  for,  as  I  have  endeavored  to  ac- 
count for  it  in  a  former  lecture,  and  shall  hereafter  more 
fully,  by  ascribing  it  to  the  influence  of  temptation,  or  to  a 
physically  depraved  constitution,  surrounded  by  the  circum- 
stances in  which  mankind  first  form  their  moral  character,  or 
put  forth  their  first  moral  choices,  universality  might  of  course 
be  expected  to  be  one  of  its  characteristics.  This  argument, 
then,  agreeing  equally  well  with  either  theory,  proves  neither. 

2.  His  secondargumentis,  that '•'■Moral  depravity  develops 
itself  in  early  life."    Answer, 

(1.)  This  is  just  what  might  be  expected  upon  the  opposite 
theory.  If  moral  depravity  consist  in  the  choice  of  self-grati- 
fication, it  would  of  course  appear  in  early  life.  So  this  argu- 
ment agrees  quite  as  well  with  the  opposing  theory,  and  there- 
fore proves  nothing.     But, 

(2.)  This  argument  is  good  for  nothing,  unless  the  following 
be  assumed  as  a  major  premise,  and  unless  the  fact  assumed, 
be  indeed  a  truth,  namely,  ^'  Whatever  is  developed  in  early 
life,  must  be  an  attribute  of  human  nature."  But  is  this  true? 
Breathing,  sleeping,  eating,  and  such  like  things — are  these 
attributes  of  nature?  But  unless  it  be  true,  that  whatever  is 
universally  developed  in  early  life,  is  an  attribute  of  human 
nature,  it  will  not  of  course  follow,  that  moral  depravity  is. 

3.  His  third  argument  is,  that  '■'•  Moral  depravity  is  not  ow- 
ing to  any  change  that  occurs  subsequent  to  birth."     Answer: 

Nor  is  choice  or  volition,  thought  or  feeling,  owing  to  any 
change  in  the  constitution,  that  occurs  subsequently  to  birth. 
What  then:  are  they  attributes  of  human  nature?  This  ar- 
gument proves  nothing,  unless  it  be  true,  that  whatever  is 
universally  true  of  men  that  is  not  owing  to  any  change  of 
constitution  that  occurs  after  birth,  must  be  an  attribute  of 
human  nature.  But  who  does  not  know,  that  this  is  not  true. 
'■'•What  then,  does  this  arguing  prove?" 

Again:  this  argument  is  just  as  consistent  with  the  oppos- 
ing theory,  and  therefore  proves  neither. 

4.  His  fourth  argument  is,   "That  moral  depravity  acts 


460  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

freely  and  spontaneously."  Answer:  the  moral  agent  acts 
freely,  and  acts  selfishly^  that  is,  wickedly.  This  argument 
assumes,  that  if  a  moral  agent  acts  freely  and  wickedly,  moral 
depravity,  or  sin,  must  be  an  attribute  of  his  nature.  Or 
more  fairly,  if  mankind  universally,  in  the  exercise  of  their 
liberty,  act  sinfully,  sinfulness  must  be  an  attribute  of  human 
nature."  But  what  is  sin?  Why  sin  is  a  voluntary  transgres- 
sion of  law — Dr.  Woods  being  judge.  Can  a  voluntary  trans- 
gression of  law  be  an  attribute  of  human  nature? 

But  again:  this  argument  is  equally  consistent  with  the  op- 
posite theory.  If  moral  depravity  consist  in  the  choice  of 
self-gratification  as  an  end,  it  would  of  course  freely  and  spon- 
taneously manifest  itself.  This  argument  then,  is  good  for 
nothing. 

5.  His  fifth  argument  is,  '^That  moral  depravity  is  hard  to 
overcome."     Answer, 

1.  If  it  were  an  attribute  of  human  nature,  it  could  not  be 
overcome  at  all  without  a  change  of  the  human  constitution. 

2.  It  is  hard  to  overcome,  just  as  selfishness  naturally  would 
be  in  beings  of  a  physically  depraved  constitution,  and  in  the 
presence  of  so  many  temptations  to  self-indulgence. 

3.  If  it  were  an  attribute  of  human  nature,  it  could  not  be 
overcome  without  a  change  of  personal  identity.  But  the 
fact  that  it  can  be  overcome,  and  the  consciousness  of  per- 
sonal identity  remain,  proves  that  it  is  not  an  attribute  of  hu- 
man nature. 

6.  His  sixth  argument  is,  that  ''  We  can  predict  with  cer- 
tainty, that  in  due  time,  it  will  act  itself  out."  Answer:  Just 
as  might  be  expected.  If  moral  depravity  consists  in  selfish- 
ness, we  can  predict  with  certainty,  that  the  spirit  of  self- 
pleasing  will,  in  due  time,  and  at  all  times,  act  itself  out. 
We  can  also  predict,  without  the  gift  of  prophesying,  that 
with  a  constitution  physically  depraved,  and  surrounded  with 
objects  to  awaken  appetite,  and  with  all  the  circumstances  in 
which  human  beings  first  form  their  moral  character,  they 
will  seek  to  gratify  themselves  universally,  unless  prevented 
by  the  Holy  Spirit.  This  argument  is  just  as  consistent  with 
the  opposite  theory,  and  therefore  proves  neither. 

Again:  this  argument,  like  all  the  rest,  is  based  upon  the 
assumption  of  a  false  major  premise,  to  wit,  *•'  That  whatever 
we  can  predict  with  certainty,  of  human  beings,  must  be  an 
attribute  of  their  nature."  But  we  can  predict,  that  if  they 
live,  they  will  think  and  choose.  Are  these  attributes  of  hu- 
man nature? 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  461 

It  is  unnecessary  to  occupy  any  more  time  with  the  treatise 
of  Dr.  Woods.  I  will  now  quote  the  standards  of  the  Pres- 
byterian church,  which  will  possess  you  of  their  views  upon 
this  subject.  On  pages  30  and  31  of  the  Presbyterian  Con- 
fession of  Faith,  we  have  the  following:  "By  this  sin,  they, 
(Adam  and  Eve.)  fell  from  their  original  righteousness  and 
communion  with  God,  and  so  became  dead  in  sin,  and  wholly 
defiled  in  all  the  faculties  and  parts  of  soul  and  body.  They 
being  the  root  of  all  mankind,  the  guilt  of  this  sin  was  im- 
puted, and  the  same  death  in  sin  and  corrupted  nature  con- 
veyed to  all  their  posterity,  descending  from  them  by  ordinary 
generation.  From  this  original  corruption,  whereby  we  are 
utterly  indisposed,  disabled,  and  made  opposite  to  all  good, 
and  wholly  incUned  to  all  evil,  do  proceed  all  actual  trans- 
gressions." 

Again,  pages  152 — 154',  Shorter  Catechism.  Question  22. 
Did  all  mankind  fall  in  that  first  transgression?  Answer: 
The  covenant  being  made  with  Adam  as  a  public  person,  not 
for  himself  only,  but  for  his  posterity;  all  mankind  descending 
from  him  by  ordinary  generation,  sinned  in  him,  and  fell  with 
him  in  that  first  transgression. 

Question  23.  Into  what  estate  did  the  fall  bring  mankind? 
Ans.  The  fall  brought  mankind  into  an  estate  of  sin  and 
misery. 

Question  24.  What  is  sin?  Ans.  Sin  is  any  want  of  con- 
formity unto,  or  transgression  of  any  law  of  God,  given  as  a 
rule  to  the  reasonable  creature. 

Question  25.  Wherein  consists  the  sinfulness  of  that  estate 
whereinto  man  fell?  Ans.  The  sinfulness  of  that  estate 
whereinto  man  fell,  consisteth  in  the  guilt  of  Adam's  first  sin, 
the  want  of  that  righteousness  wherein  he  was  created,'and  the 
corruption  of  his  nature,  whereby  he  is  utterly  indisposed,  dis- 
abled, and  made  opposite  unto  all  that  is  spiritually  good,  and 
wholly  inclined  to  all  evil,  and  that  continually,  which  is  com- 
monly called  original  sin,  and  from  which  do  proceed  all  ac- 
tual transgressions. 

Question  26.  How  is  original  sin  conveyed  from  our  first 
parents  unto  their  posterity?  Ans.  Original  sin  is  conveyed 
from  our  first  parents  unto  their  posterity  by  natural  genera- 
tion, so  as  all  that  proceed  from  them  in  that  way,  are  con- 
ceived and  born  in  sin." 

These  extracts  show,  that  the  framers  and  defenders  of  this 
Confession  of  Faith,  account  for  the  moral  depravity  of  man- 
kind, by  making  it  to  consist  in  a  sinful  nature,  inherited  by 
39* 


462  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

natural  generation  from  Adam.  They  regard  the  constitution 
inherited  from  Adam  as  in  itself  sinful,  and  the  cause  of  all 
actual  transgression.  They  make  no  distinction  between 
physical  and  moral  depravity.  They  also  distinguish  between 
original  and  actual  sin.  Original  sin  is  the  sinfulness  of  the 
constitution,  in  which  Adam's  posterity  have  no  other  hand 
than  to  inherit  it  by  natural  generation,  or  by  birth.  This 
original  sin,  or  sinful  nature,  renders  mankind  utterly  disabled 
from  all  that  is  spiritually  good,  and  w^iolly  inclined  to  all  that 
is  evil.  This  is  their  account  of  moral  depravity.  This,  it 
will  be  seen,  is  substantially  the  ground  of  Dr.  Woods. 

It  has  been  common  with  those  who  confound  physical 
with  moral  depravity,  and  who  maintain  that  human  nature  is 
itself  sinful,  to  quote  certain  passages  of  Scripture  to  sustain 
their  position.  An  examination  of  these  proof  texts  must,  in 
the  next  place,  occupy  our  attention.  But  before  I  enter  up- 
on this  examination,  I  must  first  call  your  attention  to  certain 
well  settled  rules  of  biblical  interpretation. 

1.  Different  passages  must  be  so  interpreted,  if  they  can 
be,  as  not  to  contradict  each  other. 

2.  Language  is  to  be  interpreted  according  to  the  subject 
matter  of  discourse. 

3.  Respect  is  always  to  be  had  to  the  general  scope  and 
design  of  the  speaker  or  writer. 

4.  Texts  that  are  consistent  with  either  theory  prove  neither. 

5.  Language  is  to  be  so  interpreted,  if  it  can  be,  as  not  to 
conflict  with  sound  philosophy,  matters  of  fact,  the  nature  of 
things,  or  immutable  justice. 

Let  us  now,  remembering  and  applying  these  plain  rules 
of  sound  interpretation,  proceed  to  the  examination  of  those 
passages  that  are  supposed  to  establish  the  theory  of  depravi- 
ty I  am  examining. 

Gen.  5;  3.  '•'•  Adam  lived  an  hundred  and  thirty  years  and 
begat  a  son  in  his  own  likeness  and  after  his  own  image,  and 
called  his  name  Seth."  It  is  not  very  easy  to  see  why  this 
text  should  be  pressed  into  the  service  of  those  who  hold  that 
human  nature  is  in  itself  sinful.  Why  should  it  be  assumed 
that  the  likeness  and  image  here  spoken  of  was  a  moral  like- 
ness or  image?  But  unless  this  be  assumed  the  text  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  subject. 

Again.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  in  all  probability  Adam 
was  a  regenerate  man  at  the  time  and  before  the  birth  of 
Seth.  Is  it  intended  that  Adam  begot  a  saint  or  a  sinner? 
If,  as  is  supposed,  Adam  was  a  saint  of  God.  if  this  text  is 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  463 

any  thing  to  the  purpose  it  affirms  that  Adam  begat  a  saint. 
Put  this  is  the  opposite  of  that  in  proof  of  which  the  text  is 
quoted. 

Another  text  is,  Job  14:  4.  '^  Who  can  bring  a  clean  thing 
out  of  an  unclean  ?  Not  one."  This  text  is  quoted  in  sup- 
port of  the  position  of  the  Presbyterian  Confession  of  Faith 
that  children  inherit  from  their  parents  by  natural  generation, 
a  sinful  nature.     Upon  this  text  I  remark, 

1.  That  all  that  can  be  made  of  it,  even  if  we  read  it  with- 
out regard  to  the  translation  or  the  context,  is  that  a  physi- 
cally depraved  parent  will  produce  a  physically  depraved  off 
spring. 

2.  That  this  is  its  real  meaning  is  quite  evident  when  v[e 
look  into  the  context.  Job  is  treating  of  the  frail  and  dying 
state  of  man,  and  manifestly  has  in  the  text  and  context  his  eye 
wholly  on  the  physical  state,  and  not  on  the  moral  character 
of  man.  What  he  intends  is:  Who  can  bring  other  than  a 
frail,  dying  offspring  from  a  frail,  dying  parent?  Not  one. 
This  is  substantially  the  view  that  Professor  Stuart  takes  of 
this  text.  The  utmost  that  can  be  made  of  it  is,  that  as  he 
belonged  to  a  race  of  sinners,  nothing  else  could  be  expected 
than  that  he  should  be  a  sinner  without  meaning  to  affirm  any 
thing  in  regard  to  the  quo  modo  of  this  result. 

Again.  Job  15:  14.  ^^  What  is  man  that  he  should  be  clean, 
and  he  that  is  born  of  a  woman  that  he  should  be  righteous." 

1.  These  are  the  words  of  Eliphaz,  and  it  is  improper  to 
quote  them  as  inspired  truth.  That  Eliphaz  uttered  this  sen- 
timent let  what  will  be  the  meaning,  there  is  no  reason  to 
doubt;  and  there  is  just  as  little  reason  to  receive  his  doc- 
trines as  truth.  For  God  himself  testifies  that  Job's  friends 
did  not  hold  the  truth.     But, 

2.  Suppose  we  understand  the  text  as  true,  what  is  its  im- 
port? Why,  it  simply  asserts,  or  rather  implies  the  unright- 
eousness or  sinfulness  of  the  whole  human  race.  He  express- 
es the  universality  of  depravity  in  the  very  common  way  of 
including  all  that  are  born  of  woman.  This  certainly  says 
nothing  and  implies  nothing  respecting  a  sinful  constitution. 
It  is  just  as  plain  and  just  as  warrantable  to  understand  this 
passage  as  implying  that  mankind  have  become  so  physically 
depraved  that  this  fact  together  with  the  circumstances  under 
which  they  come  into  being  and  begin  their  moral  career,  will 
certainly,  (not  necessarily)  result  in  moral  depravity,  I  might 
use  just  such  language  as  that  found  in  this  text  and  natu- 
rally enough  express  by  it  my  own  views  of  moral  depravity; 


464  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

to  wit,  that  it  results  from  a  physically  depraved  constitution 
and  the  circumstances  of  temptation  under  which  children 
come  into  this  world  and  begin  and  prosecute  their  moral  ca- 
reer; certainly  this  is  the  most  that  can  be  made  of  this 
text. 

Again,  Ps.  51:  5,  ^^Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity  and 
in  sin  did  my  mother  conceive  me."     Upon  this  I  remark, 

1.  It  would  seem,  if  this  text  is  to  be  understood  literally^ 
that  the  Psalmist  intended  to  affirm  the  sinful  state  of  his  mo- 
ther at  the  time  of  his  conception  and  during  gestation.     But, 

2.  I  make  a  remark  that  is  applicable  to  all  the  texts  and 
arguments  that  are  adduced  in  support  of  the  theory  in  ques. 
tion;  namely,  that  to  take  this  view  of  the  subject  and  to  in- 
terpret these  passages  as  teaching  the  constitutional  sinfulness 
of  man  is  to  contradict  God's  own  definition  of  sin  and  the  on- 
ly definition  that  human  reason  or  common  sense  can  receive, 
to  wit,  that  ""sin  is  a  transgression  of  the  law."     This  is  no 
doubt  the  only  correct  definition  of  sin.     But  we  have  seen 
that  the  law  does  not  legiskite  over  substance  requiring  men  to 
have  a  certain  nature^  but  over  voluntary  action  only.     If  the 
Psalmist  really  intended  to  affirm  that  the  substance  of  his 
conceived  foetus  was  sinful,  then  he  not  only  arrays  himself 
against  God's  own  definition  of  sin,  but  he  also  affirms  sheer 
nonsense.     The  substance  of  an  unborn  child  sinful!     It  is 
impossible!  But  what  did  the  Psalmist  mean?  I  answer,  this 
verse  is  found  in  David's  penitential  psalm.     He  was  deeply 
convinced  of  sin  and  was,  as  he  had  good  reason  to  be,  much 
excited,  and  expressed  himself,  as  we  all  do  in  similar  circum- 
stances, in  strong  language.     His  eye,  as  was  natural  and  is 
common  in  such  cases,  had  been  directed  back  along  the  path- 
way of  life  up  to  the  days  of  his  earHest  recollection.     He 
remembered  sins  among  the  earliest  acts  of  his  recollected 
life.     He  broke  out  in  the  language  of  this  text  to  express, 
not  the  anti-scriptural  and  nonsensical  dogma  of  a  sinful  con- 
stitution^ but  to  affirm  in  his  strong,  poetic  language  that  he 
had  always  been  a  sinner  from  the  commencement  of  his  mor- 
al existence,  or  from  the  earliest  moment  of  his  capability  of 
being  a  sinner.     This  language  is  the  strong  language  of  poe« 
try.     To  press  this  and  similar  texts  further  than  this,  is  to  vi- 
olate two  sound  rules  of  biblical  interpretation,  to  wit: 

1.  That  language  is  to  be  interpreted  according  to  the  sub- 
ject matter  of  discourse.     And, 

2.  That  one  passage  is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  not  to  con- 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  465 

tradict  another.  But  to  make  this  text  state  that  sin  belongs, 
or  may  belong  to  the  substance  of  an  unborn  infant  is  to  make 
it  flatly  contradict  another  passage  that  defines  sin  to  be  a 
transgression  of  the  law  of  God. 

Some  suppose  that  in  the  passage  in  question  the  Psalmist 
referred  to  and  meant  to  acknowledge  and  assert  his  low  and 
despicable  origin  and  to  say,  I  was  always  a  sinner,  and  my 
mother  that  conceived  me  was  a  sinner,  and  I  am  but  the  de- 
generate plant  of  a  strange  vine,  without  intending  to  affirm 
any  thing  in  respect  to  the  absolute  sinfulness  of  his  nature. 

Again,  Ps.  58:  3.  '^The  wicked  are  estranged  from  the 
womb,  they  go  astray  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  speaking  lies." 

Upon  this  text  I  remark, 

1.  That  it  has  been  quoted  at  one  time  to  estabHsh  the 
doctrine  of  a  sinful  nature^  and  at  another  to  prove  that  in- 
fants commit  actual  sin  from  the  very  day  and  hour  of  their 
birth.     But  certainly  no  such  use  can  be  legitimately  made  of 
this  text.     It  does  not  affirm  any  thing  of  a  sinful  nature^  but 
this  has  been  inferred  from  what  it  does  affirm,  that  the  wick- 
ed are  estranged  from  their  birth.     But  does  this  mean  that 
they  are  really  and  Uterally  estranged  from  the  day  and  hour 
of  their  birth  and  that  they  really  ^'go  astray  the  very  day 
they  are  born,  speaking  lies?"     This  every  one  knows  to  be 
contrary  to  fact.     The  text  cannot  then  be  pressed  to  the  let- 
ter.    What  then  does  it  mean?  It  must  mean  like  the  text  last 
examined,  that  the  wicked  are  estranged  and  go  astray  from 
the  commencement  of  their  moral  agency.     If  it  means  more 
than  this,  it  is  not  and  cannot  be  true.     And  besides,  it  would 
contradict  other  plain  passages  of  scripture.     It  is  affirming 
in  strong,  graphic,  and  poetic  language  the  fact  that  the  first 
moral  conduct  and  character  of  children  is  sinful.     This  is  all 
that  in  truth  it  can  assert,  and  it  doubtless  dates  the  begin- 
ning of  their  moral  depravity  at  a  very  early  period,  which  it 
expresses  in  very  strong  language,  as  if  it  were  Uterally  from 
the  hour  of  birth.     But  when  it  adds  that  they   go  astray 
speaking  lies  we  know  that  this  is  not  and  cannot  be  to  be  lit- 
erally taken,  for,  as  every  one  knows  children  do  not  speak  at 
all  from  their  birth.     Should  we  understand  the  Psalmist  as 
affirming  that  children  go  astray  as  soon  as  they  go  at  all,  and 
speak  lies  as  soon  as  they  speak  at  all,  this  would  not  prove 
that  their  nature  was  in  itself  sinful,  but  might  well  consist 
with  the  theory  that  their  physical  depravity  together  with 
their  circumstances  of  temptation  led  them  into  selfishness 
from  the  very  first  of  their  moral  existence. 


466  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Again,  John  3:  6.    "That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh, 
and  that  which  is  horn  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit." 
Upon  this  I  remark. 

1.  That  it  may,  if  Hterallj  taken,  mean  nothing  more  than 
this,  that  the  body  which  is  born  of  flesh  is  flesh,  and  that 
that  which  is  born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit,  that  is  that  this  birth 
of  which  he  was  speaking  was  of  the  soul,  and  not  of  the 
body.     But, 

2.  It  may  be  understood  to  mean  that  that  which  results 
from  the  influence  of  the  flesh  is  flesh  in  the  sense  of  sin,  for 
this  is  a  common  sense  of  the  term  flesh  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, and  that  which  results  from  the  Spirit,  is  spirit  or  spirit- 
ual in  the  sense  of  holy.  This  I  understand  to  be  the  true 
sense.  The  text  when  thus  understood  does  not  at  all  sup- 
port the  dogma  of  a  sinful  nature  or  constitution,  but  only  this 
that  the  flesh  tends  to  sin,  that  the  appetites  and  passions  are 
temptations  to  sin,  so  that  when  the  will  obeys  them  it  sins. 
Whatever  is  born  of  the  propensities,  in  the  sense  that  the 
will  yields  to  their  control,  is  sinful.  And  on  the  other  hand 
whatever  is  born  of  the  Spirit,  that  is,  whatever  results  from 
the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  sense  that  the  will  yields 
to  Him,  is  holy. 

Again,  Eph.  2:  3.  ''By  nature  children  of  wrath  even  as 
others."     Upon  this  text  I  remark, 

1.  That  it  cannot  consistently  with  natural  justice,  be  un- 
derstood to  mean,  that  we  are  exposed  to  the  wrath  of  God  on 
account  of  our  nature.  It  is  a  monstrous  and  blasphemous 
dogma,  that  a  holy  God  is  angry  with  any  creature,  for  pos- 
sessing a  nature  with  which  he  was  forced  into  being  without 
his  knowledge  or  consent.  The  Bible  represents  God  as  an- 
gry with  men  for  their  wicked  deeds,  and  not  for  their  nature. 

2.  It  is  common,  and  proper  to  speak  of  the  first  state  in 
which  men  universally  are  as  a  natural  state.  Thus  we  speak 
of  sinners  before  regeneration^  as  in  a  state  of  nature^  as  op- 
posed to  a  changed  state^  a  regenerate  state,  and  a  state  of  grace. 
But  by  this  we  do  not  necessarily  mean,  that  they  have  a  na- 
ture sinful  in  itself  but  merely  that  before  regeneration,  they 
are  universally  and  totally  morally  depraved,  that  this  is  their 
natural,  as  opposed  to  their  regenerate  state.  Total  moral 
depravity  is  the  state  that  follows,  and  results  from  their  first 
birth,  and  is  in  this  sense  natural,  and  in  this  sense  alone,  can 
it  truly  be  said,  that  they  are  "by  nature  children  of  wrath," 
Against  the  use  that  is  made  of  this,  and  all  this  class  of  texts, 
may  be  arrayed  the  whole  scope  of  scripture  that  represents 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  467 

man  as  to  blame,  and  to  be  judged  and  punished  only  for  his 
deeds.  But  I  forbear,  as  it  cannot  be  necessary.  The  sub- 
ject matter  of  discourse  in  these  texts  is  such  as  demands 
that  we  should  understand  them  as  not  implying  or  asserting 
that  gin  is  a  part  of  our  nature. 


LECTURE  XXXVII. 
MORAL  DEPRAVITY, 

1.  Further  examination  op  the  arguments  adduced  ipi 

SUPPORT  OF  the  position  THAT  HUMAN  NATURE  IS  IN  ITSELF  SIN- 
FUL. 

The  defenders  of  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  sinfulness 
or  moral  depravity  urge  as  a  farther  argument, 

2.  That  sin  is  a  universal  effect  of  human  nature,  and  there- 
fore, human  nature  must  be  itself  sinful. 

Answer,  This  argument  proceeds  upon  the  two  false  assump- 
tions, 

'  1.  That  an  effect  must  have  the  same  character  as  its  cause. 
This  assumption,  that  an  affect  must  have  the  same  character 
with  its  cause,  is  a  false  assumption.  God's  will  caused  the 
material  universe  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  effect  is  holy 
as  the  will  of  God  is  holy.  God's  intention,  which  was  the 
cause,  is  holy.  But  the  effect,  the  material  universe,  simply 
because  it  is  an  effect^  has  no  character  at  all.  Nothing  that 
is  properly  an  effect  can  ever,  by  any  possibility,  poossess  a 
moral  character.  The  universe  of  mind,  also,  is  an  effect  of 
tho  Divine  intention.  These  minds  are  not  in  their  substance, 
and  so  far  as  they  are  effects^  holy  or  sinful.  That  is,  they 
have  in  their  essence  or  substance,  no  moral  character  whatev- 
er, simply  because  they  are  effects* 

*  Their  moral  character  is  of  their  own  forming.  Moral  char- 
acter,universally  and  necessarily,  belongs  to  intelligent^  volunta- 
ry cause  and  never  to  an  effect.  AH  responsible  causality  resides 
in  free  will.  Praise  or  blameworthiness  is  strictly  predicable 
only  of  the  agent,  never  strictly  of  his  actions.  The  agent 
who  causes  his  own  actions  is  holy  or  sinful,  is  praise  or  blame- 
worthy, for  his  intentions  or  actions.  It  is  not  the  intention 
or  action   that   is   praise  or  blameworthy,  but  the  cause  or 

.,  agent  that  acts.  When  we  say  that  moral  character  belongs 
to  the  intention,  we  do  not  mean  that  it  is  the  intention  itself 
that  deserves  praise  or  blame,  but  that  the  agent  deserves 
praise  or  blame  only  for  his  intentions.  If,  then,  choice  or  in- 
tention be  regarded  as  an  effect  of  free  will,  its  cause,  let  it 
be  understood  that  the  effect  strictly  speaking  is  neither  praise 
or  blameworthy,  but  that  the  agent  is  alone  responsible  for 
the  choice  of  which  he  is  the  cause.  The  argument  we  are 
examining  is  this :  '^Sin  is  an  effect  of  human  nature ;  there- 
fore human  nature  is  in  its  essence  and  substance   sinful." 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 


469 


This  statement  is  false;  but  state  it  thus,  and  it  is  true:  Sin 
i§  an  attribute  of  selfish  intention;  selfish  intention  is  an  ef- 
fect of  free  responsible  will;  therefore,  the  free  responsible 
cause  of  this  effect  is  blameworthy  for  this  effect,  this  sin.         /' 

2.  The  second  false  assumption  upon  which  the  argument 
we  are  examining  is  bsised,  is  this,  namely,  that  sin  as  a  uni- 
versal effect  of  human  nature  proves  that  the  substance  of  hu- 
man nature  must  be  in  itself  sinful.  This  is  a  non  sequitur. 
Sin  may  be,  and  must  be  an  abuse  of  free  agency,  and  this 
may  be  accounted  for,  as  we  shall  see,  by  ascribing  it  to  the 
universality  of  temptation  and  does  not  at  all  imply  a  sinful 
constitution.  But  if  sin  implies  a  sinful  nature,  how  did  Ad- 
am and  Eve  sin?  Had  they  a  sinful  nature  to  account  for  and 
to  cause  their  first  sin?  How  did  angels  sin?  Had  they  also 
a  sinful  nature?  Either  sin  does  not  imply  a  sinful  nature, 
or  a  nature  in  itself  sinful,  or  Adam  and  angels  must  have  had  ■  r' 
sinful  natures  before  their  fall. 

Again:  Suppose  we  regard  sin  as  an  event  or  effect.  An 
effect  only  implies  an  adequate  cause.  Free,  responsible  will 
is  an  adequate  cause,  in  the  presence  of  temptation,  without 
the  supposition  of  a  sinful  constitution,  as  has  been  demonstra- 
ted in  the  case  of  Adam  and  of  angels.  When  we  have  found 
an  adequate  cause,  it  is  unphilosophical  to  look  for  and  assign  .^ 
another. 

Again:  It  is  said  that  no  motive  to  sin  could  be  a  motive 
or  a  temptation,  if  there  were  not  a  sinful  taste,  relish  or  ap- 
petite inherent  in  the  constitution  to  which  the  temptation  or 
motive  is  addressed.  For  example,  the  presence  of  food,  it  is 
said,  would  be  no  temptation  to  eat,  were  there  not  a  constitu- 
tional appetency  terminating  on  food.  So  the  presence  of 
any  object  could  be  no  inducement  to  sin,  were  there  not  a 
constitutional  appetency  or  craving  for  sin.  So  that  in  fact, 
sin  in  action  were  impossible  unless  there  were  sin  in  the  na- 
ture.    To  this  I  reply: 

Suppose  this  objection  be  applied  to  the  sin  of  Adam  and  of 
angels.  Can  we  not  account  for  Eve's  eating  the  forbidden 
fruit  without  supposing  that  she  had  a  craving  for  sin?  The 
Bible  informs  us  that  her  craving  was  for  the  fruity  for  knowl- 
edge, and  not  for  5m.  The  words  are:  ^""And  when  the  woman 
saw  that  the  tree  was  good  for  food  and  that  it  was  pleasant 
to  the  eyes,  and  a  tree  to  be  desired  to  make  one  wise,  she  took 
of  the  fruit  thereof  and  did  eat,  and  gave  also  unto  her  hus- 
band with  her,  and  he  did  eat."  Here  is  nothing  of  a  cra- 
ving for  sin.  Eating  this  fruit  was  indeed  sinful,  but  the  sin 
40 


m 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 


consisted  in  consenting  to  gratify,  in  a  prohibited  manner,  the 
appetites,  not  for  sin,  but  for  food  and  knowledge.  But  the 
advocates  for  this  theory  say  that  there  must  be  an  adapted- 
ness  in  the  constitution,  a  something  within  answering  to  the 
outward  motive  or  temptation,  and  sin  were  impossible.  This 
is  true.  But  the  question  is,  what  is  that  something  within, 
which  responds  to  the  outward  motive?  Is  it  a  craving  for 
sin  ?  We  have  just  seen  what  it  was  in  the  case  of  Adam  and 
Eve.  It  was  simply  the  correlation  that  existed  between  the 
fruit  and  their  constitution,  its  presence  exciting  the  desires 
for  food  and  knowledge.  This  led  to  prohibited  indulgence. 
This  is  a  short  history  of  the  origin  of  all  sin  in  mankind,  as  we 
shall  see.  That  is,  all  men  sin  in  precisely  the  same  way. 
They  consent  to  gratify,  not  a  craving  for  sin,  but  a  craving 
for  other  things,  and  the  consent  to  make  self-gratification  an 
end  is  the  whole  of  sin. 

This  argument  assumes  as  true,  what  we,  on  a  former  occa- 
sion, have  seen  to  be  false,  namely,  that  sinners  love  sin  for  its 
own  sake.  If  it  could  be  true,  total  depravity  would  of  ne- 
cessity secure  perfect  blessedness.  It  would  be  the  very  state 
which  the  mind  supremely  loves  for  its  own  sake.  The  sinner 
could  then  say,  not  merely  in  the  language  of  poetry,  but  in 
sober  prose  and  fact,  '•'-Evil,  be  thou  my  good." 

The  Theologians  whose  views  we  are  canvassing,  main- 
tain that  the  appetites,  passions,  desires,  and  propensities 
which  are  constitutional  and  entirely  involuntary,  are  in  them- 
selves sinful.  To  this  I  reply,  that  Adam  and  Eve  possessed 
them  before  they  fell.  Christ  possessed  them  or  he  was  not 
a  man,  nor  in  any  proper  sense  a  human  being.  No,  these 
appetites,  passions,  and  propensities  are  not  sinful,  though 
they  are  the  occasions  of  sin.  They  are  a  temptation  to 
the  will  to  seek  their  unlawful  indulgence.  When  these 
lusts  or  appetites  are  spoken  of  as  the  "-passions  of  sin" 
or  as  '"'  sinful  lusts  or  passions,"  it  is  not  because  they  are  sin- 
ful in  themselves,  but  because  they  are  the  occasions  of 
sin. 

Again:  The  death  and  suffering  of  infants  previous  to 
actual  transgression  is  adduced  as  an  argument  to  prove  that 
infants  have  a  sinful  nature.     To  this  I  reply, 

1.  That  this  argument  must  assume  that  there  must  be  sin 
wherever  there  is  suffering  and  death.  But  this  assumption 
proves  too  much,  as  it  would  prove  that  mere  animals  have 
a  sinful  nature  or  have  committed  actual  sin.  An  argument 
that  proves  too  much  proves  nothing. 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 


471 


2.  Physical  sufferings  prove  onlj  physical,  and  not  moral 
depravity.  Previous  to  moral  agency,  infants  are  no  more 
subjects  of  moral  government  than  brutes  are;  therefore  their 
sufferings  and  death  are  to  be  accounted  for  as  are  those  of 
brutes,  namely,  by  ascribing  them  to  violations  of  the  laws 
of  life  and  health. 

Another  argument  for  a  sinful  constitution  is,  that  unless 
infants  have  a  sinful  nature,  they  do  not  need  sanctification 
to  tit  them  for  heaven.     Answer: 

1.  This  argument  assumes  that  if  they  are  not  sinful  they 
must  be  holy,  whereas  they  are  neither  sinful  nor  holy  until 
they  are  moral  agents  and  render  themselves  so  by  obedience 
or  disobedience  to  the  moral  law.  If  they  are  to  go  to  heav- 
en, they  must  be  made  holy  or  must  be  sanctified. 

2.  This  objection  assumes  that  previous  sinfulness  is  a  con- 
dition of  the  necessity  of  being  holy.  This  is  contrary  to 
fact.  Were  Adam  and  angels  first  sinful  before  they  were 
sanctified?  But  it  is  assumed  that  unless  moral  agents  are  at 
first  sinners  they  do  not  need  the  Holy  Spirit  to  induce  them 
to  be  holy.  That  is,  unless  their  nature  is  sinful,  they  would 
become  holy  without  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  where  do  we 
ascertain  this?  Suppose  that  they  have  no  moral  character, 
and  that  their  nature  is  neither  holy  nor  sinful.  Will  they 
become  holy  without  being  enlightened  by  the  Holy  Spirit? 
Who  will  assert  that  they  will? 

3.  That  infants  have  a  sinful  nature  has  been  inferred  from 
the  institution  of  circumcision  so  early  as  the  eighth  day  after 
birth.  Circumcision,  it  is  truly  urged,  was  designed  to  teach 
the  necessity  of  regeneration,  and  by  way  of  implication,  the 
doctrine  of  moral  depravity.  It  is  claimed  that  its  being  en- 
joined as  obligatory  upon  the  eighth  day  after  birth,  was  re- 
quiring it  at  the  earliest  period  at  which  it  could  be  safely 
performed.  From  this  it  is  inferred  that  infants  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  morally  depraved  from  their  birth. 

In  answer  to  this  I  would  say,  that  infant  circumcision  was 
doubtless  designed  to  teach  the  necessity  of  their  being  saved 
by  the  Holy  Spirit  from  the  dominion  of  the  flesh,  that  the 
influence  of  the  flesh  must  be  restrained,  and  the  flesh  cir- 
cumcised, or  the  soul  would  be  lost.  This  truth  needed  to  be 
impressed  on  the  parents  from  the  birth  of  their  children. 
This  very  significant  and  bloody  and  painful  rite  was  well 
calculated  to  impress  this  truth  upon  parents,  and  to  lead  them 
from  their  birth  to  watch  over  the  development  and  indulgence 
of  their  propensities,   and  to  pray  for   their  sanctification. 


472  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Requiring  it  at  so  early  a  day  was  no  doubt  designed  to  indi- 
cate that  they  are  from  the  first  under  the  dominion  of  their 
flesh,  without  however  affording  any  inference  in  favor  of  the 
idea  that  their  flesh  was  in  itself  sinful,  or  that  the  subjection 
of  their  will,  at  that  early  age,  was  sinful.  If  reason  was  not 
developed,  the  subjection  of  the  will  to  appetite  could  not  be 
sinful.  But  whether  this  subjection  of  the  will  to  the  grati- 
fication of  the  appetite  was  sinful  or  not,  the  child  must  be 
delivered  from  it  or  it  could  never  be  fitted  for  heaven  any 
more  than  a  mere  brute  can  be  fitted  for  heaven.  The  fact 
that  circumcision  was  required  on  the  eighth  day  and  not  be- 
fore, seems  to  indicate,  not  that  they  are  sinners  absolutely 
from  birth,  but  that  they  very  early  become  so,  even  from 
the  commencement  of  moral  agency. 

Again:  The  rite  must  be  performed  at  some  time.  Unless 
a  particular  day  were  appointed  it  would  be  very  apt  to  be 
deferred,  and  finally  not  performed  at  all.  It  is  probable  that 
God  commanded  that  it  should  be  done  at  the  earliest  period 
at  which  it  could  be  safely  done,  not  only  for  the  reasons  al- 
ready assigned,  but  to  prevent  its  being  neglected  too  long 
and  perhaps  altogether,  and  perhaps,  also,  because  it  would 
be  less  painful  and  dangerous  at  that  early  age  when  the  in- 
fant slept  most  of  the  time  and  was  not  able  to  exercise  and 
endanger  life,  and  also  because  it  is  well  known  that  parents 
are  more  attached  to  their  children  as  they  grow  older,  and  it 
would  be  less  painful  to  the  parent  to  perform  the  rite  when 
the  child  was  very  young  than  afterwards  when  it  had  en- 
twined itself  around  the  parental  heart.  The  longer  it  was 
neglected  the  greater  would  be  the  temptation  to  neglect  it 
altogether.  So  painful  a  rite  needed  to  be  enjoined  by  posi- 
tive statute  at  some  particular  time,  and  it  was  desirable  on 
all  accounts  that  it  should  be  done  as  early  as  it  safely  could 
be.  This  argument  for  native  constitutional  moral  depravity 
amounts  really  to  nothing. 

Again:  It  is  urged  that  unless  infants  have  a  sinful  nature, 
should  they  die  in  infancy,  they  could  not  be  saved  by  the 
grace  of  Christ. 

To  this  I  answer,  that  in  this  case  they  would  not  go,  of 
course,  to  hell. 

But  what  grace  could  there  be  in  saving  them  from  a  sinful 
constitution  that  is  not  exercised  in  saving  them  from  circum- 
stances that  would  certainly  result  in  their  becoming  sinners, 
if  not  snatched  from  them?  In  neither  case  do  they  need  par- 
don for  sin.     Grace  is  unearned  favor,  a  gratuity.     If  the 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  473 

child  has  a  sinful  nature  it  is  his  misfortune^  and  not  crime. 
To  save  him  from  this  nature  is  to  save  him  from  those  cir- 
cumstances that  will  certainly  result  in  actual  transgression 
unless  he  is  rescued  by  death  and  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  So  if 
his  nature  is  not  sinful,  yet  it  is  certain  that  his  nature  and 
circumstances  are  such  that  he  will  surely  sin  unless  rescued 
by  death  and  by  the  Holy  Spirit  before  he  is  capable  of  sin- 
ning. It  certainly  must  be  an  infinite  favor  to  be  rescued  from 
such  circumstances,  and  especially  to  have  eternal  life  con- 
ferred as  a  mere  gratuity.  This  surely  is  grace.  And  as 
they  belong  to  a  race  of  sinners  who  are  all,  as  it  were,  turned 
over  into  the  hands  of  Christ,  they  doubtless  will  ascribe 
their  salvation  to  the  infinite  grace  of  Christ. 

Again:  Is  it  not  grace  that  saves  us  from  sinning?  What 
then  is  it  but  grace  that  saves  infants  from  sinning  by  snatch- 
ing them  away  from  circumstances  of  temptation?  In  what 
way  does  grace  save  adults  from  sinning  but  by  keeping  them 
from  temptation,  or  by  giving  grace  to  overcome  temptation? 
And  is  there  no  grace  in  rescuing  infants  from  circumstances 
that  are  certain,  if  they  are  left  in  them,  to  lead  them  into  sin. 

All  that  can  be  justly  said  in  either  case  is  that  if  infants 
iire  saved  at  all,  (which  I  suppose  they  are.)  they  are  rescued 
by  the  benevolence  of  God  from  circumstances  that  would  re- 
sult in  certain  and  eternal  death,  and  made  heirs  of  eternal 
life.  But  after  all  it  is  useless  to  speculate  about  the  charac- 
ter and  destiny  of  those  who  are  confessedly  not  moral  agents. 
The  benevolence  of  God  will  take  care  of  them.  It  is  non- 
sensical to  insist  upon  their  moral  depravity  before  they  are 
moral  agents,  and  it  is  equally  frivolous  to  assert  that  they 
must  be  morally  depraved  as  a  condition  of  their  being  saved 
by  grace. 

We  deny  that  the  human  constitution  is  morally  depraved, 

1.  Because  there  is  no  proof  of  it. 

2.  Because  it  is  impossible  that  sin  should  be  an  attribute  of 
the  substance  of  soul  or  body.  It  is  and  must  be  an  attribute 
of  choice  or  intention  and  not  of  substance. 

3.  To  make  sin  an  attribute  or  quality  of^ubstance  is  con- 
trary to  God's  definition  of  sin.  ^^Sin,"  says  the  apostle,  ''is 
anomia"  a  '^transgression  of,  or  a  want  of  conformity  to  the 
moral  law."  That  is,  it  consists  in  a  refusal  to  love  God  and 
our  neighbor,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  in  loving  ourselves 
supremely. 

4.  To  represent  the  constitution  as  sinful  is  to  represent 
God,  who  is  the  author  of  the  constitution,  as  the  author  of 

40* 


474  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sin.  To  say  that  God  is  not  the  direct  former  of  the  constitu- 
tion, but  that  sin  is  conveyed  by  natural  generation  from 
Adam  who  made  himself  sinful,  is  only  to  remove  the  ob- 
jection one  step  farther  back,  but  not  to  obviate  it;  f6r  God 
estabUshed  the  physical  laws  that  of  necessity  bring  about 
this  result. 

5.  But  how  came  Adam  by  a  sinful  nature?  Did  his  first 
sin  change  his  nature?  or  did  God  change  it  as  a  penalty  for 
sin?  What  ground  is  there  for  the  assertion  that  Adam's  na- 
ture became  in  itself  sinful  by  the  fall?  This  is  a  groundless, 
not  to  say  ridiculous  assumption  and  a  flat  absurdity.  Sin  an 
attribute  of  nature!  A  sinful  substance!  Sin  a  substance! 
Is  it  asoHd,  a  fluid,  a  material  or  a  spiritual  substance? 

I  have  received  the  following  note  from  a  brother  on  this 
subject: 

"•  The  orthodox  creeds  are  in  some  cases  careful  to  say  that 
original  sin  consists  in  the  substance  of  neither  soul  nor  body. 
Thus  Bretschneider,  who  is  reckoned  among  the  rationalists 
in  Germany,  says :  ^^  The  Symbolical  Books  very  rightly  main- 
tained that  original  sin  is  not  in  any  sense  the  substance  of 
man,  his  body  or  soul,  as  Flacius  taught, — but  that  it  has  been 
infused  into  human  nature  by  Satan,  and  mixed  with  it,  as 
poison  and  wine  are  mixed." 

They  rather  expressly  guard  against  the  idea  that  they 
mean  by  the  phrase  ^'  man's  nature,"  his  substance,  but  some- 
what which  is  fixed  in  the  substance.  They  explain  original 
sin,  therefore,  not  as  an  essential  attribute  of  man,  that  is,  a 
necessary  and  essential  part  of  his  being,  but  as  an  accident, 
that  is,  somewhat  which  does  not  subsist  in  itself,  but,  as  some- 
thing accidental,  has  come  into  human  nature.  He  quotes 
the  Formula  Concordantias  as  saying:  "Nature  does  not  de- 
note the  substance  itself  of  man,  but  something  which  inheres 
fixed  in  the  nature  or  substance."  Accident  is  defined  "what 
does  not  subsist  by  itself,  but  is  in  some  substance  and  can 
be  distinguished  from  it." 

Here^  it  seems,  is  sin  by  itself,  and  yet  not  a  substance  or 
subsistence — not  a  part  or  attribute  of  soul  or  body.  What 
can  it  be?  Does  it  consist  in  wrong  action?  No,  not  in  ac- 
tion, but  is  an  accident  which  inheres  fixed  in  the  nature  of 
substance.  But  what  can  it  be?  Not  substance,  nor  yet 
action.  But  if  it  be  any  thing  it  must  be  either  substance  or 
action.  If  it  be  a  state  of  substance,  what  is  this  but  sub- 
stance in  a  particular  state?  What  a  wonder  it  must  be! 
Who  ever  saw  it?    But  it  is  invisible,  for  it  is  something  nei' 


MORAL  DEPRA\TrY.  475 

ther  matter  nor  spirit — a  virus,  a  poison  mixed  with,  yet  dis- 
tinct from  the  constitution.  Do  these  writers  think  by  this 
subtility  to  relieve  the  subject  of  constitutional  moral  deprav- 
ity of  its  intrinsic  absurdity?  If  so,  they  are  greatly  mistaken, 
for  really  they  only  render  it  more  absurd  and  ridiculous.  1 
fear  that  christian  men,  even  doctors  of  divinity  will  never  be 
ashamed  to  vindicate  this  ridiculous  absurdity,  until  some 
master  hand  shall  so  expose  it  as  to  make  a  man  blush  at  the 
folly  of  asserting  it. 

6.  I  object  to  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  sinfulness  that 
it  makes  all  sin,  original  and  actual,  a  mere  calamity,  and  not 
a  crime.  To  call  it  a  crime  is  to  talk  nonsense.  What!  a 
sinful  nature  the  crime  of  him  upon  whom  it  is  entailed  with- 
out his  knowledge  or  consent?  If  the  nature  is  sinful  in  such 
a  sense  that  action  must  be,  which  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Con- 
fession of  Faith,  then  sin  in  action  must  be  a  calamity,  and 
can  be  no  crime?  It  is  the  necessary  effect  of  a  sinful  nature. 
This  can  not  be  a  crime. 

7.  This  doctrine  represents  sin  as  a  disease,  and  obedience 
to  law  impossible  until  the  nature  is  changed  by  a  sovereign 
and  physical  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  which  the  subject 
is  passive. 

8.  Of  course  it  must  render  repentance,  either  with  or 
without  the  grace  of  God  impossible  unless  grace  set  aside 
our  reason.  If  repentance  implies  self-condemnation  we  can 
never  repent  in  the  exercise  of  our  reason.  Constituted  as 
we  are,  it  is  impossible  that  we  should  condemn  ourselves  for 
a  sinful  nature  or  for  sinful  actions  that  are  unavoidable.  The 
doctrine  of  original  sin,  or  of  a  sinful  constitution  and  of  ne- 
cessary sinful  actions,  represents  the  whole  moral  government 
of  God,  the  plan  of  salvation  by  Christ,  and  indeed  every 
doctrine  of  the  gospel  as  a  mere  farce,  and  as  the  veriest 
humbug  that  ever  insulted  and  mocked  the  intelligence  of 
man.  Upon  this  supposition  the  law  is  tyranny,  and  the  gos- 
pel an  insult  to  the  unfortunate. 

9.  This  doctrine  represents  sin  as  being  of  two  kinds:  ori- 
ginal or  constitutional  and  actual — sin  of  substance  and  sin 
of-action;  whereas  neither  the  bible  nor  common  sense  ac- 
knowledges but  one  kind  of  sin,  and  that  consists  in  disobe- 
dience to  the  law. 

10.  This  doctrine  represents  a  sinful  nature  as  the  physical 
cause  of  actual  sin. 

11.  It  acknowledges  a  kind  of  sin  of  which  no  notice  will 
be  taken  at  the  judgment.    The  bible  every  where  represents 


476  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

the  deeds  done  in  the  body,  and  not  the  constitution  itself,  as 
the  only  things  to  be  brought  into  judgment. 

12.  It  necessarily  begets  a  self-justifying  and  God-condemn- 
ing spirit.  Man  must  cease  to  be  a  reasonable  being,  and 
give  himself  up  to  the  most  ridiculous  imaginations  before  he 
can  blame  himself  for  Adam's  sin,  as  some  have  professed  to 
do,  or  before  he  can  blame  himself  for  possessing  a  sinful  na- 
ture, or  for  sins  that  unavoidably  resulted  from  a  sinful  nature. 

13.  This  doctrine  necessarily  leads  its  advocates  rather  to 
pity  and  excuse  sinners  than  unquaUfiedly  to  blame  them. 

14.  It  is  difficult  and  indeed  impossible  for  those  who  really 
believe  this  doctrine  to  urge  immediate  repentance  and  sub- 
mission on  the  sinner,  feeling  that  he  is  infinitely  to  blame 
unless  he  instantly  comply.  It  is  a  contradiction  to  affirm 
that  a  man  can  heartily  believe  in  the  doctrine  in  question  and 
yet  truly  and  heartily  blame  sinners  for  not  doing  what  is  na- 
turally impossible  to  them.  The  secret  conviction  must  be  in 
the  mind  of  such  an  one  that  the  sinner  is  not  really  to  blame 
for  being  a  sinner.  For  in  fact  if  this  doctrine  is  true  he  is 
not  to  blame  for  being  a  sinner  any  more  than  he  is  to  blame 
for  being  a  human  being.  This  the  advocate  of  this  doctrine 
must  know.  It  is  vain  for  him  to  set  up  the  pretence  that 
he  truly  blames  sinners  for  their  nature,  or  for  their  conduct, 
that  was  unavoidable.  He  can  not  do  it  any  more  than 
he  can  honestly  deny  the  necessary  affirmations  of  his  own 
reason.  Therefore  the  advocates  of  this  theory  must  merely 
hold  it  as  a  theory  without  believing  it,  or  they  must  in  their 
secret  conviction  excuse  the  sinner. 

15.  This  doctrine  naturally  and  necessarily  leads  its  advo- 
cates, secretly  at  least,  to  ascribe  the  atonement  of  Christ 
rather  to  justice  than  to  grace — to  regard  it  rather  as  an  ex- 
pedient to  relieve  the  unfortunate  than  to  render  the  forgive- 
ness of  the  excuseless  sinner  possible.  The  advocates  of  the 
theory  in  question  can  not  but  regard  the  case  of  the  sinner  as 
rather  a  hard  one,  and  God  as  under  an  obligation  to  provide 
a  way  for  him  to  escape  from  a  sinful  nature  entailed  upon 
him  in  spite  of  himself,  and  from  actual  transgressions  which 
resulted  from  his  nature  by  a  law  of  necessity.  If  all  this  is 
true,  the  sinner's  case  is  infinitely  hard,  and  God  would  be 
the  most  unreasonable  and  cruel  of  beings  if  he  did  not  provide 
for  their  escape.  These  convictions  will  and  must  lodge  in 
the  mind  of  him  who  really  believes  the  dogma  of  a  sinful 
nature.  This  in  substance  is  sometimes  affirmed  by  the  de- 
fenders of  the  dpctrine  of  original  sin. 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 


477 


16.  This  doctrine  is  a  stumbling  block  both  to  the  church 
and  the  world — infinitely  dishonorable  to  God,  and  an  abomi- 
nation alike  to  God  and  the  human  intelligence,  and  should 
be  banished  from  every  pulpit  and  from  every  formula  of  doc- 
trine, and  from  the  world.  It  is  a  relict  of  heathen  philoso- 
phy, and  was  foisted  in  among  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  by 
Augustine,  as  every  one  may  know  who  will  take  the  trouble 
to  examine  for  himself.  Who  does  not  know  that  this  view 
of  moral  depravity  that  I  am  opposing,  has  long  been  the 
strong  hold  of  Universalism?  From  it  the  Universalists  in- 
veighed with  resistless  force  against  the  idea  that  sinners 
would  be  sent  to  an  eternal  hell.  Assuming  the  long-de- 
fended doctrine  of  original  or  constitutional  sinfulness,  they 
proceed  to  show  that  it  were  infinitely  unreasonable  and  un- 
just in  God  to  send  them  to  hell.  What!  create  them  wdth  a 
sinful  nature  from  which  proceed  by  a  law  of  necessity  actual 
transgressions,  and  then  send  them  to  an  eternal  hell  for 
having  this  nature,  and  for  transgressions  that  are  unavoidable? 
Impossible!  they  say;  and  the  human  intelligence  responds 
Amen. 

From  the  dogma  of  a  sinful  nature  or  constitution  also  has 
naturally  and  irresistibly  flowed  the  doctrine  of  inability  to 
repent,  and  the  necessity  of  a  physical  regeneration.  These 
too  have  been  a  sad  stumbling-block  to  Universalists  as  every 
one  knows  who  is  at  all  acquainted  with  the  history  of  Uni- 
versalism. They  infer  the  salvation  of  all  men  from  the  fact 
of  God's  benevolence  and  physical  omnipotence!  God  is  Al- 
mighty, and  he  is  love.  Men  are  constitutionally  depraved, 
and  are  unable  to  repent.  God  will  not,  can  not  send  them 
to  hell.  They  do  not  deserve  it.  Sin  is  a  calamity,  and  God 
can  save  them,  and  he  ought  to  do  so.  This  is  the  substance 
of  their  argument.  And,  assuming  the  truth  of  their  premises, 
there  is  no  evading  their  conclusion.  But  the  whole  argu- 
ment is  built  on  '•'  such  stuff  as  dreams  are  made  of."  Strike 
out  the  ridiculous  dogma  of  a  sinful  nature,  and  their  whole 
edifice  comes  to  the  ground  in  a  moment. 


LECTURE  XXXVIII. 
MORAL  DEPRAVITY- 

//.   The  proper  method  of  accounting  for  moral  depravity. 

The  term  '^ moral"  is  from  the  Latin  mos — manners.  The 
term  "depravity,"  as  has  been  shown,  is  from  de  and  pravus 
— crooked.  The  terms  united,  signify  crooked  manners,  or 
bad  morals.     In  this  discussion  I  must, 

1.  Remind  you  of  some  positions  that  have  hefM  settled  respect- 
ing moral  depravity, 

2.  Consult  the  oracles  of  God  respecting  the  nature  of  moral 
depravity,)  or  sin. 

3.  Consult  the  oracles  of  God  in  respect  to  the  proper  method  of 
accounting  for  the  existence  of  sin. 

4.  Show  the  manner  in  zvhich  it  is  to  be  accounted  for  as  an 
ultimate  fact. 

1.  Some  positions  that  have  been  settled. 

(I.)  It  has  been  shown  that  moral  depravity  resolves  itself 
into  selfishness. 

(2.)  That  selfishness  consists  in  the  supreme  choice  of  self- 
indulgence. 

(3.)  That  self-indulgence  consists  in  the  committal  of  the 
will  to  the  gratification  of  the  sensibility,  as  opposed  to  obey- 
ing the  law  of  the  reason. 

(4.)  That  sin  or  moral  depravity  is  a  unit,  and  always  con- 
sists in  this  committed  state  of  the  will  to  self-gratification,  ir- 
respective of  the  particular  form  or  means  of  self-gratification. 

(5.)  It  has  also  been  shown  that  moral  depravity  does  not 
consist  in  a  sinful  nature. 

(6.)And  also  that  actual  transgression  can  not  justly  be 
ascribed  to  a  sinful  constitution. 

(7.)  We  have  also  seen  that  all  sin  is  actual,  and  that  no 
other  than  actual  transgression  can  justly  be  called  sin. 

2.  I  am  to  consult  the  oracles  of  God  respecting  the  na- 
ture of  moral  depravity  or  sin. 

Reference  has  often  been  made  to  the  teachings  of  inspira- 
tion upon  this  subject.  But  it  is  important  to  review  our 
ground  in  this  place,  that  we  may  ascertain  what  are  the 
teachings,  and  what  are  the  assumptions  of  the  bible  in  regard 
to  the  nature  of  sin?  Does  it  assume  that  as  truth,  which 
natural  theology  teaches  upon  the  subject?  What  is  taught 
in  the  bible,  either  expressly,  or  by  way  of  inference  and  im- 
plication upon  this  subject? 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  479 

(1.)  The  bible  gives  a  formal  definition  of  sin.  lJno.3:  4, 
Sin  is  a  transgression  of  the  law,  and  5:  17,  All  unrighteous- 
ness is  sin.  As  was  remarked  on  a  former  occasion,  this  defi- 
nition is  not  only  an  accurate  one,  but  it  is  the  only  one  that 
can  possibly  be  true. 

(2.)  The  bible  every  where  makes  the  law  the  only  standard 
of  right  and  wrong,  and  obedience  to  it  to  be  the  whole  of  vir- 
tue, and  disobedience  to  it  to  be  the  whole  of  sin.  This  truth 
lies  every  where  upon  the  face  of  the  Bible.  It  is  taught,  as- 
sumed, implied  or  expressed  on  every  page  of  the  Bible. 

(3.)  It  holds  men  responsible  for  their  voluntary  actions 
alone,  or  more  strictly  for  their  choices  alone,  and  ex- 
pressly aftirms  that  ^'if  there  be  a  willing  mind,  it  is  accepted 
according  to  what  a  man  hath,  and  not  according  to  what  he 
hath  not."  That  is,  wiUing  as  God  directs  is  accepted  as 
obedience,  whether  we  are  able  to  execute  our  choices  or  not. 

(4.)  The  Bible  always  represents  sin  as  something  done  or 
committed  or  wilfully  omitted,  and  never  as  a  part  or  attribute 
of  soul  or  body.  We  have  seen  that  the  texts  that  have  been 
relied  on  as  teaching  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  sinfulness, 
when  rightly  understood,  mean  no  such  thing. 
•  (.5.)  The  Bible  assures  us  that  all  sin  shall  pass  in  review 
at  the  solemn  judgment,  and  always  represents  all  sin  then  to 
be  recognized,  as  consisting  in  "  the  deeds  done  in  the  body," 
Texts  that  support  these  assertions  are  too  numerous  to  need 
to  be  quoted,  as  every  reader  of  the  Bible  knows. 

3.  I  am  to  consult  the  Bible  in  respect  to  the  proper  meth- 
od of  accounting  for  moral  depravity,  or  sin. 

(1.)  We  have  more  than  once  seen  that  the  Bible  has  given 
us  the  history  of  the  introduction  of  sin  into  our  world,  and  that 
from  the  narrative,  it  is  plain  that  the  first  sin  consisted  in 
selfishness^  or  in  consenting  to  indulge  the  excited  constitu- 
tional propensities  in  a  prohibited  manner.  In  Other  words,  it 
consisted  in  yielding  the  will  to  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility, 
instead  of  abiding  by  the  law  of  God  as  revealed  in  the  intel- 
ligence. Thus  the  bible  ascribes  the  first  sin  of  our  race  to 
the  influence  of  temptation. 

(2.)  The  bible  once,  and  only  once,  incidentally  intimates 
that  Adam's  first  sin  has  in  some  way  been  the  occasion  (not 
the  cause)  of  all  the  sins  of  men.     Rom.  5:  12 — 19. 

(3.)  li  neither  says  nor  intimates  any  thing  in  relation  to 
the  manner  in  which  Adam's  sin  has  occasioned  this  result. 
It  only  incidentally  recognizes  the  fact,  and  then  leaves  it 
just  as  if  the  quo  modo  was  too  obvious  to  need  explanation. 


480  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(4.)  In  other  parts  of  the  bible  we  are  informed  how  we 
are  to  account  for  the  existence  of  sin  among  men.  For  ex- 
ample, James  1 :  15.  When  lust  (desire,  epithumia)  has  con- 
ceived, it  bringeth  forth  sin.  Here  sin  is  represented,  not  as 
desire,  but  as  consisting  in  the  consent  of  the  will  to  gratify 
desire. 

James  says  again  that  a  man  is  tempted  when  he  is  drawn 
aside  of  his  own  lusts,  {epithumiai  desires)  and  enticed.  That 
is,  his  lusts  or  the  impulses  of  his  sensibility  are  his  tempters. 
When  he  is  overcome  of  these,  he  sins. 

(5.)  Paul  and  other  inspired  writers  represent  sin  as  consis- 
ting in  a  carnal  or  fleshly  mind,  in  the  mind  of  the  flesh,  or 
in  minding  the  flesh.  It  is  plain  that  by  the  term  flesh  they 
mean  what  we  understand  by  the  sensibility  as  opposed  to 
the  intelligence,  and  that  they  represent  sin  as  consisting  in 
obeying^  minding  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility.  They  re- 
present the  world  and  the  flesh  and  Satan  as  the  three  great 
sources  of  temptation.  It  is  plain  that  the  world  and  Satan 
tempt  by  appeals  to  the  flesh  orj  to  the  sensibility.  Hence 
the  apostles  have  much  to  say  of  the  necessity  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  flesh,  of  the  members,  of  putting  off  the  old  man 
with  his  deeds  &c.  Now,  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  all  this 
painstaking  on  the  part  of  inspiration  to  intimate  the  source 
from  whence  our  sin  proceeds,  and  to  apprise  us  of  the  pro- 
per method  of  accounting  for  it,  and  also  of  avoiding  it,  has 
led  certain  philosophers  and  theologians  to  take  a  view  of  it 
which  is  directly  opposed  to  the  truth.  Because  so  much  is 
said  of  the  influence  of  the  flesh,  they  have  inferred  that  the 
nature  and  physical  constitution  of  man  is  itself  sinful.  But 
the  representations  of  Scripture  are  that  the  body  is  the  occa- 
sion of  sin.  The  law  in  his  members,  that  warred  against 
the  law  of  his  mind,  of  which  Paul  speaks,  is  manifestly  the 
impulses  of  the  sensibility  opposed  to  the  law  of  the  reason. 
This  law,  that  is,  the  impulses  of  his  sensibihty,  bring  him 
into  captivity,  that  is,  influence  his  will,  in  spite  of  all  his 
resolutions  to  the  contrary. 

In  short,  the  Bible  rightly  interpreted,  every  where  assumes 
and  impUes  that  sin  consists  in  selfishness.  It  is  remarkable, 
if  the  Bible  be  read  with  an  eye  to  its  teachings  and  assump- 
tions on  this  point,  to  what  an  extent  this  truth  will  appear. 
4.  How  moral  depravity  is  to  be  accounted  for. 
(1.)  It  consists,  remember,  in  the  committal  of  the  will  to 
the  gratification  or  indulgence  of  self — in  the  will's  following 
or  submitting  itself  to  be  governed  by  the  impulses  and  de- 


310RAL  DEPRAVITY. 


481 


sires  of  the  sensibility  instead  of  submitting  itself  to  the  law 
of  the  intelligence. 

(2.)  This  definition  of  the  thing  shows  how  it  is  to  be  ac- 
counted for,  namely:  The  sensibility  acts  as  a  powerful  im- 
pulse to  the  will  from  the  moment  of  birth,  and  secures  the 
consent  and  activity  of  the  will  to  procure  its  gratification, 
before  the  reason  is  at  all  developed.  The  will  is  thus  com- 
mitted to  the  gratification  of  feeling  and  appetite,  when  first 
the  idea  of  moral  obligation  is  developed.  This  committed 
state  of  the  will  is  not  moral  depravity,  and  has  no  moral 
character  until  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  is  developed. 
The  moment  this  idea  is  developed,  this  committal  of  the 
will  to  self-indulgence  must  be  abandoned  or  it  becomes  sel- 
fishness, or  moral  depravity.  But  as  the  will  is  already  in  a 
state  of  committal,  and  has  to  some  extent  already  formed  the 
habit  of  seeking  to  gratify  feeling,  and  as  the  idea  of  moral 
obligation  is  at  first  but  feebly  developed,  unless  the  Holy 
Spirit  interferes  to  shed  light  on  the  soul,  the  will,  as  might 
be  expected,  retains  its  hold  on  self-gratification.  Here  mor- 
al character  does  and  must  commence.  Let  it  be  remember- 
ed that  selfishness  consists  in  the  supreme  and  ultimate  choice^ 
or  in  the  preference  of  self-gratification  as  an  end,  or  for  its 
own  sake,  over  all  other  interests.  Now,  as  the  choice  of  an 
end  implies  and  includes  the  choice  of  the  means.  Selfishness 
of  course,  causes  all  that  outward  life  and  activity  that  makes 
up  the  entire  history  of  sinners. 

This  selfish  choice  is  the  wicked  heart — the  sinful  nature — 
the  propensity  to  sin — the  sinful  appetite — the  craving  for  sin, 
and  all  that  causes  what  is  generally  termed  actual  transgres- 
sion. This  sinful  choice,  is  properly  enough  called  indwell- 
ing sin.  It  is  the  latent,  standing,  controlling  preference  of 
the  mind,  and  the  cause  of  all  the  outward  and  active  life. 
It  is  not  the  choice  of  sin,  but  the  choice  of  self-gratification, 
which  choice  is  sin. 

Again.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  physical  deprav- 
ity of  our  race  has  much  to  do  with  our  moral  depravity.  A 
diseased  physical  system  renders  the  appetites,  passions,  tem- 
per, and  propensities  more  clamorous  and  despotic  in  their 
demands,  and  of  course  confirms  and  strengthens  selfishness. 
It  should  be  distinctly  understood  that  physical  depravity  has 
no  moral  character  in  itself  But  yet  it  is  a  source  of  fierce 
temptation  to  selfishness.  The  human  sensibility  is,  manifest- 
ly, deeply  physically  depraved,  and  as  sin  or  moral  depravity 
consists  in  committing  the  will  to  the  gratification  of  the  sen- 
41 


482  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sibility,  its  physical  depravity  will  mightily  strengthen  moral 
depravity.  Moral  depravity  is  then  universally  owing  to 
temptation.  That  is,  the  soul  is  tempted  to  self -indulgence^ 
and  yields  to  the  temptation,  and  this  yielding,  and  not  the 
temptation,  is  sin  or  moral  depravity.  This  is  manifestly  the 
way  in  which  Adam  and  Eve  became  morally  depraved. 
They  were  tempted,  even  by  undepraved  appetite,  to  prohibi- 
ted indulgence,  and  were  overcome.  The  sin  did  not  lie  in 
the  constitutional  desire  of  food,  or  of  knowledge,  nor  in  the 
excited  state  of  these  appetites  or  desires,  but  in  the  consent 
of  the  will  to  prohibited  indulgence. 
y  Just  in  the  same  way  all  sinners  become  such,  that  is,  they 
become  morally  depraved  by  yielding  to  temptation  to-  self- 
gratification  under  some  form.  Indeed  it  is  impossible  that 
they  should  become  morally  depraved  in  any  other  way.  To 
deny  this  were  to  overlook  the  very  nature  of  moral  depravi- 
ty. It  is  remarkable  that  President  Edwards,  after  writing 
five  hondred  pages,  in  which  he  confounds  physical  and  moral 
depravity,  in  answer  to  an  objection  of  Dr.  Taylor  of  Eng- 
land, that  his  view  made  God,  the  author  of  the  constitution, 
the  author  also  of  sin,  turns  immediately  around,  and  without 
seeming  to  see  his  own  inconsistency,  ascribes  all  sin  to  temp- 
tation, and  makes  it  consist  altogether  in  obeying  the  propen- 
sities, just  as  I  have  done.     His  words  are. 

*'  One  argument  against  a  supposed  native,  sinful  depravity,  which  Dr.  TaJ'- 
lor  greatly  insists  upon,  is,  "  that  this  does  in  effect  charge  Him  who  is  the  an- 
thor  of  our  nature,  who  formed  us  m  the  icomh,  with  being  the  author  of  a  sinful 
corruption  of  nature;  and  that  it  is  highly  injurious  to  the  God  of  our  nature, 
whose  hands  hare  formed  and  fashioned  us,  to  believe  our  nature  to  be  original- 
ly corrupted  and  that  in  the  worst  sense  of  corruption." 

With  respect  to  this,  1  would  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that  this  writer,  in 
handling  this  grand  objection,  supposes  something  to  belong  to  the  doctrine  ob- 
jected against,  as  maintained  by  the  divines  whom  he  is  opposing,  which  does 
not  belong  to  it,  nor  follow  from  it.  As  particularly,  he  supposes  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin  to  imply,  that  nature  must  be  corrupted  by  some  positive  influ- 
ence; "something,  by  some  means  or  other,  infused  into  the  human  nature; 
some  quality  or  other,  not  from  the  choice  of  our  minds,  but  like  a  taint,  tincture, 
or  infection,  altering  the  natural  constitution,  faculties,  and  dispositions  of  our 
souls!  That  sin  and  evil  dispositions  are  implanted  in  the  foetus  in  the  womb." 
Whereas  truly  our  doctrine  neither  implies  nor  infers  any  such  thing.  In  order 
to  account  for  a  sinful  corruption  of  nature,  yea,  a  total  native  depravity  of  the 
heart  of  man,  there  is  not  the  least  need  of  supposing  any  evil  quality  infused, 
implanted,  or  wrought  into  the  nature  of  man,  by  any  positive  cause  or  influence 
whatsoever,  either  from  God,  or  the  creature;  or  of  supposing  that  man  is  con- 
ceived and  born  with  a  fountain  of  evil  in  his  heart  such  as  is  any  thing  prop- 
erly positive.  I  think  a  little  attention  to  the  nature  of  things  will  be  sufficient 
to  satisfy  any  impartial,  considerate  inquirer  that  the  absence  of  positive  good 
principles,  and  so  the  withholding  of  a  special  divine  influence  to  impart  and 
maintain  those  good  principles — leaving  the  common  natural  principles  of  self- 
love,  natural  appetite,  &c.  to  themselves,  without  the  government  of  superior 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY. 


483 


divine  principles  will  certainly  be  followed  with  the  corruption  ;  yea,  the  total 
corruption  of  the  heart,  without  occasion  for  any  positive  influence  at  all.  And 
that  it  was  thus  in  fact  that  corruption  of  nature  came  on  Adam,  immediately  on 
his  fall,  and  comes  on  all  his  posterity  as  sinning  in  him  and  falling  with  him. 

The  case  with  man  was  plainly  this:  When  God  made  man   at  first  he  im- 
planted in  him  two  kinds  of  principles.     There  was  an  inferior  kind  which  may 
be  natural,  being  the  principles  of  mere  human  nature;  such  as  self-love,    with 
those  natural  appetites  and  passions,  which  belong  to  the  nature  of  man,   in 
which  his  love  to  his  own  liberty,  honor  and  pleasure  were  exercised:  These, 
when  alone,  and  left  to  themselves,  are  what  the  scriptures  sometimes  call  flesh. 
Besides  these,  there  were  superior  principles,  that  were  spiritual,  holy,  and  di- 
vine, summarily  comprehended  in  divine  lore;  wherein  consisted  the  spiritual 
image  of  God,  and  man's  righteousness  and  true  holiness  ;  which  are  called  in 
scripture  the  divine  nature.     These  principles  may,  in  some  sense,  be  called  su- 
pernatural, being  (however  concreated  or  connate,  yet)  such  as  are  above  those 
principles  that  are  essentially  implied  in,  or  necessarily  resulting  from,  and  in- 
separably connected  with,  mere  human  nature:  and  being  such  as  immediately 
depend  on  man's  union  and  communion  with  God,  or  divine  communications 
and  influences  of  God's  spirit,  which  though  withdrawn,  and  man's   nature  for- 
saken of  these  principles,  human  nature  would  be  Imman  nature  still;  man's  na- 
ture, as  such,  being  entire  without  these  divine  principles,  which  the  scripture 
sometimes  calls  spirit,  in  contradistinction  to  flesh.     These  superior  principles 
were  given  to  possess  the  throne,  and  maintain  absolute  dominion  in  the   heart; 
the  other  to  be  wholly  subordinate  and  subservient.     And  while  things  continu- 
ed thus,  all  was  in  excellent  order,  peace,  and  beautiful  harmony,  and  in  a  pro- 
per and  perfect  state.     These  divine  principles  thus  reigning,  were  the   dignity, 
life,  happiness,  and  glory  of  man's  nature.     When  man  sinned  and  broke  God's 
covenant,  and  fell  under  his  curse,  these  superior  principles  left  his  heart :    For 
indeed  God  then  left  him,  that  communion  with  God  on  which  these  principles 
depended,  entirely  ceased;  the  Holy  Spirit  that  divine  inhabitant,  forsook  the 
house;  because  it  would  have  been  utterly  improper  in  itself,  and  inconsistent 
with  the  constitution  God  had  established,  that  he  should  still  maintain  commu- 
nion with  man,  and  continue  by  his  friendly,  gracious,  vital  influences,  to  dwell 
with  him  and  in  him,  after  he  was  become  a  rebel  and  had  incurred  God's  wrath 
and  curse.     Therefore  immediately  the  superior  divine  principles  wholly  ceas- 
ed: so  light  ceases  in  a  room  when  the  candle  is  withdrawn;  and  thus  man  was 
left  in  a  state  of  darkness,  woeful  corruption  and  ruin;  nothing  but  flesh  without 
spirit.     The  inferior  principles  of  self-love  and  natural  appetite  which  were  giv- 
en only  to  serve,  being  alone,  and  left  to  themselves,  of  course  became  reigning 
principles-  having  no  superior  principles  to  regulate  or  control  them,  they  be- 
came  the   absolute   masters  of  ihe   heart.      The  immediate   consequence  of 
which  was  a  fatal  catastrophe,  a  turning  of  all  things  upside  down,  and  the  suc- 
cession of  a  state  of  the  most  odious  and  dreadful  confusion.     Man  immediately 
set  up  himself,  and  the  objects  of  his  private  aflfections  and  appetites,  as  supreme 
and  so  they  took  the  place  of  God.    These  inferior  principles  were  like  fire  in  a 
house;  which  we  say  is  a  good  servant,  but  a  bad  master;  very  useful  while  kept 
in  its  place,  but  if  left  to  take  possession  of  the  whole  house,  soon  brings  all  to 
destruction.     Man's  love  to  his  own  honor,  separate  interests,  and  private  pleas- 
ure, which  before  was  wholly  subordinate  unto  love  to  God  and  regard  to  his 
authority  and  glory,  now  disposes  and   impels  him  to  pursue  those  objects, 
without  regard  to  God's  honor,  or  law;  because  there  is  no  true  regard  to  these 
divine  things  left  in  him.     In  consequence  of  which,  he  seeks  those  objects  as 
much  when  against  God's  honor  and  law,  as  when  agreeable  to  them.     God  still 
continuing  strictly  to  require  supreme  regard  to  himself,  and  forbidding  all  un- 
due gratification  of  these  inferior  passions — but  only  in  perfect  subordination  to 
the  ends,  and  agreeable  to  the  rules  and  limits,  which  his  holiness,  honor, 
and  law  prescribe — hence  immediately  arises  enmity  in  the  heart,  now  wholly 
under  the  power  of  self-love;  and  nothing  but  war  ensues,  in  a  course  against 
God.    As  when  a  subject  has  once  renounced  his  lawful  sovereign,  and  set  up  a 


484  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

pretender  in  his  stead,  a  state  of  enmity  and  war  against  his  rightful  king  neces- 
sarily ensues.  It  were  easy  to  show,  how  every  lust,  and  depraved  disposition 
of  man's  heart,  would  naturally  arise  from  this  privative  original,  if  here  were 
room  for  it.  Thus  it  is  easy  to  give  an  account,  how  total  corruption  of  heart 
should  follow  on  man's  eating  the  forbidden  fruit,  though  that  was  but  one  act 
of  sin,  without  God  putting  any  evil  into  his  heart,  or  implanting  any  bad  prin- 
ciple, or  infusing  any  corrupt  taint,  and  so  becoming  the  author  of  depravity. — 
Only  God's  withdrawing,  as  it  was  highly  proper  and  necessary  that  he  should, 
from  rebel  man,  and  his  natural  principles  being  left  to  themselves,  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  his  becoming  entirely  corrupt,  and  bent  on  sinning  against  God. 

And  as  Adam's  nature  became  corrupt,  without  God's  implanting  or  infusing 
of  any  evil  thing  into  it;  so  does  the  nature  of  his  posterity.  God  dealing  with 
Adam  as  the  head  of  his  posterity,  [as  has  been  shown,]  and  treating  them  as 
one,  he  deals  with  his  posterity  as  having  all  sinned  in  him.  And  therefore,  as 
God  withdrew  spiritual  communion,  and  his  vital,  gracious  influence  from  all 
the  members,  as  they  come  into  existence;  whereby  they  come  into  the  world 
mere  flesh,  and  entirely  under  the  government  of  natural  and  inferior  principles; 
and  so  become  wholly  corrupt,  as  Adam  did." — Edwards^  Works, pp  532 — 538, 

To  sum  up  the  truth  upon  this  subject  in  few  words,  I  would 
say, 

1.  Moral  depravity  in  our  first  parents  was  induced  by 
temptation  addressed  to  the  unperverted  susceptibilities  of 
their  nature.  When  these  susceptibilities  became  strongly 
excited,  they  overcame  the  will;  that  is,  the  human  pair  were 
overpersuadcd  and  fell  under  the  temptation.  This  has  been 
repeatedly  said,  but  needs  repetition  in  a  summing  up. 

2.  All  moral  depravity  commences  in  substantially  the 
same  way.     Proof, 

(1.)  The  impulses  of  the  sensibility  are  developed  at 
birth. 

(2.)  The  first  acts  of  will  are  in  obedience  to  these. 

(3.)Self-gratification  is  the  rule  of  action  previous  to  the  de- 
velopment of  reason. 

(4.)  No  resistance  is  offered  to  the  will's  indulging  appetite 
until  a  habit  of  self-indulgence  is  formed. 

(5.)  When  reason  affirms  moral  obligation,  it  finds  the  will 
in  a  state  of  habitual  and  constant  committal  to  the  impulses 
of  the  sensibility. 

(6.)  The  demands  of  the  sensibiHty  have  become  more  and 
more  despotic  every  hour  of  indulgence. 

(7.)  In  this  state  of  things,  unless  the  Holy  Spirit  interpose, 
the  idea  of  moral  obligation  will  be  but  dimly  developed. 

(8.)  The  will  of  course  rejects  the  bidding  of  reason  and 
cleaves  to  self-indulgence. 

(9.)  This  is  the  settling  of  a  fundamental  question.  It  is 
deciding  in  favor  of  appetite  against  the  claims  of  conscience 
and  of  God. 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  485 

(10.)  Light  once  rejected  can  be  thereafter  more  easily  re- 
sisted. 

(11.)  Selfishness  confirms  and  strengthens  and  perpetuates 
itself  bj  a  natural  process.  It  grows  with  the  sinner's  growth 
and  strengthens  with  his  strength,  and  will  do  so  forever 
unless  overcome  by  the  Holy  Spirit  through  the  truth. 

REMARKS. 

1.  Adam,  being  the  natural  head  of  the  race,  would  natu- 
rally, by  the  wisest  constitution  of  things,  greatly  affect  for 
good  or  evil  his  whole  posterity. 

2.  His  sin  in  many  ways  exposed  his  posterity  to  aggra- 
vated temptation.  Not  only  the  physical  constitution  of  all 
men,  but  all  the  influences  under  which  they  first  form  their 
moral  character  are  widely  different  from  what  they  would 
have  been,  if  sin  had  never  been  introduced. 

3.  When  selfishness  is  understood  to  be  the  whole  of  moral 
depravity,  its  quo  modo  is  manifest.  Clear  conceptions  of  the 
thing  will  instantly  reveal  the  occasion  and  manner. 

4.  The  only  difficulty  in  accounting  for  it  has  been  the  false 
assumption  that  there  must  be  and  is  something  back  of  the 
free  actions  of  the  will,  and  sustaining  to  those  actions  the  re- 
lation of  a  cause  that  is  itself  sinful. 

5.  If  holy  Adam  and  holy  angels  could  fall  under  tempta- 
tions addressed  to  their  undepraved  sensibiUty,  how  absurd  it 
is  to  conclude  that  sin  in  infants  who  are  born  with  a  physi- 
cally depraved  constitution,  can  not  be  accounted  for,  without 
ascribing  it  to  original  sin,  or  to  a  nature  that  is  in  itself  sinful. 

6.  Without  divine  illumination  the  moral  character  will  of 
course  be  formed  under  the  influence  of  the  flesh.  That  is, 
the  lower  propensities  wUl  of  course  influence  the  will,  unless 
the  intelHgence  be  developed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  was  said 
by  President  Edwards  in  the  extract  just  quoted. 

7.  The  dogma  of  constitutional  moral  depravity  is  a  part 
and  parcel  of  the  doctrine  of  a  necessitated  will.  It  is  a 
branch  of  a  grossly  false  and  heathenish  philosophy.  How 
infinitely  absurd,  dangerous,  and  unjust,  then,  to  embody  it  in 
a  standard  of  christian  doctrine,  to  give  it  the  place  of  an  in- 
dispensable article  of  faith,  and  denounce  all  who  will  not 
swallow  its  absurdities,  as  heretics.     O,  Shame ! 

8.  We  are  unable  to  say  precisely  at  what  age  infants  be- 
come moral  agents,  and,  of  course,  how  early  they  become  sin- 
ners.    Doubtless  there  is  much  difference  among  children  in 

41* 


486  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

this  respect.     Reason  is  developed  in  one  earlier  than  in  an- 
other, according  to  the  constitution. 

A  thorough  consideration  of  the  subject  will  doubtless  lead 
to  the  conviction  that  children  become  moral  agents  much 
earlier  than  is  generally  supposed.  The  conditions  of  moral 
agency  are.  as  has  been  repeatedly  said  in  former  lectures, 
the  possession  of  the  powers  of  moral  agency,  together  with 
the  development  of  the  ideas  of  the  good  or  valuable,  of  mor- 
al obligation  or  oughtness — of  right  and  wrong — of  praise 
and  blameworthiness.  I  have  endeavored  to  show  in  former 
lectures,  that  mental  satisfaction,  blessedness  or  happiness,  is 
the  ultimate  good.  Satisfaction  arising  from  the  gratification 
of  the  appetites  is  one  of  the  earliest  experiences  of  human 
beings.  This  no  doubt  suggests  or  develops  at  a  very  early 
period  the  idea  of  the  good  or  the  valuable.  The  idea  is 
doubtless  developed  long  before  the  word  that  expresses  it  is 
understood.  The  child  knows  that  happiness  is  good,  and 
seeks  it  in  the  form  of  self-gratification  long  before  the  terms 
that  designate  this  state  of  mind  are  at  all  understood.  It 
knows  that  its  own  enjoyment  is  worth  seeking,  and  doubtless 
very  early  has  the  idea  that  the  enjoyment  of  others  is  worth 
seeking,  and  affirms  to  itself,  not  in  words  but  in  idea,  that  it 
ought  to  please  its  parents  and  those  around  it.  It  knows  in 
fact,  though  language  is  as  yet  unknown,  that  it  loves  to  be 
gratified  and  to  be  happy,  that  it  loves  and  seeks  enjoyment 
for  itself,  and  doubtless  has  the  idea  that  it  ought  not  to  dis- 
please and  distress  those  around  it,  but  that  it  ought  to  en- 
deavor to  please  and  gratify  them.  This  is  probably  among 
the  first  ideas,  if  not  the  very  first  idea  of  the  pure  reason  that  is 
developed,  that  is,  the  idea  of  the  good,  the  valuable,  the 
desirable;  and  the  next  must  be  that  of  oughtness,  or  of  moral 
obHgation,  the  next  of  right  and  wrong,  &c.  I  say  again, 
these  ideas  are  and  must  be  developed  before  the  signs  or 
words  that  express  them  are  at  all  understood,  and  the  words 
would  never  be  understood  except  the  idea  were  first  devel- 
oped. We  always  find  at  the  earKest  period  at  which  chil- 
dren can  understand  words  that  they  have  the  idea  of  obli- 
gation, of  right  and  wrong.  As  soon  as  these  words  are  under- 
stood by  them,  they  recognize  them  as  expressing  ideas  al- 
ready in  their  own  minds,  and  which  ideas  they  have  had,  fur- 
ther back  than  they  can  remember.  Some  and  indeed  most 
persons  seem  to  have  the  idea  that  children  affirm  themselves 
to  be  under  moral  obligation  before  thej  have  the  idea  of  the 
good;  that  they  affirm  their  obligation  to  obey  their  parents 


MORAL  DEPRAVITY.  487 

before  they  know  or  have  the  idea  of  the  good  or  of  the  val- 
uable. But  this  is  and  must  be  a  mistake.  They  may  and 
do  affirm  obligation  to  ohey  their  parents  before  they  can  ex- 
press in  language  and  before  they  would  understand  a  philo- 
sophical statement  of  the  grounds  of  their  obligation.  The 
idea  however  they  do  and  must  have  or  they  could  not  affirm 
obligation.  It  is  agreed  and  cannot  be  denied  that  moral  ob- 
ligation respects  acts  of  will  and  not  strictly  outward  action* 
It  is  agreed  and  can  not  be  denied  that  obligation  respects  in- 
telligent actions  of  will.  It  is  also  agreed  and  can  not  be 
denied  that  all  intelligent  acts  of  will  and  such  as  those  to 
which  moral  obligation  belongs  must  respect  ends  or  means. 
If  therefore  one  has  any  true  idea  of  moral  obligation  it  must 
respect  acts  of  will  or  intentions.  It  must  respect  the  choice 
of  an  end  or  of  means.  If  it  respect  the  choice  of  a  means 
the  idea  of  the  end  must  exist.  It  can  not  justly  affirm  obli- 
gation of  any  thing  but  choice  or  intention  for  as  a  matter  of 
fact  obligation  belongs  to  nothing  else.  The  fact  is  the  child 
knows  that  it  ought  to  please  its  parent  and  seek  to  make  its 
parent  happy.  This  it  knows  that  it  ought  to  intend  long  be- 
fore it  knows  what  the  word  intention  means,  l/pon  this  as- 
sumption it  bases  all  its  affirmations  in  respect  to  its  obliga- 
tion to  obey  its  parents  and  others  that  are  around  it.  It  re- 
gards its  own  satisfaction  or  enjoyment  as  a  good  and  seeks  it 
before  it  knows  what  the  words  mean  that  express  this  state 
of  mind.  It  also  knows  that  the  enjoyment  of  others  is  a 
good,  and  affirms  not  in  word  but  in  idea  that  it  ought  to  seek 
the  enjoyment  of  all.  This  idea  is  the  basis  upon  which  all 
affirmations  of  obligation  rest,  and  if  it  be  truly  an  idea  of 
real  obligation  it  is  impossible  that  the  idea  of  the  good  or  of 
the  value  of  enjoyment  should  not  be  its  base.  To  assert  the 
contrary  is  to  overlook  the  admitted  fact  that  moral  obligation 
must  respect  choice  and  the  choice  of  an  end;  that  it  must  res- 
pect intention.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  a  being  can  truly 
affirm  moral  obligation  in  respect  to  outward  action  before  it 
has  the  idea  of  the  obligation  to  will  or  intend  an  end.  The 
idea  of  an  end  may  not  be  developed  in  words,  that  is,  the 
word  expressive  of  the  idea  may  not  be  understood,  but  the 
idea  must  be  in  the  mind  in  a  state  of  developement  or  there 
can  be  no  affirmation  of  obligation.  The  fact  is  there  is  a 
logical  connection  between  the  idea  of  the  good  and  the  idea 
of  moral  obligation,  of  right  and  wrong,  of  praise  and  blame 
worthiness.  These  latter  ideas  can  not  exist  without  the  first, 
and  the  existence  of  that  necessitates  the  developement  of 


488  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

these.  These  are  first  truths  of  reason.  In  other  words 
these  ideas  are  universally  and  neces^axily  developed  in  the 
minds  of  moral  agents  and  indeed  their  development  is  the 
condition  of  moral  agency.  Most  of  the  first  truths  are  de- 
veloped in  idea  long  before  the  language  in  which  they  are 
expressed  is  or  can  be  understood.  Thus  the  ideas  of  space, 
of  time,  of  causahty,  of  Hberty  of  will,  or  ability,  of  the 
good,  of  oughtness  or  obHgation  to  will  it,  of  right  and  wrong, 
of  praise  or  blameworthiness  and  many  others  are  developed 
before  the  meaning  of  those  words  is  at  all  understood.  Hu- 
man beings  come  gradually  to  understand  the  words  or  signs 
that  represent  their  ideas,  and  afterwards  so  often  express 
their  ideas  in  words  that  they  finally  get  the  impression  that 
they  got  the  idea  from  the  word,  whereas  in  every  instance  in 
respect  to  the  first  truths  of  reason  they  had  the  idea  long 
before  they  understood  or  perhaps  ever  heard  the  word  that 
represents  it  and  was  coined  to  express  it. 

9.  They  who  maintain  the  sinfulness  of  the  constitutional 
appetites,  must  of  course  deny  that  men  can  ever  be  entirely 
sanctified  in  this  life,  and  must  maintain,  as  they  do,  that  death 
must  complete  the  work  of  sanctification. 

10.  False  notions  of  moral  depravity  lie  at  the  foundation 
of  all  the  objections  I  have  seen  to  the  doctrine  of  entire  sanc- 
tification in  this  life. 

11.  A  diseased  nervous  system  is  a  fierce  temptation.  Some 
forms  of  disease  expose  the  soul  to  much  trial.  Dyspeptic 
and  nervous  persons  need  superabounding  grace. 

12.  Why  sin  is  so  natural  to  mankind.  Not  because  their 
nature  is  itself  sinful,  but  because  the  appetites  and  passions 
tend  so  strongly  to  self-indulgence.  Besides,  selfishness  being 
the  ruling  passion  of  the  soul,  its  manifestations  are  spon- 
taneous. 

13.  The  doctrine  of  original  sin  as  held  by  its  advocates 
must  essentially  modify  the  whole  system  of  practical  theology. 
This  will  be  seen  as  we  proceed  in  our  investigations. 

14.  The  constitution  of  a  moral  being  as  a  whole  when  all 
the  powers  are  developed,  does  not  tend  to  sin,  but  strongly 
in  an  opposite  direction,  as  is  manifest  from  the  fact  that 
when  reason  is  thoroughly  developed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  it  is 
more  than  a  match  for  the  sensibility  and  turns  the  heart  to 
God. 

15.  The  difficulty  is  that  the  sensibility  gets  the  start  of 
reason  and  engages  the  attention  in  devising  means  of  self- 
gratification,  and  thus  retards,  and  in  a  great  measure  pre- 


MORAL    DEPRAVITY. 


489 


vents  the  development  of  the  ideas  of  the  reason  which  were 
designed  to  control  the  will. 

16.  It  is  this  morbid  development  that  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
given  to  rectify,  by  so  forcing  truth  upon  the  attention,  as  to 
secure  the  development  of  the  intelligence.  By  doing  this 
He  brings  the  will  under  the  influence  of  truth.  Our  senses 
reveal  to  us  the  objects  correlated  to  our  animal  nature  and 
propensities.  The  Holy  Spirit  reveals  God  and  the  spiritual 
worid,  and  all  that  class  of  objects  that  are  so  correlated  to 
our  higher  nature  as  to  give  Reason  the  control  of  the  will. 
This  i§_regeneration  and  sanctification  as  we  shall  see  in  its 
proper  place. 


■i 


LECTURE  XXXIX. 
REGENERATION, 

In  the  examination  of  this  subject  I  will, 

I.  Point  out  the  common  distinction  between  Regenera- 
tion AND  Conversion. 

II.  State  the  assigned  reasons  for  this  distinction 

III.  State  objections  to  this  distinction. 

IV.  Show  what  Regeneration  is  not. 

V.  What  it  is. 

VI.  Its  universal  necessity. 

VII.  Agencies  employed  in  it. 

VIII.  Instrumentalities  employed  in  it. 

IX.  That  in  Regeneration  the  subject  is  both  active 
and  passive. 

X.  What  is  implied  in  Regeneration. 

XI.  Philosophical  Theories  of  Regeneration. 

XII.  Evidences  of  Regeneration. 

/.  /  am  to  point  out  the  common  distinction  between  Regenera- 
tion and  Conversion, 

1.  Regeneration  is  the  term  used  by  many  theologians  to 
express  the  Divine  agency  in  changing  the  heart. 

2.  With  them  regeneration  does  not  include  and  imply  the 
activity  of  the  subject,  but  rather  excludes  it.  These  theolo- 
gians, as  will  be  seen  in  its  place,  hold  that  a  change  of  heart 
is  first  eflfected  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  while  the  subject  is  pas- 
sive, which  change  lays  a  foundation  for  the  exercise,  by  the 
subject,  of  repentance,  faith,  and  love. 

3.  Conversion  with  them  expresses  the  activity  and  turning 
of  the  subject,  after  regeneration  is  effected  by  the  Holy 
Spirit.  Conversion  with  them  does  not  include  or  imply  the 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  expresses  only  the  activity  of 
the  subject.  With  them  the  Holy  Spirit  first  regenerates  or 
changes  the  heart,  after  which  the  sinner  turns  or  converts 
himself  So  that  God  and  the  subject  work  each  in  turn. 
God  first  changes  the  heart,  and  as  a  consequence,  the  subject 
afterwards  converts  himself  or  turns  to  God.  Thus  the  sub- 
ject is  passive  in  regeneration,  but  active  in  conversion. 

When  we  come  to  the  examination  of  the  philosophical  theo- 
ries of  regeneration,  we  shall  see  that  the  views  of  these 
theologians  respecting  regeneration  result  naturally  and  ne- 
cessarily from  their  holding  the  dogma  of  constitutional  moral 
depravity,  which  we  have  recently  examined.     Until  their 


REGENERATION.  491 

views  on  that  subject  are  corrected,  no  change  can  be  expect- 
ed in  their  views  of  this  subject.  I  said  in  a  concluding  re- 
mark, when  upon  the  subject  of  moral  depravity,  that  errone- 
ous views  upon  that  subject  must  necessarily  materially  affect 
and  modify  one's  views  upon  most  of  the  questions  in  practi- 
cal theology.  Let  us  bear  this  remark  in  mind  as  we  proceed, 
not  only  in  the  discussions  immediately  before  us,  but  also  in 
all  our  future  investigations,  that  we  may  duly  appreciate  the 
importance  of  clear  and  correct  views  on  the  subject  of  prac- 
tical theology. 

//.  I  am  to  state  the  assigned  reasons  for  this  distinction. 

1.  The  original  term  plainly  expresses  and  implies  other 
than  the  agency  of  the  subject. 

2.  We  need  and  must  adopt  a  term  that  will  express  the 
Divine  agency. 

3.  Regeneration  is  expressly  ascribed  to  the  Holy  Spirit. 

4.  Conversion,  as  it  implies  and  expresses  the  activity  and 
turning  of  the  subject,  does  not  include  and  imply  any  Divine 
agency,  and  therefore  does  not  imply  or  express  what  is  in- 
tended by  regeneration. 

5.  As  two  agencies  are  actually  employed  in  the  regenera- 
tion and  conversion  of  a  sinner,  it  is  necessary  to  adopt 
terms  that  will  clearly  teach  this  fact  and  clearly  distinguish 
between  the  agency  of  God  and  of  the  creature. 

6.  The  terms  regeneration  and  conversion  aptly  express 
this  distinction,  and  therefore  should  be  theologically  em- 
ployed. 

///.  /  am  to  state  the  objections  to  this  distinction. 

1.  The  original  term  gennao  with  its  derivatives  may  be 
rendered,  (1.)  To  beget.  (2.)  To  bear  or  bring  forth.  (3.) 
To  be  begotten.     (4.)  To  be  born  or  brought  forth. 

2.  Regeneration  is  in  the  Bible  the  same  as  the  new  birth. 

3.  To  be  born  again  is  the  same  thing,  as  the  Bible  uses, 
the  terms,  as  to  have  a  new  heart,  to  be  a  new  creature,  to 
pass  from  death  unto  life.  In  other  words,  to  be  born  again 
is  to  have  a  new  moral  character,  to  become  holy.  To  re- 
generate is  to  make  holy.  To  be  born  of  God,  no  doubt,  ex- 
presses and  includes  the  Divine  agency,  but  it  also  includes 
and  expresses  that  which  the  Divine  agency  is  employed  in 
effecting,  namely,  making  the  sinner  holy.  Certainly  a  sinaer 
is  not  regenerated  whose  moral  character  is  unchanged.  If 
he  were,  how  could  it  be  truly  said  that  whosoever  is  bom  of 
God  overcometh  the  world,  doth  not  commit  sin,  can  not  sin, 
&€*  ?    If  regeneration  does  not  imply  and  include  a  change 


492  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  moral  character  in  the  suhject,  how  can  regeneration  be 
made  the  condition  of  salvation?  The  fact  is,  the  term  re- 
generation, or  the  being  born  of  God,  is  designed  to  express 
primarily  and  principally  the  thing  done,  that  is,  the  making 
of  a  sinner  holy,  and  expresses  also  the  fact  that  God's  agency 
induces  the  change.  Throw  out  the  idea  of  what  is  done, 
that  is,  the  change  of  moral  character  in  the  subject,  and  he 
would  not  be  born  again,  he  would  not  be  regenerated,  and 
it  could  not  be  truly  said  in  such  a  case  that  God  had  regene- 
rated him. 

It  has  been  objected  that  the  term  really  means  and  expres- 
ses only  the  Divine  agency,  and  only  by  way  of  impHcation 
embraces  the  idea  of  a  change  of  moral  character,  and  of 
course  of  activity  in  the  subject.     To  this  I  reply, 

(1.)  That  if  it  really  expresses  only  the  Divine  agency,  it 
leaves  out  of  view  the  thing  effected  by  Divine  agency. 

(2.)  That  it  really  and  fully  expresses  not  only  the  Divine 
agency,  but  also  that  which  this  agency  accompHshes. 

(3.)  This  thing  which  the  agency  of  God  brings  about  is  a 
new  or  spiritual  birth,  a  resurrection  from  spiritual  death,  the 
inducing  of  a  new  and  holy  life.  The  thing  done  is  the  promi- 
nent idea  expressed  or  intended  by  the  term. 

(4.)  The  thing  done  implies  the  turning  or  activity  of  the 
subject.  It  is  nonsense  to  affirm  that  his  moral  character  is 
changed  without  any  activity  or  agency  of  his  own.  Passive 
holiness  is  impossible.  Holiness  is  obedience  to  the  law  of 
God,  the  law  of  love,  and  of  course  consists  in  the  activity  of 
the  creature. 

(5.)  We  have  said  that  regeneration  is  synonymous  in  the 
bible  with  a  new  heart.  But  sinners  are  required  to  make 
to  themselves  a  new  heart,^wlirch  they  could  not  do  if  they 
were  not  active  in  this  change.  If  the  work  is  a  work  of 
<jod  in  such  a  sense  that  He  must  first  regenerate  the  heart 
or  soul  before  the  agency  of  the  sinner  begins,  it  were  absurd 
and  unjust  to  require  him  to  make  to  himself  a  new  heart  un- 
til he  is  first  regenerated. 

Regeneration  is  ascribed  to  man  in  the  gospel,  which  it 
could  not  be  if  the  term  were  designed  to  express  only  the 
agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  "  For  though  ye  have  ten  thou- 
sand instructers in  Christ,  yet  have  ye  not  many  fathers;  for 
in  Christ  Jesus  I  have  begotten  you  through  the  gospel." — 
1  Cor.  4:  15. 

6.  Conversion  is  spoken  of  in  the  Bible  as  the  work  of 
another  than  the  subject  of  it,  and  can  not  therefore  have 


REGENERATION.  493 

been  designed  to  express  only  the  activity  of  the  subject  of  it. 
(1.)  It  is  ascribed  to  the  word  of  God. — '^  The  law  of  the  Lord 
is  perfect,  coverting  the  soul:  the  testimony  of  the  Lord  u 
sure,  making  wise  the  simple." — Ps.  19:  7.  (2.)  To  man. 
"•Brethren,  if  any  of  you  do  err  from  the  truth,  and  one  con- 
vert him;  let  him  know,  that  he  which  converteth  the  sinner 
from  the  error  of  his  way  shall  save  a  soul  from  death,  and 
shall  hide  a  multitude  of  sins." — James  5:  19,  20. 

7.  Both  conversion  and  regeneration  are  sometimes  in  the 
Bible  ascribed  to  God,  sometimes  to  man,  and  sometimes  to  the 
subject;  which  shows  clearly  that  the  distinction  under  exam- 
ination is  arbitrary  and  theological  rather  than  biblical. 

8.  Xk?J!*^ctJs  that  both  terms  imply  the  simultaneous  fixe.r- 
cise  of  both  human"and  divine  agency.  The  fact  that  a  new 
heart  is  the  thing  done,  demonstrates  the  activity  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  word  regeneration,  or  the  expression  '^born  of 
the  Holy  Spirit"  asserts  the  divine  agency.  The  same  is  true 
of  conversion,  or  the  turning  of  the  sinner  to  God.  God  is 
said  to  turn  him  and  he  is  said  to  turn  himself.  God  draws 
him,  and  he  follows.  In  both  alike  God  and  man  are  both 
active,  and  their  activity  is  simultaneous.  God  works  or 
draws,  and  the  sinner  yields  or  turns,  or  which  is  the  same 
thing,  changes  his  heart,  or,  in  other  words,  is  born  again. 
The  sinner  is  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins.  God  calls  on  him, 
""Awake  thou  that  sleepest,  arise  from  the  dead  that  Christ 
may  give  thee  light."  God  calls;  the  sinner  hears  and  an- 
swers, Here  am  I.  God  says.  Arise  from  the  dead.  The  sin- 
ner puts  forth  his  activity,  and  God  draws  him  into  life;  or 
rather  God  draws,  and  the  sinner  comes  forth  to  life. 

9.  The  distinction  is  not  only  not  recognized  in  the  Bible, 
but  is  plainly  of  most  injurious  tendency  for  two  reasons: 

(1.)  It  assumes  and  inculcates  a  false  philosophy  of  de" 
pravity  and  regeneration. 

(2.)  It  leads  the  sinner  to  wait  to  be  regenerated  before  he 
repents  or  turns  to  God.  It  is  of  most  fatal  tendency  to  rep- 
resent the  sinner  as  under  a  necessity  of  waiting  to  be  pas- 
sively regenerated  before  he  gives  himself  to  God. 

As  the  distinction  is  not  only  arbitrary  but  anti-scriptural 
and  injurious,  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  founded  in,  and  is  de- 
signed to  teach  a  philosophy  false  and  pernicious  on  the  sub- 
ject of  depravity  and  regeneration,  I  shall  drop  and  discard 
the  distinctioi),  and  in  our  investigations  henceforth,  let  it  be 
42 


1 


494  gySTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

understood  that  I  use  regeneration  and  conversion  as  synony- 
mous terms. 

IV,  I  am  to  show  what  regeneration  is  not. 

It  is  not  a  change  in  the  substance  of  soul  or  body.  If 
it  were,  sinners  could  not  be  required  to  effect  it.  Such  a 
change  would  not  constitute  a  change  of  moral  character. 
No  such  change  is  needed,  as  the  sinner  has  all  the  faculties 
and  natural  attributes  requisite  to  render  perfect  obedience 
to  God.  All  he  needs  is  to  be  induced  to  use  these  pow- 
ers and  attributes  as  he  ought.  The  words  conversion  and 
regeneration  do  not  imply  any  change  of  substance  but  only 
a  change  of  moral  state  or  of  moral  character.  The  terms 
are  not  used  to  express  a  physical,  but  a  moral  change.  Re- 
generation docs  not  express  or  imply  the  creation  of  any  new 
faculties  or  attributes  of  nature,  nor  any  change  whatever  in 
the  constitution  of  body  or  mind.  I  shall  remark  further  up- 
on this  point  when  we  come  to  the  examination  of  the  philo- 
sophical theories  of  regeneration  before  alluded  to. 

F.   What  regeneration  is. 

It  has  been  said  that  regeneration  and  a  change  of  heart 
are  identical.  It  is  important  to  inquire  into  the  scriptural 
use  of  the  term  heart.  The  term  like  most  others  is  used  in 
the  bible  in  various  senses.  The  heart  is  often  spoken  of  in 
the  bible,  not  only  as  possessing  moral  character,  but  as  being 
the  source  of  moral  action  or  as  the  fountain  from  which  good 
and  evil  actions  flow,  and  of  course  as  constituting  the  foun- 
tain of  holiness  or  of  sin,  or  in  other  words  still,  as  compre- 
hending strictly  speaking  the  whole  of  moral  character.  ''But 
those  things  which  proceed  out  of  the  mouth  come  forth  from 
the  heart;  and  they  defile  the  man.  For  out  of  the  heart  pro- 
ceed evil  thoughts,  murders,  adulteries,  fornications,  thefts, 
false  witness,  blasphemies." — Mat.  15:  18,  19.  "O  genera- 
tion of  vipers,  how  can  ye,  being  evil,  speak  good  things?  for 
out  of  the  abundance  of  the  heart  the  mouth  speaketh.  A 
good  man  out  of  the  good  treasure  of  the  heart  bringeth  forth 
good  things:  and  an  evil  man  out  of  the  evil  treasure  bringeth 
forth  evil  things."— Mat.  12:  34,  35.  When  the  heart  is  thus 
represented  as  possessing  moral  character  and  as  the  fountain 
of  good  and  evil,  it  can  not  mean, 

(1.)  The  bodily  organ  that  propels  the  blood. 

(2.)  It  can  not  mean  the  substance  of  the  soul  or  mind  it- 
self: substance  can  not  in  itself  possess  moral  character. 

(3.)  It  is  not  any  faculty  or  natural  attribute. 


REGENERATION. 


495 


(4.)  It  can  not  consist  in  any  constitutional  taste,  relish  or 
appetite,  for  these  can  not  in  themselves  have  moral  character. 

(5.)  It  is  not  the  sensibility  or  feeling  faculty  of  the  mind, 
for  we  have  seen  that  moral  character  can  not  be  predicated 
of  it.  It  is  true,  and  let  it  be  understood,  that  the  term  heart 
is  used  in  the  bible  in  these  senses,  but  not  when  the  heart  is 
spoken  of  as  the  fountain  of  moral  action.  When  the  heart 
is  represented  as  possessing  moral  character,  the  word  can  not 
he  meant  to  designate  any  involuntary  state  of  mind.  For 
neither  the  substance  of  soul  or  body,  nor  any  involuntary 
state  of  mind  can  by  any  possibility  possess  moral  character 
in  itself  And  if  the  bible  assumed  or  asserted  that  they  could 
it  could  not  be  received  as  true  by  the  human  intelligence. 
The  very  idea  of  moral  character  implies  and  is  an  idea  of  a 
free  action  or  intention.  To  deny  this,  were  to  deny  a  first 
truth. 

(6.)  The  term  heart  when  applied  to  mind  is  figurative,  and 
means  something  in  the  mind  that  has  some  point  of  resem- 
hlance  to  the  bodily  organ  of  that  name,  and  a  consideration 
of  the  function  of  the  bodily  organ  will  suggest  the  true  idea 
of  the  heart  of  the  mind.  The  heart  of  the  body  propels  the 
vital  current  and  sustains  organic  life.  It  is  the  fountain 
from  which  the  vital  fluid  flows,  from  which  either  life  or  death 
may  flow  according  to  the  state  of  the  blood.  The  mind  as 
well  as  the  body  has  a  heart  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  re- 
presented as  a  fountain  or  as  an  efficient  propelling  influence 
out  of  which  flow  good  or  evil  according  as  the  heart  is  good 
or  evil.  This  heart  is  represented  not  only  as  the  source  or 
fountain  of  good  and  evil,  but  as  being  either  good  or  evil  in 
itself,  as  constituting  the  character  of  man  and  not  merely  as 
being  capable  of  moral  character. 

It  is  also  represented  as  something  over  which  we  have 
control,  for  which  we  are  responsible,  and  which,  in  case  it  is 
wicked,  we  are  bound  to  change  on  pain  of  death.  Again: 
the  heart  in  the  sense  in  which  we  are  considering  it,  is  that, 
the  radical  change  of  which  constitutes  a  radical  change  of 
moral  character.  This  is  plain  from  Matthew  12:  34, 35,  and 
15:  18, 19,  already  considered. 

(7.)  Our  own  consciousness  then  must  inform  us  that  the 
heart  of  the  mind  that  possesses  these  characteristics  can  be 
nothing  else  than  the  supreme  ultimate  intention  of  the  soul. 
Regeneration  is  represented  in  the  bible  as  constituting  a  ra- 
dical change  of  character,  as  the  resurrection  from  a  death  in 
sin,  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  and  spiritual  life,  as  constitu- 


496  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

ting  a  new  creature,  as  a  new  creation,  not  a  physical,  but  a 
moral  or  spiritual  creation,  as  conversion  or  turning  to  God, 
as  giving  God  the  heart,  as  loving  God  with  all  our  heart  and 
our  neighbor  as  ourselves.  Now  we  have  seen  abundantly 
that  moral  character  belongs  to  or  is  an  attribute  of  the  ulti- 
mate choice  or  intention  of  the  soul. 

Regeneration  then  is  a  radical  change  of  the  ultimate  in- 
tention, end  or  object  of  life.  We  have  seen  that  the  choice 
of  an  end  is  efficient  in  producing  executive  volitions  or  the 
use  of  means  to  obtain  its  end.  A  selfish  ultimate  choice  is 
therefore  a  wicked  heart  out  of  which  flows  every  evil,  and  a 
benevolent  ultimate  choice  is  a  good  heart  out  of  which  flows 
every  good  and  commendable  deed. 

Regeneration,  to  have  the  characteristics  ascribed  to  it  in 
the  bible,  must  consist  in  a  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  will, 
or  a  change  in  its  ultimate  choice,  intention,  or  preference; 
a  change  from  selfishness  to  benevolence;  from  choosing  self- 
gratification  as  the  supreme  and  ultimate  end  of  life  to  the  su- 
preme and  ultimate  choice  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God 
and  of  the  universe;  from  a  state  of  entire  consecration  to 
self-interest,  self-indulgence  self-gratification  for  its  own  sake 
or  as  an  end,  and  as  the  supreme  end  of  life  to  a  state  of  en- 
tire consecration  to  God  and  to  the  interests  of  his  kingdom 
as  the  supreme  and  ultimate  end  of  life. 

VI.   The  universal  necessity  of  regeneration. 

1.  The  necessity  of  regeneration  as  a  condition  of  salvation 
must  be  coextensive  with  moral  depravity.  This  has  been 
shown  to  be  universal  among  the  unregenerate  moral  agents 
of  our  race.  It  surely  is  impossible  that  a  world  or  a  uni- 
verse of  unholy  or  selfish  beings  should  be  happy.  It  is  im- 
possible that  heaven  should  be  made  up  of  selfish  beings.  It  is 
intuitively  certain  that  without  benevolence  or  holiness  no 
moral  being  can  be  ultimately  happy.  Without  regeneration 
a  selfish  soul  can  by  no  possibility  be  fitted  either  for  the  em- 
ployments or  for  the  enjoyments  of  heaven. 

2.  The  scriptures  expressly  teach  the  universal  necessity  of 
regeneration.  "Jesus  answered  and  said  unto  him,  Verily, 
verily,  I  say  unto  thee,  Except  a  man  be  born  again,  he  can- 
not see  the  kingdom  of  God." — Jno.  3:  3.  "For  in  Christ 
Jesus  neither  circumcision  availeth  any  thing,  nor  uncircum- 
cision,  but  a  new  creature.'' — Gal.  6:  15. 

VH.  Agencies  employed  in  regeneration. 
I.  The  scriptures  often  ascribe  regeneration  to  the  Spirit  of 
God.     "Jesus  answered,  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto  thee,  Ex- 


REGENERATION.  497 

cept  a  man  be  born  of  water  and  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot  en- 
ter into  the  kingdom  of  God.  That  which  is  born  of  the 
flesh  is  flesh;  and  that  which  is  born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit." — 
John  3:  5,  6.  "Which  were  born,  not  of  blood,  nor  of  the 
will  of  the  flesh,  nor  of  the  will  of  man,  but  of  God." — Jno. 

U  15. 

/     2.  We  have  seen  that  the  subject  is  active  in  regeneration, 
[  that  regeneration  consists  in  the  sinner  changing  his  ultimate 
S choice,  mtention,  preference;  or  in  changing  from  selfishness     - 
( i6  lov^xnHtrenevolence;  or  in  other  words  in  turning  from  the 
/  supreTrreichorce  of  self-gratification  to  the  supreme  love  of  God     \ 
/   and  the  equal  love  of  his  neighbor.     Of  course  the  subject  of    J 
i    regeneration  must  be  an  agent  in  the  work. 
^"^3.  There  are  generally  other  agents,  one  or  more  human 
beings  concerned  in  persuading  the  sinner  to  turn.     The  bi- 
ble recognizes  both  the  subject  and  the  preacher  as  agents  in 
the   work.     Thus  Paul  says:  '*!  have  begotten  you  through 
the  gospel."     Here  the  same  word  is  used  which  is  used  in 
another  case  where  regeneration  is  ascribed  to  God. 

Again:  An  Apostle  says,  "Ye  have  purified  your  souls  by 
obeying  the  truth."  Here  the  work  is  ascribed  to  the  subject. 
There  are  then  always  two  and  generally  more  than  two 
agents  employed  in  effecting  the  work.  Several  theologians 
have  held  that  regeneration  is  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
alone.  In  proof  of  this  they  cite  those  passages  that  as- 
cribe it  to  God.  But  I  might  just  as  lawfully  insist  that  it  is 
the  work  of  man  alone  and  quote  those  passages  that  ascribe 
it  to  man,  to  substantiate  my  position.  Or  I  might  assert  that 
it  is  alone  the  work  of  the  subject  and  in  proof  of  this  posi- 
tion quote  those  passages  that  ascribe  it  to  the  subject.  Or 
again,  I  might  assert  that  it  is  effected  by  the  truth  alone  and 
quote  such  passages  as  the  following  to  substantiate  my  posi- 
tion: "Of  his  own  will  begat  he  us  with  the  word  of  truth, 
that  we  should  be  a  kind  of  first-fruits  of  his  creatures." — 
James  1:  18.  "Being  born  again,  not  of  corruptible  seed, 
but  of  incorruptible,  by  the  word  of  God,  which  liveth  and 
abideth  for  ever." — 1.  Peter  1:  23.  The  fact  is,  when  Dr. 
Woods  and  others  insist  that  Regeneration  is  the  work  or  a 
work  of  God,  they  tell  the  truth  but  not  the  whole  truth.  For 
it  is  also  the  work  of  man  and  of  the  subject.  Their  course 
is  precisely  like  that  of  the  Unitarian,  who  when  he  would 
prove  that  Christ  is  not  God,  merely  proves  that  he  was  a 
man.  Now  we  admit  that  he  was  a  man,  but  we  hold  that  he 
is  more,  that  he  is  also  God.  Just  so  we  hold  that  God  is  ac- 
42* 


498  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOaY. 

tive  in  promoting  regeneration,  and  we  hold  also  that  the 
subject  always  and  necessarily  is  active  in  the  work  and  that 
generally  some  other  human  agency  is  employed  in  the  work 
in  presenting  and  urging  the  claims  of  God. 

It  has  been  common  to  regard  the  third  person  as  a  mere 
instrument  in  the  work.  But  the  fact  is  he  is  a  wilUng,  de- 
signing, responsible  agent,  as  really  so  as  God  or  the  sub- 
ject is. 

If  it  be  inquired  how  the  bible  can  consistently  ascribe  re- 
generation at  one  time  to  God,  at  another  to  the  subject,  at 
another  to  the  truth,  at  another  to  a  third  person;  the  answer 
is  to  be  sought  in  the  nature  of  the  work.  The  work  accom- 
plished is  a  change  of  choice  in  respect  to  an  end  or  the  end 
of  life.  The  sinner  whose  choice  is  changed  must  of  course 
act.  The  end  to  be  chosen  must  be  clearly  and  forcibly  pre- 
sented: this  is  the  work  of  the  third  person,  and  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  The  Spirit  takes  the  things  of  Christ  and  shows  them 
to  the  soul.  The  truth  is  employed,  or  it  is  truth  which  must 
necessarily  be  employed,  as  an  instrument  to  induce  a  change 
of  choice.  See  this  illustrated  in  sermons  on  Important  Sub- 
jects, Sermon  I.  on  Regeneration, 

VIII.  Instrumentalities  employed  in  the  work. 

1.  Truth.  This  must  from  the  nature  of  regeneration  be 
employed  in  effecting  it,  for  regeneration  is  nothing  else  than 
the  will  being  duly  influenced  hy  truth 

2.  There  may  be  and  often  are  many  providences  concern- 
ed in  enhghtening  the  mind  and  in  inducing  regeneration. 
These  are  instrumentalities.  They  are  means  or  instruments 
of  presenting  the  truth.  Mercies,  judgments, men,  measures 
and  in  short  all  those  things  that  conduce  to  enhghtening  the 
mind,  are  instrumentalities  employed  in  affecting  it. 

Those  who  hold  to  physical  or  constitutional  moral  deprav- 
ity must  hold  of  course  to  constitutional  regeneration,  and  of 
course  consistency  compels  them  to  maintain  that  there  is  but 
one  agent  employed  in  regeneration,  and  that  is  the  Holy 
Spirit, and  that  no  instrument  whatever  is  employed,  because 
the  work  is  according  to  them  an  act  of  creative  power  ;  that 
the  very  nature  is  changed  and  of  course  no  instrument  can  be 
employed,  any  more  than  in  the  creation  of  the  world.  These 
theologians  have  affirmed  over  and  over  again  that  regenera- 
tion is  a  miracle;  that  there  is  no  tendency  whatever  in  the 
gospel  however  presented,  and  whether  presented  by  God  or 
man,  to  regenerate  the  heart.  Dr.  Griffin  in  his  Park  Street 
Lectures  maintains  that  the  gospel  in  its  natural  and  neccssa- 


REGENERATION.  499 

rj  tendency  creates  and  perpetuates  only  opposition  to  and 
hatred  of  God  until  the  heart  is  changed  by  the  Holy  Spirit. 
He  understands  the  carnal  mind  to  be  not  a  voluntary  state, 
not  a  minding  of  the  flesh,  but  the  very  nature  and  constitu- 
tion of  the  mind,  and  that  enmity  against  God  is  a  part,  attri- 
bute, or  appetite  of  the  nature  itself.  Consequently  he  must 
deny  the  adaptability  of  the  gospel  to  regenerate  the  soul. 
It  has  been  proclaimed  by  this  class  of  theologians  times  with- 
out number  that  there  is  no  philosophical  connexion  between 
the  preaching  of  the  gospel  and  the  regeneration  of  sinners, 
no  adaptedness  in  the  gospel  to  produce  that  result;  but  on 
the  contrary  that  it  is  adapted  to  produce  an  opposite  result. 
The  favorite  illustrations  of  their  views  have  been  Ezekiel's 
prophesying  over  the  dry  bones  and  Christ's  restoring  sight 
to  the  blind  man  by  putting  clay  on  his  eyes.  Ezekiel's 
prophesying  over  the  dry  bones  had  no  tendency  to  quicken 
them,  they  say.  And  the  clay  used  by  the  Savior  was  calcu- 
lated rather  to  destroy  than  to  restore  sight.  This  shows  how 
easy  it  is  for  men  to  adopt  a  pernicious  and  absurd  philosophy 
and  then  find  or  think  they  find  it  supported  by  the  bible. 
What  must  be  the  effect  of  inculcating  the  dogma  that  the 
gospel  has  nothing  to  do  with  regenerating  the  sinner?  In- 
stead of  telling  him  that  regeneration  is  nothing  else  than  his 
embracing  the  gospel,  to  tell  him  that  he  must  wait  and  first 
have  his  constitution  recreated  before  he  can  possibly  do  any 
thing  but  oppose  God?  This  is  to  tell  him  the  greatest  and 
most  abominable  and  ruinous  of  falsehoods.  It  is  to  mock  his 
intelligence.  What!  call  on  him  on  pain  of  eternal  death  to 
believe;  to  embrace  the  gospel;  to  love  God  with  all  his  heart 
and  at  the  same  time,  represent  him  as  entirely  helpless  and 
constitutionally  the  enemy  of  God  and  of  the  gospel  and  as 
being  under  the  necessity  of  waiting  for  God  to  regenerate  his 
nature  before  it  is  possible  for  him  to  do  otherwise  than  to  hate 
God  with  all  his  heart?  O  Orthodoxy,  falsely  so  called, how"7 
absurd  and  false  thou  art!  What  an  enemy  of  God;  what  a  ' 
stumbling  block  to  man ;  what  a  leaven  of  unrighteousness  and 
of  hell  is  such  a  dogma  as  this !  But  a  few  years  have  elapsed  ' 
since  almost  the  entire  church  were  settled  down  in  the  delu^-* 
sion  of  a  passive  regeneration. 

IX.  In  regeneration  the  subject  is  both  passive  and  active.  ^^ 

1.  That  he  is  active  is  plain  from  what  has  been  said  and      1 
from  the  nature  of  the  change.  1 

2.  That  he  is  at  the  same  time  passive  is  plain  from  the  fact     I 
that  he  acts  only  when  and  as  he  is  acted  upon.     That  is,      1 


500  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

he  is  passive  in  the  perception  of  the  truth  presented  bj  the 
Holy  Spirit.  I  know  that  this  preception  is  no  part  of  regen- 
eration. But  it  is  simultaneous  with  regeneration.  It  indu- 
ces regeneration.  It  is  the  condition  and  the  occasion  of  re- 
generation. Therefore  the  subject  of  regeneration  must  be  a 
passive  recipient  or  percipient  of  the  truth  presented  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  at  the  moment  and  during  the  act  of  regeneration. 
The  Spirit  acts  upon  him  through  or  by  the  truth.  Thus  far 
he  is  passive.  He  closes  with  the  truth.  Thus  far  he  is  active. 
What  a  mistake  those  theologians  have  fallen  into  who  repre- 
sent the  subject  as  altogether  passive  in  regeneration!  This 
rids  the  sinner  at  once  of  the  conviction  of  any  duty  or  re- 
sponsibility about  it.  It  is  wonderful  that  such  an  absurdity 
should  have  been  so  long  maintained  in  the  church.  But 
while  it  is  maintained,  it  is  no  wonder  that  sinners  are  not 
converted  to  God,  Why,  while  the  sinner  believes  this,  it  is 
impossible  if  he  has  it  in  mind  that  he  should  be  regenerated. 
He  stands  and  waits  for  God  to  do  what  God  requires  him  to 
do,  and  which  no  one  can  do  for  him.  Neither  God  nor  any 
other  being  can  regenerate  him  if  he  will  not  turn.  If  he  will 
not  change  his  choice,  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  be 
changed.  Sinners  who  have  been  taught  thus  and  have  be- 
lieved what  they  have  been  taught,  would  never  have  been  re- 
generated had  not  the  Holy  Spirit  drawn  off  their  attention 
from  this  error,  and  ere  they  were  aware,  induced  them  to 
close  in  with  the  offer  of  life. 

X,   What  is  implied  in  regeneration. 

1.  The  nature  of  the  change  shows  that  it  must  be  instanta- 
neous. It  is  a  change  of  choice  or  of  intention.  This  must 
be  instantaneous.  The  preparatory  work  of  conviction  and 
enlightening  the  mind  may  have  been  gradual  and  progress- 
ive. But  when  regeneration  occurs,  it  must  be  instanta- 
neous. 

2.  It  implies  an  entire  present  change  of  moral  character, 
that  is,  a  change  fraaientire  sinfulness  to  entire  holiness.  We 
have  seen  that  it  consists  in  a  change  from  selfishness  to  be- 
nevolence. We  have  also  seen  that  selfishness  and  benevo- 
lence cannot  co-exist  in  the  same  mind;  that  selfishness  is  a 
state  of  supreme  and  entire  consecration  to  self;  that  benev- 
olence is  a  state  of  entire  and  supreme  consecration  to  God 
and  the  good  of  the  universe.  Regeneration  then  surely  im- 
plies an  entire  change  of  moral  character. 

Again:  The  bible  represents  regeneration  as  a  dying  to  sin 
and  becoming  alive  to  God.     Death  in  sin  is  total  depravity. 


REGENERATIOIi. 


501 


This  is  generally  admitted.     Death  to  sin  and  becoming  alive 
to  God,  must  imply  entire  present  holiness. 

3.  The  scriptures  represent  regeneration  as  the  condition 
of  salvation  in  such  a  sense  that  if  the  subject  should  die  im- 
mediately after  regeneration  and  without  any  further  change, 
he  would  go  immediately  to  heaven. 

Again:  The  scripture  requires  only  perseverance  in  the  first 
love  as  the  condition  of  salvation,  in  case  the  regenerate  soul 
should  live  long  in  the  world  subseqent  to  regeneration. 

4.  When  the  scriptures  require  us  to  grow  in  grace  and  in 
the  knowledge  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  this  does  not  imply 
that  there  is  yet  sin  remaining  in  the  regenerate  heart  which 
we  are  required  to  put  aw^ay  only  by  degrees.  But  the  spir- 
it of  the  requirement  must  be  that  we  should  acquire  as  much 
knowledge  as  we  can  of  our  moral  relations,  and  continue  to 
conform  to  all  truth  as  fast  we  know  it.  This  and  nothing 
else  is  implied  in  abiding  in  our  first  love,  or  abiding  in  Christ, 
living  and  walking  in  the  Spirit  &c. 


LECTURE  XL. 
REGENERATION. 

XI.  Philosophical  Theories  of  Regeneration. 

Different  classes  of  Theologians  have  held  very  different 
theories  in  regard  to  the  philosophy  of  regeneration,  in  ac- 
cordance with  their  views  of  moral  depravity,  of  intellectual 
philosophy,  moral  government,  and  of  the  freedom  of  the 
human  will.     In  discussing  this  subject  I  will, 

/.  State  the  different  theories  of  regeneration  that  have  been 
held  hy  different  classes  of  theologians,  as  I  understand  them^ 
and^ 

IL  Examine  them  in  their  order. 

The  principal  theories  that  have  been  advocated,  so  far  as 
my  knowledge  extends,  are  the  following: 

1.  The  Taste  Scheme.  2.  The  Divine  Efficiency  Scheme. 
3.  The  Susceptibility  Scheme,  4.  The  Divine  Moral  Sua- 
sion Scheme. 

//.  /  will  examine  them  in  their  order. 

I.  The  Taste  Scheme. 

1.  This  theory  is  based  upon  that  view  of  mental  phi- 
losophy which  regards  the  mental  heart  as  identical  with  the 
sensibility.  Moral  depravity,  according  to  this  school,  con- 
sists in  a  constitutional  relish,  taste,  or  craving  for  sin.  They 
hold  the  doctrine  of  original  sin — of  a  sinful  nature  or  con- 
stitution, as  was  shown  in  my  lectures  on  moral  depravity. 
The  heart  of  the  mind,  in  the  estimation  of  this  school,  is 
not  identical  with  choice  or  intention.  They  hold  that  it  does 
not  consist  in  any  voluntary  state  of  mind,  but  that  it  lives  back 
of  and  controls  voluntary  action  or  the  actions  of  the  will.  The 
wicked  heart,  according  to  them,  consists  in  an  appetency  or 
constitutional  taste  for  sin,  and  with  them  the  appetites,  pas- 
sions, and  propensities  of  human  nature  in  its  fallen  state,  are 
in  themselves  sinful.  They  often  illustrate  their  ideas  of  the 
sinful  taste,  craving,  or  appetite  for  sin,  by  reference  to  the 
craving  of  carnivorous  animals  for  flesh.     Of  course, 

2.  A  change  of  heart,  in  the  view  of  this  philosophy,  must 
consist  in  a  change  of  constitution.  It  must  be  a  physical 
change,  and  wrought  by  a  physical,  as  distinguished  from  a 
moral  agency.  It  is  a  change  wrought  by  the  direct  and 
physical  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  constitution  of  the 
soul,  changing  its  susceptibilities,  implanting,  or  creating  a 
new  taste,  relish,  appetite,  craving  for  or  love  of  holiness.     It 


REGENERATION.  503 

is,  as  they  express  it,  the  implantation  of  a  new  principle  of 
holiness.  It  is  described  as  a  creation  of  a  new  taste  or  prin- 
ciple, as  an  infusion  of  a  holy  principle,  &c.  This  scheme, 
of  course,  holds,  and  teaches  that  in  regeneration  the 
subject  is  entirely  passive.  With  this  school  regeneration  is 
exclusively  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  subject  having 
no  agency  in  it.  It  is  an  operation  performed  upon  him,  may 
he,  while  he  is  asleep  or  in  a  fit  of  derangement,  while  he  is 
entirely  passive,  or  perhaps  when  at  the  moment  he  is  en- 
gaged in  flagrant  rebellion  against  God.  The  agency  by 
which  this  work  is  wrought,  according  to  them,  is  sovereign, 
irresistible,  and  creative.  They  hold  that  there  are  no  means 
of  regeneration  of  course  as  it  is  a  direct  act  of  creation. 
They  hold  the  distinction  already  referred  to  and  examined 
between  regeneration  and  conversion;  that  when  the  Holy 
Spirit  has  performed  the  sovereign  operation,  and  implanted 
the  new  principle,  then  the  subject  is  active  in  conversion  or 
in  turning  to  God. 

They  hold  that  the  soul  in  its  very  nature  is  enmity  against 
God;  that  therefore  the  gospel  has  no  tendency  to  regenerate 
or  convert  the  soul  to  God;  but  on  the  contrary  that  previous 
to  regeneration  by  the  sovereign  and  physical  agency  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  every  exhibition  of  God  made  in  the  Gospel, 
tends  only  to  inflame  and  provoke  this  constitutional  enmity. 

They  hold  that  when  the  sinful  taste,  relish,  or  craving  for 
sin  is  weakened,  (for  they  deny  that  it  is  ever  wholly  destroyed 
in  this  life,  or  while  the  soul  continues  connected  with  the 
body,)  and  a  holy  taste,  relish,  or  craving  is  implanted  or  in- 
fused by  the  Holy  Spirit  into  the  constitution  of  the  soul, 
then,  and  not  till  then,  the  gospel  has  a  tendency  to  turn  or 
convert  the  sinner  from  the  error  of  his  ways. 

As  I  have  said,  their  philosophy  of  moral  depravity  is  the 
basis  of  their  philosophy  of  regeneration.  It  assumes  the 
dogma  of  original  sin  as  taught  in  the  Presbyterian  Confes- 
sion of  Faith,  and  attempts  to  harmonize  the  philosophy  of 
regeneration  with  that  philosophy  of  sin  or  moral  depravity. 

Upon  this  scheme  or  theory  of  regeneration  I  remark, 

1.  That  it  has  been  sufficiently  refuted  in  the  lectures  on 
moral  depravity.  If,  as  was  then  shown,  moral  depravity  is 
altogether  voluntary,  and  consists  in  selfishness,  or  in  a  vol- 
untary state  of  mind,  this  philosophy  of  regeneration  is  of 
course  without  foundation. 

2.  It  was  shown  in  the  lectures  on  moral  depravity  that  sin  is 
not  chosen  for  its  own  sake — that  there  is  no  constitutional 


504  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

relish,  taste,  or  craving  for  sin — that  in  sinful  choice,  sin  is  not 
the  end  or  object  chosen,  but  that  self-gratification  is  chosen, 
and  that  this  choice  is  sinful.  If  this  is  so,  (and  who  may  not 
know  that  it  is?)  then  the  whole  philosophy  of  the  taste 
scheme  turns  out  to  be  '^such  stuff  as  dreams  are  made  of." 

3.  The  taste,  relish,  or  craving,  of  which  this  philosophy 
speaks,  is  not  a  taste,  relish,  or  craving  for  sin,  but  for  certain 
things  and  objects,  the  enjoyment  of  which  is,  to  a  certain 
extent,  and  upon  certain  conditions,  lawful.  But  when  the 
will  prefers  the  gratification  of  taste  or  appetite  to  higher  in- 
terests, this  choice  or  act  of  will  is  sin.  The  sin  never  lies  in 
the  appetite,  but  in  the  will's  consent  to  unlawful  indulgence. 

4.  This  philosophy  confounds  appetite  or  temptation  to  un- 
lawful indulgence,  with  sin.  Nay,  it  represents  sin  as  con- 
sisting mostly,  if  not  altogether,  in  temptation. 

5.  It  is,  as  we  have  seen,  inconsistent  with  both  the  Bible 
definition  of  sin  and  of  regeneration. 

6.  It  is  also  inconsistent  with  the  justice  of  the  command 
so  solemnly  given  to  sinners,  "•  Make  you  a  new  heart  and  a 
new  spirit,  for  why  will  ye  die." 

7.  It  also  contradicts  the  Bible  representation  that  men  re- 
generate each  other.  "  For  though  ye  have  ten  thousand  in- 
structers  in  Christ,  yet  have  ye  not  many  fathers;  for  in  Christ 
Jesus  I  have  begotten  you  through  the  gospel." — I  Cor.  4: 15. 

8.  It  throws  the  blame  of  unregeneracy  upon  God.  If 
the  sinner  is  passive  and  has  no  agency  in  it;  if  it  consists  in 
what  this  philosophy  teaches,  and  is  accomplished  in  the  man- 
ner which  this  theory  represents,  it  is  self-evident  that  God 
alone  is  responsible  for  the  fact  that  any  sinner  is  unregcne- 
rate. 

9.  It  represents  regeneration  as  a  miracle. 

10.  It  renders  holiness  after  regeneration  physically  neces- 
sary, just  as  sin  was  before,  and  perseverance  also  as  physi- 
cally necessary,  and  falling  from  grace  as  a  natural  impossi- 
bility. In  this  case  holy  exercises  and  living  arc  only  the  grati- 
fication of  a  constitutional  appetite. 

11.  It  renders  perseverance  in  holiness  no  virtue,  as  it  is 
only  self-gratification,  or  the  gratification  of  appetite. 

12.  It  is  the  assumption  of  a  philosophy  at  war  with  the 
Bible. 

13.  Upon  this  theory  regeneration  would  destroy  personal 
identity. 

2.  The  Divine  Efficiency  Scheme  or  Theory. 

This  scheme  is  based  upon,  or  rather  is  only  a  carrying  out 


REGENERATION,  505 

of  an  ancient  heathen  philosophy,  bearing  the  same  name. 
This  ancient  philosophy  denies  second  causes,  and  teaches 
that  what  we  call  laws  of  nature  are  nothing  else  than  the 
mode  of  Divine  operation.  It  denies  that  the  universe  would 
even  exist  for  a  moment  if  the  Divine  upholding  were  with- 
drawn. It  maintains  that  the  universe  exists  only  by  an  act 
of  present  and  perpetual  creation.  It  denies  that  matter  or 
mind  has  in  itself  any  inherent  properties  that  can  originate 
laws  or  motions;  that  all  action,  whether  of  matter  or  mind, 
is  the  necessary  result  of  direct  Divine  irresistible  efficiency 
or  power;  that  this  is  not  only  true  of  the  natural  universe, 
but  also  of  all  the  exercises  and  actions  of  moral  agents  in 
all  worlds. 

The  abettors  of  the  Divine  efficiency  scheme  of  regenera- 
tion aj>ply  this  philosophy  especially  to  moral  agents.  They 
hold  that  all  the  exercises  and  actions  of  moral  agents  in  all 
worlds,  and  whether  those  exercises  be  holy  or  sinful,  are 
produced  by  a  Divine  efficiency,  or  by  a  direct  act  of  Omnipo- 
tence; that  holy  and  sinful  acts  are  aUke  effects  of  an  irresisti- 
ble cause,  and  that  this  cause  is  the  power  and  agency  or  effi- 
ciency of  God. 

This  philosophy  denies  constitutional  moral  depravity  or 
original  sin,  and  maintains  that  moral  character  belongs  alone 
to  the  exercises  or  choices  of  the  will;  that  regeneration  does 
not  consist  in  the  creation  of  any  new  taste,  relish,  or  craving, 
nor  in  the  implantation  or  infusion  of  any  new  principles  in 
the  soul:  but  that  it  consists  in  a  choice  conformed  to  the  law 
of  God,  or  in  a  change  from  selfishness  to  disinterested  be- 
nevolence; that  this  change  is  effected  by  a  direct  act  of  Di- 
vine power  or  efficiency  as  irresistible  as  any  creative  act 
whatever.  This  philosophy  teaches  that  the  moral  character 
of  every  moral  agent  whether  holy  or  sinful,  is  formed  by  an 
agency  as  direct,  as  sovereign  and  as  irresistible  as  that  which 
first  gave  existence  to  the  universe;  that  true  submission  to 
God  implies  the  hearty  consent  of  the  will  to  have  the  char- 
acter thus  formed,  and  then  to  be  treated  accordingly,  for  the 
glory  of  God.  The  principal  arguments  by  which  this  theo- 
ry is  supported  so  far  as  I  am  acquainted  with  them^  are  as 
follows: 

(1.)  The  bible,  its  advocates  say,  teaches  it  in  those  texts 
that  teach  the  doctrine  of  a  universal  and  particular  Provi- 
dence, and  that  God  is  present  in  all  events;  such  for  example 
as  the  following:  ^^The  lot  is  cast  into  the  lap;  but  the  whole 
disposing  thereof  is  of  the  Lord." — Pro  v.  16:  33.  "Lord, 
43 


506  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

thou  wilt  drdain  peace  for  us;  for  ihou  also  hast  wrought  all 
our  works  in  us." — Isaiah  26:  12.     "•!  form  the  light,  and  cre- 
ate darkness;!  make  peace,  and  create  evil.     I  the  Lord  do 
all  these  things^ — Isaiah  45:  7.     "And  all  the  inhabitants  of 
the  earth  are  reputed  as  nothing:  and  he  doeth  according  to 
his  will  in  the  army  of  heaven,  and  among  the  inhabitants  of 
the  earth;  and  none  can  stay  his  hand,  or  say  unto  him.  What 
doest  thou?" — Daniel  4:  35.     "Shall  a  trumpet  be  blown  in 
the  city,  and  the  people  not  be  afraid?  shall  there  be  evil  in  a 
city,  and  the  Lord  hath  not  done  27?" — Amos  3:  6.     "For  of 
him,  and  through  him,  and  to  him,  are  all  things;  to  whom  be 
glory  for  ever.     Amen." — Romans  11:  36.     "In  whom  also 
we  have  obtained  an  inheritance,  being  predestinated  accor- 
ding to  the  purpose  of  him  w^ho  worketh  all  things  after  the 
counsel  of  his  own  will." — Ephesians  1:  11.     ""'For  it  is  God 
which  worketh  in  you  both  to  will  and  to  do  of  his  good  plea- 
sure."— PhiHppians  2:   13.     "Now   the   God  of  peace,  that 
brought  again  from  the  dead  our  Lord  Jesus,  that  great  Shep- 
herd of  the  sheep,  through  the  blood  of  the  everlasting  cove- 
nant, make  you  perfect  in  every  good  work  to  do  his  will, 
working  in  you  that  which  is  well-pleasing  in  his  sight,  through 
Jesus  Christ;  to  whom  be  glory  for  ever  and  ever.     Amen." 
—Hebrews  13:  20,  21.     "Blessed  be   the  Lord  God  of  our 
fathers,  which  hath  put  such  a  thing  as  this  in  the  king's  heart, 
to  beautify  the  house  of  the  Lord  which  is  in  Jerusalem." — 
Ezra  7:  27.     '■'•The  preparation  of  the  heart  in  man,  and  the 
answer  of  the  tongue,  is  from  the  Lord.     A  man's  heart  de- 
viseth  his  way:  but  the  Lord  directcth  his  steps." — Proverbs 
16:  1,9.     ''•The  king's  heart  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Lord,  as 
the  rivers  of  water:  he  turneth  it  whithersoever  ho  will." — 
Proverbs  21:  1.     "But  now,  O  Lord,  thou  art  our  Father:  we 
are  the  clay,  and  thou  our  potter;  and  we  all  are  the  work  of 
thy  hand." — Isaiah  64:  8.     "And   a  certain  woman  named 
Lydia,  a  seller  of  purple,  of  the  city  of  Thyatira,  which  wor- 
shipped God,  heard  us:  whose  heart  the  Lord  opened,  that 
she  attended  unto  the  things  which  were  spoken  of  Paul." —  . 
Acts  16:  14.     "Nay  but,  O  man,  who  art  thou  that  repliest 
against  God  ?  Shall  the  thing  formed  say  to  him  that  formed  it. 
Why  hast  thou  made  me  thus?     Hath  not  the  potter  power 
over  the  clay  of  the  same  lump  to  make  one  vessel  unto  hon- 
or, and  another  unto  dishonor?" — Romans  9:  20,  21.     "And 
I  will  harden  Pharaoh's  heart,  and  multiply  my  signs  and 
raj  wonders  in  the  land  of  Egypt." — Exodus  7:  3.     "And  the 
Lord  hardened  the  heart  of  Pharaoh,  and  he  hearkened  not 


REGENERATION. 


507 


unto  them;  as  the  Lord  had  spoken  unto  Moses." — Ex.  9:  12. 
'^And  the  Lord  said  unto  Moses,  Go  in  unto  Pharaoh:  for  I 
have  hardened  his  heart,  and  the  heart  of  his  servants,  that  I 
might  shew  these  my  signs  before  him." — Ex.  10:  1.  "And 
the  Lord  hardened  the  heart  of  Pharaoh  king  of  Egypt,  and 
he  pursued  after  the  children  of  Israel:  and  the  children  of 
Israel  went  out  witli  an  high  hand.  And  1,  behold  1  will  har- 
den the  hearts  of  the  Egyptians,  and  they  shall  follow  them: 
and  1  will  get  me  honor  upon  Pharaoh,  and  upon  all  his  host, 
upon  his  chariots,  and  upon  his  horsemen." — Ex.  14:  8,  17. 
'•But  Sihon  king  of  Heshbon  would  not  let  us  pass  by  him: 
for  the  Lord  thy  God  hardened  his  spirit,  and  made  his  heart 
obstinate,  that  he  might  deliver  him  into  thy  hand,  as  appear- 
eth  this  day." — Deuteronomy  2:  30.  '^There  was  not  a  city 
that  made  peace  with  the  children  of  Israel,  save  the  Hivites, 
the  inhabitants  of  Gibeon:  all  other  they  took  in  battle.  For 
it  was  of  the  Lord  to  harden  their  hearts,  that  they  should 
come  against  Israel  in  battle,  that  he  might  destroy  them  ut- 
terly, and  that  they  might  have  no  favour,  but  that  he  might 
destroy  them  as  the  Lord  commanded  Moses." — Joshua  11: 
19,  20.  "-And  the  three  hundred  blew  the  trumpets,  and  the 
Lord  set  every  man's  sword  against  his  fellow,  even  through- 
out all  the  host:  and  the  host  fled  to  Beth-shittah  in  Zererath, 
and  to  the  border  of  Abel-meholah,  unto  Tabbath." — 
Judges  7:  22.  '•'And  again  the  anger  of  the  Lord  was  kin- 
dled against  Israel,  and  he  moved  David  against  them  to 
say.  Go,  number  Israel  and  Judah." — 2  Samuel  24:  1. 
••'Now  therefore,  behold,  the  Lord  hath  put  a  lying  spirit 
in  the  mouth  of  all  these  thy  prophets,  and  the  Lord  hath 
spoken  evil  concerning  thee." — 1  Kings  22:  23.  "-For  thou 
hast  hid  their  hearts  from  understanding:  therefore  shalt 
thou  not  exalt  them.'''' — Job  17:  4.  "He  turned  their  hearts 
to  hate  his  people,  to  deal  subtilely  with  his  servants." — 
Psalms  105:  25.  '^For  the  Lord  hath  poured  out  upon  you 
the  spirit  of  deep  sleep,  and  hath  closed  your  eyes:  the  pro- 
phets and  your  rulers,  the  seers  hath  he  covered." — Isaiah 
29:  10.  ""'They  have  not  known  nor  understood,  for  he  hath 
shut  their  eyes,  that  they  can  not  see;  and  their  hearts  that 
they  can  not  understand." — Isaiah  44:  18.  "1  form  the 
light,  and  create  darkness;  I  make  peace  and  create  evil.  I 
the  Lord  do  all  these  things.'''' — Isaiah  45:  7.  ''And  if  the 
prophet  be  deceived  when  he  hath  spoken  a  thing,  I  the  Lord 
have  deceived  that  prophet,  and  I  will  destroy  him  from  the 
midst  of  my  people  Israel." — Ezek.  14:  9.     "The  people  an- 


508  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

swered  him,  We  have  heard  out  of  the  law  that  Christ  abideth 
for  ever;  and  how  sajest  thou,  The  Son  of  man  must  be  lifted 
up?  who  is  this  son  of  man?  Then  Jusus  said  unto  them,  Yet 
a  little  while  is  the  light  with  you:  walk  while  ye  have  the  light, 
lest  darkness  come  upon  you:  for  he  that  walketh  in  darkness 
knoweth  not  whither  he  goeth.  While  ye  have  light,  believe 
in  the  light  that  ye  may  be  the  children  of  light.  These  things 
spake  Jesus  and  departed,  and  did  hide  himself  from  them. 
But  though  he  had  done  so  many  miracles  before  them,  yet 
they  beHeved  not  on  him:  That  the  saying  of  Esaias  the  pro- 
phet might  be  fulfilled,  which  he  spake.  Lord,  who  hath  be- 
lieved our  report?  and  to  whom  hath  the  arm  of  the  Lord  been 
revealed?  Therefore  they  could  not  beheve,  because  that 
Esaias  said  again:  He  hath  blinded  their  eyes,  and  hardened 
their  hearts;  that  they  should  not  see  with  their  eyes,  nor  un- 
derstand with  their  heart,  and  be  converted,  and  I  should 
heal  them.  "These  things  said  Esaias,  when  he  saw  his  glo- 
ry, and  spake  of  him."— John  12:  34,  35,  36,  37,  38,  39,  40, 
4L  '•'Therefore  hath  he  mercy  on  whom  he  will  have  mercy^ 
and  whom  he  will  he  hardeneth." — Romans  9:  18.  '-And 
with  all  deceivableness  of  unrighteousness  in  them  that  per- 
ish; because  they  received  not  the  love  of  the  truth,  that  they 
might  be  saved.  And  for  this  cause  God  shall  send  them 
strong  delusion,  that  they  should  believe  a  lie;  That  they  all 
might  be  damned  who  believed  not  the  truth,  but  had  plea- 
sure in  unrighteousness." — 2  Thessalonians  2:  10,  11,  12. 
"For  God  hath  put  in  their  hearts  to  fulfil  his  will,  and  to  agree, 
and  give  their  kingdom  unto  the  beast,  until  the  words  of 
God  shall  be  fulfilled."— Revelation  17:  17. 

I  have  quoted  the  passages  upon  which  the  defenders  of 
this  scheme  lay  the  principal  stress  and  would  remark  respec- 
ting them  and  all  such  like  passages, 

[1.]  That  they  prove  nothing  to  the  point.  The  question 
in  debate  is  not  whether  God  is  or  is  not  in  some  sense  pre- 
sent in  every  event,  or  whether  there  be  not  some  sense  in 
which  every  thing  may  be  ascribed  to  the  Providence  and 
agency  of  God,  for  this  their  opponents  admit  and  maintain. 
But  the  true  question  at  issue  respects  only  the  quo  modo  of 
the  Divine  agency  of  which  these  passages  say  nothing.  It 
is  neither  affirmed  or  implied  in  these  passages,  nor  in  any 
other  that  God  is  the  direct,  efficient,  irresistible  agent  in  all 
those  cases. 

[2.]  Other  passages  abundantly  imply  and  affirm  that  he  is 
not  the  direct,  efficient,  and  irresistible  agent  in  the  production 


REGENERATION.  509 

of  moral  evil.  Example:  '''•Will  ye  steal,  murder,  and  com- 
mit adultery,  and  swear  falsely,  and  burn  incense  unto  Baal, 
and  walk  after  other  gods  whom  ye  know  not;  and  come  and 
stand  before  me  in  this  house,  which  is  called  by  my  name,  and 
say,  We  are  delivered  to  do  all  these  abominations?" — Jer. 
7:  14.  ^'•For  God  is  not  the  author  of  confusion,  but  of 
peace,  as  in  all  churches  of  the  saints." — 1  Cor.  14:  33.  "  Let 
no  man  say  when  he  is  tempted,  I  am  tempted  of  God:  for 
God  can  not  be  tempted  with  evil,  neither  tempteth  he  any 
man:  But  every  man  is  tempted,  when  he  is  drawn  away  of 
his  own  lust,  and  enticed.  Then  when  lust  hath  conceived,  it 
bringeth  forth  sin:  and  sin,  when  it  is  finished,  bringeth  forth 
death.  Do  not  err  my  beloved  brethren.  Every  good  gift 
and  every  perfect  gift  is  from  above,  and  cometh  down  from 
the  Father  of  lights,  with  whom  is  no  variableness,  neither 
shadow  of  turning." — James  1:  13 — 17.  '-But  if  ye  have 
bitter  envying  and  strife  in  your  hearts,  glory  not,  and  lie  not 
against  the  truth.  This  wisdom  descendeth  not  from  above, 
but  is  earthly,  sensual,  devilish.  For  where  envying  and 
strife  is,  there  is  confusion  and  every  evil  work.  But  the 
wisdom  that  is  from  above  is  first  pure,  then  peaceable,  gentle 
and  easy  to  be  entreated,  full  of  mercy  and  good  fruits,  with- 
out partiaUty,  and  without  hypocrisy." — James  3:  14 — 17. 
•'■  These  things  have  I  written  unto  you  concerning  them  that 
seduce  you." — 1  John  2:  26.  ^'  And  they  said  one  to  another. 
We  are  verily  guilty  concerning  our  brother,  in  that  we  saw 
the  anguish  of  his  soul,  when  he  besought  us,  and  we  would 
not  hear,  therefore  is  this  distress  come  upon  us." — Gen.  42: 
21.  "And  Pharaoh  hardened  his  heart  at  this  time  also, 
neither  would  he  let  the  people  go." — Ex.  8:  32.  ^' And  Pha- 
raoh sent  and  called  for  Moses  and  Aaron,  and  said  unto  them, 
I  have  sinned  this  time:  the  Lord  is  righteous,  and  I  and  my 
people  are  wicked." — Ex.  9:  27.  *•'  Then  Pharaoh  called  for 
Moses  and  Aaron  in  haste;  and  he  said,  I  have  sinned  against 
the  Lord  your  God,  and  against  you.  Now  therefore,  forgive, 
I  pray  thee,  my  sin  only  this  once,  and  entreat  the  Lord  your 
God  that  he  may  take  away  from  me  this  death  only." — Ex. 
10:  16,  17.  "1  call  heaven  and  earth  to  record  this  day 
against  you,  that  1  have  set  before  you  life  and  death,  blessing 
and  cursing:  therefore  choose  life  that  both  thou  and  thy  seed 
may  live." — Deut.  30:  19.  ^'And  again  the  anger  of  the 
Lord  was  kindled  against  Israel,  and  he  moved  David  against 
them  to  say,  Go  number  Israel  and  Judah.  And  David's 
heart  smote  him  after  that  he  had  numbered  the  people.  And 
43* 


510  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

David  said  unto  the  Lord,  I  have  sinned  greatly  in  that  I  have 
done :  and  now,  I  beseech  thee,  O  Lord,  take  away  the  iniqui- 
ty of  thy  servant,  for  I  have  done  very  foolishly." — 2  Sam. 
24:  9,  10.  '■'■For  this  people's  heart  is  waxed  gross,  and  their 
ears  are  dull  of  hearing,  and  their  eyes  they  have  closed;  lest 
at  any  time  they  should  see  with  their  eyes,  and  hear  with 
their  ears,  and  should  understand  with  their  heart,  and  should 
be  converted,  and  I  should  heal  them." — Mat.  13:  15. 

These  passages  plainly  teach  and  imply  that  God's  agency, 
to  say  the  least,  in  the  production  of  sin,  is  not  direct,  efficient, 
irresistible.  Their  Scripture  argument  then  proves  nothing 
to  the  purpose  of  this  philosophy. 

(2.)  Another  argument  by  which  the  Divine  efficiency 
scheme  has  been  sustmned  is  that  Divine  foreknowledge  im- 
plies it. 

This  is  an  assumption  without  the  shadow  of  proof 

(3.)  Third  argument:     The  Divine  purposes  imply  it. 

This  also  is  a  sheer  assumption. 

(4.)  Fourth  argument:  Prophecy  or  the  foretelling  of  fu- 
ture events  implies  it. 

This  again  is  assumption  without  proof  These  arguments 
assume  that  God  could  not  know  what  future  events  would  be, 
especially  what  the  free  actions  of  men  would  be  unless  he 
produces  and  controls  them  by  a  direct  and  irresistible  effi- 
ciency. 

(5.)  Fifth  argument:  The  bible  ascribes  both  the  holy  and 
sinful  actions  of  man  to  God,  and  in  equally  unqualified 
terms. 

This  settles  nothing  of  the  quo  modo  in  either  case. 

(6.)  It  is  admitted,  say  some,  that  holy  actions  are  produced 
by  a  direct  divine  efficiency;  and  as  the  bible  ascribes  the 
sinful  actions  of  men  to  God  in  as  unqualified  terms  as  holy 
ones  we  have  no  right  to  infer  a  difference  in  the  quo  modo  of 
his  doing  it. 

We  are  not  only  allowed,  but  are  bound  to  infer  that  his 
agency  is  different  in  the  one  case  from  what  it  is  in  the  other. 
The  bible  has,  as  we  shall  see,  settled  the  philosophy,  or  the 
manner  in  which  he  produces  holy  exercises  in  moral  agents. 
It  also  every  where  assumes  or  affirms  that  he  is  concerned 
only  providentially  in  the  production  of  sin;  that  sin  is  an 
abuse  of  his  providence  and  of  the  liberty  of  moral  agents. 

(7.)  It  has  been  assumed  that  it  is  naturally  impossible  for 
God  to  create  a  being  that  should  have  the  power  of  originat- 
ing his  own  actions. 


REGENERATION.  51 1 

This  is  purely  an  assumption,  and  of  no  weight  whatever.  It 
certainly  is  not  an  affirmation  of  reason;  and  I  can  not  see 
any  ground  for  such  an  affirmation. 

(8.)  It  has  been  asserted  that  if  such  a  creature  existed,  he 
would  be  independent  of  God  in  such  a  sense  that  God  could 
neither  certainly  control  him,  nor  know  what  he  would  do. 

This  is  a  mere  begging  of  the  question.  How  can  this  be 
known?  This  argument  assumes  that  even  Omniscience  can 
not  know  how  a  free  moral  agent  would  act  upon  condition  of 
his  originating  his  own  choices,  intentions  and  actions.  But 
why  this  assumption? 

OBJECTIONS  TO  THIS  THEORY. 

1.  It  is  mere  philosophy,  and  that  falsely  so  called. 

2.  It  is  supported,  so  far  as  I  can  sec,  only  by  the  most  un- 
warrantable assumptions. 

3.  Its  tendency  condemns  it.     It  tends, 

(1.)  To  beget  and  perpetuate  a  sense  of  divine  injustice. 
To  create  a  character  by  an  agency  as  direct  and  irresistible 
as  that  of  the  creation  of  the  world  itself,  and  then  treat  moral 
beings  according  to  that  character  so  formed,  is  wholly  incon- 
sistent with  all  our  ideas  of  justice. 

(2.)  It  destroys  a  sense  of  accountability,  or  tends  to  de- 
stroy it. 

(3.)  It  contradicts  human  consciousness.  I  know  it  is  said 
that  consciousness  only  gives  our  mental  actions  and  states, 
but  not  the  cause  of  them.  This  I  deny,  and  affirm  that  con- 
sciousness not  only  gives  us  our  mental  actions  and  states,  but 
it  also  gives  us  the  cause  of  them,  especially  it  gives  the  fact 
that  we  ourselves  are  the  sovereign  and  efficient  causes  of  the 
choices  and  actions  of  our  will.  In  our  passive  states  we  can 
almost  always  recognize  the  cause  of  these  phenomena.  At 
least  we  can  very  often  do  so.  I  am  as  conscious  of  originat- 
ing in  a  sovereign  manner  my  choices  as  I  am  of  the  choices 
themselves. 

4.  This  theory  virtually  denies,  or  rather  stultifies  the  eter- 
nal distinction  between  liberty  and  necessity. 

5.  If  this  theory  were  true,  with  our  present  consciousness 
we  can  not  believe  it.  We  can  not  but  affirm  to  ourselves 
that  we  are  the  efficient  causes  of  our  choices  and  volitions. 

6.  The  philosophy  in  question  really  represents  God  as  the 
only  agent,  in  any  proper  sense  of  that  term,  in  the  universe. 
If  God  produces  the  exercises  of  moral  beings  in  the  manner 


512  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

represented  by  this  philosophy,  they  are  in  fact  no  more  agents 
than  the  planets  are  agents.  If  their  exercises  are  all  di- 
rectly created  by  the  power  of  God,  it  is  ridiculous  to  call 
them  agents. 

7.  If  this  theory  is  true,  what  we  generally  call  moral 
beings  and  moral  agents,  are  no  more  so  than  the  winds  and 
the  waves  or  any  other  substance  or  thing  in  the  universe. 

8.  Again:  if  this  theory  be  true,  no  being  but  God  has  or 
can  have  moral  character.  No  other  being  is  the  author  of 
his  own  actions.  He  is  the  subject,  but  not  the  author  of  his 
actioYis.  He  is  the  passive  subject,  but  not  the  active  efficient 
cause  of  his  own  exercises.  To  affirm  moral  character  of  such 
a  passive  subject  is  truly  ridiculous. 

9.  This  theory  obliges  its  advocates,  together  with  all 
other  necessitarians,  to  give  a  false  and  nonsensical  definition 
of  free  agency.  Free  agency,  according  to  them,  consists  in 
doing  as  we  zoill,  while  their  theory  denies  the  power  to  will 
except  as  our  willings  are  necessitated  by  God.  But  as  we 
have  seen  in  former  lectures,  this  is  no  true  account  of  free- 
dom, or  liberty.  Liberty  to  execute  my  choices  is  no  liberty 
at  all.  Choice  is  connected  with  its  sequents  by  a  law  of  ne- 
cessity;  and  if  an  effect  follow  my  volitions,  that  effect  follows 
by  necessity  and  not  freely.  All  freedom  of  will  must,  as 
was  formerly  shown,  consist  in  the  sovereign  power  to  origi- 
nate our  own  choices.  If  I  am  unable  to  will  I  am  unable 
to  do  any  thing,  and  it  is  absurd  and  ridiculous  to  affirm  that 
a  being  is  a  moral  or  a  free  agent  who  has  not  power  to 
originate  his  own  choices. 

10.  If  this  theory  is  true,  God  is  more  than  the  accomplic-e 
of  the  devil;  for 

(1.)  Satan  can  not  tempt  us  acccording  to  this  theory,  unless 
God  by  a  direct  divine  efficiency  moves  him  and  compels  him 
to  do  so. 

(2.)  We  can  not  possibly  yield  to  his  temptation  except  as 
God  compels  iis  to  yield  or  creates  the  yielding  within  us. 
This  is  a  blasphemous  theory  surely  that  represents  God  as 
doing  such  things.  That  a  philosophy  like  this  could  ever 
have  been  taught  will  appear  incredible  to  many,  I  doubt  not. 
But  such  is  the  fact,  and  such  the  true  statement  of  the  views 
of  this  class  of  theologians,  if  I  can  understand  them. 

11.  But  this  theory  is  inconsistent  with  the  bible,  as  we 
have  seen. 

12.  It  is  also  inconsistent  with  itself,  for  it  both  affirms  and 
denies  natural  ability.     Its  advocates  admit  that  we  can  not 


p 


REGENERATION. 


513 


act  except  as  we  will,  and  affirm  that  we  can  not  will  except 
as  our  willings  are  created  by  a  direct  divine  efficiency. 
How  absurd  then  it  is  to  maintain  that  we  have  natural 
ability  to  do  any  thing.  All  that  can  truly  be  said  of  us  upon 
the  principles  of  this  theory  is  that  we  have  a  susceptibility 
to  be  acted  upon,  and  to  be  rendered  the  subjects  of  certain 
states  immediately  and  irresistibly  created  by  the  power  of 
God.  But  it  is  absurd  to  call  this  a  natural  ability  to  do  our 
duty. 

13.  If  this  theory  is  true,  the  whole  moral  government  of 
God  is  the  merest  farce  and  humbug  that  ever  existed.  The 
gospel  is  an  insult  to  men  in  two  respects  at  least: 

(1.)  Upon  this  theory  men  do  not,  can  not  deserve  punish- 
ment. 

(2.)  If  they  do,  the  gospel  is  presented  and  urged  upon 
their  acceptance,  when  in  fact  they  have  no  more  power  to 
accept  it  than  they  have  to  create  a  world. 

14.  Again:  this  theory  overlooks  and  virtually  denies  the 
fundamentally  important  distinction  between  moral  and  physi- 
cal power  and  moral  and  physical  government.  All  power 
and  all  government  upon  this  theory  are  physical. 

15.  Again:  this  theory  renders  repentance  and  self-con- 
demnation impossible  as  a  rational  exercise. 

16.  This  theory  involves  the  delusion  of  all  moral  beings. 
God  not  only  creates  our  volitions,  but  also  creates  the  per- 
suasion and  affirmation  that  we  are  responsible  for  them.  O, 
shame  on  such  a  theory  as  this! 

///.   The  Susceptibility  Scheme  is  next  to  be  considered. 

1.  I  shall  state  what  this  scheme  is. 

2.  In  what  this  theory  agrees  with  the  theory  of  Divine 
Moral  Suasion. 

3.  In  what  those  theories  differ. 

4.  State  the  arguments  by  which  this  theory  is  defended. 

5.  State  the  difficulties  with  which  it  is  encumbered 

1.  What  this  theory  is. 

This  theory  represents  that  the  Holy  Spirit's  influences  are 
both  physical  and  moral;  that  He  by  a  direct  and  physical  in- 
fluence excites  the  susceptibilities  of  the  soul  and  prepares 
them  to  be  affected  by  the  truth;  that  He  thereupon  exerts 
a  moral  or  persuasive  influence  by  presenting  the  truth,  which 
moral  influence  induces  regeneration. 

2.  Wherein  this  and  the  Divine  Moral  Suasion  theory 
agree. 

(1.)  In  rejecting  the  Taste  and  Divine  Efficiency  Schemes 


514  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

(2.)  In  rejecting  the  dogma  of  constitutional  moral  de- 
pravity. 

(3.)  In  rejecting  the  dogma  of  physical  regeneration ;  for  be 
it  remembered  that  this  theory  teaches  that  the  physical  in- 
fluence exerted  in  exciting  the  susceptibilities  is  no  part  of  re- 
generation. 

(4.)  They  agree  in  maintainnig  the  natural  ability  or  lib- 
erty of  all  moral  agents. 

(5.)  That  the  constitutional  appetites  and  passions  have  no 
moral  character  in  themselves. 

(6.)  That  when  strongly  excited  they  are  the  occasions  of 
sin. 

(7.)  That  sin  and  moral  depravity  are  identical,  and  that  they 
consist  in  a  violation  of  the  moral  law. 

(8.)  That  the  moral  heart  is  the  ruling  preference  or  ulti- 
mate intention  of  the  mind. 

(9.)  That  the  carnal  mind  or  heart  is  selfishness. 

(10.)  That  the  new  or  regenerate  heart  is  benevolence. 

(11.)  That  regeneration  consists  in  a  change  from  selfish- 
ness to  benevolence,  or  from  the  supreme  love  of  self  to  the 
supreme  love  of  God  and  the  equal  love  of  our  neighbor. 

(12.)  That  this  change  is  effected  by  the  truth  presented  by 
the  Holy  Spirit  or  by  a  Divine  moral  persuasion. 

3.  Wherein  they  differ. 

This  philosophy  maintains  the  necessity  and  the  fact  of  a 
physical  influence  superadded  to  the  moral  or  persuasive  in- 
fluence of  the  Hol}^  Spirit  as  a. sine  qua  non  of  regeneration. 
The  Divine  moral  suasion  theory  regards  regeneration  as  be- 
ing induced  alone  by  a  moral  influence.  This  theory  also  ad- 
mits and  maintains  that  regeneration  is  effected  solely  by  a 
moral  influence,  but  also  that  a  work  preparatory  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  moral  influence  and  indispensable  to  its  efficiency 
in  producing  regeneration  is  performed  by  a  direct  and  physi- 
cal agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  upon  the  constitutional  suscep- 
tibilities of  the  soul  to  quicken  and  wake  it  up  and  predispose 
it  to  be  deeply  and  duly  affected  by  the  truth.  The  arguments 
by  which  that  part  of  this  theory  which  relates  to  a  physical 
influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  supported  are,  so  far  as  I  am 
acquainted  with  them,  as  follows: 

(1.)  It  is  maintained  by  the  defenders  of  this  scheme  that 
the  representations  of  the  bible  upon  the  subject  of  the  Holy 
Spirit's  agency  in  regeneration  are  such  as  to  forbid  the  sup- 
position that  His  influence  is  altogether  moral  or  persuasive, 
and  such  as  plainly  to  indicate  that  He  also  exerts  a  physical 


REGENERATION.  515 

agency  in  preparing  the  mind  to  be  duly  effected  by  the 
truth.  In  reply  to  this  argument  I  observe, 
,  [1.]  That  I  fear  greatly  to  disparage  the  work  and  agency 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  work  of  man's  redemption  from  sin, 
and  would  by  no  means  resist  or  deny,  or  so  much  as  call  in 
question  any  thing  that  is  plainly  taught  or  implied  in  the  bible 
upon  this  subject. 

[2.]  I  admit  and  maintain  that  regeneration  is  always  indu- 
ced and  effected  by  the  personal  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
The  question  now  before  us  relates  wholly  to  the  mode  and  not 
at  all  to  the  fact  of  the  Divine  agency  in  regeneration.  Let  this 
be  distinctly  understood  for  it  has  been  common  for  theologi- 
ans of  the  old  school,  as  soon  as  the  dogma  of  a  physical  re- 
generation and  of  a  physical  influence  in  regeneration  has 
been  called  in  question,  to  cry  out  and  insist  that  this  is  Pela- 
gianism,  and  that  it  is  a  denial  of  divine  influence  altogether, 
and  that  it  is  teaching  a  self- regeneration  independent  of  any 
divine  influence.  I  have  been  ashamed  of  such  representations 
as  these  on  the  part  of  chri>tian  divines  and  have  been  dis- 
tressed by  their  want  of  candor.  It  should,  however,  be  dis- 
tinctly stated  that,  so  far  as  I  know,  the  defenders  of  the  the- 
ory now  under  consideration  have  never  manifested  this  want 
of  candor  towards  those  who  have  called  in  question  that  part 
of  their  theory  that  relates  to  a  physical  influence. 

[3.]  Since  the  advocates  of  this  theory  admit  that  the  Bible 
teaches  that  regeneration  is  induced  by  a  Divine  moral  sua- 
sion, the  point  of  debate  is  simply  whether  the  Bible  teach- 
es that  there  is   also   a  physical   influence  exerted    by  the 
Holy  Spirit  in  exciting  the  constitutional  susceptibilities.     We 
will  now  attend  to  their  proof  texts.     '-^  Then  opened  he  their 
understanding  that  they  might  understand  the  Scriptures." — 
Luke  24:  45.     It  is  affirmed  that  this  text  seems  to  teach  or 
imply  a  physical  influence  in  opening  their  understandings. 
But  what  do  we  mean  by  such  language  as  this  in  common 
life?     Language  is  to  be  understood  according  to  the  subject 
matter  of  discourse.     Here  the  subject  of  discourse  is   the 
understanding.     But  what  can  be   intended  by  opening  it? 
Can  this  be  a  physical  prying,  pulUng,  or  forcing  open  any 
department  of  the  constitution?     Such  language  in  common 
life  would  be  understood  only  to  mean  that  such  instruction 
was  imparted  as  to  secure  a  right  understanding  of  the  Scrip- 
tures.    Every  one  knows   this,  and  why  should  we  suppose 
and  assume  that  any  thing  more  is  intended  here?     The  con- 
text plainly  indicates  that  this  was  the  thing  and  the  only- 


516  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

thing  done  in  this  case.  "  Then  he  said  unto  them,  O  fools, 
and  slow  of  heart  to  believe  all  that  the  prophets  have  spoken! 
Ought  not  Christ  to  have  suffered  these  things,  and  to  enter 
into  his  glory?  And  beginning  at  Moses  and  all  the  prophets 
he  expounded  unto  them  in  all  the  Scriptures  the  things  con- 
cerning himself.  And  said  unto  them.  Thus  it  is  written,  and 
thus  it  behooved  Christ  to  suffer,  and  to  rise  from  the  dead 
the  third  day." — Luke  24:  25 — 27,  46.  From  these  verses  it 
appears  that  he  expounded  the  Scriptures  to  them,  when  in 
the  light  of  what  had  passed,  and  in  the  light  of  that  measure 
of  Divine  illumination  which  was  then  imparted  to  them,  they 
understood  the  things  which  He  explained  to  them.  It  does 
not  seem  to  me  that  this  passage  warrants  the  inference  that 
there  was  a  physical  influence  exerted.  It  certainly  affirms 
no  such  thing.  "  And  a  certain  woman  named  Ljdia,  a  seller 
of  purple,  of  the  city  of  Thyatira,  which  worshipped  God, 
heard  us;  whose  heart  the  Lord  opened,  that  she  attended 
unto  the  things  which  were  spoken  of  Paul." — Acts  16:  14. 
Here  is  an  expression  similar  to  that  just  examined.  Here  it 
is  said  that  the  Lord  opened  the  heart  of  Lydia  so  that  she 
attended,  &c.;  that  is,  the  Lord  inclined  her  to  attend.  But 
how?  Why,  say  the  advocates  of  this  scheme,  by  a  physical 
influence.  But  how  docs  this  appear?  What  is  her  heart  that 
it  should  be  pried,  or  pulled,  or  forced  open?  and  what  can 
be  intended  by  the  assertion  that  the  Lord  opened  her  heart? 
All  that  can  be  meant  is  that  the  Lord  secured  her  attention 
and  disposed  her  to  attend,  and  so  enlightened  her  when  she 
did  attend  that  she  believed.  Surely  here  is  no  assertion  of 
a  physical  influence,  nor,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  any  just  ground 
for  the  inference  that  such  an  influence  was  exerted.  A  moral 
influence  can  sufficiently  explain  all  the  phenomena;  and  any 
text  that  can  equally  well  consist  with  either  of  two  opposing 
theories  can  prove  neither. 

Again,  there  are  many  passages  that  represent  God  as  open- 
ing the  spiritual  eyes,  and  passages  in  which  petitions  are 
offered  to  God  to  do  this.  It  is  by  this  theory  assumed  that 
such  passages  strongly  imply  a  physical  influence.  But  this 
assumption  appears  to  me  unwarrantable.  We  are  in  the 
habit  of  using  just  such  language  and  speak  of  opening  each 
other's  eyes  when  no  such  thing  is  intended  or  imphed  as  a 
physical  influence,  and  when  nothing  more  than  a  moral  or 
persuasive  influence  is  so  much  as  thought  of.  Why  then 
resort  to  such  an  assumption  here?  Does  the  nature  of  the 
case  demand  it?    This  I  know  is  contended  by  those  who 


REGENERATION.  517 

maintain  a  constitutional  moral  depravity.  But  this  dogma 
has  been  shown  to  be  false,  and  it  is  admitted  to  be  so  bj 
those  who  maintain  the  theory  now  under  consideration. 
Admitting,  then,  that  the  constitution  is  not  morally  de- 
praved, should  it  be  inferred  that  any  constitutional  change 
or  physical  influence  is  needed  to  produce  regeneration?  I 
can  see  no  suflicient  reason  for  believing  or  affirming  that  a 
physical  influence  is  either  demanded  or  exerted.  This  much 
I  freely  admit,  that  we  can  not  affirm  the  impossibility  of  such 
an  influence,  nor  the  impossibihty  of  the  necessity  of  such  an 
influence.  The  only  question  with  me  is,  does  the  bible 
plainly  teach  or  imply  such  an  influence?  Hitherto  I  have 
been  unable  to  see  that  it  does.  The  passages  already  quoted 
are  of  a  piece  with  all  that  are  relied  upon  in  support  of  this 
theory,  and  as  the  same  answer  is  a  sufficient  reply  to  them 
all  I  will  not  spend  time  in  citing  and  remarking  upon  them. 

(2.)  Again:  A  physical  influence  has  been  inferred  from 
the  fact  that  sinners  are  represented  as  dead  in  trespasses  and 
sins,  as  asleep,  &c.  &c.  But  all  such  representations  are 
only  declaratory  of  a  moral  state,  a  state  of  voluntary  aliena- 
tion from  God.  If  the  death  is  moral  and  the  sleep  moral, 
why  suppose  that  a  physical  influence  is  needed  to  correct  a 
moral  evil?  Can  not  truth  when  urged  and  pressed  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  effect  the  requisite  change? 

(3.)  But  a  physical  influence  is  also  inferred  from  the  fact 
that  truth  makes  so  different  an  impression  at  one  time  from 
what  it  does  at  another.  Answer:  This  can  well  enough  be 
accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  sometimes  the  Holy  Spirit  so 
presents  the  truth  that  the  mind  apprehends  it  and  feels  its 
power,  whereas  at  another  time  he  does  not. 

(4.)  But  it  is  said  that  there  sometimes  appears  to  have  been 
a  preparatory  work  performed  by  a  physical  influence  predis- 
posing the  mind  to  attend  to  and   be  affected  by  the  truth. 
Answer:  There  often  is  no  doubt  a  preparatory  work  predis- 
posing the  mind  to  attend  to  and  be  affected  by  truth.     But 
why  assume  that  this  is  a  physical  influence?  Providential 
occurrences  may  have  had  much  to  do  with  it.     The  Holy 
Spirit  may  have  been  directing  the  thoughts  and  communica- 
ting instructions  in  various  ways  and  preparing  the  mind  to 
attend  and  obey.     Who  then  is  warranted  in  the  affirmation 
that  this  preparatory  influence  is  physical?  I  admit  that  it  may 
be,  but  I  can  not  see  either  that  it  must  be,  or  that  there  is 
any  good  ground  for  the  assumption  that  it  is, 
44 


518  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

IV,   The  last  theory  to  be  examijied  is  that  of  a  Divine  Moral 
Suasion. 
This  theory  teaches. 

1.  That  regeneration  consists  in  a  change  in  the  ultimate 
intention  or  preference  of  the  mind,  or  in  a  change  from  sel- 
fishness to  disinterested  benevolence,  and. 

2.  That  this  change  is  induced  and  effected  by  a  Divine 
moral  influence:  that  is,  that  the  Holy  Spirit  effects  it  with, 
through,  or  by  the  truth.  The  advocates  of  this  theory  as- 
sign the  following  as  the  principal  reasons  in  support  of  it. 

(1.)  The  bible  expressly  affirms  it.  "Jesus  answered.  Ve- 
rily, verily.  I  say  unto  thee,  Except  a  man  be  born  of  water 
and  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God. 
That  which  is  born  of  the  flesh  is  flesh;  and  that  which  is 
born  of  the  Spirit  is  spirit.*' — John  3:  5.  6.  "Being  born 
again,  not  of  corruptible  seed,  but  of  incorruptible,  by  the  word 
of  God,  which  liveth  and  abideth  for  ever." — 1  Peter  1:  '23. 
•Of  his  own  will  begat  he  us  with  the  word  of  truth,  that 
we  should  be  a  kind  of  first-fruits  of  his  creatures." — James 
1 :  18.  ''For  though  ve  have  ten  thousand  instructers  in  Christ 
yet  have  ye  not  many  fathers:  for  in  Christ  Jesus  I  have  begot- 
ten you  through  the  gospel." — Corinthians  4:  15. 

(*2.)  Men  are  represented  as  being  sanctified  by  and  through 
the  truth.  -Sanctify  them  through  the  truth:  thy  word  is 
truth.'' — John  17:  17.  "Now  ye  are  clean  through  the  word 
which  I  have  spoken  unto  you." — John  15:  3. 

(3.)  The  nature  of  regeneration  decides  the  philosophy  of 
it  so  far  as  this,  that  it  must  be  effected  by  truth  addressed  to 
the  heart  through  the  intelligence. 

(4.)  Unless  it  is  so  effected  it  has  no  moral  character. 

(5.)  The  regenerate  are  conscious  of  having  been  influ- 
enced bj  the  truth  in  turning  to  God. 

(6.)  They  are  conscious  of  no  other  influence  than  light 
poured  upon  the  intelHgence  or  truth  presented  to  the  mind. 

(7.)  When  God  affirms  that  he  regenerates  the  soul  with  or 
by  the  truth  we  have  no  right  to  infer  that  he  does  it  in  some 
other  way.  This  he  does  affirm:  therefore  the  bible  has  set- 
tled the  philosophy  of  regeneration.  That  he  exerts  any 
other  than  a  moral  influence  or  the  influence  of  Divine  teach- 
ing and  illumination  is  sheer  assumption. 

OBJECTIONS. 

1.  To  represent  sinners  as  regenerated  by  the  influence  of 
truth  although  presented  and  urged  by  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
virtuaUy  to  deny  total  depravity.     To  this  it  is  answered, 


REGENERATION. 


519 


(1.)  It  does  indeed  deny  constitutional  moral  depravity 
and  constitutional  or  physical  regeneration. 

(2.)  Adam  and  the  sinning  angels  were  changed  or  regen- 
erated from  perfect  holiness  to  perfect  sinfulness  by  motives 
presented  to  them,  at  least  Adam  was.  Now  if  they 
could  be  regenerated  from  entire  holiness  to  entire  sinfulness 
by  a  moral  influence  or  by  means  of  a  lie,  is  it  impossible  that 
God  should  convert  sinners  by  means  of  truth?  Has  God 
so  much  less  moral  power  than  Satan  has? 

(3.)  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that  it  is  much  easier  to  con- 
vert or  regenerate  men  from  holiness  to  sin,  than  from  sin  to 
holiness. 

[1.]  This,  I  answer,  seems  to  reflect  upon  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  God  in  forming  the  human  constitution. 

[2.]  Should  the  fact  be  granted,  still  it  may  truly  be  urged 
that  the  motives  to  holiness  are  infinitely  greater  than  those 
to  sin,  so  that  the  Holy  Spirit  has  altogether  the  advantage 
in  this  respect. 

2.  If  sinners  are  regenerated  by  the  light  of  the  truth,  they 
may  be  regenerated  in  hell  as  they  will  there  know  the  truth. 

(1.)  The  bible  I  answer,  represents  the  wicked  in  hell  as 
being  in  darkness  and  not  in  the  light  of  the  truth. 

(2.)  The  truth  will  not  be  presented  and  urged  home  there 
by  the  persuasive  Spirit  of  God. 

(3.)  The  gospel  motives  will  be  wanting  there.  The  oflfer 
of  pardon  and  acceptance,  which  is  indispensable  to  induce 
repentance  and  obedience,  will  not  be  made  then.  There- 
fore sinners  will  not  be  converted  in  hell. 

REMARKS. 

1.  This  scheme  honors  the  Holy  Spirit  without  disparaging 
the  truth  of  God. 

2.  Regeneration  by  the  Holy  Spirit  through  the  truth  illus- 
trates the  wisdom  of  God.  There  is  a  deep  and  Divine  phil- 
osophy in  regeneration. 

3.  This  theory  is  of  great  practical  importance.  For  if 
sinners  are  to  be  regenerated  by  the  influence  of  truth,  argu- 
ment, and  persuasion,  then  ministers  can  see  what  they  have 
to  do,  and  how  it  is  that  they  are  to  be  '■'■  workers  together 
with  God." 

4.  So  also  sinners  may  see  that  they  are  not  to  wait  for  a 
physical  regeneration  or  influence,  but  must  submit  to,  and  em- 
brace the  truth  if  they  ever  expect  to  be  saved. 


520  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

5.  If  this  scheme  is  true,  we  can  see  that  when  truth  is 
made  clear  to  the  mind  and  is  resisted,  the  Holy  Spirit  is  re- 
sisted, for  this  is  his  work  to  make  the  mind  clearly  to  appre- 
hend the  truth. 

6.  If  this  theory  is  true,  sinners  are  most  likely  to  be  re- 
generated while  sitting  under  the  sound  of  the  gospel,  while 
listening  to  the  clear  exhibition  of  truth. 

7.  Ministers  should  lay  themselves  out  and  press  every  con- 
sideration upon  the  attention  of  sinners  just  as  heartily  and 
as  freely  as  if  they  expected  to  convert  them  themselves. 
They  should  aim  at  and  expect  the  regeneration  of  sinners 
upon  the  spot  and  before  they  leave  the  house  of  God. 

8.  Sinners  must  not  wait  for  and  expect  physical  omnipo- 
tence to  regenerate  them. 

9.  The  physical  omnipotence  of  God  affords  no  presump- 
tion that  all  men  will  be  converted;  for  regeneration  is  not 
effected  by  physical  power. 

10.  To  neglect  and  resist  the  truth  is  fatal  to  salvation. 

11.  Sinners  are  not  regenerated  because  they  neglect  and 
resist  the  truth. 

12.  God  can  not  do  the  sinner's  duty  and  regenerate  him 
without  the  right  exercise  of  the  sinner's  own  agency. 

13.  This  view  of  regeneration  shows  that  the  sinner's  de- 
pendence upon  the  Holy  Spirit  arises  entirely  out  of  his  own 
voluntary  stubbornness,  and  that  his  guilt  is  all  the  greater 
by  how  much  the  more  perfect  this  kind  of  dependence  is. 

14.  This  view  of  regeneration  shows  the  adaptedness  of 
the  Law  and  Gospel  of  God  to  regenerate,  sanctify  and  save 
the  souls  of  men. 

15.  It  also  demonstrates  the  wisdom  of  appointing  such 
means  and  instrumentalities  to  accomplish  their  salvation. 

16.  Physical  regeneration  under  every  modification  of  it  is 
a  stumbHng  block. 

17.  Original  or  constitutional  sinfulness,  physical  regener- 
ation, and  all  their  kindred  and  resulting  dogmas  are  aUke 
subversive  of  the  gospel  and  repulsive  to  the  human  intelli- 
gence, and  should  be  laid  aside  as  relicts  of  a  most  nonsen- 
sical philosophy. 


LECTURE  XLI. 

REGENERATION. 

XII.  Evidences  of  Regeneration. 
In  the  discussion  of  this  subject  I  will, 

I.  Make  several  introductory  remarks. 

II.  Show  wherein  the  experience  and  outward  life 
saints  and  sinners  may  agree. 

III.  Wherein  they  must  differ. 
/.  Introductory  Remarks. 

1.  In  ascertaining  what  are  and  what  are  not  evidences  of 
regeneration,  we  must  constantly  keep  in  mind  what  is  not  and 
what  is  regeneration,  what  is  not  and  what  is  implied  in  it. 

2.  We  must  constantly  recognize  the  fact  that  saints  and 
sinners  have  precisely  similar  constitutions  and  constitutional 
susceptibilities  and  that  therefore  many  things  are  common  to 
both. 

3.  What  is  common  to  both  can  not  of  course  be  an  evi- 
dence of  regeneration. 

4.  That  no  state  of  the  sensibility  has  any  moral  character 
in  itself  That  regeneration  does  not  consist  in  or  imply  any 
physical  change  whatever  either  of  the  intellect,  sensibility, 
or  the  faculty  of  will. 

5.  That  the  sensibility  of  the  sinner  is  susceptible  of  every 
kind  and  degree  oi  feeling  that  is  possible  to  saints. 

6.  The  same  is  true  of  the  consciences  of  both  saints  and 
sinners,  and  of  the  intelligence  generally. 

7.  That  moral  character  belongs  to  the  ultimate  intention. 

8.  That  regeneration  consists  in  a  change  of  the  ultimate 
intention. 

9.  That  the  moral  character  is  as  the  ultimate  intention  is. 

10.  The  enquiry  is,  what  are  evidences  of  a  change  in  the 
ultimate  intention?  What  is  evidence  that  benevolence  is  the 
ruling  choice,  preference,  intention  of  the  soul? 

This,  it  would  seem,  must  be  a  plain  question  and  must 
admit  of  a  very  easy  and  satisfactory  answer. 

It  is  a  plain  question,  and  demands  and  may  have  a  plain  an- 
swer. But  so  much  error  has  prevailed  as  to  the  nature  of  re- 
generation and  consequently  as  to  what  are  evidences  of  re- 
generation that  we  need  patience,  discrimination,  and  perse- 
verance and  withal  candor  to  get  at  the  truth  upon  this  sub- 
ject. 

44* 


522  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

//.  Wherein  the  eocperience  and  outward  life  of  sai7its  and  sifi- 
ners  may  agree. 

It  is  plain  that  they  may  be  alike  in  whatever  does  not 
consist  in  or  necessarily  proceed  from  the  attitude  of  their 
will,  that  is,  in  whatever  is  constitutional  or  involuntary.  For 
example, 

1.  They  may  both  desire  their  own  happiness.  This  de- 
sire is  constitutional,  and  of  course  common  to  both  saints  and 
sinners. 

2.  They  may  both  desire  the  happiness  of  others.  This 
also  is  constitutional  and  of  course  common  to  both  saints  and 
sinners.  There  is  no  moral  character  in  these  desires  any 
more  than  there  is  in  the  desire  for  food  and  drink.  That  men 
have  a  natural  desire  for  the  happiness  of  others  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  they  manifest  pleasure  when  others  are 
happy  unless  they  have  some  selfish  reason  for  envy,  or  un- 
less the  happiness  of  others  is  in  some  way  inconsistent  with 
their  own.  They  also  manifest  uneasiness  and  pain  when 
they  see  others  in  misery,  unless  they  have  some  selfish  rea- 
son for  desiring  their  misery. 

3.  Saints  and  sinners  may  alike  dread  their  own  misery 
and  the  misery  of  others.  This  is  strictly  constitutional,  and 
has  therefore  no  moral  character.  I  have  known  that  very 
wicked  men  and  men  Avho  had  been  infidels  when  they  were 
convinced  of  the  truths  of  Christianity,  manifested  great  con- 
cern about  their  families  and  about  their  neighbors,  and  in  one 
instance  I  heard  of  an  aged  man  of  this  description  who  when 
convinced  of  the  truth,  went  and  warned  his  neighbors  to  flee 
from  the  wrath  to  come,  avowing  at  the  same  time  his 
conviction  that  there  was  no  mercy  for  him,  though  he  felt 
deeply  concerned  for  others.  Such  like  cases  have  repeated- 
ly been  witnessed.  The  case  of  the  rich  man  in  hell  seems 
to  have  been  one  of  this  description  or  to  have  illustrated  the 
same  truth.  Although  he  knew  his  own  case  to  be  hopeless, 
yet  he  desired  that  Lazarus  should  be  sent  to  warn  his  five 
brethren  lest  they  also  should  come  to  that  place  of  torment. 
In  this  case  and  in  the  case  of  the  aged  man  just  named  it  ap- 
pears that  they  not  only  desired  that  others  should  avoid  mis- 
ery, but  they  actually  tried  to  prevent  it  and  used  the  means 
that  were  within  their  reach  to  save  them.  Now  it  is  plain 
that  this  desire  took  control  of  their  will  and  of  course  the 
state  of  the  will  was  selfish.  It  sought  to  gratify  desire.  It 
was  the  pain  and  dread  of  seeing  their  misery  and  of  having 
them  miserable  that  led  them  to  use  means  to  prevent  it.     This 


REGENERATION.  523 

was  not  benevolence,  but  selfishness.  It  no  doubt  increases 
the  misery  of  sinners  in  hell  to  have  their  number  multiplied, 
that  is,  they  being  moral  agents  can  not  but  be  unutterably 
pained  to  behold  the  wretchedness  around  them.  This  may 
and  doubtless  will  make  up  a  great  part  of  the  misery  of  de- 
vils and  of  wicked  men,  the  beholding  to  all  eternity  the  misery 
which  they  have  occasioned.  They  will  not  only  be  filled 
with  remorse;  but  undoubtedly  their  souls  will  be  unutterably 
agonized  with  the  misery  they  will  behold  around  them. 

Let  it  be  understood  then  that  as  both  saints  and  sinners 
constitutionally  desire,  not  only  their  own  happiness,  but  also 
the  happiness  of  others,  they  may  alike  rejoice  in  the  happi- 
ness and  safety  of  others  and  in  converts  to  Christianity,  and 
may  alike  grieve  at  the  danger  and  misery  of  those  who  are 
unconverted.  I  well  recollect  when  far  from  home  and  while 
an  impenitent  sinner  I  received  a  letter  from  my  youngest 
brother  informing  me  that  he  was  converted  to  God.  He,  if 
he  was  converted,  was,  as  I  supposed,  the  first  and  the  only 
member  of  the  family  who  then  had  a  hope  of  salvation.  I 
was  at  the  time  and  both  before  and  after  one  of  the  most  care- 
less sinners,  and  yet  on  receiving  this  intelligence,  I  actually 
wept  for  joy  and  gratitude  that  one  of  so  prayerless  a  family 
was  likely  to  be  saved. 

Indeed  I  have  repeatedly  known  sinners  to  manifest  much 
interest  in  the  conversion  of  their  friends  and  express  grati- 
tude for  their  conversion  although  they  had  no  religion  them- 
selves. These  desires  have  no  moral  character  in  themselves. 
In  as  far  as  they  control  the  will,  the  will  yielding  to  impulse 
instead  of  the  law  of  the  intelligence  then  is  selfishness. 

4.  Saints  and  sinners  may  agree  in  desiring  their  own  sancti- 
fication  and  the  sanctification  of  others.  They  may  both  de- 
sire their  own  sanctification  as  the  condition  of  their  salvation. 
They  may  also  desire  the  sanctification  of  others  as  the  con- 
dition of  their  salvation. 

5.  Saints  and  sinners  may  both  desire  to  be  useful  as  a  con- 
dition of  their  own  salvation. 

6.  They  may  also  desire  that  others  should  be  useful  as  a 
condition  of  their  salvation. 

7.  They  may  both  desire  to  glorify  God  as  a  means  or  con- 
dition of  their  own  salvation. 

8.  They  may  also  desire  to  have  others  glorify  God  as  a 
means  of  their  salvation.  These  desires  are  natural  and  con- 
stitutional when  the  salvation  either  of  ourselves  or  others  is 


524  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

desired  and  when  these  things  are  seen  to  be  conditions  of 
salvation. 

9.  They  may  both  desire  and  strongly  desire  a  revival  of 
religion  and  the  prosperity  of  Zion  as  a  means  of  promoting 
their  own  salvation  or  the  salvation  of  their  friends.  Sinners 
have  often  been  known  to  desire  revivals  of  religion. 

10.  They  may  agree  in  desiring  the  triumph  of  truth  and 
righteousness  and  the  suppression  of  vice  and  error  for  the 
sake  of  the  bearings  of  these  things  on  self  and  friends. 
These  desires  are  constitutional  and  natural  to  both  under 
certain  circumstances.  When  they  do  not  influence  the  will 
they  have  in  themselves  no  moral  character.  But  when  they 
influence  the  will,  their  selfishness  takes  on  this  type.  It 
then  manifests  zeal  in  promoting  rehgion.  But  if  desire  and 
not  the  intelligence,  controls  the  will,  it  is  selfishness  notwith- 
standing. 

11.  Moral  agents  constitutionally  approve  of  what  is  right 
and  disapprove  of  what  is  wrong.  Of  course  both  saints  and 
sinners  may  both  approve  of  and  delight  in  goodness.  I  can 
recollect  weeping  at  an  instance  of  what  at  the  time  I  sup- 
posed to  be  goodness,  while  at  the  same  time  I  was  not  reli- 
gious myself.  I  have  no  doubt  that  wicked  men  not  only  often 
are  conscious  of  strongly  approving  the  goodness  of  God,  but 
that  they  also  often  take  delight  in  contemplating  it.  This  is 
constitutional  both  as  it  respects  the  intellectual  approbation 
and  also  as  it  respects  the  feeUng  of  delight.  It  is  a  great  mis- 
take to  suppose  that  sinners  never  are  conscious  of  feelings  of 
complacence  and  delight  in  the  goodness  of  God.  The  Bible 
represents  sinners  as  taking  delight  in  drawing  near  to  him. 
•■'  Yet  they  seek  me  daily,  and  delight  to  know  my  ways,  as  a 
nation  that  did  righteousness,  and  forsook  not  the  ordinance 
of  their  God:  they  ask  of  me  the  ordinances  of  justice;  they 
take  dehght  in  approaching  to  God. — Isa.  58^:  2.  "-And  lo, 
thou  art  unto  them  as  a  very  lovely  song  of  one  tbat  hath  a 
pleasant  voice,  and  can  play  well  on  an  instrument:  for  they 
hear  thy  words,  but  they  do  them  not." — Ezek.  33:  32.  ^^For 
I  deUght  in  the  law  of  God  after  the  inward  man." — Romans 
7:  22. 

12.  Saints  and  sinners  may  aUke  not  only  intellectually  ap- 
prove, but  have  feeUngs  of  deep  complacency  in  the  charac- 
ters of  good  men,  sometimes  good  men  of  their  own  time  and 
of  their  acquaintance,  but  more  frequently  good  men  either 
of  a  former  age,  or  if  of  their  own  age,  of  a  distant  country. 
The  reason  is  this :  Good  men  of  their  own  day  and  neighbor- 


REGENERATION. 


525 


hood  are  verj  apt  to  render  them  uneasy  in  their  sins,  to  an- 
noy them  by  their  faithful  reproofs  and  rebukes.  This  offends 
ihem  and  overcomes  their  natural  respect  for  goodness.  But 
who  has  not  observed  the  fact  that  good  and  bad  men  unite  in 
praising,  admiring,  and  loving  so  far  as  feeling  is  concerned, 
good  men  of  by-gone  days,  or  good  men  at  a  distance  whose 
life  and  rebukes  have  annoyed  the  wicked  in  their  own  neigh- 
borhood ?  The  fact  is,  that  moral  agents  from  the  laws  of  their 
being,  necessarily  intellectually  approve  of  goodness  wherev- 
er they  witness  it.  And  when  not  annoyed  by  it,  when  left  to 
contemplate  it  in  the  abstract  or  at  a  distance,  they  cannot 
but  feel  a  complacency  in  it.  Multitudes  of  sinners  are  con- 
scious of  this  and  suppose  that  this  is  a  virtuous  feeling  in 
them.  It  is  of  no  use  to  deny  that  they  sometimes  have  feel- 
ings of  love  and  gratitude  to  God,  and  of  respect  for  and  com- 
placency in  good  men.  They  often  have  these  feelings  and 
to  represent  them  as  always  having  feelings  of  hatred  and  of 
opposition  to  God  and  to  good  men,  is  sure  either  to  offend 
them  or  to  lead  them  to  deny  the  truths  of  religion;  if  they 
are  told  that  the  Bible  teaches  this.  Or  again  it  may  lead 
them  to  think  themselves  Christians  because  they  are  con- 
scious of  such  feelings  as  they  are  taught  to  beUeve  are  pecu- 
liar to  Christians.  Or  again,  they  may  think  that  although 
they  are  not  Christians,  yet  they  are  far  from  being  totally  de- 
praved, inasmuch  as  they  have  so  many  good  desires  and  feel- 
ings. It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  saints  and  sinners  may 
agree  in  their  opinions  and  intellectual  views  and  judgments. 
Many  professors  of  religion,  it  is  to  be  feared,  have  supposed 
rehgion  to  consist  in  desires  and  feelings  and  have  entirely 
mistaken  their  own  character.  Indeed  nothing  is  more  com- 
mon than  to  hear  religion  spoken  of  as  consisting  altogether 
in  mere  feehngs,  desires  and  emotions.  Professors  relate 
their  feelings  and  suppose  themselves  to  be  giving  an  account 
of  their  religion.  It  is  infinitely  important  that  both  profes- 
sors of  religion  and  non-professors  should  understand  more 
than  most  of  them  do  of  their  mental  constitution  and  of  the 
true  nature  of  religion.  Multitudes  of  professors  of  religion 
have,  it  is  to  he  feared,  a  hope  founded  altogether  upon  desires 
and  feelings  that  are  purely  constitutional,  and  therefore  com- 
mon to  both  saints  and  sinners. 

13.  Saints  and  sinners  agree  in  this  that  they  both  disap- 
prove of  and  are  often  disgusted  with  and  deeply  abhor  sin. 
They  can  not  but  disapprove  of  sin.  Necessity  is  laid  upon 
every  moral  agent,  whatever  his  character  may  be,  by  the  law 


526  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

of  his  being,  to  condemn  and  disapprove  of  sin.     And  often 
the  sensibility  of  sinners  as  well  as  saints  is  filled  with  deep 
disgust  and  loathing  in  view  of  sin.     I  know  that  representa- 
tions  the  direct  opposite  of  these  are  often  made.     Sinners 
are  represented  as  universally  having  complacency  in  sin,  as 
having  a  constitutional  craving  for  sin  as  they  do  for  food  and 
drink.     But  such  representations  are  false  and  most  injurious. 
They  contradict  the  sinner's  consciousness,  and  lead  him  either 
to  deny  his  total  depravity,  or  to  deny  the  Bible,  or  to  think 
himself  regenerate.     As  was  shown  when  upon  the  subject  of 
moral  depravity,  sinners  do  not  love  sin  for  its  oxm  sake;  but 
they  crave  other  things,  and  this  leads  to  prohibited  indulgence, 
which  indulgence  is  sin.     But  it  is  not  the  sinfulness  of  the 
indulgence  that  was  desired.     That   might  have  produced 
disgust  and  loathing  in  the  sensibility  if  it  had  been   consid- 
ered even  at  the  moment  of  the  indulgence.     For  example: 
Suppose  a  licentious  man,  a  drunkard,  a  gambler,  or  any  other 
wicked  man,  engaged  in  his  favorite  indulgence,  and  suppose 
that  the  sinfulness  of  this  indulgence  should  be  strongly  set 
before  his  mind  by  the  Holy  Spirit.     He  might  be  deeply 
ashamed  and  disgusted  with  himself,  and  so  much  so  as  to  feel 
a  great  contempt  for  himself,  and  feel  almost  ready,  were  it 
possible,  to  spit  in  his  own  face.     And  yet  unless  this  feeling 
becomes  more  powerful  than  the  desire  and  feeling  which  the 
will  is  seeking  to  indulge,  the  indulgence  will  be  persevered 
in   notwithstanding   this  disgust.     If  the  feeling  of  disgust 
should,  for  the  time,  overmatch   the  opposing  desire,  the  in- 
dulgence will  be,  for  the  time  being,  abandoned  for  the  sake 
of  gratifying  or  appeasing  the  feeling  of  disgust.     But  this  is 
not  virtue.     It  is  only  a  change  in  the  form  of  selfishness. 
Feeling  still  governs,  and   not  the  law  of  the  intelligence. 
The  indulgence  is  only  abandoned  for.  the  time  being  to  grati- 
fy a  stronger   impulse  of  the  sensibility.     The  will,  will  of 
course  return  to  the  indulgence  again,  when  the  feelings  of 
fear,  disgust,  or  loathing  subside.     This  no  doubt  accounts 
for  the   multitudes  of  spurious  conversions  sometimes   wit- 
nessed.    Sinners  are  convicted,  and  their  fears,  and  disgust, 
and  loathing  excited.     These  feelings,  for  the  time,  become 
stronger  than  their  desires  for  their  former  indulgences,  and 
consequently  they  abandon  them  for  a  time,  in  obedience, 
not  to  the  law  of  God  or  of  their  intelligence,  but  in  obedi- 
ence to  their  fears,  disgust  and  shame.     But  when  conviction 
subsides,  and  the  consequent  feelings  are  no  more,  these  spu- 
rious converts  ^'  return  like  a  dog  to  his  vomit,  and  like  a  sow 


REGENERATION. 


52: 


that  was  washed  to  her  wallowing  in  the  mire."  It  should  be 
distinctly  understood  that  all  these  feelings  of  which  I  have 
spoken,  and  indeed  any  class  or  degree  of  mere  feehngs  may 
exist  in  the  sensibility;  and  further  that  these  or  any  other 
feelings  may  in  their  turns  control  the  will,  and  produce  of 
course  a  corresponding  outward  life,  and  yet  the  heart  be  and 
remain  all  the  while  in  a  selfish  state,  or  in  a  state  of  total  de- 
pravity. Indeed  it  is  perfectly  common  to  see  the  impenitent 
sinner  manifest  much  disgust  and  opposition  to  sin  in  himself 
and  in  others,  yet  this  is  not  principle  in  him;  it  is  only  the 
effect  of  present  feeling.  The  next  day,  or  perhaps  hour,  he 
will  repeat  his  sin,  or  do  that  which  when  beheld  in  others 
enkindled  his  indignation. 

14.  Both  saints  and  sinners  approve  of  and  often  delight  in 
justice.  It  is  common  to  see  in  courts  of  justice  and  on  vari- 
ous occasions  impenitent  sinners  manifest  great  complacency 
in  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  greatest  indignation 
at  and  aborrence  of  injustice.  So  strong  is  this  feeling 
sometimes  that  it  can  not  be  restrained,  but  will  burst  forth 
like  a  smothered  volcano  and  carry  desolation  before  it.  It 
is  this  natural  love  of  justice  and  abhorrence  of  injustice  com- 
mon aUke  to  saints  and  sinners,  to  which  popular  tumults  and 
bloodshed  are  often  to  be  ascribed.  This,  to  be  sure,  is  not 
virtue,  but  selfishness.  It  is  the  will  giving  itself  up  to  the 
gratification  of  a  constitutional  impulse.  But  such  feelings 
and  such  conduct  are  often  supposed  to  be  virtuous.  It 
should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  love  of  justice  and  the 
sense  of  deUght  in  it,  and  the  feeling  of  opposition  to  injus- 
tice is  not  only  not  peculiar  to  good  men,  but  that  such  feel- 
ings are  no  evidence  whatever  of  a  regenerate  heart.  Thou- 
sands of  instances  might  be  adduced  as  proofs  and  illustrations 
of  this  position.  But  such  manifestations  are  too  common  to 
need  to  be  cited  to  remind  any  one  of  their  existence. 

15.  The  same  remarks  may  be  made  in  regard  to  truth. 
Both  saints  and  sinners  have  a  constitutional  respect  for,  ap- 
probation of,  and  delight  in  truth.  Whoever  knew  a  sinner 
to  approve  of  the  character  of  a  liar?  What  sinner  will 
not  resent  it  to  be  accused  or  even  suspected  of  lying? 
All  men  spontaneously  manifest  their  respect  for,  compla- 
cency in,  and  approbation  of  truth.  This  is  constitutional; 
so  that  even  the  greatest  liars  do  not  and  can  not  love  lying 
for  its  own  sake.  They  lie  to  gratify,  not  a  love  for  false- 
hood on  its  own  account,  but  to  obtain  some  object  which 
they  desire  more  strongly  than  they  hate  falsehood.    Sinners, 


528  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

in  spite  of  themselves  venerate,  respect  and  fear  a  man  of 
truth.  They  just  as  necessarily  despise  a  liar.  If  they  are 
liars  they  despise  themselves  for  it  just  as  drunkards  and  de- 
bauchees despise  themselves  for  indulging  their  filthy  lusts, 
and  yet  continue  in  them. 

16.  Both  saints  and  sinners  not  only  approve  of  and  de- 
light in  good  men,  when,  as  I  have  said,  wicked  men  are  not 
annoyed  by  them,  but  they  agree  in  reprobating,  disapproving 
and  abhorring  wicked  men  and  devils.  Whoever  heard  of 
any  other  sentiment  and  feeling  expressed  either  by  good  or 
bad  men,  than  of  abhorrence  and  indignation  toward  the 
devil  ?  Nobody  ever  approved  or  can  approve  of  his  character; 
sinners  can  no  more  approve  of  it  than  holy  angels  can.  If  he 
could  approve  of  and  delight  in  his  own  character  hell  would 
cease  to  be  hell  and  evil  would  become  his  good.  But  no 
moral  agent  can  by  any  possibility  know  wickedness  and  ap- 
prove it.  No  man,  saint  or  sinner,  can  entertain  any  other 
sentiment  and  feeling  toward  the  devil  or  wicked  men  than 
those  of  disapprobation,  distrust,  disrespect,  and  often  of 
loathing  and  abhorrence.  The  intellectual  sentiment  will 
be  uniform.  Disapprobation,  distrust,  condemnation  will  al- 
ways necessarily  possess  the  minds  of  all  who  know  wicked 
men  and  devils.  And  often,  as  occasions  arise  wherein  their 
characters  are  clearly  revealed,  and  under  circumstances  fa- 
vorable to  such  a  result,  the  deepest  feelings  of  disgust,  of 
loathing,  of  indignation  and  abhorrence  of  their  wickedness, 
will  manifest  themselves  alike  among  saints  and  sinners. 

17.  Saints  and  sinners  may  be  equally  honorable  and  fair 
in  business  transactions  so  far  as  the  outward  act  is  concerned. 
To  be  sure  they  have  different  reasons  for  their  conduct,  but 
outwardly  it  may  be  the  same.     This  leads  to  the  remark, 

18.  That  selfishness  in  the  sinner  and  benevolence  in  the 
saint  may  and  often  do  produce,  in  many  respects,  the  same 
results  or  manifestations.  For  example:  benevolence  in  the 
saint  and  selfishness  in  the  sinner  may  beget  the  same  class 
of  desires,  to  wit,  as  we  have  seen,  desire  for  their  own 
sanctification,  and  for  that  of  others,  to  be  useful  and  have 
others  so,  desires  for  the  conversion  of  sinners,  and  many  such 
like  desires. 

19.  This  leads  to  the  remark  that  when  the  desires  of  an 
impenitent  person  for  these  objects  become  strong  enough  to 
influence  the  will,  he  may  take  the  same  outward  course  sub- 
stantially that  the  saint  takes  in  obedience  to  his  intelligence. 
That  is,  the  sinner  is  constrained  by  his  feelings  to  do  what 


REGENERATION.  529 

the  saint  does  from  principle  or  from  obedience  to  the  law  of 
his  intelligence.  In  this  however,  although  the  outward 
manifestations  be  the  same  for  the  time  being,  yet  the  sinner 
is  entirely  selfish  and  the  saint  benevolent.  The  saint  is  con- 
trolled by  principle  and  the  sinner  by  impulse.  In  this  case' 
time  is  needed  to  distinguish  between  them.  The  sinner  not 
having  the  root  of  the  matter  in  him,  will  return  to  his  former 
course  oi  life  in  proportion  as  his  convictions  of  the  truth  and 
importance  of  religion  subside,  and  his  former  feelings  return; 
while  the  saint  will  evince  his  heavenly  birth  by  manifesting 
his  sympathy  with  God  and  the  strength  of  principle  that  has 
taken  possession  of  his  heart.  That  is,  he  will  manifest  that 
his  intelligence,  and  not  his  feelings,  controls  his  will. 

20.  Saints  and  sinners  may  both  love  and  hate  the  same 
things,  but  for  different  and  opposite  reasons.  For  example.* 
They  may  both  love  the  Bible;  the  saint  benevolently  and 
the  sinner  selfishly;  that  is,  the  saint  loves  the  Bible  for 
benevolent,  and  the  sinner  for  selfish  reasons.  They  may 
love  Christians  for  opposite  reasons,  the  saint  for  their  likeness 
to  Christ,  the  sinner  because  he  considers  them  the  favorites 
of  heaven,  as  his  particular  friends,  or  because  he  in  some 
way  hopes  to  be  benefitted  by  them,  or  from  a  mere  constitu- 
tional complacency  in  goodness.  Now  observe:  the  Christ- 
ian may  have  the  same  constitutional  feelings  as  the  sinner, 
and  besides  these,  he  may  have  reasons  for  his  love  and  con- 
duct peculiar  to  the  saint.  The  saint  and  sinner  m.ay,  for 
different  and  opposite  reasons,  be  interested  in,  and  deeply 
affected  with  the  character  of  God,  with  the  truth,  the  sanc- 
tuary, and  in  all  the  duties  of  religion,  and  all  the  means  of 
grace.  They  may  alike,  but  for  different  reasons,  hate  infi- 
delity, error,  sin,  sinners,  selfishness.  A  selfish  sinner  may 
deeply  abhor  selfishness  in  others,  and  even  in  himself,  and 
still  persevere  in  it. 

21.  Again:  Selfishness  in  the  sinner  and  benevolence  in 
the  saint  may  lead  them  to  form  similar  resolutions  and  pur- 
poses; for  example:  to  serve  God — -to  avoid  all  sin — to  do 
all  duty — to  do  right — to  be  useful — to  persevere  in  well-do- 
ing— to  live  for  eternity — to  set  a  good  example — to  pay  the 
strictest  regard  to  the  Sabbath  and  to  all  the  institutions  of 
religion — to  do  all  that  in  them  lies  to  support  religious  insti- 
tutions. 

22.  Saints  and  sinners  may  agree  in  their  views  of  doctrine 
and  of  measures,  may  be  equally  zealous  in  the  cause  of  God 
^nd  religion;  may  be  equally  enlightened;  may  experience 

45 


53D  ffVSTSMATIC  TUEpLOCrr. 

delight  in  prayer,  and  in  religious  meetings,  and  in  religions 
exercises  generallj. 

23.  Both  may  be  greatly  changed  in  feeling  and  in  life. 

24.  They  may  both  give  all  their  goods  to  feed  the  poor, 
or  to  sup7»ort  the  gospel  and  send  it  to  the  heathen. 

25.  They  may  both  go  as  missionaries  to  the  heathen,  but 
for  entirely  different  reasons. 

26.  They  may  have  equal  convictions  of  sin,  and  their  sen- 
sibilities may  be  similarly  affected  by  these  convictions. 

27.  They  may  both  have  great  sorrow  for  sin,  and  great 
loathing  of  self  on  account  of  it. 

28.  They  may  have  equal  feelings  of  gratitude  to  God. 

29.  They  may  both  appear  to  manifest  all  the  graces  of 
true  saints. 

30.  They  may  both  be  very  confident  of  their  good  estate. 

31.  They  may  both  have  new  hopes  and  new  fears,  new 
joys  and  new  sorrows,  new  friends  and  new  enemies,  new 
habits  of  life. 

32.  They  may  both  be  comforted  by  the  promises  and  awed 
by  the  threatenings. 

33.  They  may  both  appear  to  have  answers  to  prayer. 

34.  They  may  both  appear  and  really  suppose  themselves 
to  renounce  the  world.  They  may  really  both  renounce  this 
w<H-ld,  the  saint  for  the  glory  of  God,  the  sinner  that  he  may 
win  heaven. 

35.  They  may  both  practice  many  forms  of  self-denial. 
The  christian  really  denies  himself  and  the  sinner  may  appear 
to  by  denying  certain  forms  of  self  seeking  for  the  securing 
of  a  selfish  interest  in  another  direction. 

36.  They  may  both  have  the  faith  of  miracles:  ^'And 
though  I  have  the  gift  of  prophecy,  and  understand  all  mys- 
teries, and  all  knowledge;  and  though  I  have  all  faith,  so  that 
I  could  remove  mountains  and  have  not  charity,  I  am  no- 
thing."—1  Cor.  13:  2. 

37.  They  may  both  suffer  martyrdom  for  entirely  opposite 
reasons.  *•  And  though  I  bestow  all  my  goods  to  feed  the  poor, 
and  though  I  give  my  body  to  be  burned,  and  have  not  char- 
ity, it  profiteth  me  nothing." — 1  Cor.  13:  3. 

38.  They  may  be  confident  of  their  good  estate,  and  may 
both  die  in  triumph  and  carry  their  hope  to  the  bar  of  God. 
"•  Then  shall  ye  begin  to  say.  We  have  eaten  and  drunk  in 
thy  presence,  and  thou  hast  taught  in  our  streets.  But  he 
shall  say,  I  tell  you,  I  know  you  not  whence  ye  are:  de- 


RBGENERATIOIY. 


531 


part  from  me  all  je  workers  of  iniquity." — Luke  13:  26,  27. 

REMARKS. 

1.  For  want  of  these  and  such  like  discriminations  many 
have  stumbled.  Hypocrites  have  held  on  to  a  false  hope  and 
lived  upon  mere  constitutional  desires,  and  spasmodic  turns  of 
giving  up  the  will,  during  seasons  of  special  excitement,  to 
the  control  of  these  desires  and  feelings.  These  spasms  they 
call  their  waking  up.  But  no  sooner  does  their  excitement 
subside  than  selfishness  again  assumes  it  wonted  forms.  It 
is  truly  wonderful  and  appalling  to  see  to  what  an  extent 
this  is  true.  Because  in  seasons  of  special  excitement  they 
feel  deeply  and  are  conscious  of  feeling,  as  they  say,  and  ac- 
ting and  of  being  entirely  sincere  in  following  their  impulses, 
they  have  the  fullest  confidence  in  their  good  estate.  They 
say  they  can  not  doubt  their  conversion.  They  felt  so  and 
so  and  gave  themselves  up  to  their  feelings,  and  gave  much 
time  and  money  to  promote  the  cause  of  Christ.  Now  this 
is  a  deep  delusion  and  one  of  the  most  common  in  Christen- 
dom or  at  least  one  of  the  most  common  that  is  to  be  found 
among  what  are  called  revival  christians.  This  class  of  de- 
luded  souls  do  not  see  that  they  are  in  such  cases,  governed 
by  their  feelings,  and  that  if  their  feelings  were  changed,  their 
conduct  would  be  of  course;  that  as  soon  as  the  excitement 
subsides  they  will  go  back  to  their  former  ways  as  a  thing  of 
course.  When  the  present  state  of  feeling  that  now  controls 
them  has  given  place  to  their  former  feelings,  they  will  of 
course  appear  as  they  used  to  do.  This  is  in  few  words  the 
history  of  thousands  of  professors  of  religion. 

2.  This  has  greatly  stumbled  the  openly  impenitent.  Not 
knowing  how  to  account  for  what  they  often  witness  of  this 
kind  among  professors  of  religion,  they  are  led  to  doubt  wheth- 
er there  is  any  such  thing  as  true  religion. 

Again:  Many  sinners  have  been  deceived  just  in  the  way  I 
have  pointed  out,  and  have  afterwards  discovered  that  they 
had  been  deluded,  but  could  not  understand  how.  They 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  every  body  is  deluded,  and 
that  all  professors  are  as  much  deceived  as  they  are.  This 
leads  them  to  reject  and  despise  all  religion. 

3.  A  want  of  discrimination  between  what  is  constitutional 
and  what  belongs  to  a  regenerate  state  of  mind  has  stumbled 
many.  Impenitent  sinners  finding  themselves  to  have  what 
they  call  certain  good  desires  and  feelings,  have  either  come  to 
the  conclusion  that   they  were  born  again  or  that  the  unre- 


532  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

generate  have  at  least  a  spark  of  holiness  in  them  that  only 
needs  to  be  cherished  and  cultivated  to  fit  them  for  heaven. 

4.  Some  exercises  of  impenitent  sinners,  and  of  which  thej 
are  conscious,  have  been  denied  for  fear  of  denying  total  de- 
pravity. They  have  been  represented  as  necessarily  hating 
God  and  all  good  men ;  and  this  hatred  has  been  represented 
as  a.  feeling  oi  malice  andeninity  towards  God.  Many  impen- 
itent sinners  are  conscious  of  having  no  such  feelings;  but  on 
the  contrary  they  are  conscious  of  having  at  times  feelings  of 
respect,  veneration,  awe,  gratitude  and  affection  towards  God 
and  for  good  men.  They  are  also  conscious  that  they  are 
often  influenced  by  these  feelings;  that  in  obedience  to  them 
they  sometimes  pray  and  sing  praises  to  God;  that  they  some- 
times manifest  a  deep  veneration  and  respect  for  good  men 
and  show  them  favor  and  do  many  things  for  them  which  they 
would  not  do  did  they  not  feel  so  deep  a  respect,  veneration 
and  affection  for  them.  Of  these  and  manj  like  things  many 
impenitent  sinners  are  often  conscious.  They  are  also  often 
conscious  of  feeling  no  opposition  to  revivals,  but  on  the  con- 
trary that  they  rejoice  in  them  and  feel  desirous  that  they 
should  prosper  and  hope  that  they  shall  be  themselves  con- 
verted. They  are  conscious  of  feeling  deep  veneration  and 
respect  and  even  affection  for  those  ministers  who  are  the 
agents  in  the  hand  of  God  of  carrying  them  forward.  To 
this  class  of  sinners  it  is  a  snare  and  a  stumbling  block  to  tell 
them  and  insist  that  they  only  hate  God  and  christians  and 
ministers  and  revivals,  and  to  represent  their  moral  depravity 
to  be  such  that  they  crave  sin  as  they  crave  food,  and  that 
they  necessarily  have  none  but  feelings  of  mortal  enmity 
against  God.  None  of  these  things  are  true,  and  this  class 
of  sinners  know  that  they  are  not  true.  Such  representations 
either  drive  them  into  infidelity  on  the  one  hand  or  to  think 
themselves  christians  on  the  other.  But  those  theologians  who 
hold  the  views  of  constitutional  depravity  of  which  we  have 
spoken,  can  not  consistently  with  their  theory  admit  to  these 
sinners  the  real  truth,  and  then  show  them  conclusively  that 
in  all  their  feelings  which  they  call  good,  and  in  all  their 
yielding  to  be  influenced  by  them  there  is  no  virtue;  that  their 
desires  and  feelings  have  in  themselves  no  moral  character. 
and  that  when  they  yield  the  will  to  their  control,  it  is  only 
selfishness. 

The  thing  needed  is  a  philosophy  and  a  theology  that  will 
admit  and  explain  all  the  phenomena  of  experience  and  not 
deny  human  consciousness.     A  theology  that  denies  human 


REGENERATION.  533 

consciousness  is  only  a  curse  and  a  stumbling  block.  But 
such  is  the  doctrine  of  universal  constitutional  moral  de- 
pravity. 

It  is  frequently  true  that  the  feelings  of  sinners  become  ex- 
ceedingly rebellious  and  exasperated,  and  they  feel  the  most 
intense  opposition  of  feeling  toward  God  and  Christ  and  min- 
isters and  revivals  and  toward  every  thing  of  good  report.  If 
this  class  of  sinners  are  converted  they  are  very  apt  to  sup- 
pose and  to  represent  all  sinners  as  having  just  such  feelings 
as  they  had.  But  this  is  a  mistake,  for  many  sinners  never  had 
those  feelings.  Nevertheless  they  are  no  less  selfish  and 
guilty  than  the  class  who  have  the  rebellious  and  blasphe- 
mous feehngs  which  I  have  mentioned.  This  is  what  they 
need  to  know.  They  need  to  understand  definitely  what  sin 
is  and  what  it  is  not;  that  sin  is  selfishness;  that  selfishness  is 
the  yielding  of  the  will  to  the  control  of  feeling,  and  that  it 
matters  not  at  all  what  the  particular  class  of  feelings  is,  if 
feelings  and  not  intelligence  controls  the  will.  Admit  their 
good  feelings  as  they  call  them  and  take  pains  to  show  them 
that  these  feelings  are  merely  constitutional  and  have  in  them- 
selves no  moral  character.  If  they  plead,  as  they  often  will, 
that  they  not  only  feel  but  that  they  act  out  their  feehngs  and 
give  themselves  up  to  be  controled  by  them,  then  show  them 
that  this  is  only  selfishness  changing  its  form,  and  the  will 
consenting  for  the  time  to  seek  the  gratification  of  this  class 
of  feehngs  because  they  are  for  the  time  being,  the  most  im- 
portunate and  influential  with  the  will;  that  as  soon  as  ano- 
ther class  of  feelings  come  in  play  they  will  go  over  to  their 
indulgence  and  leave  God  and  rehgion  uncared  for. 

The  ideas  of  depravity  and  of  regeneration  to  which  I 
have  often  alluded  are  fraught  with  great  mischief  in  another 
respect.  Great  numbers,  it  is  to  be  feared,  both  of  private 
professors  of  religion  and  of  ministers  have  mistaken  the 
class  of  feelings  of  which  I  have  spoken  as  common  among 
certain  impenitent  sinners,  for  rehgion.  They  have  heard  the 
usual  representations  of  the  natural  depravity  of  sinners  and 
also  have  heard  certain  desires  and  feelings  represented  as 
religion.  They  are  conscious  of  these  desires  and  feelings, 
and  also,  sometimes  when  they  are  very  strong,  of  being 
influenced  in  their  conduct  by  thern.  They  assume,  therefore, 
that  they  are  regenerate,  and  elected,  and  heirs  of  salvation. 
To  be  sure  they  are  conscious  that  they  often  have  feelings 
of  great  attachment  to  the  world  and  various  classes  of  feel- 
ing very  inconsistent  with  their  rehgious  feelings  as  they  call 
45* 


534  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY* 

them;  and  that  when  these  feelings  are  in  exercise  they  also 
yield  to  them  and  give  themselves  up  to  their  control.  But 
this  they  are  taught  to  think  is  common  to  all  christians;  that 
all  christians  have  much  indwelling  sin,  are  much  of  their  time 
entirely  out  of  the  way  and  never  altogether  right  even  for  a 
moment,  that  they  never  feel  8o  much  as  they  are  capable  of 
feeling  and  often  feel  the  opposite  of  what  they  ought  to  feel. 
These  views  lull  them  asleep.  The  philosophy  and  theology 
that  misrepresents  moral  depravity  and  regeneration  must,  if 
consistent,  also  misrepresent  true  religion;  and  O,  the  many 
thousands  that  have  mistaken  the  mere  constitutional  desires 
and  feelings  and  the  selfish  yielding  of  the  will  to  their  con- 
trol, for  true  religion,  and  have  gone  to  the  bar  of  God  with  a 
lie  in  their  right  hand. 

It  is  a  mournful  and  even  a  heart  rending  fact  that  very 
much  that  passes  current  for  christian  experience  is  not  and 
can  not  be  an  experience  peculiar  at  all  to  christians.  It  ig 
common  to  both  saints  and  sinners.  It  is  merely  the  natural 
and  necessary  result  of  the  human  constitution  under  certain 
circumstances.  Let  no  man  deceive  himself  and  think  more 
highly  of  himself  than  he  ought  to  think. 

5.  Another  great  evil  has  arisen  out  of  the  false  views  I 
have  been  exposing,  namely: 

Many  true  christians  have  been  much  stumbled  and  kept  in 
bondage,  and  their  comfort  and  their  usefulness  much  abridged 
by  finding  themselves  from  time  to  time  very  languid  and  un^ 
feeling.  Supposing  religion  to  consist  in  feeling,  if  at  any 
time  the  excitability  of  the  sensibility  becomes  exhausted  and 
their  feelings  subside,  they  are  immediately  thrown  into  unbe- 
lief and  bondage.  Satan  reproaches  them  for  their  want  of 
feeling  and  they  have  nothing  to  say  only  to  admit  the  truth 
of  his  accusations.  Having  a  false  philosophy  of  religion 
they  judge  of  the  state  of  their  hearts  by  the  state  of  their 
feelings.  They  confound  their  hearts  with  their  feelings  and 
are  in  almost  constant  perplexity  to  keep  their  hearts  right; 
by  which  they  mean,  their  feelings  in  a  &tate  of  great  excite- 
ment. 

Again,  They  are  not  only  sometimes  languid  and  have  no 
sensible  sensations  and  desires,  but  at  others  they  are  con- 
scious of  classes  of  emotions  which  they  call  sin.  These 
they  resist,  but  still  blame  themselves  for  having  them  in  their 
hearts,  as  they  say.  Thus  they  are  brought  into  bondage 
again,  although  they  are  certain  that  these  feelings  are  hated 
and  not  at  all  indulged  by  them.. 


REGENERATION.  535 

Oh,  how  much  all  classes  of  persons  need  to  have  clearly 
defined  ideas  of  what  really  constitutes  sin  and  holiness.  A 
false  philosophy  of  the  mind,  and  especially  of  the  will  and 
of  moral  depravity,  has  covered  the  world  with  gross  dark- 
ness on  the  subject  of  sin  and  holiness,  of  regeneration,  and 
of  the  evidences  of  regeneration,  until  the  true  saints  on  the 
one  hand  are  kept  in  a  continual  bondage  to  their  false  no- 
tions, and  on  the  other  the  church  swarms  with  unconverted 
professors,  and  is  cursed  with  many  deceived  ministers. 


LECTURE  XLII. 
REGENERATION. 

III.  Wherein  saints  and  sinners  or  deceived  professors 

MUST  differ. 

In  discussing  this  branch  of  the  subject,  I  will, 

/.  Make  several  prefatory  remarks. 

II.  Point  out  the  prominent  characteristics  of  both. 

1.  Prefatory  remarks. 

(1.)  The  Bible  represents  all  mankind  as  belonging  to  two 
and  but  two  great  classes,  saints  and  sinners.  All  regenerate 
souls,  whatever  their  attainments  are,  it  includes  in  the  first 
class.  All  unregenerate  persons,  whatever  be  their  profession, 
possessions,  gifts  or  station,  it  includes  among  sinners. 

(2.)  The  Bible  represents  the  difference  between  these  two 
classes  as  radical,  fundamental  and  complete.  The  Bible  does 
not  recognize  the  impenitent  as  having  any  goodness  in  them, 
but  uniformly  as  being  dead  in  trespasses  and  in  sins. 
It  represents  the  saints  as  being  dead  to  sin,  and  alive  to  God, 
as  sanctified  persons,  and  often  speaks  in  so  strong  language 
as  almost  compels  us  to  understand  it  as  denying  that  the 
saints  sin  at  all,  or  to  conclude  that  sinning  at  all  proves  that 
one  is  not  a  saint.  It  docs  take  the  unqualified  ground  that 
no  one  is  a  saint  who  lives  in  or  indulges  any  sin. 

(3.)  The  Bible  represents  the  difference  between  saints  and 
sinners  as  very  manifest  and  as  appearing  abundantly  in 
their  lives.  It  requires  us  to  judge  all  men  by  their  fruits.  It 
gives  us  both  the  fruits  of  regeneration  and  of  an  unregene- 
rate state,  and  is  exceedingly  specific  and  plain  upon  this 
subject. 

(4.)  In  treating  this  question  I  shall  endeavor  not  to  forget 
that  I  am  inquiring  after  the  evidences  of  regeneration^  and 
that  I  am  to  speak  not  of  high  and  rare  attainments  in  piety, 
but  of  its  beginnings,  and  of  those  things  that  must  exist  and 
appear  where  there  is  even  the  commencement  of  true  holi- 
ness. 

2.  I  will  point  out  the  prominent  characteristics  of  both 
saints  and  sinners. 

(1.)  Let  it  be  distinctly  remembered  that  unregenerate  per^ 
sons  all  without  exception  have  one  heart,  that  is,  they  are 
selfish.  This  is  their  whole  character.  They  are  universally 
and  only  devoted  to  self-interest  or  self-gratification.  Their 
unregenerate  heart  consists  in  this  selfish  disposition,  or  in 


REGENERATION. 


537 


this  selfish  choice.  This  choice  is  the  foundation  of,  and  the 
reason  for  all  their  activity.  They  do  all  that  they  do  and 
omit  all  that  they  omit,  for  one  and  the  same  reason,  and  that 
is  to  gratify  either  directly  or  indirectly,  either  presently  or 
remotely,  themselves. 

The  regenerate  heart  is  disinterested  benevolence.  In  oth- 
er words  it  is  love  to  God  and  our  neighbor.  All  regenerate 
hearts  are  precisely  similar.  All  true  saints,  whenever  they 
have  truly  the  heart  of  saints  of  God,  are  actuated  by  one  and 
the  same  motive.  They  have  only  one  ultimate  reason  for 
all  they  do,  and  are,  and  suffer,  or  omit.  They  have  one  ulti- 
mate intention,  one  end.  They  live  for  one  and  the  same  ob- 
ject, and  that  is  the  same  end  for  which  God  lives. 

Now  the  thing  after  which  we  are  inquiring  is  what  must 
be  the  necessary  developments  and  manifestations  of  these 
opposite  states  of  mind.     These  opposite   states  are  supreme 
and  opposite  and  ultimate  choices.     They  are  states  of  su- 
preme devotion  to  ultimate  and  opposite  ends.     In  whatever 
they  do,  the  saint,  if  he  acts  as  a  saint,  and  the  sinner,  have 
directly  opposite  ends  in  view.     They  do,  or  omit  what  they 
do,  for  entirely  different  and  opposite  ultimate  reasons.     Al- 
though, as  we  have  seen,  in  many  things  their  opposite  ends 
may  lead  them  to  attempt  to  secure  them  by  similar  means, 
and  may  therefore  often  lead  to  the  same  outward  life  in  many 
respects,  yet  it  is  always  true  that  even  when  they  act  out- 
wardly alike,  they  have  inwardly  entirely  different  ultimate 
reasons  for  their  conduct.     As  it  often  happens  that  the  saint 
in  pursuing  the  highest  good  of  being  in  general  as  an  end, 
finds  it  necessary  to  do  many  things  which  the  sinner  may  do 
to  secure  his  selfish  end;  and  as  it  often  happens  that  the 
sinner  in  his  endeavors  to  compass  his  selfish  end,  finds  it  neces- 
sary to  use  the  same  outward  means  that  the  saint  does  in  his 
efforts  to  secure  his  end,  it  requires  not  unfrequently  a  good 
degree  of  candor  and  of  discrimination  to  distinguish  between 
them.     And  as  saints  and  sinners  possess  the  same  or  similar 
constitutions  and  constitutional  propensities,  their  desires  and 
feelings  are  often  so  much  alike  as  to  embarrass  the  superficial 
inquirer  after  their  true  spiritual  state.     As  has   been   said, 
the  sinner  often  in  seasons  of  strong  religious  excitement,  not 
only  has  desires  and  feelings  resulting  from  the  laws  of  his 
constitution  similar  to  those  that  are  experiencd  by  the  saints, 
but  he  also  for  the  time  being  gives  up  his  will  to  follow  these 
impulses.     In  this  case  it  requires  the  nicest  discrimination 
to  distinguish  between  the  saint  and  the  sinner;  for  at  such 


538  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

times  thej  not  onlj  feel  alike  but  they  also  act  alike.  The 
difficulty  in  such  cases  is  to  distinguish  between  the  action  of 
a  will  that  obeys  the  intelligence  and  one  that  obeys  a  class 
of  feelings  that  are  so  nearly  in  harmony  with  the  dictates  of 
the  intelligence.  To  distinguish  in  such  cases  between  that 
which  proceeds  from  feehng  and  that  which  proceeds  from 
the  intelligence  requires  no  slight  degree  of  attention  and  dis- 
crimination. One  needs  to  be  a  close  observer  and  no  tyro 
in  mental  philosophy  to  make  just  discriminations  in  cases  of 
this  kind. 

Let  it  be  understood  that  the  fundamental  difference  be- 
tween saints  and  sinners  does  not  consist  in  the  fact  that  one 
has  a  sinful  nature  and  the  other  has  not,  for  neither  of  them 
has  a  sinful  nature. 

(2.)  Nor  docs  it  consist  in  the  fact  that  the  saint  has  had 
a  physical  regeneration  and  therefore  possesses  some  element 
of  constitution  which  the  sinner  has  noi. 

(3.)  Nor  does  it  consist  in  this,  that  saints  are  aiming  or 
intending  to  do  right  while  sinners  are  aiming  and  intending 
to  do  wrong.  The  saint  loves  God  and  his  neighbor,  that  is, 
chooses  or  intends  their  highest  good  for  its  own  sake.  This 
choice  or  intention  is  rights  though  right  is  not  the  thing  in- 
tended. The  good,  that  is,  the  valuable  to  being,  and  not  the 
right,  is  that  upon  which  the  intention  terminates.  The  sinner 
chooses  his  own  gratification  as  an  end.  This  choice  or  in- 
tention is  wrong,  but  wrong  is  not  the  end  chosen  or  the  thing 
upon  which  the  intention  terminates.  They  are  both  choos- 
ing what  they  regard  as  valuable.  The  saint  chooses  the 
good  of  being  impartial /t/.  That  is,  he  chooses  the  highest 
good  of  being  in  general  for  its  own  sake  and  lays  no  greater 
stress  upon  his  own  than  is  dictated  by  the  law  of  his  own  in- 
telligence. His  duty  is  to  will  the  greatest  amount  of  good  to 
being  in  general,  and  promote  the  greatest  amount  of  good 
within  his  power.  From  the  relation  of  things  every  one's 
own  highest  well-being  is  committed  to  his  particular  keep- 
ing and  promotion  in  a  higher  sense  than  that  of  his  neighbor 
is.  Next  to  his  own  well-being  that  of  his  own  family  and 
kindred  is  committed  to  his  particular  keeping  and  promotion 
in  a  higher  sense  than  that  of  his  neighbor's  family  and  kin- 
dred. Next  the  interest  and  well-being  of  his  immediate 
neighborhood  and  of  those  more  immediately  within  the 
sphere  of  his  influence,  is  committed  to  his  keeping  and  pro- 
motion. Thus  while  all  interests  are  to  be  esteemed  accord- 
ing to  their  intrinsic  and  relative  value,  the  law  of  God  re- 


REGENERATION.  539 

quires  that  we  should  lay  ourselves  out  more  particularly  for 
the  promotion  of  those  interests  that  lie  so  much  within  our 
reach  that  we  can  accomplish  and  secure  a  greater  amount 
of  good  by  giving  our  principal  attention  and  efforts  to  them 
than  could  be  secured  by  our  practically  treating  the  interests 
of  every  individual,  of  every  family  and  of  every  neighbor- 
hood as  of  equal  value  with  our  own.  The  practical  judg- 
ment of  all  men  always  was,  and  necessarily  must  be  that  the 
law  of  God  demands  that  every  one  should  see  to  his  own 
soul  and  should  provide  for  his  own  household,  and  that  the 
highest  good  of  the  whole  universe  can  best  be  promoted 
only  by  each  individual,  each  family,  each  neighborhood,  and 
each  nation  taking  care  to  secure  those  interests  more  imme- 
diately committed  to  them,  because  more  immediately  within 
their  reach.  This  is  not  selfishness  if  the  intention  is  to  se- 
cure the  highest  good  of  being  in  general,  and  of  these  par- 
ticular interests  as  a  part  of  the  general  good,  and  because  it 
falls  particularly  to  us  to  promote  these  particular  interests 
inasmuch  as  their  promotion  is  particularly  within  our  reach. 
The  law  of  God,  while  it  demands  that  I  should  will  the 
highest  good  of  being  in  general  for  its  own  sake,  and  esteem 
every  interest  known  to  me  according  to  its  intrinsic  and  rela- 
tive value,  demands  also,  that  as  a  pastor  of  a  church,  I  should 
give  my  time  and  influence  and  energies  more  particularly  to 
the  promotion  of  the  good  of  the  people  of  my  own  charge. 
More  good  will  upon  the  whole  result  to  the  world  from  pas- 
tors taking  this  course  than  any  other.  The  same  is  true  of 
the  family  relation  and  of  all  the  relations  of  life.  Our  rela- 
tions give  us  peculiar  facilities  for  securing  good,  and  im- 
pose on  us  peculiar  responsibilities.  Our  relation  to  our 
own  highest  well-being  imposes  peculiar  responsibilities  on 
us  in  regard  to  our  own  souls.  So  of  our  families,  neighbor- 
hoods, &c.  It  should  be  well  considered  then,  that  the  pre- 
cept, ""Thou  shaltlove  thy  neighbor  as  thyself,"  does  not  re- 
quire every  one  to  pay  just  the  attention  to  his  neighbor's 
soul  that  he  does  to  his  own,  nor  the  same  attention  to  his 
neighbor's  children  and  family  that  he  does  to  his  own.  He 
is  bound  to  esteem  his  neighbor's  interest  according  to  its  rela- 
tive value,  and  to  pursue  his  own  interest  and  the  interest  of 
his  family  and  neighborhood  and  nation  in  a  manner  not  in- 
consistent with  the  interests  of  others,  but  in  a  manner  as 
highly  conducive  to  the  promotion  of  their  interests  as  in  his 
judgment  will  upon  the  whole  secure  the  greatest  amount  of 
good.     If  I  have  a  life  to  live,  and  a  certain  amount  of  time 


540  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and  talent  and  money  and  influence  to  lay  out  for  God  and 
souls,  I  am  bound  to  use  all  in  that  manner  that  in  my  honest 
judgment  will  upon  the  whole  secure  the  greatest  amount  of 
good  to  being.  I  am  not,  certainly,  to  divide  the  pittance  of  my 
possessions  among  all  men  of  present  and  coming  genera- 
tions. Nor  am  I  to  scatter  my  time  and  talents  over  the  face 
of  the  whole  globe.  But  on  the  contrary,  benevolence  dic- 
tates that  I  should  lay  out  my  time  and  talents  and  influence 
and  possessions  where  and  when  and  in  a  way,  in  my  honest 
estimation  calculated  to  secure  to  being  the  greatest  amount 
of  good. 

I  have  said  thus  much,  as  might  seem,  by  way  of  episode; 
but  in  fact  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  have  these  thoughts  in 
mind  when  we  enter  upon  the  discussion  of  the  question  be- 
fore us;  to  wit:  What  are  evidences  of  a  truly  benevolent 
state  of  mind?  For  example;  suppose  we  should  enter  up- 
on the  inquiry  in  question,  taking  along  with  us  the  assump- 
tion that  true  benevolence,  that  is,  the  disinterested  love  of 
God  and  our  neighbor,  implies  that  we  should  not  only  esteem 
but  also  treat  all  other  interests  of  equal  intrinsic  value  with 
our  own,  according  to  their  intrinsic  and  relative  value.  I 
say,  should  we  in  searching  after  evidence  of  disinterested  be- 
nevolence, take  along  with  us  this  false  assumption,  where 
should  we  find  any  evidence  of  benevolence  on  earth?  Neman 
does  or  can  act  upon  such  a  principle.  God  has  never  acted 
upon  it.  Christ  never  acted  upon  it.  Why  did  God  select 
the  particular  nation  of  the  Jews  and  confine  His  revelations 
to  them?  Why  did  Christ  preach  the  gospel  to  the  Jews  on- 
ly, and  say  that  he  was  not  sent,  save  to  the  lost  sheep  of  the 
house  of  Israel?  Why  has  God  always  acted  upon  this  prin- 
ciple of  accomplishing  the  greatest  practicable  good?  He  es- 
teems the  good  of  all  and  of  each  of  his  creatures  according 
to  its  intrinsic  and  relative  value,  but  does  good  when  and  as 
He  best  can.  If  the  greatest  amount  of  ultimate  good  can 
be  secured  by  choosing  Abraham  from  all  other  men,  and  ma- 
king him  and  his  posterity  the  objects  of  peculiar  eflfort  and 
spiritual  cultivation,  and  the  depositories  of  the  holy  oracles 
which  He  intended  should  ultimately  bless  all  nations,  why, 
He  does  it.  He  exercises  His  own  discretion  in  His  efforts  to 
accomplish  the  greatest  amount  of  good.  Good  is  his  end 
and  He  does  all  the  good  He  can.  In  securing  this  He  does 
many  things  that  might  appear  partial  to  those  who  take  but 
a  limited  view  of  things.  Just  so  with  all  truly  benevolent 
creatures.     Good  is  their  end.     In  promoting  it,  their  intelli- 


REGENERATION.  541 

gence  and  the  law  of  God  dictate  that  they  should  bestow 
their  particular  efforts,  attention,  influence,  and  possessions 
upon  those  particular  interests  and  persons  that  will,  in 
their  judgment,  result  in  the  highest  good  of  being  in  general 
as  a  whole.  The  whole  Bible  every  where  assumes  this  as 
the  correct  rule  of  duty.  Hence  it  recognizes  all  the  rela- 
tions of  life,  and  the  peculiar  responsibiUties  and  duties  that 
grow  out  of  them,  and  enjoins  the  observance  of  those  duties. 
The  relation  of  husband  and  wife,  of  parent  and  child,  of  ru- 
ler and  subject,  and  indeed  all  the  relations  incident  to  our 
highest  well-being  in  this  life,  are  expressly  recognized  and 
their  corresponding  obligations  assumed  by  the  inspired  writers ; 
which  shows  clearly  that  they  understood  the  law  of  supreme 
love  to  God  and  equal  love  to  our  neighbor  to  imply  an  obli- 
gation to  give  particular  attention  to  those  interests  which  God 
had  placed  more  particularly  within  the  reach  of  our  influence; 
always  remembering  that  those  interests  are  to  be  pursued 
impartially;  that  is,  in  consistency  with  the  promotion  of  all 
other  interests,  by  those  to  whom  their  promotion  is  particu- 
larly committed.  For  example:  I  am  not  to  pursue  my  own 
good  and  that  of  my  family  or  my  neighborhood  or  my  nation, 
in  a  manner  inconsistent  with  the  interests  of  my  neighbor  or 
his  family  or  neighborhood  or  nation.  But  I  am  to  seek  the 
promotion  of  all  the  interests  particularly  committed  to  me, 
in  harmony  with,  and  only  as  making  a  part  of  the  general 
interests  of  being. 

Now  let  it  be  remembered  that  the  saint  is  benevolent,  and 
all  his  life  as  a  saint  is  only  the  development  of  this  one  prin- 
ciple ;  or  his  outward  and  inward  activity  is  only  an  effort  to 
secure  the  end  upon  which  benevolence  fastens,  to  wit,  the 
highest  good  of  God  and  of  being  in  general. 

The  sinner  is  selfish,  all  his  activity  is  to  be  ascribed  to  an 
intention  to  secure  his  own  gratification.  Self-interest  is  his 
end.  It  is  easy  to  see  from  what  has  been  said  that  to  an  out- 
ward observer  a  benevolent  saint  may  and  often  must  appear 
to  be  selfish,  and  the  selfish  sinner  may  and  will  appear  to  be 
disinterested.  The  saint  pursues  his  own  good  and  the 
happiness  and  well-being  of  his  family  as  a  part  of  universal 
good  and  does  it  disinterestedly.  The  sinner  persues  his 
own  gratification,  and  that  of  his  family,  not  as  parts  of  uni- 
versal good  and  disinterestedly,  but  as  his  own  and  as  the  in- 
terest of  those  who  are  regarded  as  parts  of  himself  and 
whose  interest  he  regards  as  identified  with  his  own. 

They  are  both  busy  in  promoting  the  interests  of  self  and 
46 


542  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

family  and  neighborhood  &c.  And  the  difference  between 
them  lies  in  their  ultimate  intentions  or  the  reasons  for  what 
they  do. 

There  is,  as  I  have  intimated,  special  difficulty  in  ascertain- 
ing, for  certainty,  which  is  the  saint  and  which  the  sinner, 
when  the  sinners  selfishness  is  directed  to  the  securing  of  a 
heavenly  and  eternal  interest  instead  of  a  worldly  and  tempo- 
ral one.  He  may  and  often  does  aim  at  securing  a  heavenly 
and  an  eternal  interest  both  for  himself,  and  family,  and 
friends.  When  he  does  this  his  outward  manifestations  are 
so  very  like  those  of  the  true  saint  as  to  render  it  difficult  if 
not  impossible  for  an  observer  for  the  time  being  to  distinguish 
accurately  between  them. 

I  have  compared  the  saint  and  the  sinner  in  my  last  lec- 
ture for  the  purpose  of  showing  in  what  respect  they  may  be 
aHke. 

I  will  now  in  a  few  particulars  proceed  to  contrast  them 
that  it  may  appear  in  what  they  diffisr. 

1.  And  fundamentally  they  are  radically  opposite  to  each 
other  in  their  ultimate  choice  or  intention.  They  are  su- 
premely devoted  to  different  and  opposite  ends.  They  live 
to  promote  those  opposite  ends. 

2.  The  saint  is  governed  by  reason,  the  law  of  God  or  the 
moral  law;  in  other  words  still,  the  law  of  disinterested  and 
universal  benevolence  is  his  law.  This  law  is  not  only  reveal- 
ed and  developed  in  his  intelligence,  but  it  is  written  in  his 
heart.  So  that  the  law  of  his  intellect  is  the  law  of  his  heart. 
He  not  only  sees  and  acknowledges  what  he  ouglit  to  do  and 
DC,  but  he  is  conscious  to  himself  and  gives  evidence  toothers, 
whether  they  receive  it  and  are  convinced  by  it  or  not,  that 
his  heart,  his  will  or  intention,  is  conformed  to  his  convic- 
tions of  duty.  He  sees  the  path  of  duty  and  follows  it.  He 
knows  what  he  ought  to  will,  intend  and  do,  and  does  it.  Of 
this  he  is  conscious.  And  of  this  others  may  be  satisfied  if 
they  are  observing,  charitable,  and  candid. 

3.  The  sinner  is  right  over  against  this  in  the  most  impor- 
tant and  fundamental  respects.  He  is  not  governed  by  rea- 
son and  principle,  but  by  feeHng,  desire,  and  impulse.  Some- 
times his  feelings  coincide  with  the  intelligence,  and  some- 
times they  do  not.  But  when  they  do  so  coincide,  the  will 
does  not  pursue  the  course  it  does  out  of  respect  or  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  law  of  the  intelligence,  but  in  obedience  to  the 
impulse  of  the  sensibiUty  which  for  the  time  being  impels  in 
the  same  direction  as  does  the  law  of  the  reason.     But  for  the 


REGENERATION. 


543 


inost  part  the  impulses  of  the  sensibility  incline  him*to  world- 
ly gratifications  and  in  an  opposite  direction  to  that  which  the 
intelligence  points  out.  This  leads  him  to  a  course  of  life 
that  is  too  manifestly  the  opposite  of  reason  to  leave  any 
room  for  doubt  as  to  what  his  true  character  is. 

But  he  also  has  the  law  revealed  in  his  intelHgence.  His 
head  is  right,  but  his  heart  is  wrong.  He  knows  what  he 
ought  to  do  and  will  and  be,  but  he  is  conscious  that  his  heart 
does  not  obey  his  reason.  He  is  conscious  that  the  law  is  in 
his  intelligence  but  is  not  written  in  his  heart.  He  knows  that 
he  is  not  in  heart  what  he  necessarily  affirms  that  he  ought  to 
be.  He  knows  that  he  is  hahitually  selfish  and  not  disinteres- 
tedly benevolent.  Sometimes,  as  has  been  said,  during  sea- 
sons of  special  reUgious  excitement  when  his  sensibiUty  and 
intelligence  impel  in  the  same  direction,  he  thinks  his  heart 
and  his  head  agree;  that  he  is  what  he  knows  he  ought  to  be; 
that  the  law  is  written  in  his  heart.  But  as  soon  as  this  ex- 
citement subsides  he  sees  or  may  see  that  it  was  not  his  intel- 
ligence but  his  sensibility  that  governed  his  will;  that  in  the 
absence  of  religious  excitement  his  intelligence  has  no  con- 
trol of  his  will;  that  he  is  governed  by  impulse  and  not  by 
principle.  This  will  also  be  manifest  to  others.  If  during 
reUgious  excitement  they  have  hoped  too  well  of  him,  as  soon 
as  and  in  proportion  as  excitement  ceases,  they  will  clearly 
see  that  it  was  the  impulse  of  feeling  and  not  the  law  of  the 
intelligence  that  governed  him.  They  will  soon  clearly  see 
that  he  has  not  and  had  not  the  root  of  the  matter  in  him; 
that  his  religion  was  founded  in  the  effervescence  of  the  ever 
varying  sensibility  and  not  in  the  stable  demands  of  his  rea- 
son and  conscience.  As  excitement  waxes  and  wanes  he  will 
be  ever  fluctuating.  Sometimes  quite  zealous  and  active  and 
talkative,  full  of  feeling,  he  will  have  the  appearance  of  pos- 
sessing most  of  the  phases  of  christian  character  in  a  state  of 
freshness  and  beauty.  iVnd  anon  his  religious  excitement 
ceases.  His  tongue  is  silent  on  religious  subjects.  His  zeal 
abates  apace.  His  attendance  at  the  prayer  and  conference 
meeting  is  interrupted  and  finally  ceases.  A  worldly  excite- 
ment takes  possession  of  his  sensibility.  His  will  is  carried 
of  course.  Politics,  business,  amusement,  no  matter  what,  is 
for  the  time  being  his  exciting  topic,  he  is  carried  away  with 
it,  and  remains  in  this  state  carried  hither  and  thither  by 
worldly  engrossments  until  another  religious  excitement  re- 
news and  confirms  his  delusion  and  that  of  his  friends,  who 
look  upon  him  as  a  real  christian  but  prone   to  backsliding. 


544  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

4.  Thfe  true  saint  is  distinguished  by  his  firm  adherence  to 
all  the  principles  and  rules  of  the  Divine  government.  He  is 
a  reformer  from  principle,  and  needs  not  the  gale  of  popular 
excitement  or  of  popular  applause  to  put  and  keep  him  in  mo- 
tion. His  intellect  and  conscience  have  taken  the  control  of 
his  will,  or  the  will  has  renounced  the  impulses  of  the  sensi- 
bihty  as  its  law,  and  voluntarily  committed  itself  to  the  de- 
mands of  the  reason.  This  fact  must  appear  both  on  the  field 
of  his  own  consciousness,  and  also  in  most  instances  be  very 
manifest  to  others.  His  zeal  does  not  wax  and  wane  with  ev- 
ery breeze  of  excitement.  He  is  not  carried  away  by  every 
change  in  the  effervescing  sensibiHty.  The  law  of  reason 
being  written  in  his  heart,  he  does  not  at  one  time  appear 
reasonable  and  to  be  influenced  by  conscience  and  a  regard  to 
the  law  of  love,  and  at  another  to  be  infinitely  unreasonable 
and  to  have  little  or  no  regard  to  God  or  his  laws.  He  fears 
and  shuns  popular  excitements  as  he  does  all  other  tempta- 
tions. He  loaths  and  resists  them.  The  excitements  of  po- 
litics and  business  and  amusements,  are  regarded  by  him  with 
a  jealous  eye.  He  dreads  their  influence  on  his  sensibility, 
and  when  he  feels  them,  it  causes  a  deep  struggle  and  groan- 
ing of  spirit,  because  the  will,  adhering  to  the  law  of  con- 
science, steadfastly  resists  them.  Such  like  excitements  in- 
s-tead  of  being  his  element  and  the  aliment  of  his  life,  are  a 
grief  and  a  vexation  to  him.  Instead  of  living,  and  moving, 
and  having  his  being  as  it  were  in  the  midst  of  them  and  by 
them,  he  is  only  annoyed  by  them.  They  are  not  the  moving 
spring  of  his  activity,  but  only  embarrass  his  spiritual  life. 
His  spiritual  life  is  founded  in  the  law  of  the  intelligence, 
and  supported  by  the  light  of  the  Holy  Spirit  poured  upon 
his  intellect  through  the  truth.  He  steadily  resists  the  flood 
tides  of  mere  feeling  on  every  subject  and  abides  by  truth  and 
principle  and  moral  law  whatever  may  be  the  circumstances 
of  worldly  or  religious  excitement  around  him.  Be  it  ever 
remembered,  it  is  moral  law,  moral  principle,  the  law  of  love, 
and  not  mere  feeling,  that  governs  him. 

5.  The  sinner  or  deceived  professor,  for  they  are  one,  is 
right  over  against  this.  Excitement  is  his  element  and  his 
life.  He  has  truly  no  moral  principle  except  in  theory.  He 
is  never  truly  influenced  by  truth,  law,  reason,  but  always  by 
excitement  of  some  kind.  His  activity  is  based  on  this; 
hence  he  is  not  disturbed  and  embarassed  in  his  movements 
by  excitements  of  any  kind,  any  longer  than  it  takes  to  put 
down  one  form  of  excitement  and  take  on  another.     If  when 


REGENERATION. 

he  is  much  interested  and  excited  and  carried  away  in  one 
direction,  a  counter  influence  or  excitement  comes  in  his  way, 
,he  is  taken  aback  for  the  time  being.  He  is  disconcerted  and 
embarrassed,  perhaps  displeased.  But  you  will  soon  see  him 
go  about  and  fill  away  to  the  new  excitement.  Excitement 
is  his  life,  and  although  like  a  ship  at  sea,  he  is  thrown  into 
temporary  confusion  by  a  sudden  change  of  the  winds  and 
waves,  so,  like  her  whose  life  and  activity  are  the  breezes  and 
the  gale  and  the  ocean  wave,  he  readily  accommodates  hi« 
sails  and  his  course  to  the  ever  changing  breeze  and  currents 
of  excitement  in  the  midst  of  which  he  loves  to  live,  and  on 
the  foaming  surface  of  which  he  is  borne  along.  If  you  wish 
to  move  him,  you  must  strongly  appeal  to  his  feelings.  Rea- 
son does  not,  can  not  govern  him.  'Tis  not  enough  to  say  to 
him.  Thus  saith  the  Lord.  He  will  admit  the  right,  but 
surely  will  not  do  it.  He  will  not  go  that  way^  unless  you  can 
first  make  his  feelings  move  in  that  direction.  He  holds  the 
truth  only  in  theory  and  in  unrighteousness.  It  is  not  the 
law  of  his  life,  his  heart,  his  warmest  affections  and  sympa- 
thies. Present  considerations  to  his  intelligence:  unless  they 
excite  his  sensibility,  and  arouse  his  hopes,  or  fears,  or  feel- 
ings in  some  direction,  you  might  as  well  attempt  to  change 
the  course  of  the  winds  by  your  words.  His  imagination 
must  be  aroused  and  set  on  fire.  His  sensibility  must  be 
reached,  enkindled.  The  gales  of  excitement  must  be  awaked, 
and  the  mainspring  of  his  action  must  be  touched  and  direc- 
ted to  impel  his  will,  before  you  can  quicken  him  into  life. 
His  feelings  are  his  law. 

6.  The  saint  is  justified.^  and  he  has  the  evidence  of  it  in 
the  peace  of  his  own  mind.  He  is  conscious  of  obeying  the 
law  of  reason  and  of  love.  Consequently  he  naturally  has 
that  kind  and  degree  of  peace  that  flows  from  the  harmony 
of  his  will  with  the  law  of  his  intelligence.  He  sometimes  has 
conflicts  with  the  impulses  of  feeling  and  desire.  But  unless 
he  is  overcome,  these  conflicts,  though  they  may  cause  him  in- 
wardly and  perhaps  audibly  to  groan,  do  not  interrupt  his 
peace.  There  are  still  the  elements  of  peace  within  him.  His 
heart  and  conscience  are  at  one,  and  while  this  is  so,  he  has 
thus  far  the  evidence  of  justification  in  himself.  That  is,  he 
knows  that  God  can  not  condemn  his  present  state.  Con- 
scious as  he  is  of  conformity  of  heart  to  the  moral  law  he  caa 
not  but  affirm  to  himself  that  the  lawgiver  is  pleased  with 
his  present  attitude.  But  further,  he  has  also  within  the  Spir- 
it of  God  witnessing  with  his  spirit  that  he  is  a  child  of  God, 
46* 


546  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

forgiven,  accepted,  adopted.  He  feels  the  fiKal  spirit  drawing 
his  heart  to  exclaim,  Father,  Father.  He  is  conscious  that  he 
pleases  God  and  has  God's  smile  of  approbation. 

He  is  at  peace  with  himself  because  he  affirms  his  heart  to 
be  in  unison  with  the  law  of  love.  His  conscience  does  not 
upbraid,  but  smile.  The  harmony  of  his  own  being  is  a  wit^ 
ness  to  himself  that  this  is  the  state  in  which  he  was  made  to 
exist.  He  is  at  peace  with  God,  becanse  he  and  God  are  pur- 
suing precisely  the  same  end  and  by  the  same  means.  There 
can  be  no  collision,  no  controversy  between  them.  He  is  at 
peace  with  the  universe  in  the  sense  that  he  has  no  ill-will 
and  no  malicious  feelings  or  wish  to  gratify  in  the  injury  of 
anyone  of  all  the  creatures  of  God.  He  has  no  fear  but  to 
sin  against  God.  He  is  not  influenced  on  the  one  hand  by 
the  fear  of  hell,  nor  on  the  other  by  the  hope  of  reward. 
He  is  not  anxious  about  his  own  salvation,  but  prayerfully 
and  calmly  leaves  that  question  in  the  hands  of  God  and  con- 
cerns himself  only  to  promote  the  highest  glory  of  God  and 
the  good  of  being.  "Being  justified  by  faith  he  has  peace 
with  God  through  our  Lord  Jesus  ChrisL"  '-'-  There  is  now  no 
condemnation  to  them  that  are  in  Christ  Jesus,  who  walk  not 
after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit." 

7.  The  sinner's  experience  is  the  opposirte  o(  this.  He  is 
under  condemnation,  and  seldom  can  so  far  deceive  himself^ 
even  in  his  most  rehgious  moods,  as  to  imagine  that  he  has  a 
conscionsness  of  acceptance  either  with  his  own  conscience 
or  with  God.  There  is  almost  never  a  time  in  which  he  has 
not  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  restlessness  and  misgiving  with- 
in. Even  when  he  is  most  engaged  in  religion  as  he  supposes^ 
he  finds  himself  dissatisfied  with  hims<;lf.  Something  is 
wrong.  There  is  a  struggle  and  a  pang.  He  may  not  exactly' 
see  where  and  what  the  diffi-culty  is.  He  does  not  after  all 
obey  reason  and  conscience,  and  is  not  governed  by  the  law 
and  will  of  God.  Not  having  the  consciousness  of  this  obedi^ 
ence,  his  conscience  does  not  smile.  He  sometimes  feels 
deeply,  and  acts  as  he  feels,  and  is  conscious  of  being  sincere 
in  the  sense  of  feeling  what  he  says  and  acting  in  obedience) 
to  deep  feeling.  Bat  this  does  not  satisfy  conscience.  He  is 
more  or  less  wretched  after  all.  He  has  not  true  peace. 
Sometimes  he  has  a  self-righteous  quiet  and  enjoyment.  But  thi^ 
is  neither  peace  of  conscience  nor  peace  with  God,  He  after 
all  feels  uneasy  and  condemned,  notwithstanding  all  his  feel- 
ing and  zeal  and  activity.  They  are  not  of  the  right  kind., 
Hence  they  do  not  satisfy  the  conscience.     They  do  not  meet 


REGENERATION.  547 

the  demands  of  his  intelHgence.  Conscience  does  not  ap- 
prove. He  has  not  after  all  true  peace.  He  is  not  justified; 
he  can  not  be  fully  and  permanentiy  satisfied  that  he  is.  He 
is  not  for  any  length  of  time  satisfied  with  his  best  perfor- 
mance. He  is  conscious  after  all  of  sinning  in  all  his  holiest 
duties,  and  he  is  the  more  sure  of  this  in  proportion  as  he  is 
more  enlightened.  He  thinks  to  be  sure  that  this  is  the  uni- 
versal experience  of  all  true  saints;  that  although  neither 
conscience  nor  God  is  satisfied  with  his  obedience,  not  even 
in  his  best  frames  and  states,  yet  he  thinks  to  be  sure  he  has 
some  degree  of  holiness  and  conformity  to  the  will  of  God,  al- 
though not  enough  to  bring  out  the  approbation  of  conscience 
and  the  smile  of  God  upon  his  soul.  He  imagines  that  he  has 
some  true  religion;  some  half-way  obedience.  He  is  a  true 
though  an  imperfect  saint,  whose  best  obedience  can  and 
does  satisfy  neither  his  own  sense  of  duty  nor  his  God.  With 
him,  justification  is  a  mere  theory,  a  doctrine,  an  opinion,  an 
article  of  faith  and  not  a  living  felt  reality;  not  an  experience, 
but  an  idea,  a  notion,  and  at  best  a  pleasing  and  dreamy  de- 
lusion. 

8.  The  saint  has  made  the  will  of  God  his  law,  and  asks 
for  no  other  reason  to  influence  his  decisions  and  actions  than 
that  such  is  the  will  of  God.  He  has  received  the  will  of  God 
as  the  unfailing  index  pointing  always  to  the  path  of  duty. 
His  intelligence  affirms  that  God's  will  is  and  ought  to  be 
law  or  perfect  evidence  of  what  law  is;  and  therefore  he  ha& 
received  it  as  such.  He  therefore  expects  to  obey  it  always 
and  in  all  things.  He  makes  no  calculations  to  sin  in  any 
thing;  nor  in  one  thing  more  than  another.  He  does  not  cast 
about  and  pick  and  choose  among  the  commandments  of  God;, 
professing  obedience  to  those  that  are  the  least  offensive  to 
him,  and  trampling  on  those  that  call  to  a  sterner  morahty 
and  to  hardier  self-denial.  With  him  there  are  no  little  sin& 
in  which  he  expects  to  indulge.  He  no  more  expects  to  eat 
too  much  than  he  expects  to  be  a  drunkard;  and  gluttony  is 
as  much  a  sin  as  drunkenness.  He  no  more  expects  to  take 
an  advantage  of  his  neighbor  than  he  expects  to  rob  him  on  the 
highway.  He  no  more  designs  and  expects  to  indulge  in  se- 
cret than  in  open  uncleanness.  He  no  more  expects  to  in- 
dulge a  wanton  eye  than  to  commit  adultery  with  his  broth- 
er's wife.  He  no  more  expects  to  exaggerate  and  give  a  false 
coloring  to  truth  than  he  expects  and  intends  to  commit  per- 
jury. All  sin  is  an  abomination  to  him.  He  has  renounced 
it  ex  anima.     His  heart  has  rejected  sin.  as  sin.-    His  heact  ha* 


548  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

embraced  the  will  of  God  as  his  law.  It  has  embraced  thf^ 
whole  will  of  God.  He  waits  only  for  a  knowledge  of  what 
the  will  of  God  is.  He  needs  not,  he  seeks  not  excitement  to 
determine  or  to  strengthen  his  will.  The  law  of  his  being 
has  come  to  be  the  will  of  God.  A  thus  saith  the  Lord,  im- 
mediately awakens  from  the  depths  of  his  soul  the  whole-heart- 
ed amen.  He  does  not  go  about  to  plead  for  sin,  to  trim  his 
ways  so  as  to  serve  two  masters.  To  serve  God  and  Mam- 
mon is  no  part  of  his  policy  and  no  part  of  his  wish.  No:  he 
is  God's  man,  God's  subject,  God's  child.  All  his  sympathies 
are  with  God;  and  surely  *■'  his  fellowship  is  with  the  Father 
and  with  his  Son  Jesus  Christ."  What  Christ  wills,  he  wills; 
what  Christ  rejects,  he  rejects. 

9.  But  right  over  against  this  you  will  find  the  sinner  or  de- 
ceived professor.  God's  will  is  not  his  law;  but  his  own  sen- 
sibility is  his  law.  With  him  it  is  not  enough  to  know  the 
will  of  God;  he  must  also  have  his  sensibility  excited  in  that 
direction  before  he  goes.  He  does  not  mean  nor  expect  to 
avoid  every  form  and  degree  of  iniquity.  His  heart  has  not  re- 
nounced sin  as  sin.  It  has  not  embraced  the  will  of  God  from 
principle,  and  of  course  has  not  embraced  the  whole  will  of 
God.  With  him  it  is  a  small  thing  to  commit  what  he  calls 
little  sins.  This  shows  conclusively  where  he  is.  If  the  will 
of  God  were  his  law — as  this  is  as  really  opposed  to  what  he 
calls  little  as  to  what  he  calls  great  sins,  he  would  not  expect 
and  intend  to  disobey  God  in  one  thing  more  than  in  another. 
He  could  know  no  httle  sins,  since  they  conflict  with  the  will 
of  God.  He  gofs  about  to  pick  and  choose  among  the  com- 
mandments of  God,  somatimes  yielding  an  outward  obedience 
to  those  that  conflict  least  with  his  inclinations,  and  which 
therefore  will  cost  him  the  least  self-denial,  but  evading  and 
disregarding  those  that  lay  the  ax  to  the  root  of  the  tree  and 
prohibit  all  selfishness.  The  sinner  or  deceived  professor 
does  not  in  fact  seriously  mean  or  expect  wholly  to  obey  God. 
He  thinks  that  this  is  common  to  all  christians.  He  as  much 
expects  to  sin  every  day  against  God  as  he  expects  to  live, 
and  does  not  think  this  at  all  inconsistent  with  his  being  a  real 
though  imperfect  christian.  He  is  conscious  of  indulging 
in  some  sins,  and  that  he  has  never  repented  of  them  and  put 
them  away,  but  he  thinks  that  this  also  is  common  to  all  chris- 
tians, and  therefore  it  does  not  slay  his  false  hope.  He  would 
much  sooner  indulge  in  gluttony  than  in  drunkenness  because 
the  latter  would  more  seriously  affect  his  reputation.  He 
would  not  hesitate  to  indulge  wanton  thoughts  and  imagina- 


REGENERATION. 


549 


tions  when  he  would  not  allow  himself  in  outward  licentious- 
ness because  of  its  bearing  upon  his  character,  and  as  he  says, 
upon  the  cause  of  God.  He  will  not  hesitate  to  take  little 
advantages  of  his  neighbor,  to  amass  a  fortune  in  this  way 
while  he  would  recoil  from  robbing  on  the  highway  or  on  the 
high  seas;  for  this  would  injure  his  reputation  with  man,  and 
as  he  thinks,  more  surely  destroy  his  soul.  Sinners  sometimes 
become  exceedingly  self-righteous  and  aim  at  what  they  call 
perfection.  But  unless  they  are  very  ignorant  they  soon  be- 
come discouraged  and  cry  out,  O  wretched  man  that  I  am, 
who  shall  deliver  me  from  the  body  of  this  death?  They, 
however,  almost  always  satisfy  themselves  with  a  mere  out- 
ward moraFity  and  that,  as  I  have  said,  not  descending  to  what 
thev  call  little  sins. 


LECTURE  XLIII. 
REGENERATION- 

In  what  Saints  and  Sinners  differ. 

10.  Saints  are  interested  in  and  sympathize  with  every  effort 
to  reform  mankind  and  promote  the  interests  of  truth  and  right- 
eousness in  the  earth. 

The  good  of  being  is  the  end  for  which  the  saint  really  and 
trulj  lives.  This  is  not  merely  held  by  him  as  a  theory,  as 
an  opinion,  as  a  philosophical  speculation.  It  is  in  his  heart, 
and  precisely  for  this  reason  he  is  a  saint.  He  is  a  saint  just 
because  the  theory  which  is  lodged  in  the  head  of  both  saint 
and  sinner  has  also  a  lodgment  and  a  reigning  power  in  his 
heart,  and  consequently  in  his  life.  The  fact  is  that  saints 
as  such  have  no  longer  a  wicked  heart.  They  are  '^  born 
again,"  '^born  of  God,"  and  '•'they  can  not  sin,  for  his  seed 
remaineth  in  them,  so  that  they  can  not  sin  because  they  are 
born  of  God."  "  They  have  a  new  heart,"  "  are  new  crea- 
tures," "  old  things  are  passed  away,  and  behold  all  things  are 
become  new."  They  are  holy  or  sanctified  persons.  The 
bible  representations  of  the  new  birth  forbid  us  to  suppose 
that  the  truly  regenerate  have  still  a  wicked  heart.  The 
nature  of  regeneration  also  renders  it  certain  that  the  regen- 
erate heart  can  not  be  a  wicked  heart.  His  heart  or  choice 
is  fixed  upon  the  highest  good  of  God  and  the  universe  as  an 
end.  Moral  agents  are  so  constituted  that  they  necessarily 
regard  truth  and  righteousness  as  conditions  of  the  highest 
good  of  moral  agents.  These  being  necessarily  regarded  by 
them  as  indispensable  to  the  end,  will  and  must  be  considered 
as  important  as  the  end  to  which  they  sustain  the  relation  of 
indispensable  conditions.  As  they  supremely  value  the  high- 
est good  of  being,  they  will  and  must  take  a  deep  interest  in 
whatever  is  promotive  of  that  end.  Hence  their  spirit  is  ne- 
cessarily that  of  the  reformer.  For  the  universal  reformation 
of  the  world  they  stand  committed.  To  this  end  they  are  de- 
voted. For  this  end  they  live  and  move  and  have  their 
being.  Every  proposed  reform  interests  them  and  naturally 
leads  them  to  examine  its  claims.  The  fact  is  they  are 
studying  and  devising  ways  and  means  to  convert,  sanctify, 
reform  mankind.  Being  in  this  state  of  mind  they  are  predis- 
posed to  lay  hold  on  whatever  gives  promise  of  good  to  man. 
A  close  examination  will  show  a  remarkable  difference  be- 
tween saints  and  sinners  in  this  respect.     True  saints  love 


REGENERATION.  551 

reform.     It  is  their  business,  their  profession,  their  life  to  pro- 
mote it;  consequently  they  are  ready  to  examine  the  claims 
of  any  proposed  reform;  candid  and   self-denying  and  ready 
to  be  convinced  however  much  self-denial  it  may  call  them  to. 
They  have  actually  rejected  self-indulgence  as   the  end  for 
which  they  live  and  are  ready  to  sacrifice  any  form  of  self-in- 
dulgence for  the  sake  of  promoting  the  good  of  men  and  the 
glory  of  God.     It  is  not  and  can  not  be  natural  to  them  to  be 
prejudiced  against  reform,   to  be  apt   to  array   themselves 
against  or  speak  lightly  of  any  proposed  reform,  until  they 
have  thoroughly  examined  its  claims  and  found  it  wanting  in 
the  essential  attributes  of  true  reform.     The  natunil  bearing 
or  bias  of  the  saint's  mind  is  in  favor  of  whatever  proposes  to 
do  good,  and  instead  of  ridiculing  reform  in  general  or  speak- 
ing lightly  or  censoriously  of  reform  the  exact  opposite  is  na- 
tural to  him.     It  is  natural  to  him  to  revere  reformers  and  to 
honor  those  who  have  introduced  even  what  proved  in  the  end 
not  to  be  wholesome  reforms  if  so  be  there  is  evidence  that  they 
were  sincere  and  self-denying  in  their  efforts  to  benefit  man- 
kind.    The  saint  is  truly  and  greatly  desirous  and  in  earnest 
to  reform  all  sin  out  of  the  world,  and  just  for  this  reason  is 
ready  to  hail  with  joy  and  to  try  whatever  reform  seems,  from 
the  best  light  he  can  get,  to  bid  fair  to  put  down  sin  and  the 
evils  that  are  in  the  world.     Even  mistaken  men  who  are 
honestly  endeavoring  to  reform  mankind,  and  denying  their 
appetites,  as  many  have  done  in  dietetic  reform,  are  deserving 
of  the  respect  of  their  fellow  men.     Suppose   their  philoso- 
phy to  be  incorrect,  yet  they  have  intended  well.     They  have 
manifested  a  disposition  to  deny  themselves  for  the  purpose 
of  promoting  the  good  of  others.     They  have  been  honest  and 
zealous  in  this.     Now  no  true  saint  can  feel  or  express  con- 
tempt for  such  reformers  however  much  mistaken  they  may  be. 
No;  his  natural  sentiments  and  feeUngs  will  be  and  must  be 
the  reverse  of  contempt  or  censoriousness  in  respect  to  them. 
If  their  mistake  has  been  injurious,  he   may  mourn    over 
the  evil,  but  will  not,  can  not  severely  judge  the  honest  re- 
former. War,  slavery,  licentiousness,  and  all  such  like  evils  and 
abominations  are  necessarily  regarded  by  the  saint  as  great  and 
sore  evils,  and  he  longs  for  their  complete  and  final  overthrow. 
It  is  impossible  that  a  truly  benevolent  mind  should  not  thus 
regard  these  abominations  of  desolation.     The  cause  of  peace,, 
the  cause  of  anti-slavery,  and  that  of  the  overthrow  of  licen- 
tiousness, must  lie  near  the  heart  of  every  truly  benevolent 
mind.     I  know  that  often  sinners  have  a  certain  kind  of  in- 


552  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

terest  in  these  and  other  reforms.  This  will  be  noticed  and 
explained  in  the  proper  place.  But  whatever  is  true  of  sin- 
ners under  certain  circumstances,  it  must  be  always  true  of 
Christians  that  they  hail  the  cause  of  peace,  of  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  and  of  the  abolition  of  every  form  of  sin,  and  of 
every  evil,  moral  and  physical,  with  joy,  and  can  not  but  give 
them  a  hearty  God-speed.  If  they  see  that  they  are  advo- 
cated on  wrong  principles,  or  with  a  bad  spirit,  or  by  bad 
men,  and  that  injurious  measures  are  used  to  promote  them,  the 
saints  will  mourn,  will  be  faithful  in  trying  to  find  out  and  to 
proclaim  a  more  excellent  way.  Do  but  keep  in  mind  the 
fact  that  saints  are  truly  benevolent,  and  are  really  and  hearti- 
ly consecrated  to  the  highest  good  of  being,  and  then  it  will 
surely  be  seen  that  these  things  must  be  true  of  real  saints. 
The  saints  in  all  ages  have  been  reformers.  I  know  it  is 
said  that  neither  Prophets,  Christ,  nor  Apostles,  nor  primi- 
tive saints  and  martyrs  declaimed  against  war  and  slavery, 
&c.  But  they  did.  The  entire  instructions  of  Christ,  and  of 
Apostles,  and  Prophets  were  directly  opposed  to  these  and  all 
other  evils.  If  they  did  not  come  out  against  certain  legalized 
forms  of  sin,  and  denounce  them  by  name,  and  endeavor  to 
array  public  sentiment  against  them,  it  is  plainly  because  they 
were,  for  the  most  part,  employed  in  a  preliminary  work. 
To  introduce  the  gospel  as  a  Divine  revelation;  to  set  up  and 
organize  the  visible  kingdom  of  God  on  earth;  to  lay  a  founda- 
tion for  universal  reform,  was  rather  their  business  than  the 
pushing  of  particular  branches  of  reform.  The  overthrow 
of  state  idolatry,  the  great  and  universal  sin  of  the  world  in 
that  age;  the  labor  of  getting  the  world  and  the  governments 
of  earth  to  tolerate  and  receive  the  gospel  as  a  revelation 
from  the  one  Only  Living  and  True  God;  the  controversy 
with  the  Jews  to  overthrow  their  obje<:tions  to  Christianity; 
in  short  the  great  and  indispensable  and  preliminary  work  of 
gaining  for  Christ  and  his  gospel  a  hearing,  and  an  acknowl- 
edgment of  its  divinity,  was  rather  their  work  than  the  push- 
ing of  particular  precepts  and  doctrines  of  the  gospel  to  their 
legitimate  results  and  logical  consequences.  This  work  once 
done  has  left  it  for  later  saints  to  bring  the  particular  truths, 
precepts,  and  doctrines  of  the  blessed  gospel  to  bear  down 
every  form  of  sin.  Prophets,  Christ,  and  his  Apostles  have 
left  on  the  pages  of  inspiration  no  dubious  testimony  against 
every  form  of  sin.  The  spirit  of  the  whole  Bible  breathes 
from  every  page  blasting  and  annihilation  upon  every  unholy 
abomination,  while  it  smiles  upon  every  thing  of  good  report 


REGENERATIOX.  553 

that  promises  blessings  to  man  and  glory  to  God.  The  saint 
is  not  merely  sometimes  a  reformer;  he  is  always  so.  He 
is  necessarily  so  if  he  abide  a  saint.  It  is  a  contradiction  to 
say  that  a  true  saint  is  not  devoted  to  reform;  for,  as  I  have 
said,  he  is  a  true  saint  just  because  he  is  devoted,  heart  and 
soul  and  life  and  all,  to  the  promotion  of  the  good  of  universal 
being. 

1 1.    The  sinner  is  never  a  reformer  in  any  proper  sense  of 
the  word. 

He  is  selfish  and  never  opposed  to  sin,  or  to  any  evil  what- 
ever from  any  such  motive  as  renders  him  worthy  the  name  of 
reformer.  He  sometimes  selfishly  advocates  and  pushes  cer- 
tain outward  reforms;  but  as  certain  as  it  is  that  he  is  an  un- 
regenerate  sinner,  ?o  certain  is  it  that  he  is  not  endeavoring 
to  reform  sin  out  of  the  world  from  any  disinterested  love  to 
God  or  to  man.  Many  considerations  of  a  selfish  nature  may 
engage  him  at  times  in  certain  branches  of  reform.  Regard 
to  his  reputation  may  excite  his  zeal  in  such  an  enterprize. 
Self-righteous  considerations  may  also  lead  him  to  enhst  in  the 
army  of  reformers.  His  relation  to  particular  forms  of  vice 
may  influence  him  to  sot  his  face  against  them.  Constitu- 
tional temperament  and  tendencies  may  lead  to  his  engaging 
in  certain  reforms.  For  example,  his  constitutional  benevo- 
lence, as  phr:'nologisls  call  it,  may  be  such  that  from  natural 
compassion  he  may  engage  in  reforms.  But  this  is  only  giv- 
ing way  to  an  impulse  of  the  sensibility,  and  it  is  not  princi- 
ple that  governs  him.  His  natural  conscientiousness  may 
modify  his  outward  character  and  lead  him  to  take  hold  of 
some  branches  of  reform.  But  whatever  other  motives  he 
may  have,  sure  it  is  that  he  is  not  a  reformer;  for  he  is  a  sin- 
ner, and  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  a  sinner  is  truly  engaged  in 
opposing  sin  as  sin.  No,  it  is  not  .9m  that  he  is  opposing,  but 
he  is  seeking  to  gratify  an  ambitious,  a  self-righteous,  or  some 
other  spirit,  the  gratification  of  which  is  selfishness. 

But  as  a  general  thing  it  is  easy  to  distinguish  sinners,  or 
deceived  professors  from  saints  by  looking  steadfastly  at  their 
temper  and  deportment  in  their  relations  to  reform.  They 
are  self-indulgent,  and  sinners  just  forthe  reason  that  they  are 
devoted  to  selfindulgence.  Some  times  their  self-indulgent 
spirit  takes  on  one  type  and  sometimes  another.  Of  course 
they  need  not  b3  expected  to  ridicule  or  oppose  every  branch 
of  reform,  just  because  it  is  not  every  reformer  that  will  rebuke 
their  favorite  indulgences  and  call  them  to  reform  their  lives. 
But  as  every  sinner  has  one  or  more  particular  form  of  indul- 
47 


554  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

gence  to  which  he  is  wedded,  and  as  saints  are  devising  and 
pushing  reforms  in  all  directions,  it  is  natural  that  some  sinners 
should  manifest  particular  hostility  to  one  reform  and  some  to 
another.  Whenever  a  reform  is  proposed  that  would  reform 
them  out  of  their  favorite  indulgences,  they  will  either  ridi- 
cule it  and  those  that  propose  it,  or  storm  and  rail,  or  in  some 
way  oppose  or  wholly  neglect  it.  Not  so,  and  so  it  can  not  be 
with  a  true  saint.  He  has  no  indulgence  that  he  values  when 
put  in  competition  with  the  good  of  being.  Nay,  he  holds 
his  all  and  his  Ufe  at  the  disposal  of  the  highest  good.  Has 
he  in  ignorance  of  the  evils  growing  out  of  his  course,  used 
ardent  spirits,  wine,  tobacco,  tea,  coffee?  *Has  he  held  slaves; 
been  engaged  in  any  traffic  that  is  found  to  be  injurious;  has 
he  favored  war  through  ignorance ;  or  in  short  has  he  commit- 
ted any  mistake  whatever?  let  but  a  reformer  come  forth  and 
propose  to  discuss  the  tendency  of  such  things ;  let  the  re- 
former bring  forth  his  strong  reasons;  and  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  true  religion,  the  saint  will  listen  with  attention,  weigh 
with  candor,  and  suffer  himself  to  be  carried  by  truth,  heart 
ajad  hand  and  influence  with  the  proposed  reform,  if  it  be 
worthy  of  support,  how  much  soever  it  conflict  with  his  for- 
mer habits.  This  must  be  true  if  he  has  a  single  eye  to  the 
good  of  being,  which  is  the  very  characteristic  of  a  saint. 

But  the  sinner  or  deceived  professor  is  naturally  a  conser- 
vative as  opposed  to  a  reformer.  He  says.  Let  me  alone  in  my 
indulgences  and  I  will  let  you  alone  in  yours  provided  they  in 
no  way  interfere  with  my  own.  Consequently  he  is  in  gen- 
eral disposed  to  distrust,  to  discountenance,  and  to  ridicule  re- 
forms and  those  that  advocate  them.  He  is  uncandid  and 
hard  to  convince;  will  demand  an  express,  thus  saith  the  Lord, 
or  what  is  equivalent  to  a  demonstration  of  the  wisdom  and 
utility  and  practicability  of  a  proposed  reform.  He  will  evince 
in  many  ways  that  his  heart  is  not  predisposed  to  reforms. 
He  will  be  eagle-eyed  in  respect  to  any  faults  in  the  charac- 
ter or  measures  of  the  reformers ;  he  will  be  eager  to  detect 
and  seize  upon  any  error  in  their  logic  and  is  easily  displeased 
and  repelled  with  their  measures. 

In  short  sinners  will  be  almost  sure  to  manifest  a  latent  dis- 
like to  reforms.  They  will  dwell  much  and  almost  exclusive- 
ly upon  the  evils  of  revivals  of  religion  for  example;  the  danger 
of  spurious  excitements ;  of  promoting  fanaticism,  and  mis- 
rule; of  encouraging  false  hopes;  and  they  will  in  various 
ways  manifest  a  disrelish  for  revivals  of  religion,  but  always 
under  the  pretence  of  a  concern  for  the  purity  of  the  church 


REGENERATION. 


555 


and  the  honor  of  God.  They  will  be  too  much  taken  up  with 
the  evils  and  dangers  to  ever  give  themselves  heartily  to  the 
'  promotion  of  pure  revivals.  They  act  on  the  defensive. 
They  have  enough  to  do  to  resist  and  oppose  what  they  call 
evils  without  even  trying  to  show  a  more  excellent  way.  They 
in  general  take  substantially  the  same  course  in  respect  to  al- 
most every  branch  of  reformation,  and  especially  to  every  re- 
form that  can  touch  their  idols.  They  are  so  much  afraid  of 
mistakes  and  evils  that  they  withhold  their  influence  when  in 
fact  the  difiiculty  is  they  have  no  heart  to  the  work.  The 
fact  is,  benevolence  has  been  for  thousands  of  years  endeavor- 
ing to  reform  the  world,  and  selfishness  is  opposing  it.  And 
often  very  often,  under  the  sanctimonious  garb  of  a  concern 
for  the  honor  of  rehgion,  selfishness  utters  its  sighs  and  lamen- 
tations over  the  supposed  ignorance,  mistakes,  fanaticism  and 
injurious  measures  of  those  whose  hearts  and  hands  and  en- 
tire being  are  devoted  to  the  work. 

12.  Christians  overcome  the  world.  I  will  here  introduce 
an  extract  from  a  discourse  of  my  own  upon  this  text  reported 
in  the  Oberlin  Evangelist: 

'^  For  whatsoever  is  born  of  God  overcometh  the  world: 
and  this  is  the  victory  that  overcometh  the  world,  even  our 
faith."— John  5:  4. 

/.   What  is  it  to  overcome  the  world? 

1.  It  is  to  get  above  the  spirit  of  covetousness  which  pos- 
sesses the  men  of  the  world.  The  spirit  of  the  world  is  emi- 
nently the  spirit  of  covetousness.  It  is  a  greediness  after  the 
things  of  the  world.  Some  worldly  men  covet  one  thing  and 
some  another;  but  all  classes  of  worldly  men  are  living  in 
the  spirit  of  covetousness  in  some  of  its  forms.  This  spirit 
has  supreme  possession  of  their  minds. 

Now  the  first  thing  in  overcoming  the  world  is,  that  the 
spirit  of  covetousness  in  respect  to  worldly  things  and  objects, 
be  overcome.  The  man  who  does  not  overcome  this  spirit 
of  bustling  and  scrambling  after  the  good  which  this  world 
proffers  has  by  no  means  overcome  it. 

2.  Overcoming  the  world  implies  rising  above  its  engross- 
ments. When  a  man  has  overcome  the  world,  his  thoughts 
are  no  longer  engrossed  and  swallowed  up  with  worldly  things. 
A  man  certainly  does  not  overcome  the  world  unless  he  gets 
above  being  engrossed  and   absorbed  with  its  concerns. 

Now  we  all  know  how  exceedingly  engrossed  worldly  men 
are  with  some  form  of  worldly  good.  One  is  swallowed  up 
with  study;  another  with  politics;  a  third  with  money-getting; 


556  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

and  a  fourth  perhaps  with  fashion  and  pleasure;  but  each  in 
his  chosen  way  makes  earthly  good  the  all  engrossing  object. 

The  man  who  gains  the  victory  over  the  vv^orld  must  over- 
come not  one  form  only  of  its  pursuits,  but  every  form — must 
overcome  the  world  itself  and  all  that  it  has  to  present  as  an 
allurement  to  the  hunnan  heart. 

3.  Overcoming  the  world  implies  overcoming  the  fear  of 
the  world. 

It  is  a  mournful  fact  that  most  men,  and  indeed  all  men  of 
worldly  character  have  so  much  regard  to  public  opinion  that 
they  dare  not  act  according  to  the  dictates  of  their  consciences 
when  acting  thus  would  incur  the  popular  frown.  One  is 
afraid  lest  his  business  should  suffer  if  his  course  runs  coun- 
ter to  public  opinion;  another  fears  lest  if  he  stand  up  for  the 
truth  it  will  injure  his  reputation,  and  curiously  imagines  and 
tries  to  believe  that  advocating  an  unpopular  truth  will  dimin- 
ish and  perhaps  destroy  his  good  influence — as  if  a  man  could 
exert  a  good  influence  in  any  possible  way  besides  maintain- 
ing the  truth. 

Great  multitudes,  it  must  be  admitted,  are  under  this  influ- 
ence of  fearing  the  world;  yet  some  of  them  and  perhaps 
many  of  them  are  not  aware  of  this  fact.  If  you^or  if  they 
could  thoroughly  sound  the  reasons  of  their  backwardness  in 
duty,  fear  of  the  world  would  be  among  the  chief.  Their  fear 
of  the  world's  displeasure  is  so  much  stronger  than  their  fear 
of  God's  displeasure  that  they  are  completely  enslaved  by  it. 
Who  does  not  know  that  some  ministers  dare  not  preach  what 
they  know  is  true,  and  even  what  they  know  is  important  truth, 
lest  they  should  offend  some  whose  good  opinion  they  seek  to 
retain?  The  society  is  weak  perhaps,  and  the  favor  of  some 
rich  man  in  it  seems  indispensable  to  its  very  existence. 
Hence  the  terror  of  this  rich  man  is  continually  before  their 
eyes  when  they  write  a  sermon,  or  preach,  or  are  called  to 
stand  up  in  favor  of  any  truth  or  cause  which  may  be  unpopu- 
lar with  men  of  more  wealth  than  piety  or  conscience.  Alas! 
this  bondage  to  man!  Too  many  gospel  ministers  are  so 
troubled  by  it  that  their  time-serving  policy  is  virtually  re- 
nouncing Christ  and  serving  the  world. 

Overcoming  the  world  is  thoroughly  subduing  this  servility 
to  men. 

4.  Overcoming  the  world  implies  overcoming  a  state  of 
worldly  anxiety.  You  know  there  is  a  state  of  great  careful- 
ness and  anxiety  which  is  common  and  almost  universal  among 
worldly  men.     It  is  perfectly  natural  if  the  heart  is  set  upon 


REGENERATION.  557 

securing  worldly  good,  and  has  not  learned  to  receive  all  good 
from  the  hand  of  a  great  Father  and  trust  him  to  give  or  with- 
hold with  his  own  unerring  wisdom.  But  he  who  loves  the 
world  is  the  enemy  of  God  and  hence  can  never  have  this  fil- 
ial trust  in  a  parental  Benefactor,  nor  the  peace  of  soul  which 
it  imparts.  Hence  worldly  men  are  almost  incessantly  in  a 
fever  of  anxiety  lest  their  worldly  schemes  should  fail.  They 
sometimes  get  a  momentary  relief  when  all  things  seem  to  go 
well:  but  some  mishap  is  sure  to  befall  them  at  some  point 
soon,  so  that  scarce  a  day  passes  that  brings  not  with  it  some 
corroding  anxiety.  Their  bosoms  are  like  the  troubled  sea 
which  can  not  rest,  whose  waters  cast  up  mire  and  dirt. 

But  the  man  who  gets  above  the  world  gets  above  this  state 
of  ceaseless  and  corroding  anxiety. 

5.  The  victory  under  consideration  implies  that  we  cease 
to  be  enslaved  and  in  bondage  by  the  world  in  any  of  its  forms. 

There  is  a  worldly  spirit,  and  there  is  also  a  heavenly  spirit; 
and  one  or  the  other  exists  in  the  heart  of  every  man  and 
controls  his  whole  being.  Those  who  are  under  the  control 
of  the  world,  of  course  have  not  overcome  the  world.  No 
man  overcomes  the  world  till  his  heart  is  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  heaven. 

One  form  which  the  spirit  of  the  world  assumes  is,  being 
enslaved  to  the  customs  and  fashions  of  the  day. 

It  is  marvelous  to  see  what  a  goddess  Fashion  becomes. 
No  heathen  goddess  was  ever  worshipped  with  costHer  offer- 
ings, or  more  devout  homage,  or  more  impHcit  subjection. 
And  surely  no  heathen  deity  since  the  world  began  has  ever 
had  more  universal  patronage.  Where  will  you  go  to  find 
the  man  of  the  world  or  the  woman  of  the  world  who  does 
not  hasten  to  worship  at  her  shrine? 

But  overcoming  the  world  implies  that  the  spirit  of  this 
goddess-worship  is  broken. 

They  who  have  overcome  the  world  are  no  longer  careful 
either  to  secure  its  favor  or  avert  its  frown,  and  the  good  or 
the  ill  opinion  of  the  world  is  to  them  a  small  matter.  "  To 
me,"  said  Paul,  "•  it  is  a  small  thing  to  be  judged  of  man's 
judgment."  So  of  every  real  Christian;  his  care  is  to  secure 
the  approbation  of  God;  this  is  his  chief  concern,  to  commend 
himself  to  God  and  to  his  own  conscience.  No  man  has  over- 
come the  world  unless  he  has  attained  this  state  of  mind. 

Almost  no  feature  of  Christian  character  is  more  striking  or 
more  decisive  than  this, — indifference  to  the  opinions  of  the 
world. 

47* 


558  SYSTEM ATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Since  I  have  been  in  Ihe  ministry  I  have  been  blessed  with 
the  acquaintance  of  some  men  who  were  pecuUarly  distinguish- 
ed by  this  quaHtjr  of  character.  Some  of  you  may  have 
known  Rev.  James  Patterson,  late  of  Philadelphia.  If  so, 
you  know  him  to  have  been  eminently  distinguished  in  this 
respect.  He  seemed  to  have  the  least  possible  disposition  to 
secure  the  applause  of  men  or  to  avoid  their  censure.  It 
seemed  to  be  of  no  consequence  to  him  to  commend  himself 
to  men.     For  him  it  was  enough  if  he  might  please  God. 

Hence  you  were  sure  to  find  him  in  everlasting  war  against 
sin,  all  sin,  however  popular,  however  entrenched  by  cus- 
tom or  sustained  by  wealth,  or  public  opinion.  Yet  he  al- 
ways opposed  sin  with  a  most  remarkable  spirit — a  spirit  of 
inflexible  decision  and  yet  of  great  mellowness  and  tender- 
ness. While  he  was  saying  the  most  severe  things  in  the 
most  severe  language  you  might  see  the  big  tears  rolling 
down  his  cheeks. 

It  is  wonderful  that  most  men  never  complained  of  his  ha- 
ving a  bad  spirit.  Much  as  they  dreaded  his  rebuke  and 
writhed  under  his  strong  and  daring  exposures  of  wickedness, 
they  could  never  say  that  Father  Patterson  had  any  other 
than  a  good  spirit.  This  was  a  most  beautiful  and  striking 
exemplification  of  having  overcome  the  world. 

Men  who  are  not  thus  dead  to  the  world  have  not  escaped 
its  bondage.  The  victorious  Christian  is  in  a  state  where  he 
is  no  longer  in  bondage  to  man.  He  is  bound  only  to  serve 
God. 

II.  We  must  enquire  Who  are  those  that  over  com?,  the  world? 
Our  text  gives  the  ready  answer.     '^Whatsoever  is  born  of 

God  overcometb  the  world."  You  cannot  fail  to  observe  that 
this  is  a  universal  proposition, — all  who  are  born  of  God  over- 
come the  world — all  these,  and  it  is  obviously  implied — none 
others.  You  may  know  who  are  born  of  God  by  this  char- 
acteristic— they  overcome  the  world.  Of  course  the  second 
question  is  answered. 

III.  Our  next  question  is.  Why  do  believers  overcome  the 
world?     On  whfit  principle  is  this  result  effectedl 

I  answer,  this  victory  over  the  world  results  as  naturally 
from  the  spiritual  or  heavenly  birth  as  coming  into  bondage  to 
the  world  results  from  the  natural  birth. 

It  may  be  well  to  revert  a  moment  to  the  law  of  connection 
in  the  latter  case,  namely:  between  coming;  into  the  world  by 
natural  birth  and  bondage  to  the  world.  This  law  obviously 
admits  of  a  philosophical  explanation,  at  once  simple  and  pal- 


REGENERATIOir.  559 

pable  to  every  one's  observation.  Natural  birth  reveals  to  the 
mind  objects  of  sense  and  these  only.  It  brings  the  mind  in- 
to contact  with  worldly  things.  Of  course  it  is  natural  that 
the  mind  should  become  deeply  interested  in  these  objects 
thus  presented  through  its  external  senses,  especially  as  most 
of  them  sustain  so  intimate  a  relation  to  our  sentient  nature 
and  become  the  first  and  chief  sources  of  our  happiness. 

Hence  our  affections  are  gradually  entwined  around  these 
objects  and  we  become  thoroughly  lovers  of  this  world  ere 
our  eyes  have  been  opened  upon  it  many  months. 

Now  alongside  of  this  universal  fact  let  another  be  placed 
of  equal  importance  and  not  less  universal,  namely,  that  those 
intuitive  powers  of  the  mind  which  were  created  to  take  cog- 
nizance of  our  moral  relations,  and  hence  to  counteract  the 
too  great  influence  of  worldly  objects,  come  into  action  very 
slowly,  and  are  not  developed  so  as  to  act  vigorously  until 
years  are  numbered  as  months  are  in  the  case  of  the  external 
organs  of  sense.  The  very  early  and  vigorous  development 
of  the  latter  brings  the  soul  so  entirely  under  the  control  of 
worldly  objects  that  when  the  reason  and  the  conscience 
come  to  speak,  their  voice  is  little  heeded.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  we  find  it  universally  true  that  unless  divine  power  inter- 
pose, the  bondage  to  the  world  thus  induced  upon  the  soul  is 
never  broken. 

But  the  point  which  I  particularly  desired  to  elucidate  was 
simply  this,  that  natural  birth  with  its  attendant  laws  of  phy- 
sical and  mental  development  becomes  the  occasion  of  bon- 
dage to  this  world. 

Right  over  against  this,  lies  the  birth  into  the  kingdom  of 
God  by  the  Spirit.  By  this  the  soul  is  brought  into  new  rela- 
tions, we  might  rather  say,  into  intimate  contact  with  spirit- 
ual things.  The  Spirit  of  God  seems  to  usher  the  soul  into 
the  spiritual  world,  in  a  manner  strictly  analogous  to  the  re- 
sult of  the  natural  birth  upon  our  physical  being.  The  great 
truths  of  the  spiritual  world  are  opened  to  our  view  through 
the  illumination  of  the  Spirit  of  God;  we  seem  to  see  with 
new  eyes,  and  to  have  a  new  world  of  spiritual  objects  around 
us. 

As  in  regard  to  natural  objects,  men  not  only  speculate 
about  them,  but  realize  them;  so  in  the  case  of  spiritual  chil- 
dren do  spiritual  things  become  not  merely  matters  of  specu- 
lation, but  of  full  and  practical  realization  also.  When  God 
reveals  himself  to  the  mind,  spiritual  things  are  seen  in  their 
real  light,  and  make  the  impression  of  reahties. 


560  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

Consequently,  when  spiritual  objects  are  thus  revealed  to 
the  mind,  and  thus  apprehended,  they  will  supremely  inter- 
est that  mind.  Such  is  our  mental  constitution  that  the  truth 
of  God  when  thoroughly  apprehended  cannot  fail  to  interest 
us.  If  these  truths  were  clearly  revealed  to  the  wickedest 
man  on  earth,  so  that  he  should  apprehend  them  as  realities, 
it  could  not  fail  to  rouse  up  his  soul  to  most  intense  action. 
He  might  hate  the  light,  and  might  stubbornly  resist  the  claims 
of  God  upon  his  heart,  but  he  could  not  fail  to  feel  a  thrilling 
interest  in  truths  that  so  take  hold  of  the  great  and  vital  things 
of  human  well  being. 

Let  me  ask.  Is  there  a  sinner  in  this  house,  or  can  there  be 
a  sinner  on  this  wide  earth,  who  does  not  see  that  if  God's 
presence  were  made  as  manifest  and  as  real  to  his  mind  as  the 
presence  of  his  fellow  men,  it  would  supremely  engross  his 
soul  even  though  it  might  not  subdue  his  heart? 

This  revelation  of  God's  presence  and  character  might  not 
convert  him,  but  it  would,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  kill  his 
attention  to  the  world. 

You  often  see  this  in  the  case  of  persons  deeply  convicted; 
you  have  doubtless  seen  persons  so  fearfully  convicted  of  sin, 
that  they  cared  nothing  at  all  for  their  food  nor  their  dress. 
O,  they  cried  out  in  the  agony  of  their  souls,  what  matter 
all  these  things  to  us,  if  we  even  get  them  all,  and  then  must 
lie  down  in  hell ! 

But  these  thrilling  and  all-absorbing  convictions  do  not  ne- 
cessarily convert  the  soul,  and  I  have  alluded  to  them  here 
only  to  show  the  controlling  power  of  reahzing  views  of  divine 
truth. 

When  regeneration  has  taken  place,  and  the  soul  is  born  of 
God,  then  realizing  views  of  truth  not  only  awaken  interest, 
as  they  might  do  in  an  unrenewed  mind,  but  they  also  tend 
to  excite  a  deep  and  ardent  love  for  these  truths.  They  draw 
out  the  heart.  Spiritual  truth  now  takes  possession  of  his 
mind,  and  draws  him  into  its  warm  and  Hfe-giving  embrace. 
Before,  error,  falsehood,  death,  had  drawn  him  under  their 
power ;  now  the  Spirit  of  God  draws  him  into  the  very  embrace 
of  God.  Now  he  is  begotten  of  God,  and  breathes  the  spirit 
of  sonship.  Now,  according  to  the  Bible,  'Hhe  seed  of  God 
remaineth  in  him,"  that  very  truth,  and  those  movings  of  the 
spirit  which  gave  him  birth  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  contin- 
ue still  in  power  upon  his  mind,  and  hence  he  continues  a 
Christian,  and  as  the  Bible  states  it,  ''•he  cannot  sin,  because 
he  is  born  of  God."     The  seed  of  God  is  in  him,  and  the  fruit 


REGENERATION.  561 

of  it  brings  his  soul  deeply  into  sympathy  with  his  own  Father 
in  heaven. 

Again,  the  first  birth  makes  us  acquainted  with  earthly 
things,  the  second  with  God;  the  first  with  the  finite,  and  the 
second  with  the  infinite;  the  first  with  things  correlated  with 
our  animal  nature,  the  second  with  those  great  things  which 
stand  connected  with  our  spiritual  nature,  things  so  lovely,  and 
so  glorious  as  to  overcome  all  the  ensnarements  of  the  world. 

Again,  the  first  begets  a  worldly,  and  the  second  a  heav- 
enly temper;  under  the  first,  the  mind  is  brought  into  a  snare 
— under  the  second,  it  is  delivered  from  that  snare.  Under 
the  first,  the  conversation  is  earthly — under  the  second  '''•our 
conversation  is  in  heaven."  *  *  *  *  / 

He  who  does  not  habitually  overcome  the  world,  is  not  born 
of  God.  In  saying  this  I  do  not  intend  to  afiirm  that  a  true 
Christian  may  not  sometimes  be  overcome  by  sin;  but  I  do 
affirm  that  overcoming  the  world  is  the  general  rule,  and  fall- 
ing into  sin  is  only  the  exception.  This  is  the  least  that  can 
be  meant  by  the  language  of  our  text,  and  by  similar  declara- 
tions which  often  occur  in  the  bible.  Just  as  in  the  passage 
— '•^He  that  is  born  of  God  doth  not  commit  sin,  and  he  can 
not  sin  because  he  is  born  of  God;" — nothing  less  can  be 
meant  than  this, — that  he  can  not  sin  uniformly — can  not  make 
sinning  his  business,  and  can  sin,  if  at  all,  only  occasionally 
and  aside  from  the  general  current  of  his  life.  In  the  same 
manner  we  should  say  of  a  man  who  is  in  general  truthful  y 
that  he  is  not  a  liar. 

I  will  not  contend  for  more  than  this  respecting  either  of 
these  passages;  but  for  so  much  as  this  I  must  contend,  that 
the  new-born  souls  here  spoken  oi  do  in  general  overcome  the 
world.  The  general  fact  respecting  them  is  that  they  do  not 
sin  and  are  not  in  bondage  to  Satan.  The  affirmations  of 
Scripture  respecting  them,  must  at  least  embrace  their  general  /y^ 
character. 

What  is  a  religion  good  for  that  does  not  overcome  the 
world?  What  is  the  benefit  of  being  born  into  such  a  reli- 
gion, if  it  leave  the  world  still  swaying  its  dominion  over  our 
hearts?  What  avails  a  new  birth  which  after  all  fails  to  bring 
us  into  a  likeness  to  God,  into  the  sympathies  of  his  family 
and  of  his  kingdom,  which  leaves  us  still  in  bondage  to  the 
world  and  to  Satan?  What  can  there  be  of  such  a  religion 
more  than  the  name?  With  what  reason  can  any  man  sup- 
pose that  such  a  religion  fits  his  soul  for  heaven,  supposing 
it  leaves  him  earthly-minded,  sensual  and  selfish  ? 


562  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

We  see  why  it  is  that  infidels  have  proclaimed  the  gospel  of 
Christ  to  be  a  failure.  You  may  not  be  aware  that  of  late 
infidels  have  taken  the  ground  that  the  gospel  of  Christ  is  a 
failure.  They  maintain  that  it  professes  to  bring  men  out 
from  the  world,  but  fails  to  do  so;  and  hence  is  manifestly  a 
failure.  Now  you  must  observe  that  the  bible  does  indeed 
aftirm,  as  infidels  say,  that  those  who  are  truly  born  of  God 
do  overcome  the  world.  This  we  can  not  deny  and  we  should 
not  wish  to  deny  it.  Now  if  the  infidel  can  show  that  the 
new  birth  fails  to  produce  this  result,  he  has  carried  his  point, 
and  we  must  yield  ours.  This  is  perfectly  plain,  and  there 
can  be  no  escape  for  us. 

But  the  infidel  is  in  fault  in  his  premises.  He  assumes  the 
current  Christianity  of  the  age  as  a  specimen  of  real  religion, 
and  builds  his  estimate  upon  this.  He  proves,  as  he  thinks, 
and  perhaps  truly  proves  that  the  current  Christianity  does 
not  overcome  the  world. 

We  must  demur  to  his  assuming  this  current  Christianity  as 
real  religion.  For  this  religion  of  the  mass  of  nominal  pro- 
fessors does  not  answer  the  descriptions  given  of  true  piety  in 
the  word  of  God.  And  moreover,  if  this  current  type  of  reli- 
gion were  all  that  the  gospel  and  the  Divine  Spirit  can  do  for 
lost  man,  then  we  might  as  well  give  up  the  point  in  controver- 
sy with  the  infidel;  for  such  a  religion  could  not  give  us  much 
evidence  of  having  come  from  God,  and  would  be  of  very 
little  value  to  man ; — so  little  as  scarcely  to  be  worth  contend- 
ing for.  Truly  if  we  must  take  the  professedly  christian 
world  as  bible  christians,  who  would  not  be  ashamed  and  con- 
founded in  attempting  to  confront  the  infidel?  We  know  but 
too  w^ell  that  the  great  mass  of  professed  christians  do  not 
overcome  the  world,  and  we  should  be  confounded  quickly  if 
we  were  to  maintain  that  they  do.  Those  professed  chris- 
tians themselves  know  that  they  do  not  overcome  the  world. 
Of  course  they  could  not  testify  concerning  themselves  that  in 
their  own  case  the  power  of  the  gospel  is  exemplified. 

In  view  of  facts  Uke  these,  I  have  often  been  astonished  to 
see  ministers  setting  themselves  to  persuade  their  people  that 
they  are  truly  converted,  trying  to  lull  their  fears  and  sustain 
their  tottering  hopes.  Vain  effort!  Those  same  ministers,  it 
would  seem,  must  know  that  they  themselves  do  not  overcome 
the  world,  and  equally  well  must  they  know  that  their  people 
do  not.  How  fatal  then  to  the  soul  must  be  such  efforts  to 
"heal  the  hurt  of  God's  professed  people  slightly;  crying 
peace,  peace,  when  there  is  no  peace!" 


REGENERATION.  563 

Let  us  sift  this  matter  to  the  bottom,  pushing  the  inquiry — 
Do  the  great  mass  of  professed  christians  really  overcome  the 
world?  It  is  a  fact  beyond  question  that  with  them  the  things 
of  the  world  are  realities,  and  the  things  of  God  are  mere  the- 
ories. Who  does  not  know  that  this  is  the  real  state  of  great 
multitudes  in  the  nominal  church? 

Let  the  searching  inquiry  run  through  this  congregation — 
What  are  those  things  that  set  your  soul  on  fire — that  stir  up 
your  warmest  emotions  and  deeply  agitate  your  nervous  sys- 
tem? Are  these  the  things  of  earth,  or  the  things  of  heaven? 
the  things  of  time,  or  the  things  of  eternity?  the  things  of  self, 
or  the  things  of  God? 

How  is  it  when  you  go  into  your  closets? — do  you  go  there 
to  seek  and  to  find  God?  Do  you  in  fact  find  there  a  present 
God,  and  do  you  hold  communion  there  as  friend  with  friend? 
How  is  this? 

Now  you  certainly  should  know  that  if  your  state  is  such 
that  spiritual  things  are  mere  theories  and  speculations,  you 
are  altogether  worldly  and  nothing  more.  It  would  be  egre- 
gious folly  and  falsehood  to  call  you  spiritual-minded,  and  for 
you  to  think  yourselves  spiritual  would  be  the  most  fatal  and 
foolish  self-deception.  You  give  none  of  the  appropriate 
proofs  of  being  born  of  God.  Your  state  is  not  that  of  one 
who  is  personally  acquainted  with  God,  and  who  loves  him 
personally  with  supreme  affection. 

Until  we  can  put  away  from  the  minds  of  men  the  com- 
mon error  that  the  current  Christianity  of  the  church  is  true 
Christianity,  we  can  make  but  little  progress  in  converting  the 
world.  For  in  the  first  place  we  can  not  save  the  church  it- 
self from  bondage  to  the  world  in  this  life,  nor  from  the  direst 
doom  of  the  hypocrite  in  the  next.  We  can  not  unite  and  arm 
the  church  in  vigorous  onset  upon  Satan's  kingdom  so  that 
the  world  may  be  converted  to  God.  We  cannot  even  con- 
vince intelligent  men  of  the  world  that  our  religion  is  from 
God,  and  brings  to  fallen  men  a  remedy  for  their  depravity. 
For  if  the  common  Christianity  of  the  age  is  the  best  that  can 
be,  and  this  does  not  give  men  the  victory  over  the  world, 
what  is  it  good  for?  And  if  it  is  really  of  little  worth  or  none, 
how  can  we  hope  to  make  thinking  men  prize  it  as  of  great 
value? 

There  are  but  very  few  infidels  who  are  as  much  in  the 
dark  as  they  profess  to  be  on  these  points.  There  are  very 
few  of  that  class  of  men  who  are  not  acquainted  with  some 
humble  Christians,  whose  lives  commend   Christianity  and 


564  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

condemn  their  own  ungodliness.  Of  course  they  know  the 
truth,  that  there  is  a  reaUtj  in  the  reHgion  of  the  Bible,  and 
they  blind  their  own  eyes  selfishly  and  most  foolishly  when 
they  try  to  believe  that  the  religion  of  the  Bible  is  a  failure 
and  that  the  Bible  is  therefore  a  fabrication.  Deep  in  their 
heart  lies  the  conviction  that  here  and  there  are  men  who  are 
real  Christians,  who  overcome  the  world  and  live  by  a  faith 
unknown  to  themselves.  In  how  many  cases  does  God  set 
some  burning  examples  of  Christian  life  before  those  wicked, 
skeptical  men,  to  rebuke  them  for  their  sin  and  their  scepti- 
cism— perhaps  their  ow^n  wife  or  their  children — their  neigh- 
bors or  their  servants.  By  such  means  the  truth  is  lodged  in 
their  mind,  and  God  has  a  witness  for  himself  in  their  con- 
sciences." 

13.  But  the  sinner  does  not  overcome  the  world.  The  world 
in  some  form  overcomes  him.  Its  cares  engrossments,  pleas- 
ures, business,  politics  influence,  in  some  form  are  his  master. 
Nor  does  he  escape  from  its  dominion  over  his  heart  if  he  re- 
sorts to  a  nunnery  or  a  monastery,  or  betakes  himself  to  the 
life  of  an  ascetic  or  of  a  recluse  and  shuts  himself  out  from 
human  society.  The  world  is  still  his  master  and  holds  him 
in  a  state  of  banishment  from  its  domain.  Many  think  they 
have  overcome  the  world  merely  because  the  world  has  so 
completely  overcome  them.  It  is  so  completely  their  master 
as  to  force  them  to  back  out  of  it,  to  hide  themselves  from  it. 
They  have  not  got  the  world  under  their  feci,  but  it  has  got 
them  into  banishment  from  that  field  of  labor  and  of  usefulness 
where  God  and  reason  called  them  to  labor.  The  world  has 
prevailed  to  rout  them  from  their  strong  hold  in  Christ  and 
drive  them  to  take  refuge  in  monasteries,  nunneries,  and  in 
caves  and  dens  of  the  earth.  What  an  infinite  mistake  to  sup- 
pose that  this  is  overcoming  the  world!  To  forsake  our  field 
of  labor,  to  give  over  our  work,  to  let  the  world  of  sinners  go 
down  to  hell  and  go  ourselves  into  exile  from  the  world,  or  at 
the  bidding  of  the  world,  be  driven  completely  from  the  battle 
field  and  hide  in  caves  and  dens  and  proclaim  ourselves  the 
victors  when  in  fact  we  have  fled  before  and  unbelievingly 
succumbed  to  the  enemy  instead  of  subduing  and  overcoming 
him  by  faith. 

But  in  general.  Sinners  do  not  betake  themselves  to  flight 
in  this  way,  but  abide  in  the  world  and  tamely  submit  to  wear 
its  chains.  Let  it  be  distinctly  understood  that  the  true  differ- 
ence between  saints  and  sinners  is  that  while  they  both  live 
io  the  world,  both  mingle  in  its  scenes  and  engage  in  its  aP- 


REGENERATION.  565 

fairs,  both  have  families  or  not,  as  the  case  may  be,  both  pro- 
vide for  the  body,  cultivate  the  soil,  or  follow  some  occupation 
the  saint  has  not  a  worldly  selfish  end  in  view.  He  is  not  en- 
slaved by  the  world,  but  his  heart  is  steadfast  serving  the  Lord. 
"VVhatever  he  does  he  does  it,  not  for  some  selfish  end,  but  for 
God.  Does  he  provide  for  himself  and  his  family ;  he  does 
it  as  a  service  rendered  to  God.  He  regards  himself  as  the 
the  Lord's  and  not  his  own.  He  regards  himself  as  the  Lord's 
steward  and  in  whatever  employment  he  is  engaged,  he  ac- 
counts it  the  Lord's  business  and  himself  as  the  Lord's  ser- 
vant in  transacting  it.  He  is  not  his  own.  He  has  no  busi- 
ness of  his  own.  The  w  orld  is  not  his.  Nor  is  he  the  world's. 
He  does  not  bow  down  to  it  nor  serve  it.  He  has  been  chos- 
en out  of  the  world,  and  therefore  while  employed  by  his  mas- 
ter in  it,  he  does  all,  not  for  self,  but  for  God. 

Not  so  with  the  sinner.  He  counts  his  business  his  own. 
Hence  he  is  full  of  cares  and  anxieties.  The  losses  in  busi- 
ness are  his  losses,  and  the  profits  are  his  profits.  Living  and 
transacting  business  for  the  Lord  is  only  a  theory  with  him. 
The  practical  fact  with  him  is  that  he  is  in  bondage  to  the 
world.  He  serves  the  world  or  rather  he  serves  himself  of  the 
world.  The  world  he  serves  as  a  means  of  self-gratification. 
The  saint  serves  God  of  or  with  the  world;  the  sinner,  him*- 
self  The  saint  uses  the  world  as  not  abusing  it.  The  sin- 
ner abuses  it  and  uses  it  to  gratify  his  own  lusts.  The  saint 
overcomes  the  world  because  he  uses  it  for  God.  The  sinner 
is  overcome  by  the  world  because  he  uses  it  for  himself 

12.  The  true  saint  overcomes  the  Jlesh.  This  term  is  some- 
times used  in  the  gospel  to  signify  the  sensibility  as  distinguishr 
ed  from  the  intelligence,  and  at  other  times  in  a  more  literal 
sense  and  signifies  the  bodily  appetites  and  passions.  The 
true  saint  is  represented  in  the  Bible  as  one  who  overcomes 
both  his  bodily  appetites  and  passions,  and  also  as  overcoming 
the  flesh  in  the  still  wider  sense  of  the  sensibility.  *••  77m  I 
say  then,  Walk  in  the  Spirit,  and  ye  shall  not  fulfil  the  lust  of 
the  flesh.  For  the  flesh  lusteth  against  the  Spirit,  and  the 
Spirit  against  the  flesh:  and  these  are  contrary  the  one  to  the 
other:  so  that  ye  can  not  do  the  things  that  ye  would.  But 
if  ye  be  led  by  the  Spirit  ye  are  not  under  the  law.  Now  the 
works  of  the  flesh  are  manifest,  which  are  these;  adultery, 
fornication,  uncleanness,  lasciviousness,  idolatry,  witchcraft, 
hatred,  variance,  emulations,  wrath,  strife,  seditions  heresies, 
envyings,  murders,  drunkenness,  revellings,  and  such  like:  of 
the  which  I  tell  you  before  as  I  have  also  told^ow  in  time  past 
48 


566  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

that  they  which  do  such  things  shall  not  inherit  the  kingdom 
of  God.     But  the  fruit  of  the  Spirit  is  love,  joj,  peace,  long- 
suffering,  gentleness,  goodness,  faith,  meekness,  temperance: 
against  such  there  is  no  law.     And  they  that  are  Christ's  have 
crucified  the  flesh  with  the  affections  and  lusts." — Gal.  5:  16 
— 24.     '•'-  What  shall  we  say  then?     Shall  we  continue  in  sin 
that  grace  may  abound  ?     God  forbid.     How  shall  we,  that 
are  dead  to  sin,  live  any  longer  therein?     Know  ye  not,  that 
so  many  of  us  as  were  baptized  into  Jesus  Christ  were  bap- 
tized into  his  death?     Therefore  we  are  buried  with  him  by 
baptism  into  death:  that  like  as  Christ  was  raised  up  from 
the  dead  by  the  glory  of  the  Father,  even  so  we  should  walk 
in  newness  of  life." — Ro.  6:  1 — 4.     ''  There  is  therefore  now 
no  condemnation  to  them  that  are  in  Christ  Jesus,  who  walk 
not  after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit.     For  the  law  of  the 
Spirit  of  life  in  Christ  Jesus  hath  made  me  free  from  the  law 
of  sin  and  death.     For  what  the  law  could  not  do,  in  that  it 
was  weak  through  the  flesh,  God  sending  his  own  Son  in  the 
likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for  sin,  condemned  sin  in  the  flesh: 
that  the  righteousness  of  the  law  might  be  fulfilled  in  us,  who 
walk  not  after  the  flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit.     For  they  that 
are  after  the  flesh  do  mind  the  things  of  the  flesh;  but  they 
that  are  after  the  Spirit  the  things  of  the  Spirit.     For  to  be 
carnally  minded  25  death;  but  to  be  spiritually  minded  is  life 
and  peace.     Because  the  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God:, 
for  it  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be. 
So  then  they  that  are  in  the  flesh  can  not  please  God.     But  ye 
are  not  in  the  flesh,  but  in  the  Spirit,  if  so  be  that  the  Spirit 
of  God  dwell  in  you.     Now  if  any  man  have  not  the  Spirit  of 
Christ,  he  is  none  of  his.     And  if  Christ  be  in  you,  the  body 
is  dead  because  of  sin;  but  the  Spirit  is  life  because  of  right- 
eousness.    But  if  the  Spirit  of  him  that  raised  up  Jesus  from 
the  dead  dwell  in  you,  he  that  raised  up  Christ  from  the  dead 
shall  also  quicken  your  mortal  bodies  by  his  Spirit  thatdwell- 
eth  in  you.     Therefore,  brethren,  we  are  debtors,  not  to  the 
flesh  to  live  after  the  flesh.     For  if  ye  live  after  the  flesh,  ye 
shall  die:  but  if  ye  through  the  Spirit  do  mortify  the  deeds  of 
the  body  ye  shall  live.     For  as  many  as  are  led  by  the  Spirit 
ofGod,  they  arethesonsofGod."— Ro.8:  1—14.  With  the 
saint  it  is  not  merely  acknowledged  to  be  a  duty  to  overcome 
the  flesh,  but  he  actually  does  overcome,  and  he  is  a  saintjust 
because  he  is  delivered  from  the  bondage  of  the  flesh  and  intro- 
duced into  the  glorious  Hberty  of  the  children  of  God.     Saints 
no  longer  mind  or  obey  the  flesh.     Their  God  is  not  their 


REGENERATION. 


567 


bellj  nor  do  they  mind  earthly  things.  This  is  the  uniform 
representation  of  scripture  respecting  them.  Thej  are  not 
the  slaves  of  appetite,  or  passion,  or  lust,  under  any  form,  but 
they  are  the  Lord's  freemen.  This  is  not  only  the  represen- 
tation of  scripture  but  must  of  course  be  true  from  the  nature 
of  regeneration.  Regeneration  consists,  let  it  be  remembered, 
in  the  will's  ceasing  to  be  governed  by  the  propensities  of  the 
flesh  and  committing  itself  to  the  good  of  being.  If  the 
Bible  did  not  represent  the  regenerate  as  overcoming  the 
world  and  the  flesh,  it  would  not  only  be  inconsistent  with  it- 
self, but  also  with  matter  of  fact.  It  would  not  in  such  case 
recognize  the  nature  of  regeneration.  We  are  now  consider- 
ing, not  what  is  true  of  the  mass  o{ professing  Christians,  but 
what  is  and  must  be  true  of  real  saints.  Of  them  it  must  be 
true  that  they  do  overcome  the  world  and  the  flesh.  While 
they  live  in  the  flesh  they  walk  not  after  the  flesh,  for  if  they 
did  they  would  not  be  saints.  What  is  a  rehgion  worth  that 
does  not  as  a  matter  of  fact  overcome  the  flesh?  The  domin- 
ion of  the  flesh  is  sin,  and  does  not  the  new  birth  imply  a 
turning  away  from  sin?  Let  it  be  forever  understood  that  re- 
generation implies,  not  merely  the  conviction  and  the  theory 
that  the  flesh  ought  to  be  overcome,  but  that  it  actually  is 
overcome.  The  regenerate  "do  not  sow  to  the  flesh;"  ""do 
not  live  after  the  flesh;"  ''do  not  mind  the  flesh;"  ''■  do  not 
war  after  the  flesh;"  "have  crucified  the  flesh  with  its  affec- 
tions and  lusts;"  ""through  the  Spirit  do  mortify,  (kill)  the 
deeds  of  the  body;"  "keep  under  their  bodies  and  bring  them 
into  subjection."  This  not  only  ought  to  be,  but  it  must  be  the 
character  of  a  true  saint. 

13.  The  sinner  is  overcome  by  the  flesh.  Self-indulgence 
is  his  law.  Some  one,  or  more,  of  the  phrenological  or  con- 
stitutional impulses  always  controls  his  will.  He  not  only 
'4ives  in  the  flesh,  but  walks  after  the  flesh."  He  "fulfils  the 
desires  of  the  flesh  and  of  the  mind."  He  is  "carried  away 
with  his  own  lusts  and  enticed."  "His  god  is  his  belly"  and 
"he  minds  earthly  things."  He  "is  in  bondage  to  the  flesh." 
This  is  his  unfailing  characteristic,  that  he  is  governed,  not  by 
the  law  of  God,  but  by  his  own  desires.  He  is  the  creature 
of  impulse,  and  a  sinner  just  because  he  is  so.  With  him  to 
conquer  the  flesh  is  matter  of  duty,  of  opinion,  of  theory,  and 
not  of  actual  performance  and  experience.  He  holds  that  he 
ought  to  overcome,  but  knows  that  he  does  not.  He  acknowl- 
edges the  obligation  in  theory,  but  denies  it  in  practice.  He 
knows  what  he  ought  to  do,  but  does  it  not.     He  knows  what 


568  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

a  christian  ought  to  be,  but  is  aware  that  he  is  not  what  a 
christian  ought  to  be.     There   seems   to  be  an  infatuation 
among  sinners,  those  especially  that  profess  to  be  christians. 
They  can  profess  to  be  christians  and  yet  know  and  acknowl- 
edge that  they  are  not  what  christians  ought  to  be,  strange- 
ly assuming  that  a  man  can  be  and  is  a  christian  who  is  not 
what  a  christian  ought  to  be:  in  other  words  that  he  can  be  a 
christian   without  possessing  just  that  which  constitutes  a 
christian,  to  wit:  a  heart  conformed  to  the  intellect's  appre- 
hension of  duty.     This  is  just  what  makes  a  christian;   not 
his  seeing  and  acknowledging  what  he  ought  to  be,  but  his 
actually   doing  his  duty,  his  actually  embracing  and  conform- 
ing to  the  truth.     The  deceived  professor  knows    that  he  is 
not  free,  that  he  is  in  bondage  to  his  flesh  and  his  desires,  but 
hopes  on  because  he  thinks  that  this  is  common  to  all  chris- 
tians.    He  sees  and  approves  the  truth  and  often  resolves  to 
overcome  his  flesh,  but  as  in  the  seventh  of  Romans  he  '^finds 
a  law   in  his  members  warring  against  the  law  of  his  mind 
and  bringing  him  into  captivity  to  the  law  of  sin  in  his  mem- 
bers."    He  can  resolve   but  does  not  carry  out  his  resolves. 
When  he  resolves  to  do  good  evil  is  present  with  him  and 
conquers  him.     Of  all  this  he  is  conscious,  but  he  has  taken  up 
the  fatal  delusion  that  this  was  Paul's  experience  at  the  time 
be  wrote  this  chapter  and  consequently  that  it  must  be  the 
experience  of  all  christians.     He  does  not  run  his  eye  along 
into  the  eighth  chapter  and  see  the  contrast  between  the  ex- 
perience there  portrayed  and  affirmed  to  be  the  experience  of 
all  christians.     He  does  not  observe  that  the  apostle  is  de- 
signing in  these  two  chapters  to  contrast  a  christian  with  a 
legal  and  self-righteous  experience,  but  holds  on  to  his  delu- 
sion and  observes  not  that  the  apostle  begins  the  eighth  chap- 
ter by  the  affirmation  that  all  who  are  in  Christ  Jesus  are  de- 
livered from   the  bondage  of  which   he  was  speaking  in  the 
seventh  chapter  and  no  longer  walk  after  the  flesh  but  after 
the  Spirit;  that  the  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life  in  Christ  Jesus  has 
actually  made  them  free  from  the  law  of  sin  and  death  which 
is  in  their  members.     How  infinitely  strange  that  these  chap- 
ters are  so  misunderstood   and   perverted.     And  how  mon- 
strous and  how  melancholy  the  fact  that  the  great  mass  of 
professing  christians  to  this  day  recognize  the  seventh  and 
not  the  eighth  chapter  of  Romans  as  their  own  experience! 
According  to  this  the  new  birth  or  regeneration  does  not 
break  the  power  of  the  propensities  over  the  will.     The  truth 
is  and  must  not  be  disguised  that  they  have  not  any  just  idea 


REGENERATION.  569 

of  regeneration.  They  mistake  conviction  for  regenera- 
tion. They  are  so  enlightened  as  to  perceive  and  affirm  their 
obligation  to  deny  the  flesh,  and  often  resolve  to  do  it,  but 
in  fact  do  it  not.  They  only  struggle  with  the  flesh,  but  are 
continually  worsted  and  brought  into  bondage;  and  this  they 
call  a  regenerate  state.  O  sad.  What  then  is  regeneration 
good  for?  What  does  it  avail?  The  bible  represents  regen- 
eration as  a  '^being  born  from  above,"  ""being  born  of  God," 
and  expressly  affirms  that  ""whatsoever  is  born  of  God  over- 
cometh  the  world,"  and  affirms  that  "whosoever  is  born  of 
God  does  not  commit  sin  and  can  not  sin  because  his  seed 
(God's  seed)  remaineth  in  him  so  that  he  can  not  sin  because 
he  is  born  of  God;"  "that  he  is  a  new  creature,  that  old 
things  are  passed  away  and  that  all  things  are  become  new;" 
"that  he  is  alive  from  the  dead;"  that  he  has  ''crucified  the 
flesh  with  its  affections  and  lust;"  that  "he  is  dead  to  sin  and 
alive  unto  God,"  and  many  such  like  representations:  and 
yet  infinitely  strange  to  tell,  the  seventh  chapter  of  Romans 
is  recognized  as  a  christian  experience  in  the  face  of  the 
whole  bible  and  in  opposition  to  the  very  nature  of  regenera- 
tion and  the  experience  of  every  true  saint.  The  sinner  is 
a  sinner  just  and  only  because  he  knows  his  duty  and  does  it 
not.  He  apprehends  the  law  of  the  intelligence,  but  minds 
the  impulses  of  his  sensibility.  This  is  the  very  character 
which  the  apostle  is  so  graphically  portraying  in  the  seventh 
chapter  of  Romans.  He  could  not  possibly  have  given  a  more 
graphic  picture  of  a  sinner  when  he  is  enlightened  and  yet 
enslaved  by  his  propensities.  It  is  a  full  length  portrait  of  a 
sinner  enHghtened  and  struggling  for  liberty,  and  yet  contin- 
ually falling  and  floundering  under  the  galling  bondage  of  his 
own  lusts.  And  that  this  should  be  considered  the  experience 
of  a  regenerate  heart!  O  horrible!  How  many  thousands  of 
souls  have  been  blinded  by  this  delusion  and  gone  down  to 
hell!  And  what  is  worse  still,  commentators  and  many  min- 
isters, because  this  is  their  own  experience,  are  still  holding 
fast  to  and  inculcating  this  delusion. 

Now  let  it  be  remembered  that  just  the  diflference  between 
saints  and  sinners,  and  especially  deceived  professors,  is 
expressed  and  clearly  illustrated  in  the  seventh  and  eighth 
chapters  of  Romans;  and  to  do  this  was  the  very  design  of 
the  writer  of  this  epistle.  The  difference  consists  in  just  this: 
They  both  see  what  they  ought  to  do;  the  one  does  it  in  fact, 
while  the  other  only  resolves  to  do  it  but  does  it  not.  They 
both  have  bodies  and  both  have  all  the  constitutional  propen- 
48* 


570  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

sities.  But  the  saint  overcomes  them  all.  He  has  the  victo- 
ry through  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ.  Through  him  he  is  deliv- 
ered from  the  hody  of  sin  and  of  death  and  made  free  from 
the  law  of  sin  in  his  members.  He  is  a  conqueror  and  more 
than  a  conqueror.  The  sinner  only  cries  out,  O  wretched 
man  that  I  am,  who  shall  deliver  me  from  the  body  of  this 
death?  But  he  can  not  add,  "I  thank  God  through  Jesus 
Christ  my  Lord,"  I  am  delivered,  which  is  the  evident  mean- 
ing of  the  apostle,  as  appears  from  what  immediately  follows 
in  the  beginning  of  the  eighth  chapter.  The  sinner  sees  his 
captivity  and  groans  under  it,  but  does  not  escape.  They  are 
both  tempted.  The  saint  overcomes  through  Christ.  The 
sinner  is  overcome.  The  sinner  is  conquered  instead  of  be- 
ing Hke  the  saint  a  conqueror.  He  can  not  exultingly  say 
with  the  saint.  '•'The  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life  in  Christ  Jesus 
hath  made  me  free  from  the  law  of  sin  and  death,"  but  still 
complains  with  the  captive,  '■'I  see  a  law  in  my  members  war- 
ring against  the  law  of  my  mind  and  bringing  me  into  captiv- 
ity to  the  law  of  sin  which  is  in  my  members.  0  wretched  man 
that  I  am!" 


LECTURE  XLIV. 
REGENERATION. 

Wherein  Saints  and  Sinners  differ. 

15.  The  saints  overcome  Satan. 

This  is  expressly  taught  in  the  scriptures.  '''I  write  unto 
you  fathers,  because  ye  have  known  him  that  is  from  the  be- 
ginning. I  write  unto  you  young  men,  because  ye  have 
overcome  the  wicked  one.  I  write  unto  you,  little  children, 
because  ye  have  known  the  Father." — 1  John  2;  13.  The 
wicked  are  characterized  as  the  ""^ children  of  the  devil;"  '""as 
led  by  him  captive  at  his  will,"  ""as  being  the  subjects  of  Sa- 
tan, the  god  of  this  world,"  and  as  having  Satan  ruUng  in 
their  hearts. 

But  the  saints  are  represented  as  being  set  at  liberty  from 
his  power,  as  being  delivered,  not  from  his  temptations,  but  ac- 
tually saved  from  his  dominion.  The  difference  between  the 
saint  and  the  sinner  in  this  respect  is  represented  in  the  scrip- 
tures as  consisting,  not  in  the  fact  that  sinners  are  tempted 
while  saints  are  not,  but  in  this,  that  while  Satan  tempts  both 
the  saint  and  the  sinner,  he  actually  overcomes  the  sinner  and 
the  deceived  professor  and  leads  him  captive  at  his  will.  The 
true  saint  through  faith  and  strength  in  Christ  overcomes  and 
is  more  than  a  conqueror.  The  saint  through  Christ  triumphs 
while  the  sinner  yields  to  his  infernal  influence  and  is  bound 
fast  in  his  infernal  chain. 

16.  The  true  saint  denies  himself.  Self-denial  must  be  his 
characteristic  just  for  the  reason  that  regeneration  implies 
this.  Regeneration,  as  we  have  seen,  consists  in  turning 
away  the  heart  or  will  from  the  supreme  choice  of  self-grati- 
fication to  a  choice  of  the  highest  well-being  of  God  and  of 
the  universe.  This  is  denying  self.  This  is  abandoning  self- 
indulgence  and  pursuing  or  committing  the  will  and  the  whole 
being  to  an  opposite  end.  This  is  the  dethroning  of  self  and 
the  enthroning  of  God  in  the  heart.  Self-denial  does  not  con- 
sist, as  some  seem  to  imagine,  in  acts  of  outward  austerity, 
in  an  ascetic  and  penance-doing  course  of  starvation  and 
mere  legal  and  outward  retrenchment,  in  wearing  plain 
clothes  and  using  plain  language,  or  in  wearing  a  coat  with 
one  button,  and  in  similar  acts  of  "will  worship  and  volun- 
tary humility  and  neglecting  the  body;"  but  self-denial  con- 
sists in  the  actual  and  total  renunciation  of  selfishness  in  the 
heart.     It  consists  in  ceasing  wholly  to  live  for  self,  and  can 


572  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

be  exercised  just  as  truly  upon  a  throne  surrounded  with  the 
paraphernalia  of  royalty  as  in  a  cottage  of  logs,  or  as  in  rags, 
and  in  caves  and  dens  of  the  earth.  The  king  upon  his  throne 
may  live  and  reign  to  please  himself  He  may  surround  him- 
self with  all  that  can  minister  to  his  pleasure,  his  ambition,  his 
pride,  his  lusts,  and  his  power.  He  may  live  to  and  for  him- 
self Self-pleasing,  self-gratification,  self-aggrandizement  may 
be  the  end  for  which  he  Hves.  This  is  selfishness.  But  he 
may  also  live  and  reign  for  God  and  for  his  people.  He  may 
be  just  as  really  self-denying  on  his  throne  and  surrounded 
by  the  trappings  of  state  and  of  royalty  as  in  any  other  sta- 
tion of  life.  That  is,  he  may  be  as  really  devoted  to  God, 
and  render  this  as  a  service  to  God  as  well  as  any  thing  else. 
To  be  sure  his  temptation  is  great;  but  nevertheless  he  may 
in  fact  be  perfectly  self-denying  in  all  this.  He  may  not  do 
what  he  does  for  his  own  sake,  nor  be  what  he  is,  nor  possess 
what  he  possesses  for  his  own  sake,  but  accommodating  his 
state  and  equipage  to  his  relations,  he  may  be  as  truly  self-de- 
nying as  others  in  the  humble  walks  of  life.  This  is  not  an 
impossible,  though  in  all  probability  a  rare  case.  A  man  may 
as  truly  be  rich  for  God  as  poor  for  him  if  his  relations  and 
circumstances  make  it  essential  to  his  highest  usefulness  that  he 
should  possess  a  large  capital.  He,  to  be  sure,  is  in  the  way 
of  great  temptation,  but  if  this  is  plainly  his  duty  and  submitted 
to  for  God  and  the  world,  he  may  have  grace  to  be  entirely 
self-denying  in  these  circumstances,  and  all  the  more  com- 
mendable for  standing  fast  under  these  circumstances.  So  a 
poor  man  may  be  poor  from  principle  or  from  necessity.  He 
may  be  submissive  and  happy  in  his  poverty.  He  may  deny 
himself  even  the  comforts  of  life  and  do  all  this  to  promote 
the  good  of  being,  or  he  may  do  it  to  promote  his  own  interest 
temporal  or  eternal,  to  secure  a  reputation  for  piety,  to  ap- 
pease a  morbid  conscience,  to  appease  his  fears  or  to  secure 
the  fevor  of  God.  In  all  things  he  may  be  selfish.  He  may 
be  happy  in  this  because  it  may  be  real  self-denial;  or  he  may 
be  murmuring  at  his  poverty,  may  complain  and  be  envious 
at  others  who  are  not  poor.  He  may  be  censorious  and  think 
every  body  proud  and  selfish  who  dresses  better  or  possesses 
a  better  house  or  equipage  than  he  does.  He  may  set  up  his 
views  as  a  standard  and  denounce  as  proud  and  selfish  all 
who  do  not  square  their  lives  by  his  rule.  This  is  selfishness 
and  these  manifestations  demonstrate  the  fact.  A  man  may 
forego  the  use  of  a  coat,  or  a  cloak,  or  a  horse,  or  a  carriage,  ■. 
or  any  and  every  comfort  and  convenience  of  life.     And  all 


REGENERATION.  573 

this  may  proceed  from  either  a  benevolent  or  a  selfish  state  of 
mind.  If  it  be  benevolence  and  true  self-denial,  it  will  be 
cheerfully  and  happily  submitted  to  without  murmuring  and 
repining,  without  censoriousncss  and  without  envy  towards 
others,  without  insisting  that  others  shall  do  and  be  just  what 
and  as  he  is.  He  will  allow  the  judge  his  ermine,  the  king  his 
robes  of  state,  and  the  merchant  his  capital,  and  the  husband- 
man his  fields  and  his  flocks,  and  will  see  the  reasonableness 
and  propriety  of  all  this. 

But  if  it  be  selfishness  and  the  spirit  of  self-gratification  in- 
stead of  self-denial,  he  will  be  ascetic,  caustic,  sour,  ill-natured, 
unhappy,  severe,  censorious,  envious  and  disposed  to  complain 
of  and  pick  at  the  extravagance  and  self-indulgence  of  others. 

The  true  saint,  in  whatever  relation  of  life,  is  truly  self-de- 
nying. Whether  on  a  throne  or  on  the  dunghill,  he  neither 
lives,  nor  moves,  nor  breathes,  nor  eats,  nor  drinks,  nor  has 
his  being  for  himself  Self  is  dethroned.  God  is  enthroned  in 
his  heart.  He  lives  to  please  God  and  not  to  please  himself 
And  whether  he  wears  the  crown  and  the  purple,  the  ermine 
of  the  judge  or  the  gown  of  the  counsellor,  whether  he  culti- 
vates the  field  or  occupies  the  pulpit,  whether  he  is  engaged 
in  merchandize,  or  whether  he  opens  the  ditch  or  plies  a  han- 
dicraft, whether  in  affluence  or  poverty,  it  matters  not  how 
circumstanced  or  how  employed,  as  certainly  as  he  is  a 
true  saint,  just  so  certainly  he  does  not  live  to  or  for  him- 
self Of  this  he  is  as  conscious  as  he  is  of  living  at  all. 
He  may  be  mistaken  by  others,  and  selfish  ones  may  suppose 
him  to  be  actuated  by  selfishness  as  they  are;  but  in  this  they 
are  deceived.  The  true  saint  will  be  sure  to  be  found  self- 
denying  when  observed  and  judged  by  the  law  of  love.  Love 
would  readily  perceive  that  those  things  which  a  censorious 
and  selfish  spirit  ascribe  to  selfishness  are  to  be  accounted  for 
in  another  way;  that  they  are  really  consistent  with  and  indeed 
instances  of  self-denial.  The  spirit  of  self-pleasing  and  of 
accommodating  ourselves  to  our  circumstances  and  relations 
for  benevolent  reasons,  may  by  a  candid  mind  be  generally 
readily  distinguished  from  each  other.  The  selfish  will  natu- 
rally confound  them  and  stumble  at  them  simply  because  they 
have  only  the  experience  of  selfishness  and  judge  others  by 
themselves.  A  truly  self-denying  mind  will  naturally  also  judge 
others  by  itself  in  such  a  sense  as  to  take  it  for  granted  that 
others  are  self  denying  unless  the  manifest  indications  strong- 
ly urge  to  an  opposite  opinion. 

A  man  of  truth  is  not  wont  to  suspect  others  of  lying  with- 


574 


SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 


out  strong  evidence  of  the  fact,  and  then  although  he  may  he 
sure  that  he  tells  a  falsehood,  the  man  of  truth  is  ready  rath- 
er to  ascribe  the  falsehood  to  mistake  than  to  call  it  a  lie. 
So  the  truly  benevolent  man  is  not  wont  to  suspect  others  of 
selfishness  without  strong  evidence.  Nor  will  the  truly  self- 
denying  man  readily  suspect  his  brother  of  selfishness  even  in 
things  that  prima  facie  have  that  appearance.  He  will  rather 
naturally  infer  that  his  health  or  circumstances  or  something 
consistent  with  self-denial  accounts  for  what  he  does. 

Especially  does  the  true  saint  deny  his  appetites  and  pas- 
sions. His  artificial  appetites  he  denies  absolutely  whenever 
his  attention  is  called  to  the  fact  and  the  nature  of  the  indul- 
gence. The  christian  is  such  just  because  he  has  become  the 
master  of  his  appetites  and  passions,  has  denied  ihem  and  con- 
secrated himself  to  God.  The  sinner  is  a  sinner  just  because 
his  appetites  and  passions  and  the  impulses  of  his  desires  are 
his  masters  and  he  bows  down  to  them  and  serves  them.  They 
are  his  masters  instead  of  his  servants  as  they  are  made  to  be. 
He  is  consecrated  to  them  and  not  to  God.  But  the  saint 
has  ceased  to  live  to  gratify  his  lusts.  Has  he  been  a  drunk- 
ard, a  rake,  a  tobacco  user;  has  he  been  in  self-indulgent 
habits  of  any  kind:  he  is  reformed;  old  things  are  past  away 
and  behold  all  things  are  become  new.  Has  he  still  any 
habit  the  character  of  which  he  has  either  mistaken  or  not 
considered;  such  as  smoking,  chewing  or  snuflSng  tobacco, 
using  injurious  stimulants  of  any  kind,  high  and  unwholesome 
living,  extravagant  dressing,  or  equipage,  retiring  late  at 
night  and  rising  late  in  the  morning,  eating  too  much,  or  be- 
tween meals,  or  in  short,  has  there  been  any  form  of  self-in- 
dulgence about  him  whatever: — only  let  his  attention  be  call- 
ed to  it,  he  will  listen  with  candor,  be  convinced  by  reasona- 
ble evidence  and  renounce  his  evil  habits  without  conferring 
with  flesh  and  blood.  All  this  is  implied  in  regeneration  and 
must  follow  from  its  very  nature.  This  also  the  bible  every- 
where affirms  to  be  true  of  the  saints.  '^  They  have  crucified 
the  fiesh  with  its  affections  and  lusts,-^  It  should  be  forever 
remembered  that  a  self-indulgent  christian  is  a  contradiction. 
Self-indulgence  and  Christianity  are  terms  of  opposition.  The 
states  of  mind  designated  by  these  two  words  are  opposite 
states  of  mind.  This  is  precisely  the  difference  between  a 
saint  and  a  sinner,  that  the  saint  is  self-denying  and  the  sinner 
self-indulgent*  The  saint  is  the  lord  and  master  of  all  his 
appetites  and  passions.  He  rules  them  and  not  they  him. 
Whether  he  eats  or  drinks  or  whatever  he  does,  he  does  all 


REGENERATION. 


575 


for  God  and  not  to  gratify  himself.  The  sinner  is  the  slave 
of  his  appetites  and  passions.  It  is  not  in  his  heart  to  de- 
ny them.  Some  appetite  or  propensity  always  rules  over  him. 
He  complains  that  he  can  not  abandon  certain  indulgences. 
He  is  in  bondage  to  his  own  lusts  and  led  captive  by  them. 
Seest  thou  then  a  self-indulgent  professor  of  religion?  If  he 
be  really  so,  imagine  not  that  you  have  found  a  christian  but 
know  assuredly  that  you  behold  a  hypocrite;  for  this  is  as 
certain  as  that  he  is  alive.  The  true  saint  does  not  complain 
that  he  can  not  give  up  any  self-indulgent  habit  whatever. 
He  can  and  must  and  does  if  he  be  truly  regenerate,  give  up 
and  forsake  every  species  of  mere  self-indulgence.  Grace 
has  obtained  for  him  a  victory  and  instead  of  his  complaining 
that  he  can  not  conquer  his  propensities,  he  knows  that  he  is 
more  than  a  conqueror  through  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 

16.  The  sinner  does  not  deny  himself.  He  may  not  gratify 
all  his  desires  because  the  desires  are  often  contradictory,  and 
he  must  deny  one  for  the  sake  of  indulging  another.  Avarice 
may  be  so  strong  as  to  forbid  his  indulging  in  extravagance  in 
eating,  drinking,  dressing  or  equipage.  His  love  of  reputa- 
tion may  be  so  strong  as  to  prevent  his  engaging  in  any  thing 
disgraceful  and  so  on.  But  self-indulgence  is  his  law  notwith- 
standing. The  fear  of  hell  or  his  desire  to  be  saved  may  for- 
bid his  outward  indulgence  in  any  known  sin.  But  still  he 
lives  and  moves  and  has  his  being  only  for  the  sake  of  indul- 
ging himself.  He  may  be  a  miser,  and  starve  and  freeze  him- 
self and  deny  himself  the  necessaries  of  life,  yet  self-indul- 
gence is  his  law.  One  propensity  may  lord  it  over  and  starve 
the  rest;  but  it  is  only  self-indulgence  after  all.  The  nun 
may  take  the  vail;  the  monk  may  retire  to  the  cloister;  the 
miser  take  his  rags;  the  harlot  seek  the  brothel;  the  debau- 
chee his  indulgences;  the  king  his  throne;  the  priest  his  desk, 
all  for  the  same  ultimate  reason,  to  wit,  to  gratify  self,  to  in- 
dulge each  one  his  reigning  lust.  But  in  every  possible  case 
every  sinner,  whatever  may  be  his  station,  his  habits  or  pur- 
suits, is  self-indulgent  and  only  self-indulgent  and  that  contin- 
ually. Some  lusts  he  may  and  must  control  as  they  may  be 
inconsistent  with  others.  But  others  he  knows  and  it  will  be 
seen  that  he  does  not  control.  He  is  a  slave.  He  bows  down 
to  his  lusts  and  serves  them.  He  is  enslaved  by  his  propensi- 
ties so  that  he  can  not  overcome  them.  This  demonstrates  that 
he  is  a  sinner  and  unregenerate  whatever  his  station  and  pro- 
fessions may  be.  One  who  can  not  conquer  himself  and  his 
lusts;  this  is  the  definition  of  an  unregenerate  sinner.     He  is 


576  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

one  over  whom  some  form  of  desire  or  lust  or  appetite 
or  passion  has  dominion.  He  can  not,  or  rather  will  not  over- 
come it.  This  one  is  just  as  certainly  in  sin  as  that  sin  is  sin. 
Do  you  hear  that  professor  of  rehgion?  He  says  he  knows 
that  he  ought  to  give  up  such  a  lust  or  habit,  but  he  can  not 
give  it  up.  Why,  in  thus  saying,  he  gives  higher  evidence  of 
being  an  unregenerate  sinner  or  a  loathsome  backsHder  than 
if  he  should  take  his  oath  of  it.  O  that  it  were  known  and 
constantly  borne  in  mind  what  regeneration  is.  How  many 
thousands  of  deceived  professors  would  it  undeceive!  A  self- 
indulgent  regenerate  soul  is  a  perfect  contradiction,  as  much 
so  as  to  speak  of  a  disinterestedly  benevolent  selfishness,  or 
of  a  self-indulgent  self-denial,  or  an  unregenerate  regeneration, 
a  sinful  holiness  or  a  holy  sinfulness.  These  things  are  eter- 
nal and  necessary  opposites.  They  never  do  or  can  by  any 
possibility  be  reconciled  or  dwell  together  in  the  same  heart. 
With  the  sinner  or  selfish  professor,  self-denial  is  a  theory,  an 
opinion,  an  article  of  faith.  But  he  knows  if  he  will  but  ad- 
mit the  conviction,  that  he  does  not  live  for  God;  that  he  does 
not  eat  and  drink  and  dress  and  sleep  and  wake  and  do  what- 
ever he  does  for  God.  He  knows  he  ought  to  do  so  and  hopes 
he  does  in  some  measure^  but  he  knows  all  the  while  that  the 
preponderance  of  his  life  is  self-indulgent.  When  this  is  so, 
nothing  but  infatuation  can  cause  him  to  cling  to  his  delusion. 

17.   The  truly  regenerate  soul  overcomes  sin. 

Let  the  Bible  be  heard  upon  this  subject.  "  And  hereby 
we  do  know  that  we  know  him,  if  we  keep  his  commandments. 
He  that  saith  I  know  him,  and  keepeth  not  his  commandments, 
is  a  liar,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  him." — 1  John  2:  3,  4.  *••  And 
every  man  that  hath  this  hope  in  him  purifieth  himself,  even  as 
he  is  pure.  Whosoever  committeth  sin  transgresseth  also 
the  law:  for  sin  is  the  transgression  of  the  law.  And  ye 
know  that  he  was  manifested  to  take  away  our  sins:  and  in 
him  is  no  sin.  Whosoever  abideth  in  him  sinneth  not:  who- 
soever sinnethhath  not  seen  him,  neither  known  him.  Little 
children,  let  no  man  deceive  you:  he  that  doeth  righteousness 
is  righteous,  even  as  he  is  righteous.  He  that  committeth 
sin  is  of  the  devil;  for  the  devil  sinneth  from  the  beginning. 
For  this  purpose  the  Son  of  God  was  manifested,  that  he  might 
destroy  the  works  of  the  devil.  Whosoever  is  born  of  God 
doth  not  commit  sin;  for  his  seed  remaineth  in  him:  and  he 
can  not  sin,  because  he  is  born  of  God.  In  this  the  children 
of  God  are  manifest,  and  the  children  of  the  devil;  whosoever 
doth  not  righteousness  is  not  of  God,  neither  he  that  loveth 


REGENERATION. 


577 


not  his  brother." — 1  John  3 — 10.     ^^  Whosoever  beUeveth 
that  Jesus  is  the  Christ  is  born  of  God,  and  every  one  that 
loveth  him  that  begat,  loveth  him  also  that  is  begotten  of  him. 
By  this  we  know  that  we  love  the  children  of  God,  when  we 
love  God,  and  keep  his  commandments.     For  this  is  the  love 
of  God,  that  we  keep  his  commandments;  and  his  command- 
ments are  not  grievous.      For  whatsoever  is  born  of  God 
overcometh  the  world:  and  this  is  the  victory  that overcometh 
the  world,  even  our  faith." — 1  John  5:  1 — 4.    These  passages, 
understood  and  pressed  to  the  letter,  would  not  only  teach 
that  all  regenerate  souls  overcome  and  live  without  sin,  but 
also  that  sin  is  impossible  to  them.     This  last  circumstance, 
as  well  as  other  parts  of  Scripture,  forbid  us  to  press   this 
strong  language  to  the  letter.     But  this  mucli  must  be  under- 
stood and  admitted,  that  to  overcome  sin  is  the  rule  with  every 
one  who  is  born  of  God,  and  that  sin  is  only  the  exception; 
that  the  regenerate  habitually  live  without  sin,  and  fall  into 
sin  only  at  intervals  so  few  and  far  between  that  in  strong 
language  it  may  be  said  in  truth  they  do  not  sin.     This  is 
surely  the  least  which  can  be  meant  by  the  spirit  of  these 
texts,  not  to  press  them  to  the  letter.     And  this  is  precisely 
consistent  with  many  other  passages  of  Scripture,  several  of 
which  I  have  quoted;  such  as   this:  ^'Therefore,  if  any  man 
be  in  Christ,  he  is  a  new  creature:  old  things  are  passed  away; 
behold,  all  things  are  become  new." — *2Cor.  5:  17.     "  For  in 
Jesus  Christ  neither  circumcision  availeth  any  thing  nor  un- 
circumcision;  but  faith  which  worketh  by  love." — Gal.  5:  6. 
"  For  in  Christ  Jesus  neither  circumcision  availeth  any  thing, 
nor   uncircumcision,  but  a  new  creature." — Galatians.  6:  15. 
^  There  is  therefore  now  no  condemnation  to  them  which  are 
in  Christ  Jesus,  who  walk  not  after  the  flesh  but  after  the 
Spirit.     For  the  law  of  the  Spirit  of  life  in  Christ  Jesus  hath 
made  me  free  from  the  law  of  sin  and  death.     For  what  the 
law  could  not  do,  in  that  it  was  weak  through  the  flesh,  God 
sending  ^his  own  Son  in  the  likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for 
sin,  condemned  sin   in  the  flesh:    That  the    righteousness 
of  the  law  might  be  fulfilled  in  us,  who  walk  not  after  the 
flesh,  but  after  the  Spirit."— Romans  8:  1—4.     ''  What  shall 
we  say  then?     Shall  we  continue  in   sin,  that  grace  may 
abound?     God  forbid.     How  shall  we,  that  are  dead  to  sin, 
live  any  longer  therein?    Know  ye  not,  that  so  many  of  us 
as  were  baptized  into  Jesus   Christ  were  baptized  into  his 
death?     Therefore  we  are  buried  with  him  by  baptism  into 
death :  that  like  as  Christ  was  raised  up  from  the  dead  by  the 
49 


578  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

glory  of  the  Father,  even  so  we  also  should  walk  in  newness 
of  life.  For  if  we  have  been  planted  together  in  the  likeness 
of  his  death,  we  shall  be  also  in  the  likeness  of  his  resurrec- 
tion: knowing  this  that  our  old  man  is  crucified  with  him, 
that  the  body  of  sin  might  be  destroyed,  that  henceforth  we 
should  not  serve  sin.  For  he  that  is  dead  is  freed  from  sin. 
Now  if  we  be  dead  with  Christ,  we  believe  that  we  shall  also 
live  with  him;  knowing  that  Christ  being  raised  from  the 
deaddieth  no  more;  death  hath  no  more  dominion  over  him. 
For  in  that  he  died,  he  died  unto  sin  once:  but  in  that  he  liv- 
eth,  he  liveth  unto  God.  Likewise  reckon  ye  also  yourselves 
to  be  dead  indeed  unto  sin,  but  alive  unto  God  through  Jesus 
Christ  our  Lord.  Let  not  sin  therefore  reign  in  your  mortal 
hody,  that  ye  should  obey  it  in  the  lusts  thereof.  Neitheryield 
ye  your  members  as  instruments  of  unrighteousness  unto  sin: 
but  yield  yourselves  unto  God,  as  those  that  are  alive  from  the 
dead,  and  your  members  as  instruments  of  righteousness  unto 
God.  For  sin  shall  not  have  dominion  over  you:  for  ye  are 
not  under  the  law  but  under  grace." — Ro.  6:  1 — 14. 

There  is  not  a  greater  heresy  and  a  more  dangerous  dogma 
than  that  true  Christians  actually  live  a  great  majority  of  their 
days  in  sin.  Such  an  opinion  is  in  palpable  contradiction  of 
the  Bible,  and  absurd  in  principle.  Many  persons  seem  to 
have  the  idea,  and  this  idea  is  often  dropped  directly,  or  indi- 
rectly imphed  from  the  pulpit,  that  truly  regenerate  souls  may 
and  do  often  live  mostly  in  sin;  that  they  live  by  far  the  great- 
er part  of  their  time  in  a  backslidden  state,  so  far  at  least  as 
their  heart  is  concerned;  that  they  seldom  or  never  truly 
and  fully  obey  God  and  live  up  to  their  duty.  Now  such  rep- 
resentations are  not  only  flatly  contrary  to  the  Bible,  but  they 
are  a  greater  snare  and  stumbling  block  than  Universalism 
or  almost  any  form  of  heresy  that  can  be  named.  The  fact 
is,  if  God  is  true,  and  the  Bible  is  true,  the  truly  regenerate 
soul  has  overcome  the  world,  the  flesh,  and  Satan,  and  sin, 
and  is  a  conqueror  and  more  than  a  conqueror.  He  triumphs 
over  temptation  as  a  general  thing,  and  the  triumphs  of  temp- 
tation over  him  are  so  far  between  that  it  is  said  of  him  in  the 
living  oracles  that  he  does  not,  can  not  sin.  He  is  not  a  sin- 
ner but  a  saint.  He  is  sanctified;  a  holy  person;  a  child  and 
son  of  God.  If  at  any  time  he  is  overcome,  it  is  only  to  rise 
again,  and  soon  return  hke  the  weeping  prodigal.  '•'The 
steps  of  a  good  man  are  ordered  by  the  Lord:  and  he  delight- 
eth  in  his  way.  Though  he  fall  he  shall  not  be  utterly  cast 
down:  for  the  Lord  upholdeth  him  with  his  hand." — Psalms 
37:  23, 24. 


REGENERATION. 


579 


I  know  that  it  is  natural  and  common  to  appeal  to  experi- 
ence and  observation  in  support  of  the  dogma  I  am  opposing. 
But  how  infinitely  dangerous  and  wicked  this  is!  What!  ap- 
peal to  supposed  facts  in  history  and  christian  experience  to 
confront  and  withstand  the  express  assertions  of  inspiration? 
When  God  expressly  tells  us  who  are  christians  and  what  is 
true  of  them,  does  it  become  us  to  turn  round  and  say,  Nay, 
Lord,  for  we  and  our  neighbors  are  christians,  and  this  is  not 
true  of  us.  Who  does  not  see  the  guilt  and  danger  of  this? 
And  yet  it  seems  to  be  common  for  professors  of  religion  to 
tacitly  assume,  if  not  openly  to  avow,  that  true  christians  may 
and  do  live  for  the  greater  part  of  their  lives  in  sin. 

This  persuasion  seems  to  be  strengthened  by  the  supposed 
fact  that  David  and  Solomon  lived  a  greater  part  of  their  time 
in  sin.  But  this  is  an  unwarrantable  assumption.  The 
psalms  of  David,  taking  their  subject  and  spirit  and  dates  into 
view  as  well  as  many  other  considerations,  render  it  evident 
that  he  was  a  highly  spiritual  man  and  that  his  backslidings 
were  few  and  far  between  and  of  but  short  duration. 

The  Proverbs,  the  Song  and  the  Ecclesiastes  of  Solomon 
are  sufficient  proof  that  most  of  his  days  were  not  spent  in 
sin.  Some  have  supposed  that  inasmuch  as  the  high  places 
were  not  removed  and  that  idolatry  was  openly  practised 
under  a  great  part  of  his  reign,  that  therefore  he  must  all  this 
time  have  been  away  from  God.  But  this  may  be  accounted 
for  if  we  consider  that  the  high  places  and  idolatry  continued 
through  the  reigns  of  some  of  the  pious  kings  who  succeeded 
him,  doubtless  for  the  reason  that  neither  he  nor  they  had 
poHtical  power  and  influence  enough  to  suppress  it.  The 
book  of  Ecclesiastes  gives  on  the  face  of  it  the  highest  evi- 
dence of  having  been  written  after  his  return  from  a  season 
of  backsliding  and  skepticism,  for  very  much  of  it  is  only  a 
statement  of  his  skeptical  views  at  that  time.  But  really  there 
is  no  sufficient  proof  that  Solomon,  who  was  manifestly 
a  type  of  Christ,  lived  a  majority  or  any  thing  like  a  majority 
of  his  days  in  sin. 

But  whatever  may  have  been  true  of  Solomon  and  of  the 
saints  of  those  comparatively  dark  days,  the  New  Testament 
has  settled  the  question  that  now  under  the  dispensation  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  whoever  is  born  of  God  doth  not  commit  sin.  The 
passages  that  I  have  quoted  must  settle  this  point.  The  sixth 
and  eighth  of  Romans  is  the  experience  of  the  regenerate  soul. 

In  considering  the  attributes  of  benevolence  I  have  shown 
that  stability/  is  one  of  its  attributes,  to  which  I  would  here 


580  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

refer  the  reader  (pages  262  and  263.)  In  respect  to  the  phi- 
losophy of  christians  overcoming  sin  I  would  observe  that  the 
bible  assures  us  that  "  whosoever  is  born  of  God  does  not,  can 
not  sin  because  his  seed  remaineth  in  him,"  that  is,  God's 
seed  remaineth  in  him.  '•'■Whosoever  is  born  of  God  doth 
not  commit  sin;  for  his  seed  remaineth  in  him:  and  he  can 
not  sin,  because  he  is  born  of  God."  In  1  Peter  1 :  23  we  are 
informed  that  this  seed  is  the  word  of  God. — '•'•  Being  born 
again,  not  of  corruptible  seed,  but  of  incorruptible,  by  the 
word  of  God,  which  liveth  and  abideth  for  ever."  God  has 
begotten  him  (for  so  the  word  should  be  rendered  in  1  John  3: 
9)byhis  word  and  this  seed  remaineth  in  him.  The  truth  that 
overcame  his  will  and  subdued  or  regenerated  him  remains 
in  him  in  such  a  sense  that  it  is  said  he  can  not  sin.  It  is  so 
lodged  in  his  memory  and  so  pressed  upon  him  by  the  indwell- 
ing Spirit  of  Christ  as  to  secure  his  habitual  obedience,  and 
he  is  only  sometimes  overcome  by  force  of  strong  temptation, 
when  for  the  time  his  attention  is  drawn  away  from  the  truth  or 
seed  of  God,  which  after  all  is  lodged  within  him.  It  has  a 
permanent  lodgment  in  his  memory  although  it  may  not  be 
attended  to  in  some  moments  of  strong  temptation.  Now 
whatever  the  philosophy  of  this  fact  may  be,  it  is  a  declared 
fact  of  inspiration  that  ^'•Whosoever  is  born  of  God  doth  not 
commit  sin,  for  his  seed  remaineth  in  him  and  he  can  not  sin 
because  he  is  born  of  God."  The  connection  in  which  these 
words  are  found  as  well  as  other  parts  of  scripture,  shows 
that  this  must  respect  the  general  character  of  regenerate 
souls;  that  having  been  subdued  by  the  word  and  Spirit  of 
God  and  the  seed  remaining  in  them,  they  can  not  consent  to 
live  in  sin ;  that  they  love  God  and  hate  sin  so  much  by  vir- 
tue of  their  new  and  heavenly  birth  that  they  will  not  sin, 
unless  it  may  possibly  be  that  by  force  of  great  temptation 
they  may  fall  into  occasional  sins  and  those  so  seldom  that  it 
can  be  said  in  general  language  that  they  do  not,  can  not  sin. 
18.  The  sinner  and  the  deceived  professor  is  the  slave  of  sin. 
The  seventh  of  Romans  is  his  experience  in  his  best  estate. 
When  he  has  the  most  hope  of  himself  and  others  have  the 
most  hope  of  his  good  estate  he  goes  no  farther  than  to  make 
and  break  resolutions.  His  life  is  but  a  death  in  sin.  He  has 
not  the  victory.  He  sees  the  right  but  does  it  not.  Sin  is 
his  master  to  whom  he  yields  himself  a  servant  to  obey.  He 
only  tries  as  he  says  to  forsake  sin,  but  does  not  in  fact  for- 
sake it  in  his  heart.  And  yet  because  he  is  convicted  and 
has  desires  and  forms  resolutions  of  amendment  he  hopes  he 


REGENERATION.  581 

is  regenerated.  O,  what  a  horrible  delusion!  Stop  short 
'with  conviction  with  the  hope  that  he  is  already  a  christian! 
Alas!  how  many  are  already  in  hell  who  have  stumbled  at 
this  stumbling  stone! 

19.   The  Christian  is  charitable  in  his  judgments. 

This  is  natural  to  him  by  reason  of  his  regeneration.  He 
now  loves  every  body  and  seeks  their  good.  '•'  Love  hopeth 
all  things  and  believeth  all  things."  It  is  natural  to  us  to 
judge  charitably  of  those  whom  we  love  and  whose  virtue  and 
happiness  we  greatly  desire.  It  is  also  natural  for  us  to  in- 
terpret the  conduct  of  others  by  reference  to  our  own  con- 
sciousness. If  we  are  conscious  of  uprightness  of  intention, 
it  is  natural  to  ascribe  the  conduct  of  others  to  upright  inten- 
tions unless  it  be  manifest  that  it  is  not  so.  Not  only  the  Bi- 
ble forbids  rash  and  censorious  judging  of  the  motives  or  char- 
acter of  others,  but  it  every  where  assumes  and  implies  and 
teaches  that  truly  regenerate  persons  are  charitable  in  their 
judgments.  This  is  an  attribute  of  true  religion,  and  there 
is  scarcely  any  thing  in  which  the  difference  between  saints 
and  sinners  is  more  manifest  than  in  regard  to  this  feature  of 
their  characters.  A  truly  benevolent  mind  can  not  be  censo- 
rious. It  is  a  contradiction  to  say  that  one  who  is  benevolent 
can  judge  and  think  and  speak  censoriously  of  any  one. 
Charity  is  kind,  is  courteous,  is  forbearing.  A  ruling  dispo- 
sition to  promote  the  good  of  any  one  can  not  lead  or  allow 
us  to  rashly  impeach  his  motives,  to  judge  him  in  a  manner 
more  severe  than  the  circumstances  of  the  case  compel  us  to  do. 

Again.  x\s  a  regenerate  state  consists  in  benevolence  or 
good-will  to  all  beings,  it  implies  as  sacred  a  regard  to  the 
feelings  and  reputation  of  our  neighbor  as  we  have  to  our 
own.  Therefore  a  regenerate  soul  can  not  be  a  slanderer,  a 
tale-bearer  or  a  busy-body  in  other  men's  matters.  A  regen- 
erate soul  will  not,  and  remaining  regenerate,  can  not  take  up 
an  evil  report  of  a  neighbor  and  believe  it  but  upon  the  strong- 
est evidence.  And  when  compelled  to  believe  an  evil  report, 
he  will  not  give  any  greater  publicity  to  it  than  to  him  the 
interests  of  religion  seem  imperiously  to  demand.  This  must 
be  universally  true  of  a  truly  benevolent  mind.  A  disposi- 
tion to  beUeve  evil  and  to  report  it  of  any  one  is  totally  in- 
compatible with  good  will  to  universal  being,  so  thatif  wesee 
this  disposition  in  a  professor  of  religion  toward  any  one  we 
may  know  that  his  profession  of  religion  is  vain.  ^''If  any 
man  seemeth  to  be  religious  and  bridleth  not  his  tongue  but 
deceiveth  his  own  heart,  that  man's  religion  is  vain." 
49* 


582  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

The  saint  loves  his  enemies.  The  things  commanded  in 
the  gospel  are  really  true  of  the  saints.  They  are  Rot  only 
required  of  all  men,  but  they  are  facts  in  the  life  and  experi- 
ence of  the  saints.  The  saints  really  love  their  enemies,  bless 
them  that  curse  them,  do  good  to  those  that  hate  them  and 
pray  for  them  that  despitefully  use  and  persecute  them. 

20.  The  impenitent,  whether  professors  of  religion  or  not, 
are  censorious  in  their  judgments  and  slanderous  in  their  con- 
versation. They  are  selfish  and  of  course  have  ambitious 
projects  and  envious  feelings,  and  these  petty  interests  and 
projects  are  continually  interfered  with  by  the  interests  and 
projects  of  others  around  them.  They  judge  others  by  them- 
selves. They  know  themselves  to  be  hypocritical  in  their  pro- 
fessions, selfish  in  their  aims,  false  in  their  pretences,  ambi- 
tious in  their  schemes,  envious  in  their  spirit;  and  in  short  they 
are  conscious  of  so  much  that  is  wrong  that  they  naturally 
interpret  the  motives  and  character  of  others  by  their  own. 
They  do  not  reaHze  that  their  censorious  speeches  and  rash 
and  uncharitable  judgments  are  but  a  result  and  a  revelation 
of  their  hypocrisy.  But  their  own  oath  that  they  are  hypo- 
crites could  not  add  to  the  weight  of  evidence  afforded  by 
their  manifest  want  of  charity  as  revealed  in  their  taking  up 
a  suspicion,  a  rumor,  and  giving  it  publicity  to  the  dishonor 
and  injury  of  their  neighbor.  I  have  learned  never  to  confide 
in  a  censorious  man  or  woman.  ''•  O  my  soul  come  not  thou 
into  their  secret!  unto  their  assembly,  mine  honor  be  not  thou 
united."  They  are  false  and  will  betray  Christ  to  justify 
self. 

21.  Christians  or  truly  regenerate  souls,  experience  great 
and  present  blessedness  in  their  religion.  They  do  not  seek 
their  own  happiness  as  the  supreme  good,  but  find  it  in  their 
disinterested  efforts  to  promote  the  well-being  of  others.  Their 
state  of  mind  is  itself  the  harmony  of  the  soul.  Happiness  is 
both  a  natural  result  of  virtue  and  also  its  governmental  re- 
ward. Christians  enjoy  religion  just  for  the  reason  that  they 
are  disinterested  in  it,  that  is,  precisely  for  the  reason  that 
their  own  enjoyment  is  not  the  end  which  they  seek.  And 
selfish  professors  do  not  enjoy  their  religion  just  for  the  reason 
that  their  own  enjoyment  is  the  end  at  which  they  aim.  If  I 
seek  the  good  of  being  as  an  end,  I  am  happy  for  three  rea- 
sons: 

(1.)  It  results  from  the  approbation  of  my  own  conscience. 
(2.)  From  the  smile  of  God  upon  my  soul  and  the  conscious 
communion  and  fellowship  I  have  with  him;  and, 


REGENERATION.  583 

(3.)  I  gain  my  end  upon  which  my  heart  is  set,  and  this  is 
a  sweet  gratification.  Thus  I  am  triply  blessed.  But  if  I 
seek  my  own  happiness  as  an  end  I  fail  to  obtain  it  for  three 
reasons: 

(1.)  My  conscience  instead  of  approving,  upbraids  me. 

(2.)  God  instead  of  smiling  either  withholds  his  face  alto- 
gether from  or  frowns  upon  me.  He  withdraws  communion 
and  fellowship  from  me. 

(3.)  I  do  not  secure  my  end,  and  therefore  I  am  not  grati- 
fied but  disappointed.  Suppose  I  seek  the  conversion  of  a 
sinner,  not  from  disinterested  love  to  his  soul,  but  from  a  de- 
sire to  jj)romote  my  own  happiness.  Now  if  he  is  converted,  I 
am  not  made  happy  thereby,  for  three  reasons, 

(1.)  My  conscience  is  not  satisfied  with  my  motives. 

(2.)  God  is  not;  therefore  he  does  not  smile  upon  me. 

(3.)  His  conversion  was  not  the  end  I  sought,  and  there- 
fore in  his  conversion  I  am  not  gratified,  that  is,  I  have  not  at- 
tained my  end,  which  was  not  the  salvation  of  that  soul, 
but  my  own  happiness.  But  if  I  seek  his  salvation  disinteres- 
tedly I  am  doubly  blessed  if  he  is  not  converted,  and  triply  bles- 
sed if  he  is: — 

(I.)  Whether  he  is  saved  or  not,  my  conscience  approves 
my  intentions  and  efforts,  and  smiles  upon  my  soul. 

(2.)  God  accepts  the  will  for  the  deed  and  blesses  me  as  if 
I  had  succeeded.     Thus  I  am  doubly  blessed. 

(3.)  But  if  he  is  saved,  I  have  gained  my  end,  and  thus  am 
gratified.  So  I  am  triply  blessed.  A  saint  is  and  must  be 
happy  in  his  religion.  He  has  his  temptations  but  the  Lord 
delivers  him  and  makes  him  blessed. 

22.  The  selfish  professor, 

(1.)  Has  not  true  peace  of  conscience. 

(2.)  He  has  not  the  smile,  communion  and  fellowship  of 
God. 

(3.)  He  is  not  disinterested  and  cannot  rejoice  in  the  glory 
of  God  and  the  advancement  of  his  kingdom  for  its  own  sake, 
and  therefore  his  soul  is  not  filled  with  peace  and  joy  in  be- 
lieving. His  religion  is  rather  his  task  than  his  life  and  his 
joy.  He  is  rather  religious  because  he  must  be  than  because 
he  may  be.  He  prays  because  he  must  rather  than  because 
he  may.  With  him,  religion  is  rather  what  it  will  not  do  to 
neglect  than  what  he  delights  in  for  its  own  sake.  His  enjoy- 
ment such  as  it  is,  is  only  a  self-righteous  enjoyment.  It  is 
not  the  soul's  harmony  with  itself,  with  God,  and  with  all  the 
holy,  and  with  the  eternal  laws  of  order.     He  knows  that  his 


584  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

religion  is  not  soul-satisfying,  but  sees  so  many  professors 
around  him  manifesting  the  same  state  of  mind  in  which  he 
knows  himself  to  bo,  that  he  thinks  that  all  Christians  find 
religion  in  this  world  rather  a  task  and  a  burden  than  a  de- 
light, and  therefore  he  is  not  disposed  to  relinquish  his  hope. 
He  anticipates  happiness  in  future,  but  at  present  he  knows 
he  is  not  happy. 

23.  True  saints  rejoice  to  see  souls  converted  and  God  glo- 
rified by  any  instrumentality.  But  hypocrites  do  not  rejoice 
in  this  for  its  own  sake,  and  are  apt  to  be  envious  and  jealous 
unless  they  or  their  friends  or  denomination  are  the  instru- 
ments. 

24.  Christians  would  do  all  they  could  for  God's  glory  and 
the  world's  conversion,  whether  it  was  ever  known  or  rewar- 
ded or  not.  But  sinners  would  do  little  or  nothing  except 
out  of  respect  to  applause  and  reward. 

25.  Christians  have  the  Spirit  of  Christ. 

(1.)  Their  bodies  are  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  ^^What? 
know  ye  not  that  your  body  is  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
which  is  in  you,  which  ye  have  of  God,  and  ye  are  not  your 
own?" — I  Cor.  6:  19.  '■^  But  ye  are  not  in  the  flesh,  but  in 
the  Spirit,  if  so  be  that  the  Spirit  of  God  dwell  in  you.  Now  if 
any  man  have  not  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  he  is  none  of  his.  And 
if  Christ  be  in  you,  the  body  is  dead  because  of  sin;  but  the 
Spirit  is  life  because  of  righteousness.  But  if  the  Spirit  of  him 
that  raised  up  Jesus  from  the  dead  dwell  in  you,  he  that  raised 
up  Christ  from  the  dead,  shall  also  quicken  your  mortal  bodies 
by  his  Spirit  that  dwelleth  in  you." — Ro.  8:  9 — 11. 

(2.)  Their  bodies  are  the  temple  of  Christ.  "  But  ye  are 
not  in  the  flesh,  but  in  the  Spirit,  if  so  be  that  the  Spirit  of 
God  dwell  in  you.  Now  if  any  man  have  not  the  Spirit  of 
Christ,  he  is  none  of  his.  And  if  Christ  be  in  you,  the  body 
is  dead  because  of  sin;  but  the  Spirit  is  life  because  of  righte- 
ousness.— Ro.  8:  9 — 10.  "Examine  yourselves,  whether  ye 
be  in  the  faith;  prove  your  own  selves.  Know  ye  not  your 
own  selves,  how  that  Jesus  Christ  is  in  you  except  ye  be  rep- 
robates."— 2  Cor.  13:  5.  "  To  whom  God  would  make 
known  what  is  the  riches  of  the  glory  of  this  mystery  among 
the  gentiles;  which  is  Christ  in  you,  the  hope  of  glory." — 
Col.  1:  27.  '■'^  Jesus  answered  and  said  unto  him.  If  a  man 
love  me,  he  will  keep  my  words:  and  my  Father  will  love 
him,  and  wc  will  come  unto  him,  and  make  our  abode  with 
him." — John  14:  23.  ""I  am  crucified  with  Christ:  neverthe- 
less I  live 5  yet  not  I,  but  Christ  liveth  in  me:  and  the  life 


REGENERATION.  585 

which  I  now  live  in  the  flesh  I  live  by  the  faith  of  the  Son  of 
God,  who  loved  me,  and  gave  himself  for  me.'- — Gal.  2:  20. 
'''  That  Christ  may  dwell  in  your  hearts  by  faith;  that  ye,  be- 
ing rooted  and  grounded  in  love." — Eph.  3:  17. 

26.  Christians  have  the  Spirit  of  adoption.  "  For  ye  have 
not  received  the  Spirit  of  bondage  again  to  fear;  but  ye  have 
received  the  Spirit  of  adoption,  whereby  we  cry,  Abba, 
Father.'' — Ro.  8:  15.  "-And  because  ye  are  sons,  God  hatli 
sent  forth  the  Spirit  of  his  Son  into  your  hearts,  crying,  Abba, 
Father."— Gal.  4:  6. 

27.  They  have  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit.  "  But  the  fruit  of 
the  Spirit  is  love,  joy,  peace,  long-suffering,  gentleness,  good- 
ness, faith,  meekness,  temperance:  against  such  there  is  no 
law.  And  they  that  are  Christ's  have  crucified  the  flesh,  with 
the  affections  and  lusts."— Gal.  5:  22—24. 

28.  Christians  are  led  by  the  Spirit.  "  For  as  many  as  are 
led  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  they  are  the  sons  of  God. — Ro.  8:  14. 
'•'  But  if  ye  be  led  by  the  Spirit,  ye  are  not  under  the  law*. 
If  we  live  in  the  Spirit,  let  us  also  walk  in  the  Spirit." — Gal.  5: 
18,  25. 

29.  They  have  the  Spirit  of  prayer.  '•  Likewise  the  Spir- 
it also  helpeth  our  infirmities:  for  we  know  not  what  we  should 
pray  for  as  we  ought:  but  the  Spirit  itself  maketh  intercession 
for  us  with  groanings  which  can  not  be  uttered.  And  he  that 
searcheth  the  hearts  knoweth  what  is  the  mind  of  the  Spirit, 
because  he  maketh  intercession  for  the  saints;  according  to 
the  will  of  God."— Ro.  8:  26,  27. 

30.  They  have  the  law  written  in  their  hearts.  ''•Behold, 
the  days  come,  saith  the  Lord,  that  I  will  make  a  new  covenant 
with  the  house  of  Israel,  and  with  the  house  of  Judah:  not 
according  to  the  covenant  that  I  made  w^ith  their  fathers,  in 
the  day  that  I  took  them  by  the  hand  to  bring  them  out  of  the 
land  of  Egypt;  which  my  covenant  they  brake  although  I  was 
a  husband  unto  them,  saith  the  Lord:  but  this  shall  be  the  cov- 
enant that  I  will  make  with  the  house  of  Israel;  after  those 
days,  saith  the  Lord,  I  will  put  my  law  in  their  inward  parts, 
and  write  it  in  their  hearts;  and  will  be  their  God,  and  they 
shall  be  my  people.  And  they  shall  teach  no  more  every  man 
his  neighbor,  and  every  man  his  brother,  saying,  Know  the 
Lord:  for  they  shall  all  know  me,  from  the  least  of  them 
unto  the  greatest  of  them,  saith  the  Lord :  for  I  will  forgive  . 
their  iniquity,  and  I  will  remember  their  sin  no  more." — Jer.  ypi 
31:  31 — 34.     This  passage  the  Apostle  quotes  in  Heb.  8:  8 

— 12,  and  applies  to  Christians  under  the  new  dispensation. 


586  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY. 

The  law  that  was  written  upon  the  tables  of  stone  is  written 
bj  the  Hoi  J  Spirit  in  the  hearts  of  Christians.  That  is,  the 
spirit  or  love  demanded  by  the  law  is  begotten  in  their  hearts. 
In  other  words,  they  are  truly  regenerated,  and  love  God  with 
all  their  hearts  and  their  neighbor  as  themselves. 

I  might  notice  many  other  particulars  in  which  saints  and 
sinners  differ  but  perhaps  I  have  said  enough  for  this  course 
of  study.  If  you  return  to  the  attributes  of  selfishness  and 
benevolence  you  will  there  find  a  fuller  development  of  this 
subject.  Q[  course  ^he  manifestation  of  the  attributes  of  be- 
nevolence is"  conclusive  proof  of  a  regenerate  state,  for  all 
tEose  attributes  are  only  so  m.any  modifications  of  true  rcli- 
^on  and  their  manifestation  is  proof  of  its  existence. 

So  on  the  other  hand  the  attributes  of  selfishness  are  only 
so  many  modifications  of  sin,  and  their  manifestation  is  proof 
positive  of  an  unholy  and  unregenerate  state  of  mind. 

There  are  many  other  things  that  might  be  said,  indeed  vol- 
umes might  be  written  upon  this  subject  in  addition  to  what 
has  appeared.  But  one  thing  is  worthy  of  special  remark. 
Mistaken  notions  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  regeneration  have 
led  to  false  methods  of  estimating  the  evidences  of  regenera- 
tion, ^lost  persons  and  most  writers  seem  to  appeal  almost 
.exclusively,  or  at  least  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  feelings  o"r 
states  of  the  sensibiUty  for  evidence. of  xegeneration.  Noth- 
ing can  be  more  dangerous  and  deceptive  than  this.  They, 
regarding  regeneration  as  a  change  in  or  of  the  sensibility, 
look  thither  of  course  for  the  evidences  of  the  change.  The 
bible  appeals  to  the  life  instead  of  the  feelings  for  evi- 
dence of  regeneration.  It  assumes  the  true  philosophy  of  re- 
generation, Jbat  it  belongs  tojhe  will  and  thaf  it  must  of 
course  and  of  necessity  appear  directly  and  uniformly  in  thfe 
life.  So  many  circumstances  inffuence  the  feelings  that  they 
can  not  be  depended  on.  They  will  effervesce  or  be  calm  as 
circumstances  change.  But  thej)iitwaj:d  life  must  by  a  law 
of  necessity  always  obey  the  will.  Therefore  the  appeal  can 
more  safely  be  made  to  it  than  to  any  thing  else  that  lies  open 
to  the  inspection  of  human  eyes. 

The  subject  of  regeneration  may  know,  and  if  honest,  he 
must  know  for  what  end  he  lives.  There  is  perhaps  nothing 
of  which  he  may  be  more  certain  than  of  his  regenerate  or 
unregenerate  state;  and  if  he  will  keep  in  mind  what  regen- 
eration is,  it  would  seem  that  he  can  hardly  mistake  his  own 
character  so  far  as  to  imagine  himself  to  be  regenerate,  when 
he  is  not.     The  great  difficulty  that  has  been  in  the  way  of 


REGENERATION.  587 

the  regenerate  soul's  knowing  his  regeneration  and  has  led  to 
^..  so  much  doubt  and  embarrassment  upon  this  subject,  is  that 
regeneration  has  been  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  sensibility, 
and  hence  the  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  ever  fluctua- 
ting feelings  for  evidence  of  the  change.  No  wonder  that 
this  has  led  conscientious  souls  into  doubt  and  embarrassment. 
But  let  the  subject  of  regeneration  be  disinthralled  from  a 
false  philosophy,  and  let  it  be  known  that  the  new  heart  con- 
sists in  supreme  disinterested  benevolence  or  in  entire  conse- 
cration to  God,  and  then  who  can  not  know  for  what  end  he 
lives  or  what  is  the  supreme  preference  or  intention  of  his 
soul?  If  men  can  settle  any  question  whatever  beyond  all 
doubt  by  an  appeal  to  conciousness,  it  would  seem  that  this 
must  be  the  question.  Hence  the  bible  enjoins  it  as  an  impera- 
tive duty  to  know  ourselves  whether  we  are  christians.  We 
arejp  know  each  other  by  our  fruits.  This  is  expressly  "giv- 
en in  the  bible'~as~the'^riile  of  judgment  in  the  case.  The 
question  is  not  so  much  what  are  the  man's  opinions  as  what 
does  he  live  for?  Does  he  endeavor  to  promote  true  religion,  love 
to  God  and  man?  Does  he  manifest  a  charitable  state  of 
mind?  Does  he  manifest  the  attributes  of  benevolence  in  the 
various  circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed?  O  when  shall 
the  folly  of  judging  men  more  by  their  opinions  and^Teel^ 
ings  than  by  the  tenor  of  their  lives  cease?  It  seems  difficult 
to  rid  men  of  the  prejudice  that  religion  consists  in  feelings 
and  in  experiences,  in  which  they  are  altogether  passive. 
Hence  they  are  continually  prone  to  delusion  upon  the  most 
momentous  of  all  questions.  Nothing  can  break  this  spell 
but  the  steady  and  thorough  inculcation  of  the  truth  in  re- 
gard to  the  nature  of  regeneration. 


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